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The third part of this monograph describes areas of
significant progress, both in better informed attitudes and the provision of
services and support, and other areas where progress is required. The
persistent issue of stigma acts as a reminder of the low starting point of
knowledge and uninformed attitudes towards service-related psychological
injuries. A hopeful note is struck by the 2nd Commando Regiment and its
approach to dealing with the health and wellbeing of its workforce. The
changing attitudes of veterans have a shaping effect on broader attitudes
towards service-related non-physical injuries. These pages record some
attitudes that focus on the invaluable range of services and support available
to veterans. Other veterans’ attitudes appear to remain trapped in an
entitlement mentality that sees DVA as the enemy with whom they must wage
battles for compensation. Finally, the issue of preventative mental fitness
will be introduced, investment in which is seen to have good prospects for
improved outcomes. Ultimately, society has come a long way from a very low
starting point. However, as this report demonstrates, the results are not yet
entirely effective and without significant investment in this issue now, there
is the risk that the mistakes of the Vietnam War will be replicated, creating
another long legacy of psychological injury from recent and current
deployments.
Stigma
The issue of a pervasive stigma surrounding mental health
was raised in a number of the interviews done for this research, by
politicians, psychiatrists, senior military leaders and veterans.[1] The impacts
of stigma associated with the mental health of civilian populations are
well-understood by these groups.[2]
Much work has also been done on the stigma of mental illness in a military
context and on how mental health stigma in a civilian setting relates to stigma
in a military setting.[3]
An influential early voice on the study of stigma, Erving Goffman, described it
as a sign of disgrace setting a person apart from others, often resulting in
those affected delaying seeking help or denying their symptoms altogether until
the point of crisis.[4]
Both a lack of factual information and strong negative emotional reactions to
reduced mental fitness are at play in the original data that follows. People
find symptoms of psychopathology threatening and the discomfort that other
people feel fosters stigma and discriminatory attitudes towards those who admit
to experiencing problems.
I used to think—’that weak cu*t, what has he seen that I
haven’t seen?’ Until I got it myself and then I understood, it doesn’t mean
you’re weak, it’s an injury. (veteran S)
Everyone knows that you get PTSD and your career is over. (veteran
R)
Personally it was a difficult time as I didn’t really have
any answers why I was depressed and I couldn’t attribute it to any one
incident. It was confusing and embarrassing as I had no control of my emotions
and could not trust myself to keep it all in check. Initially it was something
I tried to hide, but it got to a stage where I was totally useless and couldn’t
concentrate on anything except trying to hide my condition. (John—Appendix
A)
Left untreated, psychological injuries and reduced mental
fitness can have wide-reaching negative impacts on personal wellbeing. It
touches every aspect of a person’s life, including their social and emotional
wellbeing, as well as their cognitive functioning. In an interview for this
research, psychiatrist and specialist in veterans’ health, Dr Andrew Khoo,
stated his belief that the stigma surrounding mental health in the ADF is our
biggest challenge and that the single biggest difference that could be made to
mental health outcomes in military personnel would be to identify unwell
individuals earlier and then maintain them in effective treatments. Dr Khoo
believes that dealing with stigma is a more urgent issue than even treatment
development. In a culture that lauds strength and shuns weakness, the cultural
change necessary to convince serving personnel to seek help is significant
(Senator Linda Reynolds).
A culture that values strength and preparedness to help
others before oneself (qualities that make a good soldier) leaves Defence
personnel and veterans vulnerable to a reluctance to seek treatment for
symptoms of psychological injuries when they occur. Coupled with a culture that
views such injuries as weakness and tantamount to malingering, the landscape of
stigma and mental health in Defence, becomes, for some, a cultural norm that
will never be resolved (Dr Graeme Killer, DVA Principal Medical Adviser):
I‘ve heard WO1s call blokes who are genuinely injured
‘lingers‘ [malingerers] on more than one occasion—disparaging at best and
downright contemptible in light of genuine illness and injury. (Sara—Appendix
A)
Further complicating the issue is that a diagnosis of a
psychological injury is often thought to lead to missed deployments and
promotion windows, and result in involuntary discharge on medical grounds.
This, combined with the fact that such injuries can be hidden, means Defence
has a negative attitudinal culture around mental health that may result in
large numbers of psychologically injured personnel not receiving treatment.
