4. Media literacy and civic engagement
   1. Australians are increasingly consuming news online more than through any other form of media. The rise of misinformation and disinformation, artificial intelligence and social media algorithms, compounded by low levels of media literacy, has found to be closely linked to a growing distrust in public institutions and a decline in public interest journalism.[1] This can weaken democratic engagement as citizens begin to feel disillusioned and disconnected from political processes.[2]
   2. Media literacy therefore plays an important role in shaping civic engagement and participation. Australians who are media literate are empowered to detect and avoid misinformation and disinformation and engage in informed debates on democratic issues.[3]
   3. This chapter examines the importance and integration of media literacy for civics education, engagement and participation to empower citizens with the skills needed to fully participate in civic life.

Impact of misinformation and disinformation on civics and electoral participation

4.4Media literacy is the ability to critically engage with media through analysis, evaluation and reflection.[4] Citizens who are media literate are empowered to participate fully in society, including social and democratic processes, and are able to detect and avoid misinformation and disinformation, and seek out higher quality information.[5]

4.5Associate Professor Tanya Notley, Professor Michael Dezuanni, and Professor Sora Park said that ‘citizens need to be able to investigate media sources to make informed decisions about which sources can be trusted’.[6]

4.6Evidence to the inquiry highlighted that there is a poor level of media literacy in Australia, creating a barrier to civic participation and engagement, and the potential to undermine efforts to strengthen civics education if not addressed.[7]

4.7An increasing reliance on social media and other online platforms as a primary source of news and information has amplified the reach of misinformation and disinformation.[8] Misinformation is ‘false information that is spread due to ignorance, or by error or mistake, without the intent to deceive’.[9] Disinformation can be defined as ‘knowingly false information designed to deliberately mislead and influence public opinion or obscure the truth for malicious or deceptive purposes’.[10]

4.8Disinformation can be a ‘serious threat’ as it can be used to ‘undermine democratic institutions and processes (such as elections) by preventing people from making informed decisions’.[11] Associate Professor Notley et al added that ‘disinformation can also polarise societies by pitting communities against each other’.[12]

4.9The News and Media Research Centre at the University of Canberra (N&MRC) provided recent examples of the effects of disinformation:

… threats to public health via the spread of disinformation around COVID-19 vaccination, which hindered the adoption of basic safety measures; the targeting of Australian public servants, e.g. Australian Electoral Commission staff during elections or the Voice referendum; disinformation about climate change; attempts to worsen religious/ethnic divisions in society; and other attempts to increase distrust in institutions.[13]

4.10The Susan McKinnon Foundation (SMF) said that when people distrust public institutions and processes, they begin to feel ‘uninformed about important issues, and potentially powerless to make a difference’.[14] SMF added that:

[People] can then withdraw from civic life or even actively oppose democracy, meaning that addressing each of the points in this cycle will be an important part of bolstering up civic engagement and trust.[15]

4.11The University of Melbourne highlighted that misinformation and disinformation are ‘growing areas of research’ and said that ongoing investment into this research is needed to ‘adequately identify and understand the problem, build cross-disciplinary theories, and develop evaluation tools which can help inform policy responses’.[16]

Social media platforms

4.12Social media platforms and messaging services such as WhatsApp and WeChat, can rapidly spread misinformation and disinformation during electoral events, making it more difficult for people to know who and what to believe.[17]

4.13Professor Anne Twomey summarised the effect of social media:

But now anyone, hiding behind an anonymous profile, can make any statements, no matter how baseless or irresponsible, with no accountability or loss of reputation, to a very wide audience.Indeed, the more outrageous or extreme the statement, the more attention it is likely to garner and the greater the following that is achieved.[18]

4.14Due to the way information is presented on social media, individuals can fall trap to the cognitive shortcuts that are often taken to assess the reliability of information. The University of Melbourne found that people on social media tend to fall for false news that has a high number of ‘likes’ or ‘shares’, and are more likely to believe:

• news in agreement with their beliefs, and more likely to share things that elicit strong emotions
• information provided by someone they trust
• information if they come across it more frequently, which is problematic when algorithms or bots present something multiple times.[19]
  15. The University of Melbourne added that ‘straightforward narratives, including those supported by deepfakes, are the most believable’.[20]
  16. Stakeholders to the inquiry highlighted the risks of the use of algorithms such as recommender systems on social media, which have the potential to ‘amplify misinformation and extreme views’ as well as hide ‘different viewpoints or valuable ideas that are not aligned with a person’s existing opinions or understanding’.[21]
  17. The Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) said that:

News websites, mobile apps, and social media platforms all make unilateral decisions about what content is shown to you. These decisions can be made by editors and journalists or by computer algorithms analysing information about other content you have consumed, or based on what you and your friends share and interact with on social media.[22]

4.18Recommender systems can create ‘echo chambers’ where people are only served information or opinions which reflect and reinforce their existing beliefs or biases.[23] SMF described it as a ‘vicious cycle that can be hard to break out of’ and added:

As discourse becomes more polarised and people’s sources of information less reliable and diverse, it can make them less willing to consider opposing views and engage with other media, further isolating them and leading to a wider decline in trust for public institutions or anything ‘mainstream’ that may counter the narratives they have come to accept …[24]

4.19Meta, owner of social media platforms Facebook, Instagram, Threads and WhatsApp, told the Committee that the algorithms used on its social media sites arranges:

… posts from friends, Groups and Pages you follow to show you what matters most to you at the top of your feed. Our ranking algorithms use thousands of signals to rank posts for each person’s Feed with this goal in mind. As a result, each person’s Feed is highly personalised and specific to them.[25]

4.20Recent state and territory elections, and the 2023 First Nations Voice to Parliament referendum revealed the scale of misinformation and disinformation[26] and their ‘potential to weaken social cohesion and breed distrust’.[27] According to several inquiry participants, this electoral event highlighted how insufficient civics and media literacy education can contribute to widespread confusion and allow a surge of misinformation and disinformation about the proposed constitutional amendments to spread rapidly on digital platforms.[28]

4.21For example, Dr Joe McIntyre and Jacqueline Charles said that bad faith actors were able to easily leverage online platforms to spread disinformation, even when it violated the technology company’s guidelines.[29]

4.22Meta said that it implemented a ‘comprehensive strategy’ in the lead-up to the Voice Referendum, ‘to proactively detect and remove content that breached our services, combat misinformation and harmful content, and promote civil participation’.[30]

4.23However, the Committee heard that Facebook’s policies were ‘poorly enforced though the campaign’.[31] A report by Reset Tech Australia examining the levels of content moderation across TikTok, Facebook and X to see whether misinformation was adequately responded to, found:

… substantial under-moderation of misleading content regarding electoral processes, and even after these posts were reported, little action appeared to be taken – meaning misinformation was left up and continued to grow in reach.[32]

4.24SMF said that Reset Tech Australia tested the processes designed to stop misinformation appearing in paid-for advertising by creating fake advertisements and found that the processes were ‘inadequate’ as 70 to 100 per cent of the ads they submitted were approved.[33]

4.25There was agreement among stakeholders that having a better understanding of how algorithms and recommender systems on social media work would help to combat the spread of misinformation and disinformation.

