Chapter 9
Australian Defence Force
9.1
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been involved in overseas peacekeeping
operations for 60 years. Since 1947, the ADF has participated in 39 UN peacekeeping
operations and 16 non-UN operations.[1] ADF troops
have operated close to home in East Timor and Solomon Islands and further afield
in places like Somalia and the Middle East.[2]
9.2
The changing nature of peacekeeping has affected the ADF's role. It is
increasingly involved in activities such as policing and civil–military tasks,
mediation between disputants, negotiation, training and education of other
forces and delivery of humanitarian assistance.[3]
9.3
In this chapter, the committee examines the capacity of the ADF, in
terms of personnel and equipment, to meet the growing demands of peacekeeping
operations. It discusses the current standard and adequacy of training for the
ADF, including whether there is a need for additional peacekeeping training or
a permanent peacekeeping force. The committee then looks at the health and
safety preparation of ADF personnel for service in a peacekeeping mission.
Capacity
9.4
Today's complex peacekeeping operations place significant demands on
Defence capacity and equipment. Defence acknowledged that it must have a force
prepared and resourced to meet the challenges of overseas deployment. For
example, the 2006–2016 Defence Capability Plan states:
The emphasis will be on a professional, well-trained,
well-equipped force that is available for operations at short notice, and one
that can be sustained on deployment over extended periods. This type of force
will provide the flexibility to deal with operations other than conventional
war, and contribute to coalition operations.[4]
9.5
The committee looks first at ADF personnel before discussing equipment and
logistics.
Personnel
9.6
The number of peacekeeping operations has surged since the end of the
Cold War, and more troops are required to meet this demand. Australia has
responded to the call. Currently, the ADF is actively engaged in eight peacekeeping
operations, five of which are UN-led, one supports the multinational force of
observers in the Sinai and two are Australian-led operations: Regional
Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and International Stabilisation
Force (ISF) in East Timor.[5]
In July 2007, approximately 1,200 personnel were deployed in support of peacekeeping
operations: 33 with UN operations, 25 in the Sinai, 140 in Solomon Islands and
990 in Timor-Leste.[6]
9.7
Australia also has troops posted to overseas operations that are not
classified as peacekeeping operations. At January 2008, there were 1,575 ADF
personnel deployed in Iraq (Operation Catalyst) and 970 personnel committed to
the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, which reached over
1,000 by mid-2008.[7]
9.8
In August 2006, in response to the growing need for an increased force,
the Australian Government announced plans to raise two additional army
battalions that would strengthen the numbers of ADF personnel available for
overseas deployment, including peacekeeping operations.[8]
Defence informed the committee that these two battalions, 7 RAR (7th
Battalion Royal Australian Regiment) and 8/9 RAR, would be raised in two
stages, the second stage depending on 'a demonstrated growth in Stage One'. The
committee notes that the Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Procurement, Greg
Combet, announced in May 2008 that the government has committed $650m in 2008–09
to the Enhanced Land Force initiative.[9]
Recruitment and retention
9.9
The ADF has for many years experienced difficulties in recruiting and
retaining personnel. On 20 March 2008, when announcing the new Defence senior
leadership team, the Minister for Defence, Joel Fitzgibbon, stated that 'the
single biggest challenge facing the Australian Defence Force in the future is
our people and skills shortage'. He recognised, as had his predecessors, the
need for the ADF to find effective ways to recruit and retain personnel.[10]
The difficulties associated with recruitment and retention have been discussed in
several reports and estimates hearings over the last two decades.[11]
The Defence Update 2007 stated:
As the ADF's commitments on operations grow, Defence needs to
grow to about 57,000 full-time military personnel over the coming decade. A
total of $3.1 billion is being invested in recruitment and retention
initiatives...[12]
9.10
Despite the need to improve Defence recruitment and retention, Lt Gen Gillespie
stated categorically that the government had 'never decided not to be involved
in an operation because we did not have the forces'.[13]
This position, however, was not universally shared. DFAT noted in relation to sending
a force to Darfur that Australia is unable to contribute more because of 'the
ADF’s current operational commitments across a range of peacekeeping and other
operations'.[14]
Equipment
9.11
As well as having sufficient personnel, Defence needs to have equipment
appropriate for peacekeeping operations. Although evidence suggested that this
matter was not of significant concern to submitters, including Defence, the committee
looks briefly at the suitability of the ADF equipment for the rising number of
complex peacekeeping operations.
