8. Strengthening the Government's response to floods
   1. Though not the focus of the inquiry, participants shared insights on how the Australian, state and local governments can better support communities to prepare, respond and recover from floods. This chapter makes recommendations to improve government data collection and management; disaster recovery and resilience funding arrangements; and government funding levels for legal aid, financial counselling and the broader community sector.
   2. Witnesses raised the need for better and more consistent flood modelling across local government areas (LGAs), which may require funding support for smaller councils. The inquiry also found broad support for the collation of available government and private sector risk and damage data—including data held by insurers—into a national database, to be made available to improve decision-making by governments, the public and insurers.
   3. The inquiry heard that government resilience and recovery funding arrangements could be strengthened. Councils provided extensive evidence on challenges faced under existing funding arrangements. Many were concerned about the administrative and financial burden on small, regional councils under the joint Australian Government–State Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements 2018 (DRFA).
   4. Other evidence addressed delays and perverse outcomes in the roll-out of grants and other government recovery measures. While support programs were appreciated, inquiry participants noted inadequate prior consultation and planning, including insufficient consideration of how government programs would interact with insurance. An overriding message was that recovery arrangements should be consulted on, well developed and widely communicated before disaster strikes. The inquiry was also told eligibility restrictions on government support for insured people had created perverse outcomes, often leaving insured people materially worse off.
   5. The Committee also heard that governments should increase funding for community sector disaster recovery work. Legal aid, financial counselling and other community organisations have absorbed a heavy burden supporting flood victims, especially those who are most vulnerable. However, the inquiry was told these organisations are unable to service the growing level of community need with current funding levels, and a more sustainable model is required.

Enhancing government flood modelling and data

8.6Floods differ to other natural perils such as cyclones and earthquakes in that their likelihood and expected depth can be estimated more accurately at the individual address level.[1] Flood risk also tends to be more concentrated than other natural disasters, such as storm and fire. As with flood risk, the likelihood of storm and fire damage varies by property and region – and this variation of underlying risk for storm and fire can be estimated. However, there are much larger numbers of properties and regions subject to frequently recurring flooding (especially riverine flooding) and which, with actuarially fair prices, would find coverage to be unaffordable. Storm and fire risk is more diversifiable, in general.

8.7The inquiry heard that granular flood risk data is essential to effective land use planning and zoning, as well as people’s ability to make informed decisions about where to live or purchase property. Granular flood risk data also directly informs insurers’ calculations of premiums. The use of ever more granular and accurate data in premium pricing for home and contents insurance has had a number of impacts, including:

• premium increases for many high-risk properties, and
• the unwinding of cross-subsidies.
  8. Flood studies are the key source of flood risk data. They are comprehensive technical assessments of the expected extent, depth and velocity of flood water across an area. They typically incorporate aerial photography, historic records, river surveys, streamflow analysis, local knowledge and geological mapping.[2]
  9. Local governments conduct most flood studies,[3] with funding from various sources including the DRFA, state governments and council rates. In Victoria, water authorities undertake flood studies, in consultation with relevant LGAs. The Committee heard that high-quality, up-to-date flood data depends on councils and water authorities having adequate resources to commission the work.
  10. The inquiry was also told that flood studies and other flood risk data are held by multiple parties in a complex access environment. The Insurance Council of Australia (ICA) holds most local government and water authority flood studies for insurers’ use in its National Flood Information Database (NFID).[4] This database is not publicly available due to commercial licensing arrangements.[5] Insurers also individually invest in collecting further flood risk data, most of which remains commercial in confidence.[6]
  11. Although some local governments and states provide public access to their flood studies, typically through online portals, the Committee heard that their quality and accessibility vary. Even when good data is available, communicating flood risk in terminology understandable to the community is a challenge, with consumers having to navigate a proliferation of different risk metrics. The result is that the stakeholders with the least access to high-quality, comprehensible flood risk data are households and small businesses.
  12. Many inquiry participants have therefore called for more accurate and consistent flood data to be collated by the Australian Government and made broadly available.

Flood modelling quality varies across local governments

8.13The effectiveness of flood modelling relies on the availability of accurate and detailed data on historical flood events, the topological characteristics of areas at risk of inundation, and the impact of the built environment, including water management infrastructure.[7] Some councils are better resourced to undertake and regularly update their flood modelling than others, as the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) explained:

What we see across Australia, in terms of the availability of high-resolution flood risk mapping, is very much driven by capability at the local council level… there is quite a difference across the nation.[8]

8.14Sydney Water made a similar observation.[9] Variance in the quality of flood studies across local governments was also recognised by the 2020 Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements.[10] Mayor Tyson of Moonee Valley City Council in Melbourne’s northwest elaborated:

If you look at a lot of Queensland councils, they're significantly larger and they have significantly more assets. I think the population, for example, of the Brisbane City Council area is three million, whereas for Moonee Valley City Council it would be about 130,000 and Maribyrnong about 90,000. … I don't believe that Victorian councils have the capacity to look at these issues alone, whether it be planning issues, infrastructure or futureproofing and the like.[11]

8.15Larger councils agreed their smaller counterparts would struggle to access sufficient funding for high-quality flood modelling.[12] Sunshine Coast Council told the inquiry:

…the councils in Queensland probably have the benefit of being large with larger resources to bring to bear on these types of issues. We have spent several hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars on improving our flood modelling over the last decade and implementing recommendations in response to the inquiry into the 2011 Queensland floods. So [we] do wonder how some of the smaller councils manage with their rate based constraints.[13]

8.16This issue is even more pronounced for rural and regional councils, some of which have populations of less than 10,000 and, therefore, a revenue base that makes it challenging to afford high quality flood studies and modelling.

8.17The inquiry heard that keeping flood maps up to date is a challenge. State and local governments have emphasised the importance of regularly updated flood studies, particularly in the context of increased development and modelling uncertainties introduced by climate change.[14] The Maribyrnong River Flood Review recommended that Melbourne Water review their flood models every 5 years and update them at least every 10 years, as well as after any major flood.[15] The Victorian 2022 flood inquiry made the same recommendation.[16] Internationally, the United Kingdom’s Environment Agency and lead local authorities are required to produce and review flood maps every six years.[17]

8.18Meeting such requirements costs money. Rural councils informed the Victorian 2022 flood inquiry that they were too resource-stretched to conduct updated flood studies, and that as a result their flood maps were outdated and inaccurate.[18] Townsville City Council said their new flood study cost $724,401, with the Queensland Reconstruction Authority contributing $500,000.[19] Logan City Council noted:

We've had the benefit of state funding for most of our recent flood studies. That's an investment that we just wouldn't have had as a standalone council. Our ability to produce relatively accurate flood modelling has benefitted from that funding. We would have been well behind in terms of our ability to do those flood studies, so you do need that investment.[20]

8.19Richmond Valley Council in the Northern Rivers explained how flood modelling and planning costs quickly build up for a smaller, rural council:

…we had our draft flood model prepared two weeks prior to the 2022 flood event. After the flood event, we spent another 12 months to review that model, which cost additional money… Then from that flood model we had to do our flood planning and our risk analysis, which is another body of work which is hundreds of thousands of dollars. Certainly, council resources aren't able to and don't have that expertise to do that type of work, so we have to farm it out to consultants to do and we have to find the money to do that.[21]

8.20The need for better funding for flood modelling was widely acknowledged in councils’ evidence to this inquiry.[22] The ICA also called for increased funding for local government flood mapping[23]—which insurers heavily rely on to assess risk.[24]

8.21The Committee heard that governments are beginning to respond to this need. For example, NEMA told the Committee about their work with state governments to assist smaller councils to access funding to improve their flood studies:

What we have done is worked very closely with state jurisdictions to isolate those high-risk catchments that don't have a really mature approach there and essentially provide the opportunity for those states to apply for funding to resource those councils to upgrade their understanding of the flood risk.[25]

Importance of high-quality flood data to the insurance industry

8.22Data is crucial to the functioning of any insurance market. Insurers rely on the available flood data to price risk, and hence premiums.

8.23Insurers generally assess a property’s risk of flood at an individual address level based on a variety of databases, particularly the NFID.[26] The NFID is a nation-wide property address database developed by the ICA in partnership with state and territory governments.[27] First created in 2008, the NFID aggregates flood hazard risk metrics from various historical government flood studies.[28] The ICA told the Committee the NFID contains 13.7 million property addresses.[29] Due to commercial licensing arrangements between governments and the specialist flood risk experts who prepare the flood maps, the NFID is not a public database.[30]

8.24Insurers use the NFID to assist in determining the flood risk to individual properties. However, the consistency and relevance of government flood data in the NFID vary. For example, the ICA advised that the NFID does not currently contain any flood mapping information for the Logan or Gold Coast LGAs.[31] Insurers usually supplement the NFID with other commercial and proprietary information sources[32] and conduct additional analysis.[33] For example, QBE noted its investment in a geospatial platform that aggregates data such as visual imagery from satellites and space-based radar.[34]

8.25Some insurers are also using satellite imagery to accurately geolocate specific buildings on each property (as opposed to using the property centroid as the default). As with other improvements in data, this will lead to a growing dispersion in premiums – lower for some and higher for others. Even with highly granular and increasingly accurate data and ever more powerful models, insurers often disagree on the risk profile of individual properties. This is further discussed in Chapter 9.

8.26Insurers regularly refresh their views on risk in an area when flood studies and NFID data are updated, for example to reflect changes to built infrastructure that impacts drainage or water flows.[35] Changes in local government risk data ultimately flow through to insurance availability and pricing.[36] For example, Youi described how the NFID had recently incorporated a new flood study by Wagga Wagga City Council,[37] modelling the impact of its upgraded levee system.[38] Youi said the updated data had changed its assessment of flood risk for Wagga Wagga, and that many addresses it had previously considered uninsurable were being transitioned within its underwriting acceptance criteria and pricing system.[39] However, the inquiry also heard evidence that insurers rarely adjust premiums in response to property-level mitigations by policyholders.[40] Data requirements to better link premiums with property-level risk improvements are addressed in Chapter 9.

8.27The Committee also heard that the impact on premiums from improved flood risk data can cut the other way.[41] For example, a property owner near Melbourne’s Maribyrnong River told the inquiry:

Kensington Banks Estate was built in 1996, and designed to be flood-proof as it was aligned with the current Melbourne Water's Flood modelling in mind. Melbourne Water have recently released new modelling, which retrospectively labels the estate to be a Flood Zone. … The rezoning of Kensington Banks as a flood zone harms me as my home is in the Kensington Banks estate. In May 2024 my insurance premium went up by 30%. I expect it will be raised even higher next year, due to Melbourne Water’s remodelling.[42]

Public access to flood risk data

8.28Councils undertake a range of approaches in making their flood studies accessible. Many councils maintain their own flood intelligence platforms for public use or provide information to individuals on request.[43] Logan City Council released its online Logan Flood Portal in November 2023, offering residents and businesses free access to comprehensive flood information.[44] Sutherland Shire Council said they make copies of current flood studies available online,[45] while Narrabri Shire Council said it makes flood certificates available via its WaterRIDE flood modelling program to a range of stakeholders by application.[46] However, 72percent of people who responded to this inquiry’s flood survey said they either could not access flood risk information on their local government website or were unsure.[47]

8.29Some state governments collate and publish flood risk data. For example, New South Wales (NSW) flood studies and plans are publicly available in static form through the SES Flood Data Portal.[48] Queensland’s FloodCheck interactive map enables the public to view the likely extent of floods and historical flood data, among other risk information.[49]

8.30In contrast, the inquiry into the 2022 floods in Victoria reported that there is no sufficiently publicly accessible statewide database on flood risk.[50] The Planning Institute of Australia’s Victorian division has described the available risk information as ‘patchy and outdated…a patchwork of datasets’.[51] Victoria does upload flood risk data into its FloodZoom web-based intelligence platform,[52] but this is not a public platform—though a public-facing component may be developed in the future.[53]

8.31The challenge of collating and communicating consistent, high-quality flood data is not new. The Australian Government’s review of the 2011 floods also highlighted the lack of consistency in the way flood risk information was collected and made available to users.[54]

8.32In response, the Australian Government established the National Flood Risk Information Portal (now the Australian Flood Risk Information Portal) in 2012, aiming to provide a national access point to flood risk data for the benefit of emergency management services, communities and others.[55] It still exists. However, none of the participants in this inquiry, including the ICA, insurers, local councils and community groups, mentioned this platform—suggesting that alternatives such as the ICA’s NFID or state-based portals are preferred. There is currently no comprehensive, national, public flood risk database in Australia that is utilised by key stakeholders to inform risk assessments.

8.33This inquiry found that there is still strong appetite for an effective national platform for flood risk data, consistent with the findings of the Victorian inquiry into the 2022 floods, the Australian Competition and Consumer Competition’s Northern Australia insurance inquiry and the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements.[56]

8.34Stakeholders discussed various benefits to having high-quality flood risk data made public and accessible through a single online location. The Planning Institute of Australia’s Victorian division emphasised the value for homebuyers and developers:

What we’d like to see is a mechanism that enables state-wide consistency and draws together the existing work done by local governments. This is the foundation for a comprehensive and publicly accessible dataset. All players in the development industry need certainty, and homebuyers need confidence.[57]

8.35The Northern Midlands Business Association also told the Committee:

The thing that we're doing at the moment as business associations is trying to get local government flood data incorporated into the state government flood data and made available through an easy-to-use application so people can make informed decisions.[58]

8.36Accessible flood risk data can also help residents and communities better prepare for flood events on an operational level.[59] The Victorian report on the 2022 flood event in Victoria found that the lack of a statewide public database for flood risk information complicated preparedness and response efforts.[60] The report also emphasised that flood risk information should be accessible for all residents in the interests of public safety, particularly for people who are more vulnerable.[61] Awareness of flood risk can also strongly influence an individual’s decision on levels of insurance held.[62]

8.37Some households may be concerned that the release of flood risk data will have adverse consequences for their insurance premiums or property values. As noted above, when flood studies are updated, households can be alarmed to discover their property’s risk profile is worse than previously believed. Local governments often bear the brunt of the resulting criticism. Survey respondents shared their frustrations:

New modelling shows my area is now at greater risk of flooding and I expect my premium to rise exponentially…to the point where I may not be able to afford it.

*

The premium increase was obscene…! They claim that council flood modelling had changed…

*

Our property has never experienced any form of storm water or riverine flooding… Despite this our property is now listed as being at moderate risk of flooding… Now our insurance premium is charging us like we live in a flood zone and our house will wash away at any moment. We can barely afford our insurance… something needs to be done about incorrect flood maps that devalue properties that don’t flood and drive up insurance prices.[63]

8.38The Planning Institute of Australia recognised these challenges:

It's a really challenging exercise to ask local governments to undertake because it is a highly emotive issue and you do get not only significant community opposition often to the application of flood overlays because of concerns about property values and insurance premiums…but it can also be highly contested through the planning process. Some of the independent planning panels that have considered flood related amendments have been huge exercises.[64]

8.39However, the Committee notes that data from updated flood studies would generally be available already to some, if not all, insurers. Whether it is public or not, this information will often be reflected in premiums. Publishing it gives consumers access to the same information, which levels the playing field and will ultimately empower better decision-making. This goal also requires flood risk data to be consistent, clear and readily comprehensible to the community.

