Overview
6.1
Australia has a vast and complex maritime domain covering 53 million square kilometres, multiple jurisdictional zones, and vertical elements that span from outer space to the sea bed. Our domestic economy relies on ocean shipping as the main means of exporting and importing goods, including strategic products such as crude oil. Hence, maritime security can impact on a broad variety of areas, such as trade, health, migration, and the environment. Further, as the recent bushfires have shown, it is essential that Australia has the shipping capability to effectively reach and assist isolated coastal communities via the sea.
6.2
Australia's maritime safety and security framework is managed by the Australian Maritime and Safety Authority (AMSA) and the Department of Home Affairs. Information provided to the inquiry suggested that, even though 5 879 ships made 32 801 calls to Australian ports in 2016‑17, there were few safety or security incidents.
6.3
This chapter begins with a discussion on fuel security in Australia. It then considers the role that Australian shipping can play in promoting broader homeland security, and concludes with a discussion on ship and crew standards, and how they can promote maritime security and safety.
Fuel security
6.4
Australia has enjoyed 40 years without a major disruption to domestic liquid fuel supplies and, hence, shortages are not something that the majority of Australians have experienced. Around 90 per cent of the fuel Australia uses is derived from oil that is sourced from overseas and, if all domestically produced oil was refined and used in Australia, it would only meet about 25 per cent of today’s demand.
6.5
Although Australia’s dependence on imports potentially exposes it to a variety of threats, it is argued that, due to the size and maturity of the global oil market, such an approach can also be source of protection and reliability.
6.6
Australia imports 60 per cent of its refined product and 80 per cent of the crude oil required for its domestic refineries. In 2017‑18, Australia sourced its crude oil from 40 countries and refined products from 66 countries. Although the majority of Australia’s imports come from Asia, many of the refineries in that region source their crude oil from the Middle East; hence, over 40 per cent of liquid fuel sold in Australia is derived from oil produced there.
6.7
Australia’s oil production makes up only 0.3 per cent of global output and, since 2000, production is down 59 per cent. Current forecasts indicate that, absent the discovery of new reserves, this trend will continue and that domestic production will continue to decline until at least 2030.
6.8
Although Australia imports the majority of its oil, it does not have a domestic fleet of oil tankers. Hence, Australia’s liquid fuel imports are supplied on ships which are foreign-crewed and foreign‑owned.
Fuel management in Australia
6.9
Australia is considered an outlier in the global community in the way we manage our liquid fuel security. In contrast to other countries with similar economies, which see fuel security in the broader context of their strategic capabilities, Australia has chosen to pursue an approach that delivers fuel to Australians as cheaply as possible; i.e. pursue an efficient market with minimal government regulation and intervention. Further, as there are substantial costs involved in building up industry‑mandated or government‑owned stocks, the Australian government does not have domestic stock holdings.
Coastal trading of petroleum products
6.10
Although in long-term decline, in addition to the role the shipping industry plays in facilitating international trade, coastal shipping continues to play a role in fuel distribution around Australia. In 2014‑15, 8.3 million tonnes of petroleum products were shipped locally from Australian refineries to terminals around Australia, including those in northern Queensland; South Australia; north-west Western Australia; and Tasmania.
6.11
This reduction in the need for the coastal shipping of petroleum products is largely a result of the rationalisation of the domestic refining industry and competition from larger refineries in the Asian region.
Australia’s stockholding obligations
6.12
As a member of the International Energy Agency (IEA), Australia has an obligation to maintain stocks equivalent to 90 days of its annual net imports. Although improving, as at December 2018 Australia held only 53 days of net imports. Notwithstanding the current counting methodology utilised by the IEA, this number would rise to 80 days if net imports included fuel currently being transported to Australia; i.e. fuel already loaded in ports of other member countries or held in tanker ships on the ocean.
6.13
The Australian government argues that consumption cover is the preferred measure of Australia’s domestic fuel security, as it measures the number of days that stocks will last under normal demand conditions. Under this measure, as at December 2018, Australia held 18, 22, and 23 days of petrol, diesel, and jet fuel, respectively.
