2.1
This chapter outlines the regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific and describes Australia's historic and current engagement with these bodies.
Overview of Australia's engagement with existing regional architecture
2.2
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) provided an overview of Australia's engagement with the following organisations and multi-country groups which form the regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific:
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the fora it leads, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus);
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC);
the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF);
the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA); and
‘minilateral’ groupings, such as the Quad (Australia, India, Japan and the United States) and the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (Australia, Japan and the United States).
2.3
DFAT noted that while international organisations, such as the United Nations, G20 and Commonwealth, also play an important role across the
Indo-Pacific, they have a broader geographic remit.
2.4
Figure 2.1 shows the membership of some key institutions in the Indo-Pacific region.
2.5
The role of key regional bodies, and Australia's involvement in them, is outlined briefly below.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
2.6
ASEAN brings together ten Southeast Asian states—Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam—and has been active for over 50 years.
2.7
DFAT noted that in 1974 Australia became ASEAN's first Dialogue Partner and in 2014 became a Strategic Partner. DFAT highlighted that 'ASEAN’s success has helped support regional security and prosperity for 50 years and it is uniquely placed to address critical regional issues'. DFAT added:
Australia supports a strong, resilient and cohesive ASEAN because it is a strategic asset for us. ASEAN and its fora play a crucial role in shaping and reinforcing rules and norms in the region. ASEAN-led architecture provides a framework of regular dialogue and cooperation that underpin peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The centrality of ASEAN within the regional architecture, together with its rotating chair system, ensures that an ASEAN country – rather than a major power – always sits at the head. This is one of ASEAN’s unique strengths.
2.8
The Department of Defence (Defence) also noted that Australia is a strong supporter of the ASEAN-led regional architecture:
ASEAN and its forums amplify Australia’s voice to the region, provide regular opportunities for Ministerial and Leader-level engagement and help enforce rules and norms of behaviour in our region. A strong, resilient, and united ASEAN supports Australia’s own peace, security, and prosperity…
2.9
DFAT advised that Australia and ASEAN have 'an agreed Plan of Action covering the breadth of our cooperation, which is updated every five years'. Cooperation with ASEAN covers:
…the breadth of human security priorities, ranging from health security to climate change, human rights, labour rights, cyber, humanitarian assistance, disaster risk reduction, defence engagement and counter terrorism.
2.10
DFAT provided the following example of cooperation with ASEAN on human security challenges:
2.11
Box 2. Cooperation with ASEAN on human security challenges
Announced at the ASEAN–Australia Special Summit in March 2018 and officially launched in July 2019, ASEAN-Australia Counter Trafficking (ASEAN-ACT) ($80m, 2018-2028) builds on Australia’s 15-year history of supporting ASEAN members to effectively respond to trafficking in persons. ASEAN-ACT advances the protection of trafficking victims’ rights in ASEAN and supports ASEAN member states to build capability in implementing obligations under the ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. The program is currently focused on the intersection between the COVID-19 pandemic and human trafficking.
The Australian-funded TRIANGLE in ASEAN project ($24m, 2015-2027) promotes safe and legal migration, ensuring the benefits of labour migration are equally realised by men and women migrant workers, employers and governments. The program operates across Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. TRIANGLE provides information and services to migrant workers on their rights and assists ASEAN countries and institutions to strengthen labour migration policies and legislation. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the program has supported migrant workers who have lost jobs or were forced to return home by providing them with food, masks, information, counselling and legal assistance.
2.12
The Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources (DISER) advised that '[as] a bloc, ASEAN countries constitute Australia’s second largest trading partner and offer significant opportunity as we seek to expand markets, diversify our trade and investment in the region'. DISER noted its relationship with ASEAN:
…spans science and innovation, metrology, maritime, trade (AANZFTA [ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA] and RCEP [Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership]), climate change and cyber security; and to a lesser extent—energy and resources.
