2. Stepping up in the Pacific

Development and strategic priorities

2.1Over the last decade, Australia has concertedly and consistently ramped up its activities in the Pacific. The Australian Government announced in September 2016 a ‘step-change’ in its engagement in the region, positioning the Pacific as among Australia’s highest foreign policy priorities. In November 2018, then-Prime Minister the Hon Scott Morrison launched a ‘new chapter’ in Australia-Pacific relations, announcing the Pacific Step-up that ‘builds on over half a century of sustained engagement, responding to the region’s priorities by further enhancing our commitments.’ The Pacific Step-up was accompanied by a record commitment of $1.4 billion in development assistance to the region in 2019–20.[1]

2.2The Office of the Pacific was established within The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) the following year to support the Australian Government’s deepening engagement with the region and to improve whole-of-government coordination. It also aimed to ’drive implementation of our regional activities, consistent with the priorities of Pacific countries’.[2]

2.3In mid-2023, the Australian Government appointed Mr Ewen McDonald inaugural Special Envoy for the Pacific and Regional Affairs. Mr McDonald also held the position of High Commissioner to Fiji. DFAT’s submission to this inquiry noted, ‘[b]ased in the region, the Special Envoy enhances Australia’s ability to respond to collective challenges and strengthens our engagement with regional organisations’.[3]

2.4DFAT submitted the following perspective on the centrality of the Pacific region to Australia’s interests:

Australia sees the Pacific as family. As Pacific nations, we share an ocean and a future and are custodians of the Blue Pacific Continent. Our relationships with Pacific island countries are long-standing and enduring, based on true partnerships, respect and friendship. Australia’s relationships with Pacific island countries are central to our national interest and national identity, recognising our shared geography, history and culture and the deeply interconnected nature of our prosperity.[4]

2.5This chapter outlines a broad range engagement in the region by public, private, and Australian civil society, including development assistance; defence, policing, and immigration interventions; and technological assistance. Australia’s substantial efforts to address climate action are detailed in the following chapter. This chapter then sets out competing positions on the geostrategic role of the Pacific and discusses areas identified by witnesses and submitters as possible priorities for the Australian Government, including:

• the importance of local leadership and Pacific-led solutions
• the role of children and young people in the region’s future
• the need to strengthen interventions related to gender, equality, and inclusion
• opportunities to meet the region’s growing health challenges, particularly related to non-communicable diseases
• governance and corruption challenges.
  6. This chapter then puts forward the Committee’s views and recommendations on these matters.

Australia’s engagement in the Pacific

Overseas Development Assistance

2.7Around two-fifths of Australia’s ODA in 2024–25 will be spent in the Pacific (around $2 billion) making Australia the region’s largest donor.[5]

2.8DFAT told the Committee successive budgets had ‘reinforced Australia’s commitment to bring new resources and energy to the Pacific’ and highlighted:

• increased ODA, including to meet development, economic, health, education, social, and climate priorities
• increased funding to expand Australia’s diplomatic presence in the region
• increased security activities, including upgraded aerial surveillance and increased cooperation between Pacific and Australian security forces
• increased infrastructure grants and loan packages to deliver quality, climate resilient infrastructure
• expanding and improving regional mobility schemes.[6]
  9. Australia’s development program is administered by DFAT and other Government departments through a mixture of bilateral, regional, and multilateral programs.[7] Papua New Guinea is estimated to receive the largest share of Australian ODA in 2024–25 (31.1 per cent), followed by the Solomon Islands (8.4 per cent), and Fiji (5.7 per cent), whilst general regional contributions will account for around a third (36 per cent) of Australian ODA spent in the region.[8] DFAT emphasised Australia’s commitment to invest in climate change, infrastructure, education, gender equality, health, and connectivity in the Pacific.[9]
  10. Given the high priority afforded climate action by Pacific leaders and civil society groups, and the substantial evidence received on this issue, climate change is addressed in the following chapter, including Australia’s efforts to address the climate crisis. Views on Australia’s overseas development program in the Pacific are outlined below.

Defence

2.11The Department of Defence (Defence) submitted that recent reviews had ‘reaffirmed that the security of the Pacific is vital to the security and prosperity of Australia’.[14] Defence emphasised that its engagement in the region placed the priorities of partners ‘front of mind’; ‘Defence responds to priorities identified by Pacific partners, articulated as part of its regular interactions as well as through formal security dialogues’. Moreover, it told the Committee its cooperation in the region enabled Pacific-led responses to Pacific security challenges in support of both the Boe Declaration and the 2050 Pacific Strategy (see Chapter 1).[15]

2.12Defence’s submission provided further details on the regional and bilateral defence initiatives currently being implemented throughout the Pacific, including:

• the Pacific Maritime Security Program, a comprehensive partnership program designed to enhance regional maritime security
• security-related infrastructure investments
• deployments through the Solomons International Assistance Force to secure the Pacific Games and local elections
• the department’s role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and the recently-agreed Pacific Response Group
• the Defence Pacific Air Program in support of Fiji and Papua New Guinea (PNG) air lift and surveillance capabilities
• education, training, and regional exercises.[16]

Policing

2.13The Australian Federal Police (AFP) submitted that it was ‘committed to supporting Pacific Island Countries build resilience to their security challenges as articulated in the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security’. With over 130 personnel spread across the Pacific, AFP told the Committee it worked in partnership with Pacific police organisations through a range of regional and bilateral programs to promote regional stability, enhance community safety and security, and maintain the rule of law.[17] AFP further stated:

The AFP is privileged to partner with police officers in the Pacific, working shoulder to shoulder, to keep our communities safe. Through the AFP’s strong and enduring partnerships, AFP activities and initiatives are designed and adapted to reflect evolving Pacific police priorities, regional threats and emerging needs.

The AFP supports Pacific police leadership, including by empowering and enabling Pacific police to lead the design, development and delivery of capability development initiatives consistent with a ‘by the Pacific, for the Pacific’ ethos.[18]

2.14AFP’s submission provided further details on the regional and bilateral policing initiatives that are currently underway throughout the Pacific.[19]

Immigration and borders

2.15The Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) emphasised the importance of a whole-of-government approach to the Pacific and its role within that, submitting that Home Affairs works closely and coordinates with other government agencies and like-minded partners. It highlighted its role supporting Pacific immigration and customs agencies, whilst providing assistance to strengthen maritime and border security.[20]

2.16Home Affairs also pointed to its role building strategic migration partnerships, including the Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme, the Pacific Engagement Visa, and the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union special mobility pathway (see Chapter 4).[21]

2.17Further, it drew the Committee’s attention to the role of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in supporting Pacific nations during natural disasters and national emergencies through the coordination and deployment of personnel and physical assistance. In relation to this capability, Home Affairs noted:

NEMA maintains and enhances strategic relationships with these deployable capabilities and is working with DFAT to strengthen relationships with equivalent national disaster management organisations across the Pacific.[22]

Cyber and connectivity

2.18DFAT pointed to Australia’s commitments to expand telecommunications infrastructure across the Pacific, including through undersea cables. It noted undersea cables are ‘critical’ to the region’s economic growth, with the financial transactions and information they carry representing a greater value than trade by sea.[23]

2.19The SPC’s Director-General noted many countries in the Pacific region have limited natural resources and suggested Australia could play a role in helping the region ‘transition into a digital age’. He argued digital services could drive future growth in the region:

With the advent of tools like Starlink in the region, suddenly you’ve got the opportunity where every village, every outlying island could potentially be connected to the internet.[24]

2.20Echoing this position, .au Domain Administration emphasised the importance of support for the digital transformation in the Pacific, calling for the Australian Government to support efforts to strengthen cyber resilience and regional connectivity.[25] It submitted:

The internet and digital technologies offer transformative opportunities for innovation, economic growth and social wellbeing, and are recognised as a critical tool for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.[26]

2.21Telecommunications provider Vocus also pointed to the potential benefits such technologies could bring to the region. It argued digital infrastructure should be ‘a key priority’ for Australia’s development assistance in the Pacific, submitting that low earth orbit satellites (like Starlink) ‘are a breakthrough technology capable of providing metro-comparable broadband speeds and performance characteristics to any location, no matter how remote’.[27] Vocus told the Committee these capabilities, as well as drone-mounted mobile networks, could support disaster response and recovery efforts.[28] Yet, it cautioned there is often a lack of commercial incentives to investing in digital infrastructure in the region, and suggested Australian Government support may therefore be necessary to address the growing digital divide.[29]

2.22Innovative Research Universities submitted that information and communication technologies are ‘essential’ for sustainable development, disaster response and risk management, and cybersecurity.[30]

2.23Australian cyber services provider CyberCX argued, given the low base of connectivity, investments in Pacific digital infrastructure could rapidly improve the lives of those connected to new services.[31] CyberCX cautioned, however, that state and criminal actors targeting critical infrastructure pose a threat to the security and prosperity of the Pacific region, and outlined its expectation that such actors would continue to seek opportunities to influence the internal politics of Pacific states.[32] As such, it advocated support for Pacific nations to establish robust cyber security measures, submitting

… a holistic multilateral [cyber security] strategy will not only bolster the economic prospects of Pacific Island nations but also contribute to regional stability and prosperity in the face of current geopolitical competition playing out in the technology domain.[33]

2.24The Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Australia (TECO) also suggested cybersecurity was an area in which the Pacific would benefit from future support and pointed to a need to develop local capacities in this field.[34]

Regional stability

2.25Many submissions addressed regional tensions and the changing geopolitical dynamics within the Pacific. Some advocated greater engagement by Australia to counterbalance competing interests in the region. For example, the World Citizens Association of Australia called for efforts to deepen regional integration in the Pacific to counter Chinese influence.[35]

2.26TECO stated the Pacific was facing ‘some of the sharpest challenges of any region in the world’.[36] It cautioned China was engaging in dept trap diplomacy, elite capture, disinformation, and intimidation in parts of the Pacific,[37] and issued the following warning:

International cooperation and development within the Pacific region are frequently complicated by the increasingly aggressive actions on the part of China. Our allies, partner, and friends in the region are placed under increasingly intense diplomatic and economic pressure by Chinese agents and interests, often to the detriment of their own interests within the region.[38]

2.27TECO told the Committee that Taiwan was a responsible and longstanding partner in the Pacific that shared the region’s political pressures. It argued more could be done to align Australia’s efforts and those of Taiwan to ensure a more unified and consistent framework of international cooperation in the Pacific.[39] TECO called for Australia and Taiwan to ‘pool our efforts, deepen our partnership in the region and communicate this partnership to the world.’ It told the Committee that doing so would combine the power of both nations to ‘do good in the Pacific’ whilst also ‘letting the international community know that free democracies are working together to bring development and prosperity to our neighbours and friends.[40]

2.28Professor Richard Herr OAM and Dr Anthony Bergin echoed these sentiments, describing Taiwan as ‘an important stakeholder’ in the region whose actions had affirmed its support for the 2050 Pacific Strategy. They further argued:

As well as its, economic strength, Taiwan is part of the Western Pacific democracies needed to promote the values of the open societies central to the Boe Declaration which is itself the cornerstone of Pacific Island approach to regional security.[41]

2.29Individually, Professor Herr warned the Committee about accepting overly simplistic narratives on the Pacific. He expressed his view that Pacific regional security had tended to be viewed ‘in apprehensively binary terms', and cautioned the media had tended to ‘resort to hyperbole and sensationalism while looking at almost all events in the region through a geopolitical lens'.[42]

2.30The University of Adelaide provided the Committee with an overview of its Regional Perspectives Research Project that was conducted in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in collaboration with local partners and the Department of Defence. The project aimed to listen to and learn from Pacific peoples to reflect their priorities in order to:

… help Defence to better understand Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, develop more sustainable and culturally sensitive engagement strategies, and play its part in creating a safer, fairer, more stable and prosperous Pacific Islands region.[43]

2.31Among other findings, the report found Australian aid was ‘generally well-regarded’ and concluded the switch in diplomatic ties by the Solomon Islands from Taiwan to China had ‘introduced complex new geopolitical concerns’ that had ‘reshaped’ perceptions of the country.[44] In Vanuatu, the project found perceptions of foreign aid from Australia and China were mixed, whilst concerns were also raised relating to domestic and overseas labour programs, which were seen to bring much-needed investment in the country whilst also potentially disrupting families and communities (see also Chapter 4).[45]

2.32Another area of contestation was identified by Standards Australia. It argued that standardisation, when done well, can function as an enabler of economic, social, and environmental progress, but warned of the threat of ‘standards diplomacy’, whereby geopolitical rivalries may manifest as efforts by one country to implement standards in Pacific countries in order to ‘leverage power and influence’.[46] It argued:

Nations with ambitious trade or strategic agendas are working with regional partners of ours and essentially gifting [National Quality Infrastructure] infrastructure which complicates Australia’s relationships in the region.[47]

2.33Standards Australia warned fragmented standards can create barriers to cross-border trade, create cyber vulnerabilities, hinder development of common markets and regulatory frameworks, and may undermine efforts to foster resilience to natural disasters.[48]

2.34In contrast, some evidence received by the Committee was concerned at what was perceived to be the prioritisation of geopolitical rivalries at the expense of other interests in the region. The Medical Association for Prevention of War (MAPW), for example, expressed concern at what it described as Australia prioritising the Pacific’s geopolitical significance at the expense of addressing the stated priorities of Pacific leaders and communities:

The Pacific region is being increasingly militarised, as tensions rise between the US and China, and Australia is willingly involved in US military planning and war preparations.[49]

2.35MAPW also described the reference in this inquiry’s terms of reference to ‘partner of choice’ (2a) as a ‘thinly veiled reference to competition with China for Pacific engagement’. MAPW further cautioned this concern had ‘more to do with [Australia’s] own interests than those of the Pacific nations themselves’.[50]

2.36Further, MAPW warned the AUKUS treaty and Australia’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines was expected to ‘inflame regional tensions’.[51] It also drew the Committee’s attention to the potential damage that could result from geopolitical rivalries being played out in the Pacific, quoting the Secretary-General of the Pacific Council of Churches, Reverand James Bhagwan:

The pressure on Pacific Island countries to choose sides in this ‘new cold war’ is beginning to unravel the cords that bind our regional, sub-regional and national political and social structures. For local communities, the concern is not geopolitics but improvement of their wellbeing through better healthcare, infrastructure development, education and employment opportunities across their islands and highlands.[52]

