Chapter 1Introduction
1.1The Select Committee on Information Integrity on Climate Change and Energy (the committee) was appointed by resolution of the Senate on 30 July 2025, to inquire into and report on:
(a)the prevalence of, motivations behind and impacts of misinformation and disinformation related to climate change and energy;
(b)how misinformation and disinformation related to climate change and energy is financed, produced and disseminated, including, but not limited to, understanding its impact on:
(i)Australian politics,
(ii)domestic and international media narratives, and
(iii)Australian public policy debate and outcomes;
(c)the origins, growth and prevalence of 'astroturfing' and its impact on public policy and debate;
(d)connections between Australian organisations and international think tank and influence networks associated with the dissemination of misinformation and disinformation related to matters of public policy;
(e)the role of social media, including the coordinated use of bots and trolls, messaging apps and generative artificial intelligence (AI) in facilitating the spread of misinformation and disinformation;
(f)the efficacy of different parliamentary and regulatory approaches in combating misinformation and disinformation, what evidence exists and where further research is required, including through gathering global evidence;
(g)the role that could be played by media literacy education, including in the school curriculum, in combating misinformation and disinformation; and
(h)any other related matters.
1.2The committee's initial reporting date was 4 February 2026. On Monday, 3November 2025, the Senate granted the committee an extension of time to present the final report to Tuesday, 24 March 2026.
Conduct of the committee's inquiry
1.3The committee advertised the inquiry on its website and wrote to organisations and individuals inviting submissions by 12 September 2025.
1.4The committee accepted and published 243 submissions from stakeholders, peak bodies, not-for-profit organisations and individuals.
1.5A list of submissions is at Appendix 1.
1.6The committee held the following public hearings:
29 September 2025 in Canberra, ACT
30 September 2025 in Canberra, ACT
11 November 2025 in Melbourne, VIC
12 November 2025 in Melbourne, VIC
13 November 2025 in Sydney, NSW
6 February 2026 in Canberra, ACT;
16 February 2026 in Canberra, ACT;
17 February 2026 in Canberra, ACT;
5 March 2026 in Canberra, ACT; and
12 March 2026 in Canberra, ACT.
1.7A list of the witnesses that appeared at the hearings is at Appendix 2.
1.8All public submissions and Hansard transcripts of hearings are available in full on the committee's website, along with other documents received and considered by the committee.
Scope of this report
1.9This report of the committee comprises eight chapters, including this introductory and background chapter, with the remaining chapters set out as follows:
Chapter 2 discusses the prevalence of threats to climate information integrity, including how they spread in Australia.
Chapter 3 looks at the playbook of climate obstruction.
Chapter 4 outlines the social and economic impact of climate obstruction.
Chapter 5 discusses an approach to strengthening information integrity in Australia.
Chapter 6 outlines inquiry participants' views and recommendations in relation to building trust, resilience and transparency in climate and energy related information.
Chapter 7 addresses inquiry participants' views and recommendations on the monitoring and regulation of digital platforms.
Chapter 8 details inquiry participants' views and recommendations in relation to renewable energy project planning and implementation processes.
Chapter 9 provides the committee's view and recommendations.
Acknowledgements and references
1.10The committee thanks all those individuals and organisations who made submissions and gave evidence at the public hearings.
1.11References in this report to Committee Hansard are to proof transcripts. Page numbers may vary between proof and official transcripts.
Growing concern about threats to climate information integrity
1.12Repeated surveys have shown that Australians are concerned about the spread of misinformation and disinformation (mis/disinformation). This concern was reflected in the evidence heard by the committee in relation to debates around the issues of climate change and energy.
1.13According to the News and Media Research Centre (NMRC) survey from 2025, concern about misinformation in Australia is high—at 74 per cent—and is the highest globally. Australians were most likely to consider online influencers and personalities as a major source of misinformation (57 per cent), followed by activists (51 per cent), foreign governments (49 per cent), Australian political actors (48 per cent) and news media and journalists (43 per cent). Australians concerned about online influencers driving misinformation was also the highest globally.
1.14Additionally, NMRC's Digital News Report: Australia 2024 indicated that climate change or the environment was one of the top topics (35percent) that Australian audiences cited when asked what types of misinformation they have encountered in the past week. Another study in 2024 also showed that of 3852 adult Australians surveyed, six in ten, or 59 per cent, had seen 'false or misleading information online in the past week'.
