Chapter 5Committee views and recommendations
5.1This inquiry was established to investigate the nation-wide Optus network outage on 8 November 2023, and to examine whether Optus exercised its responsibilities as a telecommunications carrier and operator of crucial national infrastructure with appropriate due diligence.
5.2Evidence to the committee from Optus outlined that there were three key activities undertaken by Optus on the day of the outage. Those being: identifying and resolving the cause of the outage; communicating with customers; and liaising with government and other industry stakeholders.
5.3More broadly, the inquiry explored fundamental questions prompted by the outage regarding:
the operation of the Emergency Call Service (TripleZero);
the feasibility of temporary mobile roaming during mass network outages;
whether telecommunications networks should be bound to the same security obligations as other critical infrastructure operators; and
the adequacy of consumer protections regulations and dispute resolution schemes in the telecommunications sector related to mass network outages.
5.4The above points form the basis of the committee's views and recommendations, which are explored in this chapter.
5.5At the outset, the committee wishes to acknowledge the regulatory reform in the telecommunications sector that has been committed to by the Australian Government since the outage.
5.6In particular, the committee notes that in March 2024, the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts completed its review of the outage and published its final report. Thecommittee notes that the report made 18 comprehensive recommendations that were agreed to, in principle, by the Australian Government. The committee does not seek to reiterate the findings and recommendations made in that report but will draw on them where relevant to its assessment.
Adequacy of Optus’ communications
5.7In the event of a major service disruption, like the Optus outage, Australians expect and deserve transparent, timely and informative advice. The committee considers that it is incumbent on telecommunications carriers to provide such advice. During the outage, two aspects of Optus’ communications were particularly striking.
5.8First, the committee considers that the timeliness and comprehensiveness of Optus’ public communications were inadequate.
5.9The first public interview made by the CEO, MsKellyBayerRosmarin, was at 10.40am, over six hours after the outage began. This occurred after the Minister for Communications called on Optus to provide an update.
5.10Compounding this was Optus' initial method of communication. Between 6.30am and 10.40am, Optus used social media posts and statements provided to media to communicate to its customers that an outage was occurring. Thismeans that in the early hours of the outage, unless Optus customers were able to access social media, which many presumably could not, they were left uncertain about what was happening, and when services were expected to be restored.
5.11In the committee's view, it stretches credulity that Optus did not think to update the Australian public sooner and in a more accessible way given the severity of the circumstances.
5.12Second, the committee notes deficiencies in Optus’ communications with government and essential service organisations.
5.13Evidence to the committee suggested that emergency services organisations faced challenges responding to emergencies during the outage due to a lack of timely information from Optus. Effective crisis management should include a clear communication hierarchy and systematic response, prioritising essential services, which Optus' approach appeared to neglect.
5.14Taken together, the committee concludes that Optus’ public communications during the outage were manifestly inadequate.
5.15Optus' actions after the outage, the resignation of its CEO, Ms Bayer Rosmarin, and subsequent reviews of its internal processes have done little to assuage the concern of the public, or indeed, this committee, that this may happen again or that Optus' response might be substantially different.
5.16The failure of Optus to provide credible, honest and forthright information during the outage also reflects on Optus' own inability to improve on its past communication lapse regarding the public disclosure of a malicious breach of its customers data in 2022. This suggests that Optus’ processes for learning from past incidents have not been effective.
5.17More broadly, this display of poor public communication has highlighted to the committee that there are currently no standard requirements for how carriers are to communicate with stakeholders during a mass service disruption. Itseems evident that the internal approaches of telecommunications carriers to public communications may not be reliable.
5.18The committee notes the announcement of the Australian Government on 28August 2024 to direct ACMA to make new rules to ensure customers are kept informed and updated about major outages and significant local outages.
5.19While the committee considers this direction encouraging, the committee also believes that these rules should be developed quickly given the time that has already passed since the Optus outage and the completion of the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts’ review in April 2024.
Recommendation 1
5.20The committee recommends that the Australian Communications Media Authority, in collaboration with industry partners, prioritise as a matter of urgency the development of an enforceable communications standard for carriers that obliges them to communicate to government, emergency services and the public during national outages. The standard should include details outlining at what time and how certain communications need to occur.
Provision of Triple Zero
5.21The outage was not just inconvenient but was potentially dangerous. Mostconcerning to the committee were the reports that many individuals could not be connected to Triple Zero during the outage.
