Chapter 20
Australia's development assistance—on the ground
20.1
While the committee acknowledges the need for strategic and coherent
planning in formulating its development assistance programs for the region, it
is also aware of the importance of the practical implementation of that plan.
In this chapter, the committee considers how effectively Australia delivers its
assistance on the ground to the people of the Pacific island countries.
20.2
As noted in chapter 18, an important part of the capacity-building
component of Australia's assistance programs is concerned directly with the
effective transfer of skills. A number of programs involve people from the
Pacific islands working in their equivalent department or agency in Australia,
and Australian personnel working in-country with their counterparts in the
Pacific. The committee has referred to the many government departments and
agencies engaged in this type of activity, especially those working closely
with people from the region. These include scientists in ACIAR, officials from
Australian Customs, Treasury, DAFF, Defence, the Auditor General, Ombudsman and
APRA. The second volume looks in particular at the work that the AFP is doing
in building capacity. From the outset, the committee acknowledges the fine work
that these Australians are doing in Pacific island countries.
20.3
In its report on peacekeeping, the committee considered at length
Australia's efforts in Timor Leste and Solomon Islands to build local capacity
in areas such as administration, governance, and law and order. It underlined
the importance of Australians working in these areas having a sound
understanding of, and respect for, cultural differences and an appreciation of
the different norms and customs.[1]
Identical concerns about the importance of cultural awareness training,
selection of appropriate personnel and their ability to transfer skills to
local people were raised during the current inquiry. For example, a number of
witnesses recognised that although Australian workers may be highly qualified
in their area of expertise, it did not necessarily follow that they were well
equipped to impart their skills and knowledge to local people. One witness
suggested that 'Australians do not understand the Pacific'.[2]
20.4
Evidence before this committee also reinforced the message from the
committee's peacekeeping report that Australians delivering assistance to the
region must be aware of the potential pitfalls and difficulties when
endeavouring to build capacity, such as avoiding the long-term problems of
dependency. The committee believes that there is no need to restate the
material covered in the peacekeeping report. It does, however, elaborate on one
particular aspect of technical assistance that it believes warrants closer
attention—the difficulties achieving the permanent transfer of skills.
Technical assistance
20.5
The Office of Development Effectiveness noted that Australia's aid
program directs a high proportion of its funds to technical assistance,
'perhaps as much as 50 per cent of program spending'.[3]
Furthermore, AusAID's report on economic governance noted that technical
assistance in this area is 'increasingly being delivered by Australian public
servants (deployees) rather than contracted consultants'. It indicated that
this was a trend across the aid program, but was 'particularly evident in the
governance sector'. According to the report, this use of donor-country civil
servants is an innovation in the international development context and has
attracted interest from several other countries.[4]
20.6
In its report on peacekeeping, the committee noted that Australians engaged
as technical assistants often faced the difficult decision of when to complete
a task and when to stand aside and allow their local counterpart to take over.
