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Chapter 2
Schedule 1—Simple corporate bonds
2.1
This chapter begins with an overview and background on the operation of
Schedule 1 of the bill, followed by submitters' views on the proposed
amendments.
2.2
As noted in the previous chapter, Schedule 1 amends the disclosure
regime for simple corporate bonds, changes directors' civil liability
provisions in respect to simple corporate bonds issued to retail investors, and
clarifies the application of directors' defences in respect to misleading and
deceptive statements and omissions in disclosure documents relating to offers
of all securities.
2.3
Schedule 1, Part 1 of the bill would amend the Corporations Act by:
- introducing a new disclosure regime;
- facilitating parallel trading between wholesale and retail
markets; and
- changing the civil liability provisions in respect to corporate
bonds issued to retail investors.
2.4
Schedule 1, Part 2 of the bill proposes amendments to the 'reasonable
steps' obligations relating to false or misleading statements.
Background and context of the amendments
2.5
The requirements for issuing corporate bonds into the retail market
differ from those pertaining to the wholesale market in terms of both
disclosure and liability provisions.
2.6
A retail corporate bond is a bond that is issued to investors that
include retail clients. A wholesale corporate bond issue excludes retail
investors.[1]
2.7
The wholesale market caters to sophisticated professional investors.
Under the Corporations Act, listed entities are required to adhere to a regime
of continuous disclosure[2]
under Listing Rule 3.1 and 3.1A.
2.8
Listing Rule 3.1 is given statutory force in subsection 674(2) of the
Corporations Act and is policed by the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). Entities are
liable for both criminal and civil penalties if they breach Listing Rule 3.1.
Officers of the entity have civil liability for a breach of continuous
disclosure under subsection 674(2A) of the Corporations Act. Criminal liability
may also be incurred under section 1309 of the Corporations Act if an officer
or employee 'gives, or authorises or permits the giving of, materially false or
misleading information to ASX under Listing Rule 3.1'.[3]
2.9
Under the continuous disclosure regime, sophisticated investors are
deemed to have sufficient information and possess sufficient resources to
evaluate investments. Consequently, there is no requirement for an entity
wishing to issue bonds into the wholesale market to prepare a disclosure
document.[4]
2.10
By contrast, the Corporations Act currently requires that an entity
wishing to issue bonds into the retail market prepare a full disclosure
document or prospectus. A full prospectus must disclose:
...all of the information that investors and their professional
advisors may reasonably require to make an informed assessment of:
- the rights and liabilities
attaching to the securities offered; and
- the assets and liabilities,
financial position and performance, profits and losses and prospects of the
body that is to issue the securities.[5]
2.11
The Corporations Act contains provisions relating to both civil and
criminal liability in relation to false and misleading statements and omissions
from documents. The civil liability regime is laid out in Chapter 6D of the
Corporations Act and criminal liability is covered in Part 9.4 of the Corporations
Act.
2.12
Section 728 of Part 6D.3 of the Corporations Act details the civil
liability offences relating to a misleading or deceptive statement in, or
omission from, a disclosure document.[6]
Section 729 of the Corporations Act sets out those persons who may be liable
for compensation in the event of a misstatement in, or omission from, a
disclosure document. This includes all current and proposed directors of the
entity. Furthermore, a person who suffers loss or damage because of a
contravention in a disclosure document is able to claim compensation against a
director for loss or damage even if the director 'did not commit, and was not
involved in, the contravention'.[7]
2.13
Sections 1308 and 1309 of Division 1 of Part 9.4 of the Corporations Act
deal with offences that are subject to the Criminal Code relating to
false or misleading statements[8]
and false information, respectively.[9]
2.14
The Corporations Act provides defences in relation to both civil and
criminal liability for a misstatement or omission in a disclosure document. Section
731 of the Corporations Act sets out the due diligence defence for prospectuses[10]
and provides that:
a person will not be liable because of a misleading or
deceptive statement in a prospectus or an omission from a prospectus if a
person can prove that:
- they made all inquiries (if any)
that were reasonable in the circumstances; and
- after doing so believed, on reasonable
grounds, that the statement was either not misleading or deceptive or that
there was no omission from the prospectus in relation to a particular matter.[11]
2.15
In November 2009, the Australian Financial Centre Forum chaired by Mr Mark
Johnson released a report titled Australia as a Financial Centre: Building
on our strengths. The Johnson report identified the lack of liquidity and
diversity in Australia's corporate bond market as a weakness in Australia's
financial system. To assist in the development of the retail corporate bond
market, the Johnson report recommended a reduction in regulatory requirements
on corporate debt issuance to retail investors.[12]
Reducing these regulatory requirements is the focus of the bill.
