3. Climate change: An existential threat
   1. Human-induced climate change is a global threat that endangers ecosystems and communities across the globe. But nowhere is it felt so acutely as the Pacific, where the world’s changing climate presents an existential threat for many of the region’s Island nations. But tragically, climate change is not just a future threat; it is a present-day reality for far too many Pacific Island communities who live with rising sea levels and the daily spectre of disasters, diseases, collapsing fishing stocks, lost livelihoods, and regional instability.
   2. Evidence received by the Committee during the course of this inquiry overwhelmingly supported the position that climate change remains the most pressing challenge facing the Pacific. This position echoes the findings of the Committee’s 2023 report into Supporting democracy in our region, in which it concluded:

Communities in the Indo-Pacific region are facing devastating impacts of climate change due to increasing droughts, fires, cyclones, flooding, storm and sea damage and rising sea-water levels. These disasters are all having a major impact on vulnerable communities, especially as millions of people in the region live on coastal low-lying lands.[1]

3.3The Committee’s report further acknowledged:

Pacific nations have identified ongoing challenges of climate change as their number one priority and [the Committee] recognises the significant impact climate change may have on communities… These areas require large investments in development assistance and will require continuous support from Australia and multi-lateral banks and agencies now and into the future.[2]

3.4This chapter builds on the Committee’s previous findings in this space. It first outlines where and how Pacific leaders and institutions have set priorities for climate action, and explores some of the evidence on the attitudes of Pacific communities to these issues. It also details Australia’s efforts to address climate change and explores views on the effectiveness of Australia’s interventions. This chapter then sets out the Committee’s views and recommendations on these matters.

The Pacific’s calls for climate action

3.5Evidence before the Committee repeatedly placed climate action as among the highest priorities of Pacific leaders and communities. The 2018 Boe Declaration proclaimed climate change to be ‘the single greatest threat’ facing the region. The Kainaki II Declaration the following year called for ‘urgent’ and ‘transformational’ action to address climate change. And the 2050 Pacific Strategy, endorsed in 2022, reaffirmed climate change as the single greatest threat to regional security. Subsequent PIF Leaders Forum communiques have continued to reiterate these calls for climate action (see Chapter 1).

3.6In his opening remarks to the Committee, the Solomon Islands High Commissioner, Mr Robert Sisilo, stated:

Nothing is more central to the security and the economies of the Pacific than climate change. It is not an abstract threat but an existential one. It remains the single greatest threat to livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific and we must therefore take actions aimed at stopping fossil fuel expansion and exports, ceasing fossil fuel subsidies and expanding climate finance. I think our future here is on the line.[3]

3.7Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Mr Baron Waqa, also told the Committee that climate change and its effects remain ‘the single greatest threat to the Pacific’.[4]

3.8The Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources & Security at the University of Wollongong explained how coastal areas and small islands are among the most impacted by climate change. With most Pacific peoples living in such areas, they are among the most impacted by climate change.[5]

3.9Excellency Anote Tong, Chair of the Pacific Elders’ Voice (PEV) and former president of Kiribati, detailed for the Committee the threat posed by climate change:

Successive reports of the IPCC [Independent Panel on Climate Change] have always indicated that unless carbon could be cut drastically, the impacts of climate change will render countries like ours in the Pacific uninhabitable by the end of the century… In 2022 the sixth assessment report of the IPCC advanced that to 2060—that by 2060 the more vulnerable countries in the Pacific will be uninhabitable… The IPCC reports, together with other studies, clearly indicate that unless drastic cuts can be made, several of the Pacific island countries face existential threats.[6]

3.10Excellency Tong stated that for parts of the Pacific even immediate and drastic emissions reduction targets would come too late: ‘we’ve already overshot’, he said.[7] He further cautioned:

… if the sea level continues to rise, there will come a time when, no matter what you do, you cannot defend against the incoming tide.[8]

3.11Ms Akka Rimon, an I-Kiribati PhD scholar undertaking research in climate change at the Australian National University, similarly told the Committee:

… what really strikes me is the fact that, whether we enter into an agreement [on relocating climate-affected communities] or cut down on emissions, it is already too late to change the impact. There’s already inundation, and the climate science has already predicted that low-lying islands like mine will be submerged at a certain point in time in the future.[9]

3.12Oxfam in the Pacific and Oxfam Australia (Oxfam) cautioned that the Pacific was already ‘disproportionately experiencing’ the effects of climate change, and pointed to the 2050 Pacific strategy, telling the Committee:

Pacific Island countries and communities have been vocal in their advocacy for climate action, identifying very clearly that climate change poses an existential threat to the Pacific.[10]

3.13The Medical Association for the Prevention of War (MAPW), similarly submitted:

… repeatedly, Pacific Island leaders and communities have expressed their desperation to see real climate action to address the new reality that they witness firsthand.[11]

3.14Greenpeace Australia-Pacific pointed to the centrality of climate change to the region’s challenges:

Climate justice is foundational to all other priorities and aspirations in the Pacific region. Climate change is the single biggest threat to security in the Pacific. It is an existential threat which is as we speak threatening lives, livelihoods and communities across the region.[12]

3.15Australian civil society organisations reinforced the priority given to climate action among Pacific communities. Caritas Australia, for example, told the Committee

When we talk to our partners in the region, they tell us their primary concern is the existential threat that is posed by the effects of climate change. They have also told us that more work needs to be done on climate finance and climate adaptation.[13]

3.16The Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) insisted Pacific leaders and civil society had been asking Australia to step up its efforts on climate change for years. ACFID stated:

Australia must respond to this call to action or risk losing our influence on Pacific partners. This means both stepping up our domestic commitments to climate mitigation and phasing out support for unabated carbon-intensive industries in Australia and also scaling up the quantity of Australian climate finance support, both in the Pacific and internationally.[14]

3.17The Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW) acknowledged that ‘climate change is the single greatest threat to the livelihoods and wellbeing of the people of the Pacific’. DCCEEW noted this priority has been established by Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs) themselves, as articulated in various statements and strategies:

