3.1
This chapter explores the evidence received in relation to the Indo-Pacific region including the challenges of the strategic environment and importance of cooperation in the region. It also considers the capability and complementarity of the existing regional architecture with a particular focus on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) due to the evidence received by the committee that focused on these two regional groupings.
Increasing challenges of the strategic environment
3.2
The Indo-Pacific has an increasingly challenging and complex strategic environment for Australia to navigate.
3.3
In its submission, the Australian Member Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (Aus-CSCAP) reflected on the changing strategic context in the Indo-Pacific:
Much of the existing architecture in the region was created in the 1980s and 1990s. The aims then were to ensure that the rapid economic growth enjoyed by key countries could be shared across the region with an accumulated benefit for all, and that regional security could be underpinned by cooperative approaches. These complementary objectives were widely shared by Asia-Pacific countries at the time, and were reflected in the institutions that were created and the way they worked.
Three decades on, the policy environment of the region has changed with sharper major power strategic competition and the idea of the Asia-Pacific region giving way to the wider Indo-Pacific.
3.4
In relation to what he described as ‘the more aggressive policies of the People's Republic of China,’ Mr Peter Jennings, Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, stated that most ‘countr[ies] in the Indo-Pacific region [are] trying to think about what their options are for dealing with this more assertive authoritarian power.’
3.5
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, noted China’s ‘rapid economic growth and increasing assertiveness’ in discussing the changing dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region and the challenges it presents for the strategic environment:
The dynamics of our region are changing rapidly as a constellation of nations charts new pathways—most obviously China with its rapid economic growth and increasing assertiveness. This is putting pressure on the system of international laws, rules and norms that have been carefully built over generations to keep states from transgressing upon the interests of others; and if we are to preserve a region in which the rights and sovereignty of all nations are respected, irrespective of their size or power, then it’s up to each of us to contribute to ensuring that while those rules and norms necessarily evolve with the times, they maintain the core principles that have long worked in the interests of all.
3.6
Dr Thomas Wilkins, a senior lecturer at the University of Sydney, gave an example of how the region’s strategic environment had been altered, stating:
China has been highly active in building its own institutions in order to shape regional architecture in its image. These include, amongst the most prominent, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative [BRI] and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation [SCO], a hybrid security-economic institution. It's also important to note that the BRI and the SCO reflect the blurring of economic and security functions and engage regionally on this basis.
3.7
Another change which could impact on the strategic environment in the
Indo-Pacific was identified by Mr Jennings, who suggested that the United States’ (the US) withdrawal from Afghanistan may have consequences for the region:
In my mind, this gives rise to a dangerous period. We have an America which is inward focused and really suffering from the experiences of what, frankly, has to be called a defeat in Afghanistan and we have a China which is desperate to prosecute its interests to Taiwan. I see the next few years as being a particularly dangerous period. What it requires is for the United States and its allies to shake off the Afghanistan experience and focus on what is going to be the big security issue of our time, which is stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
3.8
In addition, the Humanism Project pointed to the rising importance of India in the Indo-Pacific region, noting that ‘Australia considers India a geopolitical and economic partner in a rapidly changing Indo-Pacific region, seeing it as the only country that can counter China’s growing economic power.’
3.9
Dr David Envall, a senior lecturer at the Australian National University, explained the challenges for Australia as a result of recent changes in the region:
One of the things that Australia has struggled to do in recent years is calibrate its approach to the changing regional order, in that we've shifted very quickly from a position where there's denial that any strategic competition is underway to a very dark understanding of the region that war is almost inevitable in some ways. I think Australia needs to find a way to recalibrate its approach to achieve a middle ground between those two kinds of poles.
3.10
Aus-CSCAP argued that in some ways the changing strategic environment ‘enhances the value of existing architecture.’ The promotion of rival regional architecture and the sharpening competition between major powers in the region ‘threatens to divide the Indo-Pacific.’ Therefore, Aus-CSCAP stated:
…the emergence of the SCO and the Quad also highlights the importance of other, inclusive regional groupings—in which not some but all key regional players are present. We [Australia] have opportunities in such wide-membership meetings to gauge changing relationships and alignments—as well as to assist in moderating tensions. The more the region is divided the more important it is to promote such inclusive gatherings.
3.11
Mr Jennings pointed out that despite the ‘web of different multilateral organisations’ in the region:
The problem is that none of these were really designed to deal with an assertive and immensely powerful People's Republic of China. So the challenge we face today is: how can we gear ourselves more effectively to deal with that risk?
Importance of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region
3.12
Regional cooperation is central to the success of Australia's engagement and the regional architecture is a key tool for Australia to advance its Indo-Pacific agenda and its strategic interests. Mr Craig Chittick, First Assistant Secretary, US and Indo-Pacific Strategy Division at DFAT, explained:
I think regional architecture and regional cooperation have an important place in Australia advancing its vision for the region and advancing our international interests. Regional cooperation doesn't solve all issues but it is essential in being able to address a number of them…Where regional cooperation has, we think, really significant potential and has demonstrated that over years is by countries working together to be able to address regional issues. The work that we do in South-East Asia, for instance, with our very good relationship with ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—which is a regional cooperation body that has
10 members, each of the South-East Asian countries—is an important means by which we can help address human security issues and health security issues and advance our trade interests by linking into existing regional cooperation in the region. But that very much builds on the very important relationships we have bilaterally with the countries in the region.
3.13
Additionally, DFAT stated that 'Australia pursues a regional agenda that promotes cooperation on strategic, political and economic issues; reinforces international law; encourages full and active engagement by the United States in regional affairs; and ensures all regional countries—large and small—have a voice on regional issues'.
3.14
DFAT further explained that ‘a lot of what the Australian government does in terms of our international relations effort is on a state-to-state basis—bilateral.’ However, it also highlighted that:
Regional architecture allows us to work in ways in which bilateral relations are not sufficient, particularly when it comes to addressing trans-boundary issues or issues that engage the entire region…At its heart, our approach to the Indo-Pacific is that we desire a region that is open, inclusive, prosperous and resilient, in which countries can advance their national interests without coercion. So we use our bilateral toolset, we use our 'mini-lateral toolset' and we use our regional architecture toolset in different ways to achieve those objectives.
3.15
After describing the strategic context, Defence also emphasised the need for regional cooperation. According to Defence, ‘[t]he Indo-Pacific region is in a period of significant transformation, and Australia increasingly sits at the epicentre of a complex, contested and challenging geostrategic environment.’ As such, Defence submitted that the 2020 Defence Strategic Update 'makes clear that Defence planning will focus on the Indo-Pacific as Australia’s area of most direct strategic interest and that, within it, we must be capable of building and exercising influence in support of shared regional security interests'. Defence therefore ‘remains a steadfast supporter of existing regional security architecture; our active participation in multilateral and minilateral fora is a foundational element of Defence’s international engagement and posture.’
