List of recommendations
Recommendation 1
8.43The committee recommends the Australian Government require all large social media platforms operating in Australia to meet a minimum set of transparency requirements, enforceable with fines. Any platform which repeatedly fails to meet the transparency requirements could, as a last resort, be banned by the Minister for Home Affairs via a disallowable instrument, which must be reviewed by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.
8.44Requirements should include, at minimum, that all large social media platforms:
must have an Australian presence;
must proactively label state affiliated media;
must be transparent about any content they censor or account takedowns on their platform;
must disclose any government directions they receive about content on their platform, subject to national security considerations;
must disclose cyber-enabled foreign interference activity, including transnational repression and surveillance originating from foreign authoritarian governments;
must disclose any takedowns of coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks, and report how and when the platform identified those CIB networks;
must disclose any instances where a platform removes or takes adverse action against an elected official's account;
must disclose any changes to their platform's data collection practices or security protection policies as soon as reasonably practicable;
must make their platform open to independent cyber analysts and researchers to examine cyber-enabled foreign interference activities;
must disclose which countries they have employees operating in who could access Australian data and keeps auditable logs of any instance of Australian data being transmitted, stored or accessed offshore; and
must maintain a public library of advertisements on their platform.
Recommendation 2
8.61The committee recommends that, should the United States Government force ByteDance to divest its stake in TikTok, the Australian Government review this arrangement and consider the appropriateness of ensuring TikTok Australia is also separated from its ByteDance parent company.
Recommendation 3
8.69The committee recommends the Australian Government extend, via policy or appropriate legislation, directives issued under the Protective Security Policy Framework regarding the banning of specific applications (e.g. TikTok) on all government contractors' devices who have access to Australian government data; and
8.70The Minister for Home Affairs should review the application of the Securityof Critical Infrastructure Act 2018, to allow applications banned under the Protective Security Policy Framework to be banned on work-issued devices of entities designated of Systems of National Significance.
Recommendation 4
8.71The committee recommends the Australian Government consider extending the Protective Security Policy Framework directive banning TikTok on federal government devices to WeChat, given it poses similar data security and foreign interference risks.
Recommendation 5
8.72The committee recommends the Australian Government continues to audit the security risks posed by the use of all other social media platforms on government‑issued devices within the Australian Public Service, and issue general guidance regarding device security, and if necessary, further directions under the Protective Security Policy Framework.
Recommendation 6
8.73The committee recommends the Australian Government establish a national security technology office within the Department of Home Affairs to map existing exposure to high-risk vendors such as TikTok, WeChat and any similar apps that might emerge in the future. It should recommend mitigations to address the risks of installing these applications, and where necessary, ban them from being installed on government devices.
Recommendation 7
8.80The committee recommends the Australian Government designate an entity with lead responsibility for whole-of-government efforts to counter cyber‑enabled foreign interference, with appropriate interdepartmental support and collaboration, resources, authorities and a strong public outreach mandate.
Recommendation 8
8.82The committee recommends the Australian Government address countering cyber-enabled foreign interference as part of the 2023–2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy.
Recommendation 9
8.85The committee recommends the Australian Government clarify that Magnitsky‑style cyber sanctions in the Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 can be used to target cyber‑enabled foreign interference actors, via legislative amendment if necessary, and ensure it has appropriate, trusted frameworks for public attribution.
Recommendation 10
8.90The committee recommends the Australian Government refer the NationalSecurity Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act2018 to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security for review, with particular reference to the Act's effectiveness in addressing cyber‑enabled foreign interference.
Recommendation 11
8.94The committee recommends the Australian Government investigate options to identify, prevent and disrupt artificial intelligence (AI)‑generated disinformation and foreign interference campaigns, in addition to the Government's Safe and Responsible AI in Australia consultation process.
Recommendation 12
8.97The committee recommends the Australian Government establish a program of vetting appropriate personnel in trusted social media platforms with relevant clearances to ensure there is a point of contact who can receive threat intelligence briefings.
Recommendation 13
8.107The committee recommends the Australian Government build capacity to counter social media interference campaigns by supporting independent research.
Recommendation 14
8.120The committee recommends the Australian Government ensure that law enforcement agencies, and other relevant bodies such as the eSafetyCommissioner, work with social media platforms to increase public awareness of transnational repression.
Recommendation 15
8.124The committee recommends the Australian Government empower citizens and organisations to make informed, risk‑based decisions about their own social media use by publishing plain‑language education and guidance material and regular reports and risk advisories on commonly used social media platforms, ensuring this material is accessible for non‑English speaking citizens. Specific focus should be on protecting communities and local groups which are common targets of foreign interference and provide pre‑emptive information and resources.
Recommendation 16
8.130The committee recommends the Australian Government support independent and professional foreign-language journalism by supporting journalism training and similar programs, thereby expanding the sources of uncensored news for diaspora communities to learn about issues such as human rights abuses inside their country of origin.
Recommendation 17
8.134The committee recommends the Australian Government promote the digital literacy and the infrastructure of developing countries in the Indo-Pacific region that are the targets of malicious information operations by foreign authoritarian states.