9.12
Lt Gen Gillespie stated clearly that 'equipment procured for Defence of
Australia will continue to suit peace operations'.[15]
In his view, the ADF, so far, had been able to respond to overseas missions
without having 'had to radically restructure our force' but not without
adjustments to the capabilities:
We found in Afghanistan and Iraq that the Bushmaster [infantry
mobility vehicle] had some threat against it, so we increased its protection.
We have put some weapons on it that we had not envisaged doing before...The point
I am trying to make here is that, if we needed vehicles for Timor or Iraq and
all those other places, we did not have to invent them. We had them by taking
our force structure posture. If we have to increase force protection and put
weapons on them, then that is mission specific.[16]
9.13
He continued:
[I]t is one of the benefits of the way that we force structure
for the defence and warfighting defence of our nation...that we can pick up the
other tasks along the road by levering back to the delivery of military force
but using the hardware and the people and their skills to get the peace
outcomes that we want.[17]
9.14
Major General (Retired) Michael Smith, Austcare, submitted, however,
that the ADF might 'need some additional assets' for peacekeeping.[18]
Mr Rob Wesley-Smith, Australians for a Free East Timor, also expressed
concern that the ADF's heavy equipment might not always suit operations other
than war. It seemed to him that:
...since 1999 that the ADF has only 'big' or 'heavy' equipment,
suitable for fighting a full-on war, but not suitable for dealing with civilian
unrest and gang skirmishes...So it needs to have more versatile equipment and
outfitting.[19]
9.15
In his submission, he referred to the outbreak of violence in Timor-Leste
in 2006 suggesting that the large weapons used by foot patrols at that time were
'inappropriate'.[20]
Committee view
9.16
The committee accepts that Australia's contributions to peacekeeping operations
will be constrained in large measure by the practical considerations of available
resources, including personnel and equipment. Clearly, the ADF is looking to
increase the number of its personnel and has received increased funding for
this purpose. The committee accepts that recruiting and retaining people suitable
for service in the ADF has been a major challenge for many years and supports
current efforts to address this problem. The committee notes the Minister for
Defence's observation that the ADF must find effective ways to recruit and
retain personnel. With regard to equipment, the committee notes observations
about the need for 'more versatile equipment' or 'additional assets', but
considers that the ADF has the ability to build on its current capabilities to
meet the demands of peacekeeping.
Training for peacekeeping operations
9.17
Lt Gen Gillespie stated that the ADF is structured for war fighting and
has always had a deployment culture. When asked about Defence doctrine and
training and how it applies to a low-level threat environment, he acknowledged
the importance of adapting to the changing nature of peacekeeping.[21]
Even so, he underlined his view that the ADF focuses on what 'Defence needs to
do for the country: that is, be prepared to defend Australia and its interests,
and we force structure along those lines'. He stated:
We have found that we can adapt that force structure and our
preparedness model to help in all sorts of environments...sometimes that
adaptation is a war-fighting adaptation. Sometimes it is going to Aceh and
doing it unarmed and just using military brute manpower to bring about an
outcome.[22]
9.18
Addressing a conference at the Australian War Memorial in September
2007, Lt Gen Gillespie stated that the ADF's force structure 'continues to
provide forces that are adaptable to peace operations'. Even so, he recognised
that the 'demanding nature of contemporary peace operations may involve
adjustments to our individual and collective training regimens'. He stated that
the ADF was reviewing its existing training regime for peace operations and
indicated that preparing for a peacekeeping operation would take a 'more
prominent place in our defence planning than it has in the past'. He explained
that the ADF was preparing its personnel for peacekeeping because such
'training makes good sense, and can potentially be a force multiplier'. Nonetheless,
he pointed out that this training would be 'supplementary to our primary war
fighting roles and combat related training'.[23]
9.19
Recognising that training is an integral part of ADF culture, Lt Gen Gillespie
maintained that ADF members are not deployed on operation until the training
has been done and understood.[24]