Through these documents, and in international fora, PICTs articulate the urgent need to: accelerate global action and ambition to limit warming to 1.5°C; support Pacific island countries to address loss and damage resulting from the impacts of climate change and to build resilience through adaptation measures; address the impacts of climate change on the ocean, including ocean-based livelihoods; improve the accessibility, quality and scale of climate finance available to the Pacific region; and transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in line with Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) pathways for limiting global average temperatures to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels.[15]

3.18DCCEEW consequently highlighted the importance of action to protect the environment, stem biodiversity loss, strengthen waste management and pollution, and sustainable ocean management.[16] In terms of priorities established by the Pacific, DCCEWW pointed to accelerated action and ambition to address climate change, support for addressing the impacts of climate change, and increased accessibility, quality, and scale of climate finance.[17]

3.19The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) also told the Committee that responding to climate change was central to the region’s priorities. It emphasised the importance of Australia’s longstanding security engagement with the region, which DFAT claimed was guided by the priorities of the region itself, leading to deepened cooperation in terms of law enforcement, criminal justice, defence, maritime security, border security, humanitarian disaster relief and cyber (see also Chapter 2).[18]

Pacific attitudes

3.20The Pacific Attitudes Survey (PAS), detailed in Chapter 1, explored attitudes to climate change in Vanuatu and Samoa. Whilst four-fifths (81 per cent) of respondents in Vanuatu believed climate change was an urgent problem requiring immediate action, somewhat in contrast to the priorities established at the regional level, just over two-fifths (43 per cent) of respondents in Samoa considered it an urgent problem. Further, nearly two-fifths (39 per cent) of respondents in Samoa believed it would never be necessary to address climate change, in contrast to only 3 per cent of respondents in Vanuatu.[19]

3.21In terms of support for adaptation to climate change, Professor Michael Leach told the Committee respondents in Vanuatu had identified help with infrastructure as the highest priority intervention, followed by help with relocation, then help with livelihoods and jobs, with direct compensation being the lowest priority of the options provided.[20]

3.22Dr Kerryn Baker from the PAS research team concluded:

… there is a disconnect between the broad elite consensus on climate change and the general public perspectives that these popular attitude surveys help illuminate in the region… results like the attitudes towards climate change emphasise the value of popular attitude surveys in truly understanding the perspectives of Pacific peoples as distinct from Pacific governments[21]

3.23Nevertheless, the team cautioned that further funding and support was needed for these initiatives. Dr Baker told the Committee:

Popular attitudes survey data collection in the Pacific isn’t easy and needs dedicated funding to continue, but the insights in generates are important for our understanding of Pacific priorities.[22]

Australian-backed climate action

3.24At a global level, DFAT has acknowledged ‘the urgency and far-reaching implications of the climate crisis’, and reiterated Australia’s commitment to accelerating the transition to net-zero emissions.[23] Australia’s 2023–24 ODA budget summary acknowledged the priority given by the Pacific to address climate change:

We have heard Pacific calls for climate action and are responding at home and abroad. Australia’s climate assistance is backing Pacific leadership and is enhancing the tools and choices available to the Pacific family to combat the effects of climate change on their own terms.[24]

3.25In its submission to this inquiry, DFAT stated it was ‘making climate change a central pillar of all our partnerships, recognising Pacific priorities and leadership.’ It drew the Committee’s attention to the Australian Government’s intention to deliver $3billion in climate finance (that is, funding to support climate change mitigation and adaptation) over 2020–25, largely through existing ODA commitments (see also Chapter 2 for a discussion of Australia’s development assistance to the Pacific).[25] DFAT noted the majority of Australia’s climate finance benefits the Pacific, with a focus on adaptation and energy transition.[26]

3.26Additionally, the Australian Government has committed under its International Development Policy to ensure that at least half of all new country and regional investments over $3 million include a climate change objective from 2024–25, with this figure rising to 80 per cent in the 2028–29 financial year.[27]

3.27DFAT also pointed to the Australian Government’s appointment of an Ambassador for Climate Change, which it claimed, ‘demonstrates our resolve to step up the pace of action and work alongside global partners, particularly in the Pacific, to tackle the climate crisis’.[28]

3.28Further, Australia has pledged $100 million to the Pacific Resilience Facility (PRF, see Chapter 1), once established. Through this commitment, DFAT stated, ‘Australia is listening to Pacific partners and supporting the region’s access to climate finance’.[29] DFAT also told the Committee it was actively supporting the PRF and encouraging other donors to do likewise to ensure a ‘Pacific-led approach to climate finance that is accessible more closely on the ground.’[30]

3.29DFAT emphasised that climate action required a ‘whole-of-nation approach’, stating:

Delivering on Pacific priorities, the Australian Government is undertaking transformational action on climate change, at home and in partnership with the Pacific, and has put climate change measures at the centre of our Pacific partnerships.[31]

3.30Measures outlined by DFAT included climate finance, building climate resilience in the region, Australia’s domestic transition to renewable energy, and technical and financial support for energy transition in the Pacific.[32]

3.31DCCEEW told the Committee ‘Australia is committed to taking urgent action in response to the climate crisis’, pointing to Australia’s legislated 2030 target of reducing emissions by 43 per cent below 2005 levels and its target of net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.[34] DCCEEW highlighted the following actions taken by Australia to address climate change in the region:

• various initiatives (including funding, capacity building, outreach, and workshops), in support of the Pacific’s engagement in multilateral fora, in addition to efforts to better understand the priorities and positions of the Pacific and to ensure these are reflected in Australia’s own interventions
• advocacy with PICTs in support of a new treaty to address the full life cycle of plastics and to support a safe circular economy
• supporting Pacific governments to plan and manage their own energy transitions, among other initiatives.[35]
  32. In evidence to the Committee, DFAT noted the Pacific, including Australia and New Zealand, were responsible for only around two per cent of global emissions. It argued that, if global emissions reduction targets are to be met, the rest of the world—particularly major emitters—must take stronger action.[36]
  33. Additionally, Australia and Pacific countries have bid to co-host the 2026 United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP31 (see Box 3.2, below). DCCEEW told the Committee that Pacific countries had ‘warmly welcomed our proposal to work together to accelerate global climate action’, and stated:

