1. Introduction

Australia will concentrate our resources on the issues that matter most to our neighbours. We will offer genuine partnerships based on respect, listening, and learning from each other. We will support local leaders to create local solutions while contributing our own strengths—our economy, our institutions, and the connections and knowledge of Australians.

—Senator the Hon Penny Wong, Minister for Foreign Affairs[1]

1.1Australia’s history and identity are tied to the Pacific region. The Pacific has long been recognised as among Australia’s highest foreign policy priorities. We bear the privilege and the responsibility of supporting a strong and prosperous Pacific. Yet Australia must not dictate the nature of this support. Australia’s engagement in the Pacific region should respond to Pacific voices to ensure it is aligned with the aspirations of Pacific Island countries and its peoples.

1.2It is against this backdrop that this inquiry takes place; Australia’s determination to ensure the ways in which we engage in the Pacific region align with the priorities of Pacific peoples and their representatives. This chapter details some of the regional governance structures through which Pacific priorities are established and articulated. It then outlines key regional treaties, strategies, and frameworks in which the priorities of the Pacific are embedded. This chapter ends with an outline of the conduct of this inquiry and an overview of the structure of this report.

Key Pacific structures

1.3Pacific Island countries are far from homogenous. Indeed, the region is formed from three subregions (Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia), each of with enjoys unique characteristics and challenges. Nevertheless, the Pacific region also enjoys a high degree of unity in terms of its structures, priorities, and approaches to of the issues it faces. Relative isolation, limited population sizes, and modest economic influence have served to limit the power and influence that Pacific Island countries can exert individually. Yet, these same factors incentivise collective action, and have led to the emergence of a raft of complex regional and sub-regional governance structures.

1.4These regional structures both support and drive collective action across the Pacific, key elements of which are discussed below.

Pacific Islands Forum

1.5The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) was founded in 1971 and is the region’s foremost political and economic organisation. The inter-governmental organisation is comprised of 18 members and aims to bring the region together to ‘address pressing issues and challenges, and foster collaboration and cooperation in the pursuit of shared goals’. PIF Leaders meet annually to inform the priorities and work of the Forum, which is supported by a secretariat headquartered in Fiji. Witnesses described PIF as the ‘apex’ of the Pacific Island regional architecture.[2]

1.6The PIF Secretariat is led by a Secretary-General who serves a three-year term at the appointment of member states and is also the Chair of the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (see below). The incumbent Secretary-General, Mr Baron Waqa, took up the role in June 2024, having previously served as President of Nauru between 2013 and 2019.[3]

1.7In relation to Australia’s commitment to the Pacific structures, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) submitted:

Australia supports strong and effective regional architecture with the Pacific Islands Forum at its apex. As a founding member of the PIF, Australia is committed to working together with the Pacific and through Pacific regional architecture to novate our shared challenges and safeguard our collective peace and prosperity.[4]

Pacific Community

1.8The Pacific Community (SPC) is a 27-member international development organisation that provides technical and scientific advice to its member governments and acts as a conduit for donor funding to the region.[5] It is a key institution within the Pacific’s regional governance architecture, with ‘a strong comparative advantage in being able to bring a multi-disciplinary approach to addressing some of the region’s most complex development challenges.’[6]

1.9The work of the SPC is aligned with the 2050 Pacific Strategy and is guided by a ten-year strategic plan (currently running from 2022–31), which acknowledges climate change as ‘the greatest challenge’ facing the Pacific region.[7]

1.10SPC Director-General, Dr Stuart Minchin, described its mission as ‘to progress all Pacific people’s rights and wellbeing through science and knowledge, guided by Pacific contexts and cultures’.[8]

Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific

1.11Established by Pacific leaders in 1998, the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP) is a partnership of regional intergovernmental agencies, including the SPC, the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (see below), and the Forum Fisheries Agency (see below), among others. CROP provides high-level policy advice and support to Pacific Island countries with the aim of ‘improv[ing] cooperation, coordination and collaboration between Pacific regional organisations’.[9]

1.12CROP’s work is guided by the 2050 Pacific Strategy and set out in a charter that commits it to support: political leadership and regionalism; people-centred development; peace and security; resource and economic development; climate change and disasters; the ocean and the environment; and technology and connectivity.[10]

Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme

1.13The Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) was established as an independent organisation in 1993, charged with promoting cooperation and assisting its members to protect and improve the Pacific environment, and to ensure sustainable development in harmony with Pacific Island cultures. SPREP is a member of CROP and works towards the following regional goals, as outlined in its 2017-2026 strategic plan:

1Pacific people benefit from strengthened resilience to climate change.

