Chapter 3Optus' response to the network outage
3.1This chapter discusses Optus' response to the outage, including its handling of public communications, offers of compensation for affected customers, and the operation of Triple Zero.
Optus' efforts to restore the network
3.2Optus told the committee that it had in place a 'very clear process' to respond to a network outage and that this process was enacted. From around 10.30am on Wednesday, 8 November 2023, Optus' teams undertook a 'complex' and 'coordinated' set of physical and virtual activities to reboot the network. Optustold the committee that around 100 devices across 14 locations had to be manually rebooted to restore connectivity.
3.3The network was largely restored by 4.00pm that day, at which point Optus' engineers shifted focus to identify the root cause and take preventive action to protect the network from further outages. Optus stated that it was working with its partners to understand the trigger and the root cause of the outage (see Chapter 2), and had put in place measures to ensure there would not be a repeat occurrence.
3.4Optus told the committee in answers to questions taken on notice that it had re-configured its gateway routers and networks to prevent the propagation of large routing information changes that triggered the failure on 8 November 2023 and was 'fully confident' that this type of failure could not reoccur. Ms Kelly Bayer Rosmarin, then-CEO, conceded that the network 'should have coped' with the change that occurred, but acknowledged:
… on this occasion it did not. I can confidently assure the Australian public that we have made immediate changes to our systems to ensure that this specific issue will not cause another outage of the nature that we experienced last Wednesday.
3.5Optus submitted that it believed its response time was 'analogous to historical outage restoration timeframes within the telecommunications sector'. Optus also committed to learn from the outage and to support the government review.
Optus' public communications during the outage
3.6At 6.33am on the morning of the outage, Optus issued its first media statement:
Optus is aware of an issue that may be impacting some of our mobile and internet customers.
We are currently working to identify the cause and apologise for any inconvenience.
In case of an emergency, customers can still call 000.
3.7In a media interview at around 7.40am, the Minister for Communications, the Hon Michelle Rowland MP, urged Optus to update its customers 'as a matter of urgency', stating, 'it's an absolute necessity that people have some sense of what's going on'.
3.8At around 10.40am, Ms Bayer Rosmarin apologised for the outage in a phone interview with ABC and stated that Optus was working to restore services. Atthe time, she did not provide a timeline for a fix, and did not elaborate on the reasons for the outage.
3.9In an interview with the Australian Financial Review later that morning, Ms Bayer Rosmarin declined to provide additional details of the outage, stating that it was 'very technical' and 'there is no soundbite that is going to do it justice'.
3.10During the day of the outage, Ms Bayer Rosmarin conducted a further 11 media interviews, and Optus released nine media statements and engaged with over 200 media outlets and journalists. The following day, Optus released a statement regarding compensation for its customers, discussed further below.
3.11Singtel, Optus' parent company, issued a media statement the following week to clarify its role in the outage, which appeared to contradict Optus' own messaging (see also Chapter 2). On this matter, Ms Bayer Rosmarin clarified:
We put out a statement, which then got interpreted by various commentators as being that the root cause was the SingTel upgrade, when the trigger was the SingTel upgrade but the root cause was the routers … But I assure you [the two statements] are consistent'.
3.12Ms Bayer Rosmarin stated in evidence that Optus' communications protocol was to inform customers of an outage as quickly as possible. She told the committee that Optus had communicated directly to apologise to every Optus customer and had addressed the wider Australian community to say: 'We let you down, and for that I am deeply sorry'.
Criticism of Optus' public communications addressing the network outage
3.13Public commentary and some submissions to this inquiry suggested that Optus had not fulfilled its responsibility to keep its customers and the broader Australian community informed during the outage. For example, in an interview with ABC Radio National on 9 November 2023, the Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Financial Services, the Hon Stephen Jones MP, stated that communications from Optus to the public were 'absolutely subpar'.
3.14The Australian Financial Review similarly described Optus' public messaging as 'woeful', a 'stunning failure of crisis communications', and argued that 'the complete lack of communication about anything to do with the outage is baffling'.
