1. Committee views and recommendations

About the National Redress Scheme

1.1The Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Royal Commission) recommended a national scheme be established to provide redress to survivors.

1.2The National Redress Scheme (the Scheme) began in 2018 and is due to end in 2028.

1.3The Scheme aims to:

• Ease the pain, suffering and sorrow caused by past child sexual abuse (and related abuse) that occurred in Australian institutions.
• Recognise the impacts of that abuse.
• Provide justice for the survivors.[1]
  4. As of 9 August 2024, the Scheme has:
• Received around 46 280 applications and 16 214 redress offers have been accepted.[2]
• Paid $1.55 billion to eligible survivors.[3]
• All government institutions and 540 non-government institutions are participating in the Scheme.[4]

The inquiry

1.5On 28 November 2022, we started our inquiry into the operations of the National Redress Scheme (the Scheme).

1.6The inquiry’s aims included finding out about:

• Whether redress is fair to everyone who asks for redress.
• The experiences of First Nations people and people with disability who are seeking redress.
• Data and trends relating to redress applications.
• The effectiveness of redress support services, who help people asking for redress.
• The availability of legal advice.
• Laws that protect the information about redress applicants.
• Other matters, which included whether the Scheme is meeting the needs of victims and survivors who seek redress.
  7. We also examined the experiences of care leavers and other survivors. The Scheme defines care leavers as being applicants who were either a state ward, foster child, child migrant, in relative kinship or in court ordered care.[5]
  8. In this report, we generally use the term survivor or redress applicant. We acknowledge other terms may be used (for example, victim or victim-survivor).
  9. Throughout the inquiry, we repeatedly heard that many survivors find it difficult to understand and access the Scheme. Therefore, we have endeavoured to write this report using plain English to improve accessibility for all survivors and to assist—where possible—more survivors to learn about the Scheme.
  10. This report is not legal advice. If you need legal advice about redress or making a civil claim, you should talk to a lawyer.

Survivor expectations

1.11We want to thank everyone who came forward to tell us about their experiences, which included powerful personal reflections about deeply traumatic events.

• Your evidence made a difference. The Government made changes and improvements to the Scheme during the inquiry. We are recommending that more be done.
• Thinking about redress or asking for redress can be confronting and overwhelming. On average, disclosing what happened takes around 23 years.
• We recognise the commendable efforts being made to help survivors of child sexual abuse and to protect children from harm.
  12. While redress might not fix everything, it offers survivors a choice. The number of redress applications is increasing each year. We acknowledge what the Scheme has achieved for many survivors. We recognise the hard work and effort that goes into administering the Scheme.
  13. The Royal Commission’s report summarised the expected standard of service for a redress scheme:
• The process ‘must provide equal access and equal treatment for survivors’.
• This should apply ‘regardless of the location, operator, type, continued existence or assets of the institution in which they were abused’.
• This would be necessary, ‘if it is to be regarded by survivors as being capable of delivering justice’.[6]
  14. Powerful institutions and governments in Australia inflicted horrific abuse upon children who were controlled, violated and deprived of their human rights. Unsurprisingly, many survivors have limited trust in government or institutions.
  15. We asked Aunty Glendra Stubbs, an elder in residence at knowmore, about redress and trust. She said:
• Australia has had hard questions, such as responding to domestic violence and homelessness but ‘this is really the hardest question that we’ve had to answer as a country’.
• The Royal Commission had paved the way and ‘[t]hat came with trust’ from survivors who disclosed their experiences.
• Aunty Glendra reminded us how survivors who had ‘never talked’ had bravely come forward to disclose for the first time.[7]
  16. However, the Scheme does not always meet survivor expectations. For example, we heard:
• Applying for redress has been a traumatic experience for many survivors.
• Redress outcomes are sometimes unexpected, unfair or inconsistent.
• Some survivors need reasonable adjustments to be able to engage with the Scheme.
• Redress support services are overwhelmed with requests for help.

The Scheme is running out of time

1.17The Scheme closes to new applications in mid-2027. The Scheme is due to cease in 2028. Unless changes are made, some survivors could miss out on redress.

