4. Making decisions

Issues relating to redress decisions

4.1We heard evidence from survivors, lawyers, support services and institutions on issues including:

• The quality of redress decisions.
• The language used when explaining decisions and the reasons.
• The consistency of redress decisions.
• General uncertainty about what happens to redress applications.
  2. In Chapters 3 and 5, we discuss this evidence, including specific examples.
  3. However, this chapter talks about how decisions are made and who makes them.

What is the process?

4.4Broadly, decisions are based on what is said in the National Redress Scheme for Child Sexual Abuse Act 2018 (Cth) (Redress Act).

4.5The Redress Act creates a framework for making redress decisions, which are listed in written laws called ‘sections’. While complex in many aspects, in summary:

• There are objectives and guiding principles, such as:

• Providing justice to survivors for institutional child sexual abuse (Section 3).
• Being survivor-focused (Section 10).
• Avoiding further harm or trauma (Section 10).
• Protecting the Scheme’s integrity (Section 10).

• Important aspects of redress decisions include:

• Who is eligible for redress (Section 13), how redress is calculated (Section 32), redress offers and acceptance (Sections 39 and 40), redress payments (Section 48) and reviews of redress decisions (Section 75).
• A person should receive redress if there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that they are eligible (Section 12). Making these decisions (or determinations) about redress must happen ‘as soon as practicable’ (Section 29).
• Broadly, a person is eligible if they were sexually abused when a child (Section 13) and an institution was responsible for the abuse (Section 14).
• The Redress Act allows the Minister for Social Services to create other rules and guidelines relating to redress (Section 33 and 179).
  6. The Redress Act created the position of Scheme Operator, who is the Secretary of the Department of Social Services (the Department).

• This person can delegate (or give) their decision-making powers to another person (Section 184), including to IDMs.
• IDMs are appointed to make determinations about redress eligibility (Section 29) and to review redress decisions (Section 75).
• Rules and guidelines assist independent decision makers, such as the National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Assessment Framework 2018. However, IDMs are ‘not required to comply with any directions of the Operator’ (Section 184).
  7. As of 25 September, the Scheme does not identify IDMs, except to say that they ‘come from many different and highly experienced backgrounds’.[1] We heard, for example, that one IDM is a retired judicial officer.[2]

Who chooses the Independent Decision Makers?

4.8The Scheme Operator decides who is appointed to be an IDM. In terms of how this happens:

• They are recruited using ‘various methods’, including nomination by state and territory governments.
• Senior staff at the Department assess their suitability.[3]
  9. Skills and criteria for selecting IDMs include:
• Experience in the social welfare sector, case management or legal sector.
• A strong understanding of the cultural, social and historical factors of sexual abuse.
• Strong analytical skills.
• The ability to anticipate problems or sensitivities.
• The ability to make information-based decisions.
• The ability to interpret legislation.
• An understanding of the National Redress Scheme.
• Resilience and high emotional intelligence.
• Ability to obtain and maintain a Baseline Security Clearance.[4]
  10. In addition, there is a group or panel of five chief IDMs, which was formed in April 2022.[5]
• Chief IDMs are selected by ‘expression of interest’ from among all existing IDMs.
• The Chief IDMs also make redress decisions.[6]

Number of Independent Decision Makers

4.11The number of IDMs has increased from since the Scheme started.

• In March 2023, there were 46 IDMs,[7] which increased to 54 in April 2024.[8]
• Numbers are expected to increase to 70 by the end of August 2024.[9]
• However, IDMs are not appointed to work full time. The number is around 52 if averaged and counted based on full-time equivalent (FTE) hours.[10]
  12. The Department advised that most IDMs leave their roles as IDMs voluntarily.[11] Since the Scheme started until August 2024, there had been 84 IDMs who had worked on redress. None have been reprimanded or terminated. One was counselled over ‘expectations of professional behaviour’ and resigned.[12]

Conflicts of interest

4.13A conflict of interest is when someone’s personal or private interests could improperly influence the performance of their duties. Conflicts can be real or perceived. The Australian Public Service code of conduct requires conflicts to be avoided, declared and managed.[13]

4.14In relation to IDMs, the Department advised:

• Actual, potential or perceived conflicts of interest are required to be disclosed prior to appointment and after starting their role.
• IDMs do not assess applications from the state or territory in which they live.
• IDMs do not assess applications relating to an institution ‘where they have a known connection’, such as:

• Professional or personal connections.
• Board memberships.
• Voluntary work.

