Chapter 1Introduction and context
1.1On 29 July 2025, under Standing Order 25(2)(a)(v), the Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee (committee) agreed to re-adopt its inquiry into the quality of governance at Australian higher education providers, specifically:
(a)The adequacy of the powers available to the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA) to perform its role in identifying and addressing corporate governance issues at Australian higher education providers, with particular reference to:
(i)the composition of providers' governing bodies and the transparency, accountability and effectiveness of their functions and processes, including in relation to expenditure, risk management and conflicts of interest;
(ii)the standard and accuracy of providers' financial reporting, and the effectiveness of financial safeguards and controls;
(iii)providers' compliance with legislative requirements, including compliance with workplace laws and regulations;
(iv)the impact of providers' employment practices, executive remuneration, and the use of external consultants, on staff, students and the quality of higher education offered; and
(v)any related matters.
1.2The committee agreed to present its report on 4 December 2025.
1.3On 26 August 2025, the committee agreed to present an interim report on 19September 2025.
Referral during the 47th Parliament
1.4The inquiry was originally self-referred on 29 January 2025, during the 47thParliament.
1.5During the 47th Parliament, the committee received 299 submissions, as well as additional information and answers to questions on notice. The committee also held one public hearing in Canberra on 12 March 2025.
1.6The prorogation of the 47th Parliament on 28 March 2025 limited the committee's ability to progress the inquiry, with the inquiry lapsing at the end of the 47thParliament.
1.7On 14 April 2025, the committee presented an interim report which strongly supported re-referring the inquiry in the 48th Parliament.
Conduct of the committee's inquiry
1.8Following re-adoption of the inquiry in the 48th Parliament, the committee re‑advertised the inquiry on its website and invited new submissions by 28August 2025.
1.9At the time of reporting, the committee has published 32 submissions, as well as additional information and answers to questions on notice.
1.10At the time of reporting, the committee has held two public hearings:
Canberra – Tuesday, 12 August 2025; and
Sydney – Monday, 8 September 2025.
1.11Links to public submissions, hearing programs, Hansard transcripts of evidence, answers to questions on notice, and other additional information published by the committee are available on the inquiry website.
1.12In undertaking its inquiry, the committee also had access to all correspondence and evidence received during the 47thParliament.
Acknowledgement
1.13The committee thanks those individuals and organisations who contributed to the inquiry by providing written submissions and giving evidence at public hearings. In particular, the committee would like to acknowledge the individuals who shared their personal experiences, which have helped to shape the findings of this report.
Terminology
1.14The committee notes that university governing bodies are referred to variously as university councils, senates, or boards. For ease of reference, the committee has chosen to use the term university council throughout this report.
Scope of this report
1.15This report is an interim report that focuses on the accountability and transparency of decision making within universities, remuneration of vice‑chancellors and other senior executives, and the appropriateness of TEQSA's powers.
1.16The report comprises five chapters, including this introductory and background chapter. The remaining chapters are as follows:
Chapter 2 examines university governance arrangements in Australia.
Chapter 3 focuses on:
the accountability and transparency of university decision‑making;
the number of elected staff and student council members and their experiences as council members; and
the management of potential conflicts of interest.
Chapter 4 looks at the remuneration of senior university executives.
Chapter 5 examines opportunities to strengthen TEQSA's powers.
1.17While the focus of this interim report is outlined above, the committee also received evidence relating to its wider inquiry terms of reference. This includes evidence about:
the corporatisation of universities, including the influence of private sector consultants on university councils;
systemic and sector-wide non‑compliance with workplace laws, high levels of insecure work, and increased workloads; and
reduced academic autonomy, reduced course quality, and poorer student experience.
1.18These issues will be addressed in the committee's final report. The final report will also look at the interoperability of regulation across Commonwealth, state, and territory jurisdictions, as well as potential regulatory changes aimed at improving the quality of governance at Australian higher education providers.
Context for the inquiry
1.19There has been a growing focus on university governance in Australia in recent years, with a range of issues highlighted by both the Australian Universities Accord (Accord) process, as well as the Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman's (OFWO's) focus on underpayment trends in the university sector.