4.26The Australian Media Literacy Alliance (AMLA) emphasised that media literacy not only includes the ability to critically engage with news stories, but also understanding the algorithms.[34]

4.27Similarly, SMF said that ‘effective regulation of social media, or increased transparency in how they operate, is important’ as recommender systems ‘could play a role in dividing Australian political discourse’.[35] SMF added that:

It is clear that without the help of social media platforms themselves, any efforts to tackle misinformation will have limited impact because no one else can identify and respond to harmful misinformation as quickly, and we are largely at the mercy of their algorithms as to what information we see online and how far this spreads.[36]

4.28SMF further explained that current efforts in the European Union and United Kingdom are ‘showing promise in highlighting potential regulatory avenues to pursue’.[37]

4.29AHRC recommended that independent research is conducted into ‘the nature and impact of recommender systems on democratic processes and improve social media platforms’ transparency around the management and operation of recommender systems’.[38]

Artificial intelligence

4.30Artificial intelligence (AI) can have a powerful influence on democratic processes through the circulation of realistic misinformation and disinformation content.[39]

4.31The Department of Home Affairs provided examples of how AI can be used during electoral processes:

… political ads and campaigns that utilise AI to generate false content can spread narratives that sway public perception of candidates and their positions on certain issues. AI capabilities can also be used to interfere in the voting process, such as circulating realistic disinformation about where and how to vote, or to discourage voters from showing up to polling locations. If left unchecked, the use of AI could gain prominence in political and electoral advertising and have a significant impact on Australian voters’ ability to make reliably informed decisions in an electoral context.[40]

4.32AHRC similarly said that AI can be used to ‘generate cheap, persuasive, and personalised content for harmful purposes’ and such content may ‘harm several human rights’.[41]

4.33It is becoming increasingly difficult to identify AI generated content, with evidence to the inquiry emphasising the need for all Australians to be media literate to recognise credible and trustworthy information.[42]

4.34The University of Melbourne warned that the cues that individuals usually use to detect misinformation and disinformation, for example by checking if the ‘English looks poor’, are evolving as AI-generated content becomes more realistic.[43] Professor Jeannie Marie Paterson, Director at the Centre for AI and Digital Ethics at the University of Melbourne said:

Particularly around scams, we'd be saying, 'Look at the URL,' and, 'Look at whether the English looks poor,' if it's written work; and, if it's an image, we'd say, 'Look at whether the image is inaccurate,' such as whether it has extra fingers, famously. The problem is—this is the influence of AI—that those things now are no longer indications of misinformation because, of course, AI corrects language; it can tone the language to the recipient's interests, proclivities and even language capabilities; and the images themselves are becoming problematic.[44]

4.35Meta said that it is taking steps to increase transparency around the use of AI on its social media platforms, such as:

… “Made with AI” labels on AI-generated video, audio and images, based on our detection of industry-shared signals of AI images or people self-disclosing that they’re uploading AI-generated content.[45]

4.36The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) warned that due to the increase in AI-generated content, election management bodies and isolated electoral campaigns ‘no longer suffice’ in ‘delivering impartial and independent elections’.[46] The AEC said it supports a national digital literacy campaign and suggested watermarking and self-declarations of material that have been generated or altered by AI.[47]

4.37AMLA similarly stated that the risks from generative AI tools highlights the urgency for all citizens to be ‘capable of identifying, using and creating credible and trustworthy information, and critically reflecting on the media they engage with’.[48]

4.38The AHRC said that there is a need for ‘further research about the prevalence and impact of synthetic content spread by foreign actors and how that adversely impacts Australian democracy’.[49] It recommended that the government ‘build capacity to counter social media interference campaigns by supporting independent research’.[50]

Barriers to media literacy for vulnerable groups

4.39Australians with higher media literacy are more likely to engage in civic activities.[51] However, marginalised groups often face unique barriers to media literacy, therefore limiting their civic participation.[52] These priority groups include:

• people living in low-income households
• people with a low level of education and/or with low literacy
• people living with a disability
• people living in rural, regional and remote Australia
• older Australians
• First Nations
• culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) Australians.[53]
  40. Associate Professor Notley et al explained that these groups experience broader challenges due to:

… inadequate access to devices and the internet, insufficient access to trusted sources of information, a lack of understanding of the needs and experiences of these groups within the broader public, attitudinal barriers to using media and technology and having no one to turn to for media and technology support.[54]

4.41Individuals with lower media literacy can be particularly vulnerable to the algorithms on social media. For example, the AHRC said that recommender systems have the ‘ability to “micro target” certain parts of an electorate’ to ‘[push] specific political agendas’.[55] It added that ‘this is particularly harmful for more vulnerable demographics, such as older individuals’.[56]

4.42The professors said that news engagement and media literacy support should be targeted to meet the needs of these groups, and it is ‘critical that policies recognise existing inequalities and inequities when it comes to people’s ability to be media literate’.[57]

4.43This section will examine the effects of misinformation and disinformation on CALD groups, including migrant communities.

Culturally and linguistically diverse communities

4.44Chapter 3 explored how members of the CALD community receive information during electoral events and in broader civics education. The Committee heard that these groups are particularly vulnerable to misinformation and disinformation which can quickly spread on social media platforms popular within migrant communities such as Facebook, WhatsApp and WeChat.[58]

4.45Migrant communities often face barriers to accessing the information they need in their native languages and therefore rely on social media channels. The Settlement Council of Australia explained that this may be because ‘most translated materials in Australia are embedded within English-language websites, necessitating English literacy skills to access them’.[59]

4.46Research by Dr Fan Yang and Associate Professor Sukhmani Khorana on media literacy in Chinese and South Asian communities in Australia found that translated voting information on official government websites such as the AEC is not ‘communicated in a way that fits into the everyday language norm’ and misleading information can sometimes be circulated due to mistranslation.[60] Dr Yang said:

… many non-English speaking migrants find official translations from public agencies to be awkward and funny, because they don't necessarily follow norms of everyday use of language. This also leads to the suspicion that these agencies are using translation machines, which can cause trust in government agencies to drop in our migrant communities as well.[61]

4.47While social media channels are valuable for information sharing within these communities, they are also ‘rife with false or misleading content that can distort perceptions of the electoral process’.[62] The Settlement Council of Australia said that ‘socially marginalised groups are a common target’ for such misinformation.[63]

4.48Dr Yang and Associate Professor Khorana added that ‘the limited visibility and closed nature of these interpersonal communications’ could make these communities more vulnerable to ‘political exploitation’.[64]