2.37The Centre for Human Security and Social Change at La Trobe University called for Australia to ensure its engagement in the region focused on issues that were prioritised by Pacific peoples (including climate change, food security, and governance) and to ensure such action was not ‘overshadowed by geopolitical prerogatives’ and ‘geo-strategic competition’.[53]

2.38Similarly, the Federation of Catholic Bishops Conferences of Oceania cautioned geopolitical rivalry was negatively impacting the security and stability of the Pacific, whilst undermining relationships throughout the region.[58] And Professor Richard Herr OAM told the Committee, ‘Pacific Island countries are conflicted by the desire to want to participate in decisions impacting them while not wanting to be drawn into conflicts not in their national interests'.[59]

2.39Drawing on its consultations with Pacific leaders and civil society groups, the Pacific Australian Emerging Leaders Network also suggested geopolitical tensions risk undermining Australia’s standing in the region:

There is a prevailing perception that Australia views Pacific nations primarily through a geopolitical lens. The depiction of the relationship as a ‘family’ can be met with scepticism, suggesting a paternalistic dynamic.[60]

2.40Relatedly, a joint submission from Professors Barnett and Wang and Mr Tanielu suggested Australian-Chinese rivalry was ‘harming the prosperity’ of the Pacific. The joint submission argued:

For most Pacific Island countries, China’s growing presence in the South Pacific is much less a threat to their security and much more an opportunity to access new and additional resources to help address their key security challenges.[61]

2.41The academics also cautioned, ‘Australia should not assume it has moral superiority in the region' and called for both powers to work together:

Establishing institutions for cooperation between Australian, Chinese and Pacific Island firms, governments, and universities can more efficiently address the region’s major challenges as well as establish confidence and cooperation between all parties.[62]

2.42Act for Peace expressed concern for what it perceived to be the politicisation of aid amid heightened geopolitical tensions in the region.[63]

2.43France offered a middle ground approach to geopolitical rivalries in the Pacific:

The whole EU, not France alone, defines China as a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival and we think this tryptic perfectly fits our very complex relationship. Therefore our approach is very much in line with the Australian government’s moto: “cooperate where we can, disagree where we must, and engage in the national interest”’.[64]

2.44It further told the Committee that France’s approach in the Pacific is 'fundamentally aimed at reducing tensions in the region, without being naïve’.[65]

2.45DFAT told the Committee Australia was helping to build resilience and capacity across the Pacific to address ‘shared security challenges’:

The Australian Government’s security engagement is a broad and deep whole-of-government effort that delivers on bilateral security treaty commitments and deepens our security, law enforcement and criminal justice partnerships in the Pacific.[66]

Views on Australia’s engagement in the Pacific

2.46Evidence was generally supportive of Australia’s development assistance in the Pacific. TECO, for example, described Australia as ‘a force for good’ in the region.[67] ACFID summarised Australia’s role as follows:

Australia’s development assistance underpins our close relationships with Pacific Island countries and cements Australia as a partner of choice in supporting the Pacific’s economic development aspirations and security objectives.[68]

2.47ACFID further described Australia’s aid program as fair, transparent, accessible, and inclusive, and stated:

Australia has a long history of effective, principled development programs, programs that build livelihoods, resilience and achieve outcomes. Australia delivers programming from a rights based approach demonstrative of the core values of the Australian community.[69]

2.48Caritas Australia, however, noted Australia’s ODA was 0.69 per cent of government spending in 2023–24 and projected to fall to 0.68 per cent in 2024–25, making Australia one of the least generous within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. It cautioned Australia’s ability to address the region’s priorities was constrained by its limited funding.[70]

2.49ACFID also highlighted Australia’s relatively low ODA, telling the Committee Australia is consequently ‘punching well below our weight’. It therefore urged the Australian Government to increase ODA to one per cent of the federal budget for 2026–27.[71]

2.50In a 2019 report into Australia’s aid program in the Indo-Pacific, this Committee recommended that the Australian Government commit a minimum of 0.5 per cent of government expenditure to the international development program within five years and a minimum of 0.7 per cent within ten years.[72] The Australian Government has yet to respond to the Committee’s report and recommendations.

2.51Expressing concerns at elements within Australia’s Pacific development program, Save the Children claimed it prioritises ‘immediate diplomatic and economic gains over short and long-term social development'.[73]

2.52ACFID broke down Australia’s ODA spent in the Pacific in 2022–23, claiming the majority was allocated for infrastructure and climate finance projects, leaving less than 10 per cent for Australian NGOs and only 12 per cent being directed through Pacific civil society. It questioned the balance of Australia’s ODA, cautioning progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals—particularly those related to health and education—was ‘significantly behind’ target.[74]

2.53ActionAid added that the majority of aid funding is currently directed to for-profit managing contractors.[75]

2.54Separate to discussions on the overall effectiveness and the quantum of ODA, submissions to this inquiry called for various changes Australia’s international development program, as outlined below.

Pacific-led development

2.55Many submitters and witnesses emphasised the importance of working through existing regional architecture. Save the Children Australia’s Dr Betty Barkha, for example, told the Committee, ‘Pacific regional bodies provide invaluable support to Pacific governments, serving as a bridge for the development and implementation of public policy and programs’.[76]

2.56Mr ‘Alopi Latukefu from the Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education called for greater Australia investment in regional structures, telling the Committee these had ‘been built over generations’ and had become ‘really important parts of the resilience of the region’.[77]

2.57Act for Peace also emphasised the need to work through the existing regional architecture,[78] while ACFID highlighted the importance of working through the PIF and PIANGO, in particular.[79] However, ACFID also called for greater engagement with civil society networks:

While government-to-government bilateral relationships underwrite Australia’s engagement with the region, it is civil society networks, groups and organisations that connect communities across the region and are currently an untapped resource in Australia’s foreign policy approach to partnership.[80]

2.58Professor Richard Herr OAM described Pacific regional structures as 'an important contributor to the relatively high level of political agency that the regional states, individually and collectively, enjoy in moderating their extra-regional environment'. He expressed concern, however, that the regional architecture was being subjected to pressures which could ‘endanger its continuing effectiveness’.[81]

2.59Nevertheless, the Pacific Islands Climate Action Network (PICAN) noted the ‘dual role’ in the Forum played by both Australia and New Zealand as active members as well as major funders of the organisation. It argued this dynamic represents a potential conflict of interest in which PIF funders may exert financial influence over the Forum, thereby undermining the autonomy of Pacific leaders.[82]

2.60In contrast, the Pacific Australian Emerging Leaders Network argued, ‘Australia must move beyond a passive observer role within the PIF and actively engage as an equal partner’.[83]

2.61The World Citizens Association of Australia called for reform of the PIF, submitting Australia should work to upgrade the PIF to a ‘community’. It argued:

This would be of great help in dealing more effectively with the collective needs and issues of the Pacific region, and giving the people of the Pacific a greater voice in their own affairs.[84]

Supporting civil society and locally-led development

2.62Much of the evidence received by the Committee called for greater investment in civil society organisations (CSOs). The Australian Red Cross acknowledged the Australian Government’s provision of multiyear flexible funding for local humanitarian actors, describing the commitment as ‘a critical enabler of more effective and locally relevant humanitarian action in the Pacific region’.[85] Nevertheless, most of the evidence received by the Committee was more critical of Australia’s efforts on this front. Many submitters urged Australia to further prioritise locally-led development in the region, including Adelaide University, which called for greater efforts to ‘prioritise locally driven solutions that build local capacity and recognise local expertise and agendas’.[86]

