Chapter 4Remuneration of senior university staff
4.1The committee received a substantial volume of evidence in relation to the remuneration of Australian university executives, in particular vice-chancellors. While not unanimous, the overwhelming view among inquiry participants was that many Australian university executives are too generously remunerated, not only in comparison to other university staff but also when contrasted with their international peers. In particular, vice-chancellor pay in excess of $1 million was seen as being out of step with community expectations.
4.2Contributors to the inquiry also raised concerns about growth in the ranks of highly paid senior executive staff at universities, with the committee hearing that there are now 306 university staff across Australia who are paid more than the premier or chief minister of their state or territory.
4.3However, the committee also heard evidence from universities about the critical role of universities, as well as the complexity of the environment in which they operate. This was cited by a range of submissions as underpinning the need for salaries capable of attracting high calibre leaders in a globally competitive sector.
4.4Multiple universities also described having comprehensive frameworks in place for determining executive remuneration, which generally involve oversight by a performance and remuneration committee as well as salary benchmarking processes.
4.5Despite this, multiple participants, such as the National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU), asserted that university councils have 'undermined the credibility of our institutions' by failing to adequately explain vice-chancellor salaries, which appear to bear 'little to no' relation to university size, international ranking, or financial performance'.
4.6Submitters also highlighted the conflict between the corporate rationale provided to justify high executive salaries, and the public funding and mission of universities. This sentiment was summed up by Dr Brett White:
Vice-chancellors and senior executives in Australian universities command exorbitant salaries that are increasingly misaligned with both public expectations and institutional performance. For example, in 2023, the Vice‑Chancellor of the University of Sydney earned over $1.6 million, while similar figures exist across the Group of Eight universities. These salaries are frequently justified by comparisons to corporate executives, yet universities are public institutions with a responsibility to prioritise education and research over profit-driven motives.
4.7In response, a range of measures were put forward by participants to better align executive pay with community expectations around publicly funded institutions. Some of these measures included capping executive pay, linking vice-chancellor pay to non-executive staff pay, setting executive pay independently from university councils, and improving transparency around executive salaries.
4.8While this chapter focuses on senior executive remuneration, the committee acknowledges the evidence received on wider terms of reference, particularly in relation to the corporatisation of Australian universities, which many participants saw as a key driver of high salaries and growing executive numbers. While touched on briefly in this chapter, the issue of corporatisation will be addressed more fully in the final report.
Australian vice-chancellors are among the highest paid in the world
4.9According to the Australia Institute, Australian university vice-chancellors are 'among the highest paid in the world', with salaries more than quadrupling since 1985—when remuneration was partially regulated through the former Academic Salaries Tribunal—from $300 000 per year to $1.3million in 2023 (both figures adjusted for inflation to 2024 dollars).
4.10A report by the NTEU showed that in 2023, the top twelve vice-chancellor salaries were:
University of Canberra – $1.785 million;
Monash University – $1.565 million;
University of Melbourne – $1.447 million
University of New South Wales – $1.322 million;
Flinders University – $1.315 million;
Queensland University of Technology – $1.235 million;
University of South Australia – $1.235 million;
University of Sydney – $1.177 million;
University of Queensland – $1.162 million;
University of Tasmania – $1.115 million; and
Australian National University – $1.1 million.
4.11A further nine universities paid vice-chancellor salaries in excess of $1million, with the remainder paying salaries between $652000 and $975 000.
4.12As noted by the Australia Institute, vice-chancellor pay has grown faster than average Australian worker earnings and income support for students (see Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1Growth in university vice-chancellor pay compared to average annual earnings and maximum annual student assistance
Source: The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), Appendix A (The high pay for Vice-Chancellors does not deliver better outcomes for students), p. 2 and The Australia Institute, The high pay for Vice-Chancellors does not deliver better outcomes for students (accessed 27 August 2025).
4.13The growth in vice-chancellor salaries has also outpaced growth in the pay of university workers. The Australia Institute revealed that in 1985, an average vice-chancellor at an elite research-intensive university was paid 3.1 times more than an early career lecturer. However, by 2022, vice-chancellors were paid more than seven times as much as university lecturers.