Brigadier Andrew Sims, Director-General, Support, Headquarters Joint
Operations Command, spoke of generating a culture whereby:
...if the environment is such or the threat is so great you train
these guys so they are instinctive. That occurs not just before you leave Australia
but also when you are in theatre. This training is continual; it is ongoing...from
my time in Bosnia and East Timor, I certainly know that we were doing it once a
fortnight. They would sit there and we would go over it again and again. That
sounds tedious, but the guys understood that they did not have the time to stop
and think; they could lose someone. That training is reinforced all the way
through.[25]
9.20
Defence noted that the ADF has developed a good reputation for its
training and professionalism:
Australia's contributions to peace operations are highly
regarded and often sought, not least because our military personnel have
developed a reputation for professionalism, reliability and resourcefulness. In
the case of peace operations beyond our region, Defence places priority on
adding value predominantly through the contribution of expertise, rather than
pure numbers of military personnel.[26]
9.21
The Australian Peacekeeper and Peacemaker Veterans' Association (APPVA)
was one of the many submitters who supported this view:
...the ADF has arguably the best trained service personnel in the
world. The training has significantly provided successful contributions toward
PKO [peacekeeping operations] and has provided international accolades for the
professionalism of these people.[27]
9.22
While the ADF may be well trained, their remit has expanded to include a
range of activities involved in peacekeeping such as mediation, negotiation,
education, training and humanitarian tasks. The committee now considers how
this is incorporated into the ADF's pre-deployment training.
Pre-deployment training
9.23
Lt Gen Gillespie informed the committee that specific peacekeeping
training is routinely conducted as part of the ADF's pre-deployment training.[28]
Training covers mission mandate and skills training, liaison and negotiation
skills, cultural awareness and civil–military cooperation (CIMIC).[29]
It is delivered by the 39th Personnel Support Battalion (39 PSB),
based in Randwick, Sydney.[30]
While mainly an ADF training facility, the 39 PSB has also trained
representatives from the AFP, DFAT, Customs, the Quarantine Service and
Immigration.[31]
9.24
Defence stated that, in addition, the ADF may organise a specific
mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) to 'practise and refine the ADF contingent's
ability to deal with potential mission scenarios'.[32]
The APPVA considered MREs as 'some of the finest preparations for operations in
the world'.[33]
These exercises also included personnel from other government and
non-government agencies and are referred to in Chapter 13.
ADF Peacekeeping Centre and
International Peace Operations Seminar
9.25
Mainly a 'repository for peace operations expertise and experience', the
ADF Peacekeeping Centre (ADFPKC) at Williamtown also has a role in educating
and training ADF for peacekeeping operations. According to Defence, the centre
also monitors international peace operations, assists ADF units and individuals
train for peace operations, and develops doctrine, procedures and tactics for
peace operations.[34]
9.26
Lt Gen Gillespie explained the difference between ADFPKC training and mission-specific
training:
The peacekeeping centre is more about the policy, doctrine and
engagement type things that some of the leadership would be doing or how to be
a military observer. The pre-deployment training we give prepares people to
live in the environment and understand the culture, and to gain some of the new
techniques in things that they might do.[35]
9.27
Austcare submitted that the ADFPKC had contributed little to the
development of peace operations, as 'it has been starved of resources for many
years, staffed by only 2–4 middle-ranking officers, and having little clout
within the ADF'.[36]
The committee notes that the centre is indeed staffed by only a few officers—a
Director at Lieutenant Colonel level and three staff officers, one from each
service, responsible for analysis and development, doctrine and training.[37]
Defence informed the committee that the 'authorised establishment of full-time staff
at the ADF Peacekeeping Centre is currently two [which] is supplemented by
Reserve personnel and staff from the ADF Warfare Centre when required'.[38]
9.28
Defence acknowledged that the centre is small but suggested that it
continues 'to meet all its tasking by utilising outside resources and the
resources of the ADF Warfare Centre, of which it is an integral part'. It
