4.1
There were a number of other matters raised in evidence to the committee which are important to Australia’s strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. These issues included labour and human rights, health security, environment and climate change, critical minerals, science and technology, and the Northern Territory’s role in the region.
Human rights and labour issues
4.2
Several submissions and witnesses commented on human rights and labour issues in the Indo-Pacific region and what they perceived as opportunities for Australia to engage with the regional architecture to further address these matters.
Hong Kong
4.3
Mr Ted Hui, appearing in a private capacity, reflected on his experience as a former legislator in Hong Kong, now living in exile in Australia:
I believe I'll absolutely be arrested right at the border if I go back to Hong Kong because of my support in the freedom movements in Hong Kong in the past, and also for doing international lobbying and advocating for Hong Kong's freedom and democracy, asking for sanctions over Hong Kong...[and,] with the national security law, they can also strip all my assets. They are already doing it, asking banks like HSBC to freeze all my assets—not only mine but my whole family's assets. This is what the regime is doing to us democrats and dissidents and former pro-democracy politicians…
[Threats and intimidation by the Chinese government are] happening directly not only to me as a former legislator, as a politician; it's happening to everyone, because when people make political comments, even on social media, they are closely monitored by the very mighty Beijing intelligence forces in Hong Kong. It affects all the professions—teachers, journalists… So the threat of China is extending to everyone, even people in Australia.
4.4
Mr Sam Goodman, a senior policy advisor at Hong Kong Watch, explained the impact of the human rights situation in Hong Kong and its implications for the broader region and Australia’s strategic interests:
China's dismantling of Hong Kong's autonomy and the ongoing crackdown within the city pose a challenge to Australia's values and undermine its strategic interests within the region for several reasons: first, it undermines the safety of Australians living within Hong Kong; second, it has created a wave of Hongkongers wishing to leave the city, some of whom have sought to move to Australia; third, it has wider ramifications for China's policy towards Taiwan and regional security; and fourth, it reinforces a pattern of belligerent behaviour from Beijing, which includes its trade sanctions on Australia.
4.5
Mr Hui also asserted that the human rights issues in Hong Kong were critical in terms of the safety, stability and strategic interests of Australia in the region and encouraged Australia to put the situation in Hong Kong on the agenda of upcoming institutional meetings like the G7 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Mr Hui explained:
This is important because this is a reassurance to allies and like-minded countries to join hands economically and also ideologically to counter the growing threat China is imposing not only on Hong Kong but to the world.
4.6
Similarly, Mr Goodman stated that Hong Kong Watch has called for
like-minded partners to work together:
…to coordinate statements; introduce lifeboat schemes; enact Magnitsky sanctions against Hong Kong and Chinese officials; suspend extradition treaties with Hong Kong and China; and encourage governments to support the creation of a UN [United Nations] special rapporteur.
4.7
Mr Goodman explained what has been done to date in coordinating a response:
While the Australian government has moved to suspend its extradition treaty with Hong Kong and introduce a lifeboat scheme for Hongkongers, others have not been so willing to act, for fear of upsetting China. The most vocal countries on the human rights crisis in Hong Kong within the region have been Taiwan, Japan and India, all of which have ongoing territorial disputes with China…We know that ASEAN has failed to muster any criticism of this draconian law, despite the Australian foreign minister attending a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers less than 24 hours before the law came into force…One sign of hope has been the increased coordination of statements and action amongst the Five Eyes partners, with several statements issued by the foreign ministers of the Five Eyes countries regarding the ongoing crackdown, all countries suspending their extradition treaties with Hong Kong and four out of five of the Five Eyes countries offering schemes to assist Hong Kongers to resettle.
4.8
Additionally, in its submission, Hong Kong Watch suggested that the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) could be a useful avenue for Australia to take stronger measures in conjunction with regional partners, stating:
Hong Kong Watch believes that the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) between Australia, USA, Japan, and India could form an important bulwark against Beijing’s encroachment in the region, including in Hong Kong. Through Australia’s membership of the QUAD and the Five Eyes, Hong Kong Watch believes the Australian Government could do more to respond to the crisis in Hong Kong.
4.9
Mr Goodman explained further:
Given the shared strategic interests and common concern all four countries have shown towards the human rights crisis in Hong Kong, we believe the Quad is an important vehicle to coordinate common responses across the region. We urge Australia to champion the creation of a Hong Kong working group amongst ministers of the Quad to further assess how the four countries can respond to the crisis in the city.