2Pacific people benefit from healthy and resilient island and ocean ecosystems.

3Pacific people benefit from improved waste management and pollution control.

4Pacific people and their environment benefit from commitment to and best practice of environmental governance.[11]

Other Pacific governance structures

• Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP): a regional commission of the United Nations, which promotes cooperation among its members in pursuit of inclusive, resilient, and sustainable development in the region.
• Pacific Island Association for NGOs (PIANGO): a regional network of non-governmental organisation (NGO) coordinating bodies based in 25 Pacific Island countries and territories, described by the Australian Council for International Development as ‘an established and influential civil society actor’.[12]
• Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA): the region’s primary fisheries management organisation, the FFA provides fisheries management and development assistance to support members to maximise benefits from the conservation and sustainable use of offshore fishery resources.

Establishing the priorities of the Pacific

1.14Pacific Island countries have established a range of strategies, frameworks, treaties, and initiatives that underpin collective approaches to regional priorities. In response, the Australian Government has repeatedly committed to supporting these priorities. For example, DFAT told the Committee it was ‘listening to Pacific priorities and [was] guided by sustained and innovative leadership of the region’. Moreover, it stated, ‘the department is focused on supporting the government in delivering Pacific-led Australian backed solutions’.[13] Other examples of the Australian Government’s commitment to supporting Pacific-led solutions are detailed in the following chapters.

1.15Key Pacific initiatives in which the region’s priorities are laid out are outlined below.

Biketawa Declaration

1.16PIF leaders agreed in Kiribati in October 2000 to the ‘Biketawa Declaration’; a framework for coordinating responses to regional crises. The Biketawa Declaration expresses respect for the principle of non-interference whilst committing Forum members to seven guiding principles, including good governance; liberty of the individual; upholding democratic processes; the importance of indigenous rights, cultural values, traditions, and customs; the importance of cooperation among members; and the importance of averting the causes of conflict.[14]

Boe Declaration on Regional Security

1.17PIF leaders built on the Biketawa Declaration to agree to the Boe Declaration on Regional Security (Boe Declaration) in Nauru in 2018. The Boe Declaration is an ‘expanded concept of security’ that includes human security, humanitarian assistance, prioritises environmental security, and regional cooperation in building resilience to disasters and climate change.[15] Among other provisions, it notes, ‘climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific’.[16]

1.18The Boe Declaration has been reaffirmed through subsequent Leaders Forum communiques (most recently during the 53rd Pacific Island Leaders Forum, held in Vava’u in Tonga in August 2024),[17] and builds on over a decade of climate change and environmental declarations made by Pacific Island representatives, including:

• 2015 Smaller Islands States Leaders Port Moresby Declaration on Climate Change
• 2015 Suva Declaration on Climate Change
• 2015 Nukualofa Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Weather and Climate Services for a Resilient Pacific
• 2015 Polynesia Leaders Group Taputapuatea Declaration on Climate Change
• 2015 Lifou Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change
• 2013 Majuro Declaration on Climate Leadership
• 2008 Niue Declaration on Climate Change.[18]

Kainaki II Declaration for Urgent Climate Change Action Now

1.19Building on the Boe Declaration (see above), Forum Leaders resolved in August 2019 that ‘urgent’ and ‘transformational’ action was needed to address climate change, agreeing to the Kainaki II Declaration for Urgent Climate Change Action Now (Kainaki II Delcaration). The Kainaki II Declaration noted:

We are of the conviction that the shared prosperity and security of our Blue Pacific can only safely exist if the international community pursue efforts to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, as set out in the Paris Agreement. The science is non-negotiable. Urgent action by the international community to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is critical to keep us on the 1.5°C pathway.[19]

1.20The Kainaki II Declaration also committed Forum Leaders to develop a 2050 strategy to ensure collective action ‘to secure the future of the Blue Pacific’ (see below).[20]

1.21Then-PIF Secretary-General, Dame Meg Taylor, described the Kainaki II Declaration as ‘the strongest statement’ the PIF had ever issued on climate change, and argued it would ‘stand as a key advocacy instrument to support the Pacific’s collective voice’.[21]

2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent

1.22The 51st Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting endorsed in 2022 the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent (2050 Pacific Strategy). The preamble to the 2050 Pacific Strategy states:

As Pacific Leaders, we are strongly committed to ensuring the health and wellbeing of our people, and to human rights and equity for all. We place great value on our ocean and land, and celebrate a deep connection to our community, natural environment, resources, livelihoods, faiths, cultural values and traditional knowledge.

