Chapter 3

Financial providers

3.1Unlike physical abuse, where there can be limited opportunity for third parties to intervene, financial abuse very often involves the manipulation of financial products and services, which provides some opportunity for financial product and service providers to detect and respond to suspected financial abuse.

3.2This chapter of the report explores the issues identified by inquiry participants in relation to financial abuse and the financial services industry, being specifically providers of banking, insurance and superannuation products and services.

3.3This chapter also explores possible areas and issues for reform, including potential changes to financial providers’ systems and processes, the similarities and differences between fraud and financial abuse, industry self-regulation, and options for policy modernisation.

Similarities and differences between fraud and financial abuse

3.4Flequity Ventures reported that the direct cost to victim-survivors of financial abuse has been estimated at $5.7 billion, which is almost $3 billion more than Australians lost to scams in 2023 (Figure 3.1).[1] Further, financial abuse has been estimated as costing the economy $5.2 billion annually resulting in a staggering estimated cost of $10.9 billion.[2]

Source: Flequity Ventures, Submission 88, p. 5.

3.5Ms Catherine Fitzpatrick, Founder and Director of Flequity Ventures, highlighted the connection between fraud and financial abuse:

… It is a conversation that I have had a number of times: ‘Why don’t we consider [financial abuse] … to be fraud?’ If you take out a debt in somebody else’s name without their knowledge or consent, that is fraud. That’s a very clear case, and you would see that most organisations might waive the debt if they found that to be the situation. I think it is a cultural belief that if a stranger does something to you then you’re blameless but if you love somebody and they take advantage of you or try to control you then you’re partly to blame.[3]

3.6Ms Fitzpatrick asserted that, although many of the tactics of financial abuse are similar to those used to commit fraud, victim-survivors of financial abuse are treated differently by financial institutions:

When it comes to financial abuse, it goes to the hardship or the vulnerability team. It’s not treated as a crime. In a way it’s good, because those teams treat you as somebody who needs sensitivity and empathy, and they have more training these days … But in another way, when it’s debt, it’s: ‘Too bad, so sad; you’ve got this debt, and you need to repay it.’ It’s not: ’You are a victim of crime; therefore, how do we restore you to where you were before that crime?’ And then there are a whole lot of other provisions—credit reporting corrections and those sorts of things—that might happen. I’ve not seen a bank try to recover the money from the perpetrator of financial abuse, like they would try to recover the money from fraud.[4]

3.7ANZ pointed out the differences between financial abuse and fraud, and the challenges associated with addressing both the same way:

perpetrators of financial abuse are often legally entitled to the funds within a victim-survivor’s account (for example, where the perpetrator and victim-survivor share a joint account) or may be legally authorised to act on a victim-survivor’s account (for example in a power of attorney situation);

financial abuse losses may not involve a specific transfer of funds to a perpetrator and can instead relate to controlling behaviour or a refusal to contribute to bills and expenses; and

victim-survivors may be dependent on a perpetrator and/or unable to advocate for themselves.[5]

3.8ANZ further pointed out that victim-survivors of financial abuse may be experiencing significant change in their life circumstances and may be experiencing vulnerability. They may require domestic and family violence support.[6]

3.9Compared to fraud or scams, the legal basis for recovering or transferring funds for financial abuse may also be less clear. As such, a referral to a bank’s specialist teams may be more appropriate to enable the institution to carefully consider the circumstances of each case and determine an appropriate solution.[7]

Banking

3.10The Customer Owned Banking Association (COBA) emphasised that:

Banks play an important role in identifying, preventing and responding to financial abuse. However, due to the sensitive and complex nature of financial abuse, we acknowledge that banks alone cannot solve this problem. Disruption of financial abuse requires a multi-faceted approach involving collaboration between banks, government agencies, community organisations, and other stakeholders.[8]

3.11This section of the report will examine the following issues identified in the banking sector by inquiry participants:

the transition to online platforms;

loans and joint accounts, including buy now pay later; and

the current mechanisms of self-regulation.

Transition to online platforms

3.12The shift from financial products to online platforms has been happening over a number of years, and ANZ reported that, in the 2023 financial year, over 99 per cent of all banking transactions occurred digitally. ANZ further submitted that, between 2019 and 2023, branch transactions decreased by 47 per cent, while online and app transactions increased by 39 per cent.[9]

3.13Bendigo and Adelaide Bank stated that, while online products have made banking simpler, quicker and more convenient for customers, it has also meant perpetrators can use online banking features to inflict abuse.[10]

3.14COBA emphasised that the increasing shift of financial products to online platforms makes it increasingly difficult to identify potential ‘red flags’ and effectively manage instances of financial abuse. COBA further emphasised that this results in banks being heavily reliant on personal interactions with customers to identify financial abuse.[11]

3.15COBA observed the following features of online platforms that can facilitate financial abuse:

the ability to access a wide range of products and services and transactional capability online without the need for any assistance from a bank (customer self-serve) makes it easier for perpetrators of financial abuse to access and control a victim’s accounts;

the Consumer Data Right makes it simpler and easier for a perpetrator to gain access to and track all accounts and activity through banking apps;

new fee-free forms of electronic payments have made it easier for perpetrators to abuse through transaction descriptions that harass, coerce and threaten accountholders;

applying for an account, loan or credit card online can make it easier for a perpetrator to impersonate the identity of a victim-survivor and open products in their name without their knowledge, or to subject them to duress;

customers saving their bank passwords on devices at home can enable others to access their bank accounts through that device; and

increased utilisation of third-party authorities and powers of attorney have increased the opportunity for these third parties to conduct ‘conflicted transactions’ without the knowledge of customers (especially older customers who may not be using online platforms).[12]

3.16The Economic Abuse Reference Group (EARG) pointed out that the shift to online platforms and applications results in:

… reduced ability [to] engage in any kind of check beyond an algorithmic assessment of available transaction history and the consumer’s credit report, so there will be less opportunity to verify consent for joint applications, or identify whether the credit is for the applicant’s benefit.[13]

3.17At the committee’s public hearing in Canberra, Ms Iresha Lehane, a financial counsellor with Lifeline Australia, emphasised the ease with which online platforms can be manipulated to further elder financial abuse:

… we had a client, an older lady, whose daughter held up the phone to get the facial ID so that she could get into the app to take out the loans. That’s all it took. It was that easy.[14]

3.18COBA acknowledged that online platforms do present banks the opportunity to use technology to assist with identifying cases of financial abuse, as well as supporting customers. An example of this is the implementation of a ’quick exit’ feature on webpages; to allow a person to immediately close the webpages they were accessing and clear their browser history to protect their privacy and safety.[15]

3.19ANZ echoed COBA’s point of view in stated that the shift to online platforms provides the opportunity to identify abuse through data analysis, and that digital banking is particularly useful for this purpose as it provides comprehensive client use data. The use of machine learning to search through large volumes of data in ’real-time’ provides the potential to identify signs of increased risk of financial abuse very quickly.[16]

3.20Latitude Financial advised that it has also recently deployed an artificial intelligence solution, which aims to monitor all interactions between its contact centre and customers. Latitude Financial considered that this new capability will further strengthen its ability to identify hardship triggers and ensure that vulnerable customers and those experiencing hardship are being offered the most appropriate form of support.[17]

3.21At the committee’s public hearing in Melbourne, Ms Jasmine Opdam, Senior Policy and Advocacy officer from Redfern Legal Centre, expressed concern that the online application processes that financial providers use for their products and services is often too streamlined, and noted that more ’friction’ in application processes is important in that it provides opportunities for the identification of financial abuse:

All we need is to introduce, in many cases, the bare minimum of friction to an application process. We see this all the time in the buy-now pay-later space, where it’s an almost completely frictionless process and it’s ripe for abuse by perpetrators. What we’re talking about is introducing the bare minimum of friction so that there are opportunities to identify where financial abuse is occurring and, at a bare minimum, perhaps speaking to both co-borrowers.[18]

3.22EARG recommended that electronic transactions have added checks and balances in place to protect against financial abuse including, but not limited to, the requirement for witnessing. It is further noted that these checks and balances should be culturally appropriate and accessible.[19]

Impacts on elder abuse

3.23Uniting Communities highlighted that the shift to online and digital banking platforms has created significant challenges, particularly for people living in regional areas, culturally and linguistically diverse people and older people who do not have access to digital technologies or adequate digital literacy skills. They are then forced to rely on others (family members/non-relatives) to access their bank services, inadvertently making them susceptible to financial abuse.[21]

3.24While some older people are familiar and skilled with using online banking platforms, there is still a considerable proportion of older people who have poor digital literacy. In 2023, the Australian Digital Inclusion index found that older people have considerably lower digital literacy compared to the national average. Eastern Community Legal Centre (ECLC) asserted that lower digital literacy and the transition to online banking platforms can lead to an increased risk of financial elder abuse.[22]

3.25ECLC further observed that online financial elder abuse can occur when older people have their online login details stolen by others, both family members and non-relatives, who then use those details to make unauthorised transactions. It was also observed that financial elder abuse can be exacerbated when an appointed attorney under an enduring power of attorney has access to the older person’s online banking platforms and misuses their authority for their own benefit.[23]

3.26Many inquiry participants highlighted the benefits of physical bank branches, which can provide an important financial abuse safeguard for victim-survivors, especially older people.[24] The NSW Ageing and Disability commission explained that branch staff can play an important role in identifying and intervening in instances of financial abuse, as they are familiar with their customers and can identify changes in customer behaviour, raise questions about the customer’s decision-making capability or arrangements, and pursue concerns about interactions between family members and a customer in relation to their money or accounts.[25]

3.27ECLC proposed the following recommendations to address the impacts on older Australians resulting from the shift to online platforms:

voluntary ’opt-in’ online services: online banking should be opt-in and banks should not encourage older customers to get online services if they are not confident using them; and

warnings about getting help from family members: financial providers should provide warnings to elderly customers about the risks of financial abuse if they seek support from family and friends with online banking.[26]

3.28EARG echoed the ECLC’s recommendation that all electronic banking services should be ‘opt-in’.[27]

Abusive language in payment descriptions

3.29A prominent example of the negative impact that the transition to online platforms has had on victim-survivors is the use of abusive language in the payment description field for bank transfers and payments.[28]