1.15The Department of Home Affairs' report Strengthening Australian Democracy noted that rising mis/disinformation—amplified with the speed and reach of social media platforms—can destabilise trusted relationships between people and governments. The report identified mis/disinformation as a key challenge to Australia's democracy, specifically noting that 'false information has fuelled conspiracy theories about the government's response to fires and floods, and prompted protests against 5G technology'.
1.16Further discussion about the community impacts of climate change and energy-related mis/disinformation is provided in Chapter 4.
Challenges in defining and identifying mis/disinformation
1.17In Australia, there is no universally agreed definitions of mis/disinformation. However, most discussion in relation to definitions distinguishes between the two based on the presence or absence of intention. Generally, disinformation has been categorised as the 'deliberate spread of misleading information, crafted to deceive or manipulate' while misinformation is defined as the 'spreading of false information without intent'.
1.18The Australian Electoral Commission's Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce has defined misinformation and disinformation as follows:
Disinformation: 'knowingly false information designed to deliberately mislead and influence public opinion or obscure the truth for malicious or deceptive purposes'.
Misinformation: 'false information that is spread due to ignorance, or by error or mistake, without the intent to deceive'.
1.19In other words, both definitions relate to the spreading of false information 'but only disinformation is wrong on purpose'. According to the United Nations Development Programme, unlike 'misinformation, which can often be corrected through education and better communication, disinformation is more difficult to address and requires targeted efforts to expose and counter the deliberate falsehoods being spread'.
1.20The Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) has noted that the issue of disinformation is not just about false information, as it also involves the deliberate manipulation of public discourse:
Disinformation campaigns (often coordinated, and sometimes foreign-backed) exploit digital platforms to spread doubt and weaken democratic engagement on important topics like climate action.
1.21Both types of false information can be found across all issues that are discussed in the digital town square—that is made up of social media and online discourse. Indeed, mis/disinformation can cover issues as diverse as health, law and order, celebrities, product advice, parenting, current events and climate change. Information integrity concerns both how information is produced, and what happens to that information once it is published and spread outside the editorial control of its authors.
1.22The Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation (theCode), an industry code developed by the Digital Industry Group Inc. (DIGI), defines misinformation as digital content that is:
verifiably false or misleading or deceptive;
propagated by users of digital platforms; and
reasonably likely (but may not be clearly intended to) cause harm through dissemination.
1.23The Code also defines the following aspects of disinformation as digital content:
that is verifiably false or misleading or deceptive;
propagated among users of digital platforms via inauthentic behaviour (which includes spam and other forms of deceptive, manipulative, bulk or aggressive behaviours); and
which is reasonably likely to cause harm if it is disseminated.
1.24Additionally, the Code defines harm as that which poses 'a credible and serious threat to democratic political and policymaking processes such as voter fraud, voter interference, voting misinformation; or public goods such as the protection of citizens' health, protection of marginalised or vulnerable groups, public safety and security or the environment'.
1.25Some submitters to the inquiry, such as Independent Engineers, Scientists and Professionals, argued that blunt definitions of mis/disinformation 'lack any explanation of how truth is determined, which is imperative for identification and evaluation of misinformation and disinformation'. They further noted that 'significant differences among people as to what constitutes truth, makes proposed approaches to "combating misinformation and disinformation" highly contestable'.
1.26The AHRC considered that mis/disinformation 'are distinct from controversial or unpopular opinions. A healthy democracy depends on the ability to challenge dominant narratives and engage in robust debate'. The AHRC noted that the challenge in this space 'is to navigate this distinction carefully' and to ensure 'that efforts to counter mis/disinformation do not inadvertently suppress diverse viewpoints or critical discourse'.
1.27Research conducted by Resolve Strategic in 2022 indicated a lack of consensus in Australia on the meaning of 'misinformation'. Further, 'Australians' assessment of whether material concerning politically contentious topics such as the effects of climate change, is misinformation or truthful is sharply divided, according to their allegiance to different political parties'.
1.28In general, people's perceptions of misinformation are very loose, and are often tied to their identities and beliefs, rather than determined via vigorous fact-checking. For example, research cited by DIGI suggests that people who are most likely to interact with and share misinformation typically already agree with its advocated political stance. The Australian Energy Infrastructure Commissioner also told the committee that people tended to 'gravitate towards information that they trust' and that 'people pick and choose what sort of information resonates with them'.