If our bid is successful, we look forward to working with Pacific partners to design and deliver a COP that brings profile to the unique challenges faced by the region and accelerates global climate action.[37]

3.34DFAT submitted in relation to the COP31 bid that Australia would work closely with Pacific partners on the design and delivery of the conference to help raise the profile of ‘the unique climate change challenges faced by the region’ with a view to accelerating global climate action.[38] The Embassy of France submitted that France has actively supported Australia’s bid to host COP31.[39]

3.35More generally, DFAT submitted that it was working alongside DCCEEW to ‘amplify Pacific participation and voices in UN climate change conferences and negotiations for a new global treaty to combat plastic pollution’.[40]

Views on Australia’s efforts to address climate change

3.36This section outlines views on Australia’s efforts to address climate change—both at home and across the Pacific region. It discusses Australia’s ‘fair share’ of contributions to global and regional climate finance and outlines Australia’s potential role in facilitating regional climate action and climate finance. Finally, this section details the views of witnesses and submitters on Australia’s efforts to curtail domestic emissions. For a discussion of climate mobility, including the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union and the importance of connection to land, see Chapter 4.

Considering our fair share

3.37High Commissioner Sislo noted Australia was ‘playing a big part in addressing our climate change issues’.[42] Oxfam stated Australia is the largest climate finance donor in the Pacific, contributing around half of all bilateral funding to the region. Oxfam also welcomed Australia’s leadership role, in which climate funding was predominantly through grants rather than loans.[43]

3.38PIF Secretariat Secretary-General, Mr Baron Waqa, welcomed Australia’s contribution and ongoing support for the PRF, stating:

This facility will allow the Pacific to access funding when it's needed, and they don't have to go through the strict provisions, as we heard about with regard to Green Climate Fund and others. We just don't have the capacity, time and resources to go through all that, but this Pacific Resilience Facility is an excellent fund to support the Pacific well into the future.[44]

3.39In contrast, ANU’s Institute for Climate, Energy & Disaster Solutions acknowledged Australia’s $100 million contribution to the PRF, but submitted, ‘current levels of commitments are negligible when compared to the scale of expected losses in the Pacific’.[45] Even more critical of Australia’s contributions, the Pacific Islands Climate Action Network submitted, 'Australia has not supported the [Pacific’s] priorities for climate finance to date'.[46]

3.40Pacific Elders’ Voice (PEV)— an independent alliance of prominent Pacific leaders and experts dedicated to addressing the region’s current and future challenges[47]—pointed to remarks made to the Pacific Islands Forum in 2022 by the Foreign Minister, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, in which she acknowledged climate change was the region’s top economic and security priority. She stated, ‘I want to assure you that we have heard you’.[48] PEV’s submission responded to the Foreign Ministers’ statement:

In light of these remarks, we respectfully suggest that the Australian Government is already well-aware of the priorities of Pacific Island Countries, and what a credible response by Australia to support these priorities would look like.[49]

3.41PEV concluded:

Until Pacific Island leaders suggest otherwise, the Australian Government should assume that a credible response to the climate crisis and a commitment to ending fossil fuel subsidies and approvals remains our priority.[50]

3.42Excellency Tong from PEV described Australia’s contributions to addressing climate change as ‘a little controversial’, pointing to Australia’s 2018 withdrawal from the Green Climate Fund (GCF, see Chapter 1). He described the move as ‘very noticeable’, but acknowledged Australia’s commitment to the Pacific Resilience Facility, which he suggested ‘might be a better alternative [than the GCF]’.[51]

3.43Also recognising Australia as the region’s largest contributor to climate finance, ActionAid Australia nevertheless cautioned that, because the majority of Australia’s investments are channelled to the Pacific, Australia’s global contributions to climate finance remain relatively modest.[52]

3.44Greenpeace Australia-Pacific also submitted Australia was not providing its fair share of climate finance and criticised Australia’s use of overseas development assistance to meet climate finance commitments.[53]

3.45Relatedly, PICAN told the Committee Australia’s climate finance to the region had not been additional to existing ODA commitments. As such it did not represent new resources and was merely a reallocation of existing funds at the expense of other areas of development assistance, it insisted. Moreover, PICAN argued Australia’s climate finance had been neither predictable nor consistent, thereby ‘undermining the ability of [Pacific Island Countries] to plan and implement long-term climate action effectively’.[54]

3.46Oxfam also called on Australia to ensure climate finance was additional to ODA rather than used to ‘displace’ other important development and humanitarian activities.[55] It cautioned: ‘Australia's climate finance is not new and additional, but is rather drawn from an already underfunded ODA budget’.[56] Moreover, MAPW criticised what it perceived to be Australia’s inadequate climate finance contributions and cautioned Australia against ‘rebranding’ ODA as climate finance.[57]

3.47Oxfam Australia stated that the Pacific region had ‘barely contributed to climate change at all, yet [is] having to deal with its impacts with very little support’. It pointed to 2023’s cyclones Judy and Kevin, which caused damage to Vanuatu amounting to around 60 per cent of the island country’s Gross Domestic Product. Australia’s contribution of $12.8 million represented only two per cent of the loss and damage faced by Vanuatu as a result of the cyclones: ‘this is reflective of the overall bigger picture of a shortfall in Australia’s climate finance’, Oxfam Australia argued.[58]

3.48Further, Oxfam claimed Australia was ‘one of the lowest’ contributors to climate finance across the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and suggested Australia was falling short of its annual ‘fair share’.[59] Oxfam submitted Australia’s ‘fair’ contribution to climate finance to be US$4 billion annually, claiming:

The modest increase in Australia's climate finance commitment under this Government from $2 billion to $3 billion over 2020–2025 still leaves a vast gap between a fair share of climate finance and commitments.[60]

3.49ActionAid Australia and the Shifting the Power Coalition (SPC) acknowledged Australia’s commitment to increase climate finance, but similarly argued ‘this continues to fall well short of [Australia’s] fair share of the global USD100 billion per year climate finance target’.[61] Both Action Aid and the International Women’s Development Agency (IWDA) cited global studies that estimate Australia’s ‘fair share’ of climate finance to be around US$4 billion annually. Australia’s current contributions amount to only around 15 per cent of this figure, they argued, of which less than half is spend in the Pacific.[62]

