Chapter 4 - Connecting Australia and the Pacific

  1. Connecting Australia and the Pacific

Fostering people-to-people links

4.1The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) submitted that people-to-people connections ‘are a key feature’ of its Pacific partnerships, highlighting activities in sport, education, media, churches, and in relation to Pacific mobility schemes.[1] The importance of church networks across the Pacific was highlighted in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 also laid out some of the critical links built between Australian and Pacific institutions that help to foster people-to-people links, for example between Australian and Pacific civil society organisations, police and defence forces, and in relation to border management and immigration.

4.2This chapter builds on these links to outline how a range of technical and academic engagement is fostering people-to-people links between Australia and the Pacific. It also discusses key mobility pathways that enable Pacific Islanders to travel to Australia, as well as the views of submitters and witnesses on these issues. Finally, this chapter notes the growing recognition of the important role First Nations leadership can play in the region, and provides the Committee’s views and recommendations and these matters.

Technical and academic engagement

4.3Submitters highlighted a number of technical areas of engagement that could foster people-to-people links between the Pacific and Australia, including:

  • Archival work and culture
  • Scientific engagement
  • Academic links
  • Sport
  • Human rights and law reform
    1. Each area is discussed further below.

Archival work

4.5Both the National Archives of Australia (NAA) and the National Film and Sound Archive (NFSA) emphasised the value of supporting archival work in the Pacific. The NAA argued its partnerships in the Pacific, capacity building work in the region, and efforts to make the national archival collection available to Pacific clients were forging deep cultural connections and people-to-people links:

National Archives has a crucial function to fulfil in strengthening cultural diplomacy in the Pacific. We play a vital role in ensuring documents that demonstrate the historical connections between Australia and the Pacific are preserved and accessible into the future, and importantly, we can connect communities to records of significance and share our world-class archival knowledge with international archives.[2]

4.6The NFSA detailed for the Committee some of the challenges faced by Pacific archivists and outlined Australia’s role in preserving Pacific records. It argued for efforts to scale up digitisation in the Pacific and the need to develop regional capacity as well as additional funding to do so.[3]

4.7Also emphasising the importance of archival work in the face of climate change and its potential to build people-to-people connections, Wantok Musik argued:

… we know that climate change threatens many Pacific countries. We need to ensure that, alongside efforts to address the pressing environmental impacts, we put in the resources to ensure preservation of music, art and language and culture that we can assist with digitising. These art forms are powerful mediums to strengthen people-to-people links and partnerships… This is the most effective kind of cultural diplomacy because it’s based on respect.[4]

4.8Wantok Music also pointed to art and music as ‘cultural diplomacy’, arguing they could be a ‘powerful tool’ for connecting people, communicating ideas, and fostering international understanding and cooperation.[5] It also warned of severe impacts of climate change on the cultural heritage of small Pacific nations and highlighted the need to record, preserve, and share stories from affected communities. It further submitted:

The Wantok Musik Foundation believes that cultural diplomacy will be essential to the success of any long-term investment. Allowing investment in, and actively encouraging cultural diplomacy will help to create a sense of shared culture, art and heritage, with the primary objectives of enabling cultural dialogue across the region, creating constructive relationships, improving communication and cooperation, preventing misunderstandings and reducing socio-cultural conflicts.[6]

Scientific engagement

4.9Science was another area of technical engagement that submitters argued was fostering people-to-people links between Australia and the Pacific. The Australian Academy of Science (AAS) emphasised the importance of science in meeting the priorities of the Pacific and in supporting development, capacity-building, and people-to-people links. It further argued, ‘scientific capability and mechanisms for science advice to inform decision-making are vital to support economic, environmental, and social development’.[7]

4.10AAS also outlined the vital role it played in integrating the unique needs and priorities of the Pacific region into global scientific dialogue, and advancing Indigenous Pacific knowledge within international fora. It argued such initiatives were necessary due to the lack of Pacific scholarly institutions able to do so themselves, and called for support from the Australian Government in the establishment of a Pacific Academy of Sciences that could take on this role.[8]

Academic links

4.11Several submitters raised opportunities for building people-to-people links through academic engagement. Australian Academic Volunteers Abroad, for example, argued ‘knowledge diplomacy’ could strengthen relations among countries through research and education, but warned of a ‘dearth’ of academic leadership in the Pacific due to recruitment and retention issues. It therefore called on the Australian Government to support capacity building of Pacific academia through, for example, direct, targeted, and sustained volunteering to provide strategic academic leadership by current and retired senior Australian academics.[9]

4.12Associate Professor Helen Gardner and Dr Jonathan Ritchie also highlighted the value of academic relationships in the Pacific whilst detailing for the Committee the obstacles faced by academics from Papua New Guinea seeking to enter Australia for work. Obstacles, they told the Committee, included visa and medical clearance costs, extensive documentation requirements, and lengthy processing times. Associate Professor Gardner and Dr Ritchie argued streamlined digital applications for short-term visas for scholars from Papua New Guinea would be more appropriate and would encourage greater collaboration with Australia.[10]