4.10
Hong Kong Watch summarised its position that Australia could do more to respond to the human rights crisis in Hong Kong in providing the following recommendations in it submission:
1. Working with likeminded partners in the region to coordinate targeted sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong officials guilty of human rights abuses;
2. Working with likeminded partners, particularly those in the QUAD and Five Eyes, to ensure Hong Kongers have a lifeline out of the city;
3. Given Australia’s attendance at the G7 meeting taking place in the UK [United Kingdom] next month, Ministers should ensure that Hong Kong is on the G7 agenda and use the expanded format as an opportunity to agree coordinated action including pushing for the creation of a UN Special Rapporteur/ Envoy for Hong Kong; and
4. The Australian Government should consider an entities list for companies complicit in human rights violations.
4.11
In addition to the human rights issues in Hong Kong, labour rights were also commented on including trade unions being disbanded and workers’ rights being curtailed. Mr Hui explained that organisations like teachers unions:
…are the largest organisations in support of Hong Kong’s freedom and democracy. They are the most organised. They have the access. They have the power to mobilise people. That’s why they are the most targeted.
4.12
Mr Goodman added the point that ‘trade unionism is guaranteed under Hong Kong's constitution and under the basic law. So China forcibly closing the teachers union is a violation of its obligations under the Sino-British treaty which is lodged at the UN.’ Mr Goodman further explained:
I think it is also worth pointing out that, at the beginning of the pandemic, it was health workers and trade union workers who went on strike to encourage Hong Kong to close its border with mainland China to limit the spread of COVID. In retaliation, they were threatened with severance of their pay. They were threatened that they were going to be fired. So the clampdown on trade unions is not something new that's happened overnight. There has been a continual drift…
One additional point about the strategy of closing down civil society and the teachers union is it first started with an op-ed in China Daily, which was a mouthpiece attacking the teachers union. Then the Hong Kong government disaffiliated from the teachers union and it was forced to close down. This week we have seen similar soundings about the Hong Kong Law Society, where, again, China Daily has attacked them. Carrie Lam, the Hong Kong chief executive, has come out and told the Law Society that they now must stay out of politics or else they too may be closed down. So we are seeing a pattern of behaviour here that reinforces the fact that, firstly, the Hong Kong government has no autonomy; it is increasingly clear that Beijing runs the city. Secondly, there is a lot of signalling going on in the propaganda press of Beijing that is putting pressure on civil society groups to disband.
Myanmar
4.13
Mr Richard Smith, Co-Chair of the Australian Member Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (Aus-CSCAP), commented on the human rights issues in Myanmar and what he perceived as the ineffective regional responses to date:
I think Myanmar has been a very significant issue in itself, because of the focus that it puts on the approach to human rights and civil rights issues. As I see it, neither approach—neither the ASEAN softly, softly approach, if you like, nor the much tougher EU and US approach—has had any effect whatsoever. I don't know what factors are involved in the government's decision to position itself where it has, as it were, between there. It may be related to specific Australian interests and individuals in Myanmar…But it does seem to me extraordinarily frustrating in the sense that neither approach is achieving anything. The ASEAN has appointed a deputy foreign minister of Brunei to be their envoy to the Myanmar regime, but whether we can expect any progress from that, I'm frankly doubtful. So I really can't judge what an effective policy would be in this area. Making bold statements would certainly make a lot of us feel a lot better, but I doubt that it would make any difference on the ground.
4.14
However, Professor Anthony Milner, Co-Chair of the Aus-CSCAP, submitted:
I think it is true that, in bringing Myanmar towards civilian government rather than military government, ASEAN did play a constructive role. We're all frustrated now that nothing seems to be working, but nevertheless the ASEAN record in Myanmar deserves a bit of respect, I think.
4.15
Mr Peter Jennings, Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, indicated that from his perspective, ‘ASEAN's failure to deal with the military takeover in Myanmar’ is an example of how ‘ASEAN has been a very disappointing instrument.’
4.16
Dr Lavina Lee, a senior lecturer at the Macquarie University, commented on what sensitivities may be present in preventing Australia from being more active and outspoken on the human rights issues being faced in Myanmar:
I'm not an expert on Myanmar, but I actually think that it's not so much ASEAN or our sensitivities to ASEAN holding us back; it's more our worries and anxieties about pushing the Myanmar junta more towards China. It's just one of those difficult situations where, yes, I think we should be more vocal in criticising the regime and the crackdown on civilians but, at the same time, we don't want to be so severe that we close off opportunities to engage with them and try to influence them, because if you ostracise them you actually have no levers over them anymore. If you give them nothing, they've got nothing to lose by not listening to you. In that particular instance, I know you're interested in what we can do to help the human rights situation and restore democracy there. I think, on a rhetorical level, we could definitely do more to criticise what's going on on the ground there, but there's always that delicate balance, from the broader geostrategic picture, that we don't want Myanmar to be a client state, effectively, of China..