We work with our people to deliver on a vision that they will help to nurture. We welcome the support of our national and regional institutions in these efforts. We have often taken on challenges much bigger than ourselves. Many of our nations have gained political independence and have set new paths for their future. Our governance is maturing, and our people have much higher expectations of transparency and accountability. Our public services are supporting a gradual improvement of our wellbeing and quality of life. Much work remains, yet we are confident of success.[22]

1.23The 2050 Pacific Strategy outlines the region’s long-term approach to working together as a region, and identifies seven priority thematic areas:

1political leadership and regionalism

2people-centred development

3peace and security

4resource and economic development

5climate change and disasters

6ocean and environment

7technology and connectivity.

1.24The 2050 Pacific Strategy reaffirms the importance of the Boe Declaration, reiterating that climate change ‘is the region’s single greatest threat to security’.[23]

1.25To support the 2050 Pacific Strategy, the PIF adopted a 2023–30 implementation plan, in which it was noted that regional actors would build on national and regional systems, processes, institutions, and capacities, whilst also engaging with partners to ensure the strategy was adequately resourced and supported. The implementation plan identified five sets of cross-cutting ‘regional collective actions’:

1governance

2inclusion and equity

3education, research, and technology

4resilience and wellbeing

5partnerships and cooperation.[24]

1.26The Australian Government’s new International Development Plan (IDP, see Chapter2) describes the 2050 Pacific Strategy as ‘the blueprint to advance Pacific-led regionalism’ to which Australia is committed. The IDP notes the 2050 Pacific Strategy resulted from extensive national and regional consultation and reflects Pacific priorities.[25] Emphasising the centrality of the 2050 Pacific Strategy, DFAT submitted that it ‘articulates a collective vision for Pacific regionalism and identifies regional priorities’.[26] DFAT’s submission to this inquiry also noted the Australian Government ‘works in partnership to support the PIF’s vision for the region through the 2050 Strategy and the Boe Declaration’.[27]

1.27The Embassy of France described the 2050 Strategy as France’s ‘compass’ in the region.[28] And the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources & Security noted that the 2050 Pacific Strategy is mirrored in national instruments across the region.[29]

Kioa Climate Emergency Declaration

1.28Civil society and church groups agreed to the Kioa Climate Emergency Declaration (Kioa Declaration) in October 2022, reaffirming the collective goal to achieve carbon neutrality in the region by 2050 and urging greater action by emitting countries. More specifically, the Kioa Declaration called for greater action on mitigation, including:

• phasing out fossil fuels, committing not to begin any new fossil fuel projects, and ending subsidies for fossil fuel projects;
• action on adaptation, including finance and support for community-led initiatives;
• support for the Loss and Damage fund;
• ensuring just, dignified and safe movement of peoples in the context of climate change;
• guaranteed and more equitable access to finance;
• Ocean policies that are compatible with climate goals, including a ban on deep sea mining and other measures; and
• Cancellation of climate debts.[30]

Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative

1.29The Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative (Fossil Fuel Treaty) is a movement calling for an equitable global transition away from fossil fuel production and a just transition to renewable energy in keeping with commitments to limit global warming to below 1.5 degrees Celsius. The initiative has been spearheaded by a bloc of Pacific nations, including Vanuatu and Tuvalu.[31]

1.30On 17 March 2023, six Pacific Island governments met in Port Vila, Vanuatu, to call for a ‘just transition to a fossil fuel free Pacific’ (Port Vila Call), including Fiji, Niue, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.[32] The Port Vila Call included the following:

The Pacific will no longer accept the fossil fuel lie. We have the power and responsibility to lead, and we will. Pacific leaders called for the Paris Agreement to limit warming to 1.5ºC, and have demanded an end to the development and expansion of fossil fuel extracting industries, starting with new coal mines.1 Pacific civil society has challenged the world to step up the fight for urgent fossil fuel phase out and effective climate action.[33]