2.13
In conjunction with DFAT and ASEAN partners, DISER stated that it is working to 'build supply chain resilience in the region'. In addition:
As ASEAN increases its focus on technology and digital trade issues, particularly in response to COVID-19, the portfolio has a role to play in proactively shaping ASEAN’s agenda to ensure this supports a diverse, competitive, trusted, transparent technology ecosystem with secure protections for intellectual property. IP Australia engages closely with ASEAN counterparts on IP capability to provide a more certain trading environment for Australian businesses and innovators.
2.14
Opportunities identified by DISER to focus engagement in areas of mutual interest, include:
uplifting the digital capability of micro, small and medium enterprises;
strengthening cyber security responses; and
2.15
DISER advised the committee that through the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agencies Forum (APRSAF), 'Australia and Japan will play a larger role in influencing regional space industry collaboration and relationships, particularly with ASEAN countries'.
ASEAN Regional Forum
2.16
The ARF is 'a key ministerial-level platform for security dialogue in the
Indo-Pacific'. Its broad membership enables Australia to engage with a wider range of partners than other regional forums.
2.17
The Australian Member Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (Aus-CSCAP) noted that Australia ‘was a leader in establishing the ASEAN Regional Forum.’
2.18
The ARF meets annually at ministerial level and is underpinned by five workstreams: counter-terrorism and transnational crime; information and communications technology security; disaster relief; maritime security; and non-proliferation and disarmament. Australia is engaged on ARF efforts on human security initiatives, such as combatting climate change, countering violence extremism, preventative diplomacy, and coastal disaster mitigation.
2.19
For example, DFAT advised that Australia currently co-chairs the maritime security workstream with Vietnam and the European Union. Since 2018, Australia has led ARF discussions to boost regional cooperation and address emerging challenges to the international rules and principles that ensure order at sea.
East Asia Summit
2.20
DFAT indicated that the EAS is the 'Indo-Pacific's premier forum for leaders' level dialogue on strategic and economic issues', and was established in 2005, with Australia as a founding member. Further, it is 'the only leader-led forum which convenes key regional players to discuss political, security and economic challenges facing the Indo-Pacific'. The EAS has 18 members and includes the ten ASEAN member states, as well as Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States.
2.21
DFAT stated that Australia uses annual EAS meetings between leaders, foreign ministers, and economic ministers 'to build and maintain political support for international rules and standards and instil habits of cooperation that support regional stability and economic prosperity'. Australia works with partners in the EAS 'to reinforce a rules-based regional order, including through leaders’ statements and practical cooperation'.
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus
2.22
Defence submitted that the ADMM-Plus, the membership of which mirrors that of the EAS, 'plays a central role in facilitating dialogue on security issues in the region'. First held in 2010, the ADDM-Plus forms part of broader ASEAN-led regional architecture.
2.23
Aus-CSCAP noted that the ADMM-Plus ‘brings ASEAN members together with all ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners.’
2.24
Defence submitted that its engagement in the ADMM-Plus and associated expert working groups 'aims to deepen regional engagement in support of a peaceful, inclusive and resilient region of sovereign states, by ensuring regional countries are able to engage equitably in dialogue on the region’s security'.
2.25
Defence also noted that the inaugural ASEAN-Australia Informal Defence Ministers’ Meeting took place in Hanoi, Vietnam in February 2020, providing a forum for direct engagement with ASEAN Ministers on strengthening Australia’s defence cooperation with the region.
Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative
2.26
The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative was ‘established in 2014 by the Republic of Korea (ROK) as an annual event comprising a 1.5 track dialogue (think tanks and officials) and an officials’ meeting to facilitate peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia by promoting economic cooperation.’ Its membership comprises ASEAN, Australia, China, the EU, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, the ROK, Russia and the United States (the US). DFAT explained that ‘[t]he Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been invited but has never attended. A focus of the initiative is engaging the DPRK economically. Sanctions on the DPRK and its continuing refusal to abide by legally binding UNSC [United Nations Security Council] sanctions make this difficult.’ DFAT noted that Australia had participated in the forum from 2017–2019, but the forum had not met since 2019.