3.16
Finally, Defence emphasised that '[c]ollaboration and cooperation is required to respond effectively to the region’s shared security challenges', noting:
In parcel with the whole-of-government Pacific Step-up, existing regional architecture allows Australia to enhance our security cooperation, working together with our partners to support a sovereign, stable, prosperous and rules-based Indo-Pacific.
Capability and complementarity of regional groupings
3.17
Submitters provided a range of views on whether the number and nature of multilateral and bilateral mechanisms and groupings in the Indo-Pacific are adequate for promoting a stable, resilient and inclusive Indo-Pacific. The evidence also considered the complementarity of the existing regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
3.18
In relation to the adequacy of existing regional architecture, Aus-CSCAP stated that ‘the existing institutions by no means satisfy all of Australia’s regional objectives,’ but noted that progress has been made in addressing issues such as ‘trade liberalization, the development of democracy, responses to economic crises, maritime security, cyber and critical technology, critical minerals, countering violent extremism and disaster and humanitarian relief.’ Furthermore, in bringing together all the relevant players:
…the existing institutions help to inform participants about developments right across the region…These institutions also develop and maintain channels of communication not only in formal multilateral settings but also in informal interactions around the edge of the main meeting. The importance of bilateral meetings in the margins of these gatherings should not be underestimated.
3.19
Aus-CSCAP submitted that ‘[t]here should be no doubt that regional institutions and forums have a part in strengthening Australia’s security and economic influence’ as well as in ensuring that Australia has the capacity to shape its strategic environment and to sustain and contribute to the evolution of the Rules Based Order. However, Aus-CSCAP questioned ‘whether these ends would be better served by using the existing architecture differently, or whether instead the new environment requires new or more institutionalised architecture.’
3.20
Nonetheless, Mr Richard Smith, Co-Chair of Aus-CSCAP, stated:
In our view, changing the existing regional architecture would be very difficult. That's not to say we could not use it in different ways. As we see it then the issue is less the nature of the architecture and what changes might be possible but rather the question of using the existing architecture effectively to pursue our interests in this changing strategic environment.
3.21
Therefore, Aus-CSCAP asserted that Australia should look for the opportunities within existing architecture, stating:
While Australia cannot walk away from the existing architecture, we can't expect more formal changes in this architecture even as the political and strategic environment is changing. Rather, we have to work out how best to use what we have—operating at both the government-to-government and Track 2 [non-government] levels—to meet changing needs. It is more important than ever to take opportunities offered within this architecture to strengthen bilateral as well as multilateral understanding and cooperation—tackling such growing issues as health, cyber-security, maritime security and the promotion of a Rules-Based Order.
3.22
Defence stated that ‘our approach to regional architecture is informed by our judgement that we're seeing the most consequential strategic realignment in the Indo-Pacific since the end of the Second World War in 1945.’ It means that Australia must ‘work with partners in our region to promote what we judge to be our core interests around a peaceful, resilient and inclusive Indo-Pacific.’ Therefore, ‘[e]xisting regional architecture is going to be critical to our ability to advance those principles, and if we didn't have this architecture we would need to create it.’
3.23
DFAT submitted that Australia ‘harnesses the complementarities between regional fora,’ including the ASEAN-led architecture, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Quad. DFAT explained:
Australia’s engagement with regional forums complements our bilateral and multilateral work to advance Australia’s international policy objectives. Leveraging these complementarities promotes cooperation on strategic, political and economic challenges…
Australia works through the various groupings to promote, strengthen and reinforce links between regional initiatives.
Perspectives on the complexity of existing regional architecture
3.24
Submitters considered the suggestion that regional architecture in the
Indo-Pacific reflects a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of a large number of intertwined groupings and discussed whether this is an effective approach to regional cooperation and engagement.
3.25
Submitters saw benefits in the diversity of the existing regional architecture. Dr Wilkins begun by pointing out the different purposes for which these regional mechanism were created:
There's great diversity in the function, membership and effectiveness of the formal and informal institutions that comprise regional architecture… First, institutional mechanisms can nominally be subdivided by functionality into those with a primarily economic focus and those with a primarily security focus. It needs to be recognised also that economics and security are increasingly intertwined, with the rise of geoeconomics and economic security concerns, and that some institutions focus across the two realms while others are increasingly breaking down the distinctions altogether…
Secondly, an important distinction is between those institutions that provide regional avenues for dialogue, including trust-building through interaction, and those that are designed with a more practical, tangible set of objectives that have exclusive membership, such as the Quad. Examples of the former might include the East Asia Summit [EAS] and the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF], whereas examples of the latter might include the US, Japan and Australia trilateral strategic dialogue. The Quad is perhaps presently something in between the two.
3.26
Therefore, in considering the ‘complex patchwork’ of the region, Dr Wilkins suggested looking at the ‘functional differentiation between what various organisations actually offer—their purpose, their membership…’ and whether they are ’task focused and instrumentally focused, where they actually get things done…vis-a-vis the many, many, regional talk shops, as they have been called.’
3.27
Dr Envall agreed, stating ‘[a]s Dr Wilkins said, different institutions have different functional roles and can achieve different goals for Australia to achieve its national interests.’
3.28
Additionally, Dr Wilkins proposed a way of looking at the regional architecture is to consider that:
…there are kind of three poles of institutional power within the region. Firstly, there's the US alliance system and those instruments that attach to that, like the trilateral strategic dialogue and, perhaps, the Quad as well. Then there's China leading things like the Belt and Road Initiative, but particularly the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Eurasia. And then in the middle are the ASEAN countries, with their ASEAN Plus process. Each of these, in some ways, is trying to advance their own national interests and stamp their own vision of what the region should look like. They're in kind of dynamic competition, although, of course, there are some overlaps between them. So that's just one other way of approaching the problem.
3.29
It is for these reasons that Aus-CSCAP, also commenting on the complexity of the current regional architecture, explained that although a more coherent regional architecture might be preferable, achieving this would be difficult for the following reasons:
A single body inclusive in membership—and able to take and implement decisions on security, economic and other matters—has obvious attractions, but the current complex architecture is not to be understood merely as a design fault. The fact that the region itself is highly complex—with no unifying civilizational heritage and relations between states being influenced by long-term suspicion—needs to be taken into account. The different regional institutions have developed in specific historical contexts. Attempting to create a new comprehensive institution would likely exacerbate rather than mediate regional tensions.
3.30
Although, as Aus-CSCAP emphasised, ‘[t]his reality does not preclude examination and debate regarding whether existing processes can be more productive and better coordinated.’
3.31
DFAT acknowledged that 'some observers have from time to time described regional architecture as a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of complicated arrangements which might impede prosecution of our international agenda', but noted:
We do not agree with this characterisation. Australia actively engages in regional architecture to reinforce foreign policy priorities—for example, in both the EAS and APEC we use leader-level engagement to buttress international trading rules against protectionist pressures. Prosecuting our agenda through multiple forums provides Australia with strategic ballast and builds international support to advance our interests.