3.50ActionAid Australia and the SPC observed that only two per cent of global climate finance was directed to the Pacific in 2022, and noted Australia was yet to make any contribution towards the Loss and Damage Fund established in 2022 at COP27 (see Chapter 1).[63] IWDA called for Australia to immediately commit $100 million to the Loss and Damage Fund.[64]

3.51Jubilee Australia Research Centre (Jubilee Australia) and partners echoed this call to fund the global Loss and Damage Fund and also called on Australia to increase to $4 billion annually its commitment to the USD100billion climate finance goal.[65] Jubilee Australia’s Dr Fletcher stated, ‘[a]s a leading climate polluter, Australia has a moral responsibility to provide [its fair share for climate finance]’.[66]

3.52Mr ‘Alopi Latukefu, Director of the Edmund Rice Centre for Justice, joined this call for the Australian Government to allocate at least $4 billion in climate finance based on its share of responsibility and its capacity to pay, noting the amount was likely to rise significantly in light of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG, a global climate finance goal designed to strengthen the global response to climate change post-2025).[67] Oxfam also noted the collective goal was set to rise, with Pacific leaders expected to press an NCQC in the trillions of dollars. Oxfam argued the NCQG should include loss and damage funding as a third pillar, in addition to mitigation and adaptation, and called on Australia not to oppose this inclusion:

[Australia’s opposition] is seen as a deliberate attempt to undermine the moral obligation that Australia and other wealthy nations have to Pacific small island developing states, and other climate vulnerable nations, to provide finance for loss and damage.[68]

3.53Relatedly, Greenpeace Australia-Pacific drew the Committee’s attention to the outcome statement from the recent COP29 Dialogue, hosted in Fiji in April 2024, which made the following reflection on loss and damage:

A paradigm shift is essential to address the inadequacies of traditional climate finance models, which perpetuate cycles of dependency and fail to confront the root causes of injustice. Loss and damage finance must be recognised as a distinct and essential pillar of climate action, separate from adaptation and from ODA. Democratised governance structures within climate finance mechanisms are crucial.[69]

3.54Greenpeace Australia-Pacific described the Loss and Damage Fund as a ‘paradigm shift’, which it claimed was necessary to address the inadequacies of existing climate finance models.[70]

3.55ANU’s Institute for Climate, Energy & Disaster Solutions told the committee that loss and damage remains ‘a key priority for Pacific nations’, and emphasised the critical importance of loss and damage given the limitations of adaptation.[71]

3.56Caritas also called for Australia to fund the Loss and Damage Fund, stating:

… to properly align Australian responses with Pacific priorities, substantial shifts in climate diplomacy are needed including stronger advocacy by Australia for Pacific interests in establishing and resourcing the Loss and Damage Fund, and engaging with the Pacific around emissions reduction ambition.[72]

3.57Mr ‘Alopi Latukefu, Director of the Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education, told the Committee that, in addition to climate finance and disaster response, Australia had a role to play in ‘actually providing a sense that there are pathways for many of the communities in the region who are facing really existential threats’. In particular, Mr Latukefu pointed to the need for interventions around food and water security, and mosquito-borne diseases.[73]

Australia’s role in future climate fora

3.58Several submitters discussed the bid by Australia and Pacific Islands to co-host COP31 in 2026 (see Chapter 1). I-Kiribati PhD scholar Ms Akka Rimon described the COP31 bid as an opportunity for the Pacific and Australia to ‘build momentum in bringing about green growth and the transition needed’.[74] Greenpeace Australia-Pacific noted COP31 presents both an opportunity and a responsibility,[75] and described the proposal as ‘an important event on the horizon as a means of pursuing Pacific climate demands and ambitions’.[76]

3.59Dr Yves Lafoy, New Caledonia’s representative in Australia, told the Committee it would be a ‘huge step forward’ if COP31 were to be hosted by Australia and the Pacific, and expressed confidence that the event would induce Australia to commit to further emissions reduction targets.[77]

3.60The ANU Institute for Climate, Energy & Disaster Solutions (ICEDS) warned the perception of past inaction and a lack of ambition on Australia’s part on climate action has impacted relationships in the region. ICEDS submitted these concerns could undermine Australia’s COP31 bid.[78] It nevertheless insisted:

COP31 presents a unique and significant opportunity to make collaborative and meaningful progress in mitigation, adaptation, finance loss and damage, and just transitions.[79]

3.61ICEDS consequently called on the Australian Government to strengthen its response to climate change in the Pacific by ‘working with First Nations and Pacific Island stakeholders (leaders, officials and universities) in the convening, design and delivery of COP31’.[80] Critical of Australia’s efforts to tackle climate change. Dr Luke Fletcher, Executive Director of Jubilee Australia, told the Committee:

Australia is the third largest fuel exporter and the second largest climate polluter when taking into account emissions from these exports. For Australia to demonstrate true commitment and solidarity to its Pacific family, particularly in the lead-up to COP31, we’d like to see a reorientation of policies in support of phasing out fossil fuels. This would mean an end to new fossil fuel projects and subsidies and a clear plan to phase out fossil fuel exports.[81]

3.62Both the ICEDS and PICAN called for First Nations voices to be central to Australia’s design and delivery of COP31 (see also Chapter 4).[82]

3.63Jubilee Australia and partners argued Australia’s perceived reticence to address climate priorities could jeopardise the outcomes of future COPs and undermine buy-in from Pacific partners.[83] Relatedly, Pacific Islands Students Fighting Climate Change called on Australia to be more responsive to the demands of the Pacific:

[I]f Australia wishes to host COP31 in partnership with the Pacific, and if it expects the international community to treat this goal as credible, then it cannot continue to ignore the demands of its ‘partners’ and ‘Pacific family’.[84]

3.64The group further warned:

The true test of Australia’s climate credentials is not the government holding an inquiry, but whether the government takes actions aimed at stopping fossil fuel expansion and exports, ceasing fossil fuel subsidies, and expanding climate finance. Without doing these things, Australia cannot be considered a credible host for COP31 or a genuine partner of Pacific nations.