4.14The 'increasing pay gulf between the executive leadership and the university staff' was also observed by other participants, such as the NTEU, which pointed out that vice-chancellor salaries have outstripped those of the Prime Minister and state premiers.
4.15Various participants also noted that Australian vice-chancellor salaries are high by international standards, even when compared to some of the top-ranking universities in the world.
4.16This appears to be supported by a Canadian analysis, which found that the average vice-chancellor salary in Australia is higher than in many comparable countries (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2Average vice chancellor salaries in selected countries
Source: Julie Hare, 'Are Australian university bosses worth the big bucks?', Australian Financial Review, 25January 2024. See also, Dr Michael Tomlinson, Submission 9 (47th Parliament), p. 5.
4.17For many contributors, the contrast between high vice-chancellor remuneration and the casualisation and underpayment of other university staff was stark. For example, the Australia Institute pointed out that the average annual remuneration for university tutors—a workforce that has become highly casualised—is less than three per cent of the average vice-chancellor salary (under $23000).
4.18The Australia Institute also contrasted the pay of vice-chancellors at Melbourne University with its history of underpayment of university staff over a ten-year period (see Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3Melbourne University - vice-chancellor salaries and underpayment of university staff
Source: The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), Appendix A (Uni Vice-Chancellors keep getting richer while those who teach and research are left behind), p. 2 and The Australia Institute, Uni Vice-Chancellors keep getting richer while those who teach and research are left behind (accessed 27 August 2025).
High salaries are not limited to vice-chancellors
4.19However, various participants pointed out that high executive salaries are not limited to vice-chancellors. According to the NTEU, in 2023, there were 306 senior executives at Australian universities who earned more than state leaders. However, there was significant variation between universities. For example, Monash University had 16 executive staff who earned more than the Premier of Victoria ($481 190), while the University of New England had one executive staff member earning more than the Premier of New South Wales ($416 440).
4.20Table 4.1 shows the twelve universities with the highest and lowest numbers of executives earning more than state leaders. It also provides a comparison of the number of students per executive at each university.
Table 4.1University executives paid more than the state premier or territory chief minister
| | |
Monash University | 16 ($481 190+) | 4043 |
Western Sydney University | 15 ($416 440+) | 2207 |
University of Melbourne | 15 ($481 190+) | 3606 |
Curtin University | 14 ($377 485+) | 2507 |
RMIT University | 13 ($481 190+) | 4017 |
Australian National University | 13 ($384 928+) | 1342 |
University of New England | 1 ($416 440+) | 10 183 |
Murdoch University | 1 ($377 485+) | 15 881 |
Federation University | 2 ($481 190+) | 4483 |
University of Canberra | 3 ($384 928+) | 3848 |
CQUniversity | 3 ($481 190+) | 4427 |
University of the Sunshine Coast | 3 ($427 561+) | 3803 |
Source: NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament), Attachment 1 (Ending bad governance for good), p. 4. The ACT Chief Minister salary was not listed in the NTEU submission and was sourced from the ACT Remuneration Tribunal Determination 7 of 2023.
4.21Growth in the number of senior managers at universities was highlighted by DrLionel Page, who observed that the 'unprecedented increase in senior and middle management positions' over the past two decades represented a shift toward managerial expansion:
Between 1997 and 2017, the number of senior management positions … at Australian universities increased by over 110 per cent, while middle management roles grew by 122 per cent. In contrast, the number of support staff—those in direct administrative assistance to academic functions—declined by 70 per cent over the same period. This shift … indicates a reallocation of resources from frontline academic support towards managerial expansion.
4.22Dr John Quiggin also highlighted the role of managerialism in expanding senior management numbers 'while academic staff numbers failed to keep pace with growth in student numbers'. In addition, he noted that senior managers 'increasingly adopted the language and job titles of private corporations', with large salary increases 'justified by comparison with the payment of corporate CEOs'.
4.23In a similar vein, Dr Sharon Andrew pointed to the role that competition for international students plays in driving high salaries and an 'expanding executive class':
The notion that research rankings attract international students, which brings in untied funding and fuels strategic opportunities and investments, is powerful. This has driven a growth and competition mentality used to justify high salaries in an expanding executive class despite often a poor return on investment for students, a lack of genuine nurturing of the academic mission and a blatant disregard for the rights of staff.