For example, advisers in 'line' positions are there not only to get the
bureaucracy functioning but to train their counterparts to take over these
functions. In 2007, Mr Potts, DFAT, identified the problem of turning Australian
advisers into administrative staff almost by default, particularly in a fragile
environment like Solomon Islands or even in larger countries such as PNG. He
said it was not something 'we would want to do without at least knowing it is
happening and then assessing the implications'.[5]
20.7
AusAID's report on economic governance also noted that in some cases
capacity may be so lacking that Australian personnel are required to fill key
positions. It observed, 'The question of whether personnel providing technical
assistance should do or build is a complex one, and much has been
written on the most effective modes of capacity building'. It stated that most
personnel 'occupy a grey area where they do some of both'.[6]
20.8
Mr Motteram, Treasury, similarly noted that Australian officials working
closely with their counterparts in Pacific island countries face difficulties
ensuring that their skills and knowledge are transferred.[7]
He informed the committee that one of the first challenges was 'to recognise
when we are going to step away from doing to actually assisting others to
advise ministers'. In his view, Australians may have to make hard choices:
Effectively someone has to decide, quite frequently at this
stage, ‘Should I provide my best advice through the minister...[or] should I
spend some time building capacity?’...The real challenge for our people involved
in the Pacific is to work out when to accept a second-best argument and when to
put more time into the capacity building of their counterparts...but when the
crunch comes when a budget needs to be put in, my feeling is that at the moment
there is too much reliance on our contributions. That is putting it very
broadly, but that is an issue that we need to manage in partnership with the
management of the treasuries with whom we deal.[8]
20.9
Treasury noted that its officers do not direct their work in host
countries, 'so for all intents and purposes they are working as employees of
these ministries'.[9]
In some cases, they may find themselves in circumstances where there is
uncertainty about whether to serve the interests of the host country or meet
what they believe are obligations to Australia. In this regard, Mr Motteram
explained that 'there may be conflicts of interest from time to time'.[10]
He informed the committee that:
...when we put our people into that kind of assistance it is
very important for them to gain the trust and working respect of their
colleagues. One thing we do not do is talk to them very much on anything other
than personnel issues. We have an annual recall, but effectively we put very
senior people in these roles who are able to make those sorts of decisions on
the spot and deal with those nuances. It is important for us and for the
effectiveness of our staff that we are not seen to be tracking each of the
decisions that are made or the economy per se.[11]
20.10
Mr Burch added:
...we are always very conscious about understanding the limits
of our influence in these countries. The Australian government seeks to be
influential through a number of channels, but we have a very clear
understanding about what it is that we are trying to do here in terms of
helping these countries. We are getting a better understanding of the basic
value of helping to improve outcomes here by helping them to help themselves.
You should be clear on our objectives.[12]
20.11
A similar dilemma arises for Australian advisers in situations where
corruption may be present. The committee has already noted the matter of
corruption in the region. In considering this problem, the Office of
Development Effectiveness observed that technical advisers working in
environments where corruption exists may be confronted with instances of corruption,
maladministration, or both. It came to the view that such situations 'can place
them in a difficult and sometimes dangerous position' concluding that there
should be clear guidance on this issue.[13]
It stated:
All Australian Government deployees, including those working
as technical advisers, need to understand Australian and partner government
financial and administrative procedures. They also need explicit guidelines on
what they are expected to do when they confront corruption. These should be
shared with the partner government. The guidelines need to be clear about the
consequences for advisers should they be seen to be condoning or participating
in corruption.[14]
20.12
In the committee's view, this observation applies also, but more
generally, to any situation where an Australian working in an overseas country
finds him or herself in a situation of real or potential conflict of interest.
Recommendation 21
20.13
The committee recommends that AusAID review its training programs for
all Australian officers deployed overseas as part of Australia's ODA effort.
The review should give particular attention to managing conflicts of interest,
working in environments where corruption exists and maximising skill and
knowledge transfer.
Institutional strengthening
20.14
The comments made by the Office of Development Effectiveness about the
need for guidelines also reinforce the importance of appropriate training.
Without doubt Australian officers have to make difficult decisions in often
very different cultural and workplace settings. In doing so, they are building
up a valuable body of experience and understanding of how to deal with complex
situations and also, more broadly, how to be more effective in building local
capacity in the region.