Other relevant treaties and initiatives

• The Loss and Damage Fund for Developing Countries (Loss and Damage Fund) was agreed at the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27) held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt. It was designed to ‘help low-income developing countries offset the damage from natural disasters caused by climate change’.[34] The Loss and Damage Fund was formally established during the 2023 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.[35]
• The Framework for Pacific Regionalism (FPR) established a process for agreeing to regional priorities to support ‘focussed political conversations and settlements that address key strategic issues, including shared sovereignty, pooling resources and delegating decision-making’. The FPR was endorsed by Pacific Leaders in 2014.[36]
• The Pacific Resilience Facility (PRF) is a Pacific-led, owned, and managed climate financing facility under the 2050 Pacific Strategy Implementation Plan.[37] The PRF is designed to provide small grants of under $50,000 to support communities and smaller organisations.[38] The Australian Government has committed $100 million to the PRF.[39]
• The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was founded in 2010 under the UNFCCC framework to assist developing countries with climate change adaptation and mitigation activities. The GCF is the world's largest climate fund with $15 billion of commitments and is the fifth largest source of climate finance in the Pacific. It has been criticised for being too slow, too inflexible, and too difficult for small Pacific island countries to access. Australia withdrew from fund in 2018 under the previous government before Minister Wong announced it would rejoin the GCF with a ‘modest contribution’ of $50 million in 2023.[40]

Pacific attitudes

1.31In addition to the instruments detailed above, popular surveys offer an opportunity to assess the priorities and attitudes of the region’s communities themselves. These surveys may either reinforce or challenge the priorities established by national governments and regional institutions.

1.32Academics from the Australian National University and Swinburne University of Technology provided the Committee with an overview of the findings from their Pacific Attitudes Survey (PAS), conducted in Samoa in 2021 and Vanuatu in 2023. The PAS research team submitted:

The survey findings offer a useful complement to understanding the degree to which donor policies align with the popular development priorities as identified by Pacific islanders themselves.[41]

1.33They further argued:

… a lack of reliable data on popular attitudes toward key policy issues makes it difficult to assess how Australia’s engagement efforts resonate locally.[42]

1.34Associate Professor Julien Barbara from the PAS research team outlined for the Committee why he believed the research was a necessary complement to other attempts to align Australia’s engagement in the Pacific with the region’s own priorities:

While it's really important to engage with Pacific governments, there's a missing dimension, we think, in terms of engaging with people of the Pacific in terms of what their priorities are… The Pacific lacks a robust tradition of gathering popular data, so it's hard to find out what Pacific people think and what their priorities are… We think our data is a rich source of triangulating what the priorities of Pacific people are and how they align with broader aid program support and engagement.[43]

1.35Further PAS findings on development priorities and climate change are detailed in the Chapters that follow.

Conduct of the inquiry

1.36On 24 April 2024, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, referred to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (Committee) a request to inquire into and report on the priorities of Pacific Island countries and the Pacific region.

1.37On 15 May 2024, under its resolution of appointment, the Committee resolved to have the Foreign Affairs and Aid Subcommittee (Subcommittee) conduct the inquiry.

1.38In announcing the inquiry, Chair of the Subcommittee, Mr Josh Burns MP, stated the inquiry would provide an important opportunity to consider Australia’s engagement in the Pacific and evaluate the extent to which Australia’s initiatives align with the policies and priorities of Pacific Island nations themselves.[44]

1.39The inquiry was advertised on 16 May 2024 and the Subcommittee called for submissions addressing the terms of reference by 28 June 2024.[45]

1.40The Subcommittee received and published 86 submission, which are listed at Appendix A. Five public hearings were held, as listed in Table 1.1.

1.41Witnesses who gave evidence at these hearings are listed at Appendix B.

1.42The Subcommittee expresses its appreciation to submitters and witnesses who contributed to this inquiry.