While no one is arguing that those with reduced mental fitness require support
and/or treatment as a priority over career considerations, it is widely
acknowledged by working professionals both within and outside the ADF, that the
stigma of mental illness is a significant additional barrier to an ADF career
than a medical issue alone. The lack of recorded evidence of mental illness can
result in delays in recognition by DVA in the future (Dan Pronk, former ADF
Regimental Medical Officer). This has led to Veteran D, already chronically
unwell, becoming re-traumatised as he attempted to establish the basis of his
claims later—‘You don’t say anything until you get out, then [you’re] accused
of pension chasing’ (veteran D). Increased awareness that war can have negative
psychological effects and that this constitutes an entirely normal human
reaction, normalises psychological injury which is an important part of this
puzzle (Peter Leahy, Chairman, Soldier On). Sometimes a formal diagnosis can be
unhelpful, stigmatising and making the situation worse:
Fifty years ago Michel Foucault drew attention to the
medicalising of social problems; in looking at the deployed experience of
uniformed men and women, we need to avoid psychologizing what may be moral
problems.[5]
Suggested solutions include the need for highly-targeted
stigma reduction measures (Nicole Sadler, Defence psychologist; comments in an
interview for this research) because a message that reaches one target group
will be ineffective with other groups. Frank Quinlan (Mental Health Australia
CEO; in an interview for this research) suggested that the issue of stigma
should be turned on its head. At present, those experiencing reduced mental
fitness are made to feel ashamed of their situation. Instead, there is a need
to replace stigma with a narrative that is unwilling to accept discrimination
of those affected by injuries of this kind—‘We should be focused on an
organisational discourse of genuine care and support that can equip soldiers
and their commanders to layer culturally appropriate models in their own units,
coupled with expert care’ (Paul Dabovich, researcher, University of Adelaide).
This kind of change is unlikely to organically occur from within Defence and
will require political intervention (Melissa Parke MP, ALP Fremantle).
Dr Andrew Khoo stated in an interview for this research that
one of the most important things that will convince serving Defence personnel
to seek treatment for mental health-related issues is to see others do it,
resolve the issue with treatment and successfully return to work. In this view,
this will begin to foster a justified belief that mental injuries will be
treated like physical ones. Additionally, while some mental injuries, like
physical ones, will not be successfully treated and result in a return to work,
if others see resources and support being made available to those affected,
stigma will be further eroded. The recounting of personal experiences by
credible sources who overlap with the target group and who have themselves
experienced reduced mental fitness, may be one strategy to assist in the
erosion of stigma. The point is that rather than proselytising, these personnel
instead provide the opportunity to learn from the experiences of those who have
been through a successful rehabilitation program.
Soldiers sometimes seek to disguise the truth to achieve
their desired outcome. Examples range from 15-year-olds forging birth
certificates to join the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) in 1915 to soldiers
disguising mental and physical injuries to avoid the unpleasant social and
professional consequences of acknowledging them. Creating clarity around this
may encourage dialogue around harm minimisation and improved strategies when a
soldier’s career comes to an end (interview with Paula Dabovich).
One interviewee, John, remarked:
When I was diagnosed as having depression and anxiety issues,
I was effectively downgraded medically. The period of MEC [Medical Employment
Classification] downgrade was approximately 12 months, during which time I was
not eligible to participate in any courses, exercises, training, weapon
handling, driving of a military vehicle, etc. At certain ranks and windows in a
soldier’s career you only have limited opportunity to be considered for
promotion or attendance on promotion and career advancement courses. If you are
ineligible for these activities due to being MEC downgraded, you essentially
miss the window and that opportunity has flow-on effects for the remainder of
your career. For example, DSCMA [Directorate Soldier Career Management Agency]
will compare you against your peers for such things as promotion by looking at
everyone’s annual PARs [Performance Appraisal Reports] over a period of 3–5
yrs. If you have been unable to participate in all activities and exercises,
then your annual PAR will reflect this and you are no longer going to be
competitive with your peers for promotion, courses or certain jobs. (John—Appendix
A)
While a psychological injury may mean that an individual is
no longer able to perform their duties until they recover fully, much like the
impact of a physical injury, it is the additional element of stigma that
accompanies a psychological injury which amplifies the impact beyond a medical
issue. The following comments from David (see Appendix A) illustrate the manner
in which reduced mental fitness can be mistaken for a disciplinary problem (and
dealt with using bastardisation):
If you went to the padre or psych, [you were seen as], for
lack of a better word, [a] ‘poofter, faggot or weak cu*t’; sorry for the use of
this language but to understand how demoralising it was for some soldiers,
these words must be used. It started from higher ranks such as a Sergeant or
Corporal and as you could imagine, it only manifested tenfold amongst the
diggers. I clearly remember one soldier who was thrown into a cage, locked in
there like an animal, a cold bucket of water tossed in and broomsticks poked
through the gaps. This is a severe case but stands true. He was later