2.63Plan International Australia also advocated for increased funding for Pacific CSOs, noting Australia’s current level of contributions are around half that of OECD partners.[87]

2.64ACFID also called on the Australian Government to respond to the priorities of CSOs:

The priorities of Pacific Island countries are best identified and evaluated by Pacific Island countries. Australia’s development program should ensure that it listens and responds to Pacific voices and priorities. The Australian Government must to listen to the voices of Pacific Island countries and to have specific regard to the voices of Pacific CSOs.[88]

2.65ACFID further argued:

Pacific people have long advocated for locally-led and owned approaches to development that both value and respectfully integrate Pacific culture, faith, values and traditions. Supporting and strengthening civil society not only enables Australia to deliver a more effective and locally led development program - it also supports pluralism, strengthens effective and accountable governance, builds deeper partnerships and contributes to greater security and stability across the region.[89]

2.66ACFID called for the Australian Government to set a target to direct 25 per cent of all ODA to civil society, in keeping with commitments made through the Grand Bargain (an agreement, of which Australia is a signatory, reached in 2016 between some of the largest donors and humanitarian organisations) and emphasising the need for flexible, multi-year, and core funding. It acknowledged some funding for CSO may need to be channelled through Australian NGOs, which it submitted hold longstanding partnership with the region and support local organisations to increase their capacity to absorb donor funding.[90] ACFID told the Committee it was important for Australia to invest in Australian NGOs as a ‘whole-of-nation resource’, but argued ‘Australia is underutilising Australian NGOs in its development program’.[91]

2.67Also highlighting the importance of strong CSOs across the region, Save the Children Australia called for the Australian Government to foster the capabilities of local organisations.[92] The Live & Pacific Network called for greater urgency and ambition in Australia’s Pacific aid, and argued it could better meet the region’s challenges by channelling funding directly, and at a lower overall cost, through localised development initiatives that benefit communities.[93]

2.68Caritas Australia noted Pacific CSOs were constrained by insufficient resources and funding, leading to skills shortages, retention issues, a lack of long-term funding, and a power imbalance with donors.[94] It therefore urged the Australian Government to support CSOs with capacity building and financial diversification strategies, and to leverage civil society networks, including churches in a region in which over 90 per cent identify as Christian:

In the Pacific region, [CSOs] including churches, play an essential role in building stable, cohesive and peaceful societies. They are the most effective and widespread social and cultural institutions. Locally, they are often the first responders and shelters during disasters, site of community wide meetings, and in rural and remote areas often the best built physical infrastructure in the area.[95]

2.69DFAT agreed that the church was an influential part of all Pacific nations, noting church networks inform how Australia’s ODA is targeted across the region and are often also involved in service delivery.[96] It drew the Committee’s attention to its Pacific Church Partnership Program, which it claimed is supporting the programs of Pacific churches, as well as helping to build capacity and strengthen organisational governance.[97]

2.70YWAM Medical Ships’ Mr Charles Abel described the Christian faith as providing a ‘strong basis for people-to-people connections’ in the Pacific (see also Chapter 4), whilst Dr Sarah Dunn stated that a sense of spirituality was ‘a core part of life’ in the region.[98]

2.71Director-General of the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, Mr Sefanaia Nawadra, also recognised the key role churches play in reaching communities and advocating for change, arguing they have ‘the most reach in all of the Pacific’.[99]

2.72The International Women’s Development Agency (IWDA) emphasised the critical importance of Australia listening to and responding to the priorities expressed by diverse Pacific voices.[100] It welcomed DFAT’s guidance note on locally-led development, but expressed concern at its ‘overwhelming focus’ on institutional and fiduciary risk. IWDA therefore called for a greater appreciation for the risk of not adequately investing in these organisations in terms of democratic backsliding, poorer economic performance, and the undermining of women’s rights in the region.[101]

2.73Relatedly, IWDA drew a distinction between localisation and decolonisation. It claimed localisation operates ‘in the same system with different players’, calling instead for efforts to decolonise Australia’s engagement in the Pacific. Such an approach, it stated, would focus on ‘changing the system itself’.[102] Moreover, IWDA questioned DFAT’s recent approach to the issue in relation to localisation and women’s rights organisations:

DFAT’s approach in recent years demonstrates a concerning trend of requiring local organisations to receive direct funding, regardless of whether they may prefer to receive funding through intermediaries who can provide support on meeting the extensive compliance requirements, thereby freeing up their own staff to work on core business of advancing women’s rights. Far from responding to Pacific women’s calls to decolonise South-North partnership, this approach risks imposing a donor driven agenda and replicating patterns of power and coloniality.[103]

2.74The Australian National University Institute for Climate, Energy & Disaster Solutions made similar calls for locally-led development and a ‘fundamental shift’ in the ways in which the aid system operates in the Pacific. It cautioned:

Australian aid to the Pacific has become increasingly politicised, privatised and contested, resulting in a donor-driven system that often fails to empower Pacific communities or reduce aid dependency. The aid is often controlled by large organisations and can be seen to serve Australian interests, marginalising local Pacific companies and communities.[104]

2.75The International Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Consortium (ISRHRC) also argued that Australia’s partnerships in the region should go beyond localisation to decolonisation. It claimed understanding the power dynamics that exist between Australia and its development partners was necessary to 'rebalance these relationships through valuing local approaches and knowledge'.[105]

2.76Relatedly, in the 2023 report into Supporting democracy in our region, this Committee recommended that the Australian Government set annual baseline CSO funding, as a percentage of ODA.[106] It stated:

The Committee supports the CSOs’ request for a minimum allocation of Australia’s [ODA] funding to ensure long term continuation of programs and support for local communities in our region… The Committee strongly believes that CSOs play a critical role in supporting the inclusion of women, people with disabilities, youth and other marginalised groups across the Indo-Pacific region. The Committee recognises the value of CSOs working on the ground in country, as they often have the ability to respond rapidly to issues that may arise. The Committee notes that boosting funding for Australian based CSOs in the region is important in order for these sustainable partnerships to be effective and to thrive.[107]

2.77The Australian Government has yet to respond to the Committee’s report and recommendations.