5.22At the outset, the cause of the Triple Zero issue was unknown, but has since been found to be a technical malfunction relating to the presence of live 3G towers that had not wilted, as is the normal procedure during a network outage. Given the imminent planned shutdown of 3G networks on 28 October 2024, it is unlikely that this exact issue will happen again. While the committee reserves comment on this matter as technical issues relating to the cause of the outage are outside of the scope of this inquiry, it is clear that Triple Zero measures should be strengthened to avoid future malfunctions and subsequent outages.
5.23What the committee can comment on is the management of communications and visibility of the issue during the outage. Telstra, the Emergency Call Person, informed the committee that Triple Zero operated as normal on the day of the outage. This contradicted with advice from Optus that many of its consumers could not call Triple Zero.
5.24It has become clear that neither Telstra nor Optus had full visibility of what caused the issue, or why it occurred, meaning no single entity had the ability to provide timely advice to key stakeholders including emergency service organisations, and to the public. The committee considers that the inability of any one body to have effective oversight of the Triple Zero network presents a clear threat to the safety of the Australian community.
5.25The committee notes that the Australian Government has agreed to a number of measures to strengthen Triple Zero reliability and prevent similar outages in the future, including the establishment of a Triple Zero custodian, which would assume responsibility for the network and monitor its operation. The committee notes its support for these recommendations and urges the Government to implement these measures as a matter of priority.
Compliance with statutory obligations
5.26Optus has certain obligations to perform welfare checks on its customers who cannot connect to Triple Zero during a network outage. However, the inquiry highlighted that Optus' disclosure of its activities related to this obligation was not transparent.
5.27Optus initially advised the committee that 228 calls failed, and that welfare checks were untaken for each of these calls. It later revised this number upwards a further two times, and ultimately disclosed in late January 2024 that 2697Triple Zero calls were not be connected during the outage. Optus advised this was determined after an internal audit on its welfare check obligations in late November 2023.
5.28The committee is concerned by the implication that, for an extended period after the outage, Optus did not know the welfare status of 2468 of its customers who unsuccessfully called Triple Zero. Further, it is unclear to the committee whether the additional callers received welfare checks from Optus. If they did, the committee questions the value for the customer in receiving a welfare check so long after their initial Triple Zero call.
5.29The committee notes that Optus has acknowledged its failings in this area. Inresponse, Optus has made changes to its welfare check process and sought an independent review of its compliance with its obligations. According to the findings of that review, Optus has sufficiently addressed the concerns relating to improved welfare checking training.
5.30The committee is further concerned that the investigation by the Australian Communications Media Authority into Optus' compliance with its obligations regarding the Emergency Call Serviceis still ongoing, with no indication of when it will report its findings.
5.31The committee considers that Optus cannot meaningfully implement changes to its welfare check procedures without understanding the full extent to which it did or did not comply with its Triple Zero obligations. Accordingly, it is the committee's view that the Australian Communications Media Authority must expedite the findings of its review and make them publicly available as soon as possible.
Recommendation 2
5.32The committee recommends that the Australian Communications Media Authority publish the findings of its review into Singtel Optus Pty Ltd and its subsidiaries’ compliance with its obligations under the Telecommunications (Emergency Call Service) Determination 2019, the Telecommunications Act 1997 and Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999 as soon as possible.
Recommendation 3
5.33The committee recommends that the Australian Communications Media Authority:
review the remedial action undertaken by Optus to strengthen its processes, procedures, governance controls and communications plans to ensure extensive error checking and regular audits are in place with a view to preventing similar issues reoccurring and ensuring more transparent communications and fulfilment of statutory obligations; and
if required, appoint an Independent Reviewer to review and assess the remedial actions undertaken by Optus.
Feasibility of emergency roaming
5.34Evidence to the inquiry from the carriers suggested that activating large-scale roaming during a nation-wide outage of one carrier network is not currently possible due to technical, administrative and financial constraints.
5.35However, the committee notes that work is being progressed in this space. Aftera 2023 report from the Australian Consumer and Competition Commission found that temporary disaster roaming is technically feasible, carriers and the Australian Government have been working to test temporary disaster roaming within a localised area for a short, specified duration during natural disasters.
5.36The committee recognises the critical importance of this work and the life-saving outcomes it may bring. The committee similarly recognises that implementing emergency roaming is a complex undertaking. That said, the need for emergency roaming in circumstances outside of natural disasters has only become more urgent since the outage. Australians are currently living in a time where the threat of cyberattacks is pronounced, and livelihoods are more dependent on constant connection than ever before.