3.32
Similarly, Aus-CSCAP argued that:
The wide-ranging nature of this architecture serves rather than impedes the prosecution of our [Australia’s] interests. It enables us to engage on a large set of challenges, with sub-regions as well as the region as a whole, and at multiple levels—Heads of Govt/State, Ministers, officials, and second trackers.
3.33
Dr Envall also reiterated the importance for Australia to cooperate and continue to draw on the multiple avenues available to it through existing regional architecture with the caveat that:
Australia isn’t a great power in the Indo-Pacific or Asia-Pacific, so there are accompanying limits to its capacity to shape the region’s dynamics. As has long been known, existing multilateral and minilateral country groupings are valuable assets in this endeavour. They allow for wider network cooperation with like-minded countries in the region—Japan being a classic example—as well as offering opportunities to work on particular issues with a broader range of nations. Australia’s approach to multilateral and minilateral organisations in the region should remain all-embracing.
…
I'd be reluctant to say Australia should really narrow down the kinds of institutions that it can operate in. I think Australia is very capable of engaging with multiple institutions…it needs to be open to the kinds of opportunities that can come through networked diplomacy in this way.
3.34
However, Dr Envall suggested there are different challenges associated with the ‘spaghetti bowl’ characterisation depending if the regional mechanisms in question related to security or trade matters. He was of the view that ‘this spaghetti-bowl effect is less important when it comes to diplomacy and security, compared to trade and investment, where…it would be much better for Australia to try to reduce that effect as far as possible.’ Dr Envall explained:
The reason it's problematic to trade is that you have overlapping and often differing trade rules amongst different agreements. In particular, bilateral trade agreements are problematic in this respect because you have countries and businesses—private industry—having to deal with multiple rules and regulations across the region. It's highly problematic, and I think it's one of the reasons the region is increasingly moving toward more regionwide frameworks like CPTPP [Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership] or RCEP [Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership]. It doesn't necessarily work in the same way when it comes to security, because then you're talking much more in terms of state actors engaging in a range of activities, whether that be traditional security—military cooperation and joint exercises—or human security, in terms of addressing pandemics, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
3.35
Dr Lavina Lee, a senior lecturer at the Macquarie University, suggested that the Quad is an ideal mechanism to cut through the ‘spaghetti bowl’ perception in the region as it brings together like-minded partners with a shared agenda, stating:
…[it] encompasses the four most capable countries in the region. They're the most capable; they've got shared interests, shared democratic liberal values, broadly speaking…And I think the reason Australia is attracted to the Quad is that it can drive the agenda with a group of like-minded countries in the security sphere, because they are four countries who have decided that the time to wait has gone; that the time to act, to counter and to shape Chinese behaviour is narrowing; and that there needs to be a kind of action oriented agenda going forward.
Ability of existing regional mechanisms to promote a stable, resilient and inclusive Indo-Pacific
3.36
Evidence received by the committee discussed the ability of existing regional mechanisms to promote a stable, resilient and inclusive Indo-Pacific and whether Australia can do more to facilitate that objective.
3.37
DFAT raised the importance of the regional architecture in supporting a stable and resilient Indo-Pacific and highlighted some key mechanisms:
At a time when power is shifting to, and within, the Indo-Pacific region and the regional order is under pressure, we are strengthening our engagement across the region’s architecture to secure a stable and durable regional order, reinforce the rules and norms that underpin our interests...
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its architecture remains at the heart of Australia’s Indo-Pacific agenda. We actively engage in the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to prosecute Australia’s strategic interests—including reinforcing important norms and expectations of state behaviour—on issues such as the South China Sea, the Myanmar crisis, and on security issues such as cyber and counter-terrorism.
3.38
According to DFAT, ‘Australia’s long-standing approach to the South China Sea is that disputes should be settled peacefully and in accordance with international law’ and noted:
…regional institutions and groupings [are seen] as playing an important role in facilitating discussions among all countries with interests in the South China Sea, including littoral states as well as those with interests in the maritime domain.
3.39
DFAT pointed to Australia’s support for ASEAN-centred forums, such as the EAS and ARF, which:
…provide venues to share our concerns about developments in the South China Sea with other regional states, complementing bilateral channels. We work actively within these fora to promote regional peace and security.
3.40
Furthermore, DFAT also added:
The Quad is another regional grouping that provides a forum for Australia, India, Japan and the US to share views on developments in the South China Sea and discuss ways we can cooperate to assist ASEAN Member States and others address regional maritime security challenges.
3.41
However, in relation to the ability of the existing regional architecture to provide mechanisms for dispute resolution, Aus-CSCAP questioned its effectiveness, particularly in relation to the South China Sea, stating:
…the existing architecture has not been terribly effective in resolving those disputes. It has been effective in ensuring that all the parties understand each other's positions and understand how far apart they are, but neither the ARF nor any of the institutions have evolved into being dispute resolution mechanisms. That was an early ambition when we created the ARF, in 1993 or 1994, but it has not evolved to that point. Frankly, I think the scale of the South China Sea issue is such that it probably can't be resolved in that way. There is discussion, of course, between the ASEAN countries—ASEAN being part of the architecture—and China about a code of conduct. Many of us are pessimistic about what that would produce.
3.42
Dr Envall stated that as a means of boosting ‘deterrence against attempts of military coercion in the region [which] is without doubt a vital goal for Australia and should be a priority for Australia's engagement with the regional architecture,’ Australia should look to ‘[d]eepening the trilateral strategic dialogue, for instance, to further strengthen strategic cooperation with the US and Japan would be one way of promoting a more resilient region.’
3.43
Furthermore, Dr Envall suggested that Australia should not only ‘maximise its opportunities to cooperate with like-minded partners’ but also remain ‘open to institutional participation that brings it into engagement with less-like-minded countries.’
3.44
Similarly, Mr Jennings agreed that Australia should invest more in its diplomatic capability in order to ensure regional stability and security, stating:
I think we've underinvested in our own diplomatic capabilities for way too long now. If we want the international rule of law to work, we have to put some effort into actually promoting it and making it work and encouraging other countries to make it work. And I think the more we can do to support that to give confidence to the South-East Asian countries that there is an alternative to simply having to acquiesce to authoritarian power from China, then that's a smart strategy for Australia to adopt.
3.45
Dr Envall raised economic competition in the region as a significant strategic challenge for Australia and noted some existing regional mechanisms that could help promote a more resilient region in this space:
…Australia's far from the only country in the region to be subject to attempts at geoeconomic coercion. Regional multilateral groupings such as the CPTPP or RCEP are valuable tools for promoting transparent and open trade and investment norms and practices across the region. Working with countries such as Japan, South Korea, the US or India would help to not only highlight attempts at geoeconomic coercion but also develop the norms and practices to help resist these and build a more resilient region.
3.46
Furthermore, with regard to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Dr Wilkins suggested that Australia:
…should do its utmost to try and get the United States back at the table for that to offer some real gravitas and some real strong alternative to things like the BRI to avoid ceding economic governance around the region to China by default in the absence of the United States. It's still significant without the US, but it's really sort of a second-rater unless Australia can encourage, and Japan as well is very keen to encourage, the United States back in.