1.18There are a few reasons why this could happen, which include:

• Early estimates of how many survivors would apply for redress were wrong. Redress applications and requests for support are being received in far greater numbers than expected. The Australian Government has put more resources into the Scheme, but catching up is going to take a huge effort.
• Even though the Royal Commission said that survivors are believed, it is up to survivors to prove the ‘reasonable likelihood’ of their abuse.
• Some survivors may receive poor advice (or no advice) about how the Scheme works and other possible options, such as making a civil claim.
• The choices are potentially overwhelming and confusing. There are multiple redress schemes and options to make a civil claim. The way prior compensation payments are deducted from redress payments adds further complexity.
  19. It generally takes more than a year for the Scheme to process a redress application. In earlier years, processing times averaged between 11 and 12 months.[8] Table 1.1 shows the average processing time for redress applications since the Scheme began.

Source: Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, response IQ24-000175.

1.20Administering the Scheme has been more challenging than expected:

• The Department of Social Services told us that ‘the Scheme has been more complex to implement than originally anticipated’.[10]
• The Australian Government said that ‘[r]ecruitment and retention of suitable staff is an ongoing challenge in administering the Scheme’.[11] In 2023–24, staff turnover was 29%.[12]
• Delays and mistakes erode trust. This is likely contributing to delays and negative experiences during the redress process.
• During the Royal Commission’s private sessions, 5% (among 2974 participants) reported abuse experiences relating to 3 or more institutions.[13] However, this is not reflected in the Scheme. Almost half of redress applications (42%) name 3 or more institutions.[14] Institutions may have shared responsibility.
  21. Other factors such as mental health, poverty, mistrust of government and privacy concerns may also deter or prevent survivors from making redress applications.
  22. In general, improvements to the Scheme are happening too slowly to be of greatest benefit to survivors:
• Some constructive recommendations were made in earlier reports and reviews, such as in the Second Year Review (a review that occurred in the Scheme’s second year of operation).[15] However, they are taking too long to implement. This is impacting on redress applicants and eligible survivors.
• Observations made in evidence we received suggest that some reforms are taking longer than expected or are simply not going to plan.
• Promoting awareness of the Scheme is a key example. When the Scheme closes, some survivors could miss out on the opportunity to seek redress simply because they did know about it.
  23. Table 1.2 summarises and compares recommendations from the Second Year Review (March 2021) and the Committee’s Interim Report (November 2021) with what we heard during this inquiry.

Source: Multiple sources; Committee analysis.

1.24In 2021, the Second Year Review report said that ‘the window for making meaningful changes to the Scheme has now closed’.[26] The Scheme is due to close in 2028, but we were concerned to learn during our inquiry that trends suggest that the Scheme is unlikely to finish its work on time.

1.25We heard from knowmore that the Scheme is ‘approaching a dangerous crunch point’ and ‘many thousands of eligible survivors… are at risk of missing out’.[27]

1.26This is shown in Table 1.3. By the end of 2023–24, the Scheme received an additional 16000 new redress applications (applications). Applications waiting for an outcome (notional pending) has continued to increase while time until closure (months remaining) has decreased.[28]

Source: Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.24, response IQ24-000195; Supplementary Submission 9.23, response IQ24-000175.

1.27Unless redress applications suddenly decrease, based on recent trends, our analysis suggests that the Scheme will be unable to provide redress to all eligible applicants on time.

• While the Scheme is completing around 407 outcomes completed per month (on average), new applications are being received at a rate of around 1360 per month (on average)
• New applications outnumber outcomes by about 953 per month. Around 25 000 redress applications are already waiting for an outcome. This number is likely to keep increasing.
• There are 48 months left in the Scheme’s life from 1 July 2024.
• Based on the current average completion rate of 407 outcomes per month it is estimated that around 19 500 outcomes will be achievable between July 2024 and 30 June 2028 (when the Scheme closes).
• We recognise some factors that affect application trends are beyond the Scheme’s control. For example, 1813 applications have been withdrawn and 2476 are ‘unable to be actioned’.[29] We were told that this is usually because the Scheme needs more information from the redress applicant (or nominee), or because the survivor asks for the process to be paused.[30]
  28. Extending the Scheme would need a political agreement among the federal, state and territory governments.
  29. The Australian Government cannot decide to extend the Scheme on its own. Some (or all) states could withdraw their power referrals – which are due to end in 2028 – but these referrals can be extended.