1.20In addition, there has been significant media coverage of university spending on consultants, vice-chancellor salaries, and discretionary expenditure at the same time as cuts are made to courses and staffing.
1.21Concerns have also been raised in relation to the transparency of university decision-making and the management of potential conflicts of interest—including the ability of vice-chancellors to hold paid external positions in addition to their university leadership roles.
1.22The remainder of this chapter provides an overview of:
the Accord process;
the OFWO's focus on issues in the Australian university sector; and
general commentary in relation to other university governance issues.
1.23The chapter also provides a summary of key actions taken to date in relation to the issues identified above.
Australian Universities Accord
1.24The Accord was delivered through a 12-month review of Australia's higher education system by a panel of eminent Australians led by ProfessorMaryO'KaneAC. The Accord's objective was to 'devise recommendations and performance targets to improve the quality, accessibility, affordability and sustainability of higher education, in order to achieve long term security and prosperity for the sector and the nation'.
1.25The Accord review received over 300 written submissions. Of these, 46 per cent included themes of 'governance, accountability and community', while 37 per cent referenced 'regulation and governance'.
1.26The Australian Universities Accord Interim Report (Accord Interim Report), released in July 2023, stated that 'issues of wage theft, casualisation and student safety' show that current governance obligations on university councils 'do not always translate into effective oversight and support for staff and students, and that this is a systemic challenge'.
1.27The Accord Interim Report also referred to a growing emphasis on appointing people with business expertise to university councils—a change driven at least in part by amendments to university acts that sought to decrease the size of governing bodies and strengthen their mix of skills.
1.28However, the Accord Interim Report also noted that 'business expertise must be balanced by council members who deeply understand the functions of universities, including learning and teaching, research and management'.
1.29This was reflected in the Accord review's broader 'vision for Australia's future higher education system' by 2035:
Governing bodies, notably university councils, proactively foster positive institutional cultures that are transparent and able to deliver strategically, whilst retaining a strong commitment to staff satisfaction and student experience, safety, and wellbeing. Councils comprise members with business expertise, but also those who know and appreciate the unique characteristics of higher education. Students are recognised as integral stakeholders and treated as partners in decision-making processes. The obligations and needs of students are embedded in the day-to-day operations and strategies of institutions.
1.30The Accord Interim Report recommended five areas for priority action that the review panel identified as important early measures to improve higher education accessibility, fairness, stability, and integrity.
1.31One of these, Priority Action 5, recommended that the Australian Government engage with state and territory governments and universities to improve university governance, with a particular focus on:
universities being good employers;
student and staff safety; and
membership of governing bodies, ensuring additional involvement of people with expertise in the business of universities.
1.32Specifically, the Accord Interim Report proposed that university councils be strengthened by 'rebalancing their composition to put greater emphasis on higher education expertise'. It also stated that university councils 'must as a priority do more to improve student and staff wellbeing and become exemplary employers'.
1.33The finding of the Australia Universities Accord Final Report (Accord Final Report) in relation to governance was that Australia's regulatory and university governance arrangements have been too slow to respond to a number of important issues, especially in relation to student wellbeing and staff employment (particularly casualisation and underpayment).
1.34More broadly, the Accord Final Report found that there was scope to improve the 'effectiveness and clarity of regulatory arrangements' in the university sector, with fragmented legislative requirements creating 'unnecessary complexity for providers in identifying obligations and designing their activities for compliance'.
1.35In relation to TEQSA, the Accord Final Report found that it had helped strengthen the reputation of the university sector in Australia, successfully establishing minimum standards for the sector and 'enforcing a baseline for provider behaviour'.
1.36However, the Accord Final Report also noted that TEQSA's regulatory powers 'are limited by its enabling legislation and the regulatory standards'. Itsuggested regular review and adjustment of TEQSA's powers 'to allow it to become the agile and forward-leaning regulator required to support a dynamic tertiary education system'.
Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman – issues in the Australian university sector
1.37The OFWO's annual compliance and enforcement priorities focus on industries 'at significant risk of non-compliance', as well as emerging issues 'of considerable public interest and concern'.