Previous inquiries by the Committee

1.43The terms of reference for this inquiry complement previous inquiries undertaken by the Committee, including:

• During this parliament, in November 2023, the Foreign Affairs and Aid Subcommittee tabled its report into matters relating to supporting democracy in our region. The inquiry considered opportunities for Australia to partner with countries in the region to promote democracy and the international rules-based order.[46]
• During the 46th Parliament, in March 2022, the Foreign Affairs and Aid Subcommittee tabled its report into strengthening Australia’s relationships with countries in the Pacific region. The inquiry considered the implementation of Australia’s Pacific Step-up, including opportunities to strengthen and align the initiative with Pacific Island countries.[47]
• In November 2021, the JSCFADT Human Rights Subcommittee tabled its report into the human rights of women and girls in the Pacific. The inquiry examined Australia’s role in the region following the ‘Pacific Step-up’ (see Chapter 2), with an emphasis on the advancement of the human rights of women and girls, and the role of Australia’s overseas development assistance.[48]
• In September 2021, the JSCFADT Trade Subcommittee tabled its report into deepening relations with Pacific nations through trade, entitled ‘One Region, One Family, One Future’. The inquiry considered the conditions necessary to activate greater trade and investment with countries in the Pacific region to the benefit of both Australia and Pacific countries.[49]
• In April 2021, the JSCFADT Defence Subcommittee tabled its report into Australia’s defence relationships with Pacific Island nations. The inquiry considered, among other matters, the extent to which the Pacific Step-up corresponded with the needs and priorities of Pacific nations.[50]

Report structure

1.44Chapter 2 of this report outlines the key ways in which the Australian Government engages in the Pacific through its Overseas Development Assistance, defence and police partnerships, and other areas. It briefly discusses the geostrategic dynamics in the region, and presents vies on Australia’s engagement in the Pacific, including recommendations from witnesses and submitters on areas of greatest priority.

1.45Chapter 3 is focused on climate change, which has been repeatedly identified as the region’s most pressing priority. It outlines the specifics of the Pacific’s call’s for climate action and presents the findings of a survey on the attitudes of communities in two Pacific countries towards these issues. It then provides an overview of Australia’s investments in climate action in the region, before presenting a range of views on these initiatives.

1.46Chapter 4 examines the ways in which links are built between peoples in the Pacific and Australia, and details a number of avenues for technical and academic engagement. This chapter then outlines key mobility pathways between the Pacific and Australia, it discusses the connection to land and the impact of climate change on mobility for many Pacific peoples, before presenting a range of views on these mobility pathways. Finally, this chapter details the important role played for First Nations leadership in Australia’s engagement in the Pacific.

Footnotes

[1]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australia’s International Development Policy: For A Peaceful, Stable and Prosperous Indo-Pacific, August 2023, p. 4

[2]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 3; and Professor Richard Herr OAM, Submission 70, p. [4]

[3]PIF members include Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Countries and entities with observer status include Tokelau, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Timor-Leste, Wallis and Futuna, the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, the Asian Development Bank, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the United Nations Secretariat, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, and the World Bank. Taiwan is a PIF Development partner. See Pacific Islands Forum, The Pacific Islands Forum, https://forumsec.org

[4]DFAT, submission 80, p. 5

[5]Pacific Community members include American Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, France, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vanuatu, and Wallis and Futuna

[6]Pacific Community, Our Work, https://www.spc.int/about-us/our-work (accessed 26 July 2024)

[7]Pacific Community, Strategic Plan 2022–2031: Sustainable Pacific development through science, knowledge and innovation, 2022, p. 10

[8]Dr Stuart Minchin, Director-General, Pacific Community, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 27

[9]CROP members include the PIF, the Forum Fisheries Agency, the Pacific Aviation Safety Office, the Pacific Power Association, the Pacific Islands Development Program, the Pacific Community, the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, the Pacific Tourism Organisation, and the University of the South Pacific. See Pacific Islands Forum, Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP), forumsec.org/council-regional-organisations-pacific-crop

[10]Pacific Islands Forum, Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP), forumsec.org/council-regional-organisations-pacific-crop (accessed 26 July 2024)

[11]Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, Submission 14, p. [1]

[12]Australian Council for International Development, Submission 73, p. 9

[13]Ms Kathleen Logan, First Assistant Secretary, Pacific Strategy Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 8

[14]“Biketawa” Declaration, 28 October 2024

[15]Pacific Islands Forum, Boe Declaration Action Plan, August 2019, pp. 6–7

[16]Pacific Islands Forum, Boe Declaration Action Plan, August 2019, p. 6

[17]Pacific Islands Forum, Fifty-Third Pacific Islands Forum: Forum Communique, 26–30 October 2024, p. 5