4.13The Oceania Institute at the University of Melbourne pointed to ‘huge opportunities’ for strengthened academic engagement between Australia and the Pacific but again argued that visa requirements and the costs of studying in Australia, among other factors, were hampering such interactions.[11] It therefore called for the establishment of a scheme to incentivise joint appointments and secondments between Australia and Pacific academic institutions, as well as a review of Pacific visa application processes—particularly when supported by Australian institutions.[12]

4.14Also underscoring the value of education in building people-to-people links, Innovative Research Universities (IRU) stated that education cooperation and research collaboration could play a ‘valuable role in the next phase’ of the Australia-Pacific relationship.[13] The IRU pointed to the opportunities presented by the region’s large youth population (see Chapter 2), stating:

… we believe that expanding collaborative education and research programs in the Pacific will enable Australia to build the expertise and deep people-to-people links necessary to achieve Pacific Island and Australian strategic priorities.[14]

Building links through sport

4.15Both High Commissioner Sisilo and DFAT noted the value of sport in building and maintaining relationships between Australia and the Pacific.[15] High Commissioner Sisilo stated:

It would be a good thing if our sportspeople could come [to Australia] for their training, preparing for regional games and, of course, the big ones. That is an area that we are certainly looking at in our attempts to build the relationship between our youth.[16]

4.16Brigadier Nerolie McDonald told the Committee of a dedicated sports program run by the Department of Defence in the Pacific, claiming it is a way for people from different countries to understand one another, and ‘builds such great people-to-people links’.[17]

4.17DFAT outlined a range of government-funded sporting initiatives throughout the region, from grassroots participation through to elite sporting programs and administration. It described sport as ‘a unifying force across the region’ and ‘one of the deepest cultural linkages that we have with [much of the Pacific]’. It told the Committee that people-to-people connections form a ‘key element’ of its Pacific partnerships, including through sport, education, media, and churches.[18] In particular, DFAT highlighted the $15 million per year PacificAus Sports program that fosters partnerships with peak sporting bodies in Australia to build linkages and capability in Pacific counterpart organisations, including in netball, Rugby League, football, and AFL.[19] DFAT also highlighted the importance of the Olympics in the region, noting Australia supported Pacific athletes from 13 countries to participate in the Paris 2024 Olympics.

4.18DFAT also noted the potential for the involvement of women and girls in sport to be ‘a powerful catalyst for change’.[20]

4.19The Oceania Institute at the University of Melbourne suggested mobility schemes (see below) could offer opportunities in a range of fields, including sport, to offer exchanges that ‘improve understanding of and support for Pasifika peoples, cultures and societies in both Australia and the Pacific Islands’.[21]

Human rights and law reform

4.20Efforts to strengthen local human rights movements and provide support for legal reform were highlighted by a number of submitters as having the potential to strengthen people-to-people links. For example, the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) argued that one of the best ways Australia could strengthen these links would be to reinforce national human rights institutions or to support their establishment, whilst building links with regional human rights organisations.[22]

4.21AHRC noted Australia’s International Development Policy (see Chapter 2) identifies a number of thematic rights (including gender equality and disability rights, among others), but advocated that the Australian Government explicitly adopt a human rights-based approach to the Pacific.[23]

4.22Emphasising the value of strengthening legal practice across the region, the Bar Association of Queensland described the importance of legal training workshops for Pacific law graduates in fostering people-to-people links. It called for Australian Government funding and a long-term commitment to support the development of the legal professional across the region, in line with the government’s commitment to the rule of law.[24]

4.23The Law Council of Australia also highlighted the importance of legal professional associations in the Pacific in strengthening the rule of law and promoting good governance, which it claimed would enable sustainable development, promote regional stability, and facilitate economic growth.[25] It called for further resourcing to enable continuous legal education as well as to provide opportunities for Pacific lawyers in Australia, arguing these activities would further strengthen people-to-people links and partnerships.[26]

4.24In terms of judicial connections, the Federal Court of Australia (FCA) submitted, ‘robust and independent courts are fundamental to the rule of law, which underpins the legitimacy and functionality of democratic states’. It told the Committee its international relationships were ‘founded on the trust and respect built through strong people-to-people links and partnerships’.[27] However, the FCA cautioned justice and the rule of law across the Pacific were ‘fragile’ and Pacific judiciaries ‘under-supported’. It therefore called on the Australian Government to provide ongoing support for the establishment of a permanent Pacific Judicial Secretariat to enable Pacific judiciaries to engage with Australian counterparts and address shared priorities.[28]

Mobility pathways

4.25Pathways to facilitate the travel of Pacific Islanders to Australia have long been among the region’s priorities. The Committee previously inquired into trade relations with the Pacific and reported on various mobility frameworks, including the Pacific Labor Mobility scheme (PALM).[29] The Committee recognised the value of these schemes—particularly in terms of facilitating remittances and developing skills among participants—but expressed concern for the wellbeing of some workers related to poor working conditions and exploitative labour arrangements, and urged the Australian Government to review labour mobility schemes with a view to strengthening and improving their compliance.[30]

4.26The Committee again reported on Pacific labour mobility programs in 2022, finding them to be generally viewed in a positive light, whilst again identifying opportunities to improve these schemes.[31] It recommended the Australian Government consider scaling up the program, including by providing pathways for permanent residency.[32]

4.27The Committee also took evidence during the inquiry in relation to a proposed temporary relocation visa for Pacific Islanders affected by natural disasters and climate change, but ultimately made no recommendation on this issue.[33]

4.28This section outlines key Australia-Pacific mobility schemes, discusses climate mobility and the connection of many Pacific communities to land, and provides a range of views put to the Committee on these issues.

Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union

4.29Australia and Tuvalu signed in November 2023 the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union (ATFU), providing Tuvalu with security guarantees and a special permanent residency visa pathway for Tuvaluans (as well as spouses, dependents, and children) to live, work, and study in Australia each year.[34] DFAT told the Committee the ATFU ‘reflects our shared commitment to delivering Pacific led solutions to our shared challenges’.[35] Through the ATFU, 280 visa places are allocated annually through a random ballot. The Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) described the benefits of the scheme as follows:

The [ATFU] will enable Tuvaluan visa holders to send remittances, diversify livelihoods and acquire new skills which can be used to strengthen community resilience in Tuvalu. This demonstrates the role lawful migration can play in supporting development and climate resilience efforts.[36]

4.30The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) outlined how the ATFU was a response to estimates that half the land area of Funafuti, the capital of Tuvalu, will be flooded by tidal waters daily by 2050. UNHCR emphasised that Article 2 of the ATFU expressly provides that the statehood and sovereignty of Tuvalu will continue. Further, the agreement recognises the desire of Tuvalu’s people to continue to live in the territory, where possible, whilst also providing for the creation of a special mobility pathway.[37]

Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme

4.31The PALM scheme (subclass 403 visa) provides short-term opportunities for Pacific workers from nine Pacific countries and Timor-Leste to work in Australia when there are not enough local Australian workers available.[38] The scheme is jointly managed by DFAT and the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations with the support of the Pacific Labour Facility (PLF, a contracted mechanism to support administration and implementation of the PALM scheme).

4.32In 2023–24, 25,228 visas were granted under the scheme.[39] The majority of PALM scheme workers in 2024 were working within the agriculture sector (54 per cent) or the meat processing sector (38 per cent).[40]

4.33An independent evaluation of the PLF was undertaken in mid-2023, which broadly found, ‘[the facility] has delivered effective and efficient services to PALM scheme stakeholders against the backdrop of a highly complex and dynamic operating and policy context’.[41]

4.34DFAT highlighted the scheme’s success, submitting:

[PALM] enhances people-to-people links, providing opportunities to engage diaspora, community groups, unions, and churches to support workers. [Participants] make an important contribution to the economies and culture of regional and rural communities across Australia as well as Pacific sending countries.[42]

4.35DFAT told the Committee the Australian Government had expanded and improved the PALM scheme since its introduction, including through additional resources to improve sending operations and to better prepare workers to deploy; embedding skills development in the scheme; addressing concerns about the social impact of the scheme, for example through a family accompaniment pilot; and supporting participants to access their superannuation wages.[43]

Pacific Engagement Visa

4.36The Pacific Engagement Visa (PEV, Subclass 192 visa) offers a new permanent residency visa pathway for up to 3,000 participants (including partners and dependent children) from participating Pacific Island countries to live, work, and study in Australia through a ballot process. DFAT submitted that the PEV ‘responds to long-standing requests from Pacific partners for greater access to Australia and easier movement around the region’.[44] Applicant numbers for the first ballot held in mid-2024 significantly exceeded the annual quota, according to DFAT.[45] Upon closing in August 2024, 56,127 paid registrations were made to the PEV for a potential of up to 171,450 family members—more than fifty-times the annual allocation.[46]

Student exchanges

4.37Several submissions emphasised the value of student exchanges, pointing to the New Colombo Plan (NCP), in particular. The NCP is a scholarship program for Australian undergraduate students to study for up to one year overseas. DFAT explained the NCP as follows:

The [NCP] is a signature initiative of the Australian Government which aims to build Indo-Pacific capabilities by supporting Australian undergraduates to undertake study, language training and internships in the region.[47]

Climate mobility and the connection to land

4.38Evidence received by the Committee emphasised the connection between climate change and mobility, making mobility pathways all the more critical for Pacific Islanders themselves. For example, Mr ‘Alopi Latukefu from the Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education stated that, as Pacific peoples are forced from the homes in which they have lived for thousands of years, Australia will have to be part of the conversations around their future. He cautioned, ‘Australia must also be willing to listen and not be closed to those conversations’.[48]

4.39Relatedly, Excellency Anote Tong, Chair of the Pacific Elders’ Voice, appeared to make a similar suggestion when he called for continuing short-term efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change, but cautioned, ‘in the longer-term I think we need to do something a lot more drastic’.[49]

4.40Act for Peace told the Committee that displacement in the Pacific region is among the highest in the world on a per capita basis—and is increasing.[50] The Australian National University Institute for Climate, Energy & Disaster Solutions submitted, ‘climate change will affect mobility trends and challenge our cultural and national sovereignty and regional stability.[51] It further claimed:

While movement across the Pacific Region is often economically driven, climate change has the potential to shift the migration landscape significantly and drastically. Pacific islanders will leave their countries in droves seeking secure homes and livelihoods elsewhere. This requires without a doubt, proper policy discussions, preparation, and future-mapping.[52]