3.30Some perpetrators have developed a tactic where they make one or more electronic funds transfer of a small amount of money to the victim-survivor and use the description field to send an abusive message. This is often used when other options for communication have been blocked.[29]

3.31Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) explained that technology-facilitated abuse through transactions has a range of impacts on victim-survivors. These include that victim-survivors can relive abuse when they see these messages throughout their account statements. Additionally, CBA highlighted that, if the victim-survivor applies for any type of credit or submits a rental application, these transactions appear on the victim-survivor’s statements that may be required to secure the credit or rental contract.[30]

3.32Transaction monitoring for financial abuse is becoming common practice for banks. Bank of Queensland submitted that its customer advocate office receives frequent reports on outbound payment transfers that have been identified as potentially abusive, threatening or harmful, or which includes inappropriate language. Bank of Queensland further advised that perpetrators identified through this process are issued warning letters from the bank.[31]

3.33EARG asserted that the CBA’s model for identifying and responding to abusive electronic money transfers is best practice. It was noted that CBA have developed several interventions that can be offered to customers, including:

setting up new, safe accounts for victim-survivors;

de-linking the victim survivor’s bank account from PayID so the perpetrator can no longer send abusive transactions to their email address, mobile number or ABN;

sending warning letters to perpetrators;

removing a perpetrator’s access to digital banking for a period of 3 months;

referring victim-survivors to external support organisations including the Good Shepherd Financial Independence Hub; and

in extreme cases, termination of a perpetrator customer’s banking relationship if they continue to act in breach of the bank’s relevant acceptable-use policy.[32]

3.34CBA highlighted that, in 2020, it implemented an automatic block on some of the most offensive and abusive language on its online banking platforms, which has resulted in nearly one million blocked transactions since its implementation.[33]

3.35The Salvation Army recommended that financial institutions continue to work to minimise the impacts of financial abuse and harassment communicated through transaction descriptions.[34]

3.36EARG recommended that all authorised deposit-taking institutions adopt the Commonwealth Bank model to identify and respond to abusive electronic money transfers.[35]

Loans and joint accounts

Joint accounts

3.37Having a joint account with a spouse is often seen as a symbol of togetherness and partnership. However, in financially abusive relationships joint accounts can often lead to significant financial, physical and mental harm to victim-survivors.[36]

3.38WEstjustice identified the following ways that joint accounts can be used by perpetrators to commit financial abuse:

limiting access to joint funds;

withdrawal of significant amounts of money by one party;

refusing to repay debt;

damage to credit scores; and

using transactions to stalk or monitor a person’s movements and spending.[37]

3.39Even though it may not be in the perpetrators best interests to stop payment or default on a joint debt, they may do so knowing that it will cause further harm to the victim-survivor.[38]

3.40Westpac noted that in circumstances of separation, whether or not as a result of family and domestic violence, it has protection measures in place so joint accounts are not misused. These measures include options for customers to put ’two to sign’ authority on joint accounts, to freeze accounts and to place auto-blocks on credit cards.[39]

3.41The Hon. Anna Bligh, Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Banking Association (ABA), highlighted the difficulties associated with designing safe financial products:

To illustrate the complexity, dual authorisation arrangements were introduced as a measure to stop an individual withdrawing cash from joint accounts or redraw facilities without the consent of both partners. Unfortunately, banks have subsequently seen that these arrangements can also be used as a tool of abuse to prevent the other joint account holder using the account independently or setting up recurring payments from the account, for example.[40]

3.42Bendigo and Adelaide Bank presented a case study that identified a new approach for joint accounts. A subsidiary of Bendigo and Adelaide Bank, Up, released a product in 2021, called 2Up, that allows customers to open a 2Up account with another Up customer, creating a shared account while retaining individual accounts. Customers can contribute to shared financial goals or commitments while retaining their own personal accounts and continuing to work towards their own financial goals. The product encourages transparency and makes it easy for linked customers to see the incoming and outgoing funds. This product is aimed at ensuring financial independence alongside joint financial commitments.[41]

3.43The Centre for Economic Safety’s first Designed to disrupt report proposed potential design options to prevent misuse of joint accounts. Key design options included:

the application of fraud monitoring analysis to large withdrawals and red flags that identify potential abuse behaviour;

simplified separation processes to de-link accounts from perpetrators without notification;

once aware of the separation, restrictions on withdrawals by each person to half the funds and require both parties to sign for the remainder until property settlement;

information for customers to inform them of the safest account settings;

reporting functions for online products, to provide avenues for customer concerns or employee safety concerns to be actions; and

improvements to the hardship process.[42]

3.44WEstjustice recommended that when a financial institution establishes a joint account, it has the responsibility to ensure the following:

that each joint account holder has their own access to the account;

what information will be visible and/or shared with the other account holder; and

explaining what mechanisms exist to ensure safety of the account, such as a ‘two to sign’ requirement before withdrawals can be made.[43]

Financial hardship

3.45The National Credit Code provides a framework for customers to advise their lender of their inability to meet their obligations. If a lender is given notice by a customer that they are unable to meet their obligations under a credit contract (hardship notice), the lender decides whether to agree to change the contract or not as follows:

(a)the lender agrees to change the contract—if this occurs, the lender must give the customer written notice stating that the change has been agreed and setting out the details of the change; or

(b)the lender does not agree to change the contract—if this occurs, the lender must give the customer written notice that includes reasons for their decision, contact details for the AFCA scheme and the customer’s rights under that scheme.[44]

3.46While s72(2) of the National Credit Code specifies that the lender is not required to agree to change the credit contract, the section is accompanied by a note that explains what may constitute reasonable cause for a consumer’s inability to meet their obligations, ’such as family violence, illness or unemployment’.[45]

3.47Under the mandatory comprehensive credit reporting regime, large banks are required to provide credit information about consumers to credit reporting bodies—this includes information about financial hardship arrangements.[46]

3.48The reasons why a customer may experience financial hardship are many and varied, financial abuse being one of the reasons. Financial hardship can be the first line indicator of financial abuse or as a result of separation.[47]

3.49Large lenders have developed hardship streams, which allow customers to delay payments, manage accounts and, in some circumstances, waive the entire debt.[48]

3.50The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) published a report in May 2024 titled ’Hardship, hard to get help: Lenders fall short in financial hardship support’ (hardship report).[49] The hardship report outlined findings from ASIC’s review of ten large home lenders and found that landers were failing to identify and respond to their customers’ hardships.[50]

3.51ASIC’s hardship report found that most lenders had an organisation-wide policy and staff training to identify and respond to customers experiencing vulnerability. However, ASIC also identified a range of issues with how lenders handled hardship notices from vulnerable customers. ASIC observed 35 per cent of customers dropped out of the assessment process at least once[51]

3.52The Salvation Army explained that, although financial institutions have made efforts to make hardship arrangements trauma-informed for those experiencing financial hardship and financial abuse, the administrative processes of hardship applications will always have a retraumatising effect.[52]

3.53ASIC highlighted that it is a positive step that some lenders have introduced special support teams for consumers experiencing financial abuse, while cautioning that this additional support serves little benefit if consumers that need specialised assistance can’t access it.[53]

3.54The Consumer Action Law Centre expressed concern that:

When core financial hardship obligations are being inadequately met, it raises concerns that the more subtle but well-known markers of financial abuse are not being identified or responded to. Preventing and responding to financial abuse are key to meeting financial hardship obligations.[54]

3.55The Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA) stated that fair, flexible and inclusive design of hardship processes (for example, accessible communications, call scripts, system flags, sensitively designed online forms, good call notes and staff training) can better identify and support tailored hardship responses for all customers, and provide particular sensitivity to the proportion of hardship cases involving financial abuse.[55]

3.56In response to the hardship report, ASIC asserted that it expects all lenders to take the following steps to improve their financial hardship practices[57]:

identify where consumers may be experiencing vulnerability and take extra care with, and provide additional support to, these consumers; and

have in place adequate systems, resourcing, training, compliance and other arrangements to enable hardship functions to operate effectively.[58]

3.57AFCA supported the ASIC hardship report’s recommendations to improve lenders responses to financial hardship, including applying a financial abuse lens to hardship applications to better identify those cases involving financial abuse and potential interventions.[59]

3.58The Centre for Women’s Economic Safety (CWES) supported ASIC’s hardship report recommendations, but further noted that, while the report only refers to home loan lenders, the recommendations should actually apply to all lending.[60]

3.59Financial institutions must ensure that hardship arrangements are flexible, responsive and easily navigable by vulnerable customers. The Salvation Army recommended that financial institutions continue to develop accessible, trauma-informed resources and continue to invest in hardship arrangements to minimise the barriers to access for those experiencing financial abuse and other trauma.[61]

3.60EARG observed that financial institutions tend to respond to financial-abuse related debts by waiving them on the basis of financial hardship or on compassionate grounds, even where the victim-survivor or their advocate has engaged in alleged breaches of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 or raised other legal causes of action.[62]

3.61Additionally, EARG noted that financial intuitions are often reluctant to engage in disputes about misconduct or maladministration in the delivery of the financial product, preferring instead to seek information about the victim-survivor’s current financial circumstances and, if appropriate, provide an outcome based on addressing their financial hardship.[63]

3.62Ms Bronwyn Davis, Family Violence Financial Counsellor at Women’s Legal Service Victoria, echoed this sentiment:

The path of complaint changes to hardship. They’ll waive it and the client will be satisfied with that because it means they can move on, and we don’t always get to see accountability [of the perpetrator] or the outcome for what it actually is.[64]

3.63It was proposed that financial institutions be required to report on the proportion of complaints alleging financial abuse which are resolved on the basis of financial hardship alone. NAB, Westpac and ANZ reported that currently they do not capture complaints data in this manner.[65]

3.64At the committee’s public hearing in Melbourne, Ms Darlene Mattiske-Wood, Board Director of COBA, noted her support for mandating the proposed requirement to report on the proportion of complaints alleging financial abuse.[66]

Buy Now Pay Later

3.65Buy Now Pay Later (BNPL) is a short-term instalment loan that allows consumers to pay for goods and services over a few weeks. The first instalment is often due at time of purchase with three further instalments then due every two weeks.[67]