5.37The committee notes that the current feasibility study is focused on roaming capabilities to be implemented in times of natural disasters only, and not during major outages. The committee considers that this is just the first step and encourages continued government and industry efforts to test the feasibility and practicality of nation-wide roaming during network outages.
Recommendation 4
5.38The committee recommends that the Australian Government work with telecommunications carriers to examine large-scale network roaming and mutual assistance arrangements for major outages.
Preparedness of industry
5.39The committee acknowledges evidence from Optus that the events of the outage on 8 November 2023 were initiated by a confluence of unanticipated and unlikely technical events. The committee similarly acknowledges the inherent complexity of coordinating and executing the restoration of a nation-wide telecommunication network.
5.40In evidence, Optus outlined its contingency and preparedness protocols. Thecommittee is broadly satisfied that Optus took these seriously.
5.41However, despite assurances provided by Optus and other telecommunications carriers on the stringency of their redundancy and resiliency practices, the committee does not have confidence that these additional measures will ensure the appropriate management of an outage in the future.
5.42Despite being crucial to the functioning of society, telecommunications carriers are not bound by the same security requirements as other critical infrastructure providers. The committee notes the Australian Government's intention to rectify this by including telecommunications carriers in the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018. The committee supports this course of action and recommends the Australian Government do so as a matter of urgency.
Recommendation 5
5.43The committee recommends that the Australian Government prioritise as a matter of urgency the introduction of amendments to the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 to clarify that telecommunications carriers are included as critical infrastructure providers.
Compensation for consumers
5.44A key question remains for the committee. If such an outage is to occur again, how can Australians have confidence that their livelihood and safety will be protected, and that they have access to suitable recourse if it is not?
5.45The committee considers it reasonable that customers expect to be adequately compensated for the inconvenience and losses incurred because of network outages.
5.46Optus’ compensation offer to customers did not meet customer expectations. The committee considers that Optus’ offer to provide additional data to 'make more of the network' was disingenuous because few of its customers, including those already on fixed term plans, are likely to need or make use of the additional data being offered.
5.47Equally, the committee considers that comments by Optus that the loss of service represented only $1–2 a day exemplifies that it does not fully appreciate the severity of the outage on its customers. The dollar figure may represent what Optus charges for its services, but not what the loss of that service represents to its customers. The committee is of the view that Optus should have provided discounts on future bills for affected customers, as opposed to the provision of data, to more appropriately reflect the importance of connectivity to Australian consumers and businesses.
Role of the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman
5.48The committee acknowledges that Optus has recognised the unique impact the outage had on small businesses and created a specific response with a dedicated team to address it. Nevertheless, if customers do not feel they have received a satisfactory outcome from mediation with Optus, they have the option to pursue recourse through the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman.
5.49However, the committee does not believe that this scheme is the most appropriate mechanism for compensation arising from large-scale outages as it relies on customers to individually initiate a claim, and only addresses one customer at a time. Where the outage is widespread and the cause of the complaint is abundantly clear, the committee considers that customers should not be expected to assume the burden of navigating their rights and responsibilities to claim rightful compensation.
5.50The committee notes that this issue was highlighted by the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts’ review in April 2024 and that the Australian Government agreed to implement the associated recommendation within 12 months. The committee recommends that the Australian Government expedite the processes and develop a tailored dispute resolution mechanism to be activated in instances of major service outages, operated by the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman.
Recommendation 6
5.51The committee recommends that the Australian Government direct the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman to expedite the development of a tailored dispute resolution mechanism to ensure appropriate compensation in the event of mass telecommunications outages.
Consumer Service Guarantee
5.52The committee also considered whether current telecommunications service guarantees reflect how people need and use telecommunications services.
5.53The committee notes that broadband and mobile services are not covered under the Consumer Service Guarantee. The current Consumer Service Guarantee instrument was extended for three years in 2023, with the Australian Government citing the need to do so until alternative arrangements could be developed.
5.54The way consumers access telecommunications services has significantly evolved over the past decade. Many Australians now rely on internet applications or mobile services to make calls, as opposed to fixed-line phones. Given this, the committee considers that the Optus outage exemplifies the fact the current regulation is not fit for purpose and that a review of the instrument is warranted.
Recommendation 7
5.55The committee recommends that the Australian Government undertake a review of the Consumer Service Guarantee with a view to considering a new, updated Telecommunications (Customer Service Guarantee) Standard, that also applies to fixed broadband and mobile telecommunications services.
Senator Sarah Hanson-Young
Chair