8.40It is also important to note that, in addition to flood studies that model flood risk at the present time, LGAs and water authorities are increasingly undertaking and often publishing climate modelling of what flood risk will look like decades into the future. A good example of this is updated modelling for the Maribyrnong River Catchment released in mid-2024 by Melbourne Water.[65] This showed an increase in the number of homes estimated to be at a 1-in-100 year risk of flooding in the present-day 2024 scenario. It also showed a marked increase in the number of homes estimated to be at a 1-in-100 year risk (or higher, such as a 1-in-20 year risk[66]) in the median 2100 climate change scenario. The 2100 scenario is used for planning and development purposes, showing the predicted flood extent and depths under climate change in the year 2100.[67]

8.41Climate modelling will become an increasingly important part of the analytical work required to be undertaken by LGAs or water authorities. It will be even more resource intensive than traditional flood studies.

Community understanding of flood risk data

8.42Where flood risk data is accessible to the public, it is often misunderstood. Flood risk data is complex.[68] The NSW Reconstruction Authority told the Committee that presenting flood risk data in a way that can be widely understood and acted upon is challenging.[69] Logan City Council explained:

Flood risk is inherently complex and individual Councils and agencies present different sources of flood risk information, such as mapping, property reports and fact sheets, using different definitions, terminology and presentation styles. This disparity can be confusing for residents and business owners.[70]

8.43This inquiry was told that the ‘Average Recurrence Interval’ (ARI) is frequently misunderstood.[71] ARI describes the probability of a flood of a certain size occurring, expressed as the average time period between floods of a certain size. For example, a 1-in-100 year flood will occur on average once every 100 years, and equates to a one per cent chance of a flood occurring in any given year.

8.44The Committee heard that phrases like ‘1-in-100 year flood’ have confused many communities, with reports that some residents assume that if a 1-in-100 year flood happened last year, it will not occur again for another 99 years. In fact, the probability of another flood of such size occurring again in the following year remains unchanged at 1 per cent. As Allianz explained:

It is possible to have several 1-in-100 year floods within a 100 year period, just as it is statistically possible to go for 100 years without a single flood.[72]

8.45The table below shows the ARI and flood probabilities used to describe the frequency of flood events.

Source: Allianz Australia, Submission 13, p. 6.

8.46Although consumers frequently misunderstand the ARI, the alternatives also have problems. For example, Allianz recommended a system of simple High, Medium and Low risk categories,[73] but Mayor Jon Raven of Logan City Council said the council had found this approach unsuitable:

…there's always a risk, when you simplify it, that you actually dilute the facts. We tried to use a low-risk, moderate-risk, high-risk model, but what gets captured in the moderate risk model are things like that one-in-2,000 annual risk. You wouldn't call that moderate, I wouldn't call that moderate, but, in a technical sense, it sits in the moderate spectrum. Again, there's a balancing point around the language that you use, giving people accurate information but not overwhelming them with technical data.[74]

8.47The General Manager of Disaster and Emergency Management at the City of Gold Coast also stressed that flood risk needs to be communicated much more consistently across Australia:

If we can move to more consistent language, particularly nationally—is it ARI, is it AEP [Annual Exceedance Probability], is it one in 100, is it one per cent? … [T]here are a whole range of things we can do to better unpack the technical information into what's consumable by the community, so they can understand their risk and then engage accordingly with the insurance industry.[75]

8.48NEMA noted that it was developing a community risk reduction, education and awareness program to deliver national evidence-based guidance on communicating risk, hoping ultimately to improve households’ mitigation behaviours.[76]

8.49In addition to the overarching confusion that many in the community experience when grappling with risk measures, another factor that is worth considering is how personal experience impacts subjective perceptions of risk. A recent study on storm surges in northern Queensland found that people with direct experience of surges tended to rely on their subjective experiences when assessing risk, whereas those with little experience tended to rely more on objective measures.[77] The study found that ‘experience can both facilitate and impede risk perception’.[78]Moreover, the study found that, given that the level of experience with storm surge varies across the community, ‘individuals would benefit from tailored communication that emphasises personal risk and impact of events’.[79] Other studies have arrived at similar findings in relation to cyclones and storms.[80]

Current data sharing arrangements

8.50Following the 2022 flood events, the Australian Government announced $22.6million (over four years) for initiatives to improve the targeting of mitigation investment, reduce disaster risk, and improve insurance affordability and availability over time.[81] As part of this package, the Australian Government established the Hazards Insurance Partnership (HIP), which brings together representatives of the Australian Government and the insurance sector to tackle issues at the intersection of hazard risk and insurance, as noted in Chapters 1 and 3.[82]

8.51The HIP collaboration has discussed data sharing proposals, including the creation of an enduring data asset to improve understanding of insurance affordability and underinsurance, and better inform policy and program design.[83] NEMA said it is also developing Australia’s first National Disaster Risk Profile, to create an authoritative understanding of current national hazard risks to guide mitigation investments.[84] NEMA explained that the HIP:

…has a number of elements…or work streams… a big one is around building a data asset and particularly around insurance and linkage and integration of insurance data with other datasets to try to construct essentially better decision-making information for government and a range of other stakeholders. To date, we have got a bunch of activities on the go…around data access and sharing.[85]

8.52HIP meeting papers note discussions around establishing bilateral data sharing agreements between governments and the insurance industry.[86] For example, insurers at the 2 February 2023 meeting, including the ICA, Insurance Australia Group (IAG), Suncorp, Royal Automobile Club of Queensland Limited (RACQ), Allianz and QBE, affirmed their willingness to share appropriate data to support targeted mitigation investment and policy design, though noting the need to ensure competition considerations are appropriately managed.[87] NEMA told the Committee:

These initiatives recognise that while the insurance sector is a private market, there are key actions that the Australian Government (and NEMA specifically) can do to bring together relevant stakeholders, improve collaboration and data sharing, build the evidence base for how households and communities can effectively reduce risk…[and] help build a shared picture of risk.[88]

8.53Many councils have called on the insurance industry to share the flood risk data underpinning insurance premium calculations, arguing that residents and businesses are entitled to understand the reasons behind high premiums.[89] Hawkesbury City Council stressed that the lack of open data to explain premiums causes confusion and frustration for both councils and consumers.[90]

8.54Pressure on insurers to share their data is increasing. Resilient Sydney, a collaboration of all 33 metropolitan councils of Greater Sydney, told the Committee:

Over decades, the insurance, reinsurance and financial industries have invested in long-term natural catastrophe models, and these models consider increased climate risk and provide a granular understanding of flood risks to inform their business decisions on tolerable risk. Data developed and held by insurers is not publicly available or shared with government land use decision-makers. State and local government do not have similar datasets.[91]

8.55Many insurers told this inquiry that they supported a public national database on flood risk—but did not specify how much of their own data they would be willing to share.[92] Similarly, in its 2024–25 budget submission, the ICA supported the idea of a national hazard data asset, and recommended that the Australian Government work with state, territory and local governments to update, standardise and make publicly available climate hazard data, but made no comment on insurers’ contributions.[93]

8.56The inquiry heard that at least one insurer and council are now attempting to navigate the sensitivities involved in setting up a data-sharing arrangement. The City of Moreton Bay told the Committee:

…we've been in a number of discussions with one particular insurer…about a data-sharing agreement… The devil is in the detail in terms of identifying how we handle that data. Obviously it's sensitive commercial data from their perspective as part of a competitive insurance environment, and from our perspective we have carriage of private personal information, and we need to ensure anything we share is dealt with appropriately. From the insurance perspective, they operate under the auspices of a bank, so their data sharing regulations and framework are quite strict, almost stricter than local government. However, local government and our information technology services are also improving and constantly evolving the way that they protect and manage personal data. So it requires an ongoing discussion.[94]

Committee comment

8.57The Committee notes that flood risk data is currently held by multiple parties in a complex ecosystem—and the stakeholders with the least access are households and small businesses. Moreover, data on property-level risk is currently being released in an ad hoc way and is of variable quality. This limits the ability of households, businesses, governments and insurers to make well-informed decisions.

8.58The Committee acknowledges efforts by all levels of government and the insurance industry to collaborate towards improved data-sharing arrangements, including through the HIP, but notes that these efforts depend on insurers’ and local governments’ willingness to contribute their own data—including data held in the NFID.

8.59The Committee also notes that useful state and national risk datasets require greater consistency and higher quality across local government flood studies. Flood risk levels also need to be communicated to consumers in a more consistent and readily comprehensible way.

8.60Local government flood studies should also be accessible by all households and small businesses through a national public database. The Committee acknowledges that past efforts to develop similar public portals have had mixed results, and notes that any new national database should be developed with extensive reflection on past efforts, in consultation with relevant stakeholders.

8.61The Committee respects concerns expressed by community members about negative impacts on their insurance premiums and property values after new flood data is publicly released. However, releasing more high-quality data would even the playing field, giving consumers access to data that is already in the possession of insurers and some government agencies.

8.62To address these concerns, the Committee believes that LGAs (and water authorities where relevant) should develop strategies for releasing data in a way that involves suitable community consultation and engagement. This is because, firstly, the LGAs or water authorities are best placed to do this, as they created the studies and can therefore best explain them; and secondly, the LGAs or water authorities understand local sensitivities and can therefore design nuanced consultation processes. As with flood modelling, it would be necessary to appropriately resource LGAs to undertake this consultation and engagement, particularly regional and rural LGAs with small revenue bases.

8.63The Committee recommends that the Australian Government work with state and territory governments to ensure flood maps are produced to a high standard across the nation, regardless of the size of the local government area producing the modelling. This may require:

• increased funding for local government areas and water authorities, and
• the development of agreed standards to ensure that flood mapping is completed to at least an agreed minimum standard.

That, over time, this higher quality flood modelling be made freely accessible to homeowners and the general public along with easy to understand information about flood risk exposures at each property. This may be best undertaken in the first instance by local councils and/or water authorities responsible for generating the flood modelling, consistent with Recommendation 3 of the Actuaries Institute’s Funding for Flood Costs report (August 2023).

8.64The Committee recommends that the Australian Government ultimately move towards a national, centralised, public-facing portal containing flood risk data at the household level for:

• all households and small businesses across Australia, and
• all land being considered for release for development and all land that has been released for development, but not yet developed.

Agencies tasked with developing the portal should reflect upon governments’ past efforts to develop similar portals and lessons learnt. The portal should be easily accessible, user friendly and display high-quality flood risk information in a way that is readily understandable to communities.

That before data is released on such a portal for existing properties (residential and small business), that the entity creating the flood study release that data through a staged process involving appropriate community consultation and engagement.

8.65The Committee recommends that the Australian Government commission research into effective ways of communicating flood risk to communities. The research may explore communities’ understanding of the Average Recurrence Interval, categories such as High, Medium or Low flood risk, and the Annual Exceedance Probability percentage. The research should be used to establish standard best-practice communication strategies for local governments and other stakeholders in communicating flood risk to communities.

8.66The Committee recommends that the Australian Government continue to work with the insurance industry through the Hazards Insurance Partnership to collate:

• data contained in the National Flood Information Database, and
• household-level data held by insurers (de-identified where appropriate).

Enhancing flood recovery arrangements

8.67The inquiry heard that the community appreciates the financial and other support provided by each level of government during and after disasters. However, witnesses questioned the adequacy and timeliness of payments under the current Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements (DRFA) for smaller regional councils, and many councils want ‘build back better’ principles incorporated into routine DRFA funding.

8.68The Committee also heard that government recovery support—including buyback and retrofitting/raising programs—needs to be proactively planned and rehearsed in advance of disasters, with ample community consultation and education. This includes the need for better consideration of how grants will interact with insurance, to avoid unnecessary delays and perverse outcomes.

8.69This section outlines disaster support arrangements across the three levels of government, particularly through DRFA mechanisms, and suggestions for improvement. It then addresses issues with the design and delivery of specific recovery and resilience schemes.

Disaster support across the three levels of government

Federal and state governments

8.70Constitutional authority for emergency management sits primarily with the states and territories. However, the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (first released in 2012) acknowledges the role of Australian Government assistance in responding to ‘nationally significant’ crises.[95]

8.71Direct Australian Government financial support for individuals after disasters includes the Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment[96] and the Disaster Recovery Allowance,[97] both delivered via Services Australia. As NEMA explained: ‘The Australian Government may activate these payments when an event is particularly severe, taking into account the severity and widespread nature of the impacts to individuals and communities.’[98]

8.72Under the Social Security Act 1991, the Australian Government Disaster Relief Payment and Allowance to individuals can be authorised for locations specified by the (federal) minister with responsibility for emergency management in the event of a major disaster. Historically, ministerial disaster determinations identified affected locations at the LGA level—as was the case during the major floods.[99] More recent determinations have identified affected suburbs at the sub-LGA level.[100]

8.73The quantum of support delivered through these payments is significant. Relief payments to individuals through the Disaster Recovery Allowance and Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment totalled $3.47 billion across the major flood events in Queensland, NSW, Victoria and Tasmania.[101]

8.74As noted above, the Australian Government also provides disaster funding to states and territories under the DRFA, and thereby to local governments.[102] State and local governments become eligible for Australian Government co-funding to cover many disaster response and recovery costs under the DRFA if ‘a coordinated multi-agency response was required’ and if ‘state expenditure exceeds the small disaster criterion’[103]—currently set at $240,000 across a state per event. As noted in NSW’s Disaster Assistance Guidelines 2021, this small disaster criterion ‘applies to the whole disaster event, whether it has occurred within one Local Government Area or over a number of Local Government Areas.’[104] A state or territory must apply to the Australian Government to activate the DRFA in response to an eligible emergency, and costs are shared.

8.75Eligible expenditures under the DRFA are extensive. The more ‘routine’ funding categories (A and B) include emergency support for individuals, such as emergency food, clothing or temporary accommodation; other emergency support, such as counter-disaster operations for the protection of the general public, or make-safe and reconstruction works for essential public assets; and concessional interest rate loans.

8.76Categories C and D allow the states to seek additional Australian Government funding for exceptional measures to support the holistic recovery of a severely impacted region, community or sector. Eligible expenditure includes: community recovery funds; recovery grants for small businesses, non-profits and primary producers; and other acts of relief or recovery requested by a state in exceptional circumstances.[105]

8.77State governments have established slightly different procedural arrangements for administering access to DRFA funds by local councils and other aid recipients. In Victoria, councils notify Emergency Recovery Victoria (ERV) of a disaster event, and ERV assesses whether the event meets the state-wide threshold for eligibility under the DRFA based on impacts across all affected LGAs. ERV contacts NEMA to request Commonwealth activation of the DRFA when it believes an event meets the threshold.[106] In Queensland, the Queensland Reconstruction Authority manages DRFA funding following a similar procedure. Queensland also has an entirely state-funded, all-hazards relief program under its State Disaster Relief Arrangements, with a separate activation process.[107] Community members’ eligibility to apply for the activated support is usually advertised based on included LGAs. In NSW, the state minister for emergency services issues a formal natural disaster declaration that specifies the LGAs eligible for DRFA-funded disaster relief,[108] including specific recovery programs.[109]

8.78Australian and state government DRFA funding in response to the 2022 floods has been substantial, and it continues to grow. NEMA informed the Committee that $7.45 billion in ‘exceptional circumstances assistance’ had been funded (under categories C and D), which was ‘cost-shared (50:50) between the Australian and State Governments’,[110] on top of the billions in emergency payments to individuals. Some councils told the Committee in 2024 they were still assessing 2022 disaster costs for the purposes of claiming reimbursement under the DRFA, or that they were waiting on the outcome of applications (discussed below).