2.16
In December 2010, the Government announced the Competitive and
Sustainable Banking System package. The Government identified the bond
market as a key element of the long-term safety and sustainability of the
financial system and pointed to the need to:
develop a deep and liquid corporate bond market by launching
the trading of Commonwealth Government Securities on a securities exchange, to
reduce our reliance on offshore wholesale funding markets.[13]
Treasury consultation
2.17
In December 2011, Treasury released a discussion paper on the development
of the retail corporate bond market in Australia. It considered the optimum
disclosure and liability requirements.[14]
2.18
The Treasury discussion paper observed that when Australian companies
wish to obtain funding, they either:
- access overseas debt markets (generally
the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe);
- borrow from the Australian
wholesale market;
- borrow from Authorised
Deposit-taking Institutions; or
- issue equity (for example, shares
or rights) or issue some combination of debt and equity (for example, hybrids
or convertible bonds).[15]
2.19
Treasury noted that because medium and small companies rarely have
access to foreign or domestic wholesale debt markets, they are restricted to
bank borrowing or issuing equity. However, when overseas and wholesale markets
tighten, raising funds becomes difficult. Treasury further noted that 'the
United States, and to a lesser extent New Zealand and the United Kingdom, all
have thriving retail corporate bond markets' and that Australian companies of
all sizes would benefit from the development of the retail corporate bond
market.[16]
2.20
Treasury also found that the current disclosure regime for retail bonds
is 'costly and onerous' for companies,[17]
and that the length and complexity of the document may deter retail investors
from considering retail bonds.[18]
Retail trading in Commonwealth
Government Securities
2.21
Professional investors are able to trade in Commonwealth Government
Securities (CGS) in over-the-counter markets.[19]
In 2012, Parliament passed the Commonwealth Government Securities Legislation
Amendment (Retail Trading) Bill 2012. The legislation was designed to enable
retail trading in CGS depositary interests[20]
on the public exchange in order to foster the development of the retail debt
market, including corporate debt.[21]
ASIC expected that retail trading of CGS would commence in April 2013.[22]
2.22
In his Second Reading Speech to Parliament on the Corporations Amendment
(Simple Corporate Bonds and Other Measures) Bill 2013, the Hon. Bill Shorten
MP, Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, noted that the retail
market in CGS was a valuable precursor to the retail bond market:
Having an active retail CGS is an important step in
establishing a wider retail corporate bonds market by providing a visible
pricing benchmark for retail investors in corporate bonds.[23]
ASIC Class Order 10/321 and
'vanilla' corporate bonds
2.23
The disclosure requirements for simple corporate bonds were modified
prior to the current bill to incorporate a two-part prospectus.
2.24
In May 2010, ASIC introduced Class Order 10/321 specifying the criteria
for 'vanilla' corporate bonds. A 'vanilla' bond is a low-risk bond with
relatively straightforward terms and conditions, and no unusual features. The
committee heard from Dr Richard Sandlant, Manager of the Disclosure and
International Unit at the Treasury, that 'vanilla' bonds were synonymous with
simple corporate bonds.[24]
In its Class Order, ASIC defined a 'vanilla' corporate bond as a debenture of a
body that:
- is denominated in Australian
dollars;
- has a fixed term of no more than
10 years, with the principal plus any accrued interest payable at the expiry of
the term;
- may provide for redemption prior
to the expiry of the fixed term in certain circumstances;
- has a floating rate of return that
comprises a reference rate plus a fixed margin or a fixed rate of return;
- provides for interest to be paid
periodically on specified dates;
- is not subordinated under the
terms of the debenture to any debt owing to unsecured creditors of the body;
- is not convertible into another
class of securities; and
- is issued at the same price as all
other debentures issued under the prospectus for the debenture.[25]
Main provisions of Schedule 1: Part 1—Amendments relating to simple
corporate bonds
Two-part prospectus for simple corporate
bonds
2.25
The bill's amendments to the Corporations Act would provide a new
disclosure regime for the offer of simple corporate bonds. This will require a
body corporate to issue a two-part simple corporate bond prospectus consisting
of a base prospectus and an offer-specific prospectus.[26]
Although the Corporations Act will contain the framework and eligibility
criteria for the two-part prospectus, the content and structure will be
specified by regulations.[27]
2.26
The two-part prospectus includes a base part that is valid for three
years and an offer-specific part that is valid for the period of the offer. The
EM describes the structure of the two-part prospectus as follows:
- Base: the base part would have a
life of three years. The base prospectus will have general information about
the issuer and the issue that is unlikely to change significantly over three
years. Issuers will have the option of releasing a base prospectus in
anticipation of making an actual offer of bonds. Issuers will not generally
need to update the base document.
- Offer-specific: for each fund
raising tranche, issuers will need to release a second document outlining the
key details of the offer, that being the offer-specific prospectus. The offer-specific
prospectus will have similarities with the cleansing notice regime for other
offerings, whereby it will include a statement outlining that the issuer has
complied with their continuous disclosure obligations. Issuers will need to
disclose in the second part any matters material to a consideration of an
investment in the bonds that have not already been the subject of continuous
disclosure.[28]
2.27
Under the proposed section 713A, the bill sets out the criteria that
simple corporate bonds must meet in order to qualify for the new streamlined
disclosure regime:
- The securities must be debentures as defined in section 9 of the
Corporations Act. [Schedule 1, item 22, subsection 713A(2)]
- The securities must be quoted on a prescribed financial market. [Schedule
1, item 22, subsections 713A(3) and (4)]
- The securities must be denominated in Australian currency. [Schedule
1, item 22, subsection 713A(5)]
- The fixed term of the securities cannot exceed 10 years. [Schedule
1, item 22, subsection 713A(6)]
- The principal and any accrued interest must be repaid to the
holder at the end of the fixed term of the security. [Schedule 1, item
22, subsection 713A(7)]
- The interest rate must be either a fixed or floating rate. A
floating rate is comprised of a reference rate (to which the issuer has no
direct control) and a fixed margin set by the issuer. [Schedule 1, item
22, subsection 713A(8)]
- The securities can be subject to an increase in the fixed rate or
the fixed margin in respect to the interest payable but cannot be subject to a
decrease in the interest payable. [Schedule 1, item 22, subsections
713A(9) and (10)]
- Interest payments under the security must be paid periodically
and cannot be deferred or capitalised by the issuing body. [Schedule 1,
item 22, paragraphs 713A(11)(a), (b) and (c)]
- The face value for the security cannot exceed $A1000. [Schedule
1, item 22, subsection 713A(12)]
- Securities can only be redeemed prior to the end of the fixed
term in specified circumstances. [Schedule 1, item 22, subsection 713A
(13)]
- Debt to security holders is not subordinated to debts to
unsecured creditors. [Schedule 1, item 22, subsection 713A(14)]
- The securities must not be able to be converted into another
class of securities. [Schedule 1, item 22, subsection 713A(15)
- The price payable for the securities must be the same for all
persons who accept the offer. [Schedule 1, item 22, subsection 713A(16)]
- The body offering the securities must have continuously quoted
securities, or is a wholly owned subsidiary of a body corporate that has
continuously quoted securities. [Schedule 1, item 22, subsections
713A(17) and (18)]
- The most recent auditor's report on the most recent financial
statements must not have been modified. [Schedule 1, item 22, subsections
713A(19) and 713A (20)][29]
2.28
A two-part prospectus must be lodged with ASIC. ASIC has the power to
determine whether the proposed offer meets the criteria for a simple corporate
bond.[30]
2.29
In order to streamline the process for issuers, reduce the length of the
offer-specific prospectus and increase its readability, information in the
offer-specific prospectus can be incorporated by cross-reference to the
information contained in the base prospectus lodged with ASIC.[31]
2.30
A supplementary or replacement document may be lodged with ASIC if the
issuer becomes aware of a misleading or deceptive statement in, or an omission
from, the two-part prospectus.[32]
Parallel trading of simple
corporate bonds
2.31
Under the bill, simple corporate bonds can be issued directly into the
retail market through the ASX. However, there are also provisions to allow simple
corporate bonds to be traded on the ASX as depositary interests in a similar
fashion to the way foreign shares and CGS are currently traded on the ASX.