3.66The Financial Rights Legal Centre observed that BNPL is an example of a credit product that has been purposely designed to prioritise frictionless and easy on-boarding and usage over safety. Minimal identification requirements in addition to minimal sign-up hurdles can result in perpetrators using BNPL products to financially abuse victim-survivors. Victim-survivors of financial abuse can potentially only find out they have a BNPL debt in their name when they are being pursued by a debt collector and their credit score has been negatively impacted.[68]

3.67Zip Co highlighted the steps conducted to ensure the individual applying for the Zip product is who they say they are. These steps include collection and independent verification of identification documents, undertaking a credit check, requiring applicants to connect a third-party bank account, obtaining confirmation that the applicant’s bank account is held in the same name as the applicant and requiring email and mobile numbers for two-factor authentication when transacting on, or updating an account.[69]

3.68Currently, BNPL providers are not subject to responsible lending obligations under the National Consumer Credit Protection Act2009 and are not required to undertake any credit checks or other affordability assessments prior to providing credit.[71] While BNPL debts may be for small amounts, perpetrators can accumulate multiple debts from different providers that can add up to amounts in the thousands.[72]

3.69National Legal Aid asserted that the prevalence of BNPL contracts in the context of family violence has been identified as a growing trend. National Legal Aid identified that BNPL products are liable to financial abuse because accounts can be easily opened and operated online from a victim’s phone using basic personal information.[73]

3.70The Salvation Army identified the following ways BNPL can impact victim-survivors experiencing financial abuse:

a person using violence may take out debt in the name of the victim-survivor without their knowledge;

a person using violence may force the victim-survivor to take out a debt in their name through fear of violence; and

the victim-survivor may be forced to take out a debt for accessing vital funds to leave their unsafe environment, or to purchase necessities within the household.[74]

3.71VincentCare Victoria brought to the committee’s attention the concerning trend of BNPL products being used to facilitate financial elder abuse as a result of the increasing cost of living crisis.[75]

Treasury Laws Amendment (Responsible Buy Now Pay Later and Other Measures) Bill 2024

3.72In June 2024, the Australian Government introduced the Treasury Laws Amendment (Responsible Buy Now Pay Later and Other Measures) Bill 2024 (BNPL Bill) to regulate the BNPL industry. The BNPL Bill would amend several acts to extend the application of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act2009 to BNPL services.[76]

3.73The Consumer Action Law Centre acknowledged that the BNPL Bill introduces beneficial measures, including credit licence obligations and the requirement of BNPL providers to be a part of the Australian Financial Complaints Authority. However, the Consumer Action Law Centre expressed concern regarding the BNPL Bill’s ‘scaled’ responsible lending obligations, which results in BNPL providers not having the same suitability and affordability requirements and objectives as ordinary credit providers.[77]

3.74 The Salvation Army noted that further legislation may be required to provide more comprehensive protection, however concluded that the BNPL Bill is ’a step in the correct direction to better protect community members from unsuitable sources of credit’.[78]

3.75EARG made clear that it supports the BNPL Bill, but highlighted that several of its key concerns about the proposed legislation were not addressed in the BNPL Bill, including:

the lack of income verification, which would ensure the BNPL provider’s assessment of the consumer’s financial situation is based on correct information and that consumers are not sold unaffordable credit;

the lack of recognition of family and domestic violence (including financial abuse) as a factor that may lead to identity theft and fraud;

the rebuttable presumption that BNPL products under $2000 meet the requirements and objectives of the consumer, as the requirements and objectives limb of responsible lending obligations can help identify applications for credit where the named borrower is unlikely to receive any benefit; and

inadequate financial hardship and family violence practices and policies.[79]

3.76The Ecstra Foundation echoed the above concern regarding the adequacy of protections for amounts under $2000, which could leave victim-survivors of financial abuse vulnerable to further abuse.[80]

3.77The Consumer Action Law Centre recommended the following stronger measures to make BNPL less vulnerable to financial abuse:

a requirement for BNPL providers to conduct a suitability assessment including for amounts less than $2000

introduce a requirement for BNPL providers to consider if a customer is at risk of financial abuse and family and domestic violence as part of a suitability assessment for entering a new contract or increasing the credit limit of an existing contract; and

a requirement for BNPL providers to implement safeguards to prevent identity theft in BNPL, including by perpetrators of financial and family and domestic violence.[81]

3.78The Salvation Army recommended the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 be amended to extend greater Responsible Lending Obligations compliance requirements to BNPL lending to maximise the protection of victim-survivors from financial abuse and include identity-verification requirements.[82]

3.79For more information on the BNPL Bill, the Senate Economics Legislation Committee published a report in August 2024 that addressed the key issues relating to BNPL, separate to those specifically related to financial abuse.[83]

Self-regulation

Banking Code of Practice

3.80The Banking Code of Practice (Banking Code) is a set of enforceable standards of practice and services in the Australian banking industry, and provides safeguards and protections not set out in the law.[85] All 20 of the ABA’s members must adopt the Banking Code, and it binds member banks as a matter of contract.[86]

3.81The Banking Code requires member banks to take extra care with vulnerable customers, including victim-survivors of family or domestic violence or elder abuse.[87]

3.82The Banking Code requires banking staff to be trained to act with sensitivity, respect and compassion, and to work with customers to find suitable ways to undertake their banking. Banks are also required to be respectful of confidentiality, make communications easy, provide guidance to help customers maintain and regain control of finances, and refer customers to external support services where appropriate.[88]

3.83The ABA highlighted the other Banking Code requirements, which include:

not approving a new loan or an increase where the co-borrower does not receive a substantial benefit, unless the bank has taken reasonable steps to ensure the customer understands the risks being a co-borrower, has accepted reasons for why the customer wants to be a co-borrower on the loan, and is satisfied the customer is not experiencing financial abuse;

ending liability under a loan in certain circumstances;

various protections for those making guarantees including limiting liability, providing certain information, and requiring a minimum of three days to review the guarantee unless additional requirements are met;

changing joint account authorities, at the request of one party, for both to approve future withdrawals; and

assisting a joint account holder experiencing financial difficulty without involving the other person initially, if requested.[89]

3.84Member banks’ compliance with the Banking Code is monitored by the Banking Code Compliance Committee (BCCC), which is overseen by an independent Chair, a consumer representative and an industry representative.[90]

3.85The BCCC identified the following main commitments aimed at identifying, deterring and responding to financial abuse:

the obligation to take extra care with customers experiencing vulnerability and financial abuse (Chapter 14);

obligations to protect co-borrowers from financial abuse when lending (Chapter 17);

obligations to assist guarantors to make informed and independent decisions when guaranteeing loans (Chapters 26, 27, 28 and 29);

the obligation to manage withdrawal authorities on joint accounts in line with customer preferences (Chapter 35); and

the best interest duty: where the bank believes the representative is not acting in the best interest of the customer (Chapter 39, paragraph 163).[91]

3.86The Australian Human Rights Commission noted that the Banking Code is the only industry code with ASIC approval and offers consumer protections through a set of enforceable rights and entitlements that operate in addition to the law.[92]

3.87The 2025 Banking Code comes into effect in February 2025 and expands on the current Banking Code protections for vulnerable people by including the following:

encouraging vulnerable customers to tell banks about their circumstances so that banks can work with their customers in relation to their banking services; and

committing member banks to take reasonable steps to ensure that a meeting is held with guarantors. Part of the rationale for this new commitment is to provide an additional opportunity for any vulnerability flags (including financial abuse) to be identified.[93]

3.88The first inclusion is a result of the 2021 independent review of the Banking Code, which identified that the Banking Code should adopt similar wording to Clause 93 of the General Insurance Code. Clause 93 encourages vulnerable customers to inform the financial institutions about their circumstances, including any financial abuse.[94]

3.89St Vincent de Paul Society National Council of Australia (St Vincent de Paul Society) asserted that the responsibility of banks to take extra care with customers experiencing vulnerability is weakened by non-committal statements included in the Banking Code. St Vincent de Paul Society highlighted that statements such as ’we may become aware of your circumstances only if you tell us about them’ , ’we will be respectful of your need for confidentiality’ and ’we will try and make it easier for you to communicate with us’ does not incentivise victim-survivors to disclose financial abuse and does not guarantee confidentiality or access to secure and easy forms of communication.[95]

3.90St Vicent de Paul Society noted the 2025 Banking Code has partially addressed this issue, but proposed the following recommendation:

While this is an improvement, it does not go far enough. The Society recommends that the ABA fund research to inform the development of ’red flags’ which could be used by banks in a proactive manner to identify potential instances of financial abuse.[96]

3.91Uniting Communities also highlighted issues with supporting vulnerable customers, noting that ’taking extra care with customers who are experiencing vulnerability’ does not specifically include an obligation to monitor uncharacteristic or unusual patterns in transaction activities. Additionally, the duty to take extra care is limited to only when the customer tells their bank about their vulnerable circumstances. Uniting Communities point out that victim-survivors are often reluctant to identify themselves as vulnerable and may not even realise they would be considered vulnerable by their bank.[97]

3.92Uniting Communities recognised that the ABA’s industry guidelines provide further details on providing extra care for vulnerable customers, including that a ’bank should be aware of potential warning signs of financial abuse … [when the customer] makes unusual or uncharacteristic transactions’.[98]

3.93Uniting Communities emphasised that there is a mismatch between the common law, which says banks do not generally have an obligation to monitor a customer’s use of funds on their behalf, and what the ABA encourages member banks to incorporate into their internal processes, procedures and policies.[99]

3.94The BCCC submitted that changes should be made to the Banking Code to:

address the lack of onus on banks under the existing Code to proactively identify customers who may be experiencing vulnerability and offer support; and

include an obligation requiring banks to utilise their data capability and to develop systems to proactively identify customers at risk of experiencing vulnerability.[100]

3.95The Financial Rights Legal Centre identified that the Banking Code cannot be enforced by a regulator, such as ASIC, and victim-survivors of financial abuse can struggle to enforce contractual rights. Although, the Financial Rights Legal Centre did note that AFCA will take the Banking Code into account when determining disputes.[101]

Customer Owned Banking Code of Practice

3.96The Customer Owned Banking Code of Practice (COBCOP) is the code of practice for Australia’s mutual banks, credit unions and building societies. Currently 55 customer-owned banks subscribe to the 2022 COBCOP.[102]

3.97COBA highlighted the following COBCOP clauses that are relevant to supporting victim-survivors of financial abuse:

Clause 26 – We will adapt our customer service standards where reasonably practicable, and take extra care where we are aware that you are experiencing vulnerable circumstances; and

Clause 27 – We will train our staff how to identify customers experiencing vulnerability, and how to adapt our customer service standards for them in a sensitive and helpful way. Our training will include awareness of vulnerable circumstances as a result of domestic violence and elder abuse.[103]

3.98Bank of Us and Transport Mutual Credit Union further acknowledged the COBCOP vulnerability provisions, and noted that they specifically reference domestic violence, elder abuse and financial abuse.[104]

3.99The Financial Rights Legal Centre acknowledged that the COBCOP has similar protections to the Banking Code. It highlighted that the COBCOP also has similar limitations, such as the requirement of customers to self-identify themselves as victim-survivors of financial abuse or family and domestic violence in order to invoke any protections.[105]

Australian Finance Industry Association codes of practice

3.100The Australian Finance Industry Association (AFIA) has four industry codes in place that apply to some members depending on the code. AFIA’s four current codes of practice are:

Online Small Business Lenders Code of Practice;

Buy Now Pay Later Code of Practice;

Car Rental Code of Practice; and

Insurance Premium Funding Code of Practice.