Liquid Fuel Security Review
6.14
The government is currently undertaking a review into the security of Australia’s liquid fuels. Amongst other things, this review is looking at how liquid fuel is supplied to Australia; the threats to fuel security; fuel pricing; and Australia’s ability to withstand disruptions. On 4 April 2020, the government released an interim report which stated the following:
Early findings demonstrate that the liquid fuel market is increasingly complex and globally integrated, with a range of different players. Many factors, such as supply disruptions from natural disasters, are beyond the control of government. This means that fuel security is not a problem to be solved but, rather, something to be monitored and managed to minimise risks as the market adapts to our changing needs over time. Transparency in fuel supply chains is essential for industry and the Government to be able to effectively manage our fuel security.
Views on fuel security
6.15
Inquiry participants had varying perspectives on whether Australia has a fuel security issue. Rather than the amount of fuel Australia has stockpiled, a key concern raised with the committee was that Australia does not have a domestic shipping capability to transport oil, and currently relies completely on foreign-crewed and owned ships. It was argued that this lack of a domestic capability could potentially expose Australia during times of emergency or conflict.
6.16
Both the Australian Maritime Officers Union (AMOU) and the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) raised this issue in their respective submissions, stating that Australia has no oil tankers in its domestic fleet. The MUA noted that, although Australia requires approximately 60 ships operating full time to keep it supplied with fuel, there are zero Australian‑crewed tankers. AMOU highlighted that, in times of conflict or emergency, there would be no Australian‑owned, registered, and crewed vessels which the government could utilise to transport vital fuel supplies.
6.17
AMOU also noted that the lack of tankers inhibits Australia's ability to ensure that there are adequate fuel reserves to meet its international obligations on fuel security.
6.18
In contrast, the Australian Institute of Petroleum (AIP) claims that Australia does not have a fuel security issue. It submits that, since 2003, the domestic industry has integrated itself into the broader Asian market and established multiply reliable sources of supply within the region. Further, with the emergence of additional exporters, such as India and the United States, added diversity and flexibility is expected over time.
6.19
AIP submits that a number of reviews have confirmed that the supply of liquid fuels is highly secure, competitively priced, and reliable. Further, it argued that Australia has robust emergency response plans and arrangements in place to mitigate any disruption risks which may compromise Australia's access to these fuels.
6.20
In his evidence to the committee, the Chief of Joint Capabilities within the Department of Defence, Air Marshal Warren McDonald, also argued that Australia does not have a fuel security issue. He stated that the defence force has access to ‘as much fuel as we need’, and that Australia has diversity in its supply chain.
6.21
Professor Ross Garnaut provided the committee with a different perspective on achieving genuine long-term fuel security. In his evidence to the committee he highlighted that the world is in the early stages of a massive energy transition within the transport industry, and that, within a few years, electric cars will have similar capital costs to those with internal combustion engines. He stated that these electric vehicles will use both less energy and energy in a cheaper form, and that Australia has the best resources in the developed world to provide this form of energy and is 'naturally the world's low-cost supplier'. He also said:
The path to self-sufficiency in fuel, to reduced reliance on long transport chains to insecure parts of the world, is through acceleration of the transition to zero emissions fuel, which will be Australian renewable electricity, Australian hydrogen, Australian ammonia—not only Australian; it will be highly decentralised around Australia. So that is a path to genuine fuel security. I don't think that there's any security comparable in holding reserves of petroleum in the United States or anywhere in any single place in Australia. So that's my point about security. It will be cheaper, it will be more reliable, it will be Australian and it will be secure.
6.22
BioEnergy Australia submitted that biofuels be considered as part of the solution to improving Australia's national fuel security. Noting the decline in domestic refining, and Australia's reliance on fuel imports, it stated that 'Australia would be exposed to catastrophic challenges should there be disruptions to the main shipping line to Australia'. Given this, BioEnergy Australia suggested that the 'production of biofuels in Australia [could] help diversify the sources of transportation fuels, including marine fuels, and decrease Australia's reliance on petroleum imports'.
Homeland security
6.23
A number of inquiry participants suggested there was a strong correlation between the number of Australian ships and the level of homeland security. For example, the MUA submitted that the security threats posed by shipping are significantly reduced if Australian owned, operated, and crewed ships are utilised for Australia’s domestic freight and passenger task. It suggested that Australian ships improve the degree of control over its trade dependency and sea routes, which are essential to economic independence, defence, and border security.
6.24
The Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers (AIMPE) also stressed the importance of policies which support Australia's maritime industry, arguing that ‘it is not in Australia's national interest to have foreign personnel in complete control of vessels operating continuously in Australian waters’.