informed the committee further that the Peacekeeping Centre is 'to maintain all
its responsibilities with two full-time staff supported by a contractor pool
and Reservists'.[39]
9.29
This centre also provides training to higher ranks (from Major to
Lieutenant Colonel equivalent) through the annual two-week International Peace
Operations Seminar (IPOS). The seminar focuses on policy and doctrine and involves
40 to 50 participants from Australia and overseas, including the ADF, government
and non-government agencies and civilians.[40]
9.30
While the content changes according to circumstances and the needs of
the ADF, common topics include: conflict prevention; the UN; ADF/Australian government
policy and planning; civil–military cooperation (CIMIC); humanitarian issues;
gender; culture; and dealing with the media.[41]
The Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law (APCML) conducts a two-day module on
legal issues for the IPOS seminar.[42]
9.31
According to Defence, over the last three years (prior to July 2007),
251 personnel had attended training activities conducted by the ADF Peacekeeping
Centre. It should be noted that these figures also included overseas
participants.[43]
9.32
Referring mainly to IPOS, Red Cross argued that, while acknowledging the
large number of people and time constraints involved, IPOS-type training should
be provided to all those deploying to overseas peace operations:
...with the exception of the AFP's IDG course, which all deploying
AFP personnel must attend, other training programs target only a limited number
of Defence and other government personnel who may be deployed. The vast
majority of a peacekeeping contingent is therefore unlikely to have a clear
understanding of the humanitarian organisations and their legitimate roles in
the area of operation. This raises squarely the need for more uniform training
of all Australian personnel deploying on peace operations.[44]
9.33
The committee is of the view that while the role expected of the ADFPKC
is ambitious and to be applauded, the centre does not have the resources
necessary to fulfil its objectives. It is clear that the centre has limited
capacity to include any significant number of ADF personnel in its seminars and
courses or to conduct research of substance, particularly in the important area
of analysis and development.
Scope for improvement
9.34
Despite the training that ADF members undergo before deployment to a
peacekeeping operation, some witnesses were of the view that the ADF could do
more. They particularly wanted to highlight the challenges facing those trained
for warfare but deployed on a peacekeeping operation. The United Nations
Association of Australia (UNAA) and the UN Youth Association of Australia
(UNYAA) observed:
We think a concerted effort should be made to train personnel
for the diverse challenges of peace operations, particularly focusing on
familiarising the ADF with the different rules of engagement within peace
operations and also their requirements under international humanitarian law and
the different requirements in those situations.[45]
9.35
Major General (Retired) Tim Ford noted that while there is a requirement
for the Australian military to be competent in their own discipline, it also needs
to understand the complex nature of peacekeeping operations:
The ADF has already appreciated that those deploying on peace
operations must be well trained in 'war fighting' capabilities, and the 'use of
force' to be credible, but they must also appreciate the principles of minimum
use of force, consent and impartiality, and the complex nature of peacekeeping
operations to be fully effective.[46]
9.36
Major General Smith, Austcare, agreed. He drew attention to the 2006
deployment of the ADF to Timor-Leste stating that his heart went out to these 'Australian
diggers' who 'were not really equipped and prepared for the task that we were
asking them to do'. In his view:
[We] cannot anymore say that you are a war fighter or you are a
peacekeeper; you are a soldier. The same people who might be doing the
traditional peacekeeping thing of monitoring for one part of their assignment
might be doing almost war fighting for another and then in the middle they
might have to do some crowd control as well. So we have a responsibility to
prepare our young men and women for that...[47]
ADF personnel serving as
peacekeepers
OPERATION
TOWER in Timor-Leste (image courtesy Department of Defence).
Engineers from the 3 Combat
Engineer Regiment, as part of Timor-Leste Battle Group 3, build a playground
for the children of the Hope Orphanage in Gleno (image courtesy Department of Defence).
West
Australian Army Reserve soldiers during perimeter patrol around the palm oil
plantation at Mbalisuna (image courtesy Department of Defence).