psychologically discharged from the Army. Of course that’s not fair. This was
not uncommon and rank just turned a blind eye or walked out of the room when
this behaviour was developing. A friend recently told me that he believes some
of the courageous men he served with, were the diggers that copped sh*t every
single day of their service. They were belittled, demoralised, but yet they
continued to stand by their mates and serve their duty. (David—Appendix A)
Susan’s comments below illustrate the urgent need to
normalise discussion and treatment of those diagnosed with a psychological
injury:
One of the biggest issues that I faced in Defence was
management, particularly middle management, not knowing how to handle or deal
with mental illness. The truth is it should be dealt with no differently than
any other injury. Management level Corporal through to Major need to make it
‘ok’ to talk about mental health. It’s all well and good having processes in
place but most of these processes make people requiring them feel like they are
only to be used if you are struggling or can’t handle it. Programs and support
should be a continued ‘wellbeing approach’. Like a BFA [Basic Fitness
Assessment] or a peer review. It’s just something that happens. It should just
become so normal that no one even thinks twice about it. Going to war is not
normal—seeking support for it is!! It is for this reason that there needs to be
more open communication about PTSD and mental health in my opinion, to
encourage people to talk openly about it. Make it normal ‘morno’ talk, not a
slide show every twelve months. It needs to be personal and it needs to be
real. (Susan—Appendix A)
The comments below illustrate the shame still attached to
psychological injuries, which is reflected in the attitude that it is better to
hide the problem than allow others to think you are ‘nuts’:
I have kept my PTSD and Chronic Depressive Disorder very
quiet, so at this stage it has had minimal effect on my work life; I do find
that I have time off on occasion due to ‘not feeling quite right’, but at this
stage my employer is kept very much in the dark and I deal with my issues at
home. Well it’s not really fair, but I also don’t want my employer and my work
mates thinking that I’m nuts. (Gary—Appendix A)
While mental fitness issues can be hidden or disguised as
something else, it is also the case that other kinds of (physical) medical
conditions may be kept from employers for career reasons.
Ex-Service
Organisations
A key feature of the service model as it currently exists is
the collection of ESOs that have grown to fill the (perceived) void between
services and support provided by Defence and those provided by DVA. These pages
record examples of ESOs that provide an invaluable range of services and
support to veterans. There is, however, a feeling (expressed by a number of
interviewees for this research who prefer not to be linked to these comments)
that some advocacy and support groups appear to remain trapped in an
entitlement mentality that sees DVA as the enemy with whom they must wage
battles for compensation. These groups are often protective of their own
organisation and wary of cooperation with others. It has been noted that
failure on the part of the RSL, as the premier and iconic representative group,
to keep pace with the changing needs of younger veterans has contributed to the
proliferation of newer and smaller organisations.[6]
As discussed in a previous section of this paper, while many
interviewees acknowledge the useful role played by ESOs in plugging gaps
between Defence and DVA, and providing care and support to veterans, problems (including
the above-cited entitlement mentality) do exist in the current model. While a
small number of such organisations have been around for decades (RSL and Legacy
are the examples most people are familiar with), many smaller organisations
have sprung up during times of need, then disappear. A Queensland sub-branch of
the RSL has counted 80 such organisations in Queensland alone.[7] Currently,
Mates for Mates and Soldier On are seen by a number of interviewees to be more
responsive to the changing needs of veterans than the older organisations.
The manner in which ESOs compete for attention, public
donations and government funding; the overlap and redundancy in the services
they provide; and the (at times bitter) in-fighting and disagreement that
occurs between the groups themselves are some of the problems that currently
exist. Among the consequences of this is a diluting effect on the power of
these organisations. While one compellingly expressed coherent message may find
traction, empathy fatigue can be an issue when there are a number of competing
voices. Some have also been noted (by sources who chose to remain anonymous) to
foster an entitlement mentality and become fixated on winning DVA compensation
for their members and ‘going for gold’ (securing DVA Gold Cards for veterans).
Stories related during interviews for this research include
groups that celebrate every time a member receives a Gold Card as a win against
DVA, and other groups that guarantee a ‘TPI’ (Totally and Permanently
Incapacitated) classification if clients use their recommended form of words in
a DVA application. For some, winning a benefit has become an end in itself. The
emphasis on these ‘battles’, the entitlement mentality and belief that
everything is compensatable, and the extent to which the current system is open
to abuse and exploited by some groups, are among the observations made during
interviews about the current system of ESOs. Notwithstanding these issues, a
large number of veterans and others work (often unpaid) for the welfare of
Australia’s ex-service men and women. The Chief of the Defence Force (CDF)
believes that the ADF can play a useful coordination role with respect to ESOs
(Mark Binskin—CDF). Some form of centralised administration may alleviate some
of the chaos that currently exists. A coordination role that focuses efforts
where they are most needed and eliminates duplication may make a positive
difference to this sector.