4.41Witnesses also pointed to the connection between environmental protections and customary land ownership, through which efforts to strengthen customary land ownership could in turn lead to strengthened environmental protections. Jubilee Australia Research Centre (Jubilee Australia) defined customary land tenure as ‘kinship groups recognise and enforce a system of land custodianship and usage rights, that are passed down from generation to generation’.[53] It told the Committee that the livelihoods, health, economic security, and cultural existence of most Melanesian peoples are tied to customary land.[54]

4.42Mr Robert Karoro from the Kiribati Climate Action Network outlined for the Committee the profound long-term impact of phosphate mining on his home of Banaba in Kiribati. He consequently called on the Australian Government to support the region’s traditional and indigenous landowners.[55]

4.43Jubilee Australia claimed Australia had historically undermined customary land rights in the Pacific, but that customary land tenure can serve as an obstacle to deforestation and environmental degradation;[56] ‘customary landowners are the ones who hold the protection of [the] forest’, stated Jubilee Executive Director, Dr Luke Fletcher.[57] On the other hand, ‘attempts to undermine customary land tenure in the Pacific endanger the environmental stewardship of Pacific peoples’, he cautioned.[58] Jubilee Australia explained this link as follows:

The customary land system works for two reasons: first, the system ensures that every person has land on which to rely for sustenance and subsistence and as a social safety net; second, the customary land system supports and allows the continuation of the deep reservoir of agricultural skills.[59]

4.44Dr Flether warned the Committee of the potential impact for Australia’s relationships of failing to uphold customary land tenure in the Pacific:

I would not underestimate the amount of bad feeling that it generates for countries to be just riding roughshod over customary and local laws. Australia has aspirations… to have a leadership role in the Pacific. If we participate in a race to the bottom and then if we don’t up our game… then we risk being seen as other actors which are equally causing damage.[60]

4.45Jubilee therefore called for a robust commitment from the Australian Government to ensure its actions and activities did not undermine customary land tenure, that Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) was upheld, and that the Australian Government makes clear its support for customary land tenure in Melanesia.[61] Ms Emily Mitchell, Director of Jubilee’s Pacific Mining Program, emphasised the importance of FPIC in relation to the conduct of Australian mining companies in the Pacific: ‘there’s a real capacity for Australia to step up in its requirements on transparency, due diligence and free, prior and informed consent in the Pacific’.[62] Ms Chantelle Khan from Social Empowerment Education Program Limited also supported this position, calling for Australia to push for endorsement by local Indigenous communities to be a prerequisite for development projects, recommending Australia advocate this position during COP31 (see also Chapter 3).[63]

Views on Australia-Pacific mobility pathways

4.46In relation to mobility pathways, DFAT told the Committee it works in support of Pacific priorities ‘to deepen Australia’s connections’ to the region, including the PALM scheme and PEV, as well as other schemes discussed below.[64] The Australian Government has also worked to reduce visa processing times for Pacific visitors through a newly-established Pacific Service Centre.[65] Home Affairs submitted the PALM scheme, PEV, and ATFU ‘provide enhanced regional economic integration through mobility to Australia, as Pacific Island workers take up jobs in Australia, develop and diversify their skills and send income home to support family members’.[66]

4.47In relation to mobility from the region, The Oceania Institute and the University of Melbourne submitted:

Pasifika peoples are mobile and transnational. Their mobility and extended networks of kin are key to their cultures, identities, and livelihoods, and deliver benefits to both Australia and the Pacific Islands.[67]

4.48High Commissioner Sisilo described the PALM scheme as a ‘game changer’ for the Solomon Islands, which he said brings ‘mutual economic benefits’ for both Australia and the Pacific, whilst also ‘building important community and people-to-people connections’. He told the Committee he would welcome an increase in the numbers of workers who could take up Australian visas through the scheme, emphasising the opportunities it would create for the country’s youth and recent graduates.[68] In support of this position, findings from the Pacific Attitudes Survey (see Chapter 1) found that respondents in both Samoa and Vanuatu expressed strongly positive views of mobility programs due largely to improved household incomes.[69]

4.49The National Council of Churches in Australia acknowledged the potential for the PALM scheme and other migration frameworks to support communities in some Pacific countries to adapt to climate change and rising sea levels.[70]

4.50Act for Peace commended the Australian Government for the PALM scheme, PEV, and the ATFU, and recommended it continue to explore opportunities to increase labour mobility in ways that are beneficial for both the Pacific and Australia.[71] However, it urged the Australian Government to step-up efforts to eradicate exploitation and address protection issues associated with these schemes to ensure their benefits are more equitably shared.[72]

4.51The Oceania Institute and the University of Melbourne called the PEV ‘an important experiment’ and advocated an independent review of the scheme to ensure its effectiveness for participants, for Australia, and for Pacific islands.[73] In relation to the ATFU, however, the Institute warned the agreement had raised expectations among other Pacific Island nations which may seek similar pathways in the future. It also questioned the Australian Government’s commitment to these schemes, given what it perceived to be a discrepancy with the intentions of affected Pacific countries.[74]

4.52Also in relation to the ATFU, Ms Corrine Fagueret from the Edmund Rice Centre told the Committee people in Tuvalu were positively predisposed towards the agreement and appreciative of the opportunities is presented, but insisted that, for the majority of Tuvaluans, their preference was to remain in place rather than to relocate to Australia.[75]

4.53Further evidence was somewhat critical of these mobility schemes. The Fred Hollows Foundation, for example, cautioned that mobility pathways, such as those detailed above, risk depleting local capacities within Pacific nations—particularly in the healthcare field. The Fred Hollows Foundation consequently called for an evaluation of the health impacts of these schemes.