3.101AFIA has also released the Finance Industry Code of Practice, which is Australia’s first non-bank lending code of practice, for consultation. The proposed code includes industry guidelines on financial difficulties, vulnerability, family and domestic violence and financial abuse.[106]

3.102The Online Small Business Lenders Code of Practice and Insurance Premium Funding Code of Practice include provisions relating to financial hardship and working with customers in good faith if they are experiencing financial difficulties in meeting any financial obligations. Neither code includes specific provisions that address financial abuse.[107]

3.103The Car Rental Code of Practice ensures an industry standard is set in regard to transparency of pricing and credit card charging practices, rental contract terms and damage assessment and billing. Currently, the Card Rental Code of Practice does not include any specific provisions addressing financial abuse; however, AFIA noted that this code is currently being updated to include clauses related to expectations around financial hardship, vulnerability and financial abuse. AFIA emphasised that these updates would ensure that car rental providers treat customers experiencing financial difficulties with sensitivity and respect and provides appropriate support.[108]

Buy Now Pay Later Code of Practice

3.104The AFIA Buy Now Pay Later Code of Practice (BNPL Code) was established in 2021 and sets out best practice standards for the sector, strengthening customer protections. AFIA reported that 90 per cent of BNPL companies have signed up to the code.[109]

3.105AFIA highlighted that the BNPL Code includes protections for customers experiencing financial hardship, mandatory training to assist staff with identifying vulnerable customers and requirements for information on hardship assistance to be readily available on websites and any digital platforms. AFIA further highlighted that the BNPL Code specifically identifies family and domestic violence as a factor that may contribute to a customer’s vulnerability.[110]

3.106EARG noted that, similar to other industry codes, the BNPL Code places the onus on customers to disclose their vulnerabilities rather than forcing BNPL providers to proactively identify warning signs of financial abuse. EARG also noted that, although it is a requirement for BNPL providers to have information readily available, publicly accessible information about BNPL providers’ approaches to financial hardship and family and domestic violence varies greatly by provider, with some not having accessible numbers or contact information for their hardship teams.[111]

Insurance

3.107Insurance is supposed to be a safety net, but it can be weaponised in family and domestic violence situations. The manipulation of insurance policies within the context of family and domestic violence exacerbates victim-survivors vulnerabilities and provides an avenue for continued financial abuse.

3.108This section of the report examines issues identified in the general, health and life insurance sector by inquiry participants.

General insurance

3.109In general insurance, perpetrators may deliberately seek to misuse products to limit access to information, cancel policies to leave the victim-survivor without an economic safety net, and impact the claims process to exert control by leaving their partner financially vulnerable and with damaged or irreparable assets.[112]

3.110The Financial Rights Legal Centre highlighted the following ways a perpetrator can use a general insurance product to commit financial abuse:

a perpetrator can take control of the family insurances through cancelling the policy or varying the policy, removing the victim-survivor as a co-insured party or third-party beneficiary. This is done to ensure that a victim-survivor is not covered by the policy, claim or payment;

a perpetrator can refuse to access a benefit under a policy in their own name, such as temporary accommodation under home and contents insurance, because it is the victim-survivor (and possibly children) living in the home and in need of the benefit;

a perpetrator can use insurance to stalk their ex-partner by accessing new contact and address details; and

a perpetrator can force victim-survivors to pay an excess following an accident.[113]

3.111National Legal Aid reported that perpetrators can misappropriate insurance payouts under joint policies. The perpetrator takes an insurance payment made under a joint policy for their own benefit and without the agreement of the other party. National Legal Aid also noted that, in some instances, the perpetrator lodges the insurance claim online and receives payment without the victim-survivor/joint policy holder’s knowledge.[114]

3.112The Financial Rights Legal Centre observed that some insurers ask claimants to act in a way that could compromise their safety, specifically in cases when insurers require victim-survivors to inform police in the case of a ’malicious act’. This can pose significant risk in cases of family and domestic violence and the Financial Rights Legal Centre proposed that insurers should abandon that requirement due to the undue encumbrance the requirement can place on claimants.[115]

3.113 The Insurance Council of Australia submitted that, unlike a customer’s relationship with a bank where the financial institution readily has access to a customer’s transactions, insurance is a product generally only used by the customer when the unexpected happens, without customers wanting or requiring daily interaction with their insurer.[116]

3.114Furthermore, outside of an active claims scenario, an insurer’s relationship with customers is limited to once-a-year at the time of policy renewal. The Insurance Council of Australia pointed out that many general insurers may not see possible signs of vulnerability until a claim is made. The Insurance Council acknowledged that the general insurance industry needs to improve its ability to identify and support vulnerable customers.[117]

3.115AFCA submitted its recommendation for the general insurance industry to invest and improve its processes to enable early identification and response to financial hardship and vulnerability. AFCA also suggested insurers should, when handling claims, anticipate claimants are likely to be experiencing some form of vulnerability and reduce the onus on claimants to disclose and demand more assistance from insurers.[118]

Conduct of others clause

3.116Many general insurance policies have intentional or malicious damage clauses which, depending on the policy, could leave victim-survivors unable to claim for damage to or loss of the home or contents caused intentionally by the perpetrator.[119]

3.117The reason why these clauses act against the interest of victim-survivors is because of the joint nature of the policy. A joint policy indemnifies co-insureds where there is a joint loss and is typically used for home or car insurance. A composite policy, which is generally used for business insurance, allows for each insured to have a separate and distinct claim.[121]

3.118In 2020, Suncorp introduced a ’conduct of others’ clause, which aims to protect customers by making it easier for Suncorp’s claims teams to respond when a policyholder may have been prejudiced by the acts of another policy holder/s or those who have a financial interest in the policy, such as the perpetrator of financial abuse. Where a perpetrator causes property damage, they work with the customer experiencing the abuse and may be able to accept claims that would normally not be covered.[122]

3.119The Insurance Council of Australia highlighted that the conduct of others clause provides greater protection to victim-survivors by providing flexibility to allow claims to be paid in cases of wrongful conduct by other policy holders in family and domestic violence situations, even where there is no legal requirement to do so.[123]

3.120The Insurance Council of Australia shared the following case study which illustrates the benefits of this clause:

Susan lodged a claim as her husband Peter had forced her out of the family home, separating her from her two young children, and then damaged her jewellery, furniture, and other items plus sold her personal belongings on Facebook marketplace without consent. Peter has a police record, has been incarcerated and is the subject of active apprehended violence orders from Susan and his parents. Police helped Susan to re-enter the home briefly to collect the children and some essential items. She and the children have been living with her mother-in-law with only a backpack of their belongings each. Under ’conduct of others’, Suncorp was able to cover some items maliciously damaged/ stolen including the children’s beds, hair straightener and camera. Without the ’conduct of others’ coverage available, none of the damage/replacement cost of these items would be coverable under the policy guidelines.[124]

3.121The Insurance Council of Australia noted that the ‘conduct of others’ clause is a good example of how insurers can offer greater support to victim-survivors by providing flexibility to allow claims to be paid in cases of wrongful conduct by other policy holders in domestic and family violence situations, even where there is no legal requirement to do so.[125]

3.122AFCA noted its strong support for a systemic and consistent approach to the handling of claims in circumstances of family and domestic violence and support for the introduction of the ’conduct of others’ clause for all general insurers.[126]

The General Insurance Code of Practice

3.123The 2020 General Insurance Code of Practice (Insurance Code) sets out the best-practice standards that go beyond the requirements legislated under the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (IC Act), Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act), Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (ASIC Act) and the Privacy Act 1988 (Privacy Act).[127]

3.124The Insurance Code is voluntary and ensures insurers follow the included standards when conducting business and interacting with customers, including the provision of extra care and support for vulnerable customers.[128]

3.125The Insurance Council of Australia pointed out that the Insurance Code does not cover all general insurance products, such as workers’ compensation, marine insurance, medical indemnity, motor vehicle injury insurance, domestic builders’ insurance and warranty insurance. Additionally, the Insurance Code does not apply to non-general insurance products.[129]

3.126The Insurance Council of Australia highlighted that Part 9 of the Insurance Code, titled Supporting customers experiencing vulnerability,contains commitments for code subscribers to have internal policies and training to understand how to best support customers experiencing vulnerability, including those affected by family and domestic violence. This includes the commitment to have a publicly available policy on their website detailing how they will support customers affected by family and domestic violence.[130]

3.127The Insurance Code is currently being reviewed by an independent panel. The Insurance Council of Australia made a recommendation to the independent panel that general insurers should endeavour to consider how the design of their products and processes could be improved for greater customer inclusion.[131]

3.128Wotton and Kearney proposed that the Insurance Council of Australia amend Part 9 of the Insurance Code to ensure consistency, clarity and compliance across the industry when providing support to vulnerable clients, including provisions which:

require insurers to treat joint policy as a composite policy to protect the interests of victim-survivors;

clarify the meaning and expectations of ’support measures’ and ’vulnerable customers’;

provide that an ’invitee’ forfeits their status when they cross into the realm of a violent intruder, rendering any prior exclusion null and void;

provide for discretionary emergency assistance payments;

standardise the inclusion of quick exit buttons on insurer websites; and

require insurers to include statements in their annual report that qualify and describe the ways in which their domestic violence policies have been implemented.[132]