Another suggestion that has been made is that such
organisations should actively attempt to include all veterans in activities,
not just the wounded, injured or ill (Gus Gilmore—military officer). A diverse
community is much better able to help a minority of those adversely affected
people than if those few who experience reduced mental fitness are forced to
try and help themselves in the absence of the support of empathetic veterans.
Reported experiences of
members of the 2nd Commando Regiment—a case study
An encouraging note is the work being done by the 2nd
Commando Regiment and the comparatively mature approach it takes to the mental
fitness of its workforce. There are elements of this that provide an example of
what can be done. This Regiment has achieved much-improved outcomes for its
members. It has been successful at substantially reducing the stigma around
reduced mental fitness and has offered substantial support to transitioning
members in a culturally appropriate way.
One feature of debates around mental fitness and the
military that often goes unreported is those commanders who are well-informed
on mental fitness and related issues, and who genuinely care about the
individual welfare of soldiers under their command and are able to communicate
that to them. Numerous examples of this became apparent while completing this
research. Air Chief Marshall Mark Binskin, Lieutenant General Angus Campbell,
Lieutenant Colonel Ian Langford and Major General Jeffrey Sengelman all ‘get
it’, as does (Wing Commander) Joanna Elkington who described her entire remit
as CO as genuinely caring about her people and personally concerning herself
with their welfare. Sources of information for this section include current
serving members and senior leadership including the CO (with protected
identities), a former 4RAR (now the 2nd Commando Regiment) Regimental
Psychologist (Clint Marlborough), independent research conducted by journalist
Chris Masters, and doctoral research by Paula Dabovich.
The view in the 2nd Commando Regiment is that each
individual soldier represents such a significant capability that, should that
capability be reduced for any (preventable) reason (including mental fitness),
it should be identified as quickly as possible, resources marshalled, and
appropriate care and support given to get that individual (capability) back
working as soon as possible. One of the strategies used for achieving this end
is the Human Performance Wing (HPW). Extracts of the Human Performance
Handbook: a Guide for Commandos by Commandos, developed within the HPW,
were obtained for this report (the document as a whole is restricted to
internal regimental use only). The handbook states the following:
The Human Performance Wing (HPW) was established in 2013 as a
soldier led, academically informed and command supported initiative to provide
culturally appropriate support to seriously wounded, injured and ill commandos.
HPW is an intermediate space where soldiers are supported during times of
significant change, as they work to establish and achieve their goals and
update their identity.
The aim of 2nd Commando Regiment’s HPW is to provide
culturally relevant, non-clinical holistic care to members who are undergoing
rehabilitation. HPW also facilitates personal development using human
performance optimisation principals to enhance individual wellbeing and
collective capability as well as providing the opportunity for those
transitioning from the regiment to do so with a strong personal foundation and
dignity.[8]
From a number of accounts, this is an individually focused
support network that treats mental fitness in a similar way to physical
fitness. It takes a mature and considered approach, often involving support
personnel who have experienced the negative impacts of psychological injury
themselves, with an emphasis on recovery and returning to work as soon as and wherever
possible. Part of the philosophy of the HPW is to look at a ‘state of battle
readiness’ as a continuum along which all soldiers operate, and that an
individual temporarily posted to the HPW is simply on another point in that
continuum. A current serving member of 2nd Commando Regiment commented during
an interview for this research that ‘the HPW is genuinely good; look at 2nd
Commando Regiment as an example of what is working well’ (veteran S).
Clint Marlborough (former military psychologist) commented
during interview that 2nd Commando Regiment treats mental health like physical
health; it makes a big investment in people, understanding that they will get
hurt, and wanting to treat any mental/physical injuries and get them going
again. Another current serving member of 2nd Commando Regiment commented that
in his 15 years in the Army he had not been given any mind-related training
until being posted to 2nd Commando Regiment where the CO encouraged his
workforce to engage with the Redesign My Brain TV series. Paula Dabovich
made the comment that the 2nd Commando Regiment has a capacity-building
framework that focuses on high-end and optimised performance, and which seeks
to build upon strengths regardless of very real and often serious physical,
psychological or battlespace limitations. She said it focuses on growth, rather
than disability.