4.24As well as increasing the number of highly paid university executives, some participants observed that corporatisation has also increased the number of senior executives with limited academic experience. For example, the Australian Council of Heads of Schools of Social Work (ACHSWE) argued that pressure on universities to operate as businesses had reshaped 'the fundamental values, purpose and operations of higher education to align with corporate managerialism':
This includes a new class of professional administrative-track Vice Chancellors, Pro Vice Chancellors, and other senior executives, often with limited academic experience. While having some of these positions held by people with a diversity of backgrounds/expertise is not necessarily a problem, it is where such appointments are too commercially focused or are held by people who are not interested in the intrinsic value of education and research and not cognisant that universities should serve the public good. Such senior executives continue to be appointed at a rapid rate, effectively taking over universities and displacing academics.
The rationale for high executive salaries
4.25A number of participants argued that vice-chancellor pay reflects the scale and complexity of university operations. For example, the Australian Higher Education Industrial Association (AHEIA) observed that 'universities are multi‑million dollar businesses that are required to operate in a commercial manner'.
4.26Similarly, Mr Luke Sheehy, Chief Executive Officer of Universities Australia, told the committee that vice-chancellor salaries were set to be competitive in attracting the 'best and brightest' to lead Australian universities. Mr Sheehy provided the example of his alma mater, Monash University:
… it has around 80,000 students. It's one of the largest employers in the state of Victoria. It's significantly larger than universities that would come to mind from the US or the UK. They have an enormous amount of work that they do in commercial ventures and research collaborations globally. So … our governing bodies set vice-chancellors' salaries so they're competitive and get the best and brightest to lead these wonderful institutions.
4.27Professor Andrew Deeks, Vice-Chancellor and President of Murdoch University, argued that vice-chancellor salaries were also designed to be competitive in the international market:
The remuneration of Vice Chancellors is in what I would call in the 'expatriate band', along with Singapore and Hong Kong. These are the salaries needed to attract experienced university leaders to move their families to Australia to take up the roles.
4.28The University Chancellors Council (UCC) described university executive remuneration as 'competitive, aligned with performance criteria, and generally transparent in accordance with the Remuneration Transparency Framework developed by Universities Australia'. It argued that universities' remuneration arrangements—along with their employment practices and the use of consultants—are designed to 'balance the need to attract high-quality academic and executive leadership with the responsibility of maintaining financial sustainability'.
4.29A similar view was expressed by Victoria University, which argued that as universities are 'major contributors to the Australian economy, remuneration needs to reflect the value high calibre leadership roles whilst recognising their public purpose nature'.
4.30Charles Sturt University (CSU) noted that vice-chancellor pay was benchmarked against Chief Executive Officer remuneration in 'public and not-for-profit organisations of similar scale and complexity'. CSU contended that:
Unlike most public sector departments, universities have long been expected to operate in many ways like businesses and are required to compete for revenue share in national and global markets: for research funding, for industry partners, for students, and for leadership—including people who can run a large, complex, customer-facing business.
4.31However, Professor Lionel Page, rejected the argument that high salaries were needed to attract quality leaders in a competitive international market. Rather, he contended that these salaries reflect the power that current governance arrangements have granted senior executives:
Indeed, relative to other Australian industries, the higher education sector features a relatively low level of competition. Australian Universities are not characterised by high stake high risk decision making by top managers but by practices that are widely shared across the industry ... In that context, high salaries are not needed to attract highly competitive managers whose decisions will lead to substantial effects on value creation. Indeed, most VCs are local academics, often from that same university, that went the managerial route. These high salaries are the reflection of the power that the governance structure has granted to the top managers and to their ability to privilege their incentives, instead of the traditional mission that the Australian society would typically want universities to fulfil.
4.32The argument was also rejected by Dr Michael Tomlinson, who stated that there was 'no obvious reason why Australian university Vice-Chancellors are more highly paid on average than their peers in New Zealand, Canada, the UK and even the US'. Indeed, Dr Tomlinson described the Australian situation as 'a form of market failure', where 'Australian universities seem to be captured by internal competition against each other … leading to VC remuneration rising ever higher compared to … other countries'.