4.49Stakeholders to the inquiry highlighted the spread and harms of misinformation and disinformation campaigns during the Voice Referendum in 2023, with major political events of this kind often amplifying such messaging.[65]

4.50The University of Melbourne said that the referendum campaign showed that:

… migrants from diverse socio-cultural backgrounds possess varying levels of literacy regarding Indigenous affairs, highlighting the need to craft messages that are linguistically accessible and adapted to the information consumption habits of migrant communities.[66]

4.51AMES Australia said it worked closely with the AEC and the Social Policy Group to deliver in-language information about the referendum but found challenges due to the different style of voting for the referendum. It said that there was also ‘lots of misinformation going around’, with the presenters having to counter these.[67]

4.52Dr Yang said that often the burden falls onto family members, community members or ethnic journalists to voluntarily ‘take the responsibility of debunking and countering false information’ which can be emotionally exhausting.[68] Dr Yang added:

Women and young family members are more likely to face pushback or criticism when they try to correct misinformation, disinformation within your family or simply being silenced.[69]

4.53There was support for building media literacy capacity for both migrant and broader CALD communities, and within government institutions to engage with these communities to build long-term relationships of trust.[70]

4.54The Settlement Council of Australia (SCOA) said that ‘providing digital literacy training to migrants and refugees can empower them to access reliable information and participate in online civic discussions’.[71] It said that the Australian Government should also be responsible for creating ‘easily accessible sources of verified information to counteract false narratives’.[72]

4.55Similarly, the Queensland University of Technology recommended targeted media literacy support for vulnerable groups and added that ‘targeted campaigns will risk low engagement if not co-designed with the people with the most barriers to participation’.[73]

4.56There was support for translated resources to counteract disinformation. SCOA highlighted that access to accurate information in-language empowers these communities to discern between fact and fiction:

Within migrant and refugee communities, the challenge is that when disinformation and misinformation spreads there's not necessarily equal access to the accurate information. The misinformation might be readily available in other languages. It can also come from overseas. For example, individuals might actually consume their news on many topics from sources overseas and not necessarily local sources. There's a lot more access to misinformation because it's more readily available in languages other than English.[74]

4.57In October 2024, the Committee visited multicultural groups in Melton, Victoria to learn more about political participation and media literacy of CALD communities. It heard a strong view that grassroots advocacy is the best way to reach and engage with these communities.

4.58SCOA reflected this and said:

… public awareness campaigns should be conducted to educate voters on recognising and reporting false information. These efforts must include community leaders to help disseminate accurate information and build trust within their communities.[75]

4.59The University of Melbourne raised that more research needs to be conducted into how CALD communities receive information and how to combat misinformation.[76]

4.60Associate Professor Khorana warned that while well-intentioned, a fact-checking sheet ‘is probably not going to do the trick’ and suggested a multipronged approach to countering misinformation and disinformation:

… most of the misinformation and disinformation is not text based. It's to do with media. It's image based, video based and audio based. I think the efforts to counter it or the efforts to prebunk it really, again, need to be aware of those cultural and linguistic norms … especially in these communities where the communicative norms are just different.[77]

Initiatives by electoral commissions

4.61Misinformation and disinformation can significantly amplify during federal, state and territory and local government elections making it more difficult for Australians to identify legitimate information online. False information about elections can also ‘undermine confidence in the integrity of democratic processes’.[78]

4.62The Committee heard from the AEC and some state and territory electoral commissions about measures implemented during the delivery of electoral events to combat misinformation and disinformation.

4.63The AEC runs various measures to ensure that it maintains ‘levels of trust and satisfaction’ including:

• Stop and Consider campaign – encourages voters to think critically about sources of electoral information and supports public understanding of electoral processes.
• Social media – maintaining an awareness of evolving information, domestic and international environments, and changing community and stakeholder expectations. Proactively posting information to AEC social media channels, including AEC TV on YouTube to debunk misinformation or disinformation online.
• Defending Democracy Unit – ‘pre-bunking’ misinformation builds voter resilience prior to exposure.
• Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce – includes relevant agencies across government, working together to provide information and advice to the Electoral Commissioner on matters such as cyber or physical security incidents, mis- or disinformation campaigns, and foreign interference in electoral processes.
• Disinformation Register – established prior to the 2022 federal election, the register lists prominent pieces of disinformation regarding the electoral process, alongside the correct, fact-based information.[79]
  64. Democracy Matters told the Committee that the AEC’s measures ‘are to be applauded’ as they ‘safeguard Australian elections against deliberate efforts to mislead members of the public at key decision making moments’.[80] It emphasised that these mechanisms ‘must be underpinned by media literacy education based in formal education institutions across Australia’.[81]
  65. Similarly, the University of Melbourne said that:

… the AEC is very well respected in Australia and around the world. It's doing a very good job of protecting and countering election misinformation, but it has a very narrow remit.[82]

4.66State and territory electoral commissions also run similar measures. For example, the NSW, Victorian and Northern Territory electoral commissions said that they have disinformation registers to help manage the negative impacts of false information posted online about electoral processes.[83]

4.67The NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC) also ran a Stop and Consider campaign based on the AEC campaign during the 2023 state election. This was delivered across a range of digital and print media, and translated in Cantonese, Vietnamese, Mandarin, Arabic, Greek, Italian and Korean.[84] The NSWEC said that post-campaign research found that those with very high disinformation belief had a higher recall of the campaign, ‘indicating it was well targeted’.[85]

Media literacy education

4.68Media literacy education plays a critical role for all Australians to be able to discern between fact and fiction, be empowered to participate meaningfully in civic life and engage in debates on important issues.[86] Media literate citizens are also protected against misleading content online and actively seek out higher quality information.[87]

4.69However, most Australians have received very little or no media literacy education at school and 30 per cent of adults have never received any form of media literacy support across their lifetime.[88] There is also currently no comprehensive Australian national resources to support adult media literacy.[89]

4.70This section will explore the effectiveness of media literacy education in schools and opportunities to boost education for Australians of all ages.

Media literacy in school

4.71Young people’s trust in traditional forms of media is declining, with an increasing preference for social media as a key source of information and avenue for political engagement and expression.[90]

4.72Schools have an important role to play in building media literacy and critical thinking skills from the earliest stage and throughout schooling.[91] However, most young people in Australia are not receiving regular media literacy lessons in school and are therefore not confident that they can identify misinformation and disinformation. Young people are also unlikely to check the legitimacy of news sources.[92]

4.73For example, a survey of 1,069 Australian school children conducted by Western Sydney University found that 24 per cent of students aged 8 to 16 years had received lessons at school in the past year to help them judge the trustworthiness of news stories.[93] Recent research found that awareness of algorithms on social media among Australians aged 13 to 16 is low.[94]

4.74The Committee’s civics education survey also found that most educators surveyed were unsure that their students can work out whether information about politics and social issues is reliable. Only 14 out of the 224 educators who answered the question said that they were ‘very sure’ that their students can find information about politics and social issues.[95] Box 4.1 provides examples of some educators’ responses collected through the Committee’s survey.