3.15A Sydney Morning Herald column argued that '[Optus'] communications machine is yielding little' and the Chief Executive of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) publicly described the response as a 'clown show'.
3.16ACCI submitted that Optus had failed to meet its obligation to keep customers informed, stating, 'the most frustrating aspect was the lack of communication about the issue and expected resolution times'. ACCI further stated:
Optus's initial acknowledgement of the incident was a vague statement about the significance of connectivity. Businesses and consumers were left unaware of the outage details, causing difficulties for those relying on services … Even two days later, some ACCI members had not received any communications from Optus about the outage or compensation plans…The outage's impact was worsened by the absence of updates on services restoration times.
3.17The Australian Communications Consumer Action Network (ACCAN) also argued that Optus' communications surrounding the outage had been inadequate, claiming that '[t]he lack of clear communication from Optus prompted significant anxiety and uncertainty among Optus customers, with material impacts across Australian society'. It further stated that the lack of communication about the expected duration of the outage 'made the situation more difficult for Optus consumers and those dependent upon the Optus-derived services'.
3.18Public commentary also pointed out that this was not the first time Optus' communications with its customers during a crisis had come under scrutiny. In September 2022, Optus disclosed that it had been the target of a cyber-attack in which the personal data of up to 9.8 million of its current and former customers had been exposed. Commentary at the time labelled Optus' communication as ineffective and inadequate.
3.19Drawing on the two incidents, an ABC News analysis argued that Optus had 'once again decided to keep shtum for hours as a bewildered nation worked out for itself where the problem stemmed from' and that Ms Bayer Rosmarin seemed 'to have learned nothing'.
3.20The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association submitted that Optus should have a 'crisis management plan to communicate effectively with affected stakeholders'.
3.21The NSW Government submitted that Optus had failed in its obligation to inform government departments and services that rely on its network. It referred to the Communications Alliance's emergency communications protocol which facilitates 'efficient interactions between the telecommunications industry and relevant Australian Government agencies when events cause major disruptions to telecommunications services'. The NSW Government claimed that under the protocol, its emergency management unit, whose role it is to coordinate with emergency services organisations, should have been notified by Optus about the outage immediately, but that it was not informed until four hours after the outage commenced.
Optus' defence of its public communications
3.22On the day of the outage, Ms Bayer Rosmarin claimed Optus' communication had been 'very front-footed', stating: '[w]e had messages out early, letting our customers know of the outage'.
3.23In its submission, Optus again defended the adequacy of its public communications:
In what was a dynamic and evolving situation, our priority was restoring services to our customers as quickly as possible and ensuring they were informed of the evolving situation through the channels available to us.
3.24At the public hearing, Ms Bayer Rosmarin addressed this matter further, stating that the outage itself hindered communications but insisting that Optus did what it could on the day:
While I believe wholeheartedly that we did everything we could to provide timely, accurate and credible information, I acknowledge that there is always more we could have done. There is no question that the outage itself initially adversely affected our ability to more effectively communicate with each other, our consumers, media and government in the early hours of Wednesday morning.
3.25She further stated that there was 'no intention from Optus not to communicate'.
3.26Ms Bayer Rosmarin acknowledged the criticism of Optus' communications during the outage and of her for not appearing publicly sooner. However, she told the committee that she had prioritised the crisis response in the initial hours and had little information to share at first. Ms Bayer Rosmarin also noted:
As frustrated as everybody was that we didn't have more information to give, which is what people really wanted, about what the problem was and when it would be fixed, I can't tell you how frustrating that was on our side as well. We wish we'd had something more to communicate in those early hours.
3.27Ms Bayer Rosmarin also told the committee that she believed the public expected her to focus on resolving the issue and that it would be 'unusual' for a CEO to appear publicly during an outage. Ms Bayer Rosmarin also noted that the Optus communications team was actively providing information through the media and stated, 'the team had the view at the time that this was being covered widely and all our customers knew what we knew'.
3.28Optus stated that it had enacted its emergency protocols in response to the outage and clarified that its communications protocol included leveraging the media:
Issuing statements to the media from an Optus spokesperson that they can reiterate to reassure customers is part of our protocol and the way that we use the media to make sure our customers know what's going on.