8.79Federal and state funding for mitigation and resilience measures has also been increased. The $741 million Resilient Homes Fund for flood-affected Queenslanders was established in May 2022 in response to the floods, jointly funded by the Australian and Queensland Governments and administered by the Queensland Reconstruction Authority. The fund supports ‘eligible homeowners to retrofit or raise their homes so they can return to their normal lives sooner after floodwaters recede, with minimal disruption to family and finances.’[111] Flood-affected Queenslanders could register to be considered for three program options: Resilient Retrofit, Home Raising or Voluntary Home Buy-Back.[112]

8.80A similar scheme was announced for the Northern Rivers region in NSW in October 2022, co-funded by the Australian and NSW Governments. The $700 million Resilient Homes Program is administered by the NSW Reconstruction Authority and also provides financial support for rebuilding with flood hardened materials, house raising and buybacks.[113] The NSW Government also announced a $100 million Resilient Lands Program[114] to identify and acquire flood-safe land for new housing in the Northern Rivers.[115]

8.81The Australian Government also launched its flagship Disaster Ready Fund in September 2022, and committed to investing $1 billion over five years ($200 million per year) ‘in disaster mitigation infrastructure and systemic disaster risk reduction projects’.[116] The role of such mitigation and resilience initiatives to address insurance affordability problems is discussed in Chapter 9.

8.82State governments also fund or coordinate non-financial support to flood-hit communities, such as demolition or debris removal. For example, NSW provided free structural assessments, demolition and waste removal for properties damaged in the February/March 2022 floods.[117] The Victorian Government also organised for the provision of free structural assessment reports for flood-affected properties, for use to support insurance claims.[118]

8.83State governments can also provide access portals for navigating government assistance and referrals to community services—such as the Queensland Government’s standing 24/7 Community Recovery Hotline, or the Victorian Government’s Flood Recovery Hotline established after the 2022 floods.[119]

8.84State governments also delegate many of their emergency management and recovery responsibilities to local governments.

Local governments

8.85The inquiry heard that local governments operate at the coalface of disaster resilience for their communities, from planning and preparation through to clean-up and rebuilding.

8.86Prior to and during a flood, councils coordinate local disaster planning and response operations, often through dedicated disaster management groups.[120] Council staff are among the first boots on the ground after a flood. Comments by the Local Disaster Coordinator for the City of Gold Coast were typical of the stories shared:

We had everyone from librarians to car parking officers knocking on the door and providing a small welfare pack, and then making them feel comfortable that the road was clear, and they were able to make their way to the [recovery] hub…[121]

8.87Many councils also contribute to resource-sharing with their neighbours through regional emergency management clusters or similar arrangements.[122] As relayed by Lismore Mayor SteveKrieg:

…every council pooled their resources together to get the best result for the region, to try and get the fastest recovery and emergency response. If we needed something from Richmond Valley, it was readily available. If Byron needed something from Lismore, it was readily available.[123]

8.88Councils organised evacuation centres,[124] and in the aftermath of floods many also stood up recovery centres or hubs in partnership with state governments and community organisations.[125] These gave locals face-to-face access to representatives from state governments, Services Australia, community centres, legal aid services and financial counselling services, and in some cases insurance industry representatives. A Clarence Valley councillor told the inquiry:

There were representatives from state governments. There were charities. There was the Red Cross. There were church organisations. We had volunteers on the ground coming in from around New South Wales to help out with the recovery. We had the Army. We had the SES. We had the RFS.[126]

8.89As expressed by another council, such centres let residents ‘access at one location the full range of support services that are available from Government and key non-government agencies.’[127]

8.90State and local governments often worked closely in establishing these centres, and witnesses welcomed the presence of state government representatives on the ground to support residents in accessing disaster grants.[128] The Manager of Emergency Management and Public Safety for the City of Moreton Bay explained its working relationship with Queensland Government agencies:

One of the key stakeholders in [our] local disaster management group, and at the district level, at the time of the 2022 floods, was the Department of Communities, Housing and Digital Economy. They were the lead stakeholder to establish the recovery hubs within the region. … Those recovery hubs were located in facilities which we'd identified before the event as being suitable within the area of communities which were most at risk and most vulnerable to the impacts of flooding. They provided outreach teams, additional resources, and council supported wherever required in order to establish recovery hubs both in fixed locations and pop-up hubs very close to impacted areas to try and provide the community immediate face-to-face access with recovery services.[129]

8.91With widespread road blockages and telecommunication failures, recovery centres were essential to many residents’ ability to access rapid advice, apply for disaster payments or grants, or start their insurance claim process. Mayor Jon Raven of Logan City Council told the inquiry:

In a widescale flood event like we saw in 2022—we're a city that has two rivers—our city actually gets split into four or five different sections that all get isolated from each other and from our services. So those local community hubs become absolute havens for people to connect to.[130]

8.92When floodwaters recede, councils undertake emergency make-safe repairs to essential infrastructure, including transportation, water and sewage networks. They must then restore these assets long term. If funding is activated under the DRFA, councils can apply for the reimbursement of many of these disaster-related expenses, including essential infrastructure repairs and clean-up operations.

Opportunities to enhance the DRFA

8.93Commonwealth-, joint- and state-funded support was all broadly welcomed by participants in this inquiry. Legal Aid NSW said Australian Government disaster payments and NSW’s Back Home Grant, At-Home Caravan Program and federal–NSW Resilient Homes Program had been ‘critical to assist disaster affected people who do not have any or adequate insurance cover to recovery from disasters’.[131] NSW’s Resilient Lands Program, the Queensland Household Resilience Program and federal–Queensland Resilient Homes Fund were also acknowledged,[132] as were Victorian Government grants.[133] Charities received valuable grants to support their communities,[134] while others noted the importance of grants for primary producers (given the prevalence of underinsurance for farmers)[135] and businesses.[136]

8.94However, participants also suggested ways to improve the design or implementation of government financial support.

8.95Several councils questioned the appropriateness of activation thresholds for the DRFA for small, regional communities, while other evidence highlighted disparate experiences of the benefits of recovery grant programs between flood-hit LGAs. For example, Sutherland Shire Council argued that:

The current Commonwealth and associated State Government Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements are dated (2018) and need review. Climatic conditions have evolved since these arrangements were established. Events can be far more localised but equally devastating to local communities yet do not qualify for disaster recovery funding relief. There can also be degrees of devastation that affects local communities and supporting services and infrastructure. This should enable a more nuanced approach to disaster recovery relief through a tiered disaster declaration process to enable easier access to some relief.[137]

8.96The Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements noted this issue in its 2020 final report, which observed that councils struggled to access adequate support for highly localised disasters that failed to reach the statewide threshold of $240,000 in costs (the ‘small disaster criterion’).

8.97The Commission’s view was that the DRFA should be reserved as a safety net for large-scale cases, but that state governments could and should activate alternative funding streams for more localised disasters. However, the Commission also noted evidence that the ‘small disaster criterion’ may have a disproportionate impact on less populous jurisdictions, and recommended that activation thresholds be reviewed by Australian, state and territory governments.[138]

8.98The Commission also affirmed that ‘The provision of recovery assistance, under the DRFA, should be based on need within communities, rather than being based on geographical areas which meet predefined impact indicators.’[139] However, governments tend to allocate disaster relief funding at the LGA level, as described above. This inquiry heard that this approach can be slightly adhoc in practice.

8.99As witnesses observed, floods rarely respect LGA boundaries.[140] The Committee heard that some disaster-hit communities in LGAs adjacent to the most obvious ‘impact zones’ of the 2022 floods were initially overlooked for support,[141] with different support levels activated for flooded communities on opposite sides of the LGA border.[142] The Committee also heard of mixed experiences of the federal–NSW Resilient Homes Program between LGAs in the Northern Rivers,[143] while stakeholders in disaster-prone northern Queensland noted that the federal–Queensland Resilient Homes Fund was unavailable outside the southeast corner, and called for the program’s expansion.[144]

8.100Many witnesses questioned the adequacy of current disaster response arrangements to support smaller, regional councils with limited staff and low revenue-raising capabilities, even if the LGA is eligible for DRFA and state-based support. The Committee heard the challenges start with resourcing the initial emergency response, as described by Gannawarra Shire Council in northern Victoria:

Resource-wise it is a challenge for rural councils, in particular. We had very few individuals able to support the organisations in our control centres, as an example, and definitely looked to the state to try to provide support as well. It's purely a numbers game in terms of individuals who can provide that sustained support…[145]

8.101Funding challenges continued in the recovery phase, with witnesses questioning the adequacy of the quantum of funding made available to support smaller regional and rural communities. Reflecting on the support program the NSW Reconstruction Authority is developing for the Central West, resident Sean Haynes said: ‘At this point in time, $40 million has been allocated to the Central West, which covers four local government areas… we’re advocating that’s definitely not enough’.[146]

8.102The slow process required for councils to assess their disaster expenditure and secure approvals for reimbursement under the DRFA was also raised as an issue, as explained by the City of Greater Bendigo:

The City believes it has sustained $15M in damages with over 5,700 defects identified ranging from small-scale culvert clearing through to full reconstruction of sections of sealed and unsealed roads. Approximately 80 per cent of the rural road network has some form of damage to it. … A key challenge for Local Government continues to be the significant time taken to receive Government approval to proceed with the works, which continues to delay much needed repairs to be undertaken. Under the existing DRFA framework, at this stage major rehabilitation works cannot proceed until claim approval has been provided by the [Victorian] Department of Transport and Planning.[147]

8.103Illustrating the length of delays, Gannawarra Shire Council informed the Committee that as of April 2024, the majority of its expenses from floods in the 2022–23 financial year were still being assessed for eligibility under the DRFA.[148] Greater Shepparton City Council elaborated on the administrative burden:

The core funding for emergency management to local government is fairly low, to say the least. It's I think in the order of $60,000 a year. It pales in comparison with the in-kind contribution. Some of that is retrievable through [Disaster Recovery] funding arrangements, but it is also a really significant administrative burden to go through that process of pulling all of those claims together and sifting through what can be claimed and what can't be claimed and what's merely I guess our contribution to the community at a time of great need.[149]

8.104NEMA acknowledged councils’ concerns about the accessibility and timeliness of DRFA support, with Coordinator General Mr Brendan Moon telling the inquiry that:

All of us, through the many reviews that have been undertaken of the response and the recovery to these events from Queensland through to Victoria, recognise it's just not quick enough. It's not responsive enough. We need to change the system and work with the states to ensure that those systems are much more effective.[150]

8.105Mr Moon noted that NEMA had since undertaken workshops with councils to better explain DRFA application processes, and promised that ‘We're going to get out on the front foot and speak to councils and communities much earlier about what can be mobilised quickly and what do we need in place to get that going.’[151]

8.106The Committee also heard that badly affected regional communities need ongoing support for years following a disaster, beyond initial funding injections. Mayor Kevin Beatty of Cabonne Council in the Central West warned: ‘Whilst we have been supported by both New South Wales and [the] federal government in the immediate clean-up and recovery efforts, our communities are going to require ongoing support for a number of years.’[152]

8.107Witnesses also noted the layers of disadvantage faced by regional, rural and remote communities,[153] leading to disproportionate mental health impacts from natural disasters.[154] The Committee heard that pockets of disadvantage may be unable to access the support needed for full recovery. Community services often cannot adequately service smaller towns or more isolated rural properties.[155] The Committee heard from the principal solicitor of TASC National, a Toowoomba-based community legal and advocacy service covering a region of some 400,000 square kilometres, who described the difficulty of maintaining services across their footprint, including:

…the impact that…flooding has on our service delivery, particularly in the rural, regional and remote areas that we service. The impact has been significant and will continue to be significant as we push to service the smaller towns in between our offices, which are located in Toowoomba, Ipswich, Goondiwindi, Roma, Hervey Bay and Bundaberg. In the last two weeks, we've had to cancel our in-person services to the Roma office, we've had power interruptions in Goondiwindi, and we've had to carefully consider the risk in proceeding with our rural women's outreach legal service to Miles and Chinchilla.[156]

8.108Witnesses also spoke of difficulties servicing large rural areas and remote communities after major floods, noting the added complications of widespread under-insurance, essential roads becoming impassable, and limited availability of emergency housing. In far north Queensland, Cook Shire Council’s acting Chief Executive Officer and Local Disaster Coordinator told the inquiry:

We're largely uninsured because of the cost of insurance in this area… The issue with this, of course, is that the shires have to pick up the burden. … [W]e'd been on standby for over two weeks prior to the cyclone coming and the rain event and then all through Christmas. … We also had Wujal Wujal [Aboriginal Shire]. Most of the people from Wujal were evacuated to Cooktown, which took up a lot of the resources and a lot of the accommodation in Cooktown. … [M]ost of the houses that were destroyed or were largely affected were in areas that had a single road to that area that was cut off. We were spending a lot of time fixing the roads. People had nowhere else to go. There were no houses available and there was no accommodation available, so they had no choice other than to muck out their houses and try and make a liveable space where they were.[157]

8.109Large councils were sympathetic to the challenges faced by smaller counterparts under current funding arrangements, including DRFA triggers. The Chief Executive Officer of the City of Moreton Bay told the inquiry:

…the trigger points that are now in place for smaller local governments are inhibitors for those local governments to be able to really budget well for their disaster events. They will need to ensure that they have funds set aside in a reserve that they can't really use for any other purpose, waiting for the next flood, disaster event, cyclone, fire, for anything to happen that is going to be something where there is the ability, or eligibility, to apply for funding through the Queensland Reconstruction Authority and…the disaster relief funding arrangements… For a council of our size and the Sunshine Coast, the trigger points are less of an issue. But for those smaller councils…it's going to be difficult, moving forward.[158]

8.110The Committee also heard that small councils were more likely to struggle to fund community-level mitigation and resilience investment, particularly to protect more isolated settlements with small populations. Cook Shire Council told the inquiry:

[S]ome of the pockets of areas that had the worst damage have quite low density populations. It's very difficult for us to go and build infrastructure and protect small pockets of housing; however, quite a few of the residents mentioned that they were quite happy to look into a buyback scheme and just get out of their house and leave it completely.[159]

8.111Townsville Enterprise warned that the task of increasing resilience ‘is too large to be shouldered by local governments, particularly those smaller councils in regional areas that don’t have the rates-base to invest in mitigation infrastructure.’[160] Commentary that small councils also struggle to fund quality flood modelling was discussed earlier in this chapter.

8.112Many councils wanted post-flood infrastructure repairs that are routinely funded through the DRFA to allow for resilience upgrades, rather than replacing like for like. For example, the City of Greater Bendigo welcomed the $500,000 in funding it received from the Victorian Government after the 2022 flood event for the ‘reinstatement of infrastructure not eligible under the DRFA funding program to include “Build Back Better” outcomes’.[161] Mayor Peter Freshney of Latrobe Council, Tasmania, told the inquiry:

We put a road back exactly as it was because we weren't able to upgrade it. If we were to upgrade it and build it back better we would have to bear the cost, so to have funding that is only to return like for like made available isn't in the best long-term interests of local government, local constituents and all levels of government. So, while grants are wonderful and very much appreciated, there needs to be some consideration of building back better in real terms.[162]

8.113In addition to all of the funding issues highlighted above, local governments are facing increasing costs to insure their own assets. A number of LGAs spoke about recent trends in insurance costs, including higher premiums and rising excesses.[163] Some councils found themselves paying materially higher premiums for less coverage.[164] This was coupled with an unwillingness on the part of insurers and reinsurers to cover certain types of assets (for example, major water pipes).[165]

8.114Reforms to the DRFA are already underway, in response to recommendations of the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements.[166] The improvements being implemented are likely to be welcomed by participants in this inquiry. The DRFA have also been subjected to a recent external review through the Commonwealth-commissioned Independent Review of Commonwealth Disaster Funding (the Colvin Review). Among other matters, the review considered:

• Options to embed resilience and risk reduction into response and recovery funding and how the Commonwealth can incentivise states and territories to better manage risks and mitigate recovery costs.
• Options within Commonwealth, states and local governments (including cost sharing) to encourage greater investment in disaster risk reduction and resilience to help constrain growing disaster recovery costs.
• Processes, protocols and guidelines (e.g., funding activations, evidence and eligibility criteria, audit requirements).[167]
  115. The review is expected to be published soon.