• There are steps taken to allocate cases while avoiding known conflicts.[14]

How are independent decision makers supported?

4.15The Department provided us with examples of training, support and advice available to IDMs. This includes:

• Training about the Scheme.
• Training on administrative law principles.
• Access to advice from Chief IDMs.
• Access to a legal helpdesk and policy guidance.
• Regular workshops or meetings to discuss current issues and legislative updates.[15]
  16. From July 2024, induction training has included information on administrative decision-making principles, procedural fairness and preparing a statement of reasons. Existing IDMs are being given ‘refresher training’.[16]
  17. The Department advised that this training intends to ensure IDMs follow a consistent approach; however, each decision maker can make ‘their own individual evaluation of the evidence’ and different or ‘disparate outcomes’ are possible.[17]
  18. We asked whether this meant IDMs had not previously received this training. The Department advised:
• IDMs have had ‘intensive programs’ and a broad range of training.[18]
• The concern that the IDM ‘may not have properly dealt with… a particular factual issue and applied the right judgement’ was acknowledged.[19]
• Later, the Department clarified that they did not mean to imply that ‘there was no relevant training for IDMs’.[20]
• The Department added that ‘training has evolved throughout the life of the Scheme’ and ‘has always included material to assist… in construction of the statement of reasons’.[21]
  19. The Scheme Operator told us that he had ‘worked closely with the independent decision makers… and have engaged them regularly as a group so that they understand my priorities for Scheme improvements’.[22]

What is considered when making decisions?

4.20This question was an ongoing theme during the inquiry.

4.21Broadly, IDMs are asked to consider:

• The content in a redress application.
• Information provided by institutions.
• The Redress Act.
• The Assessment Framework (publicly available).
• Policy guidance.[23]
  22. IDMs can ask for more information from:
• Redress applicants.
• Institutions relevant to the application.[24]
  23. In addition, there are assessment framework policy guidelines, a document which is not publicly available. A matrix is also used (see table 3.2 in Chapter 3).
  24. In May 2024, we received a document that talked about the checks made to reassure participating institutions about redress decisions:
• Applications are checked for veracity (their truthfulness).
• Until March 2022, applicants were asked to sign a legally binding statutory declaration.
• Rigorous proof of identity processes.
• There are penalties for providing false information.
• The ‘key assessment document’ is not publicly available[25] but is available to IDMs.[26]
  25. Asking questions (of survivors and institutions) to seek more information is sometimes to ensure procedural fairness but mostly it is about ‘trying to understand the account of abuse’.[27]
  26. The Department advised us that in May 2024, there were 21 fraud matters being investigated.[28]
  27. We heard that there is ‘no definitive rule’ on the weight (or reliance) placed upon documents or evidence being considered. IDMs consider ‘the whole context of the application’ and the guiding principles in the Redress Act.[29]
  28. The Department advised that considerations would include:
• The applicant’s age when the abuse occurred.
• The length of time since the abuse occurred.
• The impact trauma may have on memory.
• The redress application could be the first time a survivor has disclosed the abuse to anyone.
• How institutions often kept poor records and ‘often actively covered up abuse’.[30]

Who checks the decisions?

4.29We asked the Department about how they monitor redress decisions for quality and comparability with similar applications.

4.30The Department advised no data is collected regarding comparable outcomes.[31]

4.31However, the Department said that ‘to promote consistency’, IDMs are supported in several ways.