2.32
In order to facilitate parallel trading of simple corporate bonds in the
wholesale and retail markets, the bill proposes the same depositary interests
mechanism that already exists for retail trading of CGS. Depositary interests
'provide retail investors with a beneficial ownership in an underlying
security' and would allow simple corporate bonds in the wholesale market to be
offered to retail investors.[33]
2.33
A depositary nominee—that is, the person who issues beneficial interests
to another party—can only issue these interests with the agreement of the
issuing body. The disclosure obligation is that required by the issuer of the
simple corporate bond (the underlying asset) in the two-part prospectus.[34]
2.34
The EM notes that in addition to amending the Corporations Act to
facilitate parallel trading of simple corporate bonds, further regulatory
changes will be needed to ensure that all relevant requirements can be met.[35]
The removal of 'deemed liability'
for directors
2.35
The EM notes that section 728 of the Corporations Act:
prohibits a person from offering securities under a
disclosure document if, among other things, there is a misleading or deceptive
statement, an omission of required material, or a new circumstance has arisen.[36]
2.36
A contravention of subsection 728(1) of the Corporations Act is a
criminal offence by an issuer if the contravention is materially adverse to an
investor.[37]
2.37
Section 729 of the Corporations Act currently establishes 'deemed
liability', applying liability to all directors of the relevant body,
regardless of their involvement, for misleading or deceptive statements and
omissions in a disclosure document:
If there is an offer of securities and a person suffers loss
or damage because of a misleading or deceptive statement, an omission of
required material, or where a new circumstance had arisen in a disclosure a
document, the person has the right to recover compensation for that loss or
damage from a range of persons including each director of the body making the
offer.[38]
2.38
The Treasury discussion paper noted that the amendments provide specific
criteria for simple corporate bonds and therefore, 'it may be appropriate to
remove directors' deemed liability for retail corporate bonds'.[39]
Treasury has noted that:
Removing directors' deemed liability would be consistent with
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) developments, noting that COAG has
agreed there is a case for reform to promote a consistent and principled
approach to the imposition of personal criminal liability for corporate fault
(similar considerations apply to civil liability).[40]
2.39
The bill proposes to limit the liability of directors with regard to the
two-part prospectus for simple corporate bonds such that liability for
compensation does not automatically include directors unless they are involved
in the prohibited actions:
[F]or an offer of simple corporate bonds under the 2-part
simple corporate bonds prospectus, the range of persons to which the person has
the right to recover compensation for a loss or damage does not include
directors or proposed directors of the body making the offer (and, if the body
is a wholly owned subsidiary of a body corporate, does not include directors or
proposed directors of that body corporate) unless the director or proposed
director is involved in, among other things, the misleading or deceptive
statement, the omission of required material, or where new circumstances have
not been reflected in the disclosure document as required by the Corporations
Act.[41]
Part 2—Amendments relating to false or misleading statements
Reasonable steps obligations
2.40
Part 9.4 of the Corporations Act relates to offences. Section 1308 in
Part 9.4 sets out offences relating to 'false or misleading statements' made by
a person.[42]
2.41
In a joint media release, the Treasurer, the Hon. Wayne Swan MP, and the
Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, the Hon. Bill Shorten MP, stated
that the bill would amend the Corporations Act to 'clarify the defences
provided in respect to director's liability that apply to all offers of
securities'.[43]
2.42
Part 2 of Schedule 1 of the bill proposes adding 'reasonable steps'
defences for directors in Part 9.4 of the Corporations Act. The 'reasonable
steps' provisions of the bill are as follows:
- A statement or information was not
false or misleading in a material particular:
- If the person proves that all
inquiries (if any) that were reasonable in the circumstances to make were made,
and after making those inquiries the person believed on reasonable grounds that
the statement or information was not misleading in a material particular. [schedule
1, items 52 and 53, subsections 1308(10) and 1309(7)]
-If the person proves that they
relied on information provided to them by somebody other than a director,
employee or agent of the body (if the person is a body) or someone other than
an employee or agent of the individual (if the person is an individual) and the
reliance placed on the information by the person was reasonable in the
circumstances. [schedule 1, items 52 and 53, subsections 1308(12) and
1309(9)]
- The information in a document did
not omit or have omitted from it any matter or thing that without which the
document would be misleading or deceptive in a material respect:
-If the person proves that all
inquiries (if any) that were reasonable in the circumstances were made, and
after making those inquiries the person believed on reasonable grounds that
there was no such omission. [schedule 1, item 52 , subsection 1308(11)]
-If the person proves that they
relied on information provided to the person by somebody other than a director,
employee or agent of the body (if the person is a body), or someone other than
an employee or agent of the individual (if the person is an individual), and
the reliance placed on the information by the person was reasonable in the
circumstances. [schedule 1, item 52, subsection 1308(13)]
- The information in the document
did not omit or have omitted from it any matter or thing that would render the
information in the document misleading in a material particular:
-If the person has made all
inquiries (if any) that were reasonable in the circumstances to make, and after
making those inquiries the person believed on reasonable grounds that there was
no such omission. [schedule 1, item 53, subsection 1309(8)]
-If the person proves that they
relied on information provided to the person by somebody other than a director,
employee or agent of the body (if the person is a body), or someone other than
an employee or agent of the individual (if the person is an individual), and
the reliance placed on the information by the person was reasonable in the
circumstances. [schedule 1, item 53, subsection 1309(10)][44]
Submitter views on Schedule 1
2.43
The committee received seven submissions addressing Schedule 1 of the
bill, with two public submissions and one confidential submission making
specific comments. All the submissions supported the general thrust of the
amendments to develop the retail corporate bond market.