4.54Save the Children Australia similarly suggested to the Committee that the PALM scheme could result in children being left with one parent or their extended family, leaving them vulnerable to abuse, neglect, exploitation, and declining school retention.[76] It therefore also called for a review of the impacts of PALM and other labour mobility schemes on children.

4.55Whilst also acknowledging the economic benefits of the PALM scheme, the Federation of Catholic Bishops Conference of Oceania (FCBCO) cautioned participants in the scheme may be prone to workplace exploitation and social isolation, which it cautioned could lead to broader societal risks such as anti-social behaviour.[77] The FCBCO acknowledged efforts by the Australian Government to implement safeguards to protect migrant workers, but submitted these issues remained with the scheme.[78]

4.56Plan International called on the Australian Government to strengthen wraparound mechanisms to support PALM participants and their families, including support for children who are separated from their parents; efforts to mitigate the loss of skilled workers on Pacific nations; and strengthened protections for participants from exploitation.[79]

4.57Language learning platform Duolingo highlighted opportunities for streamlining visa application and language proficiency tests for Pacific applicants. It argued digital testing is more efficient, competitive, and equitable than Australia’s current reliance on paper-based testing, and submitted this change would facilitate Australia’s ‘access to wider pool of talent from which to engage with the best and brightest its Pacific neighbours have to offer’.[80]

4.58Evidence was broadly welcoming of student exchange initiatives, including Australian Awards and the NCP.[81] Dr George Carter described the NCP as having provided a ‘great opportunity’ for his students, who were able to spend two weeks in the Pacific through the program.[82] The Oceania Institute at the University of Melbourne also welcomed the NCP, but cautioned its benefits were limited by the absence of funding to support Pacific students studying in Australia, as well as its restriction to Australian citizens and undergraduate students only.[83] The Australian Centre for Pacific Islands Research called for greater support for Pacific universities, including through faculty and student exchange programs that would facilitate knowledge transfer, cultural exchange, and professional development.[84]

4.59UNICEF in Australia also noted the potential for such initiatives to build connections, relationships, and capacity, and called on the Australian Government to consider partnering with agencies like UNICEF Australia to grow their influence and impact. It also recommended funding for these programs not come out of Australia’s Overseas Development Assistance budget so as to avoid reducing support for other development initiatives.[85]

4.60The Australian Global Health Alliance also expressed support for student exchanges:

The Australia Awards program remains an exemplary example of how fostering knowledge exchange and building a network of skilled professionals, who contribute to their home countries upon return, can support education and capacity building in the Pacific.[86]

4.61The Oceania Institute at the University of Melbourne, however, submitted that the Australia Awards scholarships are too limited for the ‘supply of excellent candidates’ from the Pacific and are insufficient to support higher degree research students:

The standard scholarship stipend is calibrated to support the living costs of an Australian citizen or resident who is in their early 20’s. This is not the demographic profile of research higher degree students from the Pacific Islands, who are typically mid-career, in their 30’s or early 40’s, with a family, and needing to pay private health insurance… These are not students who can live at home with their parents, or in a share house, and so their living expenses are far higher.[87]

4.62UNHCR acknowledged that concerns had been raised in relation to the potential for those that utilise the ATFU to become stateless, it welcomed elements of the agreement, in particular those components that ‘recognise statehood and sovereignty and support human mobility with dignity’. UNCHR described these aspects of the ATFU as having the potential to set a positive precedent for the region and beyond.[88]

4.63The International Organisation for Migration also pointed to the ATFU as ‘an exemplary and practical model for cooperation’, and emphasised the need within climate mobility frameworks to recognise the desire of Pacific people to stay in place.[89]

4.64The Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) welcomed the ATFU, submitting that the agreement was expected to ‘deliver benefits to local communities and align strongly with Pacific priorities’, whilst also being of substantial benefit to Australian businesses.[90] ACFID called on the Australian Government to ‘engage in open dialogue with other Pacific Island nations who may want to establish similar treaties allowing for special visas that promote “mobility with dignity”’.[91]

4.65ACFID also welcomed the PALM scheme and the PEV, which it suggested would likely deliver benefits to local communities as well as Australian businesses, and claimed they were strongly aligned with Pacific priorities.[92]

4.66Act for Peace also expressed support for the ATFU, pointing to the need to prioritise climate adaptation so as to enable communities to remain in-place whilst also being prepared to support relocations, when and where necessary.[93] Act for Peace called on the Australian Government to ‘search for other ways to increase labour mobility of mutual benefit to Australia and the Pacific’ and to expand existing pathways to respond to climate-induced mobility needs.[94]

4.67I-Kiribati PhD scholar Ms Akka Rimon urged consideration of ‘an inclusive mobility pathway’ for all Pacific countries affected by climate change, rather than the select countries that currently enjoy such pathways.[95]