• Scheme staff review each application before it is given to an IDM, ‘to ensure it has all the necessary information’.[32]
• Scheme staff review determinations to check for completeness, for example:

• Whether prior payments were considered.
• Whether procedural fairness was followed.[33]

• If something looks irregular, ‘discrepancies are referred back to the relevant independent decision maker for clarification’.[34]
• However, the IDMs ‘cannot be instructed to change aspects of their determination’.[35]
• Chief IDMs conduct quality assurance on ‘themes, trends and opportunities to inform a knowledge base and support continual improvement’.[36]
  32. We asked the Scheme Operator why inconsistent outcomes may occur. He said:
• ‘Neither you nor I are aware of all the details of each individual case’.
• Cases will appear similar, ‘but what the IDM has in front of them is the application… and the responses from the relevant institution. We can’t control that. That’s their decision making’.
• Further, the Scheme is designed so that decisions are done independently and without direction, although the Operator can offer guidance and training to IDMs.[37]
  33. We asked the Department about the meaning of quality assurance. The Department advised:
• IDMs can access legal and policy support if they are ‘having trouble’.
• However, ‘they are the people in whom the decision is vested’ and they have ‘decision autonomy within the confines of what the legislation says’.[38]
  34. There is also an assurance team with the Department, comprising 10 people, who conducts checks. IDMs are not part of this team.[39]

Offensive language and rape myths

4.35We heard that offensive language could be used. knowmore said:

• The ‘statement of reasons’ can include offensive language or language that misunderstands the nature of child sexual abuse.[40]
• This could include questioning why a survivor delayed reporting the abuse. This language sounds like the decision was based on ‘rape myths’ and, in turn, this means that the survivor does not feel believed.[41]
• Making complaints about offensive language is possible; however, making complaints cannot change the outcome.[42]
  36. knowmore added:
• When complaints are made, the ‘response is often that they will train the IDMs on particular issues’.
• However, the damage is done, because nobody within the Scheme anticipated the impact before sending the statement of reasons.[43]
  37. knowmore provided us with the following anonymised example:
• The client experienced extreme sexual and physical abuse, perpetrated by a teacher at the client’s school, over a period of more than 2 years.
• The client self-lodged an application for redress in January 2023. In December 2023, an NRS decision-maker determined that the client was ineligible for redress on the basis that the institution did not have records of their attendance. knowmore assisted the client to make a successful application to revoke the ineligible decision, providing proof of attendance. In May 2024, an NRS decision-maker again determined that the client was ineligible for redress on the basis that the reasonable likelihood standard was not met.
• The decision-maker reached this conclusion despite accepting that the client recalled experiencing abuse as a student and the impact this had on the client. The decision-maker also noted that the client was enrolled at the relevant school and that the teacher was employed during the relevant period of time.
• In the statement of reasons, the decision-maker made comments that do not reflect an understanding of the nature of child sexual abuse or the reasonable likelihood standard of proof. For example, the decision-maker commented that details were not provided as to why the client continued to encounter the teacher and that if the abuse had happened as described, it is likely that other students and teachers would have been aware of the abuse. This approach shows a complete lack of understanding of the typically hidden and predatory nature of child sexual abuse.
• The client says that they have been re-traumatised by the decisions the NRS has made. They say that they feel the NRS doesn’t understand child sexual abuse or care about survivors.
• The client is terminally ill and has considered whether they want to spend their last days worrying about these matters, but the client does not want other survivors to have the same experience of the NRS.[44]

Guidance on child sexual abuse in medical settings

4.38During the inquiry, we heard evidence that decisions relating to child sexual abuse in medical settings have been inconsistent and unjust towards survivors.[45]

4.39The Second Year Review recommended that guidance relating to medical settings should be reviewed to give ‘greater clarity’ for IDMs.[46]

• On 20 September 2023, we sent the Department written questions asking:

• How many redress applications have been determined ineligible because they were characteristic of a medical procedure.
• How decision makers determine whether a medical procedure was consensual.