4.75While lessons in online safety and information literacy are currently embedded in the Australian Curriculum, Professor Rosalind Dixon said that education on misinformation is taught ‘inconsistently and without sufficient support and guidance’.[96]

4.76The University of Melbourne agreed that media and information literacy lessons vary from school to school and are ‘inadequate and much behind places like Finland’ as ‘it is still very limited in scope’.[97]

4.77Similarly, the N&MRC said that ‘when information literacy is on a school’s curriculum, implementations vary widely between states, territories, and private / public schools’.[98]

4.78The N&MRC added that in any case, the lessons that students receive ‘are poorly suited to deal with the toxic information environment’.[99] For example, a commonly used information-checking methodology in Australian education presents students with a checklist of website design clues, including: ‘Are there ads? Is it a .com or a .org? Is there scientific language? Does it use footnotes?’[100] However, the N&MRC said that this can be ‘problematic’ as these questions ‘no longer lead to proof of reliability’ because ‘anyone can design a professional-looking webpage, or use spellcheck’.[101]

4.79Stakeholders overwhelmingly supported strengthening media literacy education in the Australian Curriculum, as well as ensuring it is regularly updated in an evolving digital landscape.[102]

4.80Democracy Matters emphasised that media literacy needs to be a ‘core skill’ that is:

… taught from early primary to upper secondary years of schooling, so that individuals can critique the merits and veracity of the vast array of mechanisms available regarding Australia’s democracy, electoral events, and voting.[103]

4.81The Law Council of Australia said that education on civics and citizenship ‘should be accompanied by more general education aimed at building media literacy skills, including about how to critically assess the factual accuracy and general credibility of content’.[104] It added that this should be ‘made a cross-curriculum priority’ as it develops critical thinking skills, equips students with media literacy skills and increases civic engagement.[105]

4.82The Australian Youth Affairs Coalition also supported the prioritisation of digital media literacy in the curriculum and encouraged ‘engagement with the eSafety Commissioner’s youth advisory group to receive input and direction on these issues directly’.[106]

4.83The Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA) told the Committee that it is trying to balance the Australian Curriculum between ensuring that it is ‘contemporary, relevant and up to date’, but ‘not changing it all the time’ considering the workload and fatigue that creates for teachers.[107]

4.84There was some support for investment in resources outside of the school curriculum, such as youth-led media outlets and platforms, to ensure that young people have ‘readily available access to quality, reliable and digestible news and information on social issues’.[108]

4.85The Y said that young people prefer using social media as an outlet for information because they ‘do not feel that mainstream news media portrays them in a fair and equitable way, nor do they have confidence that their interests and concerns are understood by media’.[109] As such, it recommended that investment should be targeted towards:

… increasing collaboration between youth-led media outlets and platforms (such as WhyNot …) that young people trust and feel represented by, and resources, such as the ABC Fact Check, who provide high-quality, nonpartisan and transparent fact-checking.[110]

4.86Associate Professor Notley et al similarly said that there are a ‘suite of high-quality curriculum aligned news literacy resources by public institutions’ that are ‘well used by teachers’ that should be supported by government.[111] It said that this includes:

ABC Education, the Museum of Australian Democracy and the National Film and Sound Archive of Australia as well as commercial enterprises such as Squizkids’ NewsHounds program (designed for primary school students).[112]

Support for teachers

4.87The Committee heard in Chapter 2 that some teachers do not feel comfortable discussing and teaching contemporary topics and controversial issues in the classroom. Stakeholders to the inquiry raised that teachers need more support to teach media literacy skills, including issues relating to social media and AI.

4.88For example, one respondent to the Committee’s civics education survey who teaches at a public school in NSW said:

We have to teach students that Wikipedia is problematic, much less try to come to terms with emerging AI issues. Similarly, we are cautioned about bringing political issues and the like into the classroom that I just don't because I know there are some parents who would lodge a complaint about "indoctrination" while I was simply trying to use a contemporary example to illustrate the skills. (Public school, Major city, NSW)[113]

4.89AMLA told the Committee that Version 9.0 of the Australian Curriculum includes media literacy as a multidisciplinary subject so that the development of these skills is guided ‘throughout the delivery of a number of other elements’.[114] However, it said that there is a ‘gap of whether there are sufficient supportive resources for teachers to know how to take that forward’.[115]

4.90Associate Professor Deborah Henderson similarly said that:

Teachers need professional learning opportunities as to how they can teach through and about forms of social media and effectively guide their students to utilise digital technologies to gather information about their world and their place in it.[116]

4.91The University of Melbourne said that media and information literacy education should start in primary school and ‘include additional support for school teachers, such as relevant professional development, to ensure they can confidently deliver this education’.[117] It emphasised, however, that responsibility is often placed on schools when media literacy should be a ‘whole-of-life journey’:

Technology is changing quickly in terms of the information that is available to people. We tend to put a lot of responsibility on schools: 'Schools will fix that.' Schools are part of the piece, but it is difficult even for teachers and schools to keep up with changes in technology and changes in political discourses. This has to be a whole-of-life journey and not: 'We'll fix this in a school system.' The conversation starts there but, by the time children finish primary school, the technology they are responding to in their interactions with social media will have changed.[118]

4.92ACARA told the Committee that it currently provides resources to teachers on cybersecurity and privacy of data, in particular AI and large language models. This is provided through a ‘curriculum connection document’ that shows teachers how to embed the information into learning areas.[119] ACARA said that the document includes information on:

… how AI can be used to change people's perspectives on things and the messaging. … we also have areas such as critical and creative thinking that we expect students are developing as well. That's an important part of understanding the materials that we're being presented with. And, as I said, also these issues of privacy and cybersecurity play a part. When we're talking about educating the whole child, we understand that this is going to be covering quite a number of areas that we want students to develop. We also have an area of the curriculum around media literacy.[120]

Cultural institutions

4.93As discussed in Chapter 2, cultural institutions, particularly those which are part of the Parliamentary and Civics Education Rebate (PACER) program within the formal curriculum, play a role in teaching students and teachers about media literacy. Cultural institutions such as libraries also contribute to promoting media literacy among the broader population.