First Nations leadership

4.68Evidence received by the Committee clearly highlighted the potential for Australian First Nations leadership in strengthening relationships in the Pacific as well as the readiness of leaders and communities throughout the region to engage with First Nations representatives. DFAT acknowledged this, submitting it was implementing a First Nations approach to foreign policy that ‘projects Australia’s shared and full identity including our modern diversity and the rich heritage of First Nations people’. It noted the appointment in April 2023 of Australia’s first Ambassador for First Nations people, for whom the Pacific has been identified as a priority.[96]

4.69Also emphasising the importance of Australia’s Indigenous heritage, the Australian Human Rights Commission told the Committee that Pacific Island countries had demonstrated ‘a strong connection and interest to engage [First Nations Australians]’, and pointed to the recognition of First Nations people and Indigenous knowledge, practices, and philosophies within the 2050 Pacific Strategy.[97]

4.70The Edmund Rice Centre’s Mr Latukefu welcomed what he described as Australia’s ‘First Nations approach to foreign policy engagement’ in the Pacific. He also suggested there were models of remote service delivery that had been developed with Australia’s First Nations communities that could be drawn on when designing programs in the region.[98]

4.71Relatedly, Micah Australia told the Committee that elevating First Nations foreign policy was essential to participating in Pacific affairs and is required if Australia is to establish an authentic partnership with the region.[99] The Pacific Australian Emerging Leaders Network similarly submitted, ‘genuine participation in Pacific affairs requires recognition of Indigenous Australians in these spaces’.[100]

4.72Also emphasising the importance of making First Nations peoples central to Australia’s regional engagement, the Fred Hollows Foundation submitted:

Indigenous Australian and Pacific Islander peoples share long-standing cultural and family connections. First Nations people were Australia’s first diplomats and Australia should continue to leverage these cultural connections to strengthen its relationships with the Pacific.[101]

4.73Incorporating First Nations perspectives into Australia’s engagements in the Pacific had the potential to ‘transform relations’, argued Oxfam, ‘making them more culturally sensitive and inclusive’.[102] The Centre for Human Security and Social Change also noted the value of embedding Indigenous perspectives, experiences, interests, and people in Australia’s foreign policy to strengthen relationships with the Pacific. However, it cautioned such an approach demanded that Australia ‘get our house in order’ with respect to reconciliation. It argued:

Australia’s failure to reconcile and embrace its Indigenous history is not lost on our Pacific neighbours…Being a respected and legitimate international citizen in our region is closely tied to Australia’s domestic capabilities to reconcile with its own First Nations people.[103]

Committee comment

4.74Strong people-to-people links are central to our relationship with the wider Pacific region. The Committee recognises that Australia’s successful partnerships throughout the Pacific must be built on these people-to-people engagements. It also recognises that these links require ongoing efforts to ensure they are built and maintained. As such, the Committee welcomed the extensive engagement on this topic from a broad range of stakeholders, as detailed above.

4.75Central to our connections with the Pacific is the two-way access facilitated by a range of mobility schemes. As such, the Committee welcomes recent improvements in the mobility schemes that are available to the region. In particular, the Committee viewed positively the establishment of the Pacific Service Centre that is designed to facilitate visas for Pacific visitors. The Committee also noted the introduction of the Pacific Engagement Visa, which it considers to be addressing a much-needed pathway for mobility from the region. The Committee would nevertheless urge the Australian Government to consider significantly expanding the annual quota of the PEV well beyond the current cap of 3,000, as well as considering options for offering the visa pathway to other Pacific countries that might express an interest to participate in the future.

4.76Further, the Committee continues to see merit in the idea of a temporary relocation visa for Pacific Islanders affected by natural disasters and climate change, as outlined in its 2022 report on Strengthening Australia’s relationships in the Pacific, and would welcome the Australian Government’s ongoing consideration of this proposal.

4.77The Committee is convinced current labour mobility schemes are broadly positive, offering immense economic benefits for Pacific communities as well as Australia and Australian businesses. It is also confident that these schemes foster invaluable social, cultural, and religious ties, whilst enhancing vital people-to-people links between Australia and the Pacific. The Committee welcomes efforts by DFAT to evaluate these schemes and to expand and improve their operation. However, the Committee reiterates its concerns outlined in its previous report into Strengthening Australia’s relationships in the Pacific at the potential negative effects of these schemes—for participants, their families left behind, as well as the communities from which they come. It therefore urges the Australian Government to continue to work to strengthen Pacific mobility schemes and to address any negative effects resulting from their use.

4.78In relation to the connection to land, the Committee recognises the vital importance of land for peoples across the Pacific, and notes the central role Australia can and should play to ensure Pacific communities are able to remain on their ancestral lands. It also notes the protective potential of customary land rights and encourages the Australian Government to explore ways to support these rights as an end in itself as well as a means to strengthen environmental protections in the Pacific.

4.79Another key area of engagement between the Pacific and Australia is in sport. In the Committee’s view, Australia has an unrivalled strategic and tactical advantage in this space. Sport offers a unique opportunity to build goodwill, increase our influence, and strengthen people-to-people connections throughout the region. As such, the Committee commends efforts by the Australian Government to leverage this advantage. It is nevertheless convinced that further opportunities exist to expand these activities to the benefit of both Australia and our Pacific partners, and would welcome further efforts by the Australian Government to this end. The Committee also considers that mobility schemes have the potential to offer mutually-beneficial exchanges in areas like sport, and would welcome further efforts by the Australian Government to explore such opportunities.