2.78Somewhat in contrast to these views, however, UNICEF Australia called for Australia to prioritise its partnerships with multilateral institutions: ‘[m]ultilateral institutions such as UNICEF play a key role in the region, and are a key way of strengthening regional security and driving development outcomes at scale,’ it submitted.[108] It further claimed multilateral partners, like UNICEF, work with regional governments and local partners in ways which allow for timely and flexible initiatives that are innovative and effective. UNICEF Australia concluded:

…it is also important to optimise the aid architecture in the Pacific through better utilising the strengths of various stakeholders including government, private sector, UN, INGOs, research institutions and civil society, by ensuring complementarity in the roles played by different stakeholders in a sector. The focus should be on leveraging the strengths of each stakeholder depending upon their comparative advantage to achieve long term sustainable gains.[109]

2.79UNICEF Australia pointed to the important system-strengthening role played by UN agencies and their ability to deliver responses quickly and at scale. It therefore urged Australia to maintain a ‘balanced set of investments and partnerships’ and stated, maintaining the diversity of those collaborations is important’.[110]

Prioritising children and young people

2.80Save the Children Australia pointed to the significance of the growth in the region’s youth population, in which around a fifth of the population is between 15 and 24 years of age. It cautioned, ‘the youth bulge is expected to significantly impact areas such as healthcare, education, employment, and urbanisation over the next five years’.[111]

2.81UNICEF Australia argued children are ‘at the forefront of the region’s most significant opportunities and also its greatest challenges’.[112] It told the Committee children make up two-fifths of the region and over half the region’s population is under 24 years of age. It noted this presents ‘an incredible opportunity’ for the Pacific,[113] telling the Committee, '[p]rioritising children produces a significant return on investment and is critical for improving a country’s economic and climate resilience'.[114]

2.82However, UNICEF Australia cautioned children and young people were often marginalised and overlooked in Australia’s engagement in the region. It also warned that one-in-six children under-five in the region experiences severe food poverty, whilst more than four-fifths report experiencing violent discipline in school.[115] Further, UNICEF Australia noted Australia does not currently recognise children and young people as a distinct group within its International Development Policy, and called for the development of an International Children’s Development Strategy.[116] It argued:

Demographic realities in the Pacific necessitate an aid program and climate resilient policies and investments that prioritise the needs of children and young people and the sectors they rely on most—health, education, nutrition, wash and social protection. Doing so is not only good development practice but will provide stronger return on ODA in the long run.[117]

Gender, sexuality, and advancing women’s rights

2.83A recurring theme throughout this inquiry was the central importance of women’s rights organisations to future efforts to address the priorities of the Pacific. For example, DFAT drew to the Committee’s attention it’s Pacific Women Lead program supporting women’s leadership through the PIF, SPC, multilateral partners, and women-led civil society organisations, worth $170 million between 2021–26. DFAT described the program as designed to ‘ensure rights are realised and to increase the effectiveness of regional gender equality efforts’.[118]

2.84Building on the calls for locally-led development detailed above, IWDA advocated long-term flexible funding for women’s rights organisations to cover core costs and not just program costs. Such an approach, it submitted, would allow these organisations to ‘engage in adaptive planning with confidence’.[119]

2.85IWDA told the Committee that the vital work of women’s rights organisations in the Pacific was ‘demanding and underresourced'.[120] In calling for an increased allocation of Australia’s ODA for this work, it emphasised the impact of climate on women and girls:

Women and girls face disproportionate climate risks as a result of discriminatory gender norms and structures. For example, changes to natural resources increase the labour demands of gendered activities such as subsistence farming and collecting food, fuel and water. Financial stress and lack of access to the necessities of life can exacerbate intimate partner violence, while exposing women to greater risk of sexual assault as they have to travel greater distances to source food and fuel.[121]

2.86ActionAid similarly pointed to the ‘disproportionate’ impacts of climate change on women and girls, and urged the Australian Government to target funding for women’s rights organisations and gender responsive approaches to climate change and disasters.[122] To address this, Ms Roselyn Mantanung from Plan International Papua New Guinea, argued:

Prioritising gender and climate are not just matters of fairness but also strategic necessity. Pacific girls are the next generation of political and community leaders, business owners and parents; investing in them is an intergenerational investment in a brighter, strong future for the entire region.

2.87Ms Carolyn Kitione, Regional Representative for Shifting the Power Coalition, outlined for the Committee the intersection between climate change and gender:

… our countries are already experiencing the severe impact of frequent intense and out-of-season cyclones, coastal erosion and rising sea levels. This crisis disproportionately affects women, in particular young women and women with disabilities, exacerbating existing gender inequalities, and increasing their vulnerability in the face of climate disasters.[123]

2.88Ms Kitione called for greater integration of cultural and gender considerations within climate finance instruments.[124]

2.89Stressing the value of providing long-term and flexible funding to women’s rights organisations, ACFID submitted:

Global evidence points to the most effective and impactful outcomes being achieved when [women’s rights organisations] are provided with core, flexible, long-term funding which provides stability for them to exist and become a mainstay of local civil society, advocating for women’s rights and gender equality.[125]

2.90Noting that only around four per cent of Australia’s ODA is currently spent on targeted gender equality initiatives, ActionAid Australia called for 20 percent of all bilateral ODA to the Pacific to be spent on initiatives with gender equality as the primary objective.[126]

2.91A number of submissions also highlighted the importance of Australia’s support for addressing sexual and gender-based violence (GBV) in the Pacific. The ISRHRC argued rates of sexual and gender-based violence in the Pacific are disproportionately high, and submitted that, whilst under a third (30 per cent) of women globally experience physical and/or sexual violence during their lifetime, numbers are far higher in the Pacific: 79 per cent of women in Tonga experience physical and/or sexual violence, it reported, with 76 per cent in Samoa, 73 per cent in Kiribati, 72 per cent in Fiji and Vanuatu, and 64 per cent in the Solomin Islands.[127]

2.92ISRHRC also noted the importance of sexual and reproductive health and rights during a crisis, describing such interventions as ‘lifesaving, empowering, and cost-effective’. However, ISRHRC warned this area remains ‘one of the most neglected and underfunded components of humanitarian response’.[128]

2.93ActionAid and the Shifting the Power Coalition (SPC) also noted the ‘marginalisation of women’s voices and leadership’ in disaster management, arguing this was symptomatic of wider gender inequality across the Pacific. ‘Gender inequality is pervasive across the Pacific region due to entrenched patriarchal and heteronormative cultural, religious and social norms,’ it argued, leading to an entrenched prevalence of GBV and a disproportionate impact of climate change and disasters on women and LGBTQIA+ peoples across the Pacific.[129]

2.94ActionAid and SPC described Australia as having made ‘strong progress’ on improving gender equality mainstreaming into its international development program. It nevertheless called for a commitment of 20 per cent of ODA in the Pacific to be spent on initiatives that have gender equality as their primary objective and for 5percent of ODA to be spent on women’s rights organisations.[130]

2.95The Committee also heard from Ms Tatryanna Utanga and Ms Valery Wichman from the Te Tiare Association in relation to years of advocacy for the Anuanua (‘rainbow’) community and the campaign to decriminalise homosexuality in the Cook Islands. Ms Wichamn told the Committee how the successful campaign had led to different countries in the Pacific looking to the Cook Islands as leaders in the rights of LGBTQI+ communities and stated:

There was definitely a trial period and there were lines drawn between different parties. But, at the end of the day, what was important was the values that brought all of our people together: love, kindness and respect.[131]

2.96She nevertheless cautioned that, although the Anuanua community of the Cook Islands is now equal under the law, there is still work to be done to improve people’s lives and acceptance. Ms Wichman also acknowledged the support for the campaign from regional partners.[132] To this end, the Committee heard from DFAT that the Australian Government has committed to supporting LGBTIQA+ initiatives in the region as well as on a country-by-country basis.[133]

Striving for disability equity

2.97Australian Disability & Development Consortium (ADDC) and CBM Australia drew the Committee’s attention to the extensive lack of disability support services across the Pacific. It consequently called for the Australian Government to identify people with disabilities as a priority group within its development assistance.[134] ADDC and CBM Australia also pointed to the impact of climate change on people with disabilities, stating that people with disabilities are the ‘largest and most complex group at risk of climate change’. It cautioned that climate change ‘amplify[ies] the risks and exclusion that people with disabilities already experience daily, while also introducing new risks and creating new barriers’.[135]