20.15
Another important lesson that Australia's technical advisers are
learning concerns the patience required in institutional strengthening. Indeed,
Treasury has come to appreciate that building and strengthening state
institutions is a long-term and complex task. According to Mr Motteram:
...the issues of building another finance ministry are a lot
more complex than we thought in 2003. We are a little humble at this stage in
Treasury. We are prepared to say that it is quite a complex process in trying
to build capacity within another sovereign ministry, and the issues are more
than technical. We see our role now as assisting others, building capacity with
individuals in the Treasury, thinking about the institutions themselves and the
systems that go to make up a well-functioning public finance system, and
Treasury as well.[15]
20.16
He explained further that while they are in-country, advisers will want
to achieve change, but reform in areas such as microeconomics is quite a
complex area involving reforms that do not occur overnight. Mr Motteram noted
that an underlying challenge in motivating staff was to regard the job 'as
building the capacity of local public servants to provide good advice to
ministers to make whatever decisions...that they wish to make'.[16]
He cited experiences in Solomon Islands to highlight the difficulty in capacity
building, suggesting that it 'probably took a little too long to recognise that
we had moved past stabilisation of the Treasury':
...in the Solomon Islands there were criminals wandering around
the Treasury demanding money and so on. We moved fairly quickly from that
phase. One of the first allocations was to build a fence around the place. The
physical security aspect was quite important there. Now we are working with the
Solomon Islands’s government and our partners in the ministry to emphasise
building capacity within that ministry in terms of the people there but also
the institution itself. That is a far subtler and more difficult exercise than
getting the budget into order initially. We are recognising that there are
generational issues associated with this.[17]
20.17
The Office of Development Effectiveness also referred to the importance
of managers being 'more realistic about what can be achieved and more specific
about the changes the aid program intends to bring about'.[18]
20.18
Clearly, Australian personnel engaged in providing technical assistance
have over recent times built up an impressive body of knowledge and
understanding of the difficulties and complexities in institutional
strengthening. Mr Motteram informed the committee that they now have a growing
number of staff with experience in Pacific island countries and when issues
arise, there is a pool of people able to contribute with 'more insights and
sympathy'. In his view, this development is an unidentified benefit and its
engagement in capacity building in developing countries is yet to be matched.[19]
Treasury has compared its work with other countries such as the United States,
France and the Netherlands and found:
...we do not see much evidence of complete immersion, in a
sense, that goes on of placing people in these treasuries for two or three
years at most. We put people in the treasuries for a long time to do the roles
there, whereas the other treasuries provide assistance on a project-by-project
basis. If you need assistance in debt issuance then someone will come from the
United States Treasury to help you out on that project, whereas the dimensions
of our engagement are about building up the long-term capacity of that Treasury
to operate.[20]
20.19
Mr Motteram explained that there is 'a much
greater whole-of-government focus in Australia’s interventions than
there are in the other countries. We have a deeper concept of that compared to
other jurisdictions'.[21]
Thus, through their efforts as support staff in countries such as PNG, Treasury
officials have seen 'an improved strategy towards financial planning'. They
have also learnt some important lessons.
Committee view
20.20
The committee believes that if Australia is to improve its effectiveness
in delivering assistance to the region, it must make a concerted effort to
ensure that lessons learned are captured and used to benefit all engaged in
Australia's ODA. Training that draws on the body of knowledge and experience
that Australian officials are building is critical to achieving continuous
improvement in the delivery of Australia's aid program.
Training and preparedness
20.21
In its report on peacekeeping, the committee recognised that a high
priority should be placed on training for overseas service. It acknowledged
that there were limits to the resources and time that could be devoted to
training but even so, it drew attention to the patchwork of institutions and
organisations providing training on behalf of the various agencies. It found:
...if Australia is to achieve an effective whole-of-government
training framework, it must begin by finding a way to integrate the separate
training programs and ad hoc courses into a coherent whole. While
allowing agencies to continue to train their personnel for their specific
functions, this whole-of-government approach would avoid duplication, identify
and rectify gaps in training and promote better cooperation and coordination
among all participants in the field. A central agency is required to provide
overarching strategic guidance and planning that would give coherence to the
agencies' individual and joint education and training programs.[22]
20.22
The committee's findings in 2008 about training still have currency. In
light of additional evidence, the committee also believes that an added
emphasis in training should be placed on making better use of people returning
from service in the region. Treasury provides a clear example of the way in
which Australian government agencies are building a wealth of expertise. It is
important that the lessons to be learnt from their experiences are captured and
used in educating and training Australian personnel preparing for future
deployment.