4.94For example, the Museum of Australian Democracy (MoAD) at Old Parliament House offers programs for students to ‘explore the role of media and support students to be empowered, informed digital citizens’.[121]

4.95MoAD said that as part of its collaboration with AMLA it has implemented a media literacy framework into its education programs, workshops and teacher professional development to support ‘students of all ages to develop questioning techniques to assist in identifying mis and dis information in media’.[122]

4.96The National Film and Sound Archive of Australia (NFSA) provides PACER alternative learning programs and said that in 2023 it engaged with more than 11,000 teachers and students through structured media literacy activities.[123]

4.97National and State Libraries Australasia said that its member libraries ‘provide digital resources, accessible to anyone in the world, that promote diligent enquiry into the legitimacy of information consumed’.[124]

4.98AMLA highlighted the importance of ensuring that these institutions are ‘suitably resourced’, stating that:

Along with building media literacy comes the obligation to ensure that trusted, publicly funded institutions are suitably resourced to provide the information needed by the population to be well-informed, so that citizens who have become media literate and are looking for credible sources, can actually find them. This requires adequate funding of … national cultural institutions and libraries that play a crucial role in providing free access to information.[125]

4.99The Australian Library and Information Association (ALIA) told the Committee that teacher librarians in schools are responsible for ‘whole school information literacy programs’ and the decline of qualified school library staff in public schools:

… places students in these schools at risk of significant disadvantage in obtaining the necessary information and media literacy skills. This threatens a growing divide between schools who are well resourced and those where students have less support.[126]

4.100ALIA recommended more support for every Australian school having a well-resourced school library run by qualified staff.[127]

Public broadcasters

4.101Public broadcasters, such as the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) provide free access to information for all Australians to ensure that election information and coverage is ‘accessible and trustworthy’.[128] ABC and SBS are favoured news sources for CALD communities[129] and ‘are the most trusted news sources in Australia’.[130]

4.102ABC said that in partnership with the AEC, it delivers ‘media literacy workshops for young Australians living in rural and remote areas’ that are mapped to the Australian Curriculum.[131]

4.103The Y told the Committee that more funding should be targeted towards resources that ‘young people trust and feel represented by’ such as the ABC Fact Check.[132]

4.104The SBS Examines service provides ‘culturally appropriate explainers’ in-language to counterbalance the proliferation of misinformation and disinformation, including through AI or foreign interference.[133] SBS explained:

Launched in July 2024, SBS Examines provides additional, culturally appropriate explainers and in-depth reporting in more than 40 languages including English, Arabic, Dari, Hindi, Mandarin, Pashto, Persian, Hindi, Punjabi, Russian, Ukrainian. They focus on issues affecting social cohesion in Australia and addressing misinformation circulating in one or more communities, through articles, podcasts and videos available across SBS platforms and third parties’ including YouTube and social media (Instagram, X, Weibo, WeChat, and TikTok).[134]

4.105SBS said that the team develops the pieces by consulting with its multilingual staff ‘who are in touch with their communities’ and ‘see the news that circulates online’.[135]

4.106AMLA and Victorian Trades Hall Council (VTHC) recommended more funding to these public news sources,[136] with the VTHC stating that ‘public interest journalism which the ABC and SBS provide is fundamental to the upholding of our democracy and social cohesion’.[137]

A national strategy for media literacy

4.107Stakeholders expressed strong support for the development of a national strategy for media literacy, aimed at empowering students and citizens of all ages to engage actively in social and democratic processes within a rapidly evolving media landscape.[138]

4.108AMLA said that it has done ‘substantial work to support the development of a national strategy’ and has identified that a strategy should:

• provide direction for educators and curriculum development
• raise awareness and encourage a whole-of-community response
• ensure all Australian citizens can access the support they need to benefit from diverse forms of media and avoid media harms.[139]
  109. NFSA added that an ‘ongoing, comprehensive, and coherent national strategy for media literacy’ should deliver media literacy education that is appropriate for and co-designed with diverse groups and communities.[140]
  110. Similarly, the AEC said it supports ‘any efforts from government and civil society to invest in a national digital literacy campaign’ as ‘electoral management bodies cannot do it alone and isolated electoral campaigns no longer suffice’ in the face of changing community and stakeholder needs.[141]
  111. AMLA said that in addition to a national strategy, there are immediate actions that can be taken to improve media literacy levels in Australia, including resources for libraries and museums, and ‘a grant scheme to support grassroots organisations that are best placed to support media literacy education within high needs communities’.[142]
  112. Associate Professor Notley et al described the leadership role taken by trusted public institutions:

In all other international jurisdictions where media literacy has been successfully implemented on a wide scale, government policy has promoted and enabled media literacy initiatives through policy and funding. In many European countries, public cultural institutions lead national media literacy efforts in recognition of the strength, capacity and public trust these institutions have.[143]

4.113The University of Melbourne said that a concerted effort across government, the private sector and academia should be regularly evaluated through ‘robust mechanisms’ to ‘ensure that strategies evolve in line with the changing landscape of information dissemination’.[144]

4.114Some inquiry participants noted the importance of the development of media literacy tools to support individuals process information and that moves beyond reliance on fact-checking websites as ‘this may not be sufficient on its own’.[145]

4.115The University of Melbourne warned that without tools that an individual can use to discern fact from fiction, it can be difficult to correct misinformation or disinformation that accords with their world views.[146] It said that people should have the tools to decide this for themselves:

That kind of thing, going hand in hand with information literacy, is probably much more effective than trying to say, 'Someone is going to decide whether something is true or false,' because it also adapts on the ground to new information.[147]

4.116N&MRC provided an example of a four-pronged information literacy tool to assist an individual to assess a claim being made:

1Evaluating the information environment – did the claim arise from a library source or the internet, social media or TV?

2Choosing a reading strategy – Vertical (deep, critical engagement with ideas) or Lateral (open another tab, do a search, check what trusted sources say)

3Checking trusted sources – encyclopedias, ABC, SBS, BBC, New York Times

4Reflecting on the emotional impact – Are triggers such as music, images, words, ad hominem attacks, being used? Why are they trying to make you angry or sad?[148]

4.117N&MRC said such a tool should be distributed through public information campaigns, libraries and public service induction programs,[149] and included in the Australian Curriculum in the form of a ‘mandatory Civic Literacy Certificate’.[150]

International media literacy initiatives to combat disinformation

4.118The Committee heard that Australia is lagging behind other advanced democracies, including countries in Europe, Africa and Latin America, which have successfully established media literacy policies and programs.[151] Some inquiry participants agreed that approaches to media literacy education overseas are good sources of best practice for Australia to draw on.