2.98The Pacific Disability Forum (PDF) similarly noted the region faces ‘significant barriers to inclusion’, with many countries lacking the requisite infrastructure or resources, as well as entrenched social attitudes that, it argued, ‘hinder the full participation and resilience of persons with disabilities’. In response, PDF called for increased funding and resources for inclusion, the active involvement of persons with disabilities in the design of programs and policies, and enhanced regional collaboration across the region.[136]

2.99DFAT’s submission detailed Australian-funded partnerships with the PIF and SPC which it claimed have ‘disability equity at their core’. DFAT also outlined its provision of technical support, core-funding, as well as grants in support of disability organisations.[137]

2.100ACFID welcomed DFAT’s development of a new International Disability Equity and Rights Strategy, which identifies disability equity as a core issue within Australia’s international development program.[138] ADDC and CBM Australia called for this strategy to require that 80 per cent of all Australian-funded development programs address disability equity.[139]

Addressing health and the growing prevalence of non-communicable diseases

2.101The Committee acknowledges that delivering on the priorities of the Pacific requires a commitment to listen to what Pacific leaders and communities are requesting of us. As an example, PNG is Australia’s largest development partner, with an estimated $637.4 million in ODA funding (2024-25), and noting Australia is PNG’s largest trading partner. The Committee noted the evidence of PNG’s Prime Minister, Hon James Marape (included in a written submission from YWAM Medical Ships) and the evidence of Mr Charles Abel (former Deputy Prime Minister of PNG) that PNG sees the continuation and expansion of targeted investments in mobile health clinics and consistent outreach programs to generate collaborative health solutions as a priority.[140] The Committee notes Prime Minister Marape’s view that the existing YWAM Medical Ship should be life-extended as a high priority to enable the continuation of the program in the western provinces of PNG.

2.102The Australian Global Health Alliance argued health should be central to Australia’s regional development program:

Good health is foundational to a nation and region’s economic and social prosperity, and crucial to maintaining stability and security. Efforts in the Pacific to enhance Australia’s position as a partner of choice for the Pacific family should therefore include the recognition of global health as a strategic cross-cutting asset of international development and foreign policy, alongside diplomacy, investment and trade.[141]

2.103It emphasised the need to tackle the growing threat posed by the high prevalence of non-communicable diseases (NCDs, that is, a disease that is not transmissible directly from one person to another), in particular.[142]

2.104The George Institute for Global Health similarly emphasised the importance of addressing NCDs and their growing impact on health systems across the region. It told the Committee people in the Pacific face some of the world’s highest rates of NCDs—particularly cardiovascular disease, chronic respiratory diseases, cancers, and diabetes—accounting for 12 million deaths in the WHO Western Pacific region. As the donor responsible for around two-fifths of development assistance in the region, Ms Veronica Le Venez claimed Australia’s investments have a ‘major influence’ on the decisions of other countries in the Pacific. She therefore urged Australia to play a leadership to ensure increased investments in health development assistance, with an emphasis on tackling NCDs.[143]

2.105Noting NCDs are a leading (and growing) cause of mortality in the region, the McCabe Centre for Law and Cancer acknowledged that PIF Leaders had consistently identified NCDs as a human, social, and economic crisis facing the Pacific. It pointed to the August 2024 PIF Leaders communique which reaffirmed the region’s commitment to addressing the NCD crisis.[144]

2.106The Fred Hollows Foundation also called for action on NCDs, which it submitted account for up to three-quarters of the region’s deaths.[145] The Fred Hollows Foundation highlighted ‘alarmingly high rates’ of blindness and vision impairment, 90 per cent of which it claimed was treatable. It further argued

Improving eye health can directly impact economic integration and mobility by enabling individuals to participate fully in economic activities. Restoring sight is not only cost-effective, with high returns on investment, but it also brings about wider social and economic benefits. Restoring sight boosts education, employment, and social inclusion, improving lives beyond health.[146]

2.107The Fred Hollows Foundation also pointed to the threat of diabetes, which it stated was emerging as the next major health crisis, describing it as an ‘impending tsunami’.[147] Exacerbating the threat of NCDs, it cautioned there had been a ‘substantial exodus’ of nurses from the region over recent years, ‘resulting in a loss of critical skills and training’.[148]

2.108With nearly two-thirds (62 per cent) of key health infrastructure being located close to coastlines, Save the Children Australia warned the region’s health systems were not adequately equipped to meet future needs related to climate change and natural disasters.[149]

2.109The communique from the 53rd Pacific Islands Forum, held in Tonga in August 2024, identified the vulnerability of the region’s health system to climate change as its first substantive issue, and pointed to the region’s ongoing crisis related to NCDs.[150]

Governance and corruption

2.110Transparency International Australia and Transparency Solomon Islands (TIA and TSI) told the Committee the Pacific consistently scores poorly in terms of perceived levels of corruption. In findings from an annual corruption barometer, nearly two-thirds (61 per cent) of respondents in the region thought corruption in government is a significant problem, with more than half (56 per cent) perceiving it to be worsening.[151] Further, TIA and TSI submitted that almost a third of respondents who had accessed public services in the previous year reported paying a bribe—the highest rate of any region covered by the study.[152] Highlighting the significance of these findings, it cautioned, '[c]orruption hampers inclusive economic growth, stability, gender equality and increases poverty'.[153]

2.111Mr Clancy Moore, Transparency International Australia CEO, cautioned corruption, if unaddressed, threatens to undermine all Pacific priorities.[154]

Committee comment

2.112The Committee considers that Australia’s development program must be built on the contributions of Pacific voices and must respond to the priorities advocated by Pacific leaders and communities. As such, it welcomes the Australian Government’s commitment to delivering Pacific-led, Australian-backed solutions and to continuously ensure Australia’s interventions align with those of the Pacific. The Committee also welcomes the Australian Government’s ongoing efforts to work with and through Pacific regional architecture.

2.113In the view of the Committee, one message stood out among the evidence received during the course of this inquiry; that is the call for greater efforts to support locally-led development, including the need for flexible, long-term, core funding for civil society actors. Indeed, the Committee recognises the essential work carried out by civil society across the Pacific in areas from climate action, to health care, inclusion, and rights. It also recognises the need to ensure Australian Government-funded initiatives in the region are locally-led and locally-owned, where appropriate. This will require a significant reallocation of ODA directly to CSOs through long-term, flexible, and core funding that supports the sustainability and responsiveness of these organisations. Priorities should include women’s rights, disability organisations, and groups working to promote the rights of LGBTQIA+ communities, in particular. On this issue, the Committee notes the Australian Government’s commitment to supporting LGBTQIA+ initiatives throughout the Pacific.

2.114The Government’s approach to ODA should complement Australia’s already strong commitment to working through and alongside Pacific regional and national structures. But the Committee also considers the Australian Government should be willing to be bolder, more flexible, and willing to absorb more risk in pursuit of effective and sustainable locally-led development in the Pacific. As such, and in keeping with the Committee’s report of 2023, the Committee recommends the Australian Government prioritise funding for CSOs within the ODA budget, following consultations both within Australia as well as across the Pacific.