Capability and complementarity of ASEAN
3.47
The committee received evidence discussing the benefits of and assessing ASEAN as a central or complementary part of the regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific, as well as perspectives on Australia’s engagement with ASEAN now and in the future.
Support for ASEAN
3.48
Defence submitted that ASEAN sits at the heart of the existing regional architecture and acknowledged that:
ASEAN does come under criticism for being a slow-moving, consensus based organisation. But, in a region that is facing the level of strategic contest and strategic change, an entity that does bind the region, that does require a consensus to agree change, is, we think, becoming more important. Certainly in our engagement with ASEAN, we share and endorse its official position behind a peaceful, inclusive, resilient region of sovereign states.
3.49
Aus-CSCAP also noted the strategic importance of ASEAN-led architecture for Australia:
Southeast Asia is so strategically central to Australia’s security that it remains important to work steadily in multilateral (ASEAN) as well as bilateral contexts to maintain our influence. Australia’s reputation as an enthusiastic and creative supporter of regional processes is a political asset.
3.50
On a similar note, Dr Wilkins recommended that Australia ‘ensure it remains fully engaged with ASEAN-led multilateral institutions and seek to deepen cooperation with member states individually and through the organisation itself.’
3.51
Aus-CSCAP highlighted a number of achievements of ASEAN-led architecture in the region, including:
A recent ASEAN-led achievement is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes all the countries of East Asia as well as Australia and New Zealand. Also, with respect to ASEAN, if we look back over seven decades it is extraordinary that a region once among the most dangerous in the globe has now become relatively stable. In particular, a remarkable reconciliation has been forged between communist and non-communist states. Beyond Southeast Asia, ASEAN has been important in bringing China, Japan and South Korea into dialogue, particularly in the ASEAN Plus Three grouping. The smaller Southeast Asian states, in fact, have been leaders in promoting not just Northeast Asian dialogue but also pan-Asian regionalism.
3.52
DFAT acknowledged that while ASEAN does move slowly, it has moved steadily over the course of decades and is strategic asset for Australia:
While it can be frustrating, like most regional and multilateral institutions, we very much see the value in it. We continue to invest in the organisation as a development path. It's an institution that is subject to the world that it exists in, and…as power changes in our region, ASEAN and its member states are addressing the changes in power and the way in which they manifest themselves in the best way that it can—as we all are. It is a theatre for strategic competition, but, I have to say, a region with an institution like ASEAN is a much more stable and predictable region than it would be if it didn't have the regional architecture that we do.
3.53
Similarly, Aus-CSCAP conceded that:
ASEAN-led institutions can be frustrating for Australia—partly because the ASEAN determination to promote regional unity can hinder decisive action in a crisis. These institutions, however, have helped over fifty years to stabilize our region; also, with their inclusive all-Indo-Pacific reach, they offer the opportunity to engage all major powers with interests in this region.
Some ASEAN-led meetings are dismissed as ‘talk-shops’—but ASEAN insists on the value of talk, not only in handling disputes but also in building a sense of ‘region’. To be able to influence our strategic environment, Australia needs to be positioned inside not outside this conversation—and to keep in mind that ASEAN is indigenous to the region, and often sensitive regarding proposals likely to challenge its centrality.
3.54
When asked about the critique of ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making model and the example of how ASEAN has dealt with the military coup in Myanmar, His Excellency Mr Shingo Yamagami, Ambassador of Japan to Australia, explained:
As a student of international relations, I think everything international requires a great degree of patience. That's my understanding…I'm very, very optimistic about the future of ASEAN. Like Australia, Japan is enjoying very close cooperation and relationships with each and every member of ASEAN. Yes, this issue we are facing in Myanmar is tremendous, but I think ASEAN comes first when it comes to addressing the issue within their region with close cooperation coming from
like-minded countries, including Australia, Japan and the United States. That's my thinking.
Concerns about ASEAN
3.55
On the other hand, Mr Jennings raised some concerns about the ability of ASEAN to deal with increasingly aggressive powers in the region:
…frankly, the regional security architecture is not strong enough to deal with the threats presented by an assertive People's Republic of China. ASEAN has been a very disappointing instrument. China has worked very hard over the decades to weaken ASEAN—to split it, to make it impossible for ASEAN to speak with a unified voice on the big strategic issues of the day from a South-East Asian perspective. We've seen that in ASEAN's failure to effectively deal with China's military role in the South China Sea and, even more recently, ASEAN's failure to deal with the military takeover in Myanmar.
3.56
Similarly, Dr Lee also criticised ASEAN’s ability to counter China’s influence in the region, stating:
Why didn't Australia put more faith in ASEAN? It's simply because we do not consider ASEAN able or willing to respond to the problem of China. China has effectively neutralised ASEAN by exploiting ASEAN's insistence on consensus and de-escalation, regardless of what China is doing. Consensus is a problem, because all China needs to do is to buy off one or two ASEAN members, as Beijing has done with Cambodia and Laos. It's very much like a hung jury which cannot come to any decision.
3.57
Additionally, Dr Lee submitted ‘I can't see a way forward for ASEAN to be able to take strong positions on international law.’ She used its efforts to develop a code of conduct for the South China Sea to highlight these issues, explaining:
ASEAN persisted for 20 years in trying to negotiate a code of conduct with China. The code of conduct was never a solution because it was never going to be binding, does not use international law as the basis for negotiations and does not prevent or preclude China from continuing to change facts on the ground in terms of building and militarising artificial islands. Regrettably, the ASEAN code of conduct process provided China with diplomatic cover because it allowed Beijing to claim that it was seeking to resolve the disputes with South-East Asian countries and that so-called outsiders like Australia and the United States ought to mind their own business. All the while, China was extending its de facto control over the maritime territories of South-East Asian claimant states.
3.58
Despite these criticisms, Dr Lee assured that committee that Australia still should engage with ASEAN-led institutions, noting that ‘[s]ome of those institutions are very important and it is a useful fora for Australia to be a good international citizen to participate and engage in the East Asia Summit, ADMM+ [ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus] or the ARF.’
3.59
Dr Lee summarised her position stating:
…my major point is that ASEAN as an actor in its own right has been hampered by its own culture of neutrality and de-escalation. ASEAN countries don't want to take sides; they don't want to choose. That was possible at a time when there wasn't great power tension and competition—which are increasing. Now I think countries like Australia and the other Quad countries are effectively trying to get ASEAN to choose, and ASEAN is refusing to choose. So we've got a situation where we see our strategic options narrowing and that it's becoming a bit more urgent. Hence, we want to be partnered with countries that can actually act and that are willing to act.