• We restated those questions again at a public hearing on 20 October 2023, which included asking about virginity testing.
• The Department agreed to ‘answer them in full’ and wanted time to avoid giving us any ‘misleading information’ or ‘information that is not trauma-informed’.[47] The Department is yet to provide its responses to these questions.
  40. On 14 November 2023, the Department advised:
• IDMs determine eligibility on a case-by-case basis.
• This is done in accordance with the Redress Act and related legislation.[48]
  41. The Senate debated amendments (or changes) to the Redress Act in March 2024, which included debate on an amendment about redress for child sexual abuse in medical settings, such as virginity tests.
  42. During the debate, the Minister representing the Minister for Social Services advised the Senate:
• ‘With specific reference to intrusive internal examinations, the scheme provides guidance to independent decision makers to support such a decision where a purported medical procedure was involved.’
• ‘This guidance was updated in response to a recommendation of the second-anniversary review.’[49] (also known as the Second Year Review or Kruk Review).
  43. We received further advice in May 2024 from the Scheme Operator:
• There are publicly available guidelines, which include a definition of penetrative abuse which ‘underpins the decisions made by the Scheme’s independent decision makers in their assessment of applications to the Scheme’.[50]
• In addition, there are more guidelines that ‘are an aide to IDMs which may be taken into account’. They ‘go into greater detail… including more graphic detail’ than the publicly available guidelines.[51]
• The Scheme provides ‘extensive assistance’ to redress applicants.[52]
  44. In June 2024, we found that the Department had sought advice from a medical ethicist about child sexual abuse in medical settings. We asked for a copy of the report and, after about one month, the Department advised that it could be confidentially inspected but not given to the Committee.[53]
  45. We also asked the Department what advice about the ethicist report was given to the Minister for Social Services (or the Minister representing the Minister in the Senate) during recent debate on redress legislation amendments.
  46. The Department advised:
• ‘The department prepared material to support the Minister or her representative during the debate on the National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Amendment Bill 2023 (Amendment Bill). This included content relevant to the Committee’s question.’[54]
  47. In August 2024 we heard about Lorraine’s experience (discussed in Chapters 5 and 8) and asked the Department further questions. The Department said:
• After the Second Year Review was completed in 2021, the Department contracted an ethicist to write a report.[55] The Department received the ethicist’s report in around February 2022.[56]
• The ethicist report was ‘used to update the policy that IDMs use in their assessment of abuse in a medical setting’.[57]
• We asked whether the professional guidance is the medical ethicist’s report. The Department said: ‘That’s right’.[58]
  48. In September 2022, the Department advised the Minister for Social Services that implementation of the recommendation in the Second Year Review about better guidance was now ‘complete’.[59] The Department confirmed this in a further briefing to their Minister in April 2023: ‘internal guidance material has been updated’.[60]
  49. While these events were happening, we know that Lorraine, who experienced horrific abuse, was found ineligible for redress on the basis that virginity testing was a ‘medical procedure’.[61]
  50. We asked knowmore – who have helped thousands of survivors with redress and legal advice – about applications being deemed medical procedures, rejected and these outcomes being advised with an unexpected phone call. knowmore said:
• ‘Our experience is exactly that’.
• Medical procedures are discussed only within the Scheme’s internal policy, a document which ‘we’ve been unable to access’ because it is protected information.[62]
  51. We again asked the Department in written questions on notice on 27 June 2024 and at a public hearing on 21 August 2024 for the medical ethicist’s report and for a copy of ‘briefing material’ given to the Minister for Social Services relating to parliamentary debate on Redress Act amendments that related to virginity testing.
  52. The Department then updated its position on the evidence given to us.
• The Minister did not receive the medical ethicist report.
• The Minister was advised only that an ethicist ‘had assisted with reviewing and informing guidance on this issue’.
• The Department declined to say whether omitting to give the report from the Minister was unusual.[63]
  53. The Department again refused to provide a copy of the ethicist report to us, except to offer a confidential inspection.[64]
  54. During a public hearing on 18 September 2024, the Department offered to allow us to inspect the ethicist report on a confidential basis. Being a ‘quite substantial’ document and with limited time available, the inspection did not go ahead.[65]
  55. However, we discussed aspects of the ethicist report with the Department. For example:
• The phrase ‘child sexual abuse in medical settings’ does not always mean virginity testing. Whatever policy or guidance says, ‘that is subordinate to the definition of sexual abuse’ in the Redress Act. IDMs are ‘advised to follow the Act and read the guidance’.[66]
• On whether the Minister for Social Services had been advised about virginity testing, the Department said there were ‘conversations with her office where that was clear’.[67]
• We asked whether the intent was to conceal information from the Minister for Social Services.