Compensation offered by Optus
3.29On 9 November 2023, the day after the outage, Minister Rowland publicly stated that there was a 'reasonable expectation' among Optus customers that they would be compensated for the outage. That same day, Optus made the following offer to customers:
(a)For postpaid mobile customers (including small business), 200GB of additional free data to use over two months: i.e. For a day's network outage, customers receive two months of additional usage.
(b)For prepaid mobile customers, unlimited data over the weekend for the remainder of the year from 18 November: i.e. For a day's network outage, customers receive 14 days of additional usage.
(c)For home internet customers, a speed increase on their NBN lines or 4G/5G home connections: i.e. For a day's outage our customers can get more of the network in the form of a faster connection for the next six weeks.
3.30In its submission, Optus stated that it had assessed whether to compensate customers for a day of lost service, but found that this only amounted to between $1 and $2 which may not be 'meaningful to most customers'. Ms Bayer Rosmarin provided a further explanation of the compensation offer:
We understand how essential our services are to our customers. We are very sorry for the outage, and we know that there is nothing we can do or say that will give people back the time that they lost and some of the things that occurred on that day. That's why we tried to do something meaningful for our customers. We agree with you that just refunding people for the day with between $1 and $2 was not going to cut it, and that's why we went further, to offer those data offers to our customers.
3.31Optus also acknowledged businesses that were 'uniquely impacted' during the outage may be eligible for compensation and urged them to get in contact with Optus. The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) advised impacted customers to file a formal complaint.
3.32During the public hearing on 17 November 2023, Ms Bayer Rosmarin advised the committee that 8500 customers and small businesses had 'reached out' to discuss compensation. At the time of the hearing, Optus reported that it was in discussions with customers for damages amounting to $430 000 in financial compensation and had so far paid out $36 000. Ms Bayer Rosmarin declined to commit to an overall quantum of compensation, telling the committee that Optus would 'individually engage with each customer on their unique circumstances' to determine what compensation may be warranted.
3.33In answers to questions on notice, Optus advised that it was not yet able to determine how many small businesses were impacted by the outage, but that it had paid out both cash and account credits to affected businesses.
Views on Optus' compensation
3.34In public commentary, ACCAN CEO, Andrew Williams, described the Optus data offer as a 'token' and a 'hollow gesture', and argued that it does not 'make up for the inconvenience' caused to customers.
3.35The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) suggested the proposed compensation was 'woefully inadequate', arguing that free data was not what Optus customers wanted or expected:
Noting that many customers, including small businesses, have unlimited internet plans, it is unclear how this compensatory scheme serves them in any way.
3.36ACCI submitted that Optus should instead provide credits, discounts, or financial compensation commensurate with actual losses experienced by businesses.
3.37In its submission to this inquiry, Optus stated that 'the approach that we have taken is commensurate with the network outage experienced and exceeds approaches taken previously in Australia'. Optus argued that anything more than the compensation already offered would set a precedent with 'far-reaching' implications for other sectors:
… there is no precedent for compensation being paid by telecommunications providers to all business customers who suffer a loss of business as a result of an outage of the kind that occurred on 8November, either here or overseas. For example, NBN Co's terms with telecommunications providers such as Optus make it clear that there is no compensation for business interruption; liability is limited to a refund of fees for the period of any outage…Similarly, there is no precedent for essential services such as electricity providers to pay compensation for business losses when there is an outage.
3.38In response to calls for Optus to compensate customers for consequential losses, Optus submitted:
… this would create a new precedent that would extend far beyond Optus and apply to all other telecommunications providers, as well as other providers of essential services, critical infrastructure and public services. This makes it a much broader policy question for government that would have far reaching implications across many sectors of the economy and the cost of these services for Australian consumers.
3.39Ms Bayer Rosmarin reiterated this position in evidence to the committee:
On the issue of consequential losses, we felt that this was an issue that's much more broad and that, should government choose to look into this, we'd love to be part of that conversation. But there is no precedent for telcos or other essential providers covering consequential losses, and we are very conscious that this would have far-reaching implications not just for Optus and not just for all telcos, including the NBN, but also for other essential services, utilities and government services, so this needs to be a much broader conversation than us unilaterally determining how to go about that.