A
Malaysian policeman and an Australian Timor-Leste Battle Group soldier conduct
a vehicle check in the mountain area south of Dili in the district of Dare (image
courtesy Department of Defence).
9.37
Writing in the Australian Army Journal, Colonel John Hutcheson
also noted that Australian soldiers had a good understanding of the application
of lethal force but 'developing other techniques (and non lethal weapons) to
subdue an adversary will increase the number of options available' to them. He
indicated that more work could be done in developing soldiers' thinking and
decision-making, suggesting that the 'army must continue to work at placing
soldiers in a variety of scenarios to support their decision-making skills at
home and in-theatre'.[48]
Australian Training Support Team East
Timor (ATST-EM)
9.38
Apart from the general support for ADF to improve their training regime so
that it gives greater attention to peacekeeping-type activities, as distinct
from warfare, there was no evidence of significant problems with ADF's training
programs. One particular deployment, however, did raise concerns that related
directly to the requirement for ADF peacekeepers to be trained for non-military
type tasks. Two members of ATST-EM were highly critical of their preparation
for this mission. As noted in Chapter 7, ATST-EM was deployed to East Timor
during 1999–2003 with the primary mission to establish, train and develop the
East Timor Defence Force to be a conventional army.[49]
Captain Wayne McInnes argued that there was 'no fundamental linkage
between the normal, run-of-the-mill soldiering skills and those skills that are
required by soldiers to operate in an environment when it is defence
cooperation'. He stated:
There is no real training package available that gives you any
sort of foundation to be able to operate within international law and to
understand the politics of the day. There is not a great understanding of the
functioning of UNTAET, as well. So you are under a cloud of uncertainty, right
from the word go.[50]
9.39
The committee has already suggested in Chapter 7 that the experiences of
ATST-EM should be used as a case study to ensure that the lessons to be learnt
from this deployment are captured. It would also provide an opportunity to look
carefully at whether ADF personnel would benefit from additional training that
focuses on the challenges of serving in an operation unarmed, as members of
ATST-EM were, or in situations and operations where war-fighting skills are not
applicable.
Committee view
9.40
The committee acknowledges that the ADF is widely recognised and
respected for its high standards, professionalism and effectiveness. The committee
notes, however, that peacekeeping entails a range of activities not necessarily
associated with warfare. The committee notes that the skills and capabilities
required to deal with peacekeeping operations are not new. Armies during
conflict have always been required to give thought to how to engage with the
civilian authorities and populace. It is just as important to have these skills
and capacities to deal with conventional conflict situations as the war in Iraq
has demonstrated.
9.41
Even so, the committee has drawn attention to the suggestions by some submitters,
particularly former ADF members who served in command positions in peacekeeping
operations, about the need to have training over and above that required for
warfare. As outlined above, the ADF has incorporated into its training regime
programs specifically designed for peacekeeping deployments. In this regard, the
committee notes the limited capacity of the ADF Peacekeeping Centre,
especially at a time when the nature of peacekeeping is changing and presenting
new challenges for the ADF.
9.42
The committee also notes the comments by Lt Gen Gillespie indicating
that training for peacekeeping operations is going to take a 'more prominent
place' in ADF training. The committee supports this initiative and suggests
that the ADF report regularly to the committee on the progress made in this
area of training.
Recommendation 8
9.43
The committee recommends that the ADF place a high priority on its
undertaking to give training for peacekeeping operations a 'more prominent
place' in its training regime. This training should extend to reservists as
well as regular members of the ADF.
9.44
One major concern about the ADF's training for peacekeeping operations
related to the integrated nature of modern operations, and the need to
cooperate and coordinate activities with other government agencies and
non-government organisations. This aspect of ADF's training is considered
further in Chapter 11—ADF–AFP interoperability; Chapter 13—Coordinating
Australia's contribution; and Chapter 14—Non-government organisations.