1.29Dr John Cook, an expert from the University of Melbourne, noted that one 'working definition for misinformation is any argument or information that conflicts with the best available evidence and experts'. However, another approach involves 'assessing the presence of misleading rhetorical techniques and fallacies in misinformation'. Examples Dr Cook gave of misinformation included questions about the science and the impact of climate change; information casting doubt about solutions and attempts to reduce emissions; and attacks on scientists and anyone supporting climate action with the aim of eroding public trust in climate science and discrediting scientists, including by casting them as biased and partisan.
1.30The different ways in which climate change and energy-related mis/disinformation is spread is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
International context
1.31The issue of mis/disinformation has increasingly been raised at the international level, particularly in relation to climate science and mitigation efforts. Forexample, several organisations/political bodies have highlighted the challenges of addressing mis/disinformation, including the:
World Economic Forum (WEF);
International Panel on the Information Environment (IPIE); and
United States (US) House Oversight and US Senate Budget Committee.
WEF Global Risks Reports
1.32The WEF annual Global Risk Report identifies and analyses the most significant threats to the world over the short and long term, analysing geopolitical, environmental, societal and technological domains.
1.33In both 2024 and 2025, the Global Risk Report identified mis/disinformation across all subject areas as the biggest short-term risk (spanning the next two years), while extreme weather events were ranked second. In the long-term rankings, matters relevant to climate change (extreme weather events, critical change to Earth's systems, biodiversity loss and natural resource shortages) ranked as the top four risks for both reports. This is shown in Figure 1.1 below.
Figure 1.1Global risks: 2025
Source: World Economic Forum: The Global Risks Report 2025, p. 8.
1.34The 2025 report also noted that efforts to combat mis/disinformation are being made more difficult with the increased use of AI which can generate 'false or misleading content that can be produced and distributed at scale'.
IPIE report on information integrity about climate science
1.35The IPIE is an independent and global science organization providing scientific knowledge about the health of the world's information environment. The IPIE provides 'actionable scientific assessments about threats to the information environment, including AI bias, algorithmic manipulation, and disinformation' that can be used by policymakers, industry, and civil society.
1.36In June 2025, the IPIE released its report Information Integrity about Climate Science. The report found that the global response to climate change is being obstructed and delayed by the production and circulation of misleading information about the nature of climate change and the available solutions.
1.37Its findings indicated that powerful actors—including corporations, governments, and political parties—intentionally spread false or misleading narratives about anthropogenic climate change. These narratives circulate across digital, broadcast, and interpersonal communication channels. The report argued that this results in a decline in public trust, diminished policy coordination, and a feedback loop between scientific denialism and political inaction.
1.38The report also noted that the primary actors behind these false and misleading narratives 'have been powerful economic and political interests, from fossil fuel companies to governments and nation-states' and that these actors create alliances to 'obstruct and delay timely climate action'. This is aided by 'scientific hired hands', described as pseudo-experts or quasi-scientists, who aid the dissemination of fringe or partisan claims with a weak scientific basis. The report recommended further research into the activities of these actors and the alliances, particularly in the Global South.
1.39While social media and digital communication is a key source of thesefalse and misleading narratives, the report also noted that traditional media is also implicated, particularly in the Global South.
Denial, Disinformation, and Doublespeak: Big Oil's Evolving Efforts to Avoid Accountability for Climate Change
1.40In April 2024, US Congressman Jamie Raskin and US Senator Sheldon Whitehouse released a joint staff report Denial, Disinformation, and Doublespeak: Big Oil's Evolving Efforts to Avoid Accountability for Climate Change. The report was the result of a three-year investigation by Democratic Party staff in the US House Oversight and US Senate Budget Committee.
1.41The report explores the efforts large fossil fuel companies—including ExxonMobil, Chevron Corporation and Shell—allegedly undertake to deceive the public and investors about the effect of fossil fuels on climate change and how they undermine efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
1.42Key observations within the report include:
Fossil fuel companies have understood the effects of fossil fuels on the climate since at least the 1960s but have worked to undermine public understanding of this.
The campaign against climate action waged by these companies has evolved from outright denial of climate change to undermining action using a playbook of deception and disinformation.
The fossil fuel industry uses intermediaries like trade associations and thinktanks to spread false and misleading narratives against climate action.
The industry strategically partners with universities to lend credibility to its deception campaigns while silencing or attacking opposing voices.