India
4.17
The Humanism Project’s submission raised various human rights concerns in relation to India, describing 'ongoing religion-based discrimination, authoritarian nationalism and attack[s] on human rights and democratic dissent' in the country. It urged Australia to be more active in relation to these concerns:
Australia considers India a geopolitical and economic partner in a rapidly changing Indo-Pacific region, seeing it as the only country that can counter China’s growing economic power. Australia believes in a democratic value-based partnership with India for strengthening trade relations between the two nations, however takes a selective view of India’s human rights violations by calling them India’s internal matters in a bid for good relations. At the same time Australia was quick to condemn the killing of protestors in Hong Kong in 2019 and regularly condemns the human rights abuses that the Uighur and other minorities suffer[ing] under the current Chinese regime.
Set against the backdrop of India’s escalating problems, Australia’s silence can be interpreted as complicity in human rights violations in the
Indo-Pacific. It can affect the future of a values-based relationship between the two countries.
4.18
Dr Angana Chatterji, a scholar of South Asia, explained the impact of the Indian Government’s nationalist agenda on democracy and human rights in India:
The Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] is reordering the basis of India statehood. Exclusionary politics posits difference as antinational, igniting the fault lines of India's already conflicted democracy…
Dissenting student activists, public intellectuals, civil society advocates, media persons, lawyers, scholars, teachers, women, minorities and allies are deemed 'antinational'. Many are detained, imprisoned on reportedly specious charges.
4.19
In addition, ‘[w]ith the objective of altering the basis of Indian citizenship, the BJP government passed the Citizenship (Amendment) Act of 2019 and determined to commence an all-India National Register of Citizens [NRC].’
Dr Chatterji explained that ‘[t]hose at risk of loss of citizenship include tribal, indigenous, ethnic and minority communities’:
The onslaught of nationalisation dispossesses Adivasis and Dalits of their ancestral lands. Forcible conversions to Hinduism and obstruction of the right of individuals to convert from Hinduism jeopardise the religious freedom of Christians…
The government of India's militarised rule and colonial relations to Kashmir are fostered through impunity laws, atrocities, suppression, lockdowns, and political, religious, legal and academic unfreedoms. The state removed certain legal barriers to permanent residency for
non-Kashmiris in order to politically reconstitute Muslim-majority Kashmir's demographics and render Muslims a minority…
Gendered, Islamophobic and racialised, [the BJP’s] impact on Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, Adivasis, Dalits and other caste-oppressed groups, and LGBTQIA communities and their allies, is staggering.
4.20
Dr Chatterji asked the committee ‘do you recognise this India? Will the international community acquiesce to this illiberal new order?’ Noting that ‘[w]ide bilateral cooperation focuses on issues of security and terrorism, as does regional cooperation,’ she asked that Australia act ‘urgently and concomitantly prioritise accountability.’ Furthermore, Dr Chatterji asserted that the situation in India is ‘well beyond, 'Should we raise this?' or 'Can we overlook it?' It is at a stage where it is incredibly serious and needs to be taken into account.’
4.21
Dr Ruchira Talukdar, a researcher in environmental regulations and environment-related human rights issues, commented on the scope for Australia to utilise the Quad, given that India is a partner in the relationship, to address the human rights issues in India:
I see it as an opportunity for Australia to be able to call out on the lapses of democracy in India. Australia has forever maintained that its relationships with its neighbours, particularly with India, are based on democratic values. It sees India as an emerging democratic super power and sees the compatibility with India, based on its democratic values. So it is in Australia's interests and the interests of the relationships it's forging through the Quad to be able to, while building trade relationships with India, talk about and bring to notice the lapses in democracy in India…But I must point out that Australia has been pointing out human rights violations in Hong Kong, whereas it has, in a way, turned a blind eye to human rights violations, draconian laws, crackdown on civil society in India. It perhaps does not stand to the interest of Australia and India's long-term relationship, specifically when Australia says it is based on democratic values. So, yes, I would say that it's a good opportunity for Australia to also be raising the issue of lapses of democracy in India while it strengthens its relationships with India.