2.44
The committee heard evidence from Treasury that the retail bond market
is currently quite small, with, for example, only 0.7 per cent of self-managed
super fund assets being held as debt securities in September 2012.[45]
2.45
Treasury also noted that while Australian investors are active in the
equity market, investors could benefit from the development of the retail debt
market because it would allow them to diversify their exposure by including
lower-risk and less-volatile debt securities, such as bonds, in their
portfolios. This was seen as particularly important for retirement-age
Australians, particularly with the increase in life expectancy over recent
decades.[46]
2.46
Treasury has stated that it expects the initial market for retail simple
corporate bonds to comprise older Australians and the trustees of self-managed
super funds looking to diversify into relatively low-risk stable assets:
[T]he type of investors who will be attracted to simple corporate
bonds are likely to be older Australians and self-managed super fund trustees
who are looking to manage longevity risk and looking for long-term, low risk,
relatively stable sources of income that will diversify their holdings against
equities and other, perhaps more volatile or higher-risk assets in their
portfolios.[47]
2.47
Treasury also saw that developing the retail bond market would alter the
structure of the market and facilitate bank lending to smaller domestic
customers:
Growing the retail bond market will help to reduce reliance
on offshore wholesale funding markets for raising corporate debt and free-up
bank balances for lending to the domestic market, particularly small
businesses.[48]
2.48
Similarly, industry foresaw benefits to corporate entities, investors
and businesses:
A deeper and more liquid retail corporate bond market has
benefits for corporates, businesses and investors. For corporates, it will
broaden their funding sources and help facilitate their growth aspirations. For
investors, a fully functioning retail corporate bond market will offer
investors more choice and an opportunity to diversify their investments.
Facilitating this funding will free up the banks' balance sheets to continue
supporting SMEs, who traditionally do not have the same access level of access
to capital markets as their larger counterparts.[49]
2.49
The committee received evidence about the possible reasons why the
retail market in corporate debt in Australia was underdeveloped. Mr Steve
Lambert, Executive General Manager of Debt Markets at National Australia Bank
(NAB), agreed with the committee that there are fewer debt issues and fewer
debt instruments available compared to the number of equities in the market,
and that as a retail investor, it is more difficult to purchase small amounts
of debt (for example, $A1000–2000) than it is to purchase the equivalent amount
of shares.[50]
2.50
However, Mr Lambert also pointed to the complexity of prospectus
requirements and director liability as other key impediments to developing the
retail corporate bond market, and as reasons why so far, only one entity has
taken advantage of ASIC Class Order 10/321 to issue 'vanilla' corporate bonds.[51]
Prospectus requirements
2.51
The submissions that commented specifically on Schedule 1 all supported
the amendments regarding the proposed two-part prospectus insofar as it aims to
make the documentation process for issuing corporate bonds no more onerous than
the process for issuing equities. However, some submitters made comments
regarding various aspects of the proposed two-part prospectus. Of particular
note were suggestions for the use of term sheets for simple corporate bonds,
and the use of a two-part prospectus for more complex corporate bonds.
Use of term sheets for simple
corporate bond offers
2.52
The bill proposes a two-part prospectus comprising a base disclosure
document and offer document for the issue of simple corporate bonds.
2.53
However, some submitters noted that while a base disclosure document and
offer document are appropriate for 'corporate bonds with more unusual or
complex features', a base document and a two-page term sheet should be
sufficient for those bonds which meet the criteria of a simple corporate bond:
For Simple Corporate Bonds which meet the criteria stated in
the legislation, we propose a base disclosure document which allows information
to be incorporated by reference from ASIC, as well as a two-page term sheet
outlining the key characteristics of the bond, rather than an offer document.[52]
2.54
Mr Lambert explained how the base document and term sheet currently
operate in the wholesale market:
Typically in the wholesale market a large issuer will have an
offering circular or an offering document which would have all of the base
details upon which that series of bonds could be issued under. It has all of
the details; it has everything that they will need. You need both documents;
you need to have reference to that. And then every time you do another issue or
another transaction, that is done under an offering circle or a term sheet,
which is basically a couple of pages and which has all of the details of that
specific issue. You need [to] read both together. Rather than every time you do
a new deal doing quite a fat document—you have already done the fat one once—you
just do a skinny one for every subsequent issue. That is probably the best way
to think about it.[53]
2.55
NAB provided the committee with recommendations that it made in its
submission to the Treasury discussion paper on retail corporate bonds regarding
the information that should be included in a term sheet and a two-part
prospectus.[54]
Use of a two-part prospectus for
more complex corporate bonds
2.56
Mr Lambert also expressed a preference for more complex offers that do
not meet the criteria for an offer of simple corporate bonds (for example, a
bond issue with a life of greater than 10 years) to still be eligible for a
two-part prospectus that would consist of a base document and an offer document
(as opposed to a two-page term sheet). Being eligible for a two-part prospectus
would obviate the need for a corporate entity to prepare a full prospectus with
every subsequent bond issue and would therefore make it easier for corporate
issuers to meet the legislative requirements.[55]
2.57
In a prior response to a Treasury discussion paper[56]
that canvassed various options that would allow more complex bonds to be
included under a simplified two-part prospectus regime, NAB proposed that terms