‘Big Army’ (the Australian Regular Army) has Soldier
Recovery Centres (SRCs) which at first glance look like the 2nd Commando
Regiment model of High Performance Wing. However, it was described during
interviews for this research as being outside the unit’s chain of command, and
while the HPW is about individual results and outcomes, the SRCs become dumping
grounds for unwanted and discharging soldiers. The SRCs are often staffed by
NCOs and commanders who have no experience with mental fitness issues,
therefore furthering the opportunities for misunderstandings and stigma to
flourish. Staff equipped with maturity, compassion and wisdom have the ability
to provide the level of non-clinical support genuinely required in this area.
David Dunt (professor, University of Melbourne) commented during an interview
for this research that the SRCs have not been rolled out well. A senior
commander of 2nd Commando Regiment stated in interview that ‘while 2nd Commando
Regiment is doing mental health well, it’s an indictment on the ADF, not a
positive for 2 Commando’ (protected identity).
However, translating 2nd Commando Regiment’s HPW to ‘Big
Army’ is not quite so simple (Senior Commander). This commander went on to say
that ‘Big Army’ first has to define the problem before they can attempt to
begin dealing with issues of mental fitness. A former 4RAR psychologist related
a story during interview that the day he marched into the Regiment, the CO
asked him ‘why the fu*k are you here? What am I supposed to do with you?’, in
genuine bewilderment at the presence of a psychologist in his regiment. By the
end of his posting to 4RAR, SOCAUST (Special Operations Commander Australia)
presented him with an award recognising the contribution he had made to the
Regiment (Clint Marlborough). This is a powerful illustration of the change in
attitude and the power of having the right person for the job.
While the Special Air Services Regiment also invests heavily
in the training and support given to each of its operators and achieved similar
success to that described above, it was Chris Masters’ impression that the
‘brotherhood’ model of 2nd Commando Regiment means its members enjoy better
mental health support than their SASR colleagues with their ‘lone wolf’
reputation.[9]
It is noted that while the time devoted to mental fitness in
the Australian Regular Army, Navy and Airforce is felt by some to be
inadequate, it is one of a number of competing priorities, particularly in busy
operational units. As this report demonstrates, however, it is a priority that
is critical to preventing the sorts of issues discussed above from flourishing.
Prevention
Mental health promotion is any action which maximises mental
health and wellbeing. Prevention is defined as interventions that occur before
the initial onset of a disorder to prevent the development of the disorder.
Prevention relies on reducing the risk factors for mental disorder, as well as
enhancing the protective factors that promote mental health. Universal
interventions are aimed at improving the overall mental health of a population:
an example would be programs aimed at building mental health literacy across
all personnel in all services as part of an integrated mental health
awareness-raising process (Kerry Howard).
As stated, a key challenge presented by the issue of mental
health and Defence is the need to find a circuit breaker to the circular argument
that sees ‘broken’ veterans doing battle with DVA. As suggested, a change in
narrative to one focused on health, rather than illness, might go some way to
achieving this end. This preventative approach might be underpinned by an
increased focus on such things as:
- raising mental health literacy/awareness
-
mental health first aid and
-
increasing the evidence base for best-practice preventative
models.
This may not only reduce the rates and fall-out of reduced
mental fitness, but potentially result in a reduction in treatment and
compensation expenditure. The change in mindset in getting everyone involved in
activities of this kind, not just the ‘sick’, may also make significant headway
in decreasing the stigma that surrounds reduced mental fitness.
The recently released National Review of Mental Health
Programmes and Services, completed by the National Mental Health Commission
under the heading ‘Future Approaches and Funding Priorities’, makes the point
that the re-allocation of resources to ‘upstream services’ such as prevention,
can achieve value for taxpayers’ dollars.[10]
For example, the Review identifies measures to help the Commonwealth maximise
value for taxpayers’ dollars by using its resources as incentives to achieve
desirable and measurable results, and funding outcomes rather than activity. It
also proposes re-allocating funding from downstream to upstream
services, including prevention and early intervention. Evidence exists for the
economic benefits of a preventative approach to mental health.[11]
The World Health Organization (WHO) report Prevention of
Mental Disorders—Effective Interventions and Policy Options describes
prevention as one of the most obvious ways to alleviate the burdens related to
‘mental disorders’.[12]
According to the report, mental disorders are linked to human rights issues
which demonstrates how pervasive the effects of stigma, discrimination and
human rights violations are. It is (wrongly) believed that no effective
treatment modalities exist. Preventative strategies can therefore not only
impact the wellbeing of those affected, but also combat the stigma associated
with ‘disorders’ of this kind.