Complementarity of ASEAN
3.60
While some Australian commentators are critical of ASEAN-led bodies,
Aus-CSAP suggested that it is important to recognise different approaches to regionalism, particularly when discussing the effectiveness of ASEAN-led architecture as they tend to be designed as dialogue forums rather than output-orientated action bodies. According to Aus-CSCAP, Australia must remain a participant in the ‘conversation of the region,’ noting:
…given the complexity of the region—the influence of Islamic, Buddhist, Confucian, democratic and communist traditions; the divisive impact of a century of colonialism; and the conflicts resulting from the Cold War—there is a felt need for specifically community-building dialogue. Given Asia’s scale and diversity, as well as its recent history, promoting a sense of community—achieving unity within both ASEAN and across Asia more generally through patient deliberation—is seen as a strategic objective in itself. It can be viewed as more important than forcing agreement on a practical policy.
3.61
As such, there is scope for complementarity between regional architecture. For example, DFAT emphasised the complementarities between ASEAN and the Quad, stating:
…it has been important over the last 18 months to underline the complementarities between ASEAN and the Quad. At the recent Quad Summit, for example, Quad leaders underscored their steadfast support for ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The Quad also helps the four partners to be better, more coordinated Dialogue partners for ASEAN.
3.62
The Embassy of the United States of America (US Embassy) concurred that ‘Australia and the United States…are both strong advocates for ASEAN centrality and coordinate our support to ASEAN closely.’
3.63
However, Dr Lee reflected on the differences between ASEAN and the Quad, suggesting that:
…the Quad is far more flexible and a more useful organisation. It is not overly burdened by long-winded processes and conventions. It is an action-oriented and responsive grouping. It offers the possibility of drawing in other South-East Asian countries in an ad hoc manner through the Quad plus process. These countries could include Vietnam and Indonesia, who are similarly worried about China's behaviour and ASEAN's ineffectiveness.
As things stand, the Quad is increasing in relevance and importance. The conversations between Quad members are far more upfront, honest and constructive than our conversations in ASEAN led meetings. This is true from the level of prime ministers and presidents to foreign ministers to secretaries of departments and senior officials.
Finally, institutions are valuable because they can help Australia pursue and entrench our interests and our preferred values. The Quad is valuable because it puts ASEAN on notice. If ASEAN continues to allow China the diplomatic cover to engage in its illegal and destabilising activities, then the Quad will grow in importance. If that occurs, ASEAN will eventually lose its so-called diplomatic centrality.
Strategic importance of the 'Quad' for Australia
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The Quad's place within the Indo-Pacific region, how it relates to other existing regional architecture, as well as the expectations of its members was all canvassed in submissions. In particular, the evidence discussed the question of whether the Quad should progress towards formal institutionalisation or remain as a flexible informal grouping.
The Quad’s place in the region
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Mr Jennings articulated his perspective on what brought the Quad together:
The arrival of the QUAD as a grouping of Australia, Japan, India and the US being driven by the Heads of Government of each country is a significant and welcome security development…Each of the QUAD countries has experienced the difficulties of dealing with a more assertive Beijing…[and therefore have a] shared interest in grouping together.
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In considering whether the Quad would succeed as a regional body,
Mr Jennings gave a cautious yes, noting ‘we need to be realistic about the situation, because all the Quad countries have differing priorities and differing historical backgrounds, which shape their capacities and interests to invest in this new structure.’ He explained:
The United States is beset with internal challenges, which will be the top priority for the Biden Administration. Washington wants its allies and friends in the Indo-Pacific to do more heavy lifting in regional security. Australia and Japan are America’s two closest allies in the region and increasingly like-minded on the strategic outlook. The trilateral-Australia-Japan-US relationship has the potential to become a powerful shaper of regional security. But Japan has some internal political and cultural constraints on its military posture and Australia is still deciding how far it can or should play a leading (as opposed to supporting) security role.
India for its part is a friend but not a treaty ally of the United States. New Delhi is shaping a new international security role for itself with roots in its non-aligned past. I expect India to play a more cautious role within the QUAD. It will not want the grouping to be seen as directed against China.
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In light of this, Mr Jennings suggested:
…the engine of Quad activity is really the trilateral relationship that exists between Australia, Japan and the United States. This is something that has grown at great pace and in the very practical areas of defence cooperation over the past decade. And it reflects the shared priorities and substantially shared strategic outlooks of those three countries, and I think it will be those three that really set the pace and drive the agenda for the Quad, with India somewhat lagging behind—more cautious but still exploring how it can play a more effective role in Indo-Pacific security.
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When asked about the adequacy of the Quad to act as a security
counter-balance to other assertive powers in the region, Mr Jennings did not think it was quite there yet, explaining:
I think India in particular will be tentative about wanting to harness its foreign policy interests too close to, in particular, the United States. But America is still here. America is still the security guarantor of choice for most Indo-Pacific countries. America still has an overwhelming predominance of military power in the Indo-Pacific region. In Australia and Japan in particular it has two strong allies, substantially like-minded, that are looking to strengthen their own defence and security and are particularly concerned about China. So that's a positive.
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On the other hand, Dr Lee seemed more confident, stating that ‘[t]he Quad consists of the four countries in the region…who have irreversibly decided to balance and counter the worst aspects of Chinese behaviour,’ and noted that ‘[t]hey also happen to be the four most powerful naval countries in the
Indo-Pacific, apart from China.’
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Due to the increasing power tensions and competition in the region, Dr Lee suggested that ‘the Quad and Quad-plus mechanisms are useful and important in this time of urgency because we are effectively creating an institution.’ Admittedly, ‘a fledgling quasi-institution,’ but nonetheless useful as Australia ‘can put forward [its] preferred values and interests, put them into action and, hopefully, flesh it out a bit more.’ Therefore:
…if we are going to prioritise in this situation of narrowing options, we need to prioritise action-oriented groupings like the Quad, where we've got like-minded states all committed to the same things, with the same kinds of threat perceptions and interests, who can actually put on the ground and implement our preferred vision of the region, which is open, liberal based and based on international law.
Institutionalisation of the Quad
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On the question of what kind of entity the Quad should be understood as, DFAT described the Quad as ‘an informal diplomatic network’ and noted that while:
…there are some countries that seem to believe that it is more than that…it is a grouping of countries that share an outlook on the world, countries that share…a democratic basis and have a vision for our region, in terms of it being open, prosperous and resilient, that they all believe in.’
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Dr Wilkins similarly expressed that ‘[t]he Quad should not be misconstrued as an alliance; it's rather networking together several existing US allies and strategic partners into a loose alignment front based upon shared interests and values.’
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From Japan’s perspective, Ambassador Yamagami explained that ‘the Quad is not an institution; rather, the Quad is a vehicle for promoting this concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific. It's not a fixed organisation or institute like NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] or the EU [European Union]. That is our understanding.’