4.119The European Union (EU) recognised that media literacy supports free and fair elections and introduced legislation to strengthen the role of media literacy and the provision of frameworks and guidelines.[152] EU member countries are now ‘required to regularly report on what they are doing to develop media literacy’ and share best practices through the European Media and Information Fund.[153]

4.120NFSA said that countries such as Finland, Sweden and Ireland have demonstrated that education ‘remains the key component for populations to withstand the negative impact of fake news and misinformation’.[154] It added that these countries ‘are recognised as having some of the most literate populations in the world’.[155]

4.121Finland has been recently rated as the EU’s ‘most resistant nation to disinformation’.[156] VTHC said that information literacy and strong critical thinking are core components of Finland’s national curriculum and ‘are taught across a variety of subjects’:

Ways to identify and understand misinformation and disinformation are taught across a variety of subjects including, maths where pupils are taught statistics can be used to lie to you, art, where they learn how images and their meaning can be manipulated, and in Finnish language they are taught how words can be used to confuse, mislead and deceive.[157]

4.122Democracy Matters added that in Finland, the Kavi Institute not only trains teachers and students, but also journalists and public servants ‘on how to identify and respond to mis and disinformation as well as where to find verifiable and reliable information’.[158] It said that the New Literacies Development Program for pre-primary and primary school education is ‘the most significant single media education investment in Finland’.[159]

4.123According to VTHC, in Germany, online platforms face significant fines of up to 1.25 million Euros if illegal content is not removed within 24 hours.[160]

4.124ABC said that governments around the world are regulating social media platforms ‘more effectively’:

For example, the European Union has introduced the Digital Service Act (DSA), the Digital Market Act (DMA) and the Artificial Intelligence Act (Al Act). These measures oblige online and social media platforms to proactively fight disinformation, ensure transparency in relation to the algorithms used to prioritise content, and warrant online safety.[161]

4.125VTHC similarly said that like governments such as the UK, Canada and France, the Australian Government should ‘collaborate with Australian unions, NGOs and fact-checkers who act as independent and trusted voices to better understand the sources, spread and impact of disinformation in Australia’.[162]

Committee comment

4.126Australians face an increasingly complex online information ecosystem which can be rife with misinformation and disinformation. Low levels of media literacy pose a significant barrier to civic engagement and, if left unaddressed, threaten to undermine ongoing efforts to enhance civics education and democratic participation. There is an urgent need for a whole-of-life approach to civics education and media literacy.

4.127The Committee notes that while legislative responses to misinformation and disinformation are important steps, regulation alone is insufficient to fully address this issue. A key aspect lies in fostering critical thinking skills to help individuals recognise and resist false information. A long-term commitment to media literacy will prepare future generations to navigate an increasingly complex online information environment.

4.128A national media and digital literacy strategy with a coordinated approach across educational institutions, government agencies, cultural organisations and communities is needed. The strategy should be designed to empower Australians and encourage them to evaluate the credibility of information, take an active role in shaping their communities and hold their leaders accountable.

4.129The national strategy for media and digital literacy should adopt a four-part approach incorporating both immediate and longer-term actions:

• Strengthening media and digital literacy in the Australian Curriculum
• Expanding media literacy support for adults, with a focus on vulnerable groups
• Enhancing development and access to reliable, translated resources to counteract disinformation
• Advancing research on media consumption patterns and recommender systems on social media
  130. Current education in Australian schools on digital literacy is taught inconsistently and without sufficient support and guidance for teachers. A priority of the national strategy should be to embed media and digital literacy more deeply within the Australian Curriculum across multiple subject areas.
  131. Stakeholders pointed to Finland as a model of best practice, described as the EU’s most resistant nation to disinformation, where information literacy and strong critical thinking are key components of the national curriculum and taught across multiple subjects such as maths, art and language studies.
  132. The Committee recommends that ACARA draw on successful international models to prioritise media and digital literacy in the next version of the Australian Curriculum. This should be implemented as a cross-curriculum priority to equip students with the skills to critically assess information sources across several subjects.

4.133The Committee recommends that ACARA draw on successful international models to commence work to prioritise media and digital literacy education in the next version of the Australian Curriculum as a cross-curriculum priority.

4.134The Committee recognises that frequent curriculum updates can be burdensome for teachers. As such, ACARA should collaborate with universities and researchers to develop media literacy tools that can be taught in schools to support critical information processing as they can be adaptable on the ground to new information. These tools should be designed for longevity, reducing the need for constant updates in response to the fast-evolving digital environment.

4.135The Committee recommends that ACARA, in collaboration with universities and other academics, design media literacy tools for the next version of the Australian Curriculum to support students’ critical information processing that are adaptable to a changing online environment.

4.136A consistent theme throughout this inquiry was that teachers need more support to engage their students in contemporary issues. Changes to the Australian Curriculum means that teachers will need more support and training to deliver content on complex issues such as social media, misinformation and disinformation, and AI.

4.137As such, the Committee recommends that ACARA work with the state and territory education authorities, and teacher associations, to develop national teacher professional development resources containing standardised instructions, resources and tools.

4.138The Committee recommends that, further to Recommendation 5, ACARA collaborate with state and territory education authorities and teacher associations to develop guidance, resources and tools that support the delivery of education on media and digital literacy. This should cover social media, misinformation and disinformation, and artificial intelligence. Nationally consistent teacher professional development resources should be in place for the new version of the Australian Curriculum.

4.139While schools play a significant role in fostering media literacy, education should be lifelong, and responsibility cannot rest solely on institutions. Rather, a collaborative, societal approach is needed to reinforce these skills. The comprehensive media literacy strategy should prioritise support for adult populations, particularly for CALD communities and other vulnerable groups.

4.140Chapter 3 recommended that the Australian Government collaborate with CALD grassroots community organisations to develop and deliver civics education programs in community centres across Australia. Leveraging these partnerships presents an opportunity to incorporate digital literacy training to empower individuals to access reliable information and participate in online civics discussions.

4.141Digital and media literacy programs, co-designed with community centres, should teach participants how to critically evaluate information sources and identify misinformation and disinformation. The Australian Government should also consider funding grant schemes for grassroots organisations that are best placed to support media literacy education within high needs communities.

4.142The Committee recommends that the Australian Government work with grassroots community organisations for CALD people and other vulnerable groups to develop and deliver co-designed media and digital literacy training to support members of these groups build their skills to critically evaluate information sources and identify misinformation and disinformation.

4.143False narratives and misinformation proliferate rapidly on social media and can significantly impact public understanding of democratic issues, especially during electoral events. For CALD communities, misinformation and disinformation may be more readily available in languages other than English, and with no translated resources to counteract these, communities are more vulnerable to political exploitation.

4.144The Committee acknowledges the hard work of the AEC and state and territory electoral commissions in establishing disinformation registers. Such resources can reduce the burden on community members and families who often bear the responsibility of debunking information circulating on social media channels.

4.145The third element of a national strategy for media literacy should focus on funding to improve the development of and access to factual, translated resources to counteract disinformation. The Committee considers that the AEC and its state and territory counterparts, with appropriate funding, are best placed to develop and disseminate these resources. The AEC should work with grassroots organisations and community leaders to ensure that information is translated appropriately and is communicated in a way that fits into everyday language norms.

4.146The Committee recommends that the AEC be appropriately funded to work with state and territory electoral commissions and grassroots community organisations, to develop and disseminate factual, appropriately translated electoral information in a range of formats, including audio, visual, infographic and simple text that can be easily shared across social media platforms.