1.30The Committee recommends that the Australian Government seek agreement from state and territory governments to extend the National Redress Scheme beyond 2028, including agreement on extending existing state power referrals to the Commonwealth.

1.31The Committee recommends that if extending the National Redress Scheme in all respects is not agreed, the Australian Government and state and territory governments should consider:

• Asking potential redress applicants to register by a set date to allow registered survivors to apply for redress after 30 June 2027.
• Extending aspects of the Scheme, such as access to psychological care (counselling) and/or direct personal responses.

1.32The Committee recommends that the Australian Government should provide additional funding to the Department of Social Services, knowmore Legal Services and Redress Support Services to ensure all redress applications can be finalised on time.

1.33The Committee recommends that the Australian Government should begin a public awareness campaign to ensure:

• Survivors and potential redress applicants know that they have limited time to make an application.
• Survivors with an application on hold are told that the Scheme is closing.

Redress experiences could be better

1.34Being aware that redress is available, getting the right advice, weighing up the options, writing an application and reliving past trauma is challenging for many survivors.

1.35For some groups in the community, including First Nations people, people with disability and care leavers, there may be too many barriers to accessing redress.

1.36We heard that barriers to accessing redress include:

• Many survivors become stuck trying to complete the redress application form. Answering the questions triggers traumatic memories. Trauma impacts on memories, which could be from decades ago. Verifying identity can be traumatic. Some survivors cannot sign their name.
• The redress application form (and related guidance) assumes the survivor is literate in English with regular Internet access. The process inherently disadvantages anyone with limited literacy, language barriers or communication impairments.
• For survivors seeking redress, the reason many have disability (most often post-traumatic stress disorder), cannot read or write, live in poverty or don’t know their real identity, is often directly related to the abuse suffered while in care.
• Asking for help is possible but finding a trusted person takes time. There are concerns about privacy in small communities. Knowing information will be shared with the responsible institution causes concern for many survivors. Some survivors currently rely on the same institution for daily care.
• For survivors who live in remote and rural areas, geography, weather and distance create additional access barriers.
  37. After a redress application is lodged, the long wait for an outcome creates a fear of possible rejection. Elderly or unwell redress applicants may fear that they could die before knowing the outcome. They fear that the delays could be deliberate. The uncertainty creates anxiety and further trauma.
  38. Understandably, anxious survivors and support services email or call the Scheme to ask for updates. Responding to queries likely diverts Scheme staff away from tasks that could get redress applications processed sooner.
  39. Sometimes the delay is beyond the Scheme’s control, including where:
• A responsible institution refuses to cooperate with the Scheme.
• Institutions change names and they could merge with (or separate from) other institutions.
• Someone must decide which institution, as it currently exists, should be responsible for the abuse.
  40. In addition, checks are made to detect possible fraudulent claims and protect the Scheme’s integrity.
  41. When an applicant is eligible for redress, the Scheme makes a redress offer. Nearly all redress offers are accepted. However, there could be more to the story:
• Some survivors might disagree with their offer but accept it rather than ask for a review (a kind of appeal), possibly because they don’t have the energy to fight or want to move on from the trauma.
• Some redress offers are accepted without the benefit of legal advice and, sometimes, the decision is later regretted.
• In other situations, language explaining the offer and outcome are possibly misunderstood. Some survivors don’t have a trusted person to help them.
• Survivors can ask for a direct and personal response (such as an apology from the institution) upon request. These requests are increasing but lower than expected.
  42. Nominee arrangements provide some flexibility, because another person (such as a lawyer) can do things on behalf of the redress applicant. However, sometimes nominee arrangements are regrettably ignored when the applicant is contacted instead of the nominee.
  43. Some survivors and their carers prefer to keep caring arrangements informal. For someone to accept or decline a redress offer on a survivor’s behalf, they must be a legal nominee. This means having a guardianship order or power of attorney arrangement with the survivor. This requirement could materially change relationships between carers and survivors.
  44. Being told that you are ineligible for redress is likely to be a devastating shock. The impact is huge and potentially catastrophic.
• Sometimes this is discovered when the redress application is being prepared. For example, research might find that the abuse occurred outside an institutional setting, which means there is no responsible institution.
• A small number of redress applications are found ineligible. Sometimes eligibility is established but the redress offer is much lower than expected.
  45. Unexpected or unsuccessful outcomes can imply that the survivor is not believed or that society has rejected them.
  46. Those outcomes must be communicated with great care. While practices have possibly improved, a few examples of correspondence and forms we sighted looked overly officious and dense with dazzling colour schemes.[31] Although consistent and efficient messaging is important, there is possibly an overreliance on impersonal templates. We think that this could potentially be done better.
  47. We heard concerning evidence (for example during a public hearing on 2 August 2024) that the Department of Social Services has likely tasked relatively junior or inexperienced staff with contacting survivors to deliver news that is likely to be received with shock and devastation. Depending on the circumstances, this could cause psychological injury to survivors. We are reassured from knowmore’s evidence that they have seen some of these messages ‘delivered with infinite care.’[32]
  48. However, the risk and sensitivity involved in communicating with survivors has possibly been underestimated. If this has happened, then it is a strategic error that must be fixed.
  49. The law requires officers to take into account that redress should be ‘survivor-focused’ and ‘assessed, offered and provided so as to avoid, as far as possible, further harming or traumatising the survivor.’[33]
  50. Reflecting upon evidence we heard from several witnesses, in August 2024 the Scheme Operator (Mr Ray Griggs AO CSC) said that the Scheme ‘did not live up to the standards expected’ such as ‘in relation to processing and the delivery of redress outcomes to applicants.’[34]