3.129WEstjustice proposed similar recommendations to Wotton and Kearney, and further recommended that the Insurance Code be modernised to increase the financial safety of victim survivors of family violence, including defining family violence and financial abuse.[133]

3.130The Zahra Foundation expanded on this recommendation and proposed that the modernisation of the Insurance Code should include a requirement for insurers to maintain victim-survivors’ no-claim status and allowing claims to be made without involving perpetrators.[134]

Health insurance

3.131Private Healthcare Australia submitted that health funds frequently encounter people separating who wish to terminate a joint health insurance policy and create a new one for themselves, often with dependents involved.[135]

3.132Private Healthcare Australia further noted that health funds regularly assist a separated couple to have their children named on two policies so both parents can assist their children to use their health insurance policy and attend health services. In these circumstances, health funds ensure dependents can use their full entitlement from one insurance policy facilitated through their parents’ two membership cards or numbers.[136]

3.133In circumstances of family and domestic violence, without a court order it is challenging for health fund staff to know when someone trying to remove a partner or dependent from their health insurance policy is engaging in financial abuse, as these requests commonly follow amicable relationship separations.[137]

3.134Private Health Care Australia highlighted that some health funds are currently updating their processes to ensure victim-survivors are not disadvantaged by being removed from a health insurance policy.[138]

Life insurance

3.135Life insurance products have been used by perpetrators to commit financial abuse, coercive control and physical threats. In some cases, perpetrators have used the existence of life insurance to threaten someone’s personal safety or life on the basis that they will be able to claim on a policy.[139]

3.136The Council of Australian Life Insurers (CALI) further pointed out that it was aware of instances where a perpetrator has committed murder and sought to claim on an insurance policy on their victim’s life. However, CALI noted that in these cases the common law principle of forfeiture prevents a perpetrator who is criminally responsible for someone’s death from receiving a financial benefit from that death, including life insurance payments.[140]

3.137CALI submitted that, although life insurance policies are most commonly held by individuals over their own lives, policies can be jointly owned. This occurs in situations where a couple shares a policy that insures both their lives, where one person owns a policy over the life of another person or where it is owned by the trustee of a self-managed superannuation fund (SMSF).[141]

3.138Issues with these arrangements generally arise when the relationship between the parties breaks down, including in cases of family and domestic violence or financial abuse. In these situations, the victim-survivor will need the consent and cooperation of the perpetrator to be removed from the joint policy.[142]

3.139CALI highlighted that victim-survivors may be unwilling to approach the perpetrator to request the authorisation or it may be unsafe to do so and there is currently no legislative mechanism that triggers a reassessment of the policy.[143]

3.140 The Financial Rights Legal Centre recommended the establishment of a mechanism for joint policies to be cancelled or replaced with individual policies to reduce the risk of harm to the victim-survivor of financial abuse. This could include insurers adopting standard clauses in terms and conditions that enable one party to end life insurance policies over their life or to convert them to some form of their own life insurance policy. It could potentially involve commitments made under the Life Insurance Code of Practice.[144]

The Life Insurance Code of Practice and industry policies

3.141The Life Insurance Code of Practice (Life Code) establishes enforceable standards that subscribed life insurers agree to uphold. CALI emphasised that the Life Code includes specific commitments for customers experiencing vulnerability or financial hardship, including due to financial abuse and family and domestic violence. CALI noted the following commitments:

take extra care to support vulnerable customers. Vulnerability is broadly defined and includes people affected by family and domestic violence and financial abuse; and

have publicly available policies on their websites about how they will support people if they are affected by family violence and financial abuse.[145]

3.142Additionally, to support the Life Code the life insurance industry has developed the Life Insurance and Family Violence Policy, which sets out areas that should be covered under life insurers policies. These areas of inclusion include:

making sure that safety is paramount for customers affected by family and domestic violence through the protection of private and confidential information. These measures include taking the customer’s reasonable communication preferences into account, with mechanisms to ensure adherence to these and using technology to improve customer safety;

a commitment to the customer that their family and domestic violence situation will have no adverse effect on their claim if applicable; and

taking family and domestic violence into consideration when designing products.[146]

3.143The Financial Rights Legal Centre pointed out that the Life Insurance and Family Violence Policy is an ’aspirational document’, as it is voluntary and does not bind insurers or have any legal requirements.[147]

3.144The Financial Rights Legal Centre undertook an audit of the Life Insurance and Family Violence Policy and noted its assessment found that Life Code subscribers’ family violence insurance policies greatly differed, and only one insurer met the 11 areas that a policy ’should’ have. It was further noted that over half of the 17 subscribers only scored 5.5 out of 11 or less.[148]

3.145To address this issue, the Financial Rights Legal Centre recommended that the Life Insurance Family and Domestic Violence Policy guide be incorporated into the Life Code and be made contractually enforceable.[149]

Superannuation

3.146While the uses of superannuation are more limited, and superannuation as a system has more friction than most other financial products, superannuation balances can be substantial relative to a victim’s total wealth. This means that if superannuation products are abused they can have very significant impacts on victim-survivors’ overall financial wellbeing.[150]

3.147The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) emphasised the unique role superannuation has in a women’s financial security, noting that often it can be the only financial asset a woman has that exists solely in their name.[151]

3.148Ms Cathy Oddie provided a submission to the inquiry that detailed her lived experience of financial abuse, and in which she noted that her superannuation was all she had left after experiencing financial abuse at the hands of her perpetrator:

By 2016, the perpetrator had completely depleted all my savings, and I had been forced into selling my share portfolio to pay basic living expenses. My only tangible asset left was my superannuation and there was no way I was going to let him get access to that.[152]

3.149The Super Members Council highlighted that a perpetrator has limited opportunities to use a victim-survivors’ superannuation to commit financial abuse, and often only can when the condition for release is met. The conditions for release include:

(c)during the accumulation phase: early release of superannuation including through a claim for financial hardship;

(d)during the retirement phase: a person is over a certain age and has met a condition of release; and

(e)payment of a death benefit: a member has died, and their super balance and any associated insurance benefit is paid to a beneficiary.[153]

3.150The Future Group pointed out that, while an individual’s superannuation can be at risk due to financial abuse, the other risk in cases of financial abuse is that a victim-survivor could have limited superannuation in the first place as a result of being coerced and controlled away from working.[154]

3.151This section of the report will examine issues identified in the superannuation industry by inquiry participants, including early release of a victim-survivors’ superannuation, contribution splitting, and the impact on financial elder abuse. Superannuation death benefit payments and self-managed superannuation funds were examined in Chapter 2 of this report.

Early release of superannuation

3.152AFCA reported that the number of complaints relating to superannuation is relatively low. Complaints about applications for early release represent the largest group. AFCA noted that the issues raised in these complaints include trustee processes and issues about policy settings for early release.[155]

COVID-19 early release of super scheme

3.153During the COVID-19 pandemic, an early release of super (ERS) scheme that allowed eligible people to withdraw up to $20,000 for their superannuation allowed over three million people to withdraw a combined $38 billion from their superannuation accounts.[156]

3.154The Super Members Council highlighted that this scheme disproportionately impacted women, who withdrew 21 per cent of their starting balances, compared to men who withdrew 17 per cent. Additionally, 14 per cent of women accessed their entire super balance.[157]

3.155The scheme was aimed at providing financial relief to people facing financial hardship due to the pandemic, such as job loss or significant income reduction.[158] As there was no requirement that evidence be provided to prove the individual was eligible for the scheme, the ERS scheme provided an opportunity for perpetrators to access victim-survivors’ superannuation.[159]

3.156ASFA highlighted a survey conducted in 2021 by Australia’s National Research Organisation for Women’s Safety (ANROWS) on intimate partner violence during the COVID-19 pandemic.[160] ANROWS’ survey reported that one in five women reported their partner had been financially abusive towards them in the last 12 months. ASFA further highlighted that, of these women, one in three reported that their partner had pressured them to give them access to their money in the last 12 months, of which 43 per cent said this included their superannuation.[161]

3.157This was further supported by the Australian Institute of Family Studies, whose chief executive officer reported that an estimated 70,000 of 1.5 million women who withdrew their superannuation through the ERS scheme did so as a result of coercion.[162]

3.158The Super Members Council recommended that the government undertake an assessment of the number of women who were coerced into accessing their superannuation during the COVID-19 ERS scheme and the detrimental financial impact this will have on their retirement. The Super Members Council emphasised that this data will be critical to informing future policy decisions and avoiding unintentionally facilitating abusive behaviour.[163]

Early release for financial hardship

3.159When leaving an abusive relationship and trying to maintain custody of children, victim-survivors can be forced to pay their share of the mortgage (or in some cases the entire mortgage), rent for themselves, a substantial bond to move into a rental property, legal fees, childcare fees and general living expenses. The Future group pointed out that the economic shock of separation is extreme and is an impossible financial situation for many victim-survivors.[164]

3.160At the committee’s public hearing in Canberra, Ms Christina Hobbs, General Manager at the Future Group, highlighted that access to superannuation can provide much needed financial support during the settlement process:

Because they don’t have any access to financial resources, women are often not able to go through a proper settlement process. They can’t afford the legal fees; they can’t even afford support for an out-of-law legal process. Of course, these women are not qualifying for any form of legal aid because, if you look at them on paper, their salaries are often high, and their assets are high. So, the idea that someone’s going to be better off in retirement by not taking money out that would fund, let’s say, those legal fees is ridiculous.[165]

3.161For many victim-survivors, once they leave the perpetrator, but prior to formal property settlement, their superannuation may be the only form of financial asset that isn’t controlled by the perpetrator as the superannuation account is in their own name, whereas they may only have a shared bank account with the perpetrator.[166]

3.162The Future Group argued that victim-survivors having access to their superannuation could prevent homelessness, aid psychological recovery, prevent unemployment and fund legal support for a fair settlement.[167]

3.163The Super Members Council noted that allowing for early release of superannuation on the grounds of severe financial hardship is appropriate in limited circumstances but noted that it could provide an avenue for facilitating financial abuse similar to the COVID-19 ERS scheme.