4.33Some participants, such as Dr Alison Barnes, National President of the NTEU, accepted that universities were large and complex organisations but questioned whether the job of a vice-chancellor was twice as complex as that of the PrimeMinister. Further, Dr Barnes challenged the assumed link between remuneration and performance:
Vice-chancellors will argue that universities are big and complex organisations that have to deal with a difficult and challenging terrain, and that's certainly true, but they earn twice what the Prime Minister earns. Is it two times more difficult than being the Prime Minister of Australia? Is it more difficult than being a state premier? Whilst I would acknowledge that universities are complex and big organisations, those wages are way out of line with community expectation. There was some research done several years ago that looked at the link between renumeration and performance, and renumeration is not inherently linked to good performance. If it were, I think you'd see our universities being run much better than they are.
4.34The link between remuneration and performance was also refuted by a researcher who noted that while 'justification for these inflated salaries often hinges on market competitiveness and the need for "strong leadership" … there is little evidence that such remuneration leads to improved educational outcomes or research performance':
My experience of leadership in academia has been weak—worse than in government or not-for-profit organisations. Instead, these salary structures entrench a culture of financial and human resource mismanagement, where public institutions function more like corporations than centres of learning.
4.35Dr David Cooper concurred and argued that the pay gap between university executives and other staff members was 'essentially aristocratic' as it could not 'be justified by the quality of executive decision making, nor by scope of executive duties. The core business of a university—teaching and research—is coordinated virtually entirely by ordinary, non-executive staff'.
4.36Still, others pointed out that high executive salaries hadn't produced management skills that prevented systemic contraventions of labour laws within universities. According to the NTEU, underpayments in the sector have reached $265million (with a further $168 million in pending provisions) and have affected more than 150000 workers across 30 institutions.
4.37Submitters also refuted the argument that high salaries were required to attract managers capable of maintaining or improving the international standing of Australian universities. For example, the Australia Institute noted that many international universities with similar global rankings to Australian universities 'pay their senior executives considerably less'. In addition, its comparison of Australian and Nordic universities found no link between remuneration and global rankings (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.2Australian and Nordic universities - vice chancellor remuneration and world university rankings
| | |
University of Melbourne | $1 447 500 | 39th |
Karolinska Institute | $290 681 | 49th |
University of Sydney | $1 177 500 | 61st |
Australian National University | $852 242 | 73rd |
University of Queensland | $1 162 500 | 77th |
UNSW Sydney | $1 322 500 | 83rd |
KTH Royal Institute of Technology | $258 228 | 95th |
Lund University | $261 812 | 95th |
University of Copenhagen | $407 769 | 97th |
University of Adelaide | $1 052 500 | 128th |
Flinders University | $1 315 000 | 301–350th |
University of South Australia | $1 235 000 | 301–350th |
Source: The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament), Appendix A (While Uni Vice-Chancellors rake in millions, young researchers struggle to survive), p. 1. Salary figures are based on 2023 date and are in Australian dollars. Rankings are 2025 World University Rankings.
4.38Further, the Australia Institute pointed out that vice‑chancellors' 'exorbitant remuneration' had not improved students' learning experiences, with 'no strong relationship between vice-chancellor pay and student satisfaction'. Indeed, it contended that universities with higher paid vice-chancellors delivered lower satisfaction rates:
Notably, the four universities with the highest student ratings of the quality of their educational experience, also pay their Vice-Chancellors less than the average across the sector, and the three universities paying their Vice‑Chancellors the most, have very low levels of student satisfaction.
4.39A similar view was expressed by Dr Sharon Andrews, who noted it was smaller universities, with fewer international students and lower rankings in research‑dominated league tables, that achieved higher student satisfaction and outcome ratings.
4.40In its response to criticisms of vice-chancellor salaries, the CSU pointed out that lower vice-chancellor remuneration would not make a material difference to the funding available to support teaching and research activities:
The recent debate about excessive Vice-Chancellor remuneration gives rise to the impression that universities would be financially able to offer a better quality of student experience by reducing Vice-Chancellor pay. At Charles Sturt, and at all universities, executive pay is a tiny percentage of expenditure. Even steep reductions in Vice-Chancellor remuneration would make an imperceptible difference to the budget available for education, facilities or research.