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In its submission, Aus-CSCAP argued that institutionalisation of the Quad would be unrealistic, stating:
In our view there is a need to be cautious about institutionalising
non-inclusive groupings. In the case of the Quad, its primary purpose is to signal to China that it cannot set the regional order unilaterally. While cooperation among its member countries on economic and development issues in the Indo-Pacific may well be of material benefit, any attempt to institutionalise the Quad would be unrealistic—because its operational utility would be limited by the divergent national interests of the key parties. Nor are other countries lining up to join the Quad—indeed, some have reservations about its divisive effect in the region.
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Mr Hugh Jeffrey, First Assistant Secretary, International Policy Division, Defence, also explored the question of the institutionalisation of the Quad:
When it comes to the idea about whether or not the Quad should be further institutionalised, my view is agnostic on this. I think the main point is to begin to establish and cement those patterns of consultation and collaboration. And institutionalisation is important only insofar as it's a vehicle for that cooperation and collaboration. To me the first is the important thing, and we should look at institutionalisation only insofar as it enables us to do that and it creates the outcomes that we need. But, as you could imagine, over-institutionalisation can actually be counterproductive. It can just bog us down in process and we don't actually get things done.
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Dr Envall concurred that institutionalisation of the Quad would not be ideal, stating:
I would argue that in its current form the Quad offers a useful level of strategic ambiguity for Australia and its other members. It provides an opportunity for indirect balancing without outright explicit containment, and this is important when engaging with countries in South-East Asia, for example. It also gives members a chance to collaborate and develop capabilities without commitments. Formal institutionalisation could risk this by exposing key strategic differences—some of which have already been talked about among members—and, in a way, by highlighting the group's geopolitical shallowness as an Indo-Pacific project.
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On institutionalisation, DFAT explained that each regional grouping 'has its own policies and rationale relating to institutionalisation and expansion', with members required to subscribe to those principles and policies. Additionally, each grouping also 'has its own processes for considering governance and membership'. Therefore, DFAT submitted:
Australia does not see merit in institutionalising or expanding the Quad. The Quad’s strength lies in its flexibility to respond to emerging and pressing challenges. Australia’s position is that the Quad remains an agile group of four countries working together constructively for the peace, prosperity and stability of the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, Australia welcomes constructive and positive engagement by non-Quad members in the Indo-Pacific.
The Quad and ASEAN
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On the question of what the response of countries in the region (such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and others) has been to the emergence of the Quad, Mr Jennings described ASEAN’s response to the Quad as cautious and suggested that Australia ‘find ways for Quad countries to cooperate with ASEAN countries, to the extent that that's what ASEAN wants and has an interest in doing.’
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Defence assured the committee that the Quad was not intended ‘to supplant existing architecture and particularly ASEAN architecture.’ Defence explained that while the Quad brings together four democratic countries that want to work together to more effectively shape the region's strategic trajectory:
…we want to work with existing architecture, not in place of existing architecture. So I think when Quad leaders met earlier this year they were very clear to try to underline that the initiatives they agreed were ones that look to respond to the needs of Indo-Pacific partners across the board and they are designed to dock into existing initiatives and to work within existing architecture. So, it's definitely not an attempt to supplant.
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DFAT also suggested that the Quad has a positive agenda and that it is taking steps to address scepticism through transparency and engagement with
South-East Asian ambassadors and high commissioners:
There is some contention out there about the Quad. There are some countries, including China, who believe it has a negative agenda, and that is something for us to be able to counter, so we very much articulate the Quad has a positive agenda, a creative agenda. It is about building resilience, about building prosperity and about shaping behaviour in accordance with international norms. We do believe the Quad has a positive agenda, but there is natural scepticism when a group of sizeable countries get together to collaborate about what that is, so we've been very transparent, very engaging, with ASEAN…before each Quad meeting, we spend time with the South-East Asian ambassadors and high commissioners in Canberra and I give them a briefing about what's happened and broadly what the agenda is. Then, similarly, after each Quad meeting [we] do a debrief with them. [We] don't give them the entire agenda—no international multilateral institution would do that—but we are very open about the agenda. It is not intended to constrain any particular country or to deny its rights but rather to make all member states of the Indo-Pacific more prosperous and more resilient in the context of what we're dealing with at the moment to be able to address health, security and economic issues.
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On the relationship between the Quad and ASEAN, Ambassador Yamagami added:
…when it comes to this important concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific, I think most of the elements are shared by our friends in ASEAN as well. They have their own version, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and there are a lot of commonalities. There are EU partners as well, so this concept is open ended, open to anybody. By joining forces with not only Quad members but ASEAN members and EU partners I think we can promote this great concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific. That is my understanding.
Development and value of the Quad
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In terms of how the Quad is developing, DFAT explained:
…the Quad has matured quite significantly just in the course of the last year, particularly with the first ever leader's meeting here, in a virtual room. The Australian government is very pleased with the way the Quad is maturing, both in terms of the addition of the leader-level element to the process but also the ongoing foreign minister's process. So we do believe that the Quad is a prominent aspect of our foreign policy, and of the United States, India and Japan similarly.
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Dr Lee agreed that the Quad leaders’ summit showed promise, stating that it ‘was very good because it actually did have some positive initiatives that showed the region what the Quad stands for and how its values can actually be implemented.’ Dr Lee suggested that Australia needs:
…to prioritise action-oriented groupings like the Quad, where we've got like-minded states all committed to the same things, with the same kinds of threat perceptions and interests, who can actually put on the ground and implement our preferred vision of the region, which is open, liberal based and based on international law…
That's what institutions do. They help us entrench our values and interests.
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Lastly, Mr Chittick indicated what he perceived as one of the Quad’s most valuable aspects:
One of the elements that I think has real value in the Quad…is that each of the Quad members, as a dialogue partner of ASEAN, will be stronger and more effective in their ability to help South-East Asia realise its aspirations through collaborating together in a group. There is very much a strategic intent for the Quad to shape our region and to do so in a very trusting and collaborative way with the region.
Opportunities for Quad members
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Mr Jennings emphasised the importance of focusing on the Quad’s democratic agenda rather than on its ability to push back against assertive powers in the region. He stated the Quad’s most important function is to:
…help India emerge as a constructive player in the Indo-Pacific beyond the Subcontinent. There seems to be some appetite in New Delhi for that to happen. I also caution you, though, that the instincts of the Non-Aligned Movement run very deep inside the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, so I think it's going to take some time. The Quad is not NATO, and it won't be for a long time, if ever, but I think it has more prospects if what can emerge from this is international rule-enhancing cooperation amongst four substantial democracies. That's the angle that I think is most productive for it.
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On the question of India and its appetite to engage with the Quad into the future, Mr Jennings also noted:
…there's broad acceptance in Indian policy circles that India needs to take a bigger step onto a broader stage and that a policy focus in a security sense that's largely focused on India's immediate neighbours in the subcontinent is no longer enough for a country of the size and scale of India…So the Quad, I think, is a somewhat tentative step on the part of India to say we now really do want to put substance to a look-East strategy, we want and deserve to have a prominent role on the global stage. And that's going to continue. I don't think that's just [Prime Minister] Modi; I think that would be probably the result of any future Indian administration. And that does create opportunities for us and for other countries to engage more constructively with India.