Our future is on the line. The Australian Government does not need to ask more questions. It needs to listen and to act.[85]

3.65Greenpeace Australia-Pacific emphasised the importance of amplifying Pacific voices during upcoming climate fora, including COP29 in Azerbaijan in late 2024.[86] It submitted, in the context of its desire to co-host COP31, ‘if it really means to not just listen but act on Pacific priorities’, Australia had ‘hard but vital work to do’ in its transition away from fossil fuels, the need for greater investments in climate finance, and in calling for a moratorium on deep sea mining (DSM).[87]

3.66In relation to DSM, specifically, Greenpeace Australia-Pacific cautioned DSM is ‘a threat which casts a deep shadow over Pacific waters’.[88] Noting that Vanuatu, Fiji, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu ‘strongly oppose’ DSM, it called for a ‘precautionary pause’ or moratorium on the activity.[89]

3.67Also advocating a ban on DSM, the Pacific Australian Emerging Leaders Network (PAELN) argued the ban was vital to the Pacific’s identity and wellbeing. PAELN cautioned, if sufficient climate finance was not made available to the region, ‘leaders may resort to deep-sea mining to fund adaptation and relocation efforts’.[90]

‘Priming the pump’: Australia’s role in facilitating access to climate finance

3.68As discussed above, Australia’s contributions to climate finance were widely criticised throughout the inquiry. Further, several witnesses raised concerns related to the ability of Pacific Island countries to access climate finance. High Commissioner Sislo told the Committee it was ‘quite a challenge’ for Pacific countries to access global climate finance instruments and called for consideration of bilateral funding instead.[91]

3.69In evidence to the Committee, Pacific Community Director-General, Dr Stuart Minchin, acknowledged that Australia would be unable to meet all of Pacific’s climate adaptation and finance needs (which he estimated at over $1 billion each year for climate finance), but called on Australia to ‘prime the pump’:

…what Australia can do is assist by providing new and additional forms of climate finance that, if you like, prime the pump for more access to the bigger funds such as the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund and others by providing flexible modalities of climate finance that these bigger funds are less able to achieve.[92]

3.70Specifically, Dr Minchin pointed to the role Australia could play by providing flexible funding to in regional institutions to ensure their capacity to support Pacific member countries to develop bids for global climate funds. He told the Committee this funding could help Pacific countries leverage global funds that might otherwise be inaccessible due to the complexity of applications.[93]

3.71Dr Minchin also noted traditional development assistance to the region was often channelled into climate finance and ‘propping up’ climate-related work rather than being used to support the economy, improve education, healthcare, and other development needs. He therefore called for improved access to global climate instruments to free up development assistance to be used in advancement of the region’s economic and social advancement.[94]

3.72Director-General of the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program, Mr Sefanaia Nawadra, also called for greater efforts to ensure access to finance for Pacific governments, including through strengthening regional and national institutions.[95]

3.73Caritas Australia submitted that Pacific communities—particularly women and people with disabilities—struggle to access climate finance instruments due to complex and time-consuming processes that are often poorly tailored to local cultures. It called on Australia to advocate reforms that would facilitate access to climate finance for the most vulnerable across the Pacific.[96] Caritas told the Committee, ‘for the communities in the Pacific who are the most vulnerable to climate change, and bearing the brunt of storm surges, it’s very hard to get access to these huge global funds’. It also advocated support for locally-managed climate funds that could ‘disperse climate funds quickly and in a targeted manner where it is most needed, with local knowledge that comes from grassroots organisations’. Relatedly, Caritas endorsed Australia’s support for the Pacific Resilience Facility due to it being controlled by Pacific countries.[97]

3.74The Australian Red Cross similarly called on Australia to influence key stakeholders to remove barriers for local actors to access climate finance so as to ensure contextually relevant projects that were locally-led, designed, and implemented.[98]

On the home front: views on Australia’s efforts to curtail emissions

3.75Separate from Australia’s efforts to support climate action across the Pacific was the question of Australia’s domestic efforts to curtain emissions. Dr Lafoy expressed the view that Australia was ‘doing its best’ to reduce emissions, but noted a possible ‘trade-off’ in some countries between economic development and emissions reductions.[99]

3.76Excellency Tong told the Committee Australia was doing ’a wonderful job in making a very deep commitment to cutting emission domestically’.[100] He questioned, however, what was being done about the high volume of subsidised exports of fossil fuels from Australia:

… even though it’s not being burned in Australia, it’s contributing to the overall global emissions level. Australia cannot ignore the fact that it is one of the largest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions via its export levels, and especially the fact that it’s highly subsidised. If only these subsidies could be redirected to renewables, maybe there might be a hope. Yes, we appreciate the resources that Australia is putting in in terms of building resilience. But on the one hand we are contributing to building resilience, and on the other hand we’re actually taking it down by contributing to the greenhouse gas emissions. So it seems a contradiction.[101]

3.77In light of the existential threat facing parts of the Pacific, Excellency Tong asked the Committee; ‘does the Australian government have the political will or the moral capacity to see that its current policies on fossil fuel exports are highly detrimental to the future of the Pacific island countries?’[102]

3.78Greenpeace Australia-Pacific told the Committee:

For Australia to be taken seriously about the values it claims to hold, it must align its own emissions target with a 1.5 degree pathway.

We know what is causing the climate crisis and its is burning fossil fuels. Australia is the third largest exporter of fossil fuels and, no matter where they are burned, they impact Pacific islands the same. We’d like to see the Australian government acknowledge and treat gas for what it is, not a transition fuel but a fossil fuel. [103]

3.79Oxfam Australia pointed to Australia’s fossil fuel subsidies, which it told the Committee amounted to $14.5 billion, ‘easily more than our fair share of climate finance’.[104] Oxfam stated:

We [Australia] exacerbate climate change. We are making the injustice of climate change much worse because instead of taxing and making the corporations causing climate change pay for their damage, we’re actually paying them to cause damage on Pacific Island countries… It is up to our Australian parliament to address that injustice. Instead of providing taxpayer funds to fossil fuel corporations, tax them fairly instead so that we can then use that money fairly for the people facing the impacts of climate change.