2.115Vital though CSOs are to the prosperity of the region and the wellbeing of its peoples, the Committee also recognises other avenues for ODA must be maintained. In particular, the Committee notes the vital role played by Australian NGOs in supporting, strengthening, and adding value to local partners in the Pacific. To this end, the Committee would also welcome an increase in ODA channelled through Australian NGOs. It considers funding to Australian NGOs preferable to for-profit contractors and recommends the Australian Government prioritise its funding accordingly.

2.116Moreover, bilateral and multilateral funding are vital to delivering on the priorities of the region and on Australia’s own development agenda. The Committee therefore considers bilateral and multi-lateral funding complements locally-led projects, and believes this diversity to be essential to ensuring our international development program is sustainable and effective. The exact balance between local, bilateral, and multilateral funding, as well as the ways in which ODA is allocated across different sectors, will be an ongoing project for DFAT, and should be heavily informed by Pacific voices. But if Australia is to remain responsive to the region’s own priorities, these allocations are likely to change over time. As such, the Committee does not consider it appropriate to commit to specific allocations of ODA by sector, despite recommendations to this effect made by many submitters.

2.117Further, the Committee considers that churches and faith-based organisations are highly influential across the region and play a key role delivering essential services to Pacific communities. As such, the Committee considers them to be vital partners in Australia’s Pacific engagement, and welcomes DFAT’s Pacific Church Partnership Program, among other initiatives supporting faith-based communities in the region. Nevertheless, the Committee considers the role of church networks could be further prioritised within Australia’s international development program and would welcome greater efforts by the Australian Government to support and work through faith-based organisations in the Pacific.

2.118Finally, the Committee was troubled by commentary around Australia being one of the least generous countries among its peers. Calls to increase the amount we spend on ODA were clearly heard by Committee members. Indeed, this Committee made just such a recommendation in 2019 when it urged the government to commit to increasing spending on ODA to at least 0.7 per cent of gross national income within ten years. However, noting ODA was already approaching this target in 2023–24 (at 0.69 per cent), but is expected to fall to 0.68 per cent in 2024–25, the Committee encourages the Australian Government to continue to work towards securing bipartisan support for the international development program, including through sustainable indexation, for the long-term growth of the aid program. In allocating future ODA budgets, the Committee encourages DFAT and the Australian Government to take into account the calls articulated in evidence to this inquiry, in particular as they relate to funding for women and girls, disability and inclusion, health programs integrated with development partner nations’ programs, and investments in tackling NCDs.

Recommendations

2.119The Committee recommends that the Australian Government continues to work towards securing bipartisan support for the international development program, including through indexation, for the long-term growth of the aid program.

2.120The Committee recommends that the Australian Government, following consultations with Australian non-government organisations and Pacific Civil Society Organisations, prioritises funding for Civil Society Organisations within the Official Development Assistance budget.

2.121The Committee recommends that the Australian Government examines the share of Overseas Development Assistance received by for-profit managing contractors, with a view to increasing the share received by Pacific civil society organisations and Australian non-government organisations.

2.122The Committee recommends that the Australian Government respond to the stated priority of the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Government and increase support through overseas development assistance via PNG or directly to YWAM to enable the life extension of the YWAM Medical Ship.

Footnotes

[1]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Stepping up Australia’s engagement with our pacific family, September 2019, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/stepping-up-australias-engagement-with-our-pacific-family.pdf (accessed 19 July 2024)

[2]DFAT, Office of the Pacific, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/office-of-the-pacific (accessed 19 July 2024)

[3]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 3

[4]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 2

[5]DFAT, Australia’s Official Development Assistance: Development Budget Summary 2024–25, p. 1

[6]DFAT, submission 80, p. 4

[7]DFAT, submission 80, p. 4

[8]DFAT, Australia’s Official Development Assistance Budget Summary 2024–25, p. 2

[9]DFAT, Australia’s Official Development Assistance Budget Summary 2024–25, Table 2, p. 8

[10]DFAT, Australia’s International Development Policy, August 2023, p. 7

[11]See generally, DFAT, Australia’s International Development Policy, August 2023

[12]DFAT, Australia’s International Development Policy, August 2023, p. 20

[13]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 5

[14]Department of Defence, Submission 82, p. [2]

[15]Department of Defence, Submission 82, p. [2]

[16]Australian Federal Police, Submission 78

[17]Australian Federal Police, Submission 78, p. 2

[18]Australian Federal Police, Submission 78, p. 2

[19]Australian Federal Police, Submission 78

[20]Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs), Submission 39, p. 3

[21]Home Affairs, Submission 39, p. 4

[22]Home Affairs, Submission 39, p. 6

[23]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 6

[24]Dr Stuart Minchin, Director-General, Pacific Community, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 32

[25].au Domain Administration, Submission 6, p. 1

[26].au Domain Administration, Submission 6, p. 1

[27]Vocus, Submission 33, p. 5

[28]Vocus, Submission 33, p. 6

[29]Vocus, Submission 33, p. 2

[30]Innovative Research Universities, Submission 54, p. [3]

[31]CyberCX, Submission 20, p. 3

[32]CyberCX, Submission 20, pp. 4–5

[33]CyberCX, Submission 20, p. 5

[34]Mr Douglas Yu-Tien Hsu, Representative, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Australia, Committee Hansard, 22 August 2024, p. 4

[35]World Citizens Association of Australia, Submission 25, p. 1

[36]Mr Douglas Yu-Tien Hsu, Representative, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Australia, Committee Hansard, 22 August 2024, p. 1

[37]Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO), Submission 44, p. [6]

[38]TECO, Submission 44, p. [6]

[39]TECO, Submission 44, p. [7]

[40]Mr Douglas Yu-Tien Hsu, Representative, TECO, Committee Hansard, 22 August 2024, p. 1

[41]Professor Richard Herr OAM and Dr Anthony Bergin, Submission 40, p. [2]

[42]Richard Herr OAM PhD, Submission 70, p. [5]

[43]Adelaide University, Submission 23, Attachment 1, p. 1

[44]Adelaide University, Submission 23, Attachment 1, p. 3

[45]Adelaide University, Submission 23, Attachment 1, p. 4

[46]Standards Australia, Submission 75, p. [2]

[47]Standards Australia, Submission 75, p. [2]

[48]Standards Australia, Submission 75, pp. [1–4]

[49]Medical Association for Prevention of War (MAPW), Submission 35, p. 2

[50]MAPW, Submission 35, p. 3

[51]MAPW, Submission 35, pp. 5–6

[52]MAPW, Submission 35, p. 4

[53]Centre for Human Security and Social Change, La Trobe University, Submission 31, p. 3

[54]Prof Michael Leach, Politics and International Relations, Swinburne University of Technology, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 2. For a further breakdown of attitudes by each response country, see Figures 8 and 9 in Assoc Prof Julien Barbara, Prof Michael Leach, Dr Kerryn Baker and Dr Christopher Mudaliar, Submission 62, p. 6

[55]Assoc Prof Julien Barbara, Prof Michael Leach, Dr Kerryn Baker and Dr Christopher Mudaliar, Submission 62, Figure 13, p. 7

[56]Dr Kerryn Baker, Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 1

[57]Associate Professor Julien Barbara, Director, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 2

[58]Federation of Catholic Bishops Conferences of Oceania, Submission 24, p. 2

[59]Professor Richard Herr OAM, sub 70, p. [3]