1.51The Committee recommends that the Department of Social Services should:

• Make reasonable adjustments and allow exceptions to the Scheme’s application procedures.
• Do this subject to individual circumstances and the risks in each case, such as where a survivor has severe disability or a communication barrier.
  52. This should include:
• Steps for completing the redress application, including:

• How questions must be answered.
• Receiving information in alternative formats, including in languages other than spoken English.

• Procedures whereby a redress applicant’s documents, identity or signatures can be witnessed or recorded by electronic or virtual means.

1.53The Committee recommends that the Department of Social Services:

• Develop ways for applicants (or their nominee) to track the progress of redress applications.
• Continue to develop plainer language and presentation in written communication.
• Continue to adjust communication style according to the survivor’s needs, including correspondence from the Scheme to applicants.
• Take greater care to respect nominee arrangements.
• Continue to develop resources in languages other than English and in a variety of accessible formats.

1.54The Committee recommends that the Department of Social Services have a greater role in connecting survivors with institutions:

• Where a survivor has indicated that they would like a direct personal response.
• When the survivor indicates that they would like the Department to assist with these arrangements.

1.55The Committee recommends that the Australian Government publish six monthly data updates regarding trends in the Scheme, including:

• The rate at which new redress applications are being received each month.
• The rate of determinations being made each month.
• Trends categorised into survivor groups, such as First Nations, disability and care leavers.
• The proportion of survivors who receive a direct and personal response.
• Review requests and how often the Scheme revises the original determination.

1.56The Committee recommends that all decisions regarding redress eligibility be determined by panels of independent decision makers. Each panel should have a minimum of three members.

1.57If this recommendation cannot be fully implemented or agreed upon, then the Committee recommends that all ineligible determinations should be automatically escalated to a panel review. Each panel should have a minimum of three members.

1.58Feedback on the Scheme is important. Survivor roundtables (or informal meetings) provide this opportunity. Direct engagement with survivors, support services and their advocates should continue.

1.59The Committee recommends that the Minister for Social Services and the Department of Social Services continue to hold regular survivor roundtables, including in regional locations.

1.60We note that there is a risk that overt promotion of the National Redress Scheme distresses survivors who prefer not to think about the subject.

1.61However, in practice, news headlines and social media posts will allude to the same subject matter with evocative language.