1.43The report did not make recommendations, but noted that the investigation and report had 'set out new evidence about the extent of the fossil fuel industry's evolving efforts to avoid accountability for climate change' and concluded that it was 'long past time to hold Big Oil accountable for its deception campaign and to take action to undo the harms it has perpetrated'.
Previous inquiries of relevance in Australia
1.44While previous parliamentary committees in Australia have not directly inquired into matters regarding climate change information and integrity, other inquiries relating to climate change and general misinformation are relevant.
Senate Inquiry into Offshore Wind Industry Consultation Process
1.45On 3 July 2024, the Senate referred an inquiry into the offshore wind industry consultation process to the Senate Standing Committee on Environment and Communications. The committee tabled its report on 5 June 2025.
1.46The report found that bad faith actors had weaponised mis/disinformation to exacerbate community concerns and resistance to offshore wind. In particular, mis/disinformation about the effect of wind turbines on ocean life was said to have circulated through posts on social media platforms, thus amplifying community opposition and creating polarisation. The report highlighted links between this mis/disinformation and fossil fuel companies.
1.47Recommendation four of the report states that 'the Australian Government and DCCEEW [the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water] [should] proactively ensure that foreign actors, spam engagement, and misinformation and disinformation do not overpower local community voices from being heard in local public debate'.
Senate Inquiry into Greenwashing
1.48On 29 March 2023, the Senate referred an inquiry into greenwashing to the Senate Standing Committee on Environment and Communications. The committee is expected to table its report on 25 June 2026.
1.49Of particular relevance to this committee are the terms of reference for the greenwashing inquiry, which include the impact of misleading environmental and sustainability claims on consumers.
Inquiry into the Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill 2024
1.50On 19 September 2024, the Senate referred the provisions of the Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill 2024 (the bill) to the Environment and Communications Legislation Committee.
1.51The bill would have provided the Australian Communications and Media Authority with new regulatory powers to require digital communications platform providers to take steps to manage the risk that mis/disinformation on digital communications platforms pose in Australia. These would include obligations on providers to assess and report on risks relating to mis/disinformation, to publish their policy in relation to managing mis/disinformation and develop and publish a media literacy plan.
1.52The report for the bill's inquiry was tabled on 25 November 2024. In tabling the report, the Senate agreed to the committee's sole recommendation that the bill be withdrawn and immediately discharged from the notice paper. This withdrawal was due to the bill's unlikely prospects of passing the Senate and the government's position not to proceed with the bill as advised by a letter to the Chair from the (now former) Minister for Communications, the Hon Michelle Rowland MP.
Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media
1.53On 24 November 2022, the Senate resolved to establish a Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media to inquire into and report on the risk posed to Australia's democracy by foreign interference through social media.
1.54The committee handed down its final report on 1 August 2023. The report found that platforms like TikTok, WeChat and others have the potential to be exploited by foreign state actors to covertly influence Australian political discourse, undermine democratic processes, and harvest data.It highlighted emerging risks such as 'foreign-interference-as-a-service' and noted that Australia's fragmented governance on this issue made it more vulnerable.
1.55The report called for strict transparency requirements for large social media companies—such as having an Australian legal presence, labelling state-affiliated media, and disclosing government content directives—with penalties including fines or bans for non-compliance. It also recommended clearer reporting pathways, stronger agency coordination, and measures that balance free expression with safeguarding democracy from authoritarian influence.
Joint Select Committee on Social Media and Australian Society
1.56The Joint Select Committee on Social Media and Australian Society made its final report, Social media: the good, the bad, and the ugly, in November 2024. The report noted that 'the broader online environment is a highly complex space that requires a complex regulatory response'.
1.57While generally focusing on the harms caused to individuals by social media, the committee was of the view that social media platforms 'are actively choosing not to provide the same levels of protections for users, transparency, and accountability mechanisms in Australia that they do in other jurisdictions' and thus are 'rapidly diluting their social licence to operate in Australia'.
1.58Recommendations of that committee relevant to this inquiry include:
amending regulation and legislation, to effectively bring digital platforms under Australian jurisdiction;
legislative provisions to enable effective, mandatory data access for independent researchers and public interest organisations, and an auditing process by appropriate regulators; and
legislative provisions requiring social media platforms to have a transparent complaints mechanism that incorporates a right of appeal process for complainants that is robust and fair.