4.22
Similarly, Mr Jennings also saw an opportunity for Australia to encourage democracy and human rights in India through such avenues as the Quad, albeit through more subtle messaging:
I guess in Australia's message to India, which hopefully we could deliver in a subtle and intelligent way, would be to say that the path to global greatness for India really should be built on a foundation of a strong regard for human rights internally. I think that that's really part of India's own democratic journey. If India is going to emerge as a powerful voice in international affairs, let's encourage them to do that on the basis of being a strong defender and respecter of human rights. So that is a message that Quad countries could make, and probably the best way to do that would be in those closed-door conversations which governments like so much. Really, the message is don't let yourself slide into a situation like China, because that's not going to win friends around the world and it's going to make it much harder for other countries to cooperate with you.
Opportunities to address labour and human rights issues
4.23
Mr Smith conceded that ‘I don't think that the mechanisms for addressing human rights across the region are very strong at all. Regrettably, they barely exist.’ Indeed, there is ‘not a great appetite, as I see it, among regional countries to address them. They are still very attached to issues of their own sovereignty and too defensive about that. They see a discussion of human rights as being intrusive…’
4.24
Furthermore, Professor Milner added:
We have to keep in mind that for this complex region, with its complex religious and historical background and so forth, human rights discourse is relatively new…Labour rights and human rights are being discussed, but there is certainly resistance to interference. One of the deepest traditions in the region is noninterference with your internal matters. I think we just have to acknowledge that the countries around us do not share our history and culture.
4.25
Dr Lee noted Australia’s tendency towards caution in speaking out on human rights in the region:
Australia has always been very reluctant, I think, to overtly promote democracy. In the foreign policy white paper they talk about not wanting to impose our values on others. And I think we have to be quite careful in the region, because we've got so many countries in South-East Asia that we're effectively trying to court. We don't want them to choose China. We'd rather they sit on the fence than actively choose China. We'd rather they choose us, but it's unclear whether they'll do that. Perhaps the best we can hope for is that they remain neutral. And we don't want to antagonise them by overtly forcing down their throats human-rights-type rhetoric.
4.26
Aus-CSCAP warned ‘we must be very wary of overestimating our importance in the region’ and noted that Australia has made some positive contributions when working one-on-one with countries such as Cambodia and Indonesia, for example. However, according to Aus-CSCAP, it seems to be a case of ‘moving quite subtly in the region, to be realistic about our power to do good but nevertheless keep patiently attempting to do so.’
4.27
Mr Jennings pointed out that ‘as a country, Australia needs to decide to be a strong champion of human rights in all of its international relationships. We've rather allowed that focus to sort of ebb away out of a kind of a pragmatic decision’ as it may effect trade, for example, with certain countries. He noted that Australia has had ‘closed-door conversations but how effective they've been over the last few years, I would really question.’
4.28
Dr Thomas Wilkins, a senior lecturer at the University of Sydney, submitted that there had been some vocalisation of support for human rights within the trilateral relationship between Australia, Japan and the United States through statements on a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ where they ‘list democracy, freedom and free trade, but they also put human rights in there.’ He did, however, question the practical outcomes of these assertions, stating:
Actually, Japan and Australia have gone on record in their joint declarations to criticise human rights abuses in China—in Xinjiang, in Hong Kong and so forth—so they're now able to use some of these mechanisms, either the Japan strategic partnership or alongside the United States, to at least assert those claims. I don't know how much of a practical result those achieve, but certainly the rhetoric in stating Australia's position is an important aspect of those engagements.
4.29
Dr David Envall, a senior lecturer at the Australian National University, described Japan as a ‘leading player’ where, through its Partnership for Quality Infrastructure and through its leadership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP), it has been able to:
…leverage its influence from one institutional mechanism to push these kinds of norms—democratic human rights and developmental norms, because Japan has been a leader in human security for a long time—into other institutions and, in a way, diffuse these kinds of ideas. That's an important part of an incremental development of the regional order.
4.30
Dr Lee asserted that the Quad has the potential to provide a platform for ‘promoting human rights, democratic norms and open economic systems’ through an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure standard which supports democratic institutions in the region. She explained that ‘the missing piece of the Quad so far is a quadrilaterally based infrastructure fund that can, in effect, compete with the BRI…’ and by getting South-East Asian countries to buy into that ‘they're buying into the rules and the standards and supporting this free and open Indo-Pacific. If we don't have that, we're just talking at the level of rhetoric.’