Committee comment

8.116The Committee heard that Australian and state government recovery funding activated under the DRFA is widely appreciated and has real benefits.

8.117However, more needs to be done to support councils with a small ratepayer base, particularly those servicing rural and remote communities. In regions prone to disasters, the inquiry heard that small councils are increasingly filling the breach left by a retreating insurance industry, but are unable to adequately resource flood modelling, disaster planning, emergency response or recovery operations.

8.118The Committee notes that although the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Recovery Arrangements recommended the DRFA not be activated for highly localised events, it also stressed that state governments should still appropriately support communities facing such events. It also recommended that DRFA trigger thresholds be reviewed overall.

8.119Inquiry participants have argued that LGA-based triggers can be too high level, and can result in pockets of disadvantage being excluded, particularly in rural and remote areas. The Committee notes that the Royal Commission stated DRFA support should be based on community need, not ‘geographical areas which meet predefined impact indicators’.[168]

8.120However, the practice of funding support being activated based on LGA boundaries remains prevalent for major state-administered recovery schemes, including ones jointly funded under the DRFA. While federal disaster declarations increasingly identify affected areas at suburb level within LGAs for the purposes of activating the Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment, arrangements for other support schemes vary between states.

8.121The Committee is recommending that the Australian and state governments work to ensure adequate support can be triggered beneath the LGA level when needed, and that overall disaster and resilience funding arrangements meet the needs of smaller councils and their communities, particularly rural and remote communities.

8.122The Committee recommends that the Australian Government continue to work with the states and territories through National Cabinet to ensure that disaster and resilience funding, and non-financial support, are accessible and adequate for all councils, particularly smaller councils.

The Committee recommends that the Government work with the states and territories through National Cabinet to ensure more disaster support can be triggered at the sub-Local Government Area level when needed.

Improving recovery and resilience schemes’ design and delivery

8.123The inquiry also heard that specific flood support schemes could be usefully strengthened, both in design and implementation.

8.124The Committee heard that government deficiencies in proactively planning the delivery of recovery measures can delay flooded communities’ ability to return to normal life. Witnesses highlighted unnecessary inefficiencies and waste, and confusing interactions between grant processes and insurance claims processes.

8.125The inquiry also heard criticisms of the eligibility criteria for some grants and other flood support measures—particularly in cases where, perversely, many insured people were reported to be materially worse off than their uninsured neighbours. Such scenarios also raise long-term commercial and moral hazard issues around the growing role of governments as de facto ‘insurers of last resort’.

Delays implementing recovery packages for decimated communities

8.126In April and May 2024, the Committee visited flood-hit regional communities in NSW and Victoria that had suffered catastrophic flooding in 2022. The Committee observed that significant damage remained unrepaired, with many derelict properties and evidence of residents still camping in severely damaged homes or in backyards.

8.127Some communities told the inquiry that progress implementing the transformative recovery plans promised by all levels of government after the floods had been marginal. When the Committee visited Lismore in April 2024, Mayor Steve Krieg spoke eloquently of governments’ collective failure to deliver:

The most traumatic thing for me as the mayor of Lismore is being nearly 2½ years post the event and not really being able to show anyone, like yourselves, any real tangible progress that has been made as far as recovery, relocations and the like that were talked about so vehemently directly after the event that swept through our region.

There are still people to this day living in North and South Lismore, who are living in caravans and living underneath their houses with tarps on their walls for privacy, facing what is going to be their third winter in what many would consider substandard living conditions. … The thing that is most disturbing for me is that we—as a council, as a state government and as the federal government—haven't been able to implement the promises that were made early on, for whatever reason.[169] [Emphasis added]

8.128Mayor Kevin Beatty of Cabonne Shire—which saw devastating flooding in Molong and Eugowra in November 2022—told the Committee in May 2024:

In November '23, the New South Wales and state government announced a $100 million Central West Recovery Resilience program, which included $40 million for a resilience home package. Although the guidelines of this package have still not been released, council understands the elements of the package include buybacks, retrofits and house raising. The delay in the announcement of the program and the details around the guidance have been a point of frustration from many of our community members. … Unfortunately now with an 18-month delay in this funding the guidelines around it have meant that homeowners have been building back with unsuitable materials that do not result in more long-term resilient homes or meeting the standards of the New South Wales government. Even with retrospective funding allowed under the guideline[s] many homeowners will unlikely be able to claim it due to utilising the wrong materials.[170] [Emphasis added]

8.129Many participants in the inquiry said government support also needed to be better coordinated, including more cohesive cooperation with the community sector and insurance companies, and better management of spontaneous volunteering.

8.130For example, the ICA called for ‘More effective coordination between government and the insurance industry … to provide faster access to government funding, consistent approaches to clean-up and debris removal, and co-incentivise investment in resilience and adaptation measures.’[171]

8.131The Federation of Community Legal Centres Victoria told the inquiry:

…it's about all of us, in terms of industry, government and community service organisations, having a fuller understanding of the complexity of these problems of disaster, the impact it has on communities and how we walk through the administrative, bureaucratic and legal processes that face these people as they try to rebuild their lives. I think it's tripartite.[172]

8.132The Committee heard of planning and coordination issues with clean-ups, including interactions between government clean-ups and insurance claims processes and with the management of volunteer ‘mud armies’. NEMA reported ‘anecdotal feedback about the impact of early recovery actions, such as the clean-up and removal of debris, … on the insurance claim process.’[173] Ballina Shire Council also said:

Council was required to respond to residents requesting free waste collection many months after we had completed the clean up because these residents had waited for their insurance provider’s approval to proceed, or had a claim denied, or once the claim was settled, the insurance arrangements meant they requested this service.[174]

8.133FNQ Volunteers Inc. and Volunteering North Queensland told the inquiry there is an urgent need for better planning around managing ‘mud army’ volunteers. The inquiry heard that in the aftermath of Cyclone Jasper:

…management of the emergent volunteers [by the council] was pretty rudimentary. … In the meantime, the Cairns community had responded. They set it all up themselves. They set up a mud army—no insurance, nothing, zero. There were thousands of people who responded as volunteers to assist with this clean-up, with no insurance—high risk.

We all know that when you go into a flood area where the floods have gone down, you've got untreated sewage, all sorts of stuff in that mud. It is high risk for disease. It's high risk if you cut yourself. You can end up septic. You can end up over at the hospital on a drip. My son actually ended up in hospital after one of the cyclones doing a clean-up. … So where does that leave us? What actually happens then? Because they haven't been given instructions, they put people at risk, actually, of not being able to claim on their own house insurance, because they removed the evidence. They go in with good hearts: 'I'm going to clean up. I'm going to help you. Welcome with open arms.' They shift everything out onto the footpath or whatever. The place is cleared; there's no evidence. … This issue of emergent spontaneous volunteering in the wake of a disaster needs to be sorted before the disaster. We need to have stuff in place for that assistance to happen, and it's not happening.[175]

8.134Mayor Jon Raven of Logan City Council also spoke about the need for better preparation in relation to volunteers prior to disaster:

After the 2022 floods, mud army volunteers were out every single day for 33 days straight. … Volunteers were expected to sign up and sit through briefing sessions not just once at the start; they were expected to do it every day for longer than an hour… it's about trying to balance that response between keeping volunteers safe and keeping them engaged and active, because they are actually lowering the cost to government to recover from this, the cost to the community to recover and the cost to the insurance industry… Having training that volunteers could nominate for before a flood emergency happens, so that they are ready and prepared, so they can respond quicker, would be a fantastic initiative…[176]

8.135The inquiry heard that the veterans-led volunteer organisation Disaster Relief Australia (DRA) may come to play a growing role in this space, having received Australian Government funding to expand its operations.[177] The City of Gold Coast said it had partnered with DRA to coordinate volunteering during the immediate disaster response, and that ‘Our experience in this last event, around immediate response planning and coordinated and targeted effort, was a very positive one’, although the council said DRA’s capabilities were still developing.[178]

8.136Meanwhile, however, the inquiry heard that levels of council and state government maturity coordinating volunteer efforts varied greatly. NEMA told the inquiry:

Some states have highly effective arrangements, while others that haven't had many disasters haven't thought as deeply about how to manage not only spontaneous volunteers but also offers of assistance. That's something we're always working with the states on, in terms of highlighting what the additional capabilities and considerations are.[179]

8.137NEMA also told the inquiry post-flood clean-up and rebuilding processes could benefit from greater standardisation and resource-sharing across borders:

There are certainly some states who incorporate their clean up with their councils, using their council resources for that. … There are other states that take a different approach, in that they let the insurance companies work with their policyholders to effect clean up… [F]rom a Commonwealth perspective, having these scalable capabilities across the nation are really important. I think the events that we are seeing…are not just confined to state borders anymore—they're across the nation. … With regard to the problem with that early clean-up phase and that recovery phase, I believe there's an opportunity to look at how we can more effectively manage resources that we can quickly relocate across borders. We still have, for example, issues…with mobilising builders who are licenced in one state but aren't necessarily licenced in another state. That's relevant to reconnecting power.[180]

8.138Witnesses from both the insurance sector and flood-affected communities also suggested that government data—including Rapid Damage Assessment data—could be better deployed post disaster to help inform insurers’ responses[181] and to streamline grants processes,[182] including for mitigation and resilience funding and buybacks (as discussed further in Chapter 9).[183]

‘Teething issues’ with recovery grant roll-out and eligibility criteria

8.139A consistent message across stakeholders was that government support and recovery arrangements—including interactions with insurance processes—need to be consulted on, planned and communicated before disaster strikes.

8.140Many stakeholders expressed concerns with the reactive approach taken to developing major recovery programs. Local governments in the Northern Rivers observed that the Resilient Homes Program, though welcome, had been a case of ‘policy on the run’, resulting in delays and emergent issues with eligibility criteria.[184] Or in the words of Clarence Valley Councillor Steve Pickering: ‘It’s way too slow, and not enough homes are included.’[185]

8.141The Committee heard that programs like Resilient Homes should be incorporated into a planning and investment approach across the entire ‘disaster lifecycle’.[186] Disaster Legal Help Victoria recommended that retrofitting and buyback options be made available to flood-prone communities much earlier, ‘not just after a disaster event when decision making is impacted by trauma’.[187]

8.142The NSW Reconstruction Authority observed that buybacks may be an extreme choice for homeowners, and the ‘decision can take a long time for some people to make’, requiring governments to take a ‘long-term approach of working with communities so they understand their risk and are prepared to take action’.[188] Disaster Legal Help Victoria elaborated:

People who are traumatised are dealing now with the question of buyback schemes. Should that be a decision that they make at potentially the worst time of their lives? There is an enormous amount of data that government and insurance companies hold in terms of areas that are high risk and that will be, time and time again, impacted by disaster events, whether they be cyclones or floods. So what we are recommending is that, instead of waiting for people to have experienced that event and to then make the decision when traumatised, those really high-risk areas are identified now, and those discussions about options for mitigation and options to move out of those properties be discussed with people now so that they can make an informed decision and better understand the ramifications of those sorts of choices.[189]

8.143Similar reflections and recommendations were made by other witnesses. The ICA said ‘All governments should establish permanent programs for buybacks and home-raising to move people out of harm’s way before disasters occur, reducing recovery costs for governments and affected communities.’[190] QBE called for ‘Developing established standing programs and agreements with state governments on clean-up and debris removal, buy back, betterment and resilience schemes, to reduce confusion around eligibility which contributes to uncertainty and delay.’[191] IAG made similar recommendations.[192] Legal Aid NSW called for an expansion of mitigation and resilience measures, and for governments to ‘consider implementing these programs in high-risk areas before as well as after disasters’.[193]

8.144A coalition of major consumer advocacy groups recommended ‘National Cabinet should agree on a clear and consistent approach to supporting relocation of communities that face high risk of natural disasters’ and that ‘Governments should provide funding for dangerously exposed communities to undertake consultations about ways to mitigate future risk, including the possibility of relocation.’[194] It noted:

Currently, community engagement is occurring on an ad hoc basis, largely dependent on the strength of individual communities and local governments within the confines of existing programs such as the Queensland Resilient Homes fund and the New South Wales Resilient Homes Program. A consistent approach across Australia should be adopted with adequate funding to identify communities most at risk from natural disasters and involve them directly in the decisions being made about their future.[195]

8.145However, the Resilient Homes schemes still enjoyed broad stakeholder support, despite ‘a lot of teething problems’.[196] Implementation appeared to be progressing faster and more smoothly in Queensland, showing the possibility of improvement with experience. Legal Aid Queensland told the Committee:

Some people have had a very smooth ride; they've been able to get what they want fairly easily. For others, the process has taken what they have felt has been too long, and they have felt that they have been left in limbo. I think, to be fair, some of that is as a consequence of it being a very new scheme, and processes, once they were worked out, have worked very smoothly, but maybe there were a few teething problems initially, as people worked out what exactly it was the scheme needed in order to help them best...[197]

8.146One of the ‘teething issues’ with flood grants and other support measures was unanticipated interactions with insurance processes. Insurers reported customers could not access government grants for repairs or retrofitting without proof they were not insured, or until after their insurance claim had been assessed and denied. This meant relief and repairs were delayed until after the conclusion of sometimes lengthy claims assessment processes.[198]

8.147Conversely, the inquiry also heard evidence on hardship caused by restricting access to the Home Equity Access Scheme—which allows older Australian homeowners to take out a low-interest loan from Services Australia, using their home as security—to properties that did have flood insurance. Financial Counselling Australia highlighted in its submission:

In situations where people could not afford flood insurance, the consequences took our sector by surprise… [such as] instances where homeowners were subsequently denied access to the Federal Government’s Home Equity Access Scheme (HEAS), which could have provided much needed funds for property improvements, including flood resilience. … The lack of affordable insurance coverage, combined with the requirement for flood insurance to access schemes like HEAS, creates a cycle where vulnerable policyholders are left without recourse. … With so many people in the Northern Rivers not having flood insurance, they found themselves having to find ways to finance their own repairs or rebuild. Now, if you are an older Australian and you are retired and reliant on a fixed income, that's going to be very difficult for you. So the Home Equity Access Scheme is potentially a lifesaver for people in that situation. But what we found when financial counsellors tried to support people through that application process is that they were denied because they didn't have flood insurance. They had building insurance, but they didn't have flood cover. That immediately meant that they were not eligible for that scheme. So we have called in our submission for that to be reviewed and for people in those situations to be allowed to continue to access that scheme.[199]

8.148Interactions between insurance claims processes and Resilient Homes grants also led to delays starting insurer-funded repairs. IAG reported that some customers had been ‘hesitant to start the repair process until they had the outcome’ from grant or buyback programs,[200] which was consistent with evidence from the community sector.[201] The Committee also heard that some applicants to Resilient Homes waited for more than a year to be assessed.[202] Conversely, Byron Shire Council advised that some consumers ‘attempting to resolve their insurance claim may dismiss other funding grants and opportunities’, assuming their claim will be successful.[203]

8.149The ICA also reported that insurer repair works could be delayed when policyholders successfully accessed government grants because of the need for negotiations between government- and insurer-funded builders to coordinate the building works.[204] A more collaborative model eventually evolved, but this took time, and Caxton Legal Centre noted that in Queensland, ‘only two insurers chose to partner with the Queensland Resilient Home Scheme, which then allowed them to do the resilient refit work on people’s home while they were also rebuilding them.’[205]

8.150Many participants in the inquiry considered the eligibility criteria for Resilient Homes and other recovery grant schemes too narrow. The Committee heard that properties too flood-prone to afford insurance, or awaiting repairs years after the floods due to protracted insurance disputes, were not considered flood prone enough for a buyback or resilience grant.