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Mr Jennings suggested that the opportunities for Australia’s engagement with India through the Quad should be underpinned by deepening bilateral relations, stating:
What needs to happen now to give the Quad more momentum is that we look to boost our own bilateral engagement with India and that's been pretty thin up until now. I think back to my time as a defence official, which is now a decade ago, trying hard to build the agenda for defence cooperation with India. It was very limited. It came from a very limited base, and we were struggling to actually get engagement and traction. So I think that that's something that we need to do more of.
If the Quad is going to work as a four-part grouping, it will have to be built on successful deep and sustained bilateral engagement between each of these countries. And the truth of the matter is that our bilateral relationship with India is pretty thin. It's not brilliant on trade. It's pretty good on people-to-people and education links, I have to say. It's not so good on the wider spread of bureaucratic or official cooperation. So there's a lot of building that needs to happen.
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In an answer to a question on notice, Dr Lee emphasised the importance of investing more into advancing regional diplomacy and deepening cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific, particularly with India as ‘it is the least developed bilateral relationship Australia has with its Quad partners.’ Dr Lee submitted:
There could always be more resources devoted to our diplomatic presence and engagement, especially at a time of greater strategic urgency. What is important is how limited resources could be directed most effectively to advance Australia's national interests. Currently, in my view, greater additional resources should be devoted towards deeper engagement (military, strategic, and economic) with the three countries in the
Indo-Pacific that have the greatest capacity and resolve to counter the worst aspects of Chinese behaviour in the region: Indonesia, Vietnam and India. The India-Australia relationship has strengthened in the last year but is still very under-developed and there is great scope there for much deeper engagement in all areas.
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In its submission, the US Embassy made clear the US ‘values its collaboration with Australia on a range of regional and global issues.’ The US Embassy submitted:
…the Quad provides a unique avenue for likeminded countries to advance cooperation on regional challenges while reinforcing international rules and shared values. Together with Australia, the United States shares with Japan and India a vision of a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Inda-Pacific region, unconstrained by coercion and anchored by democratic values. Informed by shared values, the Quad allows for coordination and collaboration on a variety of important issues, including COVID-19 vaccination, post-pandemic economic recovery, the climate crisis, maritime security, and infrastructure.
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Ambassador Yamagami explained Japan's vision of the Quad and its place in the Indo-Pacific region to the committee:
Quad partners have worked together both bilaterally and trilaterally over many years. But if you asked me to describe the evolution of the Quad, my fair observation would be: how far we have come…
The evolution of the Quad can be regarded as a response to the growing complexity in the strategic environment of the region…
The Quad is a vehicle for promoting a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific in many areas. The vision for the Quad is based on the following three pillars: first, the promotion of basic principles such as the rule of law; second, the pursuit of economic prosperity; and third, a commitment to peace and stability. It envisions an international public good that will benefit all countries in the region.
As a Quad partner, Japan brings its own perspectives and initiatives to the table...
In the face of unprecedented challenges, be it the COVID-19 pandemic or emerging powers, Japan is doing everything in its capacity to work in cooperation with natural partners like Australia. We share universal values and strategic interests with Australia. Japan therefore looks forward to promoting cooperation with Australia in protecting the rules based order. It represents the best chance that our region has to co-exist free from coercion and in pursuit of the common good.
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Mr Jennings proposed a five-part strategy for the Quad to build its success moving forward:
(1)
First, set the agenda at the Heads of Government level: A top down strategy would produce quicker results and allow the Quad to gain strength with the President and three Prime Ministers shaping the agenda and demanding outcomes. ‘If the QUAD leaders are taking the grouping seriously then so too will the four countries’ policy makers and implementors.’ Mr Jennings noted that ‘[p]leasingly, this seems to be happening.’
(2)
Second, focus on the positives of democratic cooperation, not on the People’s Republic of China (PRC): Mr Jennings stated whilst ‘[t]he QUAD may have been reanimated out of a concern about the PRC,’ it would be more valuable for the Quad to ‘emphasise the possibilities of cooperation between four of the most substantial democracies in the Indo-Pacific and to make that the driving force rather than opposition per se to the authoritarian challenge that's presented by China. I think we have all lacked, in the last few years, a positive narrative about how the democracies should be seeking to expand their influence and activities in the Indo-Pacific region.’
(3)
Third, identify a practical work program of activities:
Mr Jennings acknowledged that the Quad has shown a promising start with the virtual leaders’ meeting on 13 March 2021 issuing a vision statement, as well as a Quad Summit Fact Sheet which announced ‘the establishment of three working groups on vaccines, climate and critical and emerging technologies,’ each with ambitious policy objectives.
(4)
Fourth, expand practical Quad defence and security cooperation:
Mr Jennings stated ‘Australia has struggled to deepen extensive practical Defence cooperation with India…The QUAD presents an opportunity to expand four-way military-to-military engagement, and this has indeed been happening.’ He gave examples of Australia joining the maritime exercise Malabar, India in November 2020 and the announcement by the Indian Minister of Defence in August 2021 of a Task Force of Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet that ‘would also participate in multilateral exercise MALABAR-21 alongside the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force, Royal Australian Navy and the United States Navy in Western Pacific.’
Mr Jennings argued ‘[f]or the QUAD to be successful these promising early examples of practical military to military cooperation should be expanded and extend also to QUAD activity on cyber security, defence industry collaboration and other areas.’
(5)
Fifth, engage with ‘Quad+’ partners: As the Quad is in an early stage of development, Mr Jennings suggested ‘it should resist attempts to open its membership to other countries until such time as the QUAD countries have developed a sense of comfort in the shape, weight, and direction of their own cooperation. But that still leave open the possibility for making specific activities ‘QUAD+’ depending on the interest and availability of other partners.’
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Overall, Mr Jennings was supportive of the Quad stating that it is ‘a welcome development…[and] is something that's worth the investment and gives a positive opportunity for four of the most significant democracies in the region to cooperate more effectively together.’ Its value, in particular, comes from the fact that it is ‘being driven by the heads of government of the four Quad countries—Japan, India, the US and Australia—because that suggests it's likely to build momentum and substance faster than if it was a creature of bureaucratic processes.’
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Mr Jennings concluded that:
…the QUAD is a valuable new grouping in Indo-Pacific security, perhaps most useful for the three allied countries, the US, Japan and Australia, to engage India. The QUAD’s value is that it creates a way for democracies to cooperate in developing positive strategies to enhance regional security. Hopefully this form of cooperation [will] consolidate, broaden, and strengthen, giving other countries the hope that there are ways to preserve the international order to the benefit of free societies.