4.31
Additionally, in its submission, the US Embassy stated that the US-Australia alliance ‘is a force for good in the world’ and that the alliance is central to many vital regional groupings, including the Quad. It emphasised:
The United States and Australia's common vision of a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-Pacific requires respect for international rules, commitment to human rights, and a dedication to combatting corruption. We are confident that strong democracies—with their dedication to vibrant civil societies, robust political participation, freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, and open and transparent governance—are uniquely positioned to deliver that common vision for their people and for the region as a whole.
Regional cooperation on health security
4.32
Some submitters raised the importance of health security in the region and discussed existing and additional opportunities for regional cooperation. In particular, the regional response to the COVID-19 pandemic was mentioned.
4.33
The Department of Defence (Defence) underscored the importance of regional cooperation on health security as highlighted by the challenges revealed by the COVID-19 pandemic, stating:
On health security—vaccine supply more broadly—the pandemic has underlined that we face global health and environmental challenges that will require greater international cooperation and also that that kind of cooperation is more difficult in an era of strategic competition. What should have been an avenue for global cooperation is instead in some cases, unfortunately, being a tool of strategic competition. The attempt to place conditions around the supply of vaccines or other forms of health support I think is a worrying trend and something that we want to work against in international fora and in the subject of today's discussion, which is existing regional architecture. We want to underline that the provision of health assistance should be done without conditions…
4.34
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) advised that it works ‘through the regional architecture of ASEAN in South-East Asia and the Pacific Islands Forum in the Pacific’ to address issues around health security and vaccines.
4.35
DFAT further explained that Australia is:
…supporting ASEAN to play a central role in health security and economic recovery in Southeast Asia. Australia has pivoted our suite of ASEAN-Australia development initiatives to address COVID-19-related priorities under the Partnerships for Recovery Framework, namely health security, stability and economic recovery. In 2020, Prime Minister Morrison announced $500 million in a package of economic, development and security measures to support Southeast Asia’s recovery from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.
4.36
On 23 September 2021 in Washington, in a Statement to the President's Global Summit to End COVID-19, Prime Minister Scott Morrison provided an update on Australia’s provision of vaccines to the region, announcing the supply of additional vaccines:
At the G7 in June, I committed to sharing 20 million vaccine doses with our region. We have already delivered more than 3.2 million of those. This complements our commitment of $623.2 million to help our Indo-Pacific neighbours access vaccines and support national vaccine roll-outs. We’ve provided 4,000 ventilators, almost 2,000 oxygen concentrators, and
106 tonnes of PPE [personal protective equipment], medical equipment and supplies to the Indo-Pacific.
I’m pleased to announce today that Australia will share a further
20 million doses, and procure up to another 20 million doses beyond that. That’s up to 60 million vaccine doses for our region, between now and the end of 2022.
We’re also looking to the next phase of recovery. Supporting research and development, and genomic surveillance. Strengthening our global health system to better respond to future threats. Working through multilateral processes to mobilise political commitment and resourcing, and to reform global health architecture to make it fit for purpose.
Australia’s commitments will be met transparently and accountably, with no strings attached.
4.37
Additionally, the US Embassy highlighted the Quad’s Vaccine Partnership, stating:
The Quad Vaccine Partnership is a tangible example of collaboration among Quad countries, in which partners are drawing on their respective strengths to collaboratively expand manufacturing and distribution of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines. Quad leaders are working to strengthen equitable vaccine access for the Indo-Pacific, with close coordination with multilateral organizations including the World Health Organization and COVAX.
4.38
Ambassador Yamagami commented on Japan and Australia’s cooperation in supporting the region through vaccine assistance to address the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic:
Australia and Japan together are providing our support to other countries. In the case of Japan, we have decided to extend financial contributions with A$1.3 billion on top of 30 million doses of vaccines manufactured in Japan. So, all in all, both Australia and Japan are doing as much as possible in terms of helping our partners in South-East Asia and the Pacific island countries. Nothing is adequate. I'm in daily contact with ambassadors of those countries in terms of how we can better help those countries, but I think there is a lot Australia and Japan can do together on this front.
Using existing regional architecture to address issues associated with climate change and the environment
4.39
The committee received some evidence on environmental issues in the
Indo-Pacific region with submitters recommending that Australia draw on existing regional architecture to broaden its human security agenda to include a greater focus on environmental and climate security. Some submitters also commented on how existing regional architecture is being used in this space.