3.80Relatedly, Mr ‘Alopi Latukefu, Director of the Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education told the Committee:

If Australia wants to respond appropriately to the needs and priorities of Pacific islands nations and their peoples, our government must treat the climate crisis seriously and walk the talk. This includes transitioning rapidly out of Australia’s dependence and economic interest in the fossil-fuel economy. To be Pacific security partner of choice, Australia must step up to the identified and articulated greater security threat to the region, namely climate change.[105]

3.81The Pacific Islands Climate Action Network questioned why Australia, as a member of the PIF, needed this inquiry to identify the priorities of the Pacific when these priorities, including aspirations for a Fossil Fuel Free Pacific, had been clearly articulated over many years.[106] Pacific Islands Students Fighting Climate Change (PISFCC) expressed similar frustrations at this inquiry’s terms of reference:

Pacific Island countries and communities have already articulated their key priorities, concerns, and aspirations with clarity, in detail, and on numerous occasions over many years.[107]

3.82Despite clear calls for climate action on the part of Pacific leaders, the group criticised what it perceived to be Australia’s failure to live up to its commitments around tackling climate change.[108]

3.83350.org Pacific also questioned the Committee’s inquiry:

The nations and communities of the Pacific Islands have consistently and meticulously communicated their crucial priorities on multiple occasions over numerous years. It is unjust to require the Pacific Island states to reiterate their priorities for the latest Australian Government inquiry.[109]

3.84It urged the Australian Government to improve its relationships with Pacific governments by taking meaningful action on climate change.[110]

3.85Also taking issue with a perceived lack of action on the part of the Australian Government, MAPW denounced Australia’s response to the region’s climate priorities:

We cannot pretend to take seriously Pacific Island people’s grave fears as they see their lands disappearing, while at the same time we open up new fossil fuel projects that will feed the climate crisis.[111]

3.86The Pacific Islands Climate Action Network (PICAN) also challenged Australia’s ongoing use and expansion of fossil fuels, which it argued was ‘dangerous and detrimental’ to the aspirations of Pacific leaders for a fossil free region.[112] It further argued, '[t]he continued use and expansion of fossil fuels by Australia is compounding the climate crisis and threatening the survival of Pacific Island States'.[113] PICAN asserted there are ‘significant discrepancies’ between Australia’s stated commitments and its actions in terms of climate action.[114]

3.87DFAT officials responded to these views:

The evidence given to your committee is, I think, part of that conversation, but the broader conversation that the government is having with the Pacific is one that recognises that Australia’s climate ambition, and the willingness to deploy a voice and resources behind that, is very substantial.[115]

3.88While Greenpeace Australia-Pacific noted ‘demonstrable progress’ in Australia’s efforts to address climate change and better protect nature, it suggested it was 'time to raise ambition higher'. It submitted:

As a friend and partner to the Pacific region, Australia must fully discharge its moral and international obligations to take the strongest possible action on climate change.[116]

3.89Caritas warned Australia’s perceived inaction on climate change was impacting its relationships in the region:

Pacific leaders have been unequivocal in saying that Australia’s stance on climate change mitigation efforts at home is affecting Australia’s relationships with small island Pacific nations..[117]

3.90Applauding the Australian Government’s support for the energy transition, MAPW called for a far greater contribution to climate finance. It claimed ‘there is a long way to go still’ in terms of Australia’s role in addressing climate change. It further submitted:

Urgent and drastic reduction of carbon emissions globally must be a top priority. As a nation that has, per capita, contributed significantly to the climate crisis, Australia has a heavy responsibility in this respect.[118]

3.91Jubilee Australia and partners highlighted the ‘dark side’ of Australia’s engagement in the Pacific in terms of the behaviour of Australian mining companies in the region. It recommended the Australian Government strengthen the powers of the Australian National Contact Point (see Box 2.1, above) to investigate and take action in relation to complaints about the conduct of Australian companies that may be violating human rights or the environment.[119]

3.92Jubilee Australia further submitted that the AusNCP could be further strengthened through additional funding as well as measures to increase the market relevance of AusNCP’s work. Specifically, Jubilee noted disclosure requirements related to adverse reports by the AusNCP are limited and likely have very little impact on the market value of named companies. It therefore proposed either requiring the relevantly named company to release an adverse finding by the AusNCP to investors or mandating a disclosure to the market as a company announcement.[120] Jubilee also raised the possibility of empowering the AusNCP with the authority to sanction companies, for example through the withdrawal or denial of trade advocacy support for a named company.[121]

Committee comment

3.93The Committee notes the Australian Government’s stated intention (and that of the key departments that contributed to this inquiry) to support Pacific-led Australian-backed solutions. Accordingly, the Committee recognises that climate action has long been identified by Pacific leaders and communities as a high priority to which Australia is expected to contribute—and evidence put to the Committee confirms it remains so—along with health, education, employment, and social inclusion.

3.94The Committee considers the PRF to be an effective means of providing accessible and responsive funding in support of local efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change in the region and therefore welcomes the Australian Government’s initial $100 million commitment to the Fund. It would also welcome consideration of future commitments in support of the PRF, as well as efforts to advocate for greater support among Pacific donors. However, the Committee acknowledges the widely-held position among contributors to this inquiry that Australia is not doing its fair share to address the effects of climate change in our region. As such, the Committee urges the Australian Government to consider substantially increasing its climate finance contributions to the Pacific, including by contributing to the Loss and Damage Fund for Developing Countries. The Committee also considers Australia has a role to play facilitating greater and more equitable access to climate finance.

3.95Moreover, the Committee is concerned that increases in climate finance not come at the expense of Australia’s international development program. Accordingly, the Committee recommends that future climate finance contributions be clearly identified within the Overseas Development Assistance budget.