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
2.27
DFAT advised that APEC, which comprises 21 member economies, 'provides a key leader-level platform to engage on economic cooperation and to influence economic policies of regional partners'. Through APEC, Australia 'works to drive economic growth by promoting regional economic integration and supporting free and open trade and investment'. For example:
APEC’s technical and regulatory work delivers incremental reform at a practical level, making it cheaper and easier to do business across the region; and
APEC’s long-term economic cooperation policy agenda, the Putrajaya Vision 2040, includes a focus on health and the environment.
2.28
DFAT gave examples of how APEC ‘has offered a strong foundation for collaborative regional economic recovery’ and its ‘role in building resilience across the [Asia-Pacific] region’ across a number of key human security areas:
On health, for example, APEC facilitates the rebuilding of supply chains which helps the flow of vaccines and other essential goods. On climate change, APEC builds on its existing work to support trade in environmental goods. On labour rights, there is scope for APEC to build capacity and momentum for good practice trade agreement provisions on this issue.
2.29
As the peak regional body for economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, DISER advised that 'APEC partners are the destination for more than 70 per cent of Australia's total trade in goods and services'. DISER added:
Through DISER and its portfolio agencies, Australia is advancing its economic interests by engaging in a number of sub-groups within APEC, including on energy security, digital economy, science, technology and innovation, intellectual property, metrology and standards and conformance.
Regional energy security
2.30
DISER is also engaged with the APEC Energy Working Group (EWG) to 'promote environmentally sustainable regional energy security and economic growth'. Issues advanced through the EWG include:
…new and renewable energy technologies, energy efficiency, clean fossil energy, the development of low carbon model towns and energy infrastructure resilience. Currently the EWG is working to reduce regional energy intensity by 45 per cent by 2035 (using 2005 as a base year) and to double the uptake of renewable energy by 2030 from 2014 levels.
Science, technology and innovation
2.31
DISER is Australia's representative to the APEC Policy Partnership on Science, Technology and Innovation (PPSTI), promoting 'diversity in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields and inclusive economic growth through innovation. This includes championing the APEC Women in STEM Principles and Actions'.
2.32
DISER also delivers the Australian Government's Regional Collaboration Program with the Australian Academy of Science. This program:
…funds Australian researchers to collaborate with regional partners in the Asia-Pacific on solutions to shared challenges. As of 30 June 2020, 19 projects had received $2,142,659 in funding, and leveraged $5,405,040 in additional contributions. In addition, a one-off ‘Digital Grants’ round recently allocated $250,000 to 26 Australian early and mid-career researchers using digital methods of collaboration to address shared challenges relating to the COVID-19 response.
Pacific Islands Forum and other engagement with the Pacific
2.33
The PIF is the 'Pacific’s preeminent regional organisation, covering political, economic and security issues'. The Secretary General of the PIF is Chair of the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP), which includes nine regional organisations. DFAT advised that Australia is a member and major funder of the PIF Secretariat and associated bodies. DFAT reported that Australia 'uses these bodies to engage with the Pacific region in support of mutually agreed priorities', and stated that 'Australia’s flexible support to these organisations and philosophy of ‘leading from behind’ creates space for Pacific island countries to own and drive the regional agenda'. DFAT commented further on Australia's work in the Pacific:
The security pillar of Australia’s Pacific Step-up reinforces the Boe Declaration on Regional Security (adopted by leaders in 2008). The Boe Declaration recognises the importance of human and environmental security for a stable Pacific and highlights the need to address the threat posed by climate change. DFAT also works with regional organisations in the Pacific to promote gender equality, tackle high rates of gender-based violence, and promote disability inclusion. The Pacific labour mobility scheme helps Pacific workers understand strong labour laws and protection.
Pacific defence cooperation
2.34
Defence noted longstanding security cooperation between Australia and its partners in the Pacific, including through the Defence Cooperation Program which has been operational for more than 30 years. Defence also highlighted the role of the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting (SPDMM) which:
…is a defence-specific forum within the region’s security architecture. The forum complements existing regional organisations, particularly the PIF. SPDMM is an important part of the region’s security architecture, providing an opportunity for South Pacific Defence Ministers to discuss regional security challenges and global security developments of mutual interest.