[18]Pacific Islands Forum, Boe Declaration Action Plan, August 2019, Annex I, pp. 29–30

[19]Pacific Islands Forum, Kainaki II Declaration for Urgent Climate Change Action Now, 2019, p. 12

[20]Pacific Islands Forum, Kainaki II Declaration for Urgent Climate Change Action Now, 2019, p. 13

[21]Dame Meg Taylor, ‘The Kainaki II Declaration is a signal of Pacific strength’, Lowy Institute, lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/kainaki-ii-declaration-signal-pacific-strength, 28 August 2019 (accessed 26 July 2024)

[22]Pacific Islands Forum, 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, 2022, p. 3

[23]Pacific Islands Forum, 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, 2022, p. 21

[24]Pacific Islands Forum, 2050 Strategy Implementation Plan 2023-2030: Phase I – 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, pp. 7 and 9

[25]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s International Development Policy, August 2023, p. 21

[26]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 3

[27]DFAT, submission 80, p. 5

[28]Embassy of France, Submission 38, p. 2

[29]University of Wollongong, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources & Security, Submission 30, p. 4

[30]Koia Declaration replicated in full in Caritas Australia, Submission 65, pp. 9-13

[31]Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, Our Mission and History, fossilfueltreaty.org/about-treaty (accessed 22 July 2024)

[32]Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, ‘Block of 6 Pacific countries commit to spearhead global fossil fuel phase-out effort’, Media Release, 17 March 2023, fossilfueltreaty.org/fossil-free-pacific (accessed 22 July 2024)

[33]Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Tonga, Fiji, Niue, and the Solomon Islands, Port Vila Call for a Just Transition to a Fossil Fuel Free Pacific, 17 March 2023

[34]United Nations Development Programme, Loss and Damage Fund for Developing Countries, 26 January 2024, undp.org/belarus/stories/loss-and-damage-fund-developing-countries (accessed 7 July 2024)

[35]World Economic Forum, COP28 agrees to establish loss and damage fund for vulnerable countries, 1 December 2023, weforum.org/agenda/2023/12/cop28-loss-and-damage-fund-climate-change/ (accessed 22 July 2023)

[36]Pacific Islands Forum, The Framework for Pacific Regionalism, 2014

[37]Pacific Islands Forum, Pacific Resilience Facility, https://forumsec.org/pacific-resilience-facility (accessed 2 August 2024); and DFAT, Submission 80, pp. 7-8

[38]Dr Stuart Minchin, Director-General, Pacific Community, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 33

[39]and Mr Craig Chittick, First Assistant Secretary, Pacific Strategy Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 14 October 2024, p. 19

[40]Green Climate Fund, https://www.greenclimate.fund/ (accessed 16 September 2024); Georgia Hammersley and Roland Rajah, ‘Revisiting the Green Climate Fund in the Pacific’, The Interpreter, lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/revisiting-green-climate-fund-pacific (accessed 16 September 2024); Matthew Knott, ‘Australia rejoins global climate fund, reversing Morrison decision’, 5 October 2023; Tom Lowrey and Stephen Dziedzic, ‘Australia to re-join UN's green climate fund after Morrison government withdrawal’, 5 October 2023; and Mr Chittick, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 14 October 2024, p. 19

[41]Assoc Prof Julien Barbara, Prof Michael Leach, Dr Kerryn Baker and Dr Christopher Mudaliar, Submission 62, p. 2

[42]Assoc Prof Julien Barbara, Prof Michael Leach, Dr Kerryn Baker and Dr Christopher Mudaliar, Submission 62, p. 4

[43]Associate Professor Julien Barbara, Director, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 2

[44]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Committee to inquire into Pacific priorities’, Media release, 16 My 2024

[45]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Inquiry into Australia’s response to the priorities of Pacific Island countries and the Pacific region’, aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/PacificPriorities (accessed 24 July 2024)

[46]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into supporting democracy in our region, November 2023

[47]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Strengthening Australia’s relationships in the Pacific, March 2022

[48]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into the human rights of women and girls in the Pacific, November 2021

[49]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into Australia activating greater trade and investment with Pacific island countries, September 2021

[50]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into Australia's Defence relationships with Pacific Island nations, 1 April 2021