3.96In keeping with the Australian Government’s climate commitments, it is the Committee’s view that ODA not be spent on fossil fuel projects. And in response to Pacific demands, the Committee considers the government should use its position on the international Seabed Authority Council to seek robust regulatory arrangements with the strongest possible environmental protections before seabed mining commences. It should also advocate for this position in global fora, such as upcoming COPs.

3.97Further, the Committee was persuaded that a strengthened AusNCP could pave the way for better and more ethical engagement by Australian companies in the region. And in the Committee’s view, Australian companies should be held to account for their human rights and environmental impact overseas. As such, the Committee considers that the AusNCP should be strengthened with additional funding, and additional investigative and sanctions powers with market relevance.

3.98Finally, the Committee acknowledges that truly delivering on the priorities of the Pacific requires a commitment not to cherry-pick among a menu of options, but rather to listen to what Pacific leaders and communities are demanding of us. However, the Committee also recognises the potential for diverging priorities between Pacific Island countries as well as within them—for example between Pacific leaders and the communities they represent. Whilst the priorities established by Pacific leaders and through the region’s structures are clear, the priorities of its peoples are less so. Longitudinal surveys into the attitudes in Pacific countries, as detailed above, offer invaluable insights into the region that must be accounted for in Australia’s engagement in the region. The Committee shares Dr Baker’s view that longitudinal studies that assess the attitudes and priorities of Pacific communities are essential if Australia is to ensure its own engagement in the region is properly aligned. As such, the Committee recommends the Australian Government considers Terms of Reference and governance frameworks to support Australian and Pacific academic institutions to carry out studies of the attitudes of Pacific communities. The Australian Government must also be prepared for difficult decisions if priorities emerge that do not readily align with Australia’s own. In such an eventuality, open, respectful, and frank communication with our Pacific neighbours will be essential.

Recommendations

3.99The Committee recommends that where Pacific Island countries and Pacific civil society organisations seek to access climate finance, the Australian Government, having made a contribution to the Loss & Damage Fund for Developing Countries:

• takes steps to improve and streamline the process
• advocates globally for the creation of more equitable climate finance arrangements, in consultation with affected communities, with a view to facilitating access by the most vulnerable communities across the Pacific and elsewhere
• consider support for the establishment of, funding for, and advocating for other institutional donors to support locally-managed climate finance and climate adaptation funds to support quick and targeted dispersal, including the Pacific Resilience Fund
• explores other measures to improve access to climate finance for the most vulnerable and most effected by climate change in the Pacific.

3.100The Committee recommends that the Australian Government commits to identify any future climate finance contributions within the Overseas Development Assistance budget by 2026–27.

3.101The Committee recommends that the Australian Government publicly commits to ensure that no Overseas Development Assistance will be spent on fossil fuel projects in the Pacific by 2026–27. This policy should be implemented in consultation with Pacific Island Forum leaders.

3.102The Committee recommends that the Australian Government use its position on the International Seabed Authority Council to seek robust regulatory arrangements with the strongest possible environmental protections before seabed mining commences.

3.103The Committee recommends that the Australian Government considers options to strengthen the Australian National Contact Point for Responsible Business Conduct (AusNCP), including by:

• increasing funding for the AusNCP
• introducing additional powers to enable the AusNCP to investigate and sanction Australian corporations for human rights and environmental violations overseas.

3.104The Committee recommends that the Australian Government considers Terms of Reference and governance frameworks for the potential funding and partnership with Australian academic institutions to build the capacity of local actors to undertake surveys, including, where appropriate, into community attitudes and perceptions.

Footnotes

[1]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Supporting democracy in our region, November 2023, p. 23

[2]Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Supporting democracy in our region, November 2023, p. 30

[3]Mr Robert Sisilo, High Commissioner, Solomon Islands High Commission, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 1

[4]Mr Baron Waqa, Secretary-General, Pacific Islands Forum, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 28

[5]University of Wollongong, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources & Security, Submission 30, p. 2

[6]Mr Anote Tong, Chair, Pacific Elders’ Voice, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 2

[7]Mr Tong, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 4

[8]Mr Tong, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 8

[9]Ms Akka Rimon, PhD Scholar, School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 4

[10]Oxfam, Submission 58, p. 7

[11]The Medical Association for the Prevention of War (MAPW), Submission 35, p. 1

[12]Greenpeace Australia-Pacific, Submission 77, p. 5

[13]Dr Damian Spruce, Advocacy Associate Director, Caritas Australia, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 18

[14]Mr Alan Hewson, Policy and Partnerships Lead, Australian Council for International Development, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 19

[15]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW), Submission 48, p. 2; See also Ms Sally Box, Head of Division, International Climate Negotiations Division, DCCEEW, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 36

[16]DCCEEW, Submission 48, pp. 2–3

[17]Ms Sally Box, Head of Division, International Climate Negotiations Division, DCCEEW, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 36

[18]Ms Kathleen Logan, First Assistant Secretary, Pacific Strategy Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 8

[19]Assoc Prof Julien Barbara, Prof Michael Leach, Dr Kerryn Baker and Dr Christopher Mudaliar, Submission 62, p. 8; and Dr Kerryn Baker, Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 1

[20]Prof Michael Leach, Politics and International Relations, Swinburne University of Technology, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 5

[21]Dr Kerryn Baker, Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 1

[22]Dr Baker, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 1

[23]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australia’s Official Development Assistance: Development Budget Summary 2024–25, p. 3

[24]DFAT, Australia’s Official Development Assistance: Development Budget Summary 2024–25, p. 2

[25]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 7

[26]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 8

[27]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 8

[28]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 7

[29]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 7

[30]Ms Emily Luck, Assistant Secretary, Regional and Climate Branch, Pacific Strategy Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 10

[31]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 2

[32]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 2; and Ms Kristin Tilley, Ambassador for Climate Change, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 9

[33]Treasury, Australian National Contact Point for Responsible Business Conduct, https://ausncp.gov.au/ (accessed 5 November 2024)

[34]DCCEEW, Submission 48, p. 3

[35]DCCEEW, Submission 48, pp. 3­4 and Appendix B

[36]Ms Kristin Tilley, Ambassador for Climate Change, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 9