6.25
In responding to questioning on the use of flag‑of‑convenience (FOC) shipping by organised crime and terrorists groups, the Assistant Secretary of Customs and Trade Policy within Australian Border Force, Mr Matthew Duckworth, outlined the risk management approach that Australian Border Force utilises when a ship enters Australian waters:
… when we look at the vessels that are coming into Australia, we are fundamentally applying the Customs Act and the legislation around that that is around managing the risks of vessels entering into Australia and then coming into ports or whatever they then do here. We have a full risk assessment process that we apply to every vessel that comes in, regardless of its flag. So, if a vessel were to be entering Australia, we would receive a series of reports on that vessel coming in—security reports, pending arrival reports and so on. That provides us with details on information such as the ownership of the vessel, the flag of the vessel, of course, and previous ports it has visited. It would include cargo, crew details, a full range of information. And we would then look to make an assessment of the risks of that ship and tailor any intervention accordingly. That's our approach regardless of the flag.
6.26
Notwithstanding the above, the MUA maintained that foreign seafarers working on international ships transiting Australia, or employed in the coastal trade, undergo a far lower level of scrutiny than their Australian counterparts who are submitted to ‘rigorous criminal background checking’. As coastal trading is predominantly undertaken by foreign-crewed vessels, this raised a key concern regarding the transportation of dangerous cargoes, such as weapons‑grade ammonium nitrate.
6.27
On the issue of dangerous goods, such as ammonium nitrate, the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) also had major security concerns regarding its transportation by foreign-crewed ships around the Australian coast. The national coordinator of the ITF, Mr Dean Summers, said:
[T]hose areas where Australia considers cargoes to be essential or dangerous goods or those cargoes are ammonium nitrate, fuel or food—all the things that we hold dear to us—have to be carried on Australian ships, surely. By making it cheaper to exploit seafarers to carry those cargoes around the place, it just opens it up to security questions.
…
We know now what ammonium nitrate—just one cargo—can do … We've seen what happened [in Lebanon]. One shipload of that could do the same sort of damage in any Australian port. It is run exclusively around Australian ports under FOC shipping with vulnerable crew.
6.28
In his evidence to the inquiry, the Secretary‑Treasurer of the Seafarers International Union of North America, Mr Dave Heindel, highlighted the importance of maintaining a strong domestic fleet, and that the United States’ longstanding cabotage regime has helped maintain homeland security. Specifically he said:
In the US a key component that helps maintain US national security is strong national cabotage laws… The US Department of Defense and the US Navy have consistently emphasised the fundamental importance of maintaining a strong domestic maritime fleet as well as a strong shipbuilding industry. For example, retaining our ability to construct and maintain military-useful commercial vessels has the added benefit of boosting US sea lift capacity, along with other strategic assets that would be lost without the Jones Act.
6.29
The chair of the board of the Institute for Integrated Economic Research Australia, Retired Air Vice-Marshal John Blackburn AO, stated that at the heart of an Australian security strategy, there should be a maritime trade strategy that addresses Australian shipping. He continued:
Today in Australia neither a national security strategy or trade strategy exists. As an island nation at the end of global trade routes we're heavily reliant on just-in-time supply chains, with limited resilience in those chains and a very low tolerance for loss and assumption. Ninety-eight per cent of all our trade by volume is by sea. I posed the question last year: what would be the impact on the Australian way of life if these supply chains were interrupted even for a few weeks? Would we be prepared for the consequences, given that, for example, we import 90 per cent of our fuels, 90 per cent of our medicines and nearly all of our personal protective equipment? Now with the [COVID-19] pandemic we've seen some of the consequences in terms of medicines and PPE supplies. We've seen that the lowest cost comes at a high price in a crisis.
6.30
Although recognising that global trade and diversity of supply are essential for Australia's economic and social wellbeing, Retired Air Vice-Marshal Blackburn suggested the need to redesign critical components of domestic capabilities and supply chains under a 'smart sovereignty model'. He envisages that an Australian shipping capability, including a strategic fleet, supplemented by domestic ports and their associated infrastructure, would be key components of such a model.