4.80The Committee was persuaded at the value of academic engagement and the importance of the academic leadership role already being played by Australian universities in the Pacific. However, the Committee was concerned by the constraints faced by Pacific academics looking to enter Australia and considers the Australian Government should explore opportunities to facilitate cost-effective and efficient visa pathways for short-term academic engagement—particularly from Pacific countries.

4.81Relatedly, the Committee noted the value of student exchanges—and the NCP in particular—in strengthening people-to-people connections with the Pacific and recognised the value in extending these programs to include postgraduate students. Whilst the Committee also accepts arguments in favour of facilitating study in Australia by Pacific students, it is not persuaded that the NCP is the most appropriate mechanism to support this.

4.82Finally, the Committee noted the government’s First Nations approach to foreign policy and the appointment of a First Nations ambassador. The Committee recognised the inherent value of this policy as well as the eagerness among our international partners for such an approach—nowhere more so than in the Pacific. However, it also recognises that authentic partnerships in the region will require greater efforts by all levels of government to urgently work towards reconciliation with our First Nations peoples.

Recommendations

Recommendation 11

4.83The Committee recommends that the Australian Government—in close consultation with affected communities, national governments, and regional structures, and building on the successes of the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union—seeks opportunities to strengthen existing mobility pathways and consider additional options to support other Pacific communities, including those affected by climate change.

Recommendation 12

4.84The Committee recommends that the Australian Government reviews at least every three years key Pacific mobility schemes, including the Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme and the Pacific Engagement Visa, with a view to:

  • identifying issues faced by participants in Australia and upon return to their communities
  • evaluating the impact of these schemes on Pacific communities, families, and particularly on children
  • identifying and implementing measures to address any negative impacts of mobility schemes on participants and communities of origin.

Recommendation 13

4.85The Committee recommends that the Australian Government explores opportunities to establish more affordable and cost-effective short-term visa pathways for Pacific academics.

Recommendation 14

4.86The Committee recommends that the Australian Government considers extending the New Colombo Plan to include postgraduate students.

Recommendation 15

4.87The Committee recommends that the Australian Government considers significantly lifting the Pacific Engagement Visa (PEV) cap for upcoming years and explores opportunities to expand the PEV to other Pacific countries, where sufficient demand exists.

Mr Josh Burns MP

Chair

Foreign Affairs and Aid Subcommittee

27 November 2024

Hon Shayne Neumann MP

Chair

Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

27 November 2024

Footnotes

[1]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Submission 80, p. 9

[2]National Archives of Australia, Submission 28, p. 5

[3]National Film and SoundArchive, Submission 29, p. 5

[4]Mr David Bridie, Artistic Director, Wantok Music, CommitteeHansard, 2 September 2024, p. 1

[5]Wantok Music, Submission 79, p. [2]

[6]Wantok Music, Submission 79, p. [7]

[7]Australian Academy of Science, Submission 53, p. 1

[8]Australian Academy of Science, Submission 53, p. 2

[9]Australian Academic Volunteers Abroad, Submission 4, pp. 1 and 4

[10]Associate Professor Helen Gardner and Dr Jonathan Ritchie, Submission 22, p. [1–2]

[11]The Oceania Institute at The University of Melbourne, Submission 8, pp. 5–6

[12]The Oceania Institute at The University of Melbourne, Submission 8, p. 6

[13]Innovative Research Universities, Submission 54, p. 1

[14]Innovative Research Universities, Submission 54, p. [5]

[15]Mr Robert Sisilo, High Commissioner, Solomon Islands High Commission, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 3; Mr Mark Tattersall, First Assistant Secretary, Polynesia, Micronesia and Development Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 15; and DFAT, Submission 80, p. 10

[16]Mr Sisilo, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 3

[17]Brigadier Nerolie McDonald, Director General Pacific and Timor-Leste, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 41

[18]Ms Kathleen Logan, First Assistant Secretary, Pacific Strategy Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 8

[19]Mr Mark Tattersall, First Assistant Secretary, Polynesia, Micronesia and Development Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 15

[20]Mr Tattersall, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 14 October 2024, p. 21

[21]Oceania Institute at the University of Melbourne, Submission 8, pp. 4–5

[22]Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 15, pp. 8–9

[23]Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 15, p. 7

[24]Bar Association of Queensland, Submission 45, pp. 1 and 14

[25]Law Council of Australia, Submission 69, p. 10

[26]Law Council of Australia, Submission 69, p. 11

[27]Federal Court of Australia, Submission 11, p. 2

[28]Federal Court of Australia, Submission 11, p. 1

[29]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, One Region, One Family, One Future: Deepening relations with the Pacific nations through trade, September 2021, pp. 177–220

[30]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, One Region, One Family, One Future: Deepening relations with the Pacific nations through trade, September 2021, p. 220

[31]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Strengthening Australia’s relationships in the Pacific, March 2022, pp. 48–53

[32]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Strengthening Australia’s relationships in the Pacific, March 2022, recommendation 2

[33]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Strengthening Australia’s relationships in the Pacific, March 2022, pp. 60–61

[34]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 3; and Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs), Submission 39, pp. 4–5