4.41However, much of the criticism of executive salaries centred on the role they play in elevating the value and status of management functions above the delivery of core research and teaching activities. Against a backdrop of staff redundancies and cuts to courses, high executive salaries were seen as being out of touch with community expectations, as well as fostering a sense of disconnection and low morale within universities.
4.42One submitter described how 'exorbitant' executive pay engendered feelings of discontent, as well as a lack of trust and collegiality between executive and 'rank and file' staff. They explained that 'when executive salaries are so high, it is hard to justify the frequent "cost cutting" initiatives imposed upon staff'.
4.43Similarly, the NTEU University of Wollongong Branch (NTEU UoW) explained that 'excessive executive remuneration' had led to a 'profound disconnect between a managerial elite and cash-strapped operations at the teaching and research coalface'. For the NTEU UoW, this was exemplified by UoW's decision to create a new highly paid senior leadership position at the same time as it looked to cut $30million in staff costs:
This disconnect shows no signs of abating and is evident in a recent decision (Feb 2025) to advertise for a new senior leadership position (DVC role) with a salary estimated at between $300–400k while management is seeking to cut jobs by a further $30m. Due to significant staff outrage and local media scrutiny, the appointment has been 'paused'. That it was even contemplated is indicative of a 'tone deaf' managerial culture; while students protest cuts to subjects and courses, the Senior Executive decides to add yet another expensive executive salary.
4.44Another submitter described how staff and research activities had borne the brunt of budget cuts, while senior executive remuneration remained largely intact:
It is hard to justify such levels of pay particularly relative to other sectors and within the tertiary education sector, and in the face of phenomena of wage stagnation relative to the cost of living. Often financial pressures are addressed with redundancies that dramatically halt decadal long investments in research capabilities, both at the individual and at the institutional levels. Sadly, too often the implemented austerity measures don't go hand in hand with a review of top managers' salaries and bonuses …
This is unacceptable for the universities' workforce and deliver[s] low morale and a diffused sense of unfairness.
4.45This sense of unfairness was also picked up by the Psychosocial Safety Climate Global Observatory (PSCGO), which stated that 'a sense of injustice is wearing on university staff':
In the context of a sector which has seen volatility, job losses, an ebbing of government oversight and now well-publicised underpayment cases, steady increases to executive-level remuneration elicit increasing public and personnel disbelief and anger. The opaque decision-making at the executive level on salaries (or broader institutional direction) also plays its role.
4.46The frustration of university staff was conveyed by a number of individual submitters, including Dr Rohan Bastin who stated that:
… we have overpaid VCs, excessive entourages of [Deputy VCs], [Pro-VCs], etc. (also overpaid), a multitude of support staff running behind the VCs, [Deputy VCs], etc., and exploited cheap casual labour doing the donkey work (which is actually the core business of teaching and research) because we have a bad business model that treats universities as businesses.
4.47By contrast, at least one submitter reflected positively on the actions of the vice‑chancellor of Western Sydney University (WSU), Distinguished Professor George Williams AO, who requested a lower salary than his predecessor:
Universities obviously need to be solvent and high-quality education and research is not inexpensive, however this does not mean that it is necessary to pay excessively high salaries to management levels. There has been a growing trend to … pay excessive salaries. An exception who stands out from the crowd is the current Vice Chancellor of Western Sydney University who has stated publicly that he will not accept such a ridiculous and above-market salary when there is a need for more teaching staff.
4.48In evidence to the committee, Professor Williams and WSU Chancellor, Professor Jennifer Westacott AC, explained that the university had benchmarked Professor Williams' salary against that of the secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Veterans' Affairs (the lowest paid Commonwealth departmental secretary).
How executive salaries are set and reported
4.49Remuneration for vice-chancellors and other senior executives is set by university council performance and remuneration committees. For example, the University of Western Australia explained that remuneration for its executive is reviewed and approved by a standing committee of its governing council via 'structured performance monitoring and external benchmarking processes'. This process includes benchmarking and work value assessments by external consultants.