1.62We think a greater trauma and tragedy will potentially occur when the Scheme eventually closes and survivors come forward too late.

1.63Existing strategies – often referred to as targeted awareness – should continue. These campaigns should be suited to a diverse range of community groups.

1.64The Committee recommends that the Department of Social Services urgently undertake a public information campaign to increase awareness of the Scheme and redress support services. This should include:

• Media advertising.
• Additional resources for redress support services to share among community organisations.
• Additional information and resources to be made available at Centrelink offices.
• Information and resources in accessible formats and languages other than English.
• Information about:

• Who can help with redress applications.
• Legal advice.
• Financial advice and financial counselling.

• The closing date for redress applications.

Mistakes admitted

1.65We discuss various examples, mostly in Chapter 5, including evidence from ‘Jane’ and ‘Lorraine’ (not their real names), about the harm and trauma caused by applying to the National Redress Scheme.

1.66The Secretary of the Department of Social Services, who is the Scheme’s statutory operator, admitted that ‘we [the Scheme] do get it wrong’.[35]

1.67Given this evidence and admission, we have asked ourselves:

• Is there a wider problem and other undetected cases?
• Are the Department’s mistakes serious and systemic?
• Has the Redress Act been breached?
• Did the Department of Social Services conceal information from the Minister for Social Services, this Committee and the Parliament?
• Were these wrongs, acts and omissions intentional or accidental?
• Has the Australian Public Service code of conduct been breached?
• Has this irreparably damaged the Scheme’s credibility and trust with survivors?

Institutions not participating

1.68As of August 2024, 900 institutions have been declared into the Scheme.[36] A sizeable number are listed on the Scheme’s website as ‘intending to participate’. Those institutions are only those that have consented to be publicly named and listed.

1.69Current laws mean that negotiations to join the Scheme are done on a confidential basis.[37] Some institutions are small, uncertain of their potential liability and don’t know whether they could afford to pay redress.[38] A small number are unable to fully join and partly participate where possible. Governments might agree to act as a ‘funder of last resort’ so redress is possible.

1.70However, we believe there is a risk that a small minority of institutions may choose to remain in a grey area, where they neither join nor decline to join, while avoiding any consequences. Survivors are left uncertain about whether they will receive redress from an institution intending to join the Scheme.

1.71During the inquiry, a survivor referred to Gymnastics Australia under parliamentary privilege, which attracted media attention. A few months later Gymnastics Australia became a Scheme participant. While publicity may influence the decision of institutions to participate in the Scheme, this may not work in all cases.

1.72There should be options to place pressure on institutions who say they will join the Scheme but, in practice, try to remain hidden and intend to stay indecisive.

1.73We note that participation in the Scheme is voluntary, and it is not possible to compel any institution to join, or remain in the Scheme.

1.74The Committee recommends that the Australian Government should publicly disclose and report on:

• How many redress applications have named:

• An institution that has refused to join the Scheme.
• An institution intending to join the Scheme for longer than 12 months.
• The names of those institutions.
  75. A small number of institutions have declined to participate in the Scheme or are taking a long time to decide whether to join. These institutions may be hoping that any penalties (such as loss of their charitable status) will be lifted when the Scheme ceases in 2028.

1.76The Committee recommends that the Australian Government consider, before the Scheme closes, what penalties will continue to be directed towards responsible institutions that did not participate in the Scheme.

Inconsistent and unfair redress outcomes

1.77We saw evidence that the Scheme is not providing fair and consistent outcomes to all survivors. Exactly how often inconsistent and unfair outcomes occur is unknown.

1.78The inconsistency or unfairness often appears when survivors with similar circumstances receive different redress outcomes. For example:

• One survivor might be found eligible and the other found ineligible.
• Maybe they are both eligible; however, each might be offered a substantially different redress payment.
• A survivor might have already received compensation for some (or all) of the abuse that they experienced. Prior payments are meant to be deducted but the calculations may result in substantially different deductions and adjustments.
• Outcomes might vary on a technicality. For example, this could possibly arise in cases where:

• A child had run away from an institution and the abuse occurred elsewhere.
• The setting was institutional, but the perpetrator was a family member.
• The abuse was deemed to be a medical procedure rather than sexual assault.