[60]Pacific Australian Emerging Leaders Network, Submission 34, p. [5]

[61]Prof Barnett, Prof Wang and Mr Tanielu, Submission 18, p. 2

[62]Prof Barnett, Prof Wang and Mr Tanielu, Submission 18, p. 2

[63]Act for Peace, Submission 41, p. 5

[64]Embassy of France, Submission 38, p. [2]

[65]Embassy of France, Submission 38, pp. [1–2]

[66]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 7

[67]TECO, Submission 44, p. [7]

[68]Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), Submission 73, p. 10

[69]Ms Jocelyn Condon, Chief of Policy and Advocacy, ACFID, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 19

[70]Caritas Australia, Submission 65, p. 1

[71]Mr Alan Hewson, Policy and Partnerships Lead, ACFID, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 20

[72]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, First report: Inquiry into Australia’s aid program in the Indo-Pacific, April 2019, recommendation 3

[73]Save the Children Australia, Submission 64, p. 3

[74]Ms Condon, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 16

[75]Ms Michelle Higelin, Executive Director, ActionAid Australia, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 25

[76]Dr Betty Barkha, Pacific Gender Equality Disability and Social Inclusion Technical Advisory, Save the Children Australia, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 31

[77]Mr ‘Alopi Latukefu, Director, Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 48

[78]Act for Peace, Submission 41, p. 6

[79]ACFID, Submission 73, p. 9

[80]ACFID, Submission 73, p. 20

[81]Richard Herr OAM PhD, Submission 70, p. [3]

[82]Pacific Islands Climate Action Network, Submission 76, p. [3]

[83]Pacific Australian Emerging Leaders Network, Submission 34, p. [3]

[84]World Citizens Association of Australia, Submission 25, p. 1

[85]Mr Adrian Prouse, Head, International Programs, Australian Red Cross, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 32

[86]University of Adelaide, Submission 23.1, p. 5

[87]Ms Hayley Cull, Deputy Chielf Executive Officer, Engagement, Plan International Australia, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 38

[88]ACFID, Submission 73, p. 8; see also ACFID Humanitarian Reference Group, Submission 9, p. 6

[89]ACFID, Submission 73, p. 9

[90]Ms Condon, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, pp. 24 and 26; and ACFID, Submission 73, pp. 20, 23, and recommendation 8

[91]Mr Alan Hewson, Policy and Partnerships Lead, ACFID, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 19

[92]Save the Children Australia, Submission 64, pp. 9–10

[93]Live & Learn Pacific Network, Submission 26, p. [3]; see also Australian Red Cross, Submission 13; and Australian Centre for Pacific Islands Research, Submission 46

[94]Caritas Australia, Submission 65, p. 5

[95]Caritas Australia, Submission 65, p. 5

[96]Mr Mark Tattersall, First Assistant Secretary, Polynesia, Micronesia and Development Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 12

[97]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 10

[98]Mr Charles Abel, Papua New Guinea Patron and Dr Sarah Dunn, Senior Program Manager, Youth with A Mission Medical Ships, Australia and Papua New Guinea, Committee Hansard, 14 October 2024, p. 7

[99]Mr Sefanaia Nawadra, Director-General, SPREP, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 33

[100]International Women’s Development Agency (IWDA), Submission 74, p. 1

[101]IWDA, Submission 74, p. 11–12

[102]IWDA, Submission 74, p. 12

[103]IWDA, Submission 74, p. 12

[104]Australian National University Institute for Climate, Energy & Disaster Solutions, Submission 61, p. [16]

[105]International Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Consortium (ISRHRC), Submission 66, p. 7

[106]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Supporting Democracy in Our Region, November 2023, recommendation 8

[107]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Supporting Democracy in Our Region, November 2023, pp. 61–62

[108]UNICEF Australia, Submission 56, pp. 10–11

[109]UNICEF Australia, Submission 56, p. 11

[110]Ms Nicole Breeze, Chief Advocate for Children, UNICEF Australia, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 26

[111]Save the Children Australia, Submission 64, p. 4

[112]Ms Breeze, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 20

[113]UNICEF Australia, Submission 56, p. [3]

[114]UNICEF Australia, Submission 56, pp. [6–7]

[115]Ms Breeze, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 20

[116]UNICEF Australia, Submission 56, p. [6]

[117]Ms Breeze, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 20

[118]DFAT, submission 80, p. 5

[119]IWDA, Submission 74, p. 10

[120]IWDA, Submission 74, p. 3

[121]IWDA, Submission 74, p. 9

[122]Ms Michelle Higelin, Executive Director, ActionAid Australia, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 22

[123]Ms Carolyn Kitione, Regional Representative, Shifting the Power Coalition, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 22

[124]Ms Kitione, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 27

[125]ACFID, Submission 73, p. 24

[126]Ms Higelin, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 29

[127]International Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Consortium, Submission 66, p. 3

[128]ISRHRC, Submission 66, p. 6

[129]ActionAid and the Shifting the Power Coalition, Submission 67, p. 14

[130]ActionAid and the Shifting the Power Coalition, Submission 67, p. 14

[131]Ms Valery Wichman, Chief Adviser, Te Tiare Association, Committee Hansard, 14 October 2024, p. 14

[132]Ms Wichman, Committee Hansard, 14 October 2024, p. 14

[133]Mr Tattersall, Committee Hansard, 14 October 2024, p. 24

[134]Australian Disability & Development Consortium and CBM Australia, Submission 71, p. 2

[135]Australian Disability & Development Consortium and CBM Australia, Submission 71, p. 9

[136]Ms Sainimili Tawake, Chief Executive Officer, Pacific Disability Forum, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 3

[137]DFAT, submission 80, p. 5

[138]ACFID, Submission 73, p. 25

[139]Australian Disability & Development Consortium and CBM Australia, Submission 71, p. 2

[140]YWAM Medical Ships – Australia & PNG, Submission 86.1, Attachment 1, p. 12; and Mr Charles Abel, Papua New Guinea Patron, Youth With A Mission Medical Ships, Australia and Papua New Guinea, Committee Hansard,14 October 2024, pp. 10–11

[141]Australian Global Health Alliance, Submission 68, p. [2]

[142]Australian Global Health Alliance, Submission 68, p. [3]

[143]Ms Veronica Le Nevez, Head of Impact and Engagement, The George Institute for Global Health, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 40

[144]Ms Hayley Jones, McCabe Centre for Law and Cancer, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 41

[145]The Fred Hollows Foundation, Submission 63, p. 2

[146]The Fred Hollows Foundation, Submission 63, p. 8

[147]The Fred Hollows Foundation, Submission 63, p. 7

[148]The Fred Hollows Foundation, Submission 63, p. 4

[149]Dr Betty Barkha, Pacific Gender Equality Disability and Social Inclusion Technical Advisory, Save the Children Australia, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 31

[150]Pacific Islands Forum, Fifty-Third Pacific Islands Forum: Forum Communique, 30 August 2024, pp. 2–3

[151]Transparency International Australia (TIA) and Transparency Solomon Islands (TSI), Submission 57. p. 4

[152]TIA and TSI, Submission 57. p. 4

[153]TIA and TSI, Submission 57. p. 3

[154]Mr Clancy Moore, Chief Executive Officer, Transparency International Australia, CommitteeHansard, 2 September 2024, p. 22