In its submission to the recently completed Senate inquiry
into the mental health of the ADF, the national branch of the RSL labelled the
‘significant lack of access to services involving both prevention and care’ as
‘unsatisfactory’.[13]
Defence has a number of programs in place that incorporate
elements of preventative mental health approaches. Examples include the ‘battle
smart’ program (that may include a single two hour presentation delivered to a
soldier); suicide prevention presentations as part of yearly top-up training;
the Veterans and Veterans’ Families Counselling Service (VVCS); and ‘Mental
Health Day’ activities.[14]
However, these programs represent an ad hoc approach to preventative mental
health care (anonymous). Where best-practice and culturally appropriate
prevention strategies do not exist, making them research priorities will help
close this gap in the literature and improve service provision. The application
of such knowledge to the normal operating practices of the ADF may result in
significant increases to the wellbeing of the workforce, as well as financial
benefits for government. DVA’s allocation of resources for health treatment is
around $5.5 billion annually, of which only around $200 million is allocated
for mental health services. However, investment in preventative mental health
represents only a fraction of this $200 million.[15]
For a workforce that receives state-of-the-art training in
so much of what it does, is highly proficient in the art of conducting warfare,
and is a profession that routinely exposes its people to traumatic events, the
absence of a well-defined pro-active and preventative program of mental health
conditioning would seem to be a significant deficiency. There appears to be
little evidence of substantial preventative mental health measures being put in
place and routinely used to good effect. While some preventative services do
exist, little is known about the way in which the target groups access these
services or how effective the services are at combating rates of reduced mental
fitness.
Resilience is a topic that Defence believes is important to its
work. If Defence can train resilient and well-prepared soldiers, they will
fight better and be better prepared when they come home. As a senior commander
said:
Firstly, I believe the weight of resources should rest with
developing individual and group resilience rather than management. I believe it
is important to include group resilience in any consideration of mental health.
The military, particularly the Army, relies on complex social bonds that we
have not fully mapped and rarely acknowledge. In my experience the resilience
of strong teams has a direct relationship with the resilience of individuals
within those teams. I have a feeling that the strength of the leadership of
these teams also has a strong bearing on the resilience of the individuals. For
example, there is a contemporary Australian Infantry battalion that adopted
some very overt branding, language and labelling relating to ‘brothers in
arms’, ‘unbreakable bonds’ etc.; however, the leadership was brittle and the
unit would appear to have experienced quite a large number of mental health
challenges subsequent to their deployment. The group resilience was poor and
lacked substance, and individuals were not well prepared as a result. This is
anecdotal of course. The point is that group resilience is critically important
and must have substance and depth. It needs the depth of real and genuine
investment, not matching sleeve tattoos and t-shirts bearing mythological Greek
iconography.
Turning to individual resilience, I believe tough,
challenging and realistic training has a significant influence on the
development of individual mental resilience. As a Squadron Commander I used to
demand that we train to failure. Obviously we also trained to win because that
promoted confidence, but that came later. For a great deal of our pre-deployment
training prior to Afghanistan we threw ourselves into complex and chaotic
training serials and did our best to turn ourselves inside out. The debriefs
went longer than the orders and we were extremely hard on ourselves. We would
regularly bring in external ‘assessors’ to evaluate us and break any ‘group
think’ that was developing. We stressed the importance of excellence in
everything that we did, we demanded honesty when we collectively failed and we
pushed ourselves to breaking point at times. This was done carefully and
deliberately, and with a specific objective in mind. The objective was to
harden us individually and collectively.
Individual resilience comes from knowing that one particular
‘hard moment’ is no harder than others you might have been in before. Tough
training is the best way of ensuring that the ‘hard moment’ during a deployment
can be placed within a context of ‘other hard moments’.
So, in my view, individual and group resilience is key to
strong mental health. (senior commander, protected identity)
…
Walk soldiers up to trauma—give them their worst day in
training not in the field—this is a key to well-prepared soldiers. (senior
military commander)
The above sentiments on resilience reflect the experience of
highly-regarded military leaders. As the evidence-base around the idea of
resilience is lacking, effort could usefully be spent in bridging this evidence
gap. Care does need to be taken to ensure that individuals are not left with
the impression that illness reflects a lack of resilience and is therefore
their fault. It is important that we do not throw the problem back on
individuals, rather than holding to account the system that routinely exposes
its personnel to trauma. In addition to resilience, there is an urgent need for
an increased focus on other forms of psychological preventative measures and
increased mental health literacy (David Dunt).