8.151Others claimed the eligibility criteria for grant support excluded most community members, or blocked preventive raising/retrofitting of at-risk (but not yet flooded) properties. Miscommunication about eligibility criteria by government staff was also reported. Respondents to the inquiry survey shared their heartbreak and frustration at falling through the cracks:

We cannot afford flood insurance [as it] was going to be over $30,000. We put in for government lifting of our house etc. post flood and have been knocked back, we [are] not a priority we have been told[and] the water was 1.8 metres in our house. Although houses either side of us have been offered a house lift. Figure that one out.

*

This morning I sent off with much help a final letter to NRMA requesting a cash payout of money to match the actual cost of repairs 18 [months] on. I cried because this is probably just the start of my real struggle… my family and I are unable to live in my home still and that does not look like changing anywhere in the next 2 [C]hristmases. I am emotionally exhausted. I lost all my belongings. I continue to pay insurance and rates on a house we can’t live in [and] the NRRC [Northern Rivers Reconstruction Corporation, now the NSW Reconstruction Authority] is not going to help my shire and I still have a monumental battle on my hands 18 months on from the floods…

*

The original increase in our policy in August 2022 was 35%. The increase this year was 118%. I have tried to obtain online quotes from other insurers and they are either exorbitant or they refuse to insure in our area. We will soon have to make the decision to drop flood… We owned the property in the 2011 flood and our insurer at the time (RACQ) rejected our claim leaving us significantly out of pocket for repairs. We applied for a buy back of the property through the resilient homes fund but have been rejected, despite having 6 properties surrounding us that have been bought back and in the process of being demolished.

*

Unable to take further action for flood mitigation - the insurers had started their rebuild before the [Government] got around to determining our eligibility. We were also rejected for a buy back offer because the flood level of 1.8m in our habitable areas did not meet their criteria. House is on a slab and cannot be raised. Told we will not be offered re insurance - suburb is under an embargo (insurers words). Sourcing new insurance but cost is prohibitive, over $10k per year. Bank has said we have to have insurance otherwise in breach of mortgage contract.

*

The process broke me. The insurance process was more than a nightmare. … We have also taken measures to lift the house - unfortunately the $100,000 grants bench marked the price and out priced this for many who want to lift but are not entitled to anything from the NRRC [Northern Rivers Reconstruction Corporation]. Before the announcement people were lifting for $75,000 to $90,000 now everything is $105,000 and up not including the DA [Development Application] and planning cost required to get the quote.

*

After the flood I had notification from my insurer that they were cancelling my policy because I live in a flood zone and the reassessment of the possibility of flood made my house uninsurable. … Just one day insured, next day cancelled and my property wasn't flooded, just to the footpath height (and I am 1.2m off the ground). … Also, we don't qualify for a grant to raise our house further because of our suburb, but yet we are uninsurable. Would we have to wait until after a flood before we can get help? Surely it makes sense to help raise houses before they are damaged?

*

We have a hobby farm, 180 acres without an ABN [Australian Business Number]. [For] all the government grants that were available you had to meet so many requirements, so many people like us were left and abandoned by our government.

*

Extremely annoyed we did not receive $1,000 x3 flood grant, when I phoned NSW [Services], I was informed that as [we] had insurance we didn't qualify, that was incorrect? My understanding now is that everyone qualified if they were affected.[206]

8.152Byron Shire Council described how repeated knock-backs have worn down many poorer members of their community, and their lack of alternative paths to recovery:

Lower income consumers who have their insurance claim denied have limited options to restore or raise their homes if they are not accepted into the Resilient Homes Program. … Compounding disappointments wear on consumer’s mental health and they have few remaining options to restore their home. Local community organisations have advocated for low interest loans or other types of financial aid.[207]

8.153Many inquiry participants also noted that the Resilient Homes schemes were made available in only two regions of the country, despite many other riverside communities being prone to chronic flooding. Many stakeholders called for the Resilient Homes model to be made available nationally[208]—as discussed further in Chapter 9.

8.154The Committee also heard that the more substantial recovery grants and other support schemes were only available to the uninsured, on the assumption that people with insurance would be provided for by their insurer. However, in practice, this meant that many insured people stuck in protracted insurance disputes were also left stranded by governments. The Committee heard disturbing evidence that uninsured home-owners frequently experienced swifter, easier recovery journeys than those who had flood insurance.

8.155This message was repeated across the country. In the Northern Rivers (NSW), Resilient Lismore told the Committee:

…one of our big lessons is that often the insured are worse off after a disaster. The experience of insured people is that it takes longer for them to get home… Having insurance makes things worse for people because of the time delays and the treatment they receive from the companies, the lack of accountability, the lack of transparency and the lack of access to their homes. We've also witnessed the deterioration of properties because of the time that it takes…[209]

8.156At a public hearing in Rochester (Victoria), representatives of the Gannawarra and Greater Shepparton councils reported:

Mr Fernee: …There's conflict between the uninsured and the insured. For example, in Victoria those that are uninsured can receive a payment from the Department of Families, Fairness and Housing for the re-establishment of their properties for a certain amount of money, but those that are insured can't and therefore some who are uninsured are able to get back on their feet quicker than those who are insured. Because of that there are some concerns about whether they are better off having insurance or better off not having insurance. …

Ms Mitchell: In addition, with the make-safe program after an [Emergency Recovery Victoria] structural assessment, if you were insured you weren't eligible for that.[210]

8.157In northern Queensland, the Townsville Lot Owners group reported that after Cyclone Jasper, ‘a number of people not insured were given grants to rebuild of up to $50,000’,[211] while Mossman Support Services (Cairns) told the inquiry that:

Many residents have stated, 'What's the point of insurance?' when those who weren't insured have been treated more promptly and, in some cases, with more support by the government grants. Those that were insured are not eligible for grants or government assistance.[212]

8.158Several witnesses reflected that this pattern is sharpening conflicts around the cost burden imposed on governments and taxpayers, as well as issues of fairness and moral hazard. For example, witnesses warned that the residual risk being absorbed by all levels of government to support the uninsured was large and growing.[213] Townsville Lot Owners Group observed that this was transferring an ever greater burden to taxpayers:

Effectively, the government is the insurer of last resort... and we're all paying for it. We're just not paying for it as an insurance premium. We're paying it through every other tax that we pay to the state and federal government.[214]

8.159The inquiry heard competing views on whether governments should more fully embrace this role. An anonymous submission argued against all Australian Government disaster relief payments, saying they:

…effectively acted as a subsidy for those living in flood-prone areas, paid for by the tax dollars of those who do not live in such areas… Unless the government intends more people to live in disaster-prone areas, and thus more people to be affected by disasters, such payments and subsidies should be avoided.[215]

8.160A Way Forward (a community organisation in the Northern Rivers) made a similar argument against government interventions on insurance affordability on floodplains:

We believe that in flood affected areas such as Lismore, any government policies directed at making home insurance affordable and available to residents in the flood plain would be a mistake. A big mistake… We know floods are going to get worse and the answer is not subsidising people to live there but to introduce policies that will encourage them to move out of harm’s way.[216]

8.161Communities were also alert to issues around the fairness of other cross-subsidisation arrangements (such as subsidies or reinsurance pools, discussed in Chapter 9). For example, in community workshops organised by the NSW Reconstruction Authority:

When presented with the option of a compulsory national pool for flood, some stakeholders raised concerns regarding the fairness of lower-risk households and businesses having to contribute to a pool to support higher-risk households and businesses.[217]

8.162The Committee also heard evidence from insurers implying that they are, in a sense, ‘competing’ for market share against a de facto insurance model based on government grants. For example, Allianz commented that although it was considering product innovations to improve the availability and affordability of flood cover (such as providing capped, partial cover at lower cost), ‘the viability of these products is impacted by the availability of government assistance following large-scale catastrophes.’[218]

Committee comment

8.163The Committee acknowledges that recovery from the historically significant 2022 major flood events continues to be a challenge for all levels of government, and that some of the worst affected communities are still suffering.

8.164A key lesson is that government flood recovery programs, including major resilience schemes, should be consulted on, designed, rehearsed and widely communicated to community members in advance of floods. Lack of forethought on how government programs would interplay with insurance claims processes, and other coordination issues, have led to confusion and delays.

8.165The Committee also notes that major new federal–state recovery initiatives, including the buyback, raising and retrofitting schemes in South-East Queensland and the Northern Rivers of NSW, were announced very quickly in 2022 in response to the extraordinary nature of the events. The Committee has heard that these schemes are widely supported by insurers and the community, with many witnesses calling for the model to be expanded nationally. ‘Teething issues’ are to an extent understandable.

8.166However, the Committee also agrees that developing and implementing such schemes ‘on the run’ post disaster has contributed to extremely long delays in the recovery of the worst-hit communities—particularly the Northern Rivers, where the scheme was announced quickly but progress has been slow, and in the Central West of NSW, which was offered a similar scheme only after local lobbying (and where funding guidelines remain under development).

8.167The Committee also notes that some government assistance is limited to uninsured households and businesses. To some degree, this reflects the need to target scarce resources, but it can have unintended consequences. For example, some insured people have very limited coverage due to caps or exclusions. Many other people may have insurance but experience lengthy claims assessment processes or disputes. This can place some insured people in a position of equal need for immediate cashflow assistance as some uninsured people. The Committee notes with concern the reports that many people with insurance were worse off following the floods.

8.168The Committee is recommending that the Australian and state governments review eligibility restrictions for flood recovery programs based on insurance status, to determine whether these should be lifted in some cases. Moral hazard and fairness issues should be weighed very carefully in these decisions.

8.169Conversely, the Committee also heard from the community sector that property owners without flood insurance were unable to access the Home Equity Access Scheme, blocking a potentially straightforward pathway to fund flood repairs and resilience improvements for older, lower-income Australians. The Committee is recommending that this restriction be reconsidered.

8.170Additionally, as should be expected when applying to multiple programs of disaster support across different levels of government, the Committee is recommending that those governments work together to ensure that people in these circumstances only have to tell their story once, to minimise further trauma and delay. The ability to update electoral information once, and for this to take effect at all three levels of government, is an example of this working in practice. It relies upon information flowing from the Australian Electoral Commission to the relevant state and territory electoral commissions. Governments should be able to enable a similar flow for those affected by natural disasters, to trigger the requisite and appropriate supports.

8.171The Committee recommends a more flexible approach to post-flood grant arrangements, to expand eligibility to include some insured people, including:

• The Australian and state governments, in consultation with local governments and the insurance industry, make design, implementation and communication improvements to recovery programs to avoid future delays due to unanticipated or poorly managed interactions with insurance claims processes.
• The Australian and state governments review eligibility criteria for recovery programs, including grants, to ensure they are fit for purpose. This should include consideration of extending support currently restricted to uninsured people to include some insured people, where justified by local and individual circumstances.
• The Australian Government investigate the advantages and risks of enabling access to the Home Equity Access Scheme for resilience improvements by people who cannot access or afford flood cover.

8.172The Committee recommends that all levels of government should work together to ensure that, as far as is possible, people don’t need to resubmit the same information multiple times for different disaster support. Just as insurers should aim for one point of contact, government should aim for ‘tell your story once’.

Recognising and supporting the community sector

8.173Throughout the inquiry, the Committee saw evidence of tireless work by financial counsellors, legal aid services, community legal centres, consumer advocates, neighbourhood centres, charities and other community organisations to support some of the most vulnerable members of society after the floods.

8.174Financial Counselling Australia said its agencies across Queensland, NSW and Victoria provided extensive recovery services, with funding support from the Australian and state governments.[219] It said that in NSW and Queensland, its financial counsellors had ‘spoken with more than 7,800 people about their service, assisted more than 1,200 flood-affected community members, and completed more than 5,700 casework sessions.’[220]

8.175Legal Aid NSW said its Disaster Response Legal Service provided 6,049 legal services to 3,401 individuals impacted by the major floods across 93 LGAs, including 4,205 face-to-face services at recovery centres and hubs.[221] It ran a helpline and phone advice service, attended community meetings, provided community education and referrals, and coordinated statewide disaster legal help efforts.[222] In the Northern Rivers, the local Legal Aid NSW office ‘attended 20 recovery centres and recovery assistance points… some for months at a time’.[223] Legal Aid NSW said it was still seeing new cases from unresolved insurance claims dating to the early 2022 floods,[224] and that insurance matters represented 49percent of the Disaster Response Legal Service’s flood caseload.[225]

8.176The broader community sector’s contributions after the floods have been too numerous to list. As just a few examples:

• The Financial Rights Legal Centre provided ‘free and independent financial counselling, legal advice and representation’ through its Insurance Law Service,[226] including servicing a 53percent increase in calls to its Disaster Priority phoneline after the floods.[227]
• Community Plus+ and Caxton Legal supported ‘floodies’ in South East Queensland, ‘especially for our floodies who are older, culturally or linguistically diverse or have no idea where to turn to to navigate the system’.[228]
• The Northern Rivers Community Legal Centre’s office was ‘completely destroyed by flood’ in 2022, but its staff were still ‘quickly in disaster recovery centres providing assistance in lodging insurance claims.’[229]
• Resilient Lismore ‘operated out of an undercover car park with no walls for eight months after the 2022 floods, including through the depths of winter’ and ‘saw many, many thousands of community members come to us for assistance.’[230]
• Disaster Legal Help Victoria attended recovery hubs and town halls in Rochester, Seymour, Echuca, Elmore, Maribyrnong and Maidstone, ran a dedicated phone advice line, and triaged and referred flood victims to pro bono legal assistance.[231] The ‘vast majority’ of the legal issues it dealt with related to insurance disputes.[232]
• ARC Justice ‘had staff on the ground in the immediate aftermath of the floods’ and still ‘continues to have a regular presence at the recovery hubs in Rochester and Seymour’.[233]

Benefits of consumer advocacy in insurance disputes

8.177Such organisations have tried to meet the desperate need for advice and representation in insurance disputes after the 2022 floods. As the Financial Rights Legal Centre observed:

The Insurance Contracts Act is complex. The issues you are dealing with, whether there is a section 47 issue or a section 54 issue, are complex. I wouldn't expect a consumer to be able to figure that out on their own.[234]

8.178Byron Shire Council reported that:

Local community members have raised concerns that they, other consumers, or people they support, do not have the level of financial and legal literacy to be effective self-advocates in the insurance process.[235]

8.179Evidence throughout the inquiry suggested advocacy by a financial counsellor, solicitor or community worker can make a dramatic difference. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Financial Counselling Australia reported that just one small agency in regional Victoria had negotiated an additional $3.3 million in total for its 40clients—an increase of more than 70percent on initial insurer cash settlement offers. In one case, an initial cash settlement offer of $0 was renegotiated to nearly $400,000.[236]

8.180The Committee also heard that advocacy helped address the systemic power imbalance between insurance companies and their customers, and to raise customer confidence about taking a dispute to the Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA). ARC Justice told the Committee that:

…a way of also balancing part of the score is having organisations like ARC Justice available to people to help them do that process, so they’re not having to do it alone in that David and Goliath type battle… Even in going to AFCA, which is a friendly service, they still perceive it to be that adversarial system that is hard to navigate or is daunting.[237]

8.181Other consumer advocacy organisations framed their work on insurance disputes as a check against insurer conflicts-of-interest, which could lead to unfair outcomes if insurer decisions are never challenged. Financial Counselling Victoria said:

There's very clear evidence of very inconsistent outcomes and treatment of insured people, often in the same areas with very similar circumstances, where effectively one's been able to advocate effectively and one has not. That speaks to a real problem with the misalignment of interests between insurers and insured. The evidence therefore shows the absolute critical need of services such as financial counselling services to act as supporters for people who are in those positions.[238]

8.182Financial Counselling Victoria shared numerous examples of unfair insurance decisions that were changed only after intervention by a financial counsellor:

There were cases of the lack of capability of the customer to manage a rebuild; payouts inadequate to cover the disaster-inflated price of local materials and tradespeople, increased only with advocacy interventions; extraordinarily low cash settlement offers being increased from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands, again following financial counsellor advocacy intervention… Vulnerable victims of disasters who were not engaged with financial counsellors skilled in negotiation could be at a greater disadvantage of receiving lesser insurance outcomes.[239]

8.183Its August 2024 report Unsettled expanded on such evidence.[240]

Essential support for the most vulnerable

8.184As noted elsewhere in this report, all flood victims are vulnerable, requiring a trauma-informed approach by insurer staff. Financial Counselling Victoria told the Committee that customers facing insurance disputes are:

…people who not only do not have the resources of a large insurer but also who may have just experienced some of the most disastrous and catastrophic experiences of their lives. It is very difficult for them in ordinary circumstances to advocate effectively for their own interests, let alone in the context of having just had all of their possessions in their home destroyed.[241]

8.185Witnesses noted that flood insurance claims were emotionally challenging even for high-functioning, articulate people in good health, and that many benefited from outside support. A senior Legal Aid NSW disaster recovery solicitor explained:

There are so many different ways that [Legal Aid] helps them. … Speaking to an insurer—that's a simple thing for me to do, but, for somebody who's gone through such a traumatic event, it's beyond them to pick up a phone and call an insurer—even simple tasks like that.[242]

8.186Similarly, Encircle Community Services in southeast Queensland told the inquiry:

Some of the clients aren't even high needs clients. Some of them haven't got a complex case before the flood. I've had clients who are computer tech geniuses who are great with IT, but the second they sit down to a computer to do anything regarding the flood they just shut down and can't remember.[243]

8.187However, some cohorts of flood victims have particularly acute needs for support, advocacy and representation to navigate flood recovery successfully. The Victorian Council of Social Service explained that the value of community sector assistance and advocacy is most evident where there are multiple layers of vulnerability:

What we see then is that the power imbalance is where the community services sector really steps in. If people who may be of low literacy, for example, or who may be living alone or who are elderly can access a financial counsellor or legal support then they're much more equipped to travel through this process, which can be very combative.[244]

8.188Disability, sickness or injury, homelessness, poverty, isolation and limited English language skills can all compound a person’s difficulties navigating insurer and government processes. In addition, the inquiry heard that the digital literacy required to complete most application processes means there is a growing cohort of elderly and digitally unsophisticated people who need hands-on support accessing insurance and government support entitlements. A flood recovery solicitor for Tenants Queensland explained:

…a portion of my clients say they don't have an email address; a lot of them don't have a laptop or don't know how to use it. They need that support and that support is really important. Some say, 'I just want to speak to a person.' That's the way they're used to resolving things and they want to resolve it by speaking to a person. They get quite frustrated when they have to upload things and use that system.[245]

8.189The inquiry heard that the availability of in-person community support and government services at recovery hubs was particularly helpful. The Manager of Flood and Community Recovery at Mitchell Shire Council, Victoria, reported:

The community members were being asked to upload evidence into portals via email. We know, particularly after the October 2022 incident, that in Seymour about 58 per cent of the community do not engage in a digital environment at all. They had additional stress and anxiety about how that would occur. Having the hub's presence meant they could come in and we could sit with them and work through those processes.[246]

8.190ARC Justice echoed these comments:

We've had people come into the recovery centre who've been sent a text message that invites them if they've got a question about their claim to access it online: 'Track your claim online.' There's a sizable chunk of the population who don't know how to do that.[247]

Government funding for community flood recovery work

8.191State-based legal aid services are themselves state government statutory bodies, and community legal centres, financial counselling services and other community organisations typically receive government funding. This can include surge funding for flood recovery work from both federal and state governments. For example, Financial Counselling Australia reported that NSW and Queensland agencies had received funding from the Department of Social Services to provide flood recovery services twice in 2022, while agencies in Victoria received funding from Consumer Affairs Victoria and the Victorian State Department of Jobs, Skills, Industries and Regions.[248]

8.192The ‘Service Navigator’ program in southeast Queensland was created to activate a network of existing community organisations to help local residents navigate government and community support services after the 2022 floods, including applying to the Resilient Homes Fund or for other major recovery grants, with DRFA funding for dedicated officers. The Committee heard from the Service Navigator at Encircle Community Services, Karen Rollinson:

I work with Encircle as a service navigator. The [S]ervice [N]avigator targeted rebuild [case] management service is a program that was jointly funded by the Commonwealth and state governments through DRFA throughout the whole of the Moreton Bay region and part of the modern neighbourhood centre resilience project—so all the neighbourhood centres within the region have combined to provide this service. The service navigator program had been implemented to assist community members who were affected by the 2022 flooding events. Within the disaster, some communities with wellbeing issues often needed additional assistance from agencies. They realised we needed more of a socio-economic approach. There's a lot more going on with these people than just bricks and mortar.[249]

8.193The help provided through the program has ranged from assisting digitally unsophisticated flood victims to upload documentation to government portals,[250] to supporting clients through long-running, complex cases. Ms Rollinson noted:

I've got a lot of clients there that are going to take 12 months or more. Some of those are still with the insurance company. One I've been working with for well over 12 months, and she's going to be ongoing for probably another 12 months or more just working her way through all the insurance stuff and moving forward from there. As we all know, disasters take up to 10 years or more to recover...[251]

Adequacy of resourcing

8.194The Committee heard that government resourcing for such flood recovery work by legal aid services and the community sector did not come close to meeting demand. As summarised by the Victorian Council of Social Service:

The community sector has put in a herculean effort to support people directly with their insurance problems and to help people deal with the flow-on impacts of insurance failure. … Community services have been there to help when insurance issues push people into homelessness, contribute to family breakdown or force people to return home when their property is still mouldy and unsafe. But community organisations are under pressure, both generally, with rising demand, and specifically, in disaster affected areas.[252]

8.195The inquiry also heard that people are increasingly turning to the community sector to help them build resilience between disasters, but ongoing funding levels are inadequate for this. Asked whether their organisation was adequately resourced, the Chief Executive Officer of ARC Justice replied:

No, in short. We do what we can with the resources that we have right now, but there's no way that we're getting to the communities across the 13 local government areas [we] support. We have some very limited funding on the back of the floods from October 2022. But one of the biggest economic, social challenges that we're seeing across all of our communities, is how to prepare for the next disaster and how to recover from the past one. … This is the new normal for us and our communities, and they're looking to us to help them prepare, and we don't have the resources to do that currently. There is, absolutely, a role for financial counsellors and community lawyers, but we are very stretched...[253]

8.196The Financial Rights Legal Centre—which operates the national Insurance Law Service telephone advice line—also said that better resourcing would let it help many more people:

We've got about…12 solicitors who take calls, but the funding goes up and down. At the moment, we've got appropriate funding, but finding lawyers that have the skill to give live legal advice about a complex product like insurance…who are willing to do that for a community legal centre salary and who also have call centre skills…is difficult... We are always oversubscribed. We are never going to answer all the calls… We give legal advice and then maybe we take five per cent of those cases on to run them ourselves, and that is only for very vulnerable customers or if it is a really interesting issue of law…[254] [Emphasis added]

8.197The Consumer Action Law Centre[255] and Legal Aid NSW[256] also said they could not support everyone who sought assistance with flood insurance disputes.

8.198The Committee heard that resourcing the sector to provide more assistance earlier in flood victims’ recovery journeys would deliver value. A representative of the Federation of Community Legal Centres Victoria told the inquiry:

I think it's vital that those services are considered essential in these kinds of situations. … I think that it reduces further expenditure down the road because it means that the legal resolution is shorter and the holistic wellbeing of that person and their recovery is much better. So, yes, I think that a lot more funding at that early end…needs to occur so that we don't end up with inquiries like this.[257]

8.199However, the Committee also heard that limiting disaster-tied funding to the immediate aftermath of floods was inadequate for complex cases that could continue for years. For example, the Service Navigator program was ‘only funded till the end of June this year, so what happens to those clients that are still fighting with the insurance companies or still trying to get the supports they need after that?’[258]

8.200The inquiry was also told that community organisations’ ability to respond quickly after disasters, and support communities between disasters, was constrained by reliance on reactive, post-disaster funding injections. Legal Aid NSW explained:

With some of the work that we do, along with many of the other consumer advocates, lots of the funding for services is event based. We can really only help those clients as long as we have the resources to help…so we would have to wait for an event to happen and then try to gear up… [I]t's not just Legal Aid NSW; it's the other legal aid commissions, but also the other consumer advocates. We want to do a lot more, but in some ways we are limited by the resources that we have…[259]

8.201The Financial Rights Legal Centre also warned that funding for its Insurance Law Service was not ongoing, and called for a more sustainable funding model:

Unfortunately funding for services that support consumers with insurance disputes after disasters tends to come in small bursts after major events. Funding needs to be proactive and ongoing to allow us to recruit and retain specialist insurance staff.[260]

Committee comment

8.202The Committee expresses its appreciation for all the community organisations that contributed to this inquiry, including the frontline staff who took time to attend public hearings across regional Queensland, NSW, Victoria and Tasmania. The evidence shared has been invaluable.

8.203Legal aid, financial counselling and other community organisations have absorbed much of the burden of supporting the most vulnerable members of the community after the 2022 floods. Without the efforts of legal aid solicitors, financial counsellors and the broader community sector, many more flood victims would have faced financial and personal ruin. The Committee acknowledges and honours this work.

8.204The Committee has heard clearly that these organisations are unable to meet the growing community demand for their services with current funding levels. The Committee notes that for many of these organisations, caseload increases stemming from the 2022 floods have persisted for years, as successive waves of consumers reach personal or financial breaking points. However, government funding tied to the 2022 major floods is drying up, while baseline funding levels do not reflect the burden of ongoing flood recovery or resilience work; nor are they adequate to sustain a standing disaster recovery capability and expertise between major events.

8.205On 6 September, the Australian Government announced $800 million in funding over five years from 2025-26 to the legal assistance sector.[261] While this additional funding will be focused on uplifting legal services responding to gender-based violence, this package will also assist community legal services and other stakeholders providing assistance to communities after natural disasters.

8.206The Committee is therefore recommending that a share of this funding be allocated to provide more secure and sustainable funding for the invaluable work of this sector in disaster recovery.

8.207The Committee acknowledges the increased funding for the community legal sector recently announced. While the focus of this funding will be for family violence services, the Committee recommends that an appropriate proportion be dedicated to natural disaster services.

Footnotes

[1]Insurance Council of Australia (ICA), Submission 11, p. [6].

[2]Legislative Council Environment and Planning Committee, The 2022 flood event in Victoria, 30 July 2024, p.89.

[3]New South Wales Government, 2022 Flood Inquiry: Volume Two: Full report, 29 July 2022, p. 279. However, local councils across urban Melbourne partner with Melbourne Water—Legislative Council Environment and Planning Committee, The 2022 flood event in Victoria, p. 89.

[4]ICA, Submission 11, p. [7].

[5]ICA, Submission 11, p. [7].

[6]ICA, Submission 11, p. [7].

[7]Legislative Council Environment and Planning Committee, The 2022 flood event in Victoria, 30 July 2024, p. 89.

[8]Mr Brendan Moon, AM, Coordinator-General, National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Committee Hansard, 15 March 2024, p. 32.

[9]Mrs Kate Miles, Head of System Planning and Land Acquisition, Sydney Water, Committee Hansard, 30 July 2024, p. 4.

[10]Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, 30 October 2020, p. 420.

[11]Mr Pierce Tyson, Mayor, Moonee Valley City Council, Committee Hansard, Maribyrnong, 17 April 2024, p. 6.

[12]Mr Stephen Patey, Strategic Planning Manager, Sunshine Coast Council, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p. 10; Ms Megan Gould, Acting Manager, Road Infrastructure Planning, Logan City Council, Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 25; Townsville City Council, Submission 84, p. 1.

[13]Mr Stephen Patey, Strategic Planning Manager, Sunshine Coast Council, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p. 10.

[14]New South Wales Government, 2022 Flood Inquiry: Volume Two: Full report, p. 279; Legislative Council Environment and Planning Committee, The 2022 flood event in Victoria, p. 94; Planning Institute of Australia (Victoria), Submission 75, p. 5; Hawkesbury City Council, Submission 25, p. 2; Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, p. 420.

[15]Hon G. Tony Pagone, AM, and others, Maribyrnong River Flood Event Independent Review, August 2023, p. 119.

[16]Legislative Council Environment and Planning Committee, The 2022 flood event in Victoria, 30 July 2024, p. 94.

[17]Planning Institute of Australia (Victoria), Submission 75, p. 8; United Kingdom Environment Agency, Flood risk management plans 2021 to 2027: You said, we did, 12 December 2022, www.gov.uk/government/publications/flood-risk-management-plans-2021-to-2027-you-said-we-did/.

[18]Legislative Council Environment and Planning Committee, The 2022 flood event in Victoria, 30 July 2024, p. 92.

[19]Townsville City Council, Submission 84, p. 1.

[20]Ms Megan Gould, Acting Manager, Road Infrastructure Planning, Logan City Council, Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 25.

[21]Ms Angela Jones, Director, Community Service Delivery, Richmond Valley Council, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11April 2024, p. 8.

[22]Sutherland Shire Council, Submission 24, pp. 2–3; Ms Megan Gould, Acting Manager, Road Infrastructure Planning, Logan City Council, Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 25; Ms Angela Jones, Director, Community Service Delivery, Richmond Valley Council, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 8.

[23]Insurance Council of Australia, 2024–25 Pre-Budget Submissions, 25 January 2024, p. [4].

[24]Insurance Australia Group, Submission 16, pp. 33–39; Youi, Submission 14, p. 25; Allianz Australia, Submission 13, p. 45; RACQ Group, Submission 15, p. 24; Suncorp Group, Submission 12, p. 40; QBE Insurance Group, Submission 17, p. 25; Hollard Holdings Australia, Submission 19, p. 42; Auto & General Holdings, Submission 18, p. 47.

[25]Mr Brendan Moon, AM, Coordinator-General, NEMA, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2024, p. 32.

[26]QBE Insurance Group, Supplementary Submission 17.1, p. 2; QBE Insurance Group, Submission 17, p. 25; Auto & General Holdings, Submission 18, pp. 47–48; Youi, Submission 14, p. 25; Allianz Australia, Submission 13, p. 45; Insurance Australia Group, Submission 16, p. 39; Hollard Holdings Australia, Submission 19, p. 42; RACQ Group, Submission 15, p. 24; Suncorp Group, Submission 12, p. 40.