1.38In announcing its decision to include universities as a compliance and enforcement priority in 2022–23, the then Fair Work Ombudsman, MsSandraParker, highlighted concerns about widespread underpayments, as well as poor governance and management oversight in Australian universities:
We are concerned about the allegations of long-running underpayments in many universities, with our current investigations finding trends of poor governance and management oversight, and a lack of centralised human resources functions and investment in payroll and time-recording systems. We expect to be taking high-level enforcement action against a number of universities this year, and urge all to prioritise their compliance.
1.39Between 2022–2025, the OFWO entered into seven enforceable undertakings with Australian universities to address underpayment of staff (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman – enforceable undertakings with Australian universities
| | |
2025 | La Trobe University | More than $10.77 million, including superannuation and interest |
2025 | Griffith University | More than $8.34 million, including interest and superannuation |
2024 | University of Melbourne | $72 million, including superannuation and interest |
2024 | University of Sydney | More than $23 million, including superannuation and interest |
2023 | University of Technology Sydney | More than $4.4 million, plus superannuation and interest |
2022 | University of Newcastle | About $6.2 million, plus superannuation and interest |
2022 | Charles Sturt University | About $3.2 million, plus superannuation and interest |
Source: Fair Work Ombudsman, Enforceable undertakings (accessed 6 August 2025).
1.40In addition, in 2024, the University of Melbourne was required to pay $74 590 after the OFWO applied to the Federal Court of Australia, which found that the university had taken adverse action against two employees for making a complaint or inquiry in relation to their employment.
1.41In correspondence with Professor O'Kane as part of the Accord process, MsRachelVolzke, Deputy Fair Work Ombudsman, referred to 'apattern of repeated and often entrenched non-compliance' in universities 'particularly in relation to casual staff'. Ms Volzke went on to detail 'several trends leading to non-compliance in the university sector', including:
Failure to comply with enterprise agreement (EA) provisions around the engagement of staff or payment of entitlements:
such as misclassifying the duties or roles of casual academics and the use of payment per item (e.g. exam and/or essay) marked where the EA provides for hourly rates of pay, and where the assigned time per item is insufficient; and
in some instances, this is accompanied or facilitated by non-compliant record keeping practices which give effect to these alternative arrangements.
Poor governance and management oversight practices:
governance arrangements that do not prioritise/consider workplace relations risks or compliance, often with little or no visibility of how work is undertaken at the business level (e.g. inadequate reporting to/oversight by governing boards, resulting in a single point of failure); and
no systems for identifying compliance risk, such as reporting on payroll issues or complaints to identify red flags, areas for audit, or trends.
Lack of centralised human resources (HR) functions across faculties/schools:
HR functions are devolved to schools/faculties, including many that operate without oversight or expertise in managing employees and ensuring entitlements and workplace relations compliance (e.g. academic staff are often responsible for HR and pay-related issues);
the use of decentralised approaches has led to schools/faculties adopting different recruitment and remuneration practices within the same university, resulting in noncompliance with EAs; and
managers have low awareness of new/changed obligations in EAs.
Lack of investment in appropriate and compliant payroll and time‑recording systems:
poor implementation of new EA obligations into payroll systems; and
lack of investment in payroll and time-recording systems leading to poor/inadequate record-keeping, which significantly impacts the capacity to assess and quantify underpayments.
General media coverage and other commentary
1.42Recently, there has been a significant increase in public reporting on university governance issues. This includes concerns about:
remuneration of university executives—particularly vice-chancellors;
management of potential conflicts of interest;
the role of, and expenditure on, consultants in relation to university restructures;
high levels of discretionary expenditure (e.g. travel, marketing, advertising) at the same time as cuts are made to courses and staffing.
1.43A selection of recent media coverage is summarised below.