3.164An early withdrawal of superannuation on the grounds of financial hardship is only permitted once a year. The Super Members Council pointed out that, currently, superannuation funds do not have visibility of whether a member has been granted an early withdrawal on severe financial hardship grounds at another fund in the preceding 12 months. This could be exploited by perpetrators of financial abuse.[168]

3.165The Super Members Council recommended the government develop a tool providing super funds look-through visibility to the individual’s past engagement with the superannuation system, focusing on applications made and processed for the early release of benefits.[169]

Financial elder abuse and superannuation

3.166Once a person has entered the retirement stage and meets the conditions for superannuation release, there is a greater opportunity for perpetrators to access a victim-survivors superannuation savings.

3.167Super Consumers Australia emphasised that older people may lack awareness and understanding of their rights and options regarding superannuation, making them vulnerable to exploitation and financial abuse. Furthermore, cognitive decline can also contribute to this vulnerability.[170]

3.168The Super Members Council highlighted that, where there are no obvious red flags of financial abuse, the abusive activity cannot be identified or confirmed by a fund without the victim-survivor being willing to report the abuse or advise they haven’t consented to a specific transaction.

3.169Additionally, the Super Members Council reported that older people might not report this abuse for a number of reasons, including:

shame and embarrassment about being abused, particularly if the abuser is a family member or someone they trusted;

lack of awareness or financial literacy as to whether they are a victim of financial abuse:

cognitive impairment due to conditions like dementia or memory loss making it difficult for some people to recognise or report abuse;

isolation of victim-survivors from family, friends, and community making it harder for them to seek help;

dependency on the abuser for care and lack alternative resources, making some people reluctant to report;

protective feelings towards the abuser, especially if the perpetrator is a family member, meaning the victim may not want to get the perpetrator in trouble;

lack of trust in authorities, which may discourage a person from reporting abuse; and

inability to communicate due to physical or cognitive limitations.[171]

3.170Super Consumers Australia recommended that the government consider the need for minimum service standards to specifically outline best-practice responses to elder abuse, noting that minimum service standards have been used in other financial service sectors to help protect older Australians from financial abuse. Super Consumers Australia noted that implementing them in the context of superannuation could disrupt the use of superannuation products for financial abuse of older people.[172]

3.171This recommendation was echoed by the Super Members Council, who further recommended improvements to education and support services to older Australians about their rights and what constitutes financial abuse.[173]

Committee view

3.172It was reported that the direct cost to victim-survivors of financial abuse has been estimated at $5.7 billion, which is almost $3 billion more than Australians lost to scams in 2023. The committee is astounded at the scale of financial abuse currently being committed in Australia and is concerned that financial products continue to be manipulated by perpetrators to commit financial abuse.

3.173The evidence received by the committee has shown that financial institutions generally recognise that financial abuse is a serious and widespread problem, and that there has been some progress by the industry towards implementing measures to identify and respond to financial abuse. However, the committee believes that more must be done in this space to support vulnerable Australians.

Banking

3.174The shift from financial products to online platforms has been happening over a number of years, and in the 2023 financial year over 99 per cent of all banking transactions occurred digitally. The committee acknowledges that online platforms have made banking more convenient for customers; however, the reality is that the convenience of online banking comes with significant risks that perpetrators can and will use online banking features to inflict and facilitate financial abuse.

3.175The committee recognises that, on the positive side, online platforms do present banks the opportunity to use technology to assist with more quicky and comprehensively identifying potential cases of financial abuse, as well as supporting victim-survivor customers with options to avoid and escape their perpetrators.

3.176While the committee considers that banks need to continue to pursue measures such as industry codes to achieve more standardised online features aimed at addressing financial abuse, it considers that simple and easily implementable features such as ‘quick exit’ buttons on webpages should be adopted wherever possible. The ‘quick exit’ feature allows a person to immediately close the webpages they were accessing and clear their browser history to protect victim-survivors’ privacy and safety.

3.177That the Australian Government implement a mandatory requirement for providers of financial services and products, as well as government agencies to include a ’quick exit’ button on webpages (in accordance with current best practice) to assist victim-survivors of family and domestic violence and financial abuse.

3.178The committee heard strong concerns that financial institutions’ online application processes are too streamlined and are ripe for abuse by perpetrators’.[174] The committee believes that adding checks and balances to application processes and electronic transfers would reduce the prevalence of product manipulation by perpetrators.

3.179That financial institutions introduce minimum operating standards, with a view to achieving best practice standards through continuous improvement over time, for including increased friction points in relation to online application processes and electronic transactions to better protect against financial abuse on online platforms.

3.180The committee was concerned by the seeming lack of engagement between law enforcement agencies, criminal and family courts, and financial institutions. It appears that, despite issues of family and domestic violence potentially being well-known to law enforcement and other agencies, there is often no referral of these issues to financial institutions, resulting in the ongoing capacity of perpetrators to financially abuse victim-survivors.

3.181Given the scope of financial abuse and family and domestic violence, and the significant underreporting of abuse to law enforcement, it is further evident that financial institutions require additional pathways for referral of information regarding suspected financial abuse, including through anonymous disclosures.

3.182As a result of the deeply concerning and well-established capacity for physically violent or coercive perpetrators to manipulate online or telephone-based banking services, and the increased difficulty in frontline service providers identifying abusive behaviours remotely, the committee considers it appropriate for reports and referrals of suspected abuse to trigger increased scrutiny of the appropriateness of financial services products for at-risk customers. Where appropriate, in person attendance at a branch by suspected victim-survivors and perpetrators for direct contact with a frontline service provider with appropriate training would provide an additional opportunity to identify and interrupt financial abuse, and protect those impacted.

3.183That the Australian Banking Association, the Australian Federal Police, victim-survivor advocate organisations and relevant government departments and other stakeholders co-design standard operating guidelines for the referral of reasonably suspected or reported financial abuse to the financial institutions used by suspected perpetrators and victim-survivors. Triggers for referral should include credible reports made to anonymous law enforcement hotlines, informal and formal reports made to law enforcement, and court proceedings such as the attainment of AVO’s. The Australian Government should consider any legislative amendments required to give effect to such standard operating guidelines.

3.184That financial institutions be required to maintain anonymous reporting mechanisms through which victim-survivors of domestic and family violence, or other individuals, can report actual or suspected financial abuse of the institutions’ customers.

3.185That financial institutions ensure that a referral or report of suspected family and domestic violence involving one of their customers triggers immediate engagement with that customer, preferably through in-person attendance at a physical branch or office, to determine the suitability of their current and future financial products.

3.186Evidence received by the committee has shown that the shift to online and digital banking platforms has created significant challenges for older people, who often have lower digital literacy skills. This leads them to rely on others to access their bank services, inadvertently making them susceptible to financial abuse. The committee notes the recommendations from inquiry participants that all electronic banking services should be ’opt-in’; however, the committee notes that, due to bank closures and the volume of services already online, it will not always be possible to ensure in-person access to banking for vulnerable consumers. Accordingly, efforts to ensure ongoing access to in-person banking should be coupled with increased digital literacy education. Additionally, the committee considers that there is a critical need for financial institutions to offer in-person banking support services, such as financial counselling, to support victim-survivors, especially older Australians, to access these services safely.

3.187That financial institutions immediately review the accessibility of their in-person banking services and, where necessary, take steps to ensure that customers have reasonable access to in-person banking services or banking support services.

3.188That the Australian Government, in conjunction with the Australian Financial Complaints Authority, consider potential remedies for customers suffering financial abuse who have suffered loss after a financial institution has failed to provide reasonably appropriate access to in-person banking services or other support services in circumstances where the financial institution was aware (or should have been aware) that the customer was at high risk of financial abuse.

3.189That financial institutions, government and relevant stakeholders all increase financial literacy education and in-person support to assist older Australians to use electronic banking services and reduce the risk of financial elder abuse.

3.190The committee heard strong concerns regarding the use of payment descriptions to abuse victim-survivors. Some perpetrators have developed a tactic where they make one or more small amount electronic funds transfers to the victim survivor and use the description field to send an abusive message. The committee commends the work that some institutions have done to develop practices and responses to address this issue. The committee believes that the Australian Banking Association should consult with the banking sector and deposit-taking institutions to develop and implement minimum operating standards, with a view to moving to best practice standards through continuous improvement over time, in relation to abusive descriptions in electronic money transfers. The committee acknowledges the seriousness of this form of financial abuse and, accordingly, believes that consideration should be given to introducing appropriate penalties for the use of abusive descriptions in electronic money transfers to harass, intimidate or harm victim-survivors.

3.191That the Australian Banking Association develop and implement minimum operating standards, with a view to moving to best practice standards through continuous improvement over time, applying to all authorised deposit-taking institutions in relation to identifying and responding to abusive descriptions in electronic money transfers.

3.192That the Australian Government consider introducing appropriate penalties for the use abusive descriptions in electronic money transfers to harass, intimidate or harm the holder of the account.

3.193Having a joint account with a spouse is often seen as a symbol of togetherness and partnership. However, in financially abusive relationships joint accounts can often lead to significant harm, financially, physically and mentally. The committee heard strong concerns regarding the ways joint accounts are manipulated by perpetrators and believes that there are important interventions at the time of establishment of a joint account that would reduce the misuse of joint accounts in situations of financial abuse.

3.194That, prior to approving joint banking or credit products, financial institutions implement reasonable and practical continuous disclosure requirements relating to family and domestic violence to assist with the identification of financial abuse.

3.195That the Australian Government legislate to require financial institutions to ensure the following requirements for establishing a joint account:

that each joint account holder has their own access to the account;

that each joint account holder is aware of and has consented to what information will be visible and/or shared with the other account holder; and

that each joint account holder understands the mechanisms available to ensure the safety of the account, such as ’two to sign’, before withdrawals can be made.

3.196The reasons why a customer may experience financial hardship are many and varied, financial abuse being one of the reasons. Evidence received by the committee has shown that financial hardship can be the first indicator of financial abuse. In 2024, ASIC published a report on banks hardship processes which found that most lenders had an organisation-wide policy and staff training to identify and respond to customers experiencing vulnerability.

3.197However, ASIC also identified a range of issues with how lenders handle hardship notices from vulnerable customers. The committee is concerned by this and, noting that the administrative processes for hardship applications can be retraumatising, considers that hardship processes need to be addressed with trauma-informed responses by financial institutions. The committee endorses ASIC’s recommendations to address the shortcomings of financial institutions’ hardship processes (see Appendix 3); and notes that it would be prudent for ASIC to review the implementation and operation of its recommendations after a suitable period to assess their effectiveness.