The SPDMM membership includes Defence Ministers from Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, New Zealand, France, Chile and Australia. In the current strategic environment, SPDMM has become increasingly crucial to share experiences and address regional challenges with Pacific partners. SPDMM allows Defence partners to share views and shape solutions on existing and emerging threats in the region, contribute to key policy developments, and identify collective solutions.
Indian Ocean Rim Association
2.35
DFAT submitted that IORA is ‘the only ministerial-level forum specifically focused on the Indian Ocean region’ and is comprised of 23 member states. IORA foreign ministers meet annually, but there has only been one leaders’ meeting which was held in 2017. DFAT stated that the key priorities for IORA include:
…maritime safety and security; trade and investment facilitation; fisheries management; disaster risk management; academic, science and technology cooperation; tourism and cultural exchange; the blue economy; and women’s economic empowerment.
2.36
Australia chaired IORA from 2013 to 2015. According to DFAT, Australia’s focus is engagement with key partners on ‘maritime safety and security, women’s economic empowerment, the blue economy, fisheries management and institutional strengthening’ in particular with India, Bangladesh and
Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean region, and Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand in Southeast Asia.
'Minilateral' groupings
2.37
Alongside larger multilateral groupings of countries in the region such as ASEAN, APEC and PIF, recent years have seen the development of other smaller 'minilateral' groupings involving Australia.
2.38
Australia is involved in a number of trilateral groupings including: the Trilateral Security Dialogue (between the US, Japan and Australia); the Australia-Indonesia-Timor-Leste trilateral; the Australia-India-France trilateral; and the Australia-India-Indonesia trilateral. Additionally, of particular note, is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (involving the US, Japan, India and Australia) which was highlighted in the evidence received by the committee and is discussed further in Chapter 3.
Trilateral groupings
2.39
DFAT briefly described each of the abovementioned trilateral groupings that Australia is engaged in:
The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, comprising Australia, Japan and the United States, brings together key likeminded partners in the Indo-Pacific to engage on strategic priorities. The most senior meeting of this group has been at leaders’ level. The group is focused on counter-terrorism,
non-proliferation, maritime security, good governance, the rule of law and human rights.
The Australia-Indonesia-Timor-Leste trilateral has potential [to] deepen engagement between the three governments. The most senior meeting of this group has been at foreign ministers’ level. Ministers committed to working together to support the security, economic recovery and stability of the Indo-Pacific; encouraged concrete activities enhancing connectivity, trade, investment, tourism, agriculture and fisheries; reaffirmed support for Timor-Leste’s application for ASEAN membership and committed to gender equality, including as a key part of COVID-19 recovery efforts.
The Australia-India-France trilateral is an emerging mechanism focused on shared interests, particularly in the Indian Ocean. The most senior meeting of this group has been at foreign ministers’ level. The group is focused on practical responses to the pandemic, rising strategic competition, sustainability of oceans, disaster resilience, climate change and reinforcing the rules-based order.
The Australia-India-Indonesia trilateral brings together three major regional democracies to cooperate on connectivity, combatting terrorism and transnational organised crime, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and maritime security. The most senior meeting of this group has been at senior officials’ level.
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
2.40
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (often referred to simply as the 'Quad') is described by DFAT as 'a forum for leader and ministerial-level discussion of strategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific.' DFAT described Australia’s relationship with the Quad:
Through the Quad, Australia seeks to promote and protect a shared vision of the region and a balance that supports our interests. Our Quad engagement provides a mechanism for practical cooperation on the region’s most pressing priorities, complementing Australian engagement with ASEAN and other bilateral and regional engagement…
Australia uses the Quad to deepen practical cooperation on pressing regional challenges including maritime security, infrastructure, supply chain resilience, counterterrorism, humanitarian and disaster relief, cyber security and countering disinformation.
2.41
DISER submitted that the Quad ‘provides an agile forum to discuss emerging issues of common interest and encourages cooperation of like-minded member states—Australia, India, Japan and the United States’ and also noted the ‘opportunity for furthering Australia’s critical and emerging technology interests.’