Currently, there exists a need to go beyond the focus in the
military on ‘resilience’ to other preventative approaches. Prevention and resilience
are not synonymous. A focus on resilience is a double-edged sword. While it may
better prepare a soldier (sailor or airman) for duty (and by extension, life
after the military) it may also, inadvertently, set them up for failure. If a
defence member becomes unwell, it may further entrench stigmatised attitudes if
they are seen to lack resilience, or made to feel that it is something they
should just be able to overcome. As well as contributing to an increase in
wellbeing, a change in preventative approaches is also likely to have economic
benefits for government. There exists scope to apply preventative mental health
approaches from civilian to military settings. As this is a complex issue, a
systematic study of it is beyond the scope of this chapter; the aim instead is
to highlight this as an issue where effort could helpfully be applied in the
ADF.
We need to be saying to commanders, this is what you can do
to improve the mental health literacy of your workforce because they care about
their men: we need to be setting up efficient return-to-work policies; spend
money on IT, the Web and future education packages; and identify the best
points of access … the CDF gets it, but everyone needs to ‘get it’ and that
comes through education. (Dr Andrew Khoo)
A psychologist with a professional interest in veterans’
mental health commented during research for this paper:
Currently there is a huge cost of treating PTSD and this is
unnecessary. Prevention and mandatory psychological training and treatment
should be implemented. PTSD and other psychological injuries are curable with
treatments such as EMDR therapy [eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing]
and the member may become deployable again. Elements of these treatment options
could be included in the existing Battle Smart training. (Kerry Howard)
Another proposed treatment model relates to an increased use
of training in mental health support. ‘The military could train more military
personnel in accredited mental health support’ (Frank Quinlan). Despite
attempts to increase the mental health literacy amongst the general population,
it remains low and this is reflected in the ADF (source chose to remain
anonymous). A key observation of this monograph is that there could be
considerably greater focus on prevention. This is a view echoed in the American
context, as described in the report Preventing Psychological Disorders in
Service Members and their Families: an Assessment of Programs:[16]
Recommendation 1: The committee recommends that the DOD
employ only evidence-based resilience, prevention, and reintegration programs
and policies and that it eliminate non-evidence-based programming. Where
programming needs exist and the evidence base is insufficient, DOD should use
rigorous methods to develop, test, monitor, and evaluate new programming.
The report highlights the lack of an evidence-base for many
of the 94 identified programs that specifically address prevention on the
resilience, prevention and treatment continuum. The knowledge gap in the
evidence for preventative mental health approaches is one that needs to be
filled so that it can become a part of ‘business as usual’ for the ADF.
International and
Australian approaches to PTSD
In 2013 the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of
Psychiatrists (RANZCP) conducted a review of prominent internationally
recognised clinical guidelines for the treatment of PTSD.[17] It
evaluated each of the guidelines using a methodology called the Appraisal of
Guidelines for Research & Evaluation II (AGREE II) instrument. The
following guidelines were reviewed:
- Australian guidelines for the treatment of adults with
Acute Stress Disorder and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder; Australian Centre for
Post-traumatic Mental Health (ACPMH); 2013
- Practice guideline for the treatment of patients with
acute stress disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder; Agency for Healthcare
Research Quality (US Department of Health and Human Services (AHRQ); 2008
- ‘The Last Frontier’ Practice guidelines for treatment of
complex trauma and trauma informed care and service delivery; Adults Surviving
Child Abuse (ASCA); 2012
- The ISTSS Expert Consensus Treatment Guidelines For
Complex PTSD In Adults; International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies
(ISTSS); November 2012
- Psychiatric Evaluation of Adults, Second Edition; American
Psychiatric Association (APA) Practice Guidelines, November 2004 and a
Guideline Watch; March 2009
- VA/DoD clinical practice guideline for management of
post-traumatic stress, Department of Veterans’ Affairs and Department of
Defense ; October 2010
- Effective treatments for PTSD: Second Edition; Practice
guidelines from International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies (ISTSS);
2010
- The management of PTSD in adults and children in primary
and secondary care; National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE); March
2005
- Management of Anxiety Disorder; Clinical practice
guidelines; Canadian Journal of Psychiatry; Vol 51, Supplement 2 Chapter 8;
July 2006
The RANZCP working group concluded that all guidelines
reviewed were of high quality and considered useful in the treatment of PTSD.
It did however note that as the Australian Centre for Post-traumatic Mental
Health (ACPMH) guidelines are Australian, they are likely to be more effective
in a local context. It concluded that, as the evidence reviewed in all of the
above nine guidelines was broadly similar, the adoption of any one of the
guidelines by practitioners was appropriate.
