1.1
Over the past two years, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused unprecedented health, economic, and social challenges across Australia. The COVID-19 pandemic and the Australian Government's (government) response to it has been the defining issue of the 46th Parliament.
1.2
In March 2020, the country faced a once-in-a-century health and economic crisis resulting in the imposition of unprecedented governmental interventions and restrictions. Enormous sacrifices were made by individuals and businesses to ensure the broader health and safety of the community and to protect the public health system from being completely overwhelmed.
1.3
Throughout the 'first wave' of the pandemic Australia fared much better than other countries; but as the pandemic continued that advantage was significantly weakened by the government's complacent approach and inability to lead a truly national response to the crisis.
1.4
To date, the Australian Government's response has been characterised by poor preparation, a refusal to take responsibility and provide national leadership—including in areas of clear Commonwealth constitutional responsibility—a failure to learn lessons as the pandemic progressed, and significant failures of implementation with, at times, catastrophic consequences.
1.5
As at tabling, Australia has had over 4.6 million COVID-19 cases resulting in 6462 deaths. Approximately 30 per cent of deaths occurred in aged care facilities, residents of which were disproportionately impacted by the pandemic, being just 0.7 per cent of the Australian population. This is a terrible outcome for the community and is particularly tragic as some of these infections and deaths could have been avoided had the government responded more effectively to the pandemic.
1.6
Figure 1.1, below, shows key milestones in Australia's COVID-19 experience and provides the approximate periods during which metropolitan Sydney and Melbourne were in lockdown. These details overlay a graph (using a logarithmic scale, with cases increasing 10-fold between intervals) that shows new daily cases in Australia on a seven-day average.
1.7
When this committee first reported in December 2020 it made recommendations and findings to inform a better plan for the escalating crisis, to protect lives and livelihoods, and encourage a strong recovery that is fair, inclusive and does not leave people behind. Over one year since that report and after a prolonged pandemic, the government has still not responded to these recommendations.
1.8
As the pandemic progressed, major government decisions lacked transparency and were poorly communicated, poorly targeted, and poorly implemented. The government, particularly when under pressure, has at times played the blame game; shirking its often direct constitutional responsibilities as well as a broader leadership role, leaving state and territory governments to fill the leadership void created by the Prime Minister.
1.9
The government squandered important opportunities to take responsibility and learn from mistakes as COVID-19 took hold in Australia. The Australian Government's management of COVID-19 quarantine arrangements and its vaccine rollout constitute two of the worst failures of public administration in living memory. The aged care system, for which the Australian Government is responsible, was already in deep crisis prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, as the October 2019 Aged Care Royal Commission Interim report, titled Neglect, confirmed. It is clear from the evidence presented to this inquiry that the aged care sector was also completely underprepared for a pandemic event. Over 1934 vulnerable Australians in residential aged care paid the ultimate price for this catastrophic failure (see Chapter 2).
1.10
Throughout the pandemic, the Australian Government side-stepped its responsibility for the quarantine system, which left the country vulnerable to outbreaks, lockdowns, and widespread community transmission. This was evident from the start of the pandemic when 2700 passengers disembarked the Ruby Princess cruise ship (see Chapter 2) without quarantining. Further mistakes were made when the Australian Government passed complete responsibility for hotel quarantine to the states and territories, while refusing to plan for any purpose-built quarantine facilities.
1.11
This failure to establish stand-alone quarantine facilities resulted in overseas arrival caps being imposed, which severely restricted the number of people able to return to Australia, denying thousands of citizens entry to their own country. Australians who found themselves in this position were left to fend for themselves with few prospects of a timely return home, and often in countries where COVID-19 was running rampant.
1.12
The national vaccine rollout was Australia's safe way through the crisis. Unfortunately, the rollout was plagued by the failure to secure enough supply and significant delays which led to every target the government set itself being missed. This left millions of Australians vulnerable to the virus for longer than necessary and the reliance on lockdowns to manage virus spread being extended. There was poor role delineation between federal and state and territory governments in the early stages of the rollout, which should have been addressed prior to the rollout commencing.
1.13
The government has also failed to address the serious and dangerous vaccine misinformation promoted within the government's own parliamentary ranks.
1.14
The combination of all these vaccine failures left Australians vulnerable to infection, particularly those for whom we bear the greatest responsibility: our elderly, Australians with disabilities, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and our children.
1.15
Failures to prepare, plan, and implement were continuing almost two years into the crisis as Australians were told to learn to live with the virus. Australia opened up with 80 per cent of the population aged over 16 having received two vaccinations and was reassured that appropriate planning had occurred and it was safe to remove restrictions.
1.16
Shortly after opening up, the Omicron variant ripped through the community and quickly overwhelmed polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing facilities, with people forced to wait hours in queues in the middle of the Australian summer. While PCR testing arrangements crashed, there was also a national shortage of rapid antigen tests (RATs), with the Australian Government again denying it had any responsibility to secure their supply, and widespread community transmission took hold. These mistakes were entirely avoidable and tragically cost lives.
1.17
The lessons that should have been learned from the mismanagement of the vaccine rollout clearly had not been, as the government failed to secure an adequate supply of RATs for Australians during the opening up stage of the national plan. This was despite warnings by experts that cases would increase during this stage and that testing arrangements would need to be enhanced, including an increased reliance on RATs.
1.18
The supply shortage of RATs had devastating health consequences and led to other significant flow-on economic and social impacts. As the virus spread and more workers became unwell with COVID-19, a serious supply chain crisis unfolded. A shortage of workers and the upending of transport distribution channels led to a national shortage of fresh foods and other essential items. This seriously affected the ability of thousands of small businesses to remain open and trading, and forced the community back into lockdown-like conditions.
1.19
The National Cabinet, established at the beginning of the pandemic to help guide the national response, has been an ineffective body to deliver the national unity required during a crisis.
1.20
At no time during the pandemic has there been the national consistency that was being sought by the Australian people. Public health measures, economic supports and border closures have varied, sometimes significantly across states and territories.
1.21
At a time when national unity between leaders was needed, the Prime Minister was unable to deliver. Lack of transparency about advice which underpinned National Cabinet decisions undermined public and state and territory governments' trust in the body. In the absence of national leadership, the Australian experience has been one where state and territory governments have often led the response, leaving the Federal Government ineffectual and irrelevant throughout much of the health response.
1.22
This committee was established with bipartisan support in the face of unprecedented constraints on the ability of the Federal Parliament to function. It has not had the cooperation that was promised by the government, which has stood in the way of proper scrutiny of the government's response to COVID-19.
1.23
The importance of the committee's work has become even more critical in the face of the Australian Government's repeated failures, its refusal to take responsibility for any shortfalls, and its lack of transparency throughout the COVID-19 response.
1.24
The committee is grateful to those witnesses and submitters that assisted the committee to properly inquire into the issues facing Australians throughout the pandemic.
1.25
The committee is disappointed that it has been prevented from providing vital oversight of the management of the government's COVID-19 response by spurious claims of public interest immunity by ministers and government officials. Access to information has been restricted and interest in participation in committee hearings by key government officials has diminished over time, which has been frustrating.
1.26
The committee has been prevented from building a full picture of what the government knew, when, what advice it received and from whom, what decisions it made and how effective these decisions were in responding to different waves of the outbreak. There is no doubt that future emergency responses will be more effective if they are informed by the current pandemic response—including by learning lessons from the mistakes that have been made. Failure to learn from these mistakes will squander an important opportunity to do better in the future, including to save lives and livelihoods.
1.27
The public health emergency is not over. 2022 has seen the emergence of a new, highly contagious coronavirus BA.2 sub-variant. Studies comparing the transmissibility of BA.2 are ongoing, but early data suggests the new sub-variant is 'inherently more transmissible than BA.1' and has become the dominant strain globally. As at tabling, daily case numbers are trending upwards. There is concern from health experts about a dual risk of rising COVID-19 cases and a spike in influenza over winter.
1.28
While the government has allocated an extra $2.1 billion to help address these concerns, it has also asked the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee to provide urgent advice on transitioning away from quarantine requirements for close contacts. The committee hopes that these moves are underpinned by clear health advice and are not decisions that are being made in anticipation of avoiding political problems that may emerge in the coming winter months.
1.29
As our public health experts warn of a dangerous winter ahead, it is important that we learn the lessons of the past two years. It is essential that we have in place better readiness for a more effective response that will protect all Australians, and that we do not see a repeat of the mistakes and failures that riddled the response to the outbreaks to date.
1.30
The committee recommends that the Australian Government establish an Australian Centre for Disease Control to improve Australia’s pandemic preparedness, operational response capacity, and communication across all levels of government.
1.31
The committee recommends that the Australian Government urgently review its pandemic planning to deliver immediate improvements including:
a pandemic workforce strategy with an immediate focus on support and protection for health, aged care and other essential frontline staff;
an agreement between the Commonwealth and states and territories on the responsibilities of different levels of government for preparedness and response during a pandemic;
agreement on national principles for quarantine, including responsibility for provision of suitable facilities and for funding, management and compliance;
a plan for management of future international border closures;
a plan for timely repatriation of Australians overseas in the event of border closures or restricted international travel;
evaluate the effectiveness of plans for working with and responding appropriately to the needs of vulnerable people during a pandemic and implement updated plans accordingly, including for older Australians, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians, people living with disability and children; and
principles for addressing related health impacts, including the social determinants of health, mental health service delivery, and ensuring the health and welfare requirements of people experiencing family, domestic, or sexual violence are met.
1.32
The committee recommends that the Australian Government report to the Parliament at least once every two years, commencing in 2024, on the state of Australian pandemic preparedness, including all relevant planning, policy, and simulation activities undertaken by government agencies during the reporting period.
Acknowledgments
1.33
The committee acknowledges the tireless efforts of those who have been on the frontlines of Australia's response to COVID-19, including our doctors, nurses, other medical staff, aged care and disability care workers, and those vital workers keeping the country stocked with food and essentials—from food production workers to supermarket staff.
1.34
The committee extends its thanks and appreciation to the thousands of public servants who provided critical national support in their work on COVID-19 policy, payments, repatriations, and who often volunteered to be redeployed to areas working on the pandemic response.
1.35
This inquiry has taken place during a period of great uncertainty, posing additional challenges for witnesses and parliamentary staff. The committee is grateful for the assistance it has received.
1.36
The committee extends its sincere gratitude to the submitters and witnesses that provided evidence throughout this inquiry. The committee notes, in particular, the substantial contribution of departments and departmental officials—many of whom appeared before the committee on multiple occasions whilst also delivering critical pandemic support programs.
1.37
The committee also wishes to acknowledge the committee secretariat and other parliamentary staff for their work to support this inquiry.