Box 1.1 Summary of recent media coverage There are currently 306 university executives who earn more than state premiers, with the average vice-chancellor pay being almost twice that of the Prime Minister, including: 16 Monash University executives who are paid more than the Victorian Premier, despite the university reporting a net deficit of $9million and facing court over wage theft. A number of vice-chancellors with salaries of more than $1 million per annum also hold external paid positions, including: former Australian National University (ANU) Vice-Chancellor, Genevieve Bell ($1.1 million), who maintained a salaried role with technology company Intel for seven years while at the ANU (including the first ten months of her tenure as Vice-Chancellor). KordaMentha partner, John Dewar, who was appointed as interim Vice-Chancellor of the University of Wollongong and continued to work for KordaMetha one day per fortnight. the Flinders University Vice-Chancellor, Colin Stirling ($1.3million), who earned $160 000 as a member of the board of student recruitment company IDP Education. Previous University of Melbourne Vice-Chancellor, Duncan Maskell ($1.5 million), who earned $300 000 as a non-executive director of biotechnology company CSL. RMIT University Vice-Chancellor Alec Cameron ($1 million), who earned $67 733 as the industry-elected representative on the board of UniSuper. A number of donors to universities have been appointed as Chancellors, including: University of Melbourne Chancellor, Jane Hansen, who (with her husband Paul Little), donated $40 million to the university in the years prior to being appointed Chancellor. Previous University of Melbourne Chancellor, Allan Myers, who donated $10 million to the university before being appointed Chancellor. There has been significant reporting on the role of—and expenditure on—consultants such as Nous Group, KPMG, Deloitte, and KordaMentha to advise on university cuts, as well as potential conflicts of interest arising from consultants' roles on university councils and within university executives, including: Griffith University, where four senior positions (including two within the Vice-Chancellor's office) are held by former Nous Group consultants. Between October 2023 and April 2025, Griffith University spent more than $2.5 million on consultancy services with Nous Group or its subsidiary, Cubane Consulting Pty Ltd. A perceived lack of transparency by the ANU in relation to the Nous Group and how much it was paid for consulting work. The University of Queensland spent $331 000 on advice from Nous Group on 'functional best practice' and 'efficiencies'. The University of Melbourne paid KPMG almost $9 million for short-term business advisory services, and spent $3.1 million with Nous and Deloitte, and $275 000 with KordaMentha. The University of Wollongong engaged KordaMentha to undertake a cost-cutting exercise. A month later, the university appointed KordaMetha partner John Dewar as its interim Vice-Chancellor. Three days after John Dewar's appointment, the university struck a second 'operational review' contract with KordaMentha. High levels of discretionary spending by university executives at the same time cuts are being made to courses and staffing, including: the University of Technology Sydney spent more than $140 000 for five executives to travel to the United States for an alumni trip at the same time the university faces a $100 million cost-cutting drive that could result in 400 staff losing their jobs. |
Summary of actions to date
1.44A number of steps have been taken to date to address issues with university governance in Australia. These include:
the establishment of an Expert Council on University Governance;
the introduction of new TEQSA guidance and reporting requirements on corporate governance and industrial relations;
consultations regarding potential changes to strengthen TEQSA's powers;
investigation of ways to enhance data transparency around casual staff; and
support of an independent expert to help identify and resolve priority issues to ensure universities are exemplary employers.
1.45The University Chancellors Council also updated the Voluntary Code of Best Practice for the Governance of Australian Public Universities.
Expert Council on University Governance
1.46In response to Priority Action 5 of the Accord Interim Report, Education Ministers agreed to establish an Expert Council on University Governance (Expert Council) to strengthen university governance. The Expert Council has been tasked with developing new University Governance Principles and Recommendations which universities will need to report their compliance against. These recommendations are available to inform consideration of Education Ministers when they next meet.