longer than 10 years should be permitted under a two-part prospectus 'provided
there is clear and adequate disclosure'.[57]
2.58
NAB also suggested that subordinated corporate bonds should be
permitted, but only with a two-part prospectus that 'clearly outlines the
capital structure and the ranking of the bonds within that structure'.[58]
Mr Lambert confirmed that NAB is comfortable with the fact that the bill does
not allow subordinated bonds to qualify as simple corporate bonds.[59]
2.59
However, NAB would not recommend allowing deferral of interest because
'it is inconsistent with the view that corporate bonds provide a regular and
stable income stream', unless it was restricted to hybrid issues and clearly
disclosed.[60]
2.60
NAB pointed out that investor confusion about the nature of the bond
issue should be reduced by having the distinction between a two-page term sheet
for simple corporate bonds and a more detailed offer document (of between 10
and 20 pages) for more complex corporate bonds.[61]
Contents and length of the offer
document
2.61
An offer document would contain 'key details of the transaction as well
as any matters material to consideration of the investment which has not been
the subject of continuous disclosure'.[62]
However, Mr Lambert pointed to the importance of restricting the offer document
to a reasonable length (between 10 and 20 pages) in order that it would
actually be read carefully by potential investors and that practical disclosure
of key elements could occur.[63]
2.62
In noting that the content requirements for the disclosure documents
associated with simple corporate bonds have not yet been released, and given
that as at 22 April 2013 only one entity had taken advantage of ASIC Class
Order 10/321 relating to the issue of 'vanilla' corporate bonds, the Australian
Bankers' Association (ABA) requested that the government consult with industry
over the specific content requirements for the new disclosure regime.[64]
2.63
Treasury confirmed that the disclosure regime for simple corporate bonds
will be more streamlined than the regime under ASIC Class Order 10/321 relating
to 'vanilla' corporate bonds, and that consultation with industry is occurring:
Treasury is currently engaging in targeted consultation with
key stakeholders to develop content requirements for the disclosure documents
that will strike an appropriate balance between streamlining disclosure for
issuers, and ensuring that the documents are comprehensible and effective to
retail investors. Treasury will publicly consult on the draft regulations to
ensure the content requirements achieve these goals.[65]
2.64
Treasury expects to release the draft regulations by July 2013.[66]
Life of the base document
2.65
The ABA and NAB proposed a five-year life for the base document in order
to facilitate more repeat issuances, rather than the three-year life proposed in
the legislation.[67]
NAB stated that this finding was 'based on direct feedback we have received
from potential issuers of Simple Corporate Bonds from corporate Australia'.[68]
Eligibility criteria for simple
corporate bonds—ranking, tenor, maximum price, minimum scale requirements, and
mandatory two-part prospectus
2.66
There was support from the ABA and NAB for the provision that simple
corporate bonds cannot be subordinated to any other unsecured creditors,
effectively meaning that simple corporate bonds 'rank at least equally with all
other unsubordinated and unsecured debt obligations of the issuer'.[69]
The ABA notes this provision is consistent with the provisions for 'vanilla'
corporate bonds in ASIC Class Order 10/321 and is 'in line with the established
Australian wholesale bond market'.[70]
2.67
The ABA was critical of the proposal to limit the life of simple
corporate bonds to 10 years.[71]
NAB felt that while a bond issue with a tenor greater than 10 years would not
qualify as a simple corporate bond, it should still be eligible to qualify for
disclosure under a two-part prospectus regime.[72]
2.68
Noting that ASIC Class Order 10/321 relating to 'vanilla' corporate
bonds does not prescribe a maximum price for simple corporate bonds, the ABA
also regarded the inclusion of the $A1000 maximum bond price in the bill as
'unnecessary and problematic'.[73]
2.69
Although NAB did not express a strong view on the maximum bond price for
simple corporate bonds, Mr Lambert noted that a maximum bond price of $A1000
could stimulate the market by giving retail investors greater choice and allow
investors to more easily diversify their portfolio and thereby reduce risk.[74]
2.70
NAB welcomed the clarification that the $A50 million minimum
subscription for an offer-specific prospectus only relates to the initial bond
issue, and not to subsequent issues.[75]
2.71
Treasury noted that the value of having a minimum scale requirement of $A50 million
was that it would effectively limit bond issuances under the simple corporate
bonds regime to the top 200 companies in Australia and would therefore 'ensure
that the retail corporate bonds that are issued under this regime are high
quality'.[76]
2.72
Following questions from the committee, Treasury stated that the
two-part prospectus for simple corporate bonds was a mandatory requirement
because allowing both single and two-part prospectuses could create confusion,
whereas ensuring a consistent standard in the market would build investor
confidence. Furthermore, Treasury wanted to set a market standard where
investors would get used to looking for and reading both parts of a prospectus:
One of the challenges with the two-part prospectus is that we
want people who receive the issue specific, the second part of the prospectus,
to also look at the base. Because it is not a summary of the base; it is the
key information about the issuance, about that tranche. So it is important that
retail investors receive both documents and see both documents as being the
disclosure in combination.[77]
Continuous disclosure
2.73
The ABA requested more clarity on how the continuous disclosure regime
for listed entities would interact with the new regime for simple corporate
bonds. The ABA also submitted that documents issued under the continuous
disclosure regime that are subsequently incorporated by reference in a
disclosure document 'should not be captured by the prospectus liability
regime'.[78]
Liability regime
2.74
The committee received only one submission—from the ABA—that made
specific comments on the proposed changes to directors' civil liability and the
reasonable steps obligations.