Recent bilateral meeting with India
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On 11 September 2021, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Women, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, and Minister for Defence, the Hon Peter Dutton MP joined India’s Minister of Defence, Shri Rajnath Singh, and Minister of External Affairs, Dr. S. Jaishankar in New Delhi for the first
India-Australia 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue. The deepening of bilateral cooperation in political, economic, security and defence related matters between Australia and India was discussed:
Both sides reaffirmed the commitment to supporting a strong, resilient and inclusive regional architecture, with ASEAN at its centre. Both countries agreed to continue to work with the East Asia Summit, as the premier forum for leaders’ discussion on strategic issues in the region, in addition to other ASEAN-led institutions, like the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, as well as through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and the Indian Ocean Rim Association, to realize our long-term objectives for the region. Both sides committed to continue to work through plurilateral and trilateral mechanisms…
Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to quadrilateral cooperation between Australia, India, Japan and the United States. The Quad has a shared vision for an Indo-Pacific region that is free, open, prosperous and inclusive, and based on respect for international law…They appreciated the positive agenda aimed at promoting practical cooperation in COVID-19 vaccines, maritime security, climate change, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, connectivity and infrastructure, counter-terrorism, and critical and emerging technologies. The Ministers looked forward to continuing regular consultations under the Quad framework…
India and Australia reiterated the importance of the defence relationship, a core pillar of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. India and Australia acknowledged the increased defence cooperation between both countries and discussed initiatives to enhance defence engagements. Both sides welcomed the success of the recently concluded Exercise Malabar Phase I. The Ministers welcomed the continued participation of Australia in Exercise Malabar. Australia invited India to participate in future Talisman Sabre exercises, to empower operational compatibility between their defence services.
Quad leaders’ meeting
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As noted in Chapter 2, on 13 September 2021, the US announced President Joe Biden would be hosting the first face-to-face Quad Leaders’ Summit at the White House on 24 September 2021.
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The meeting discussed the three key focus areas previously announced at the March 2021 meeting, including ending the COVID-19 pandemic; addressing the challenges of climate change; and cooperating on critical and emerging technologies. Within these three areas, new announcements included:
Continued cooperation through the Quad Vaccine Partnership and Vaccine Experts Group to deliver vaccines to the Indo-Pacific region;
Plans to host an event at the 75th World Health Assembly (WHA) dedicated to combatting vaccine hesitancy; and
Plans to conduct at least one pandemic preparedness tabletop or exercise in 2022.
Formation of a new Green-Shipping Network, including a Quad Shipping Taskforce which will aim to establish two to three Quad
low-emission or zero-emission shipping corridors by 2030;
Establishment of a Clean-Hydrogen Partnership; and
Focusing on the climate adaptation, resilience, and preparedness of the Indo-Pacific by improving critical climate information-sharing and disaster-resilient infrastructure, including convening a Climate and Information Services Task Force and building a new technical facility.
On critical and emerging technologies:
The publication of a Quad Statement of Principles on Technology Design, Development, Governance, and Use;
Establishment of a Technical Standards Contact Group on Advanced Communications and Artificial Intelligence;
Launch of a Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative;
Support for 5G Deployment and Diversification through the launch of a Track 1.5 industry dialogue on Open RAN (Radio Access Network) deployment and adoption, coordinated by the Open RAN Policy Coalition; and
Monitoring biotechnology scanning and related opportunities for cooperation on advanced biotechnologies.
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The Quad Leaders' Summit Communique also announced a number of additional areas of action for the Quad, including:
Launch of a new Quad Infrastructure Coordination Group which will meet regularly to ‘share assessments of regional infrastructure needs and coordinate respective approaches to deliver transparent, high-standards infrastructure’ in the Indo-Pacific;
Announcement of a Quad Fellowship to focus on educational and people-to-people cooperation. This pilot fellowship program that will provide 100 graduate fellowships (25 from each Quad partner) to leading science, technology, engineering, and mathematics graduate students;
New cooperation in cybersecurity with the establishment of a Quad Senior Cyber Group to work to combat cyber threats, promote resilience, and secure critical infrastructure; and
The establishment of a working group on space cooperation which would look at ‘opportunities and share satellite data for peaceful purposes such as monitoring climate change, disaster response and preparedness, sustainable uses of oceans and marine resources, and on responding to challenges in shared domains. As well as consult on rules, norms, guidelines and principles for ensuring the sustainable use of outer space.’
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Lastly, the Quad leaders also noted a number of areas promoting regional peace, stability and security, including:
Coordinating diplomatic, economic, and human-rights policies towards Afghanistan and deepening counter-terrorism and humanitarian cooperation;
Continuing to promote adherence to international law to meet challenges to the maritime rules-based order, including in the East and South China Seas;
Supporting small island states, especially those in the Pacific, to enhance their economic and environmental resilience;
Reaffirming commitment to the denuclearization of North Korea; and
Calls for the end to violence in Myanmar, the release of all political detainees, including foreigners, engagement in constructive dialogue, and for the early restoration of democracy, as well as the urgent implementation of the ASEAN Five Point Consensus.
A new trilateral security partnership
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On 15 September 2021, in a joint statement, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom and the US announced the creation of a new trilateral security partnership, known as AUKUS. The joint statement indicated:
Through AUKUS, our governments will strengthen the ability of each to support our security and defense interests, building on our longstanding and ongoing bilateral ties. We will promote deeper information and technology sharing. We will foster deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains. And in particular, we will significantly deepen cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities.
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Following the joint leaders statement, on 16 September 2021, Prime Minister Scott Morrison acknowledged that the ‘security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region have grown significantly’ and stated:
AUKUS will build on the three nations’ longstanding and ongoing bilateral ties, and will enable the partners to significantly deepen cooperation on a range of emerging security and defence capabilities, which will enhance joint capability and interoperability. Initial efforts under AUKUS will focus on cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities.
This is an historic opportunity for the three nations, with like-minded allies and partners, to protect shared values and promote security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.
AUKUS will complement Australia’s network of strategic partnerships, including with our ASEAN friends, our Pacific family, our Five Eyes partners, the Quad and other like-minded partners.
The first initiative under AUKUS is for Australia to acquire
nuclear-powered submarine technology, leveraging decades of experience from the US and UK…
Over the next 18 months, Australia, the UK and US will intensely examine the full suite of requirements that underpin nuclear stewardship and demonstrate a clear pathway to becoming a responsible and reliable steward of this sensitive technology.
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Following the announcement of AUKUS, Mr Will Nankervis, Australian Ambassador to ASEAN, reassured Australia’s regional partners:
Our commitment to ASEAN centrality remains as steadfast as ever following the announcement that we will create an enhanced security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and United States—AUKUS—that will allow us to better share technology and capability. It is not a defence alliance or pact.
In a rapidly changing strategic environment, Australia's participation in AUKUS will strengthen our ability to work with regional partners in support of regional stability and security, within the rules-based framework on which our collective prosperity is built.
This new agreement does not change Australia's commitment to ASEAN nor our ongoing support for the ASEAN-led regional architecture. We are committed to continuing to foster a peaceful, secure region with ASEAN at its centre, and to complementing and strengthening the existing
ASEAN-led architecture.