• ‘I don’t believe that was the case’.

• We asked whether the briefing given to the Minister was adequate.

• ‘I have no comment’.[68]
  56. The Department added that the ethicist report was likely broader than virginity testing and most redress outcomes relating to medical settings are ‘clear instances’ of sexual abuse and not in dispute.[69]
  57. Separately, we suggested to the Scheme Operator that guidance ‘just opens up a can of worms’ because it is optional and open to interpretation.

• ‘People need guidance’, the Operator responded.
• Further, ‘I cannot direct IDMs’, he added.[70]

Some guidance shared with us

4.58The Department gave us an indication about advice given to IDMs about child sexual abuse in medical settings.

4.59This advice is broadly about child sexual abuse in medical settings and includes examples such as:

• Did the person undertaking the procedure or treatment have authorisation?
• Was it undertaken in a professional manner?
• Consider the legislation and practices of the time in the jurisdiction where the abuse occurred – noting that ‘some state legislation permitted examinations of children in certain circumstances’.
• Consider if any abuse of power (not just an imbalance of power) occurred.
• Was unnecessary restraint or sedative used?
• Did the procedure take place in the presence of another person, such as a chaperone? (An adult who is looking after a child).
• Did the child have a disability or additional layer of vulnerability, such being culturally and linguistically diverse?
• Was the child Indigenous?[71]
  60. There is also advice to IDMs to remind them that intrusive medical examinations ‘were sometimes used to disguise sexual abuse’.[72]
  61. In response to the Committee’s concerns about how applications detailing virginity testing are managed, the Department provided a range of priority improvements they are committed to implementing, including:
• Revising the policy guidance on abuse in medical settings to include specific reference to the 2018 World Health Organisation, Office of the High Commissioner, United Nations Human Rights and United Nations Women interagency statement ‘Eliminating Virginity Testing’ (UN interagency statement) which condemns virginity testing as a violation of several fundamental human rights with no scientific merit or clinical indication
• Clarifying the policy guidance for Independent Decision Makers (IDM) to consider in determining whether abuse in medical settings or during medical procedures is sexual abuse for the purposes of the Scheme
• Creating a panel of IDM to build knowledge and specialise in making determinations on applications that detail abuse in medical settings and intrusive internal examinations
• Enhancing IDM training on abuse in medical settings to include consideration of the UN interagency statement and revised policy
• Identifying applicants who have described abuse relating to intrusive internal examinations and were found ineligible prior to the updated policy advice in 2022 and providing them with an opportunity to seek a review of their application if they want to do this.
  62. The Committee appreciates the Department’s response, but acknowledges it only occurred due to the bravery of the women who gave traumatic evidence about their appalling experiences and their impacts. The Committee also notes the powerful advocacy of CLAN who helped give these women a voice. These are fundamentally important reforms that we hope will restore justice for these women, and we will continue to monitor their implementation.