2.75
The ABA argued that modelling retail disclosure processes and documents
on the wholesale market would remove the onus of liability for ensuring
accurate disclosure from directors and locate it with management, thereby
reducing the costs associated with issuing retail corporate bonds:
This would enable processes and documentation adopted by the
wholesale market to be used and create greater consistency between liability
regimes by allowing due diligence to be dealt with at a management rather than
board level, thereby reducing the costs with debt capital raisings in the
retail market.[79]
2.76
The ABA supported the proposal to reduce the liability standard on
directors in respect to retail corporate bonds offered under a two-part
prospectus, but drew attention to the possibility that, in practice, both civil
and criminal liability may still apply to directors:
The ABA supports the Government's proposal to reduce the
liability standard on directors in respect to retail corporate bonds by
removing strict liability for directors named in (a defective) two-part
prospectus as a proposed director under section 729 of the Corporations Act
2001. As a result directors will only have civil liability for a defective
two-part prospectus if personally 'involved' in the defective statements. 'Involvement'
of directors in a prospectus is inferred from the continued requirement for all
of the directors of an issuing company to consent to the issue of a two-part
prospectus. Directors, therefore, also remain criminally liable under sections
1308 and 1309 of the Corporations Act 2001 if a prospectus is false or
misleading unless a director can prove they have made reasonable enquiries, and
after doing so, believed on reasonable grounds that the prospectus was not
defective (due diligence defence) or placed reasonable reliance on information
provided by other people (reasonable reliance defence).[80]
2.77
Given that the ABA does not believe the bill has addressed the need for
a director to be personally involved in the due diligence process, the ABA argues
that despite the amendments in the bill, there would still be 'a greater legal
risk, administrative complexity and more costly burden involved in issuing
retail corporate bonds than wholesale corporate bonds'. Consequently, the ABA
maintains that the regulatory bias that causes an entity to favour bond issues
into the wholesale market has not been dealt with by the bill.
Treasury response
2.78
The committee received evidence from Treasury that removing directors'
deemed civil liability for a two-part prospectus for simple corporate bonds does
in fact remove the need for directors to carry out due diligence on that issue:
Under the existing law of the Corporations Act directors can
generally be sued for damages for prospectuses which contravene the prohibition
against misleading or deceptive statements or omissions, even if they are not
involved in the particular contravention. The bill relieves their liability
unless they are actively involved in the contravention, so directors cease to
have deemed civil liability. They continue to have involvement of a civil
liability but the due diligence defences remain available.
...
It means that they do not have to conduct due diligence for
all of the processes in developing the prospectus. It will reduce and relieve
some of the compliance burden in developing prospectuses because they no longer
have deemed liability for any contraventions in the prospectus unless they were
personally involved or knew of the contraventions.[81]
2.79
Dr Sandlant explained what involvement-based civil liability for
directors entailed:
If they know of or were involved in approving information in
the prospectus which is a contravention of the requirements in the Corporations
Act against misleading and deceptive statements or omissions, then they still
have liability for that involvement. But they do not have liability on
reasonable grounds for omissions or misstatements which might have been made in
the prospectus development process by officers who are working in their
business.[82]
2.80
These points were reiterated by Treasury in a written response to the
committee, along with an explanation of what would constitute evidence for
involvement in material misstatement or omission:
Directors will no longer be subject to the deemed civil
liability for offers of simple corporate bonds. As such, directors will not be
‘deemed’ liable for a contravention in respect to misstatements in, or
omissions from, disclosure documents provided for simple corporate bond
offers. However, any person ‘involved’ in a contravention will continue to
face liability for that contravention.
The amendments in the Corporations Amendments (Simple
Corporate Bonds and Other Measures) Bill 2013 (the Bill) provide that a
director will be liable for a misstatement in, or omission from, a disclosure
document if they are ‘involved’ in the misstatement or omission. In addition,
directors will continue to be liable if they become aware of a misstatement or
omission and fail to bring it to the attention of the person making the offer.
Involved (as defined in section 79 of the Corporations Act)
means that the person has:
- aided, abetted, counselled or
procured a contravention; or
- induced a contravention; or
- been in any way, by act or
omission, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to a
contravention; or
- conspired with others to effect a
contravention.
Relevant evidence to establish this contravention will be
evidence which, if it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or
indirectly) the assessment of the probability of a fact which establishes
whether a director was involved in a misstatement or omission, consistent with
what constitutes relevant evidence under general law.[83]
2.81
Dr Sandlant also noted that directors would incur criminal liability if
'they have broken any relevant laws in relation to their duties as directors,
other relevant laws as well as the civil liability'.[84]
2.82
In response to committee concerns about the safety of a product that did
not incur deemed civil liability on the part of directors, Dr Sandlant observed
that director liability had not been completely removed, and that simple
corporate bonds were, by definition, a low-risk product:
There are two points to make. One is that directors still
have involvement based civil liability and criminal liability. So liability has
not been completely removed, it has just been made, I guess, more rational or a
rebalancing of the due diligence process to make it more cost effective for,
and to encourage issuance of, corporate bonds. That is one factor—the liability
has not been removed completely, it has just been streamlined, if you like. The
other factor is that because the bill requires simple corporate bonds to be, as
we were discussing just a moment ago, relatively simple and low risk that gives
investors a greater degree of confidence in the product.[85]
2.83
Consequently, Dr Sandlant identified the compromise at the heart of the
bill; namely, that applying restrictive qualifying criteria to simple corporate
bonds allowed the relaxation of some of the 'arguably onerous requirements of
prospectus disclosure and directors' liability'.[86]
2.84
In reiterating the rationale for the changes, Treasury confirmed for the
committee that the liability provisions in the Corporations Act have only been
eased for simple corporate bonds and not for other securities:
Market participants have indicated that the liability
provisions in the Corporations Act are hindering the offer of corporate bonds
to retail investors in Australia. The deemed liability placed on directors
when an offer of corporate bonds is made to retail investors requires a level
of director engagement in the due diligence process that is onerous.
However, while the development of a deep and liquid corporate
bond market is a widely supported policy goal, it is also important that
consumers continue to receive adequate regulatory protection. For this reason,
the liabilities for directors have been eased only for simple corporate bonds.