4.147A deeper understanding of how Australians, and in particular CALD groups, receive and process information is needed to refine media literacy strategies. Media literacy not only includes the ability to critically engage with news stories, but also understand how algorithms work on social media, such as recommender systems that can target certain groups to push specific agendas, particularly during electoral events.

4.148The Committee recommends that as part of a national media literacy strategy, the Australian Government support research initiatives to gain a better understanding of how all Australians receive and process civics and electoral information on social media. Research should be focused on:

• the role of social media and the impact of recommender systems on democratic processes
• how vulnerable groups, such as CALD communities, receive and consume information to better understand how to combat misinformation and disinformation in these communities.

Senator the Hon Carol Brown

Chair

28 January 2025

Footnotes

[1]Susan McKinnon Foundation (SMF), Submission 49, p. 8; Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), Submission 117, pages 24-25.

[2]SMF, Submission 49, p. 13.

[3]Associate Professor Tanya Notley, Professor Michael Dezuanni, and Professor Sora Park, Submission 9, p. 2; Australian Media Literacy Alliance (AMLA), Submission 89, p. 1.

[4]Associate Professor Tanya Notley et al, Submission 9, pages 3-4.

[5]Associate Professor Tanya Notley et al, Submission 9, pages 3-4; National Film and Sound Archive of Australia (NFSA), Submission 59, p. 1; SMF, Submission 49, p. 9; Ms Patricia Hepworth, Member, AMLA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 May 2024, p. 17.

[6]Associate Professor Tanya Notley et al, Submission 9, p. 3.

[7]Ms Anita Planchon, Chair, AMLA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 May 2024, p. 16.

[8]University of Melbourne, Submission 41, p. 2.

[9]AHRC, Submission 117, p. 4.

[10]AHRC, Submission 117, p. 4.

[11]Associate Professor Tanya Notley et al, Submission 9, p. 1.

[12]Associate Professor Tanya Notley et al, Submission 9, p. 1.

[13]News and Media Research Centre (N&MRC), University of Canberra, Submission 28, p. 3.

[14]SMF, Submission 49, p. 13.

[15]SMF, Submission 49, p. 13.

[16]University of Melbourne, Submission 41, p. 6.

[17]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 85, p. 13.

[18]Professor Anne Twomey, Submission 31, p. 2.

[19]University of Melbourne, Submission 41, p. 3.

[20]University of Melbourne, Submission 41, p. 3.

[21]AHRC, Submission 117, p. 29.

[22]AHRC, Submission 117, p. 28.

[23]SMF, Submission 49, p. 13; AHRC, Submission 117, p. 29; Professor Twomey, Submission 31, p. 2.

[24]SMF, Submission 49, p. 13.

[25]Meta, Submission 111, p. 8.

[26]University of Melbourne, Submission 41, p. 7; Australian Lawyers Alliance and Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation, Submission 24, pages 22-23; Ms Philippa Brandon, Director of Communications, New South Wales Electoral Commission, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2024, p. 41.

[27]University of Melbourne, Submission 41, p. 7.

[28]Law Council of Australia, Submission 109, p. 5; University of Melbourne, Submission 41, p. 7; Dr Joe McIntyre and Jacqueline Charles, Submission 92, p. 22; Professor George Williams AO, Submission 1, p. 2.

[29]Dr McIntyre and J Charles, Submission 92, p. 23.

[30]Meta, Submission 111, p. 24.

[31]Dr McIntyre and J Charles, Submission 92, p. 22.

[32]SMF, Submission 49, p. 13.

[33]SMF, Submission 49, p. 13.

[34]Ms Hepworth, AMLA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 May 2024, p. 17.

[35]SMF, Submission 49, p. 13.

[36]SMF, Submission 49, p. 10.

[37]SMF, Submission 49, p. 10.

[38]AHRC, Submission 117, p. 30.

[39]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 85, p. 13.

[40]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 85, p. 12.

[41]AHRC, Submission 117, pages 24 and 25.

[42]Ms Planchon, AMLA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 May 2024, p. 16.

[43]Professor Jeannie Marie Paterson, Director, Centre for AI and Digital Ethics, University of Melbourne, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 16 October 2024, p. 2.

[44]Professor Paterson, University of Melbourne, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 16 October 2024, p. 2.

[45]Meta, Submission 111, p. 15.

[46]Mr Tom Rogers, Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 May 2024, p. 20.

[47]Mr Rogers, AEC, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 May 2024, p. 20.

[48]Ms Planchon, AMLA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 May 2024, p. 16.

[49]AHRC, Submission 117, p. 28.

[50]AHRC, Submission 117, p. 28.

[51]Associate Professor Notley et al, Submission 9, p. 2.

[52]Ms Hepworth, AMLA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 May 2024, p. 17; Associate Professor Notley et al, Submission 9, pages 2-3.

[53]AMLA, Submission 89, p. 2.

[54]Associate Professor Notley et al, Submission 9, p. 3.

[55]AHRC, Submission 117, p. 30.

[56]AHRC, Submission 117, p. 30.

[57]Associate Professor Notley et al, Submission 9, pages 2-3.

[58]Settlement Council of Australia (SCOA), Submission 98, p. 9; Dr Fan Yang and Associate Professor Sukhmani Khorana, Submission 127, p. 7.

[59]SCOA, Submission 98, p. 9.

[60]Dr Fan Yang, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2024, pages 20 and 21.

[61]Dr Yang, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2024, p. 20.

[62]SCOA, Submission 98, pages 9-10.

[63]SCOA, Submission 98, pages 9-10.

[64]Dr Yang and Associate Professor Khorana, Submission 127, p. 7.

[65]Dr Yang, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2024, p. 21.

[66]University of Melbourne, Submission 41, p. 7.

[67]Ms Maria Tsopanis, Senior Manager, Community Development and Social Participation, AMES Australia, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 16 October 2024, p. 32.

[68]Dr Yang, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2024, p. 21.

[69]Dr Yang, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2024, p. 21.

[70]Associate Professor Sukhmani Khorana, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2024, p. 21; SCOA, Submission 98, p. 9; Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Submission 36, p. 7.

[71]SCOA, Submission 98, p. 9.

[72]SCOA, Submission 98, p. 10.

[73]QUT, Submission 36, p. 7.

[74]Ms Sandra Elhelw, Chief Executive Officer, Settlement Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 19 June 2024, p. 22.

[75]SCOA, Submission 98, p. 10.

[76]Associate Professor Piers Howe, Associate Professor of Cognitive Science, School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 16 October 2024, p. 3.

[77]Associate Professor Khorana, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2024, p. 22.

[78]NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC), Submission 100.1, p. 4.

[79]Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), Submission 15, p. 16; Mr Tom Rogers, Electoral Commissioner, AEC, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 September 2024, p. 35.