Permanent peacekeeping capability
9.45
Some submitters wanted to go further than introducing additional training
elements for ADF personnel: they argued that a special peacekeeping capability should
be established within the ADF. For example, the UNAA and the UNYAA supported this
view, explaining:
...once you train down people whose primary responsibilities are
conflict to do peacekeeping operations, their effectiveness at doing those
peacekeeping operations will never be as good as those of a group who have been
trained specifically for [peacekeeping].[51]
9.46
Yet many submitters were of the opposite opinion and, like the RSL, strongly
opposed a designated peacekeeping capability:
The ADF trains and prepares for war...In the past suggestions have
been made that the ADF should primarily train for peace keeping operations. It
is fortunate that these suggestions have been ignored...training for war ensures
that...[a]dapting these core combatant skills to the individual circumstances of
each peace keeping or peace enforcing operation is...comparatively simple and has
proven to be successful in a number of varied locations and situations. Any
armed force trained specifically for peace keeping would find it impossible at
short notice to step-up to higher levels of operations, which is a further
reason for maintaining the current training regime.[52]
9.47
Major General Ford concurred:
I do not ever see a peacekeeping force sitting around Australia
waiting to go somewhere; I see us preparing for an operation based on the
forces that we have got training in our different organisations. The [AFP], the
ADF and other departments have a capacity; and when we start to think about
going into a mission...where we need to bring those together...we will.[53]
9.48
These views align with Defence's contention that it is 'well positioned
to contribute effectively to peace operations' and sees no need to establish a
permanent peacekeeping force.[54]
Lt Gen Gillespie reinforced this argument and pointed to the problems that
have arisen in countries where the defence force has been restructured for peacekeeping
operations:
In the military arena, once you move down the line of deciding
to restructure...it will take you a decade or more to recover if you [decide]
that you need to change back or you need to take a different posture. With the
nature of defence acquisition and the capabilities that you have, even if you
can build the battleship really quickly, after you have given away battleships
it is really hard to re-instil in a crew, commander and team all the
professional attributes necessary for that battleship to become a military
capability. By and large that can take a decade or more...Others have found it
pretty hard to go back...[55]
9.49
Speaking more generally about a dedicated peacekeeping unit, AusAID
representatives also agreed that it was not preferable. Mr March considered the
more pragmatic approach was to ensure sound understanding and interoperability
between agencies, so that they are able to operate together effectively when
required:
Are our standby mechanisms and our discussions outside of the
crisis robust enough? Perhaps they can be finetuned so that when we need to
bring a particular number of police plus a particular number of humanitarian
actors and a particular number of military actors, you can bring them together
quickly and there is an understood degree of interoperability and you can bring
that to bear. To me, that seems infinitely more manageable and resource
efficient than having a unit of very high level capability just off to one
side, not doing much.[56]
9.50
AusAID was of the view that better understanding between agencies,
increased information exchange, joint planning and preparation could continue
to enhance Australia's contribution.[57]
9.51
The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in
its 2001 report on Australia's role in United Nations reform was
also of the view that the ADF 'should be trained for war rather than solely for
peacekeeping'.[58]
Committee view
9.52
Considering the evidence about ADF capability and the debate for or
against a permanent peacekeeping force, the committee is of the opinion that Australia
should not move towards a permanent peacekeeping force within the ADF. Indeed,
many submitters roundly rejected the notion of Australia having a dedicated
permanent peacekeeping force. As noted earlier, however, the committee
recognises the importance of having specific peacekeeping training for ADF
members that builds on the ADF's already highly regarded pre-deployment
training.
Training in health, safety and wellbeing
9.53
Australian peacekeepers may live and work under conditions that pose
significant hazards to their health due to isolation, inadequate sanitation,
contaminated water, or the prevalence of endemic diseases such as malaria. Being
away from home for long periods of time, in potentially volatile situations, is
not easy. Preparation and training in health matters, including mental health,
should therefore be an important part of the ADF preparation for deployments. In
the following section, the committee looks at this aspect of ADF training.
9.54
According to Defence, health and first aid training is part of the
initial employment training for all personnel. This includes education about health
and hygiene and prevention of sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS.
It also consists of mental health training based on the ADF Mental Health
Strategy.