Simple corporate bonds are relatively safe securities, as
they must satisfy the conditions set out in the Bill. These conditions
restrict the type of bonds that can be classified as simple corporate bonds to
senior debt that is issued by high quality corporate entities (most likely the
top 100 to 200 companies).[87]
2.85
Treasury also emphasised that the easing of director liability in
section 728 was contingent on the criteria for simple corporate bonds as set
out in proposed section 713A remaining the same. Treasury indicated that should
the criteria in section 713A be made more flexible, the issue of
directors' deemed liability would likely be revisited:
Section 713A sets out the conditions for offering a simple
corporate bond, and the definition of a simple corporate bond. For the
amendments in section 728 to apply, the offer must be in relation to simple
corporate bonds, so section 713A must be satisfied.
If the criteria in section 713A are made more flexible, this
would increase the level of risk associated with the bonds. In the event such
changes were contemplated, it is likely that further review and consultation on
directors’ deemed liability would be undertaken.[88]
2.86
The SMSF Owners' Alliance supported the position adopted by Treasury and
stated that it believed the conditions set out in the bill would 'provide
sufficient protection for SMSFs' and that they could be complemented by the
regulations under development.[89]
2.87
The committee questioned Treasury about whether the changes to director
liability created an inconsistency and how the amendments would fit in with the
Council of Australian Governments' (COAG) moves to harmonise director
liabilities across jurisdictions.[90]
Treasury responded that:
The COAG harmonisation of director liability is aimed at
making director liability comply with a specific set of agreed-upon principles
(the COAG Principles). These principles include the removal of deemed
liability of directors for corporate fault where it is not appropriate, and
that where derivative liability is imposed, it should be imposed in accordance
with principles of good corporate governance. The reforms in the Bill are not
directly in the scope of the type of director liabilities that COAG are
considering, however, the proposed changes are consistent with the COAG
principles.[91]
Reasonable steps
2.88
In a joint media release, the Treasurer and the Minister for
Superannuation and Financial Services stated that the clarification of the reasonable
steps defences applied 'to all offers of securities'.[92]
2.89
Yet in his Second Reading Speech, Minister Shorten stated that the bill
'provides clarification around the due diligence defence in respect to
directors' criminal liability in offering corporate bonds'.[93]
2.90
The committee asked for clarification on whether the reasonable steps in
sections 1308 and 1309 would apply to all corporate bonds and securities.[94]
Treasury confirmed that they would, and that the amendments would apply across
the entire Corporations Act:
The proposed amendments that clarify what is meant by 'reasonable
steps' in sections 1308 and 1309, apply across the entire Corporations Act.[95]
2.91
Given this, the committee is concerned that the EM does not contain a
clear explanation for the amendments to the 'reasonable steps'. Schedule 1 of
the bill pertains to simple corporate bonds, and yet the amendments to the
reasonable steps provisions were added to the end of Schedule 1 without any
context or clear reasoning being given.
2.92
Treasury responded that because the reasonable steps were a
clarification, a comprehensive explanation was not required:
Paragraph 1.17 [of the EM] states 'The amendments in the Bill
to the directors' liabilities have been designed to reduce the burden on
directors when issuing corporate bonds to retail investors under the 2 part
prospectus regime and will provide directors with greater clarity on the steps
required as part of the due diligence process in relation to certain criminal
liability offences'.
As the proposed changes to the operation of sections 1308 and
1309 of the Corporations Act merely clarify what 'reasonable steps' mean,
additional commentary to that provided in paragraph 1.17 was not required.[96]
2.93
In response to questions from the committee, Treasury provided an
explanation for these changes:
While the current law provides a defence of 'reasonable steps'
to the offences in sections 1308 and 1309, it does not provide guidance on what
constitutes 'reasonable steps'. The purpose of the amendment is to provide
greater clarity as to what ‘reasonable steps’ means.
The amendments provide that a person should be deemed to have
taken 'reasonable steps' if they make reasonable inquiries or place reasonable
reliance on information provided by others. The proposed amendments reflect
the practical application of the criminal liability provisions in the
Corporations Act and are consistent with stakeholder views.[97]
2.94
Treasury also confirmed that the clarification of reasonable steps was
not predicated on removing the deemed civil liability for directors in the
issuance of simple corporate bonds, but instead 'merely provide[d] increased
guidance on the application of the defences for criminal liability for
deceptive and misleading statements'.[98]
2.95
Questioned by the committee on the consultation process undertaken with
regard to the reasonable steps, Treasury gave the following details:
Treasury has had extensive public and targeted consultation
on the Bill and the measures within the Bill (including the clarification of
the meaning of 'reasonable steps' in sections 1308 and 1309 of the Corporations
Act) since 2011. Below is a summary of that consultation:
- On 13 December 2011 the discussion
paper 'Development of the retail corporate bond market: streamlining disclosure
and liability requirements' was released for public consultation. Submissions
on the discussion paper closed on Friday 10 February 2012.
- On 24 January 2012, Treasury held
a roundtable meeting in Sydney with over 30 market participants including the
G100 and the Australian Shareholders Association to discuss aspects of the
December 2011 discussion paper.
- Throughout 2012 and 2013, a number
of small targeted consultations (comprising between 2-10 attendees) were held
with various market participants.
- On 11 January 2013, exposure draft
legislation was released for public consultation. Submissions on the exposure
draft legislation closed on Friday 15 February 2013.
A representative from the Australian Shareholders Association
attended the 24 January 2012 roundtable. At the roundtable, a comprehensive
discussion took place on the issue of the proposed removal of directors' civil
liability and the proposed clarification to what is meant by 'reasonable
steps'.[99]
Parallel trading
2.96
NAB welcomed the development of depositary interests that would allow
the parallel trading of simple corporate bonds in the wholesale and retail
markets.[100]
2.97
The committee questioned Treasury firstly about how the liability
provisions apply to bonds that are traded, and secondly, whether the liability
provisions associated with the bond transferred to the owner of the depositary
interests, and whether every subsequent person who acquires the bonds when they
are traded has the benefit of them.[101]
2.98
Treasury responded that:
Under the current law, liability for misstatements etc.
attaches to securities in two ways:
- when an offer of corporate bonds
is made by the issuer to retail investors, through the application of the
liability provisions in section 728; and
- through the general liability
provisions in section 1041H, which apply when trading occurs on the secondary
market.