3.40Optus submitted that 'communications services are not provided with a guarantee of continuous services', arguing that customers are consequently not granted an automatic right to receive compensation whenever they experience an outage.
3.41The Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO) submitted that it had received complaints about the outage, with most seeking compensation in the form of account credit, refunds of service charges, and both financial and non-financial losses. However, the TIO submitted that it could not provide any further insights as: the referral period for complaints had not concluded at the time of its submission; some consumers that intend to make a complaint may not yet have done so; and only initial, unverified information was available to the TIO at the time of its submission.
Compensation from mobile virtual network operators
3.42 In addition to its own customers, the Optus network hosts around a dozen major mobile virtual network operator (MVNOs) mobile services providers that pay to access the infrastructure through which their service is provided. Optus' submission to the inquiry did not mention compensation to MVNOs, nor did Optus' evidence to the committee refer to compensation for customers of MVNOs.
3.43Some MVNOs, such as Amaysim and Catch Connect, have made data offers to customers. To date, other MVNOs using the Optus network—such as Moose Mobile, Spintel, and Dodo—do not appear to have publicly addressed the matter of compensation.
Optus' compliance with Triple Zero protocols
3.44As detailed in Chapter 2, many Triple Zero calls could not be connected during the outage. Initially, at the public hearing on 17 November 2023, Optus advised the committee that 228 calls failed to connect to Triple Zero during the outage.
3.45The ACMA informed the committee that telecommunications providers are required to conduct welfare checks on people who are unsuccessful in attempting to call Triple Zero following a large outage. Optus stated that it had complied with this responsibility, undertaking 228 welfare checks, and confirmed that all callers were 'okay'. The ACMA confirmed that it had monitored Optus' welfare checks.
3.46In answers to questions on notice received on 24 November 2024, Optus revised this number to 229 Triple Zero calls. In further correspondence to the committee on 23 January 2024, Mr Michael Venter, the Interim CEO, advised that the number of Triple Zero calls was significantly revised upwards:
…an additional 2,468 unique service numbers made a call to the ECP during the outage on 8 November that were not answered. We anticipate that not all of these calls would have required a welfare check and our analysis of this is ongoing.
3.47The correspondence also identified why the number of welfare check recipients was initially incorrect:
The file that was used to determine what welfare checks would be performed arose from a search of the system using an incorrect parameter. This human error resulted in incomplete data being extracted from that system, which then become the base data source for the subsequent 229 welfare checks to be carried out.
3.48Optus also informed the committee that it would 'appoint an independent third party to undertake a review of our processes to support Optus’ welfare check obligations'. It committed to implementing recommendations from the review and sharing the review’s findings and Optus’ response with the committee.
3.49On 6 May 2024, Optus provided the committee with a copy of a report from EY, the independent third-party Optus had commissioned to review its processes for its welfare check obligations. In the report, EY examined whether Optus’s Management Statement of Compliance complies with section 28 of the Telecommunications (Emergency Call Service) Determination 2019. EY found Optus’s Statement to be compliant. However, it did find that Optus did not have a 'formal training plan to consistently equip staff on an ongoing basis' and had 'inadequate monitoring to ensure training completion and consistent welfare check outcomes'. EY recommended that Optus 'develop and implement a comprehensive formal training plan for the welfare check process'.
3.50On 20 September 2024, Optus provided the committee with a copy of 'Phase 2' of EY’s review in which EY reviewed the training program Optus subsequently implemented in response to Phase 1. EY determined that Optus 'sufficiently addressed the control deviation related to welfare check training'.
3.51On the matter of whether fines or penalties should apply to Optus as a result of the inability of some customers to reach the Triple Zero network, at the public hearing on 17 November 2023, Ms Bayer Rosmarin conceded that while Optus was responsible for the network outage, it was too early to determine fault in relation to access to Triple Zero. She called for an investigation into the issue by the appropriate body and committed Optus' support.