[80]Democracy Matters, Submission 79, p. 6.

[81]Democracy Matters, Submission 79, p. 6.

[82]Associate Professor Howe, University of Melbourne, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 16 October 2024, p. 4.

[83]NSWEC, Submission 100.1, p. 4; Mr Sven Bluemmel, Electoral Commissioner, Victorian Electoral Commission, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 8 August 2024, p. 35; Ms Karen Parker, Manager Corporate Information and Training, Northern Territory Electoral Commission, Committee Hansard, Darwin, 24 July 2024, p. 8.

[84]NSWEC, Submission 100, p. 5.

[85]NSWEC, Submission 100, p. 6.

[86]University of Melbourne, Submission 41, p. 7; Law Council of Australia, Submission 109, p. 23.

[87]SMF, Submission 49, p. 9.

[88]Associate Professor Notley et al, Submission 9, p. 4.

[89]Associate Professor Notley et al, Submission 9, p. 4.

[90]The Y, Submission 104, p. 26.

[91]AMLA, Submission 89, p. 1; Professor Murray Print, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2024, p. 8.

[92]AMLA, Submission 89, p. 2; Australian Youth Affairs Coalition, Submission 53, p. 7.

[93]N&MRC, University of Canberra, Submission 28, p. 3. See also: Notley, T., Chambers, S., Zhong, H.F., Park, S., Lee, J. and Dezuanni, M. (2023) News and Young Australians in 2023: How children and teens access, perceive and are affected by news media, Research Report, Western Sydney University.

[94]The Y, Submission 104, p. 26.

[95]Committee Survey Results, Appendix C.

[96]Professor Rosalind Dixon, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3 October 2024, p. 8.

[97]Associate Professor Piers Howe, Associate Professor of Cognitive Science, School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 16 October 2024, p. 5.

[98]N&MRC, University of Canberra, Submission 28, p. 3.

[99]N&MRC, Submission 28, p. 3.

[100]N&MRC, Submission 28, p. 4.

[101]N&MRC, Submission 28, p. 4.

[102]Democracy Matters, Submission 79, p. 3; University of Melbourne, Submission 41, p. 7; Law Council of Australia, Submission 109, p. 22; SMF, Submission 49, p. 9.

[103]Democracy Matters, Submission 79, p. 5.

[104]Law Council of Australia, Submission 109, p. 22.

[105]Law Council of Australia, Submission 109, pages 22-23.

[106]Australian Youth Affairs Coalition, Submission 53, p. 2.

[107]Mr Stephen Gniel, Acting Chief Executive Officer, Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 May 2024, p. 14.

[108]The Y, Submission 104, p. 27.

[109]The Y, Submission 104, p. 27.

[110]The Y, Submission 104, pages 27-28.

[111]Associate Professor Notley et al, Submission 9, p. 4.

[112]Associate Professor Notley et al, Submission 9, p. 4.

[113]Committee Survey Results, Appendix C.

[114]Ms Planchon, AMLA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 May 2024, p. 19.

[115]Ms Planchon, AMLA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 May 2024, p. 19.

[116]Associate Professor Deborah Henderson, Submission 60, p. 6.

[117]University of Melbourne, Submission 41, p. 6.

[118]Professor Jeannie Marie Paterson, Director, Centre for AI and Digital Ethics, University of Melbourne, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 16 October 2024, p. 5.

[119]Ms Sharon Foster, Executive Director, Curriculum, Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA), Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 May 2024, pages 14-15.

[120]Ms Foster, ACARA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 May 2024, p. 15.

[121]Museum of Australian Democracy (MoAD), Submission 102, p. 3.

[122]MoAD, Submission 102, pages 7-8.

[123]NCETP and PACER Alternative Attractions, Submission 94, p. 6.

[124]National and State Libraries Australasia, Submission 34, p. 3.

[125]AMLA, Submission 89, p. 3.

[126]Australian Library and Information Association (ALIA), Submission 46, p. 3.

[127]ALIA, Submission 46, p. 4.

[128]Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Submission 76, p. 4.

[129]Dr Yang and Associate Professor Khorana, Submission 127, p. 18.

[130]Victorian Trades Hall Council (VTHC), Submission 86, p. 12.

[131]ABC, Submission 76, p. 6.

[132]The Y, Submission 104, pages 27-28. The Committee notes that the ABC Fact Check closed on 28 June 2024: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Fact Check signs off today after 11 years at the ABC. Here's our guide to being your own fact checker’, 28 June 2024, www.abc.net.au/news/2024-06-28/fact-check-final-wrap-11-years/104033004.

[133]SBS, Submission 130, p. 8.

[134]SBS, Submission 130, pages 8-9.

[135]Ms Pamela Cook, Acting Director of Audio and Language Content, Special Broadcasting Service, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 16 October 2024, p. 26.

[136]AMLA, Submission 89, p. 3; VTHC, Submission 86, pages 12-13.

[137]VTHC, Submission 86, pages 12-13.

[138]AMLA, Submission 89, pages 2-3; Associate Professor Tanya Notley et al, Submission 9, p. 4; AEC, Submission 15, p. 19; NFSA, Submission 59, p. 1; MoAD, Submission 102, p. 8; The Y, Submission 104, p. 4.

[139]AMLA, Submission 89, p. 3.

[140]NFSA, Submission 59, p. 5.

[141]AEC, Submission 15, p. 19.

[142]AMLA, Submission 89, p. 3.

[143]Associate Professor Tanya Notley et al, Submission 9, p. 5.

[144]University of Melbourne, Submission 41, p. 2.

[145]University of Melbourne, Submission 41, p. 5.

[146]University of Melbourne, Submission 41, p. 5.

[147]Professor Andrew Perfors, Director, Complex Human Data Hub, University of Melbourne, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 16 October 2024, p. 2.

[148]N&MRC, University of Canberra, Submission 28, p. 2.

[149]N&MRC, University of Canberra, Submission 28, p. 6.

[150]N&MRC, University of Canberra, Submission 28, pages 9 and 10.

[151]Associate Professor Tanya Notley et al, Submission 9, p. 5.

[152]Associate Professor Tanya Notley et al, Submission 9, p. 5; NFSA, Submission 59, p. 5.

[153]Associate Professor Tanya Notley et al, Submission 9, p. 5; NFSA, Submission 59, p. 5; VTHC, Submission 86, p. 9.

[154]NFSA, Submission 59, p. 3.

[155]NFSA, Submission 59, p. 3.

[156]VTHC, Submission 86, p. 9.

[157]VTHC, Submission 86, p. 9.

[158]Democracy Matters, Submission 79, p. 3.

[159]Democracy Matters, Submission 79, p. 3.

[160]VTHC, Submission 86, p. 10.

[161]ABC, Submission 76, p. 5.

[162]VTHC, Submission 86, p. 11.