[37]DCCEEW, Submission 48, p. 4

[38]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 8

[39]Embassy of France, Submission 38, p. [4]

[40]DFAT, Submission 80, p. 8; see also and Ms Tilley, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 9

[41]United Nations Climate Change, What is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change?, unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/what-is-the-united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change (accessed 2 August 2024)

[42]Mr Sisilo, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 2

[43]Oxfam, Submission 58, p. 19

[44]Mr Waqa, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 31

[45]Australian National University Institute for Climate, Energy & Disaster Solutions, Submission 61, p. [10]

[46]Pacific Islands Climate Action Network, Submission 76, p. [2]

[47]Authors of the PEV submission include Ambassador Kaliopate Tavola, President Tommy E Remengesau, Jr, Dame Meg Taylor, Professor Konai Helu Thaman, Hon Enele Sopoaga, President Anote Tong, and Professor Robert Underwood

[48]Senator the Hon Penny Wong, ‘Speech to the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat’, Speech, 26 May 2022

[49]Pacific Elders’ Voice, Submission 20, p. [1]

[50]Pacific Elders’ Voice, Submission 20, p. [2]

[51]Mr Tong, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 9

[52]Ms Michelle Higelin, Executive Director, ActionAid Australia, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 28

[53]Greenpeace Australia-Pacific, Submission 77, p. 6

[54]Pacific Islands Climate Action Network, Submission 76, p. [2]

[55]Oxfam, Submission 58, p. 4

[56]Oxfam, Submission 58, p. 19

[57]MAPW, Submission 35, p. 2

[58]Ms Julie-Anne Richards, Climate Policy and Advocacy Lead, Oxfam Australia, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 30

[59]Oxfam, Submission 58, pp. 1 and 13

[60]Oxfam, Submission 58, p. 19

[61]ActionAid Australia and the Shifting the Power Coalition (SPC), Submission 67, p. 9

[62]ActionAid Australia and the SPC, Submission 67, p. 9; and IWDA, Submission 74, p. 10

[63]ActionAid Australia and the SPC, Submission 67, p. 9

[64]IWDA, Submission 74, p. 10

[65]Jubilee Australia and partners, Submission 81, p. [20]

[66]Dr Luke Fletcher, Executive Director, Jubilee Australia Research Centre, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 11

[67]Mr ‘Alopi Latukefu, Director, Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 41

[68]Oxfam, Submission 58, p. 22

[69]Greenpeace Australia-Pacific, Submission 77, p. 4

[70]Greenpeace Australia-Pacific, Submission 77, p. 4

[71]ANU’s Institute for Climate, Energy & Disaster Solutions, Submission 61, p. [10]

[72]Caritas Australia, Submission 65, p. 1

[73]Mr ‘Alopi Latukefu, Director, Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, pp. 47–48

[74]Ms Akka Rimon, PhD Scholar, School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 5

[75]Greenpeace Australia-Pacific, Submission 77, p. 3

[76]Greenpeace Australia-Pacific, Submission 77, p. 3

[77]Dr Yves Lafoy, Counsellor, Official Representative of New Caledonia to Australia, Embassy of France, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 3

[78]ICEDS, Submission 61, p. [7]

[79]ICEDS, Submission 61, p. [18]

[80]ICEDS, Submission 61, p. [20]

[81]Dr Fletcher, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 11

[82]Australian National University Institute for Climate, Energy & Disaster Solutions, Submission 61, p. [5]; and PICAN, Submission 76, p. [3]

[83]Jubilee and partners, Submission 81, p. [18]

[84]PISFCC, Submission 7, p. 13

[85]PISFCC, Submission 7, p. 17

[86]Greenpeace Australia-Pacific, Submission 77, p. 3

[87]Greenpeace Australia-Pacific, Submission 77, p. 5

[88]Greenpeace Australia-Pacific, Submission 77, p. 2

[89]Ms Mahealani Delaney, Pacific Community Engagement Coordinator, Greenpeace Australia-Pacific, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 21; and Greenpeace Australia-Pacific, Submission 77, pp. 2-3

[90]Pacific Australian Emerging Leaders Network, Submission 34, p. [3]

[91]Mr Sisilo, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 2

[92]Dr Stuart Minchin, Director-General, Pacific Community, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 29

[93]Dr Minchin, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 30

[94]Dr Minchin, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 29

[95]Mr Sefanaia Nawadra, Director-General, Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 29

[96]Caritas Australia, Submission 65, p. 3

[97]Dr Damian Spruce, Advocacy Associate Director, Caritas Australia, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 23

[98]Australian Red Cross, Submission 13, p. 3

[99]Dr Lafoy, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 3

[100]Mr Tong, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 8

[101]Mr Tong, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, pp. 8–9

[102]Mr Tong, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 2

[103]Ms Delaney, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 21

[104]Ms Richards, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024,p. 37

[105]Mr Latukefu, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, p. 41

[106]Pacific Islands Climate Action Network, Submission 76, p. 1

[107]Pacific Islands Students Fighting Climate Change, Submission 7, p. 1

[108]Pacific Islands Students Fighting Climate Change, Submission 7, p. 13

[109]350.org Pacific, Submission 72, p. 10

[110]350.org Pacific, Submission 72, p. 4

[111]MAPW, Submission 35, p. 2

[112]Pacific Islands Climate Action Network, Submission 76, p. [2]

[113]Pacific Islands Climate Action Network, Submission 76, p. [1]

[114]Pacific Islands Climate Action Network, Submission 76, p. [2]

[115]Mr Craig Chittick, First Assistant Secretary, Pacific Strategy Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 14 October 2024, p. 20

[116]Greenpeace Australia-Pacific, Submission 77, p. 5

[117]Caritas Australia, Submission 65, p. 2

[118]MAPW, Submission 35, p. 2

[119]Jubilee Australia and partners, Submission 81, p. [4]; and Dr Fletcher, Committee Hansard, 2 September 2024, pp. 11 and 15

[120]Jubilee Australia and partners, Submission 81.1, p. 3

[121]Jubilee Australia and partners, Submission 81.1, p. 5