[27]ICA, Submission 11, p. [7].

[28]ICA, Submission 11, p. [7].

[29]ICA, Submission 11, p. [7].

[30]ICA, Submission 11, p. [7]; QBE Insurance Group, Supplementary Submission 17.1, p. 2.

[31]ICA, Supplementary Submission 11.1, p. [2].

[32]ICA, Submission 11, p. [7].

[33]NEMA, Communiqué of Hazard Insurance Partnership (HIP) Meeting One, 2 February 2023, p. [1].

[34]QBE Insurance Group, Supplementary Submission 17.2, p. 2.

[35]Youi, Submission 14, p. 25; QBE Insurance Group, Submission 17, p. 25; Auto & General Holdings, Submission 18, p. 47; Allianz Australia, Submission 13, p. 45; Insurance Australia Group, Submission 16, p.39; Hollard Holdings Australia, Submission 19, p. 42; RACQ Group, Submission 15, p. 24; Suncorp Group, Submission 12, p. 40.

[36]QBE Insurance Group, Submission 17, p. 25; Youi, Submission 14, p. 25; Insurance Australia Group, Submission 16, p. 39; Suncorp Group, Submission 12, p. 39; Allianz Australia, Submission 13, p. 50; Hollard Holdings Australia, Submission 19, p. 42.

[37]Youi, Submission 14, p. 25.

[38]Youi, Submission 14, p. 25.

[39]Youi, Submission 14, p. 25.

[40]Ms Katherine O’Regan, Head, Investment and Growth, Lismore City Council, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 8.

[41]Allianz Australia, Submission 13, p. 50.

[42]Name Withheld, Submission 67, p. [1]; Committee Survey Results included many similar comments.

[43]Legislative Council Environment and Planning Committee, The 2022 flood event in Victoria, p. 98.

[44]Logan City Council, Submission 52, p. 4.

[45]Sutherland Shire Council, Submission 24, p. [2].

[46]Narrabri Shire Council, Submission 23, p. 4.

[47]Committee Survey Results.

[48]New South Wales Government, 2022 Flood Inquiry: Volume Two: Full report, p. 284.

[49]Queensland Reconstruction Authority, Flood mapping, www.qra.qld.gov.au/publications-and-maps/maps/flood-mapping, viewed 5 September 2024.

[50]Legislative Council Environment and Planning Committee, The 2022 flood event in Victoria, p. 98.

[51]Planning Institute Australia, ‘Victoria’s planners do not have the information they need to prepare for floods’, Media Release, 19 August 2022.

[52]Legislative Council Environment and Planning Committee, The 2022 flood event in Victoria, p. 96.

[53]Legislative Council Environment and Planning Committee, The 2022 flood event in Victoria, p. 96; Planning Institute of Australia (Victoria), Submission 75, p. 10.

[54]Department of the Treasury, Natural Disaster Insurance Review, 14 November 2011, p. 67.

[55]Geoscience Australia, Australian Flood Risk Information Portal (AFRIP),www.ga.gov.au/scientific-topics/community-safety/projects/afrip, viewed 5 September 2024.

[56]Ms Claudia Brumme-Smith, Chief Executive Officer, Townsville Enterprise Ltd, Committee Hansard, Townsville, 25 July 2024, p. 13; Narrabri Shire Council, Submission 23, p. 3; Ms Jane Keddie, Vice President, Victorian Division, Planning Institute of Australia, Committee Hansard, Maribyrnong, 17 April 2024, pp. 36–39; Legislative Council Environment and Planning Committee, The 2022 flood event in Victoria, p. xx; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC), Northern Australia Insurance Inquiry, 28 December 2020, p. 465; Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, p. 32; Mr Trent Thomson, Chief Executive Officer, Australia and New Zealand, Swiss Re Asia Pte Ltd, Australia Branch, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2024, p. 5; Mr Gordon Williams, Chief Executive Officer, Northern Midlands Business Association and the Kentish and Latrobe Independent Business Association, Committee Hansard, Devonport, 17 July 2024, p. 14; Ms Sarah McMahon, Mayor, Hawkesbury City Council, Committee Hansard, Richmond, 9 May 2024, p. 2.

[57]Planning Institute of Australia, ‘Victoria’s planners do not have the information they need to prepare for floods’, Media Release, 19 August 2022.

[58]Mr Gordon Williams, Chief Executive Officer, Northern Midlands Business Association and the Kentish and Latrobe Independent Business Association, Committee Hansard, Devonport, 17 July 2024, p. 14.

[59]Ms Yvette Andrews, Manager, Engagement and Strategy Development, Resilient Sydney, Committee Hansard, Parramatta, 10 May 2024, p. 15.

[60]Legislative Council Environment and Planning Committee, The 2022 flood event in Victoria, p. xix.

[61]Legislative Council Environment and Planning Committee, The 2022 flood event in Victoria, p. xxiii.

[62]Planning Institute of Australia (Victoria), Submission 75, p. 7.

[63]Committee Survey Results, free text responses.

[64]Miss Jane Keddie, Vice President, Victorian Division, Planning Institute of Australia, Committee Hansard, Maribyrnong, 17 April 2024, p. 39; Planning Institute of Australia (Victoria), Submission 75, p. 12.

[65]Melbourne Water, ‘Flood extent maps - October 2022, 2024 & 2100 scenarios and related maps’, https://letstalk.melbournewater.com.au/maribyrnong-river-flood-model/maribyrnong-river-flood-model-maps, last updated 19 April 2024, viewed 21 September 2024. See also: Jacobs and Melbourne Water, 2024 Maribyrnong River Flood Modelling Project Summary Report, 24 April 2024.

[66]Jacobs and Melbourne Water, ‘Appendix P. Flood Extents for simulated AEP events’, 2024 Maribyrnong River Flood Model Report (the ‘Technical report’), 13 June 2024, p. 413.

[67]Melbourne Water, Maribyrnong River Flood Review, www.melbournewater.com.au/services/projects/maribyrnong-river-flood-model.

[68]Ms Yvette Andrews, Manager, Engagement and Strategy Development, Resilient Sydney, Committee Hansard, Parramatta, 10 May 2024, p. 15; Mr Anton Usher, Manager, Corporate Governance, Sutherland Shire Council, Committee Hansard, Parramatta, 10 May 2024, pp. 7–8.

[69]Ms Amanda Leck, Head, Adaptation, Migration and Reconstruction, NSW Reconstruction Authority, Committee Hansard, 30 July 2024, p. 28.

[70]Logan City Council, Submission 52, p. 4.

[71]Mr Daniel Staley, Acting Director, Infrastructure Planning, and Manager, Development Services, City of Moreton Bay, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p. 7; Allianz Australia, Submission 13, p. 6; Mr Craig Dixon, Executive General Manager, Service and Asset Lifecycle, Melbourne Water, Committee Hansard, Maribyrnong, 17 April 2024, p. 39; Mr Jon Raven, Mayor, Logan City Council, Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 23.

[72]Allianz Australia, Submission 13, p. 6.

[73]Allianz Australia, Submission 13, p. 21.

[74]Mr Jon Raven, Mayor, Logan City Council, Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 27.

[75]Mr Mark Ryan, General Manager, Disaster and Emergency Management, and Local Disaster Coordinator, City of Gold Coast, Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 27.

[76]NEMA, Submission 40, p. 4.

[77]Livock, Kristy et al, ‘Storm surges: Exploring the role of experience and knowledge’, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 93 (2023), p. 1.

[78]Livock, Kristy et al, ‘Storm surges: Exploring the role of experience and knowledge’, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 93 (2023), p. 7.

[79]Livock, Kristy et al, ‘Storm surges: Exploring the role of experience and knowledge’, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 93 (2023), p. 7.

[80]Scovell, Mitchell et al, ‘Personalising the message: promoting cyclone protection in North Queensland’, Australian Journal of Emergency Management, October 2019; Scovell, Mitchell et al,‘How fringe cyclone experience affects predictions of damage severity’, Disaster Prevention and Management: an International Journal, 30(2) 2021, pp 240-254.

[81]NEMA, Submission 40, p. 3.

[82]NEMA, Communiqué of HIP Meeting One, 2 February 2023, p. [1].

[83]NEMA, Submission 40, p. 4.

[84]NEMA, Submission 40, p. 4; Dr Jill Charker, Deputy Coordinator-General, Disaster Resilience and Recovery, NEMA, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2024, p. 29.

[85]Dr Jill Charker, Deputy Coordinator-General, Disaster Resilience and Recovery, NEMA, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2024, p. 29.

[86]See NEMA’s communiqués of HIP meetings from February 2024 to May 2024, available at nema.gov.au/about-us/federal-budget/hazards-insurance-partnership, viewed 5 September 2024.

[87]NEMA, Communiqué of HIP Meeting One, 2 February 2023, p. [1].

[88]NEMA, Submission 40, p. 4.

[89]Logan City Council, Submission 52, p. 4; Sutherland Shire Council, Submission 24, pp. 2–3; Ms Sarah McMahon, Mayor, Hawkesbury City Council, Committee Hansard, Richmond, 9 May 2024, p. 2.

[90]Ms Sarah McMahon, Mayor, Hawkesbury City Council, Committee Hansard, Richmond, 9 May 2024, p. 2.

[91]Ms Yvette Andrews, Manager, Engagement and Strategy Development, Resilient Sydney, Committee Hansard, Parramatta, 10 May 2024, p. 15.

[92]Suncorp Group, Submission 12, p. 40; RACQ Group, Submission 15, p. 25; Insurance Australia Group, Submission 16, p. 27; QBE Insurance Group, Submission 17, p. 28.

[93]Insurance Council of Australia, 2024–25 Pre-Budget Submissions, p. [4].

[94]Mr Christopher Barnes, Manager, Emergency Management and Public Safety, City of Moreton Bay, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p. 10. See also Suncorp Group, Submission 12, pp. 11–12.

[95]Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Government Crisis Management Framework, version3.1, December 2021, p. 7.

[96]Department of Home Affairs, Disaster Recovery Payment, www.disasterassist.gov.au/disaster-arrangements/disaster-recovery-payment, viewed 27 August 2024.

[97]Department of Home Affairs, Disaster Recovery Allowance, www.disasterassist.gov.au/disaster-arrangements/disaster-recovery-allowance, viewed 27 August 2024.

[98]NEMA, Supplementary Submission 40.1, p. 1.

[99]For example: Murray Watt, Minister for Emergency Management, Social Security (Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment— Victorian floods – October 2022) Determination 2022 (No. 10), 22 December 2022, www.legislation.gov.au/F2022L01740/asmade/text, viewed 2 September 2024.

[100]For example: Murray Watt, Minister for Emergency Management, Social Security (Australian Government Disaster Recovery Payment—South East Queensland Severe Storms and Flooding—December 2023 to January 2024) (LIN 24/026) Determination 2024 (No. 4), 12 February 2024, www.legislation.gov.au/F2024L00169/asmade/text, viewed 2 September 2024.

[101]National Emergency Management Agency, Supplementary Submission 40.1, p. 1.

[102]Department of Home Affairs, Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements 2018, www.disasterassist.gov.au/disaster-arrangements/disaster-recovery-funding-arrangements, viewed 27 August 2024.

[103]Department of Home Affairs, Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements 2018, June 2018, p. 5.

[104]Resilience NSW, NSW Disaster Assistance Guidelines 2021, 2021, p. 7.

[105]Department of Home Affairs, Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements 2018, June 2018, pp. 15–16, 21 and 22.

[106]Department of Justice and Community Safety (Victoria), Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements (DRFA) Overview, February 2024 (available for download from www.vic.gov.au/disaster-recovery-funding-arrangements).

[107]Queensland Reconstruction Authority, Queensland Disaster Funding Guidelines, June 2021; Queensland Reconstruction Authority, Our role in disaster funding activations, www.qra.qld.gov.au/disaster-funding-activations/our-role-disaster-funding-activations, viewed 4 September 2024.

[108]Resilience NSW, NSW Disaster Assistance Guidelines 2021, 2021, p. 7.

[109]For example, see NSW Government, Natural disaster declarations from financial year 2021-22, www.nsw.gov.au/emergency/recovery/natural-disaster-declarations/fy-2021-22, viewed 4 September 2024.

[110]National Emergency Management Agency, Supplementary Submission 40.1, p. 1.

[111]NEMA, Submmission 40, p. 4.

[112]Queensland Reconstruction Authority, Resilient Homes Fund: Voluntary Home Buy-Back program, www.qra.qld.gov.au/resilient-homes-fund/resilient-homes-fund-voluntary-home-buy-back-program, viewed 4September 2024.

[113]NSW Government, Resilient Homes Program frequently asked questions, www.nsw.gov.au/departments-and-agencies/nsw-reconstruction-authority/our-work/northern-rivers/resilient-homes-program/resilient-homes-program-frequently-asked-questions, viewed 4 September 2024.

[114]NEMA, Submmission 40, p. 4.

[115]NSW Government, Resilient Lands Program, www.nsw.gov.au/departments-and-agencies/nsw-reconstruction-authority/our-work/northern-rivers/resilient-lands-program, viewed 4 September 2024.

[116]NEMA, Submission 40, p. 3.

[117]NSW Government, The Flood Property Assessment Program, www.nsw.gov.au/emergency/floods/recover/financial-support/property-assessment-program, viewed 4 September 2024.

[118]ARC Justice, Submission 9, p. 4.

[119]Emergency Recovery Victoria, Submission 31, p. 4.

[120]See for example: Mr Jason Membrey, Disaster Management Coordinator, Sunshine Coast Council, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2022, pp. 3–4.

[121]Mr Mark Ryan, General Manager, Disaster and Emergency Management, and Local Disaster Coordinator, City of Gold Coast, Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 20.

[122]For example: City of Greater Bendigo, Submission 68, p. 2.

[123]Mr Steve Krieg, Mayor, Lismore City Council, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 3.

[124]See for example: City of Greater Bendigo, Submission 68, p. 2.

[125]For example: the Sunshine Coast and Moreton Bay councils, as discussed in Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p. 4.

[126]Cr Steve Pickering, Councillor, Clarence Valley Council, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 4.

[127]Ballina Shire Council, Submission 64, p. 1.

[128]For example: Mr Peter Freshney, Mayor, Latrobe Council, Committee Hansard, Devonport, 17 July 2024, pp. 4–5; Councillor Kenneth Keith OAM, Parkes Shire Council, Committee Hansard, Eugowra, 8 May 2024, p. 13.

[129]Mr Christopher Barnes, Manager, Emergency Management and Public Safety, City of Moreton Bay, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p. 4.

[130]Mr Jon Raven, Mayor, Logan City Council, Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, pp. 19–20.

[131]Legal Aid NSW, Submission 34, p. 26.

[132]Financial Rights Legal Centre,CHOICE, Consumer Action Law Centre and Westjustice, Submission 27, p.72.

[133]Mr Paul Fernee, Director, Community Wellbeing, Gannawarra Shire Council, Committee Hansard, Rochester, 18 April 2024, pp. 3, 9.

[134]For example: Ms Elly Bird, Executive Director, Resilient Lismore, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 30.

[135]Legal Aid Queensland, Supplementary Submission 8.1, p. 1.

[136]Mr Chris Connors, Chief Executive Officer, Sunshine Sugar, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 40, 45.

[137]Sutherland Shire Council, Submission 24, pp. 1–2.

[138]Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, 28 October 2020, pp. 474–475.

[139]Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, 28 October 2020, p. 485.