4.40
Beyond diplomacy and military security in the Indo-Pacific region,
Mr Jennings suggested that Australia should also be ‘pursuing a broader security agenda,’ stating:
Yes, military security and military power is a core issue, and we could talk more about what might need to be done in that respect, but I think there's a broader agenda of health security, human security and climate security. It would be nice to find ways to have an intelligent discussion about climate security with South-East Asian countries, because South-East Asia is going to emerge as a hotspot for the climate related problems that we're all going to have to be dealing with in the future. So I think there's a big agenda out there. I don't think we're that well placed. I think we've been a little too overconfident that Australian decency and historical relationships will sort of carry us through, whereas we're in a period where we've got to do some fundamental rethinking about how we engage with the region and the sources of our power to make that possible.
4.41
Dr Talukdar raised concerns about India’s environmental record and explained that Australia should take these issues into account because Australia ‘is committed to building a democratic values based relationship with India.’ Dr Talukdar outlined four areas of concern:
The first is a dilution of environmental regulations. In 2020, the Indian government proposed sweeping changes to the environment impact assessment…[which] is out of sync with international law. It violates the basic tenets of public participation impact assessment for primary projects.
The second area of concern is weakening land and forest rights, and violating consent of India's indigenous people…through provisions surrounding public consultation and consent for mining projects from Adivasi communities and…[t]here has been a delay and a withholding of forest rights to nearly 5.3 million Adivasi indigenous families.
The third area of concern is targeting environmental defenders… Draconian laws have been used to curb movements and organisations.
…
The weakening of rights and regulations has benefited private corporations. It is widely regarded that the special relationship of the Adani Group and a handful of other business conglomerations with the ruling party have broken earlier bounds of what passed as acceptable crony capitalism in India. Adani has emerged as one of the biggest beneficiaries of the Modi government's massive drive to privatise public assets…The case of the Adani Group epitomises India's environment-related human rights problems. This problem deserves a critical response from Australia in order to make its partnership with India truly based on democratic values.
4.42
In its submission, the US Embassy emphasised the importance of addressing climate change issues in the region and suggested that Australia and the United States should work together:
The climate crisis poses serious short, medium, and long-term challenges for countries throughout the Indo-Pacific region, nowhere more so than in the Pacific. Climate change is a critical area where the United States and Australia are well placed to work together, to help each other and our Pacific neighbors face these challenges effectively, and to demonstrate leadership in the region to enhance implementation of the Paris Agreement, including by making ambitious efforts to reduce our own respective national emissions to help get the world on track to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. The United States has put forward a nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement to reduce emissions 50 to 52 percent below 2005 levels by 2030, and we invite Australia to match our level of ambition over the coming decade...Combatting climate change requires concerted effort and increased ambition to reduce greenhouse emissions.
4.43
Mr Jennings noted the announcement that came out of the Quad virtual leaders’ meeting in March 2021 of a climate working group.
4.44
On climate change issues, DFAT referred to its cooperation with ASEAN which covers a breadth of human security priorities, including climate change.
4.45
The Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources (DISER) also provided evidence that ‘Australia has well-established relationships with ASEAN member states through DISER's climate change capacity building programs.’
4.46
Additionally, as mentioned in Chapter 2, DFAT noted Australia’s Pacific
Step-up program and its commitment to engage with Pacific nations on environmental security:
The security pillar of Australia’s Pacific Step-up reinforces the Boe Declaration on Regional Security (adopted by leaders in 2008). The Boe Declaration recognises the importance of human and environmental security for a stable Pacific and highlights the need to address the threat posed by climate change.
Critical minerals and Australia's strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific
4.47
The Australasian Institute for Mining and Metallurgy (AusIMM) raised the issue of critical minerals and its importance for Australia’s strategic interests in the region.
4.48
In its submission, AusIMM explained:
Critical minerals are vital in driving global development, are essential ingredients for emerging energy, defence, communications, and transport technologies, and are crucial for regional security and supply chain resilience.
The resources sector in the region can build on a substantial minerals endowment and world-class research, training, engineering, and technical capabilities to move up the value chain into the advanced manufacturing of battery precursor chemicals and finished battery products. Australia is the world's largest producer of lithium concentrates and mine and process other battery metals, including nickel, cobalt, aluminium, vanadium, graphite, manganese, uranium, and rare earth elements.
Growing global demand for critical minerals is a unique opportunity for Australia's strategic regional engagement.
4.49
AusIMM sees that there is a ‘fundamental role of technical and professional leadership’ in advancing Australia's strategic interests through strategic cooperation across the Indo-Pacific in areas such as critical minerals, stating:
The opportunity for deepening cooperation between regional security partners is address[ed] through the resource sector's economic and social contributions across the region, which we see as a critical mechanism of Australia's soft power across the Indo-Pacific region.