4.50At Monash University, executive remuneration arrangements are scrutinised by its Selection and Remuneration Committee. The university also participates in the annual UCC benchmarking review undertaken by Mercer, which engages an advisory firm to evaluate senior executive roles, and periodically contracts an external advisor to review the vice-chancellor and senior executive benchmark remuneration against national and international public sector comparator organisations.
4.51A similar process is in place at Victoria University, with a summary of its remuneration arrangements provided in Box 4.1.
Box 4.1 Victoria University – executive remuneration The framework for vice-chancellor remuneration is set by the Victoria University Act 2010 (Vic), the Victoria University Council Regulations 2021 and the terms of reference of the university's Remuneration Committee. The university also aligns to Universities Australia Voluntary Code Vice Chancellor and Senior Staff Remuneration Code. The Remuneration Committee oversees the remuneration and employment conditions of the senior executive and provides input into the remuneration of the senior executive's direct reports. The Remuneration Committee reviews and approves the vice-chancellor's terms of appointment and remuneration. It monitors, reviews, and reports to Council at least twice a year on the vice-chancellor's performance against annual and long-term key performance indicators, via a report prepared by the Chancellor. The vice-chancellor's base salary is reviewed annually in November. For the remainder of the executive team, the university uses the Mercer CED Job Evaluation method. This evaluates positions based on accountabilities, skills requirements, business/organisational environment and job challenges, to classify and evaluate senior roles. Remuneration of executives and senior staff is reviewed annually by the Remuneration Committee. The Remuneration Committee also receives reports on senior executives' remuneration and reports this to Council each year. |
4.52While the Australian National University (ANU) also undertakes benchmarking, it noted that the Commonwealth Remuneration Tribunal (Remuneration Tribunal) also has a legislated role in advising on remuneration for its Vice-Chancellor and Deputy Vice-Chancellors. This function was added to the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973 in 1995, following the repeal of the Remuneration Tribunal's responsibility for determining senior executive remuneration at the ANU.
4.53Evidence presented to the committee appeared to show that universities differ in their use of performance incentive payments for senior executives. However, it was not clear how large these incentive payments are, or how widespread the use of incentive payments is across the sector.
4.54For example, Deakin University explained that its senior executives are eligible for incentive payments tied to 'tangible measures of financial sustainability and budget targets, and to non-financial measures such as student satisfaction and staff engagement'.
4.55This contrasted with Victoria University, which reported that its vice‑chancellor 'does not receive any short-term incentives or other non-traditional benefits'. Similarly, while its employment agreements and senior staff contracts include an annual remuneration review, 'the university has an enterprise-wide approach of no short-term incentives for executives and senior staff'.
4.56While most universities report having similar arrangements in place to manage executive remuneration, various contributors were critical of the way senior executive remuneration is set, as well as the opaqueness of executive pay—including bonuses.
4.57For example, the Australia Institute warned of potential conflicts of interest inherent in the current approach:
The membership of these committees is often small and dominated by a Chancellor or handful of senior executives with corporate rather than education or research backgrounds. Vice-Chancellors are often members of this committee and, according to some reports, have been known to 'attend' and even exercise 'formal rights of audience and debate' at the meetings where their pay is discussed, though not for the decision itself.
4.58Some participants, such as Ms Sarah Roberts, Victorian Division Secretary of the NTEU, drew attention to the lack of staff input into remuneration committee deliberations:
On the remuneration committees, of course, [staff] could have acted as a critic and conscience and to inform that committee as to what the public expectations might be about executive and vice-chancellor remuneration as well. What you're seeing is a lack of challenge, a lack of diversity and a lack of … sunlight being shone on decision-making by universities.
4.59Dr Adam Lucas explained the legislative basis for the exclusion of staff from performance and remuneration committees in NSW:
Currently, the NSW legislation relating to the constitution of the Performance and Remuneration Committee consists only of the Chancellor, the Deputy VC and two members drawn from the external members of Council. In other words, there is no possibility of internal scrutiny by staff of the performance and remuneration of the university and the executive.