3.198Under the current credit reporting regime, financial institutions are required to provide credit information, such as hardship provisions about consumers, to credit reporting bodies. The committee sees significant benefits in implementing a similar requirement for financial institutions to report periodically on the number of customers identified as experiencing financial abuse. The committee believes that this information would assist the Australian Government to provide informed responses and support to victim-survivors of financial abuse.

3.199That financial institutions implement the recommendations of ASIC’s report titled Hardship, hard to get help: Findings and actions to support customers in financial hardship relating to identifying and providing additional support to vulnerable consumers experiencing financial hardship.

3.200That ASIC conduct a review within 24 months on the implementation and operation of the recommendations of its report titled Hardship, hard to get help: Findings and actions to support customers in financial hardship relating to identifying and providing additional support to vulnerable consumers experiencing financial hardship.

3.201That the Australian Government implement a legislative requirement for financial institutions to report periodically on the number of customers identified as experiencing financial abuse, similar to the current requirements for financial hardship.

3.202The committee is encouraged by the Treasury Laws Amendment (Responsible Buy Now Pay Later and Other Measures) Bill 2024, which was passed by both Houses on 29 November 2024. The new law will amend the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 to extend the application of that Act to BNPL services. The committee notes the complexity of the legislation and considers that the amendments, once enacted, should be reviewed after 12 months to consider their effectiveness in supporting victim-survivors of financial abuse.

3.203Evidence received by the committee has shown that the inclusion of BNPL products under responsible lending obligations would afford greater protection to victim-survivors from financial abuse. The committee therefore considers that the review of the bill’s amendments should also examine the inclusion of BNPL products under responsible lending obligations.

3.204That the Australian Government undertake a review of the amendments to the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 in the Treasury Laws Amendment (Responsible Buy Now Pay Later and Other Measures) Bill 2024, to commence within 24 months of the amendments coming into effect, to consider their effectiveness in supporting victim-survivors of financial abuse, and specifically the inclusion of Buy Now Pay Later products under Responsible Lending Obligations.

3.205The committee acknowledges that the finance sector’s self-regulatory codes have made some progress towards supporting vulnerable Australians. However, the committee is concerned about the lack of specific reference to financial abuse under ’vulnerable customers’ and believes adding a specific reference to financial abuse would assist financial institutions to provide specialised responses and better support for victim-survivors of financial abuse.

3.206The committee notes the evidence showing that the requirement for customers to self-identify themselves as victim-survivors of financial abuse or family and domestic violence is a major barrier to accessing the protections and responses that institutions are able to offer victim-survivors. To ensure that such requirements do not prevent victim-survivors from receiving appropriate support, the committee considers that the relevant self-regulation codes be amended to require financial institutions to develop systems to proactively identify and offer support to customers who may be experiencing financial abuse.

3.207That the Banking Code of Practice, Customer Owned Banking Code of Practice and the Buy Now Pay Later Code of Practice be amended to:

include specific reference to financial abuse under ’vulnerable customers’; and

require banks to develop systems to proactively identify (to the extent reasonably practical) and offer support to customers who may be experiencing financial abuse.

Insurance

3.208Insurance is supposed to be a safety net but can be weaponised in family and domestic violence situations to exacerbate victim-survivors’ vulnerabilities and provide an avenue for continued financial abuse by perpetrators. While the committee acknowledges the particular character of the general insurance industry and claims process provides fewer opportunities for insurers to identify signs of customer vulnerability and financial abuse, the committee considers that there would be significant benefit in the insurance industry investing in developing its processes to better enable early identification and response to financial hardship and vulnerability.

3.209That the general insurance industry implement minimum operating and customer-service standards, with a view to moving to best practice standards through continuous improvement over time, relating to identifying and responding to financial hardship being experienced by victim-survivors of financial abuse.

3.210Many general insurance policies have intentional or malicious damages clauses which, depending on the policy, could leave victim-survivors unable to claim for damage to, or loss of, the home or contents caused intentionally by perpetrators. The committee commends Suncorp for its introduction of a ‘conduct of others’ clause that protects customers by making it easier for Suncorp’s claims teams to respond when a policyholder may have been prejudiced by the acts of another policy holder, such as the perpetrator of financial abuse. The committee considers that such clauses should be mandatory for all insurers.

3.211That the Australian Government amend the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 to require a ’conduct of others’ clause in all retail insurance policies.

3.212The committee acknowledges that the general insurance industry’s self-regulation code has made some progress towards supporting those experiencing vulnerabilities. However, the committee notes the lack of specific reference to financial abuse and believes that adding a specific reference to financial abuse would assist insurers to provide appropriate responses and better support to victim-survivors of financial abuse.

3.213That Part 9 of the General Insurance Code of Practice and the Life Insurance Code of Practice be amended to define family violence and financial abuse and to better promote the financial safety of victim-survivors of family and domestic violence.

Superannuation

3.214While the uses of superannuation are more limited, and superannuation as a system has more friction than most other financial products, superannuation balances can be substantial relative to a victim’s total wealth and, if abused, can have very substantial impacts on victim-survivors’ overall financial position and wellbeing. Evidence received by the committee has shown that the COVID-19 ERS scheme was manipulated by perpetrators to gain early access to victim-survivors superannuation. The committee was particularly concerned to hear that an estimated 70,000 of 1.5 million women who withdrew their superannuation through the ERS scheme did so as a result of coercion.

3.215That the Australian Government undertake a review of the COVID-19 early release of super scheme, with a focus on the number of members who may have withdrawn superannuation savings under coercion and the retirement and other impacts on victim-survivors who accessed their superannuation as a result of financial abuse; and consider an appropriate scheme for the repayment of superannuation by individuals whose withdrawals were the direct result of financial abuse, to enable them to restore their superannuation balances.

3.216Once a person has entered the retirement stage and meets the conditions for superannuation release, there is a greater opportunity for perpetrators to access a victim-survivor’s superannuation savings. The committee heard that older people may lack awareness and understanding of their rights and options regarding superannuation, making them vulnerable to exploitation and financial abuse. Furthermore, cognitive decline can also contribute to this vulnerability. The committee sees significant benefits in implementing minimum service standards to specifically outline best practice responses to superannuation elder abuse. The committee believes that applying minimum service standards in the context of superannuation could disrupt the financial abuse of superannuation products for older people.

3.217That the Australian Government consider the implementation of minimum operating standards, with a view to moving to best practice standards through continuous improvement over time, to mitigate the risk of elder abuse in relation to superannuation.

3.218The committee also identified that there are inadequate levels of ethical responsibility and professional training among financial planners, financial advisers, and accountants with respect to financial abuse. These professions play a crucial role as frontline service providers and often have a holistic and detailed knowledge of individuals’ financial situations beyond the knowledge of individual institutions, such as banks and insurance and superannuation providers.

3.219The committee believes that improved financial abuse training for these professions, and explicit professional responsibilities not to facilitate such abuse within intimate partner or family contexts, is necessary to ensure greater protections for victim-survivors and particularly individuals with comparatively low levels of financial literacy.

3.220That accounting bodies, financial advice and planning peak bodies, and victim-survivor advocate organisations co-design education resources for service providers to enable increased identification of financial abuse and timely reporting of suspected abuse to financial institutions and law enforcement bodies.

3.221That accounting, financial planning and financial advice industry bodies develop and review ethical obligations of their profession in relation to receipt of instructions which may have a financial abuse motive and institute accompanying penalties for members who actively enable or facilitate financial abuse on behalf of their clients where there is no other reasonable basis underlying the instructions given by the client.

Footnotes

[1]Flequity Ventures, Submission 88, p. 5.

[2]Department of Social Services, Answers to questions on notice, 28 June 2024 (received 13 August 2024), p. 1.

[3]Ms Catherine Fitzpatrick, Founder and Director, Flequity Ventures, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2024, p. 33.

[4]Ms Catherine Fitzpatrick, Founder and Director, Flequity Ventures, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2024, p. 33.

[5]ANZ, Answers to questions on notice, 19 August 2024 (received 9 September 2024), p. [3].

[6]ANZ, Answers to questions on notice, 19 August 2024 (received 9 September 2024), p. [3].

[7]ANZ, Answers to questions on notice, 19 August 2024 (received 9 September 2024), p. [3].

[8]Customer Owed Banking Association (COBA), Submission 115, p. 3.

[9]ANZ, Response to questions seeking further information on processes to identify, respond to and report financial abuse, received 3 July 2024, p. 3.

[10]Bendigo and Adelaide Bank, Response to questions seeking further information on processes to identify, respond to and report financial abuse, received 3 July 2024, p. 6.

[11]COBA, Submission 115, p. 13.

[12]COBA, Submission 115, p. 13.

[13]Economic Abuse Reference Group (EARG), Submission 108, p. 10.

[14]Ms Iresha Lehane, Financial Counsellor, Lifeline Northern Beaches, Committee Hansard, 13September 2024, p. 64.

[15]COBA, Submission 115, p. 13.

[16]ANZ, Response to questions seeking further information on processes to identify, respond to and report financial abuse, received 3 July 2024, p. 4.

[17]Latitude Financial, Answers to questions on notice, 8 August 2024 (received 9 September 2024), p. 9.

[18]Ms Jasmine Opdam, Senior Policy and Advocacy Officer, Financial Abuse Service NSW, Redfern Legal Centre, Committee Hansard, 8 July 2024, p. 26.

[19]EARG, Submission 108, pp 10–11.

[20]Case study provided by Women’s Legal Service Victoria, Submission 131, p. 18.

[21]Uniting Communities, Submission 36, p. 7.

[22]Eastern Community Legal Centre, Submission 126, p. 10.

[23]Eastern Community Legal Centre, Submission 126, p. 10.

[24]NSW Ageing and Disability Commission, Submission 81, p. 5; Uniting Communities, Submission 36, p. 8; Women’s Legal Service Victoria, Submission 131, p. 17.

[25]NSW Ageing and Disability Commission, Submission 81, p. 5.

[26]Eastern Community Legal Centre, Submission 126, p. 2.

[27]EARG, Submission 108, p. 11.

[28]Bendigo and Adelaide Bank, Response to questions seeking further information on processes to identify, respond to and report financial abuse, received 3 July 2024, p. 6.