Two of the above guidelines include the International
Society for Traumatic Stress Studies (ISTSS) Expert Consensus Treatment
Guidelines for Complex PTSD in Adults, and the Australian Guidelines for
the Treatment of Adults with Acute Stress Disorder and Post-traumatic Stress
Disorder by the Australian Centre for Post-traumatic Mental Health (ACPMH)
2013. Reference information on both are included below:
An international approach
The International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies is
dedicated to sharing information about the effects of trauma and the discovery
and dissemination of knowledge about policy, program and service initiatives
that seek to reduce traumatic stressors and their immediate and long-term
consequences.
ISTSS provides a forum for the sharing of research, clinical
strategies, public policy concerns and theoretical formulations on trauma
around the world. We are the premier society for the exchange of professional
knowledge and expertise in the field.
Members of ISTSS include psychiatrists, psychologists,
social workers, nurses, counselors, researchers, administrators, advocates,
journalists, clergy, and others with an interest in the study and treatment of
traumatic stress.
ISTSS members come from a variety of clinical and
non-clinical settings around the world, including public and private health facilities,
private practice, universities, non-university research foundations and from
many different cultural backgrounds.[18]
An Australian approach
Five to 10 per cent of people will suffer from posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) at some point in their lives.
The Australian Guidelines for the Treatment of Acute Stress
Disorder and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder provide information about the most
effective treatments for PTSD. They are the first national Guidelines that
provide guidance on the treatment of children and teenagers who experience
PTSD.
The Guidelines aim to support high quality treatment of
people with PTSD by providing a framework of best practice around which to
structure treatment. While there has been growing consensus about the treatment
of acute stress disorder and PTSD in recent years, approaches are varied and
there is still a gap between evidence-based practice and routine clinical care.
Approved by the National Health and Medical Research Council
(NHMRC), the Guidelines were developed by Phoenix Australia (formerly
Australian Centre for Posttraumatic Mental Health) and a team of Australia’s
leading trauma experts, in collaboration with representatives of the
professional associations for psychiatrists, psychologists, general practitioners,
social workers, occupational therapists, mental health nurses, school
counsellors, and service users. Recommendations were based on best practice
evidence found through a systematic review of the Australian and international
trauma literature.[19]
[1]. As with many sub-issues raised in these pages,
there is much research that has been done on evidence-based and best-practice
ways of addressing the issue, a full review of which is beyond the scope of
this monograph.
[2]. See, for example: Corrigan, P. (2004). ‘How
stigma interferes with mental health care’, American Psychologist,
59(7), p. 614.
[3]. See, for example: Ben-Zeev, D., Corrigan, P.
W., Britt, T. W. and Langford, L. (2012). ‘Stigma of mental illness and service
use in the military’, Journal of Mental Health, 21(3), pp. 264–273.
[4]. Goffman, E. (2009). Stigma: notes on the
management of spoiled identity. Simon and Schuster.
[5]. Frame, T. (2015) Evidence submitted to APH
Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade—Inquiry into
the mental health of Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel who have returned
from combat, peacekeeping or other deployment, op. cit.
[6]. Ryan, K. (2013) ‘The changing nature of
Australian ex-service organisations’, Third Sector Review, 19(2), pp.
27–49.
[7]. Wide Bay Burnett District of the RSL (3) to APH
Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade—Inquiry into
the mental health of Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel who have returned
from combat, peacekeeping or other deployment, op. cit.
[9]. This does not imply a link between the
respective modus operandi of these groups and improved psychological outcomes
or treatment.
[11]. Knapp, M., McDaid, D. and Parsonage, M. (2011). Mental
health promotion and mental illness prevention: the economic case,
Department of Health, London, UK.
[12]. World Health Organization (2004) Prevention
of mental disorders: effective interventions and policy options, summary
report/a report of the World Health Organization, Department of Mental Health
and Substance Abuse; in collaboration with the Prevention Research Centre of
the Universities of Nijmegen and Maastricht.
[13]. RSL National Branch submission (19) to the APH
Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade—Inquiry into
the mental health of Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel who have returned
from combat, peacekeeping or other deployment, op. cit.
[14]. Defence submission (34) to APH Senate Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, op. cit.; APH Senate Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade—Inquiry into the mental health
of Australian Defence Force (ADF) Personnel who have returned from combat,
peacekeeping or other deployment, op. cit.
[15]. Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Annual
report 2013–14, op. cit.
[16]. Denning, L., Meisnere, M. and Warner, K. (eds)
(2014). Preventing psychological disorders in service members and their
families: an assessment of programs. National Academies Press.