20.23
Professor Moore and Mr Jackson proposed the establishment of a Pacific
Regional Training Institute that would address some of the committee's concerns
regarding the training needs of Australians preparing for service in the
region. Their thesis rests on the premise that Australia needs a strategic
integration of effort in the Pacific. They suggested that to achieve this objective,
a new approach is needed to reformulate education and training into a structure
that would 'better meet regional needs and overcome observed deficiencies in
the delivery of development aid'. In their view, a Pacific regional training
institute would, inter alia, 'orientate Australians and New Zealanders
intending to work in the Pacific to cultural nuances and to techniques of
navigating through the complex situations in which they will operate'.[23]
Professor Moore suggested that the institute would cater in particular for
those seconded from a department such as Treasury who go into a line position
and not so much to AusAID people, many of whom are consultants who have been
working in these areas for a long time.[24]
20.24
The proposed institute, however, would also include training courses or
programs for people from Pacific island countries in matters such as
governance, public service management, conflict resolution and issues related
to social and economic development. Professor Moore was of the view that the
Australia Pacific Technical College, based in Fiji with a couple of different
campuses, was 'a very good initiative' but there was merit in training from an
Australian base rather than in the Pacific. He explained that the institute
would not replace training in the Pacific but people—middle to higher-level
public servants in the Pacific—would have the opportunity to see an operating
bureaucracy that is not their own.[25]
According to Professor Moore, 'Middle-level public servants from Australia and...the
Pacific, would establish relationships which may go on for 20 years while both
become more senior in the public service'.[26]
20.25
Professor Moore was of the view that there was advantage to be gained
from preparing public servants through one institution that provides
substantial training. In his view, by putting people through a more rigorous
regular training system, 'you will get more bang for your bucks'.[27]
He noted that because Brisbane is the gateway for so many international flights
from the Pacific, there would be an advantage situating it in Brisbane.[28]
20.26
Since the committee made its recommendation in 2008 about reviewing the
training provided to Australian officers to be deployed overseas, the
government has proceeded with a number of initiatives including the
establishment of the Asia Pacific Civil–Military Centre of Excellence and the
proposed deployable civilian capacity.
Asia Pacific Civil–Military Centre
of Excellence
20.27
The Asia Pacific Civil–Military Centre of Excellence was opened on
27 November 2008 and is located in Queanbeyan, New South Wales. Its key
objectives are to:
-
develop best practice in civil–military training, education,
doctrine, research and implementation;
-
support cohesive civil–military effectiveness in disaster and
conflict management overseas; and
-
strengthen national, regional and international engagement in
civil–military affairs.[29]
20.28
The centre is managed by the Department of Defence and the
organisational structure anticipates a staff of 20 personnel, including five
Defence civilian personnel, a military affairs adviser and four reservists from
a larger pool on a rotational basis. DFAT, AusAID, the AFP and
Attorney-General's each provide two secondees. The Centre is headed by an
Executive Director, and New Zealand has been approached to fill the deputy
director position.
20.29
Part of its strategic plan commits the centre to 'value-add to the work
of Australian Government departments and agencies, and non-government sector
agencies with a role in conflict and disaster management overseas'. It states:
We promote enhanced whole-of-government and whole-of-nation
approaches to disaster management, humanitarian assistance, stabilisation and
reconstruction, governance and rule of law assistance, and conflict prevention,
with a primary focus on the Asia Pacific region.[30]
20.30
Despite this last statement, which includes matters such as governance,
rule of law and conflict prevention, the focus of the centre's plan is on the
post-conflict or post-crisis phase and does not appear to entertain the much
longer-term capacity building that is the main concern of the committee's
inquiry. Before commenting further on the work of the centre and its relevance
to the committee's inquiry, the committee considers the proposed deployable
civilian capacity.
Deployable civilian capacity
20.31
Increasingly over recent years, many countries and international
organisations have acknowledged the need to have deployable civilian expertise
standing ready to assist in the immediate aftermath of conflict.[31]
A number of countries have already taken steps within their respective
administrations to improve their civilian capacity for stabilisation, nation
building and crisis management operations. They include the United States, the
United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the European Union.
20.32
Currently, a taskforce, led by AusAID and comprising members from
Defence, AFP, PM&C, the Australian Government Solicitor and
Attorney-General's, is at the policy formulation stage of developing the proposal
for an Australian deployable civilian capacity. It is to report back to
government later in 2009. Mr Robert Jackson, who is leading the team,
informed the committee that no new agency would be created. Australia's
deployable civilian capacity is not intended to be a humanitarian initiative,
it is to provide 'technical experts for post-conflict and post-disaster
environments to start the stabilisation and reconstruction phase'. He explained
that the term 'reconstruction' should be interpreted in a broader context—'the
economy, the machinery of government and essential services as well'. The
intention is to have people pre-identified 'so that it speeds up the time in
getting people onto the ground to assist'.[32]
20.33
At this early stage in developing Australia's deployable civilian
capacity, the committee is limited in its ability to comment. Even so, it
appears that with its focus on post crisis intervention, it also does not
address the committee's concerns about achieving an effective whole-of-government
training framework for those engaged in longer-term overseas development
assistance.
20.34
The committee can see, however, significant areas of overlap in the
transition from an immediate recovery phase to the institutional strengthening
phase so important in Australia's ODA program. Indeed, Defence White Paper
2009 recognised that Australia's second most important strategic interest
is 'the security, stability and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood'. It
recognised that Australia should 'continue to play a leading role in supporting
internal stability and effective governance with the countries of our immediate
neighbourhood'.[33]
20.35
The committee is concerned that two institutions have recently been
established with a strong focus on peacekeeping and disaster relief but with
little attention given to nation building, preventative diplomacy or risk
reduction. Indeed, the committee sees a missing link or a disconnection between
Australia preparing people to respond to a post-conflict or crisis situation
and preparing people to engage in capacity or nation building.
20.36
In this regard, the committee notes the proposal for a Pacific Institute
that would focus on this important phase of helping states to strengthen their
capacity for economic and human development in a stable environment. By being
better able to help countries in the region achieve political stability and
good governance, become self sufficient and resilient to the effects of natural
disasters, Australia would hopefully avoid or minimise the need for assistance in
conflict or emergency situations.
20.37
In the committee's view, the proposal for such a training institute has
great merit. Even so, because of the two recent initiatives, and the
establishment of the AFP's training centre at Majura in the ACT, the committee
is not inclined to suggest yet another body to deal with the training and
preparation of Australian officials to be deployed to the region. It is
suggesting, however, that measures be taken to draw together the experiences
and knowledge that is accumulating over time by those engaged in the region,
especially by those working to build capacity. The committee would like to see
a commitment by government to a regime of continuous improvement in the
delivery of Australia's ODA where lessons learnt from previous engagements are
converted into policies, procedures and doctrine and passed on to those about
to serve in the region.
20.38
The committee has drawn attention to the enormous range of Commonwealth
officers involved in providing assistance to the region. Clearly, if Australia
is to have an effective whole-of-government training framework, it must begin
by finding a way to integrate the current separate training programs and ad
hoc courses into a coherent whole.
20.39
The committee suggests that the Australian Government consider steps that
could be taken to strengthen the relationship between the Asia Pacific
Civil–Military Centre, the deployable civilian capacity and the various bodies
involved in preparing Australians engaged in ODA. The intention would be to
establish a visible and well-connected network of training institutions
concerned with the broad issue of human security in the region. It would
include those engaged in immediate post-conflict or emergency or humanitarian
relief operations, through to those involved in longer-term capacity building
programs as well as institutions providing language and cultural awareness
training for deployees. It would be an effective means of disseminating
information on best practice and be especially valuable in developing expertise
on Melanesia and the region more generally.
Strategic relationship between ANU
and the public service
20.40
An effective central body, however, is needed to ensure that the network
functions effectively and that public officials preparing for overseas
deployment benefit from the range of available expertise.
20.41
The Prime Minister's recent proposal to see a new re-invigorated
strategic relationship established between the ANU and the Australian
Government may well provide the solution. He observed that because 37 per cent
of the 160,000 members of the Australian Public Service live in Canberra, it
would be sensible 'to harness the resources of our national university to
enhance the administration of the Commonwealth'. According to Mr Rudd:
What we need in Canberra is a much more robust and integrated
exchange of ideas between our academics, our politicians and our public
service, and more intensive professional preparation for senior roles in
government. Imagine if this country engaged its academics in thinking about the
way ahead for the public service with initiatives which, in their totality,
would be like the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.[34]
20.42
Mr Rudd envisaged a relationship between the ANU and the public service
that would put 'education and research at the centre of building robust public
policy—'A relationship that grows excellence in policy analysis, policy advice
and public sector strategic leadership'. He referred to the good work being
done through the collaborative Australia New Zealand School of Government,
which is dedicated to promoting public sector leadership and policy. In his
view:
The next challenge is how do we take that to the next level?
How do we meet the future professional needs of our official community? [35]
20.43
Part of the response to this challenge could be to set up a special
unit, under the proposed partnership between ANU and the public service, that
would serve as the hub of a network of all organisations engaged in preparing
officials for overseas service. It would include institutions such as CDI, relevant
research schools and NGOs working in the Pacific region. The Asia Pacific
Civil–Military Centre, the deployable civilian capacity and the AFP's training
centre at Majura would form an integral part of this network concerned with
human security and building capacity in Pacific island countries.
Recommendation 22
20.44
The committee recommends that the Australian Government make a commitment
to strengthening the relationship between the Asia–Pacific Civil–Military
Centre, the deployable civilian capacity and the other bodies involved in
training Australians engaged in ODA. The intention would be to establish a
visible and well-integrated network of training institutions concerned with the
broad issue of human development and security in the region. It would bridge
any potential gaps between the immediate recovery phase and long-term
development and conflict prevention phases.
20.45
Furthermore, it recommends that the Australian Government appoint a
central body to oversee this network and ensure that adequate funding, if
needed, is available to establish and maintain this network. The Prime
Minister's proposal for a new re-invigorated strategic relationship established
between the ANU and the Australian Government provides the opportunity for the
establishment of such a body.
Conclusion
20.46
Although Pacific island countries cannot change the physical
circumstances of their size, natural resources, remoteness and susceptibility
to natural disasters, they can make themselves more resilient to the adverse
effects that often flow from these inherent impediments. In order to achieve
and sustain economic growth, they need to find ways to make better use of their
natural resources, develop their skill base, keep the costs of production to a
minimum, expand their overseas markets and moderate the devastating effects of
cyclones, floods, droughts and other weather extremes. They also need to create
an environment that encourages entrepreneurs and attracts investors by
improving economic infrastructure, governance, including financial management,
the capacity of their bureaucracies to deliver essential services and their
regulatory environment.
20.47
Australia is the main source of aid to the Pacific and has an extensive
aid program. Work is being done, for example, in agriculture, fisheries,
forestry, mining, managing natural disasters, climate change, economic
infrastructure, education, health, financial management, governance, law and
order, land tenure and financial services. Across the range of these sectors,
Australian funding is being used for research and development, for building and
improving infrastructure, and to provide advice, training, education and technical
assistance.
20.48
Although the committee recognises the fine work that Australia is doing
through its ODA programs to help Pacific island countries develop their
economies and improve the living standards of their people, it identified areas
where Australia could increase the effectiveness of its assistance. The
committee was of the view that Australia could do more to:
-
ensure that aid reaches those most in need;
-
respond to the urgent call from Pacific Island countries to help
them meet the challenges of climate change;
-
find more effective ways to ease the burden on Pacific island
countries of monitoring and policing activities in their EEZs and representing
their interests in regional and international organisations;
-
ensure that the benefits deriving from Australian assistance do
not fade as projects come to an end and funds and technical assistance are
withdrawn;
-
better align Australian assistance with the priorities of
recipient countries and of other donor countries;
-
strengthen Australia's whole-of-government effort by having a
more coherent plan and implementation strategy;
-
incorporate the work of state, territories and local governments
and NGOs in Australia's ODA;
-
help improve the quality of statistics available on key economic
and human development indicators; and
-
foster a culture of continuous improvement by making the
monitoring and evaluation of projects more rigorous.
20.49
The committee made a number of recommendations addressing these areas.
Some called on the government to give greater attention to specific areas
including climate change, tourism, the non formal education sector, the problem
of brain drain, and working with the private sector. Others required specific
action such as the re-appointment of a Pacific Investment Commissioner. The
overarching recommendations, however, were concerned with improving the overall
effectiveness of Australia's ODA through better planning and integration of
projects and a more robust system of monitoring and evaluating programs.
SENATOR RUSSELL TROOD
CHAIR
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