[35]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 8

[36]Home Affairs, Submission 39, p. 5

[37]Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Submission 49, p. 18

[38]Participating Pacific countries include Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu

[39]Home Affairs, Submission 39.2, pp. 1–2

[40]Home Affairs, Submission 39.2, p. [4]

[41]Clear Horizon, PLF Independent Evaluation, 5 December 2023, p. 13

[42]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 9

[43]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 9

[44]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 9; see also Ms Jan Hutton, First Assistant Secretary, Pacific Integration Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 11

[45]Ms Jan Hutton, Assistant Secretary, Pacific Integration Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024,p. 11

[46]Home Affairs, Submission 39.2, p. 2

[47]DFAT, Submission 80.1, p. 1

[48]Mr ‘Alopi Latukefu, Director, Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 48

[49]Mr Anote Tong, Chair, Pacific Elders’ Voice, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 4

[50]Act for Peace, Submission 41, p. 2

[51]Australian National University Institute for Climate, Energy & Disaster Solutions, Submission 61, p. [11]

[52]Australian National University Institute for Climate, Energy & Disaster Solutions, Submission 61, p. [11]

[53]Jubilee Australia and Partners, Submission 81, p. [21]

[54]Jubilee Australia and Partners, Submission 81, pp. [7] and [21]; and Dr Luke Fletcher, Executive Director, Jubilee Australia Research Centre, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 12

[55]Mr Robert Karoro, Acting National Coordinator, Kiribati Climate Action Network, Committee Hansard, p. 2

[56]Jubilee Australia and Partners, Submission 81, p. [21]

[57]Dr Luke Fletcher, Executive Director, Jubilee Australia Research Centre, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, 13

[58]Dr Fletcher, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 12

[59]Jubilee Australia and Partners, Submission 81, p. [22]

[60]Dr Fletcher, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 17

[61]Jubilee Australia and Partners, Submission 81, pp. [12-13]; and Dr Fletcher, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 15

[62]Ms Emily Mitchell, Director, Pacific Mining Program, Jubilee Australia Research Centre, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 18

[63]Ms Chantelle Khan, Executive Director, Social Empowerment Education Program Limited, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 18

[64]Ms Kathleen Logan, First Assistant Secretary, Pacific Strategy Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 9

[65]Home Affairs, Submission 39, p. 5; and DFAT, Submission 80, p. 9

[66]Home Affairs, Submission 39, p. 4

[67]Oceania Institute and the University of Melbourne, Submission 8, p. 4

[68]Mr Sisilo, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, pp. 1 and 3

[69]Assoc Prof Julien Barbara, Prof Michael Leach, Dr Kerryn Baker and Dr Christopher Mudaliar, Submission 62; and Dr Kerryn Baker, Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 1

[70]Ms Elizabeth Stone, General Secretary, National Council of Churches in Australia, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 24

[71]Act for Peace, Submission 41, p. 7

[72]Act for Peace, Submission 41, p. 7

[73]Oceania Institute and the University of Melbourne, Submission 8, p. [4]

[74]Oceania Institute and the University of Melbourne, Submission 8, p. [11]

[75]Ms Corrine Fagueret, Senior Manager, Advocacy and Research, Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education, Committee Hansard, 14 October 2024, pp. 3–4

[76]Save the Children Australia, Submission 64, pp. 5–6

[77]Federation of Catholic Bishops Conference of Oceania, Submission 24, p. 3

[78]Federation of Catholic Bishops Conference of Oceania, Submission 24, pp. 3–4

[79]Plan International Australia, Submission 31, p. 9

[80]Duolingo, Submission 31, pp. 5–6

[81]See for example, Dr Yves Lafoy, Official Representative of New Caledonia to Australia, Embassy of France, Submission 83, p. [2]

[82]Sala Dr George Carter, Deputy Head, Department of Pacific Affairs, and Director, The Pacific Institute, Australian National University, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 4

[83]Oceania Institute at the University of Melbourne, Submission 8, p. 2

[84]Australian Centre for Pacific Islands Research, Submission 46, p. [5]

[85]UNICEF in Australia, Submission 56, p. [4]

[86]Australian Global Health Alliance, Submission 68, p. [5]

[87]Oceania Institute at the University of Melbourne, Submission 8, p. 3

[88]Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Submission 49, pp. 18–19

[89]International Organisation for Migration, Submission 12, p. [2]

[90]Australian Council for International Development, Submission 73, p. 14

[91]Australian Council for International Development, Submission 73, p. 20

[92]Australian Council for International Development, Submission 73, p. 14

[93]Act for Peace, Submission 41, p. 2

[94]Act for Peace, Submission 41, pp. 7 and 10

[95]Ms Akka Rimon, PhD Scholar, School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 3

[96]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 10

[97]Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 15, p. 5

[98]Mr Latukefu, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 47

[99]Ms Jasmin Mawson, Coordinator, Pacific Australian Emerging Leaders Network, Micah Australia, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 2

[100]Pacific Australian Emerging Leaders Network, Submission 34, p. [3]

[101]Fred Hollows Foundation, Submission 63, p. 8

[102]Oxfam, Submission 58, p. 6; see also Australian Global Health Alliance, Submission 68, p. [4]

[103]Centre for Human Security and Social Change, La Trobe University, Submission 31, p. 3