Assessment framework policy guidelines

4.63The Scheme’s rules say that the assessment framework helps the Scheme’s decision makers work out how much redress an eligible survivor should be paid. Some of that framework is publicly available.[73]

4.64The other part of that framework is called the Assessment Framework Policy Guidelines. That document is not publicly available. Disclosure is an offence punishable by imprisonment or large fines.[74] This is known as statutory secrecy.

4.65From the Australian Government’s perspective, the concern is that public release ‘may increase the risk of fraudulent applications’ to the Scheme.[75]

4.66The Second Year Review said:

• There are ‘serious inconsistencies between the legislative instruments and the internal policy documents… which result in inconsistent decision-making under the Assessment Framework’.[76]
• For other comparable schemes in Australia, the frameworks and guidelines are in the public domain to ‘ensure the public is aware of how payments are determined and to improve public accountability’.[77]
  67. knowmore said that the Assessment Framework Policy Guidelines should be public to assist with:
• Insights into how decisions are made.
• Transparency.
• Managing survivor expectations about likely outcomes.[78]
  68. Dr Frank Golding OAM said:
• Without the guidelines, applying for redress is like playing sport without knowing the rules or how the umpire will interpret them.
• The guidelines ‘must be in the public domain to ensure that survivors can submit… their best case’.
• The Australian public should know whether ‘public funds are being delivered according to guidelines that are accurately and consistently interpreted’.[79]
  69. We believed that this document would help us understand why inconsistent and unfair decisions sometimes happen.
  70. We could access the document because we have inquiry powers that override statutory secrecy. The Australian Constitution gives us those powers in Section 49.
  71. Our request for the document was refused. After lengthy negotiations, we eventually inspected a copy of this document on a confidential basis in June 2024.[80]
  72. By majority, the Committee decided not to make the document publicly available.

Judicial review

4.73Redress applicants may ask for the decision to be reviewed. However, the review rights are ‘very limited’, which avoids the ‘legalistic’ aspects that may occur when government makes administrative decisions.[81]

4.74In a previous report, the Committee said that options for the courts to review redress decisions are ‘very limited’ and ‘very difficult for survivors to pursue’.[82]

4.75In July 2024, the Australian Federal Court issued two writs (legal orders) to require the Department (which administers the Scheme) to:

1Quash (or void) an existing redress decision.

2Make that decision again.[83]

4.76In doing so, the court observed:

• When the Scheme determines a redress application, all aspects (or integers) should be considered.
• Failure to address an aspect in a redress application is an error.
• This would be a ‘constructive failure to undertake the statutory duty’ in the Redress Act, the court said.
• On other words, the Scheme’s decision was faulty because the steps to determine the redress application were not properly completed according to the law.
• Further, if the reason for determining an applicant ineligible for redress is based on a narrow view of what is defined as ‘sexual abuse’, then that is also an error.
• In the Redress Act, sexual abuse of a child includes ‘any act which exposes the person to, or involves the person in, sexual processes beyond the person’s understanding or contrary to accepted community standards.’
  77. A separate issue is the way the Department may rely upon protected information with the court to defend itself from legal challenges. Survivors may not have access to the same information, which could disadvantage a survivor during court proceedings.[84]
  78. In addition to granting two writs in July 2024, the Federal Court ordered:
• The Department’s submissions (or information provided) to the court may not be accessed without permission from the court or a judge.
• The only people could be given access are a judge, court staff or a lawyer.
  79. Protected information is discussed in Chapter 12.

Footnotes

[1]National Redress Scheme, About the Independent Decision Makers, www.nationalredress.gov.au/apply/what-happens-after-applying/independent-decision-makers, viewed 25 September 2024.

[2]Bronwyn Worswick, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 8.

[3]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.8, response IQ23-000151.

[4]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.8, response IQ23-000151.

[5]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.21, p. 2.

[6]Mark Harrigan, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 6.

[7]Emma-Kate McGuirk, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 9 March 2023, p. 2.