4.50
AusIMM also noted that:
Despite a well-respected global reputation for excellence, Australia can have an insular view of the mining industry tied to its economic contribution. Australia's mining companies operate significant overseas operations with substantial integration and movement of Australasian resources professionals throughout the Indo-Pacific.
4.51
The following recommendations were made by AusIMM in its submission:
Standards Leadership: Deepen regional engagement through Australia's global leading professional standards and best practice frameworks;
Investment: Facilitate investment through major regional conferences and forums to support continued innovation and expand downstream opportunities;
Regional Partnerships: Support the uptake of Australian resources processing, technology, automation, and capabilities in partnership with AusIMM as the peak body for resources professionals within the Australasian region;
Social Responsibility and Performance: Advance geostrategic leadership by championing the adoption of Australian Environmental, Social and Governance frameworks, competencies, and training;
Future Workforce: Augment existing regional partnerships to support skills development, professional mobility, and workforce sustainability in the region;
Strategic Focus: Engage Australian professional expertise in developing a strategic White Paper series on priority areas, including critical minerals; and
Disaster Management: Maintain an expert disaster management task force comprised of Australian resources sector professionals and experts, which is deployable to support regional disaster prevention and response efforts.
4.52
DISER noted Australia’s involvement in the Trilateral EU-US-Japan Conference on Critical Materials which is a forum that:
…facilitates information exchange on critical materials, including R&D [research and development] and the development of technologies of materials, trends in renewable energy, issues relating to the supply of rare earths and promoting collaborative efforts for securing stable supply of critical materials.
Australia’s bilateral engagement with a number of regional partners complements our work through regional forums to establish more diverse and sustainable global critical minerals supply chains.
Science and technology cooperation
4.53
A number of submissions raised the importance of regional cooperation and engagement on science and technology capabilities, including nuclear science, in the Indo-Pacific and emphasised that Australia should continue to actively support, invest and participate in the relevant regional architecture on these issues.
4.54
The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) submitted that 'Australia's engagement in regional nuclear science and technology architecture directly supports our national interests,' including by contributing to improved socio-economic development in key areas of regional importance such as human health and climate change, directly leading to a more stable and secure region.
4.55
DISER commented broadly on its engagement with regional mechanisms on science and technology capabilities, including nuclear science, and submitted that its:
…engagement through Indo-Pacific institutions, such as APEC
[Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation], ASEAN, the Pacific Islands Forum and the Quad, provides the opportunity to advance Australia's interests in climate; energy; resources, including critical minerals; industry, including cyber, space and critical technologies; science, including nuclear; metrology; intellectual property; and geoscience. DISER contributes scientific, technical and industry-specific expertise to discussions on Australia's strategic interests in these Indo-Pacific institutions. For example, under APEC, DISER supports the development of science and technology cooperation through our partnership at the APEC Policy Partnership on Science, Technology and Innovation subfora.
4.56
Specifically on nuclear science and technology, DISER described the role of its portfolio agency, ANTSO, in the region:
Through our portfolio agency ANSTO, Australia engages with a number of global and regional institutions on nuclear science and technology, such as through the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA. ANSTO is actively involved with many IAEA programs, particularly, in our region, the so-called South-East Asia and Pacific, SEAP, regional group. By participating in these programs, ANSTO demonstrates our regional leadership in nuclear science, which gives credence to Australia's claim to the SEAP group's one permanent seat on the Board of Governors, the chief policymaking body of the IAEA. This position gives Australia a strong policy voice on important nuclear issues, such as safeguards in Iran and the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea], as well as the safety of nuclear facilities broadly.
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In addition to the IAEA, ANSTO also noted Australia's involvement in several other regional and mulitilateral bodies involved in nuclear science and technology, including: the Regional Cooperative Agreement (RCA) for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific; the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA); and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
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ANSTO submitted that it is ‘vital that Australia continues to actively support and participate in these regional nuclear fora' and stated:
This support needs to be demonstrated through the effective application of our foreign policy assets and capabilities. Specifically, Australia needs to:
Continue policy support for key international and regional nuclear organisations such as the IAEA, including the RCA.
Reconfirm, and where needed, regularise Australia’s payment of contributions to key international nuclear organisations such as the IAEA. This includes the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund.
Where appropriate, consider making extra-budgetary contributions to key international and regional nuclear programmes such as the IAEA, RCA and FNCA on issues in which Australia has a significant interest.