[29]EARG, Submission 108, p. 11.

[30]Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), Submission 69, p. 6.

[31]Bank of Queensland, Response to questions seeking further information on processes to identify, respond to and report financial abuse, received 9 July 2024, p. 3.

[32]EARG, Submission 108, p. 11.

[33]CBA, Submission 69, p. 6.

[34]The Salvation Army, Submission 34, p. 11.

[35]Economic Abuse Reference Group, Submission 108, p. 11.

[36]WEstjustice, Submission 113, p. 24.

[37]WEstjustice, Submission 113, p. 24.

[38]Financial Rights Legal Centre, Submission 112, p. 22.

[39]Westpac, Answers to questions on notice, 9 and 19 July 2024 (received 16 August 2024), p. 7.

[40]The Hon. Anna Bligh, Chief Executive Officer, ABA, Committee Hansard, 8 July 2024, p. 40.

[41]Bendigo and Adelaide Bank, Response to questions seeking further information on processes to identify, respond to and report financial abuse, received 3 July 2024, p. 7.

[42]Ms Catherine Fitzpatrick, Designed to Disrupt: Reimagining banking products to improve financial safety (CWES Discussion Paper 1), 2024, p. 20.

[43]WEstjustice, Submission 113, p. 24.

[44]Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), Hardship, hard to get help: Lenders fall short in financial hardship support, May 2024, https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-783-hardship-hard-to-get-help-lenders-fall-short-in-financial-hardship-support/ (accessed 16 October 2024).

[45]ASIC, Submission 48, p. 11.

[46]ASIC, Submission 48, p. 12.

[47]Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA), Submission 132, p. 16.

[48]The Salvation Army, Submission 34, p. 27.

[49]ASIC, Hardship, hard to get help: Lenders fall short in financial hardship support, May 2024, https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-783-hardship-hard-to-get-help-lenders-fall-short-in-financial-hardship-support/ (accessed 16 October 2024).

[50]Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 134, p. 11.

[51]ASIC, Submission 48, p. 16.

[52]The Salvation Army, Submission 34, p. 27.

[53]ASIC, Submission 48, p. 16.

[54]Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 134, p. 11.

[55]AFCA, Submission 132, p. 17.

[56]Case study provided by Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 134, p. 11.

[57]A full list of ASIC’s recommendations can be found in Appendix 3.

[58]ASIC, Submission 48, p. 16.

[59]AFCA, Submission 132, p. 17.

[60]Centre for Women’s Economic Safety, Submission 82, p. 10.

[61]The Salvation Army, Submission 34, p. 28.

[62]EARG, Submission 108, p. 8.

[63]EARG, Submission 108, p. 8.

[64]Ms Bronwyn Davis, Family Violence Financial Counsellor, Women’s Legal Service Victoria, Committee Hansard, 8 July 2024, p. 33.

[65]NAB, Answers to questions on notice, 8 July 2024 (received 5 August 2024), [p. 2]; Westpac, Answers to questions on notice, 8 July 2024 (received 16 August 2024), p. 8; ANZ, Answers to questions on notice, 19 August 2024 (received 9 September 2024), p. [5].

[66]Ms Darlene Mattiske-Wood, Board Director, COBA, Committee Hansard, 8 July 2024, p. 9.

[67]Treasury Laws Amendment (Responsible Buy Now Pay Later and Other Measures) Bill 2024, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 169.

[68]Financial Rights Legal Centre, Submission 112, pp 9–10.

[69]Zip Co, Response to questions seeking further information on processes to identify, respond to and report financial abuse, received 13 September 2024, p. 2.

[70]Case study provided by Centre for Women’s Economic Safety, Submission 82, p. 13.

[71]Economic Abuse Reference Group, Submission 108, p. 24.

[72]Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 134, p. 8.

[73]National Legal Aid, Submission 78, p. 7.

[74]The Salvation Army, Submission 34, p. 20.

[75]Vincentcare Australia, Submission 10, p. 7.

[76]Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Treasury Laws Amendment (Responsible Buy Now Pay Later and Other Measures) Bill 2024, August 2024, p. 1.

[77]Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 134, p. 6.

[78]The Salvation Army, Answers to questions on notice, 9 August 2024 (received 6 September 2024), p. 3.

[79]EARG, Submission 108, p. 24.

[80]Ecstra Foundation, Submission 67, p. 2.

[81]Consumer Action Law Centre, Submission 134, p. 8.

[82]The Salvation Army, Submission 34, p. 21.

[83]For full report please see Senate Economics Legislation Committee website: www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/TLABBuyNowPaylater/Report

[84]Casy study provided by Financial Right Legal Centre, Submission 112, p. 11.

[85]Australian Banking Association (ABA), Banking Code of Practice, 1 March 2020 (revised 5October2021), p. 4.

[86]Financial Rights Legal Centre, Submission 112, p. 28.

[87]ABA, Submission 99, p. 3.

[88]Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 105, p. 14.

[89]ABA, Submission 99, p. 3.

[90]Banking Code Compliance Committee (BCCC), Submission 86, p. 2.

[91]BCCC, Submission 86, p. 3.

[92]Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 105, p. 13.

[93]ABA, Answers to questions on notice, 12 August 2024 (received 2 September 2024), p. 1.

[94]ABA, Answers to questions on notice, 12 August 2024 (received 2 September 2024), p. 2.

[95]St Vincent de Paul Society National Council of Australia, Submission 45, p. 1.

[96]St Vincent de Paul Society National Council of Australia, Submission 45, p. 2.

[97]Uniting Communities, Submission 36, p. 6.

[98]Uniting Communities, Submission 36, p. 7.

[99]Uniting Communities, Submission 36, p. 7.

[100]BCCC, Submission 86, p. 5.

[101]Financial Rights Legal Centre, Submission 112, p. 29.

[102]COBA, Submission 114, p. 8.

[103]COBA, Submission 114, p. 9.

[104]Bank of Us, Response to questions seeking further information on processes to identify, respond to and report financial abuse, received 2 July 2024, p. 1; Transport Mutual Credit Union, Response to questions seeking further information on processes to identify, respond to and report financial abuse, received 1 July 2024, p.2.

[105]Financial Rights Legal Centre, Submission 112, p. 30.

[106]Australian Finance Industry Association (AFIA), Submission 96, p. 8.

[107]AFIA, Submission 96, pp 5–6.

[108]AFIA, Submission 96, p. 6.

[109]AFIA, Submission 96, p. 7.

[110]AFIA, Submission 96, p. 7.

[111]EARG, Submission 108, p. 24.

[112]Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 35, pp 2–3.

[113]Financial Rights Legal Centre, Submission 112, p. 48.

[114]National Legal Aid, Submission 78, p. [9].

[115]Financial Rights Legal Centre, Submission 112, p. 52.

[116]Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 35, p. 6.

[117]Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 35, p. 6.

[118]AFCA, Submission 132, p. 21.

[119]Financial Rights Legal Centre, Submission 112, p. 50.

[120]Case study provided by Financial Rights Legal Centre, Submission 112, p. 51.

[121]Financial Rights Legal Centre, Submission 112, pp 51–52.

[122]Suncorp, Response to questions seeking further information on processes to identify, respond to and report financial abuse, received 22 August 2024, p. 4.

[123]Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 35, p. 5.

[124]Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 35, p. 5.

[125]Wotton and Kearney, Submission 80, pp 5–6.

[126]AFCA, Submission 132, p. 20.

[127]Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 35, p. 3.

[128]Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 35, p. 3.

[129]Insurance Council of Australia, Answers to questions on notice, 8 August 2024 (received 2 September 2024), p. 1.

[130]Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 35, p. 3.

[131]Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 35, p. 4.

[132]Wotton and Kearney, Submission 80, p. 5.

[133]WEstjustice, Submission 113, p. 18.

[134]The Zahra Foundation, Submission 128, p. 5.

[135]Private Healthcare Australia, Submission 87, p. 2.

[136]Private Healthcare Australia, Submission 87, p. 2.

[137]Private Healthcare Australia, Submission 87, p. 3.

[138]Private Healthcare Australia, Submission 87, p. 3.

[139]Council of Australian Life Insurers (CALI), Submission 50, [p. 1]

[140]CALI, Submission 50, [p. i]

[141]CALI, Submission 50, p. 3.

[142]CALI, Submission 50, p. 3.

[143]CALI, Submission 50, p. 3.

[144]Financial Rights Legal Centre, Submission 112, pp 62–63.

[145]CALI, Submission 50, p. 1

[146]CALI, Submission 50, p. 1

[147]Financial Rights Legal Centre, Submission 112, p. 62.

[148]Financial Rights Legal Centre, Submission 112, p. 62.

[149]Financial Rights Legal Centre, Submission 112, p. 62.

[150]Future Group, Submission 110, [p. 5].

[151]The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA), Submission 130, p. 4.

[152]Ms Cathy Oddie, Submission 90, p. [2].

[153]Super Members Council, Submission 129, p. 4.

[154]Future Group, Submission 110, p. [5].

[155]AFCA, Submission 132, p. 12.

[156]Super Members Council, Submission 129, p. 6.

[157]Super Members Council, Submission 129, p. 6.

[158]ASFA, Submission 130, p. 4.

[159]Super Members Council, Submission 129, p. 6.

[160]The full report can be found here: www.anrows.org.au/publication/intimate-partner-violence-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-a-survey-of-women-in-australia/

[161]ASFA, Submission 130, p. 4.

[162]Future Group, Submission 110, p. [6].

[163]Super Members Council, Submission 129, p. 7.

[164]Future Group, Submission 110, p. [13].

[165]Ms Christina Hobbs, General Manager, Advocacy and Impact, Future Group, Committee Hansard, 13 September 2024, p. 53.

[166]Future Group, Submission 110, p. [13].

[167]Future Group, Submission 110, p. [13].

[168]Super Members Council, Submission 129, p. 7.

[169]Super Members Council, Submission 129, p. 7.

[170]Super Consumers Australia, Submission 97, p. 11.

[171]Super Members Council, Submission 129, p. 8.

[172]Super Consumers Australia, Submission 97, p. 11.

[173]Super Members Council, Submission 129, p. 9.

[174]Ms Jasmine Opdam, Senior Policy and Advocacy Officer, Financial Abuse Service NSW, Redfern Legal Centre, Committee Hansard, 8 July 2024, p. 26.