1.47The principles and recommendations will be developed in the context of ten priority reform areas, which are designed to 'improve transparency, accountability, engagement, and representation on university governing bodies and will ensure rigorous and transparent process for developing remuneration policies and settings for senior university staff'. The priority areas include:
achieving a balance between higher education and other expertise on the governing body, with at least one non-executive member who has university leadership expertise from outside the institution;
improving structures and processes to ensure that high risk and high priority matters reflect consultation and engagement with the university community and having appropriate oversight and reporting to and by the governing body;
reflecting the diversity of the Australian community, and the specific characteristics of the university community they serve, in making appointments;
achieving gender balance on the governing body in line with jurisdictional and Australian Government targets;
having First Nations membership on the governing body, and separate, transparent processes to capture First Nations leadership and engagement on university strategy, policies, and performance;
having one or more student members of the governing body, and separate, transparent processes to capture student input on university strategy, policies, and performance;
having one or more staff members of the governing body, and separate, transparent processes to capture staff and union input on university strategy, policies, and performance;
requiring all new appointments to go through a rigorous and transparent selection process that utilises a formal and regularly updated skills, capabilities, and diversity selection matrix that is in line with their jurisdiction's requirements and directed to the selection of the person best suited to the position;
requiring all governing body members to have, or undertake, training on the specific responsibilities and expectations of their role as governing body members, and separately clarifying the way the role of governing body members is described; and
demonstrating and maintaining a rigorous and transparent process for developing remuneration policies and settings for senior university staff, with consideration given to comparable scale and complexity public sector entities, and ensuring remuneration policies and packages are publicly reported.
New guidance and annual reporting requirements (corporate governance and industrial relations)
1.48The work of the Expert Council builds on TEQSA's new guidance and reporting requirements related to providers' workplace obligations, which aim to ensure providers can 'actively demonstrate compliance with all forms of workplace relations laws and obligations … and that they can readily implement changes to enterprise agreements appropriately and in good faith'.
1.49TEQSA's Statement of Regulatory Expectations: Compliance with workplace obligations sets out its regulatory expectations of higher education providers—in particular that providers will pay staff correctly and comply with workplace laws and industrial agreements—with a focus on providers' governance oversight and processes.
1.50The regulatory expectations are consistent with Domain 6 of the Higher Education Threshold Standards, ongoing concerns about some providers not taking responsibility for meeting their workplace obligations, and the OFWO finding that poor governance arrangements are a key trend in the sector leading to non-compliance with workplace obligations and the underpayment of wages.
Consultations to strengthen TEQSA's powers
1.51On 19 August 2025, the Hon Jason Clare MP, Minister for Education, announced that the Australian Government would begin consultations to underpin changes to the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency Act 2011 (TEQSA Act) aimed at strengthening TEQSA's powers. Identified areas for potential changes included:
a regulatory system that puts students first;
a modern regulator with powers to address emerging and systemic challenges;
opportunities to streamline regulation for universities and other higher education providers, so they can focus on teaching and learning; and
a system that supports a joined up tertiary system, helping more Australians get the skills and qualifications they need.
1.52On 3 September 2025, a consultation paper was released that sought views from stakeholders in relation to potential amendments to the TEQSA Act. The paper invited participants to answer 16 key questions to inform potential reform to the future direction of the higher education regulatory system.
Enhanced data transparency around casual staff
1.53The Department of Education is currently looking at improvements that would require universities to provide additional data to the Australian Government on casual staff numbers in order to increase transparency and understanding of workforce patterns and issues.
Independent expert to assist in identification and resolution of priority issues
1.54The Department of Education engaged an independent expert to facilitate a series of workshops with the National Tertiary Education Union, Universities Australia and the Australian Higher Education Industrial Association to help identify and resolve priority issues to ensure universities are exemplary employers.
Updated Voluntary Code of Best Practice for the Governance of Australian Public Universities (Voluntary Code).
1.55In 2024, the University Chancellors Council updated the Voluntary Code to reflect the ten priority reform areas identified by Education Ministers. Theupdates 'reflect a broader emphasis on diversity, transparency, accountability, and risk management in university governance' and included:
greater emphasis on gender balance and First Nations peoples on governing bodies;
stronger focus on transparent processes for capturing input from staff, students, and the wider community;
more rigorous and transparent appointment processes, including the use of a formal skills, capabilities, and diversity selection matrix;
regular performance evaluations of the governing body, its members, and senior executives, with specific disclosure requirements;
detailed requirements for risk management frameworks and the establishment of an Audit and Risk Committee; and
more comprehensive processes for developing and applying remuneration policies for senior university staff, including benchmarking and annual reporting.