6.31
Ms Cheryl Durant, also from the Institute for Integrated Economic Research, spoke about the benefits of having Australian crewed-vessels in times of crises, and the ability of coastal transport to reduce key vulnerabilities, some of which were exposed by the extreme bushfires over the 2019–20 summer. She provided the example of residents and tourists trapped on the beach at Mallacoota on New Year’s Eve, when raging bushfires had cut off all land‑based links to the area. She noted that, although foreign-flagged, the first ship to arrive was Australian and New Zealand crewed, and was able to provide critical supplies of food and water long before a RAN ship could arrive and evacuate those trapped. She concluded that:
… when we're looking to what maritime and coastal transport might offer to Australia in the future, another thing it offers is de-risking the vulnerabilities of having those major road and rail routes cut in the event of continuing severe bushfires and continuing floods. The projections are that they will continue, and so it needs to be a factor.
Safety and standards
6.32
Reflecting the global nature of shipping, Australia's maritime safety regime is based on international safety standards set through the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). AMSA and the Department of Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities (the Department) work to ensure that these standards are reflected in Australian legislation. Further, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is an independent agency which undertakes investigations on transport accidents, with the aim to the improve safety of, and public confidence in, aviation, marine and rail transport.
6.33
In Australia, the key Act establishing the domestic regulatory framework for international ship and seafarer safety is the Navigation Act 2012 (The Navigation Act). In addition to establishing this regulatory framework, it also gives effect to key conventions and treaties developed by the IMO, the International Labour Organisation, and the United Nations Conferences.
6.34
Under various international conventions and the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, Australia is responsible for checking and controlling ships in its territorial waters to ensure that they do not pose a threat to safety.
AMSA's role
6.35
AMSA requires ships to be seaworthy, and uses various methods to ensure that appropriate standards are met. In addition to ship monitoring, risk assessment and information gathering arrangements, measures include:
the Port State Control (PSC) system;
an international reputation which deters substandard ships;
compliance and enforcement arrangements;
appropriately trained and experienced staff; and
engagement with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), regional government meetings, and regular meetings with operators, builders, owners, crews and classification societies.
6.36
AMSA stated that flag states are responsible for ensuring their ships are constructed, maintained, manned, and operated in accordance with international standards including the:
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea;
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships;
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers;
International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention; and
IMO's Maritime Labour Convention 2006.
6.37
AMSA advised that the internationally accepted method of confirming that foreign ships are in a seaworthy condition is PSC inspections. In addition to determining whether ships are seaworthy, these inspections ensure that foreign ships are operating in accordance with the relevant international safety and environmental protection conventions when in the port of another state.
6.38
Appropriately qualified AMSA port marine surveyors (inspectors), appointed under the Navigation Act, undertake PSC inspections of ships in Australian ports. AMSA noted that it has 60 surveyors across 17 Australian ports, and that Australia has one of the world's highest rates of ship inspections.
6.39
The Department stated that Australia is renowned for having a 'rigorous and effective flag and [PSC] regime'. It noted that, in 2017, AMSA conducted 3000 PSC inspections across 54 different Australian ports; from which 165 ships were detained.
6.40
The international standards that apply to foreign‑flagged vessels are the same as those that are applied to Regulated Australian Vessels (RAVs), which are subject to a flag‑state control inspection program. The inspection program for foreign shipping focuses specifically on higher‑risk ships, and is based on factors such as the type, age and inspection history of vessels.
6.41
Over recent years, improvements in monitoring technology, has resulted in an increased oversight of shipping around the Australian coast. Emerging technologies such as Inmarsat polling, automatic identification systems (AIS), satellite AIS and shore-based radar allow for greater monitoring of ship activities, and the information gathered is used to target ships for inspection.
6.42
Where ships are in breach of convention requirements, or are being poorly operated, AMSA states that it can issue them deficiencies, Further, if they are found to be unseaworthy, they can also be detained.
6.43
Should a review of performance identify a ship or a company which poses an increased risk to the safety or welfare of seafarers, or jeopardises the protection of the environment, AMSA has the power to issue a direction notice. Under the Navigation Act, this notice can deny a ship access to Australian ports for a specified duration or requirement that it meet specific requirements when approaching or using Australian ports. The duration that a ship is refused access escalates for repeated non-compliance, and AMSA notes that it has refused ships access for up to 12 months.
6.44
AMSA submitted that PSC is a useful tool for promoting safe shipping internationally; however, it does not eliminate the need to ensure that ship owners and managers meet the requirements set out in international conventions and prioritise safety on vessels under their control.
ATSB’s role
6.45
The ATSB is established by the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 and conducts investigations in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is an independent agency separate from transport regulators, policy makers and service providers.
6.46
The ATSB's function is to improve safety and public confidence in the aviation, marine and rail modes of transport through:
independent investigation of transport accidents and other safety occurrences;
safety data recording, analysis and research; and
fostering safety awareness, knowledge and action.
6.47
The ATSB noted that it has undertaken 32 marine-specific investigations in the last 5 years and that it has, historically, received around 250 notifications a year; however, this number has increased in recent times and is now approaching 500. The ATSB submitted that it has the resources to undertake approximately seven investigations a year and, of the last seven it undertook, 10 systemic safety issues were identified, including:
the use of electronic information systems versus paper systems;
deficiencies in safety management systems and risk assessments;
and other work health and safety issues, such as the use of scaffolding and floor rest equipment.
Maritime Labour Convention
6.48
The Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) defines the minimum employment and living standards on board for ships for seafarers, including:
minimum age, medical fitness, training and recruitment;
conditions of employment, including pay, hours of work and rest, entitlement to leave, repatriation, compensation and access to training;
accommodation, recreational facilities, food and catering; and
health protection, medical care, welfare and social security protection.
6.49
The MLC is implemented in Australia by the Navigation Act and Marine Order 11 (Living and working condition on vessels) 2015, and applies to international vessels visiting Australian ports as well as RAVs with a gross registered tonnage of greater than 200 tonnes. AMSA monitors compliance with the MLC through its port and flag‑state inspection regimes of foreign‑flagged and Australian-flagged vessels.
6.50
AMSA reported that, in 2018, it received 177 complaints related to alleged breaches of the MLC. Following investigations of these complaints, deficiencies were issued against 30 vessels, and 19 vessels were detained. AMSA noted that these complaints came from a variety of sources, including seafarers themselves; other government agencies; welfare groups; representative bodies; ship pilots; and members of the public.
Views on safety and standards
6.51
The MUA advocated for the continued improvement in working conditions, safety standards, and rates of remuneration for seafarers working in international shipping. In its submission, the MUA made a number of recommendations to improve standards, such as AMSA, in consultation with industry, reviewing Marine Order 11 (Living and working conditions on vessels).
6.52
The MUA also suggests that the Australian government consider ways to improve early intervention and counselling resources available on international vessels. It proposes that AMSA, in conjunction with a number of other stakeholders, develops an appropriate Marine Order regarding the rights and obligations of masters, seafarers, and service providers in relation to employee assistance programs.
6.53
When asked by the committee about its approach to ensuring that crews are being paid appropriately, AMSA indicated that the level of interrogation depends on the intelligence it has, but would likely include a review of appropriate records to see whether a seafarer is receiving the pay that his or her signed agreement stipulates. However, in his evidence to the committee, the chief executive officer of AMSA, Mr Mick Kinley, highlighted an issue with relying on records:
… in the worst and most complex cases, they will have two sets of records. They will have the set of records which they show the inspector … [b]ut you will soon discover they have a separate lot which the crew are forced to sign.
6.54
The national coordinator for the ITC, Mr Dean Summers, also spoke about the issue of the underpayment of wages:
The industry knows that, if you have a temporary licence and you continue to trade without paying your crew extra money, you can intimidate your crew not to ask for extra money, because there are obviously opportunities to punish those crew. If you get caught, all you have to do is just pay that money back. So it's a bit of a roll of the dice on a temporary licence whether you get caught paying the seagoing industry award wages or not. And the case is that we are daily contacted by seafarers asking us if they are open to getting the extra money for being on the coast.
… the problem is that some ships pay, some ships don't, some recognise their obligations under the law, some don't, and there's no punishment and no policing of it either.
6.55
Reflecting on ship standards in the cruise industry, the CLIA noted that the industry is highly regulated and that cruise ships are subject to three layers of inspection and enforcement: flag states; port states; and classification societies.
6.56
The CLIA also noted that, to the best of its knowledge, every country in which its members' ships are registered are white listed under the Tokyo MOU, the principal regional Port State Control authority for the Asia-Pacific region. It submitted that these countries ensure that ships registered with their country comply with international regulations and standards.
6.57
Notwithstanding the above, Mr Summers from the ITC provided a scathing critique of the handling of the Ruby Princess cruise ship in early 2020. He submitted that the crew’s human and legal rights were ignored and that he was unable to speak to the seafarers as a legal industrial representative. He also highlighted the lack of regard given to the crew’s health by forcing it to sail with hundreds of active COVID cases on board:
The clincher for me … is the fact that the commissioner who had responsibility for this under the COVID pandemic … said that he knows there are 200 live cases of COVID on that ship and that there are another thousand workers on that ship but, despite that, he has orders to get that ship away and he will force that ship to sail out of Port Kembla with sick seafarers alongside well seafarers.
Committee view and recommendations
Fuel security
6.58
Australia imports approximately 90 per cent of its fuel, and that 40 per cent of the liquid fuel sold in Australia is sourced from crude oil originating in the Middle East. The committee believes that Australia's fuel security would be materially compromised if a large-scale crisis or emergency arose. This is further emphasised by the fact that, even if all domestically produced oil was refined and used in Australia, it would only meet about 25 per cent of demand.
6.59
This supply risk is also compounded by the fact that Australia does not currently meet its IEA obligations to maintain stocks equivalent to 90 days of annual net imports. The committee notes that Australia has only 53 days of net imports, and advocates that the Australian government meet all its international obligations.
6.60
The committee agrees with statements made by inquiry participants that Australia's long-term security will benefit from a transition to domestically produced environmentally friendly fuels, such as renewable electricity, hydrogen, and biofuels. Further, this will also reduce Australia's carbon footprint and help mitigate the impacts of climate change.
6.61
Given the above, the committee believes a review of liquid fuel security is long overdue, and supports measures which will mitigate threats to fuel security and increase Australia's ability to withstand supply disruptions into the future.
6.62
The committee recommends that the Australian government develops a fuel security strategy, which will include proposals to transition to locally‑sourced fuels as well as address supply issues.
6.63
The committee recommends that the Australian government meets its obligations as a member of the International Energy Agency to maintain emergency oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of annual net oil imports.
Homeland security
6.64
The committee agrees with suggestions that Australia should have a national security strategy, supported by an Australian shipping capability, which would ensure Australia’s continued access to fuel; medicines; and personal protective equipment in times of crisis. This vulnerability his been highlighted by the 2020 global COVID pandemic. Further, an Australian shipping capability would be best placed to respond to emergencies where coastal communities are inaccessible by other means, such as that experienced by residents and visitors of Mallacoota in Victoria during the 2019–20 bushfire season.
6.65
The committee recommends that the Australian government develops a national security strategy, supported by an Australian shipping capability, to ensure that Australia’s supply of essential items is not disrupted during crises and emergencies.
Safety and standards
6.66
Recognising the international nature of shipping, the committee strongly supports the ongoing development of safety standards through the IMO. The committee also advocates for the continued improvement of working conditions, safety standards, qualifications, and rates of remuneration for seafarers.
6.67
The committee is very concerned about reports that seafarers are being exploited and not paid their appropriate wage, and that two sets of records are maintained by their employers with the aim to mislead regulators.
6.68
The committee supports the proposal that AMSA considers ways to improve early intervention and counselling resources available on international vessels, including through the development of a Marine Order relating to employee assistance programs.
6.69
The committee is concerned by evidence of the lack of safety, training and qualifications on some domestic vessels, and urges the relevant maritime authorities to close these gaps. Moreover, there is also evidence that domestic qualifications, training, and crewing standards are not adequate for larger vessels operating further offshore, as vessels operating interstate which previously required Navigation Act standards are now allowed to operate with domestic qualifications and crewing.
6.70
The committee recommends that the Australian government continues to advocate for improved safety standards, including work health and safety standards; working conditions; and wages for international seafarers, and rigorously enforces all existing protections and standards.
6.71
The committee recommends that the Australian government, in consultation with key stakeholders, improves counselling resources available on international vessels through the development of a Marine Order regarding employee assistance programs.
6.72
The committee recommends that the Australian government improves safety on domestic vessels, including by expanding the jurisdiction of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau to include incidents on domestic vessels; and that the Australian government commissions an independent review of the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law Act 2012 to consider whether it provides clear and simple standards for training, crewing, and qualifications to improve marine safety on domestic commercial vessels.
6.73
The committee recommends that the Australian government amends the Navigation Act 2012 to restore an appropriate balance in ships that are covered by the Navigation Act as Regulated Australian Vessels, and those covered by the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law Act 2012 as Domestic Commercial Vessels, to ensure the Navigation Act provides the default standards for Australian commercial ships.