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Mr Mark Alexander, International Affairs Manager at ANSTO, clarified that while:
Australia has always provided its contributions to that fund [the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund] on time and in full. There have been times when we've cut that a little close to the bone, but I would say it has always been put forward on time and in full. We fully encourage other member states to follow our example. There have been some other smaller,
extra-budgetary contributions over the years to fund specific programs of work that may be very targeted...There's always the opportunity to do more, but obviously that will depend on appropriate budgets and our budgetary restrictions.
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On cyber cooperation and technology, Defence stated:
…it is obvious, if you look at liberal democracies around the world, that they still have a decisive advantage when it comes to technology. The trick, however, is translating that advantage into forms of cooperation that can cross certain boundaries because really, when it comes to cyber, economies of scale matter. So it is about: how do we operationalise cooperation, particularly with our key partners like the United States, the UK and our other close European partners? That is especially so for partners that have similar views and outlooks around, for example: How should cyber be governed internationally? How do we ensure individual rights are protected? How do you ensure that the digital rules of the road in a modern economy are reflecting what we would argue to be democratic values? I think that's an important part of the process.
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On critical and emerging technology, DISER welcomed the announcement made in the Quad Leaders' Joint Statement in March 2021 of a new Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group which ‘presents opportunities for collaboration with Quad members on AI [artificial intelligence], quantum computing and critical technology and minerals and supply chain security.’
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At the hearing on 19 August 2021, DISER confirmed that the working group was up and running and that subgroups continue to meet on a rolling basis, noting ‘the subgroups' discussions so far have pointed to really valuable cooperation and information sharing between partners.’
Importance of Northern Australia in Australia's regional engagement
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The Northern Territory Government (NT Government) submitted that the Northern Territory has an important role to play in supporting Australia’s strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region.
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The NT Government stated that a stable and secure region is critical to ensure economic cooperation can occur, noting:
This benefits all who live in the region, not just Australians or Northern Territorians. This stability will be crucial for job growth, migration, international education exchanges, resilient supply chains and so on. The various regional fora play an important role to this stability by shaping and reinforcing international rules and values-based norms. The existing framework of dialogues and engagement should be further strengthened and developed, and the Northern Territory stands ready to support our national efforts where we can…
While a relatively small Australian jurisdiction with regards to population and economic and industrial base, the Territory plays an important supporting and enabling role in our regional architecture, especially in the defence and national security.
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In relation to the Northern Territory’s role in supporting Australia’s strategic security in the region, the NT Government submitted:
As we see an increasingly complex and contested geostrategic environment to our north, the Northern Territory will play a more important role in supporting our allies and partners for defence training, exercising, infrastructure support, maintenance and sustainment base and as a regional forward/rear operating base. There is an opportunity to further develop the Territory, and other parts of northern Australia, to form an 'Alliance Hub' that supports not only the Australian Defence Force, but also key allies such as the United States (US), United Kingdom and partners like India, Japan, Singapore, Republic of Korea and so on.
Northern Australia's value as an Alliance Hub is the supporting and enabling role to effectively train, sustain, and coordinate allied and partner nation military forces in a secure, yet geostrategic location. Growing state of the art ranges; port facilities; high-speed, reduced data latency and secure communications; cyber capabilities and partnerships; a sovereign space capability; and a growing industrial base make the Australian north a key piece of the strategic geography of the Indo-Pacific…
In addition to these areas, the Territory is also well positioned to become a more central player in regional efforts to counter a wide range of
non-defence security risks that go beyond the traditional concerns of defence and foreign policy. These may include pandemic management, humanitarian and disaster relief, border security and biosecurity.
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Specifically on the Quad, Mr Guy Boekenstein, Senior Director Defence and National Security, Department of the Chief Minister and Cabinet at the
NT Government, stated that the NT Government sees itself as:
…geographically at the centre of the Indo-Pacific and therefore the Quad. Our location in the region and equal distance between India and Japan as well as being close to the US forces in Korea and Japan place us nicely at the crossroads of the Quad…’
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The key issues identified in the NT Government’s submission included:
recommending that the Commonwealth Government leverage the Northern Territory's strategic partnerships to jointly support regional cooperation;
expressing support for the Commonwealth Government's approach to rules-based international order and initiatives to ensure stability in the
Indo-Pacific region, including the Pacific Step-Up Program;
welcoming the United States re-pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, including the Pacific Deterrence Initiative;
encouraging the Commonwealth Government to engage deeply with
Asia-Pacific neighbours, particularly Indonesia, noting the Indonesia-Australian Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement which came into force on 5 July 2020; and
expressing support for diplomatic efforts to build regional confidence (for example, a proposal to establish the Indo-Pacific Maritime Law Enforcement Centre in Darwin).