2.42
DFAT advised that the Quad 'was originally born of joint efforts responding to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami'. It underwent a period of hiatus from 2008, before being reinvigorated in late 2017 through regular senior officials’ meetings. Quad Foreign Ministers first met in New York in September 2019, with ministers subsequently meeting in Tokyo in October 2020 and virtually in February 2021.
Quad leaders' summit
2.43
In March 2021, US President Biden hosted an historic Quad leaders’ summit, by videoconference, following which leaders issued a joint statement 'committing to strengthening cooperation on the economic and health impacts of COVID-19 on the Indo-Pacific, climate change and critical and emerging technology'. DFAT noted that Australia will ‘contribute subject-matter experts to the Quad working groups that have been established on each [of] these issues to take forward the agenda.’
2.44
With regard to the Quad’s cooperation on the response to COVID-19, DFAT highlighted an announcement made by Quad leaders to partner on supporting access to vaccines in the region:
…which aims to accelerate the region’s pathway out of the pandemic by ramping up vaccine manufacturing capacity, funding the procurement and distribution of vaccines and providing ‘last-mile’ delivery support across the region.
2.45
DISER also noted the Quad leaders’ statement on technology which announced:
…a new Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group, which presents opportunities for collaboration with Quad members on AI [artificial intelligence], quantum computing and critical technology and minerals and supply chain security.
2.46
On 13 September 2021, the United States announced President Joe Biden would host the first face-to-face Quad Leaders’ Summit at the White House on 24 September 2021. Details of the meeting are covered in Chapter 3.
Non-government (Track 2) diplomacy
2.47
Beyond government-to-government arrangements, Aus-CSCAP submitted that non-government, otherwise known as Track 2, diplomacy plays an important complementary role in the regional architecture of the Indo-Pacific.
Aus-CSCAP stated that ‘[w]hile governments mostly did the heavy lifting in assembling the existing regional institutions, ‘Track 2’ diplomacy has always had a role’ and that, ‘[a]rguably, in an environment in which consensus among governments is more elusive and strategic competition is shaping regional relationships, Track 2 has even more to offer.’
2.48
DFAT agreed that Track 2 diplomacy was important for Australia’s strategic interests in the region, stating:
Australia’s engagement in Track 2 (non-government) and Track 1.5 (combined government and non-government) dialogues and other informal diplomatic mechanisms plays an important role in supporting our regional strategic interests.
2.49
DFAT provided some examples of Track 2 and Track 1.5 initiatives that support Australia’s multilateral and minilateral engagement in the
Indo-Pacific, including:
[the] newly-commenced track 1.5 discussions among Australian, Indian and French think tanks and government officials provide a forum for frank discussion and sharing of ideas, supporting ongoing government-to-government cooperation within the Australia-India-France (AIF) trilateral partnership;
the long-standing Track 2 ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Dialogue (AANZ), co-led by Melbourne University’s Asialink and counterpart organisations in Malaysia and New Zealand, complements official engagement with ASEAN and its architecture; [and]
the ASEAN Regional Forum’s Track 2 mechanism, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), hosts a biennial conference and a range of workshops and other initiatives that provide a platform for exchange among regional think tanks and universities.
2.50
DFAT emphasised its support for Australia’s participation in CSCAP, including through funding assistance.
2.51
Aus-CSCAP also noted a couple of additional Track 2 initiatives that operate in the region, including:
the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council which promotes economic development in the region; and
the Association of Asian Social Science Research Councils [which] promotes regional cooperation in the field of social sciences among Asia-Pacific countries.
2.52
Aus-CSCAP concluded that Track 2 diplomacy is a useful supplement to government-to-government level regional engagement, stating:
Australia’s engagement with regional architecture, therefore, has history and momentum at both the official and non-official levels. It supplements our resources and education exports, and our military capacities, in enhancing our regional credentials…
In seeking to advance Australia’s strategic interests, Track 2 endeavours can supplement official regionalism…
Areas in which Track 2 discussion has made a contribution to official processes over the last decade or so include counter-extremism, refugee and other illegal people movements, South China Sea maritime relations, peacekeeping, regional architecture, post COVID-19 pandemic prospects and deliberation on the Rules Based Order.