9.55
Defence informed the committee that throughout their service careers, ADF
members are encouraged to maintain a sense of personal well-being and to
develop a healthy and physically fit lifestyle.[59]
Annual awareness training focuses on health education and screening, alcohol,
tobacco and drug usage, with refresher training provided throughout the career
of an ADF member.[60]
9.56
There is also mandatory pre-deployment training on health and hygiene
issues specific to the deployment as well as psychological and mental health
preparation both for the deployment and return to Australia.[61]
Psychological briefings include topics such as preparing for separation from
family, cultural adaptation, identifying and managing operational stressors,
and suicide prevention.
Committee view
9.57
In this chapter, the committee noted the ADF's pre-deployment health
training and its efforts to raise health awareness amongst its personnel.
During the inquiry, the mental health of ADF peacekeepers was raised as a
matter of concern. The committee takes this matter seriously and continues its
consideration of the mental health of ADF peacekeepers in Chapter 21 which
focuses on post-deployment care.
Families
9.58
In relation to preparing ADF members and their families for separation, the
Australian Veterans and Defence Services Council (AVADSC) suggested that members'
families should attend a pre-deployment briefing. In its view, families should
be aware of matters such as approximate date of departure and length of service
overseas, how to contact their loved ones and where to obtain assistance if
required.[62]
9.59
The committee heard of the services available to deploying members and
their families. It noted the Defence Community Organisation's (DCO) role in
arranging debriefings, emergency finance, counselling services, information on
local support groups, and other assistance.[63]
However, the committee understands that while DCO services are available on
request, they are not part of the briefing process.
Committee view
9.60
The committee notes the call for the involvement of ADF families in the
briefing process and draws the ADF's attention to these concerns.
ADF's duty of care
9.61
ADF personnel on peacekeeping deployments are generally armed and
operate in an unfamiliar and sometimes volatile environment. Under these
conditions, safety in the use of weapons and equipment is extremely important. During
this inquiry, concerns about the adequacy of training with regard to safety
were raised only in relation to ATST-EM. However, the committee is aware of a
number of previous reports and inquiries that are relevant. In 2002, the
Auditor-General noted that during deployments to East Timor, there were 117
unauthorised discharges of weapons by Australian troops, mainly as a result of
incorrect drills. The audit report suggested that Defence 'should continue to
seek to minimise the incidence of such discharges and examine the feasibility
of issuing blank ammunition to enhance the realism of pre-deployment training'.[64]
9.62
Also, the committee's 2005 report on the effectiveness of Australia's
military justice system identified what it regarded as lapses in the ADF's duty
of care, noting:
One factor that became increasingly obvious as this inquiry
progressed was the apparent lack of awareness by those in middle management of
inappropriate or risky behaviour. Their unawareness or inaction meant that
unsafe work practices continued unchecked until an incident requiring
investigation shed light on such practices. Unfortunately, in some cases, the incident
sparking the investigation involved the death of an ADF member.[65]
9.63
The committee also cites recent inquiries such as the Boards of Inquiry
into the death of Private Jacob Kovco, the Nias Island Sea King Accident and
the coroner's inquest into the death of Trooper Angus Lawrence. All point to
serious breaches in safety procedures. For example, the Board of Inquiry into
the Sea King accident stated bluntly that the 'Navy's stated commitment to
safety was not matched in practice'.[66]
9.64
Although these incidents were isolated and did not occur during a peacekeeping
operation, they are nonetheless potent reminders to the ADF of the need to
ensure that all ADF members are properly trained and comply with health and
safety guidelines and procedures, including the maintenance of equipment.
Conclusion
9.65
The ADF has a long and proud history of involvement in peacekeeping
operations. The evidence presented to this inquiry demonstrated that the ADF is
continuing its fine tradition through its highly professional and well-trained
personnel. The committee, however, raised a number of matters that it believes
the ADF should review. These include the need for ADF personnel to receive
additional training over and above that required for warfare and the adequacy
of the preparation of ADF personnel with regard to mental health.
9.66
In the next chapter, the committee turns its focus on the other major
Australian contributor to peacekeeping operations, the AFP.
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