4.60In terms of reporting of senior executive salaries, again, the evidence did not provide a clear picture of what information is reported by universities and how. A survey by the Australian Association of University Professors found that over 54 per cent of respondents 'believed there is no transparency in senior management salaries and bonuses'.
4.61Another submitter argued that there was a lack of clear reporting on executive compensation, with broad salary categories providing 'no transparency on base pay vs. bonuses and other perks'.
4.62In addition to a lack of transparency, the use of performance bonuses was also criticised by at least one academic for having 'distorted university decision-making and undermined long-term leadership and planning'.
4.63A similar view was expressed in a report prepared by the NTEU, which quoted a university employee who described university managers being paid 'an undisclosed bonus for spending less than the budgeted amount' to teach students, with the result being an over allocation of students to lecturers.
4.64The Curtin Student Guild (CSG) stated that the UCC Australian Universities Vice-Chancellor and Senior Staff Remuneration Code only provides for 'voluntary disclosure of salaries, making it difficult to determine the total remuneration of Vice-Chancellors'. CSG contrasted this with universities in the United Kingdom, which are required to disclose vice‑chancellor salaries, pensions, and benefits to an independent regulator.
4.65In arguing for greater transparency, Professor Peter Tregear OAM noted the public mission of universities and cited a ruling by the Queensland Information Commissioner in relation to the disclosure of salaries paid to government agency employees:
The public has a strong, legitimate and abiding interest in having access to sufficient information to enable scrutiny on whether funds raised by the government are expended efficiently and effectively in furtherance of the wider public interest. This extends to scrutiny of whether the public is obtaining value for money from performance of the duties of particular positions for which a government has decided to allocate funding. This public interest is even strong in the case of senior officers who have responsibility for devising and/or implementing strategic and operational plans, and delivering key performance outcomes.
Suggested actions to address concerns about executive remuneration
4.66Inquiry participants proposed a range of actions in response to the issues outlined above, including capping executive pay, linking vice-chancellor pay to non‑executive staff pay, setting executive pay independently from university councils, and improved transparency around executive salaries.
Cap executive salaries
4.67Caps on senior executive salaries were supported by a range of participants, with some proposing that caps be set to align with public sector salary benchmarks. For example, the NTEU proposed capping vice-chancellor remuneration at the level of the relevant state premier.
4.68Other contributors proposed caping salaries at a certain dollar value. The Council for the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences proposed a cap of $500000 as 'likely to be appropriate for an individual leading a university', while another submitter supported a $500 000 cap for executive salaries from 'Dean level upward', with the vice-chancellor receiving an additional50 per cent loading.
4.69A vice-chancellor salary cap of $500 000 (indexed at the rate of inflation) was supported by the Australia Institute, which recognised both the public mission of universities, as well as the widening gap between executive and non‑executive staff pay:
Growth in Vice-Chancellor salaries has outstripped growth in incomes for university staff members for decades … As public institutions, largely funded by the federal government, it is important for expenditure to be distributed more evenly through the institution and to reflect public sector pay rates—rather than inflated private sector executive norms.
4.70However, caps on vice-chancellor remuneration were opposed by some participants. For example, Professor Andrew Deeks referred to the introduction of salary caps in Ireland, which he said resulted in Irish universities struggling to recruit leaders internationally, and the best Irish leaders going elsewhere.
4.71In a similar vein, Associate Professor Mark Humphrey-Jenner argued against pay restrictions. Instead, he contended that vice-chancellors are 'underpaid relative to the private sector and other university presidents' and warned against using public sector benchmarks for university executive pay 'as this will result in executives moving to the private sector'.
Link executive salaries to professorial or other staff salaries
4.72A range of participants proposed linking senior executive salaries to the salaries of non-executive university staff. For example, the PSCGO advocated for vice‑chancellor salaries to be 'tethered to three times the professorial salary commensurate with other public officials'.
4.73Similarly, Dr Tomlinson suggested consideration of a modified version of the model used by the University of Cambridge, which ties the vice‑chancellor's salary to median staff salaries:
One approach that has been suggested is to relate them to the salaries of their staff. This model has been used at the University of Cambridge, which sets VC base salaries at 10 times the median salaries of staff generally, and five times the median salaries of academics. In 2023 this led to a base salary of $792 000 (£409 000), which is reasonable for such an eminent university with over 24 000 students and over £1 billion in revenue.