• One survivor was found ineligible but then succeeded with a civil claim.
  79. The Scheme pays up to $150000 to survivors. That limit includes a $50000 portion reserved for ‘extreme circumstances’. Deciding that abuse does (or does not) amount to something extreme can be upsetting to survivors and their advocates.
  80. Unfair or inconsistent outcomes are having systemic impacts.
• Fear of missing out on redress is changing the way support services and lawyers advise their clients.
• While sufficiently truthful, some applications may strategically include (or leave out) language to maximise redress outcomes.
• Through noticing trends and patterns, some support services have developed confidence to advise on whether a redress application is likely to succeed (although some support services avoid doing this and make no promises).
• That discussion possibly strays into legal advice and, possibly, this is not necessarily given by someone who is a lawyer.
  81. The average redress payment is $89 281.42 and, in 2023–24, around 11% had a deduction for prior payments, which averaged $33557.[39]
  82. Relatively few redress applications are found ineligible. Some are eligible and fall into a special category, such as funder of last resort (FOLR), deceased or serious criminal conviction.
  83. The Scheme has increasingly contacted redress applicants prior to a decision (or determination) about their outcome (known as ‘ineligible pre-determination calls’). This has resulted in a greater number of redress applications being withdrawn rather than determined ineligible.[40] Table 1.4 summarises eligible and ineligible redress applications since the Scheme began.

Source: Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, response IQ24-000168.

1.84Very rarely does the Scheme change its decisions. The Scheme reports on success measures, including that its decision-making quality has achieved a 99% success rate, because so few decisions are ever changed.[42] While implying that the Scheme gets decisions right the first time, this possibly overlooks a trend that suggests survivors very rarely ask for decisions to be reviewed. Table 1.5 summarises the redress offers declined, withdrawn applications and requests for review since the Scheme began.

Source: Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.8, IQ23-000141; Supplementary Submission 9.32, response IQ24-000249.

1.85Rules relating to reviews changed in April 2024. Those changes included a requirement that reviews cannot generally result in reduced redress payments. However, there are exceptions that make a reduction is possible.[44]

1.86A form must be completed and lodged to ask for a review. In July 2024, this form says that the review could mean:

• A survivor’s redress offer could be changed and potentially decrease.
• The survivor might be found ineligible (instead of eligible).
  87. Survivors are understandably fearful of this language, with some interpreting it as a threat. Survivors are at least six times more likely to decline their redress offer or withdraw their application rather than ask for a review.
  88. Survivors, support services and lawyers are understandably frustrated for reasons that include:
• Survivors can ask for a statement outlining the reasons for a redress decision. This takes time. Those statements might offer only limited insights.
• Arguing that an injustice has occurred is impossible if the reasons are vaguely described or some rules are unknown.
• Some institutions are vague about their intentions to join the Scheme.
• The ability to provide clarifying information is very hard when the basis for the decision must be guessed.
• The Scheme reviews its own decisions. There is no easy avenue of external appeal. Some survivors heard that a review could find the first determination too generous and reduce the redress payment offered.
  89. These problems have occurred for a few reasons:
• There is pressure to get things done quickly with limited resources.
• Guidelines are optional. They can be ignored.
• Decisions are being made in isolation.
• Efforts among decision makers to compare notes and to improve training have probably happened too late.
  90. The Department of Social Services said that redress decisions are made on a case-by-case basis.
  91. The Scheme’s legislated objectives include providing justice to abuse survivors. Inconsistent or unfair outcomes do not meet this objective. Unless doubts about consistency and fairness can be transparently resolved, confidence in the Scheme (and the Royal Commission’s vision) is likely to be eroded. This issue should be a high priority for the Scheme.

1.92The Committee recommends that the Department of Social Services update the ‘application for review of determination’ form to:

• Make the language plainer.
• Reduce the legal and technical jargon.

1.93The Committee recommends that legislation be amended to expressly provide that review of a redress determination cannot result in:

• A redress offer being reduced.
• Eligibility for redress being reversed.