[8]Bruce Young, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 8 April 2024, p. 17.

[9]Ray Griggs AO CSC, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 5.

[10]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, response IQ24-000167.

[11]John Riley, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 5.

[12]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, response IQ24-000157.

[13]Australian Public Service Commission, APS Values and Code of Conduct in practice, Section 5: Conflict of Interest, www.apsc.gov.au/publication/aps-values-and-code-conduct-practice/section-5-conflict-interest, viewed 25 September 2024.

[14]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.8, response IQ23-000151.

[15]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.17, pp. 2–3.

[16]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.21, p. 6.

[17]Bronwyn Worswick, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 8.

[18]Bronwyn Worswick, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 6.

[19]Bronwyn Worswick, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 6.

[20]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.18, p. 1.

[21]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.18, p. 1 .

[22]Ray Griggs AO CSC, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 2.

[23]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.17, p. 2.

[24]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.17, p. 2.

[25]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.16, attachment E.

[26]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.16, p. 2.

[27]John Riley, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2024, p. 7.

[28]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.16, p. 2.

[29]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.19, response IQ24-000162.

[30]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.19, response IQ24-000162.

[31]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.17, p. 2.

[32]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.17, p. 2.

[33]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.17, p. 2.

[34]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.17, p. 2.

[35]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.17, p. 2.

[36]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.17, p. 3.

[37]Ray Griggs AO CSC, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 6.

[38]John Riley and Bronwyn Worswick, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p.11.

[39]Val Still, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2024, p. 6.

[40]Sean Bowes and Rachel Neil, knowmore, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 32.

[41]knowmore, Supplementary Submission 14.5, p. 14.

[42]Sean Bowes and Rachel Neil, knowmore, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 32.

[43]Rachel Neil, knowmore, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 33.

[44]knowmore, Supplementary Submission 14.5, p. 15.

[45]For example, evidence received from CLAN and Lorraine.

[46]Robyn Kruk AO, Final Report Second year review of the National Redress Scheme 2021, p. 75.

[47]Letitia Hope, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 20 October 2023, pp. 31–32.

[48]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.8, response IQ23-000134.

[49]Senate Hansard, 20 March 2024, p. 953.

[50]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.16, p. 1.

[51]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.16, p. 1.

[52]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.16, p. 2.

[53]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.17, attachment A.

[54]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.17, attachment A.

[55]John Riley, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 9.

[56]John Riley, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 9.

[57]Mark Harrigan, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 7.

[58]John Riley, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 9.

[59]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, p. 2.

[60]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, p. 3.

[61]Lorraine, Committee Hansard, 2 August 2024, p. 9.

[62]Rachel Neil, knowmore, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 35.

[63]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, p. 2.

[64]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, p. 3.

[65]Letitia Hope, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2024, p. 2.

[66]John Riley, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2024, p. 2.

[67]John Riley, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2024, p. 2.

[68]John Riley, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2024, p. 2.

[69]John Riley, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2024, p. 5.

[70]Ray Griggs AO CSC, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 6.

[71]John Riley, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2024, p. 6.

[72]John Riley, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 18 August 2024, p. 6.

[73]National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Act 2018 (Redress Act), s. 32.

[74]Redress Act, s. 108.

[75]Australian Government, Guides to Social Policy Law: National Redress Guide (Version 1.21), part 6.6.

[76]Robyn Kruk AO, Final Report Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme 2021, p. 95.

[77]Robyn Kruk AO, Final Report Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme 2021, p. 91.

[78]Rachel Neil, knowmore, Committee Hansard, 8 April 2024, p. 6.

[79]Dr Frank Golding OAM, Submission 47, p. 7.

[80]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.17, attachment A.

[81]Bronwyn Worswick, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 8.

[82]Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme, Second Interim Report of the Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme 2021, p. 47.

[83]Brooks v Operator, National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse [2024] FCA 725.

[84]Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme, Second Interim Report of the Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme 2021, p. 47.