4.74Dr Tomlinson suggested that the model could be set by the Australian Tertiary Education Commission.
4.75Other participants, including the Committee of Management of the University of Western Australia Academic Staff Association suggested a model that would combine caps with links to professorial salaries:
For example: use professorial salary scales as the base and add a bonus commensurate to the seniority of the temporary service role, with clear and proportionate limits (eg for VC, the total remuneration cannot be more than triple the underlying professorial salary).
Independently determine executive salaries
4.76On 15 July 2025, the UCC issued a media release revealing that it had written to the Hon Jason Clare MP, Minister for Education, to propose development of 'a new advisory framework for Vice-Chancellor remuneration, to be supported by the Commonwealth Remuneration Tribunal' (Remuneration Tribunal). Support for this proposal was also voiced by Universities Australia.
4.77WSU also supported independent determination of vice‑chancellor salaries by the Remuneration Tribunal. It noted that 'universities are public sector institutions, funded by the federal government, with a role to deliver public good' and argued that pay determination by the Remuneration Tribunal would 'ensure benchmarking against public service standards', which would 'help to bring pay levels in line with community expectations'.
4.78This support was reiterated at the committee's public hearing, where Professor Westacott advocated for consistent processes to apply across the sector:
We certainly support very strongly that the tribunal should set senior executive salaries, and it would then follow that they should set remuneration for council members as well, so we're very strong supporters of that and very strong supporters of benchmarking. The nominations committee of the university, which I chair, has taken a very firm decision that all senior executive salaries will be public sector benchmarked, but, to that point, it would be better to have something across the whole sector, something that sets a standard. You've still got a lot of variation in salaries, so we would welcome going to a tribunal and having a proper benchmarking process.
4.79The involvement of the Remuneration Tribunal in setting council member and executive salaries was also supported by the University of Wollongong.
4.80DrMartin Parkinson AC PSM, Chancellor, Macquarie University, pointed out that council members at Macquarie University were not remunerated for their roles. However, Dr Parkinson supported the Remuneration Tribunal advising on vice-chancellor pay.
4.81In addition, while AHEIA's submission to the inquiry asserted that university governing bodies should set executive salaries, it informed the committee that its position had changed over the course of the inquiry and that it now supported an independent Remuneration Tribunal process.
4.82Support for the Remuneration Tribunal (or a similar body) to set salaries of senior university staff in line with public expectations was also received from Mr Simon Walker, with similar support from CSG and the NTEU among others.
Improve transparency of executive salaries
4.83There was support for improving the transparency of university executive salaries, including via mandated public reporting. For example, Professor Tregear suggested introducing a requirement for 'public annual remuneration reports covering university executives paid more than the top‑ranked professorial level'.
4.84Similarly, the CSG advocated for public reporting of the number of university executives earning above a reasonable threshold.
4.85Some universities pointed out that they already disclose this information. For example, in his evidence to the committee, Professor Williams noted that the range of executive salaries at WSU was available in its annual report.
4.86Similarly, the University of Western Australia submitted that it disclosed its Vice-Chancellor's salary as part of its financial statements.
4.87However, the NTEU stated that it would like to see more transparency in the way salaries are reported in annual reports as it can be 'a little bit vague'. The NTEU UOW expanded on this point and recommended that universities be required to publish 'information about salary packages including all "perks"':
Annual Reports provide a percentage figure relating to executive salaries (what percentage of total employee costs) as well as indications of how many personnel are in which broad salary bands. Exact salaries for roles are not available for scrutiny. Furthermore, staff who are paid outside of the enterprise agreements and at a much higher rate, are not captured by this data if they are not designated part of the Executive leadership. In other words, it is not clear to staff or students how many staff are paid salaries greater than those determined by the enterprise agreements.
4.88While some submitters advocated for public reporting to include information about any bonuses or weightings applied to executive salaries, others called for bonuses to be scrapped altogether as they had tended to create 'narrow incentives that often run counter to the core teaching and research interests of the university'.
4.89Recommendations addressing some of the issues raised in this chapter are set out in the committee view at the end of Chapter 5.