Virginity testing on female children

1.94Virginity testing can be a painful, humiliating and traumatic practice, but as a form of abuse it is not always covered by the Scheme.

1.95Survivors who experienced virginity tests are sometimes found eligible for redress and in other cases they are found ineligible. Survivors who reflected upon their experiences believe that they should be eligible. While child sexual abuse in medical settings is understood to be generally complex to assess, the Department of Social Services had difficulty explaining to us:

• How the Scheme’s independent decision makers could find that virginity testing was ever a valid medical procedure.
• Why assessing those redress applications would, therefore, become complex and lead to variable outcomes.
  96. The Department also found it difficult to elaborate on what information is given to independent decision makers about how virginity testing should be understood.
  97. In October 2018, the UN Human Rights Council, UN Women, and the World Health Organisation called for the ban of virginity testing as it constitutes violence against women.

Audit

1.98Parliamentary committees are not equipped for fieldwork tasks, such as reviewing consistency among a representative sample of redress outcomes and searching through computer files. The Parliament relies upon the independent Australian National Audit Office to do this work on our behalf.

1.99With assistance from the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, we proposed that an ‘audit priority of Parliament’ be determined in relation to the National Redress Scheme. We met with the Auditor-General’s staff in September 2023 to discuss.[45]

1.100We note that the Australian National Audit Office has commenced an audit into the Scheme, which is due to be completed in June 2025.

1.101The Committee recommends that a consistent approach to virginity testing in Australia should be articulated. The practice should be the subject of a separate inquiry.

Advice for survivors

1.102Many survivors will find choosing between redress or a civil claim to be very challenging without professional advice.

• knowmore, a legal service that receives government funding to provide free advice, is highly regarded for the quality of their work.
• However, in the last few years, knowmore has experienced constant increases in demand for its services while its funding kept going down (although we note that the Australian Government has recently provided extra funding).
• Some survivors make unassisted choices. Possibly their trauma is too deep to share or perhaps they can’t find the right service for their needs.
  103. We often heard that survivors and redress applicants should be receiving advice that allows them to make informed choices. We agree with that evidence.
  104. The maximum redress payment is $150000. The payment a survivor could possibly receive from civil claim is unlimited. Some survivors regret accepting redress if they think they could have got a better deal. Equally, some regret pursuing a civil claim and wished they knew about redress.
  105. As discussed in Chapter 9, the High Court’s ruling on permanent stays (the GLJ case) moved the goal posts.[46] The GLJ case improved the chances of civil cases being successful for survivors seeking compensation from institutions.
  106. However, some survivors may have accepted a redress offer or taken legal advice before the GLJ case was decided.
  107. Another complex question is about who should give advice on options:
• Lawyers suggested that social workers (who are not lawyers) sometimes step in to give legal advice or tell survivors that redress is the only option.
• Support services said some lawyers poorly explain the options to survivors who are unlikely to understand the choices.
  108. Some factors are more certain. We heard that at least some private law firms behave unethically and try to exploit survivors.
• Examples of unethical behaviour includes pressuring vulnerable clients into signing complex contracts, concealing costs the client will later owe (which are high), making unrealistic promises to clients about large compensation payments and trawling documents for potential new clients.
• Some work with claim farmers, who they pay to find them new clients.
• Claim farmers do things like making unexpected phone calls or emails to survivors and pressuring them to sign legal documents that they don’t understand.
  109. In 2021, the Committee made a recommendation on addressing claim farming, setting costs for legal advice and listing reputable lawyers. Unfortunately, that recommendation is largely unimplemented. Queensland is the only Australian jurisdiction with laws intended to prevent claim farming.
  110. Some survivors receive payment and then it quickly disappears. Survivors may also benefit from financial counselling, which could safeguard them and their money from financial abuse.
  111. We considered whether receiving legal advice or financial counselling (or both) should be mandatory for all redress applicants or merely clearly stated options.
  112. Requiring advice has risks:
• This is likely to create an extra barrier to receiving redress for some survivors, especially those who live outside major cities, speak limited English or rely on a carer to take them to appointments.
• This means more people know who is seeking redress, which in some communities, poses risks to privacy. Seeking no advice is also a choice.
• