Appendix 346th Parliament inquiry recommendations
Recommendations from interim report of 46th Parliament
1.1The following section details the recommendations made by the Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media in the 46th Parliament, and any progress on those recommendations as at February 2023.
Recommendation 1
The committee recommends that the Australian Government clearly delegate lead accountability for cyber-enabled foreign interference to a single entity in government.
1.2Lead accountability continues to be shared across Government, including by the Department of Home Affairs, the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and the Australian Federal Police (AFP), with the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce sitting within Home Affairs.However, it is also evident that there remain a number of key departments in this space, including also the Attorney-General's Department (including the National Security Hotline), the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Department of Finance, as well as agencies including the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC).
Recommendation 2
The committee recommends that the Australian Government take a proactive approach to protecting groups that are common targets of foreign interference but are not classified as government institutions.
1.3On 14 February 2023, the Minister for Home Affairs announced a new community outreach program to be coordinated by Home Affairs and ASIO. The program will identify individuals within the Australian community who might be targets of foreign interference and design and deliver a program to proactively help them understand what foreign interference is, how they can respond, and what the Government can do to protect them. This is in addition to the existing Home Affairs counter interference engagement officers in each state and territory, who work with a 'network of people who we believe might be targeted in engagements of foreign interference'.
1.4On 27 February 2023, the AFP announced the launch of an education campaign to help culturally and linguistically diverse communities (CALD) understand what FI is, how it manifests itself and where victims can report instances and seek assistance. It will include a factsheet, translated into more than 30 languages and meetings between AFP community liaison teams and CALD groups and religious leaders.
Recommendation 3
The committee recommends that the Australian Government establish appropriate, transparent, and non-political institutional mechanisms for publicly communicating cyber-enabled foreign interference in our elections and review the processes and protocols for classified briefings for the Opposition during caretaker with respect to cyber-enabled foreign interference.
1.5Established in 2019, the role of the Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce is to safeguard Australia's electoral integrity. The Taskforce provides a mechanism for sharing and referring relevant information (including foreign interference material) between relevant agencies.
1.6The AEC is aware of the threat to democracy of mis and disinformation, including through social media, and in 2021 released a Reputational Management Strategy and complementary Disinformation Register (for current election events).
1.7Guidance on caretaker conventions were updated in December 2021 and currently contain no specific guidance on classified briefings for the Opposition during the caretaker period with respect to foreign interference,noting that the ASIO Act already makes provision for the Leader of the Opposition to be 'consulted regularly … for the purpose of keeping him or her informed on matters relating to security'.
Recommendation 4
The committee recommends that the Australian Communications and Media Authority's report into the functioning of the Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation be publicly released as a matter of priority.
1.8The report was completed in June 2021 and released on 21 March 2022.
1.9Annual transparency reports about the functioning of The Australian Code of Practice on Misinformation and Disinformation (DIGI code) are also published by Digital Industry Group Inc (DIGI).
1.10In December 2022, DIGI strengthened the code, making changes in response to stakeholder feedback received through a planned review of the code. Changes included an improved definition of ‘harm’ in relation to mis and disinformation and additional commitments reflecting updates to the strengthened European Union Code of Practice. DIGI also introduced more proportionate annual transparency reporting requirements for smaller platforms to encourage them to adopt the code, which can be flexibly applied to different types of digital service providers.
1.11These updates are the latest set in a series of improvements driven by DIGI and code signatories since the DIGI code was introduced in February 2021. In October 2021, DIGI introduced independent oversight and a complaints facility to increase accountability. In 2022, independent assessment and best practice reporting guidelines were introduced to drive improvements in the transparency reporting process.
Recommendation 5
The committee recommends that the Australian Government publicly release the Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce's terms of reference.
1.12The terms of reference were published 27 October 2022.
Recommendation 6
The committee recommends that the Australian Government establish clear requirements and pathways for social media platforms to report suspected foreign interference, including disinformation and coordinated inauthentic behaviour, and other offensive and harmful content, and formalise agency remits, powers and resourcing arrangements accordingly.
1.13The nature of arrangements, including reporting arrangements, with social media platforms are not publicly available.
1.14As part of the DIGI code signatories, including social media platforms, commit to identify and address mis and disinformation:
As part of this [Complaints] process, Signatories will also consider how they can leverage current arrangements with government and relevant regulatory agencies to identify and address instances of Inauthentic Behaviours that propagate Disinformation and are the subject of measures addressed by this Code.
1.15Following the release of its June 2021 report, the ACMA anticipated that the Government would establish the Misinformation and Disinformation Action Group (MADAG) to support collaboration and information-sharing between key stakeholders on issues relating to disinformation and misinformation.
Recommendation 7
The committee recommends that the Election Integrity Assurance Taskforce undertake an audit to assess capability relevant to detecting disinformation prior to the coming election and, further, that the Australian Government consider providing information about relevant capabilities and resourcing to this committee as appropriate to assist in our deliberations.
1.16In general terms, under the Taskforce's terms of reference it is responsible for 'assessing and understanding the vulnerability of Australia’s federal electoral environment, and developing strategies and processes to ensure cohesive and effective management and response should any threats be realised'.
1.17Public information about the Taskforce's work is limited.