[140]Mr Brendan Moon, Coordinator-General, NEMA, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2024, pp. 33–34; MrsKate Miles, Head of System Planning and Land Acquisition, Sydney Water, Committee Hansard, 30 July 2024, p. 4; Annette Sheppard, President, FNQ Volunteers Inc., Committee Hansard, Townsville, 25 July 2024, p. 32.

[141]For example: River Cares, Submission 76, p. 6.

[142]For example: Sofie Wainwright and Mary-Louise Vince, ‘Hawkesbury River residents in “forgotten” council areas overlooked for flood relief funds,’ ABC News, 7 April 2022; Caitlin Cassidy and Cait Kelly, ‘“It’s really insulting”: NSW flood victims excluded from extra disaster payments lash out at Coalition,’ Guardian, 10March 2022.

[143]See the discussion across Northern Rivers councils in Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 10.

[144]Ms Claudia Brumme-Smith, Chief Executive Officer, Townsville Enterprise Ltd, Committee Hansard, Townsville, 25 July 2024, p. 20.

[145]Mr Paul Fernee, Director, Community Wellbeing, Gannawarra Shire Council, Committee Hansard, Rochester, 18 April 2024, p. 3.

[146]Mr Sean Haynes, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, Eugowra, 8 May 2024, p. 21.

[147]City of Greater Bendigo, Submission 64, p. 6.

[148]Mr Paul Fernee, Director, Community Wellbeing, Gannawarra Shire Council, Committee Hansard, Rochester, 18 April 2024, p. 4.

[149]Ms Louise Mitchell, Director, Community, Greater Shepparton City Council, Committee Hansard, Rochester, 18 April 2024, p. 4.

[150]Mr Brendan Moon, Coordinator-General, NEMA, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2024, p. 35.

[151]Mr Brendan Moon, Coordinator-General, NEMA, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2024, p. 36.

[152]Mr Kevin Beatty, Mayor, Cabonne Council, Committee Hansard, Molong, 7 May 2024, p. 2.

[153]For example: Dr Helen Haines MP, Submission 4, p. 9.

[154]Ms Megan Inglis, Principal Solicitor, TASC National, Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 11.

[155]For example: Name Withheld, Submission 91, p. [8].

[156]Ms Megan Inglis, Principal Solicitor, TASC National, Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 11.

[157]Mr Brian Joiner, Chief Executive Officer (Acting), Cook Shire Council, Committee Hansard, Cairns, 24 July 2024, pp. 26–28.

[158]Mr Scott Waters, Chief Executive Officer, City of Moreton Bay, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p. 10.

[159]Mr Brian Joiner, Chief Executive Officer (Acting), Cook Shire Council, Committee Hansard, Cairns, 24 July 2024, pp. 26–28, 31.

[160]Townsville Enterprise, Submission 81, p. 4.

[161]City of Greater Bendigo, Submission 68, p. [6].

[162]Mr Peter Freshney, Mayor, Latrobe Council, Committee Hansard, Devonport, 17 July 2024, p. 12.

[163]Mr Jason Membrey, Disaster Management Coordinator, Sunshine Coast Council, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p. 2; Mr Scott Waters, Chief Executive Officer, City of Moreton Bay, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p. 5; Mr Zac Dawes, Emergency Management Operations Officer, Townsville City Council, Committee Hansard, Townsville, 25 July 2024, p. 5.

[164]Ms Maria Weiss, Director Community, Macedon Ranges Shire Council, Committee Hansard, Heathcote, 19 April 2024, p. 4.

[165]Mr Gary Everson, Associate Director Service Delivery, Cairns Regional Council, Committee Hansard, Cairns, 24 July 2024, p. 31; Mr Andrew Armistead, Chief Executive Officer, CivicRisk Mutual, Committee Hansard, Parramatta, 10 May 2024, p. 2.

[166]NEMA, Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements Review, nema.gov.au/about-us/governance-and-reporting/reviews/DRFA, viewed 3 September 2024.

[167]NEMA, Independent Review of Commonwealth Disaster Funding, nema.gov.au/about-us/governance-and-reporting/reviews/Independent-Review-Disaster-Funding, viewed 3 September 2024.

[168]Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, 28 October 2020, p. 485.

[169]Mr Steve Krieg, Mayor, City of Lismore, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, pp. 8–9.

[170]Mr Kevin Beatty, Mayor, Cabonne Council, Committee Hansard, Molong, 7 May 2024, p. 3.

[171]ICA, Submission 11, p. [18].

[172]Dr Bronwyn Lay, Strategic Lead, Climate Justice Support Unit, Federation of Community Legal Centres Victoria, Committee Hansard, 31 January 2024, p. 24.

[173]NEMA, Submission 40, p. 4.

[174]Ballina Shire Council, Submission 64, p. 3.

[175]Ms Annette Sheppard, President, FNQ Volunteers Inc., Committee Hansard, Townsville, 25 July 2024, pp. 25–26.

[176]Mayor Jon Raven, Mayor, Logan City Council, Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 20.

[177]NEMA, Disaster Relief Australia, nema.gov.au/programs/disaster-relief-australia, viewed 4 September 2024.

[178]Mr Mark Ryan, General Manager, Disaster and Emergency Management, and Local Disaster Coordinator, City of Gold Coast, Committee Hansard,Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 20.

[179]Mr Brendan Moon, Coordinator-General, NEMA, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2024, pp. 36–37.

[180]Mr Brendan Moon, Coordinator-General, NEMA, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2024, pp. 36–37. QBE Insurance Group made similar observations in Submission 17, p. 11.

[181]Insurance Australia Group, Submission 16, p. 7.

[182]Ms Joanne Bradbury, Submission 79, p. 1.

[183]Suncorp Group, Submission 12, p. 19.

[184]Ms Angela Jones, Director, Community Service Delivery, Richmond Valley Council, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 10.

[185]Cr Steve Pickering, Councillor, Clarence Valley Council, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 10.

[186]For example: Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 28, pp. 6–7; Legal Aid NSW, Submission 34, p. 10.

[187]Disaster Legal Help Victoria, Submission 7, p. 6.

[188]Ms Amanda Leck, Head of Adaptation, Mitigation and Reconstruction, NSW Reconstruction Authority, Committee Hansard, 30 July 2024, p. 30. See also QBE, Submission 17, p. 12.

[189]Ms Sharon Keith, Program Manager, Disaster Legal Help Victoria, Committee Hansard, 31 January 2024, p.27.

[190]ICA, Submission 11, p. [27].

[191]QBE Insurance Group, Submission 17, p. 16.

[192]IAG, Submission 16, p. 20.

[193]Legal Aid NSW, Submission 34, p. 10.

[194]Financial Rights Legal Centre, CHOICE, Consumer Action Law Centre and Westjustice, Submission 27, p.12.

[195]Financial Rights Legal Centre, CHOICE, Consumer Action Law Centre and Westjustice, Submission 27, p.77.

[196]Ms Ma’ata Solofoni, Senior Solicitor, Disaster Recovery and Insurance, Legal Aid NSW, Committee Hansard, 31 January 2024, p. 37.

[197]Mr Paul Holmes, Assistant Director, Disaster Relief, Legal Aid Queensland, Committee Hansard, 31 January 2024, p. 44.

[198]Insurance Australia Group, Submission 16, pp. 20–21; Auto & General Holdings, Submission 18, p. 7. An extreme example was shared by Mr Leslie Geoffrey Pye, Chair, Richmond River Cane Growers Association, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 47.

[199]Financial Counselling Australia, Committee Hansard, 1 February 2024, pp. 7–8.

[200]IAG, Submission 16, p. 7; QBE Insurance Group, Submission 17, p. 12.

[201]Mrs Melinda McInturff, Community Resilience Coordinator, Community Plus Queensland Inc., Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, pp. 2, 7.

[202]Ms Megan Inglis, Principal Solicitor, TASC National, Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 11.

[203]Byron Shire Council, Submission 54, p. 10.

[204]Mr Andrew Hall, Chief Executive Officer, Insurance Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, 5 February 2024, p. 3.

[205]Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 28, p. 7.

[206]Committee Survey Results, free text responses.

[207]Byron Shire Council, Submission 54, p. 10.

[208]For example: Financial Counselling Australia, Supplementary Submission 6.1, p. 10; Victorian Council of Social Services, Submission 10, pp. [4–5]; Townsville City Council, Submission 84, p. 2.

[209]Ms Elly Bird, Executive Director, Resilient Lismore, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 30.

[210]Mr Paul Fernee, Director, Community Wellbeing, Gannawarra Shire Council, Committee Hansard, Rochester, 18 April 2024, p. 3; Ms Louise Mitchell, Director, Community, Greater Shepparton City Council, Committee Hansard, Rochester, 18 April 2024, p. 9.

[211]Mr Andrew Turnour, Spokesperson, Townsville Lot Owners Group, Committee Hansard, Townsville, 25 July 2024, p. 23.

[212]Ms Therese Maloney, Community Connect Worker, Mossman Support Services, Committee Hansard, Cairns, 24July 2024, p. 6.

[213]For example: Mr Christopher Barnes, Manager, Emergency Management and Public Safety, City of Moreton Bay, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p. 13.

[214]Mr Andrew Turnour, Spokesperson, Townsville Lot Owners Group, Committee Hansard, Townsville, 25 July 2024, p. 23.

[215]Name Withheld, Submission 58, p. [1].

[216]A Way Forward, Submission 60, p. 1.

[217]NSW Reconstruction Authority, Submission 83, p. 94. Janelle Saffin MP, Submission 86, p. [106] added that stakeholders at these workshops could however ‘see the value of a national pool as a time-limited mechanism to assist the transition out of high-risk locations or to build greater flood resilience.’

[218]Mr Richard Feledy, Managing Director, Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd, Committee Hansard, 9 February 2024, p. 15.

[219]Financial Counselling Australia, Submission 6, p. 2; see also Financial Counselling Australia, ‘AboutFCA’, www.financialcounsellingaustralia.org.au/about-fca/, viewed 21September 2024.

[220]Financial Counselling Australia, Submission 6, p. 2.

[221]Legal Aid NSW, Submission 34, p. 6.

[222]Legal Aid NSW, Submission 34, pp. 7–8.

[223]Ms Elizabeth Lehmann, Senior Outreach Solicitor, Disaster Response Legal Service, Legal Aid NSW, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 29.

[224]Ms Ma’ata Solofoni, Senior Solicitor, Disaster Recovery and Insurance, Legal Aid New South Wales, Committee Hansard, 31 January 2024, p. 31; Ms Elizabeth Lehmann, Senior Outreach Solicitor, Disaster Response Legal Service, Legal Aid NSW, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 29.

[225]Disaster Response Legal Service, Submission 34, p. 6.

[226]Financial Rights Legal Centre,CHOICE, Consumer Action Law Centre and Westjustice, Submission 27, p. 2.

[227]Financial Rights Legal Centre,CHOICE, Consumer Action Law Centre and Westjustice, Submission 27, p. 6.

[228]Mrs Melinda McInturff, Community Resilience Coordinator, Community Plus Queensland Inc., Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 2.

[229]Mr Aran Matkevich, Solicitor, Northern Rivers Community Legal Centre, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 28.

[230]Ms Elly Bird, Executive Director, Resilient Lismore, Committee Hansard, Lismore, 11 April 2024, p. 30.

[231]Disaster Legal Help Victoria, Submission 7, p. ii.

[232]Ms Sharon Keith, Program Manager, Disaster Legal Help Victoria, Committee Hansard, 31 January 2024, p.22.

[233]ARC Justice, Submission 9, p. 2.

[234]Mrs Julia Davis, Senior Policy and Communications Officer, Financial Rights Legal Centre, Committee Hansard, 31 January 2024, p. 11.

[235]Byron Shire Council, Submission 54, pp. 7–8.

[236]Financial Counselling Australia, Supplementary Submission 6.1, pp. 4–5.

[237]Ms Kate Clohesy, Director, Strategy and Impact, ARC Justice, Committee Hansard, 1 February 2024, p. 45.

[238]Mr Zyl Hovenga-Wauchope, Executive Officer, Financial Counselling Victoria, Committee Hansard, 1February 2024, p. 2.

[239]Ms Tracey Blythe, Disaster Recovery Coordinator, Financial Counselling Victoria, Committee Hansard, 1February 2024, pp. 2–3.

[240]Financial Counselling Victoria, Unsettled: Climate risk and cash settlements in home insurance, August 2024.

[241]Mr Zyl Hovenga-Wauchope, Executive Officer, Financial Counselling Victoria, Committee Hansard, 1February 2024, p. 2.

[242]Ms Ma’ata Solofoni, Senior Solicitor, Disaster Recovery and Insurance, Legal Aid New South Wales, Committee Hansard, 31 January 2024, p. 37.

[243]Ms Karen Rollinson, Service Navigator, Encircle Community Services, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p.23.

[244]Ms Libby Buckingham, Director, Thriving Communities, Victorian Council of Social Service, Committee Hansard, 31 January 2024, p. 20.

[245]Ms Emma Webster, Flood Recovery Solicitor, Tenants Queensland, Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 6. Similar observations were made by Ms Latha Elenkovan, Principal Solicitor and Manager, Pine Rivers Community Legal Service, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p. 22, and others.

[246]Ms Kellie Massouras, Manager Flood and Community Recovery, Mitchell Shire Council, Committee Hansard, Heathcote, 19 April 2024, p. 6.

[247]Dr Prue Bagley, Community Engagement Officer, ARC Justice, Committee Hansard, 1 February 2024, p. 35.

[248]Financial Counselling Australia, Submission 6, p. 2.

[249]Ms Karen Rollinson, Service Navigator, Encircle Community Services, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p.21. See also: CARE Goondiwindi, ‘Service Navigator Targeted Rebuild CaseManagement’, https://caregoondiwindi.org.au/programs/service-navigator/, viewed 21 September 2024.

[250]Mrs Melinda McInturff, Community Resilience Coordinator, Community Plus Queensland Inc., Committee Hansard, Logan, 10 April 2024, p. 5.

[251]Ms Karen Rollinson, Service Navigator, Encircle Community Services, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p.23.

[252]Ms Juanita Pope, Chief Executive Officer, Victorian Council of Social Service, Committee Hansard, 31January 2024, pp. 17–18.

[253]Mr Damian Stock, Chief Executive Officer, ARC Justice, Committee Hansard, 1 February 2024, p. 45.

[254]Mrs Julia Davis, Senior Policy and Communications Officer, Financial Rights Legal Centre, Committee Hansard, 31 January 2024, p. 11.

[255]Ms Philippa Heir, Managing Lawyer, Consumer Action Law Centre, Committee Hansard, 31 January 2024, p.11.

[256]Ms Ma'ata Solofoni, Senior Solicitor, Disaster Recovery and Insurance, Legal Aid New South Wales, Committee Hansard, 31 January 2024, p. 35.

[257]Dr Bronwyn Lay, Strategic Lead, Climate Justice Support Unit, Federation of Community Legal Centres Victoria, Committee Hansard, 31 January 2024, p. 24.

[258]Ms Karen Rollinson, Service Navigator, Encircle Community Services, Committee Hansard, Caboolture, 9 April 2024, p.27.

[259]Ms Ma'ata Solofoni, Senior Solicitor, Disaster Recovery and Insurance, Legal Aid NSW, Committee Hansard, 31 January 2024, p. 38.

[260]Financial Rights Legal Centre, Supplementary Submission 27.3, p. [3].

[261]Hon Anthony Albanese MP, Prime Minister of Australia, and Hon Mark Dreyfus KC MP, Attorney-General and Cabinet Secretary, ‘National Access to Justice Partnership’, Media Release, 6 September 2024.