The application of the liability provisions for an offer of
simple corporate bonds as well as for secondary trading will be consistent with
the current law (as outlined above).
As outlined above, and consistent with current law, it is
only the person who initially acquires the simple corporate bonds from the
issuer who benefits from the liability provisions in section 728. However,
every subsequent person who acquires them through secondary trading (including
the secondary trading of simple corporate bond depository interests) will have
the benefit of the general liability provisions in section 1041H.[102]
Investor education
2.99
NAB emphasised that a key element in developing the retail corporate
bond market was the education of retail investors. As part of its efforts to educate
investors, NAB has 'commissioned the Australian Centre for Financial Studies
(ACFS) to develop a series of reports about the corporate bond market in
Australia'.[103]
Adviser education and research
2.100
The Stockbrokers Association drew attention to the 'fundamental
differences between equity and debt securities' and cautioned that some 'stockbrokers
with little experience in bonds may not be equipped to advise on these products'.
The Stockbrokers Association stated that adviser knowledge would 'definitely
need to be updated if more bonds are to be presented as investment options to
retail clients'.[104]
2.101
The Stockbrokers Association also observed that compared with equities,
there is little reliable research pertaining to the bond market with which to
advise retail clients:
Another issue in adding bonds (including CGS) to the suite of
stockbrokers’ offerings is the lack of dependable research. With shares,
stockbroking firms rely on in-house expertise from specialist research analysts
to analyse the relevant issuer companies and sectors, or have third party
arrangements with specialist research houses to obtain such research. This
research informs the advice that is then given to clients. Accordingly, retail
advisers may lack specialist research in order to properly advise their
clients.[105]
Clarification of specific elements
in the bill
2.102
In its submission, NAB sought clarity on specific elements in the bill.
The committee sent these as questions on notice to Treasury and the responses
from Treasury are given here.
2.103
NAB asked Treasury about how 'among other things' in section 1.67 of the
EM will be defined, as well as whether subsection 713A(8) is restricted to the
Bank Bill Swap rate (BBSW) or whether issuers will be allowed to reference a
range of indices. Treasury responded that:
In section 1.67, the reference to 'among other things' is
intended to be inclusive. It is not defined in the legislation. When creating
a prospectus, there [are] a number of provisions of the Corporations Act where
a director may be 'involved in' a contravention and face accessorial liability.
Section 713A(8) does not refer to the BBSW, or any other
specific index. Under the current law, issuers may reference 'a floating rate
that is comprised of a reference rate and a fixed margin'.[106]
2.104
NAB asked about the consequences if, subsequent to issuance, the issuer
is removed from listed status on an appropriate exchange. Treasury replied
that:
Treasury understands that the consequences of a company
delisting will be provided for in the individual bond instruments. Treasury
has not mandated that a particular consequence flows from delisting because
this may affect commercial outcomes. For example, if a company is taken over
and subsequently delists, the bidding company may wish to honour the debt
obligations of the target company.[107]
2.105
In regards to section 1.26 which states that a 'regulation making power
has been inserted into Chapter 2L so that the requirement for a trust deed and
trustee is able to be removed for the making of the specified offer of
debentures or a specified class of offers of debentures'.[108]
NAB sought clarification as to how this would intersect with ASIC’s recent
consultation paper 199, which proposes reforms to the regulation of the
debenture sector, including increasing the role of trustees for issues of
simple corporate bonds. Treasury answered that:
ASIC’s discussion paper was released prior to public industry
consultation on this point earlier this year. Consultation revealed that there
are a number of existing issues with trustees, so a regulation making power was
inserted which would allow regulations to be made in future if required.
Treasury has not formed a final view on this issue.[109]
Committee views
2.106
The committee notes that ASIC Class Order 10/321 has not been successful
in increasing the issue of 'vanilla' or simple corporate bonds. It supports the
process through which Treasury and industry stakeholders have worked to develop
regulations that strike an appropriate balance between streamlining the issuing
process and maintaining appropriate investor safeguards. The committee is keen
to understand whether the issue of an offer document (as opposed to, for
example, a two-page term sheet) is viewed as a significant barrier to corporate
entities engaging in the retail market, or whether the removal of the due
diligence requirements for directors is sufficient to encourage greater supply
into the retail simple corporate bond market.
2.107
The committee notes that the bill proposes measures that seek to
streamline the regulatory burden faced by directors in issuing simple corporate
bonds. It believes that the two-part prospectus, the ability to trade simple
corporate bonds using simple retail corporate bond depositary interests, and
the removal of deemed civil liability for misleading and deceptive statements
in a disclosure document will all encourage the development of a deeper market
for these securities. However, the challenge of developing this market will not
be realised by focusing solely on supply-side factors. Crucially, there must be
demand for these products among retail investors. Generating this demand will
rely on educating retail investors as to the features of simple corporate bonds
and offering a product that genuinely meets the needs and risk profile of
investors.
2.108
Related to the above point, the committee also notes that the
attractiveness of simple corporate bonds relative to other types of retail
investment, including direct investment in property, may also depend on the
relative tax treatment of the various types of investment.
2.109
The committee found the EM to be obscure and ambiguous on certain
points, in particular with respect to the 'reasonable steps' obligations. The
answers to questions on notice provided useful clarification, but the committee
suggests that the quality of the EM could be improved.
Recommendation 1
2.110
The committee recommends that Treasury amend the EM to more accurately
reflect that the clarification of 'reasonable steps' applies across the entire
Corporations Act to all offers of securities.
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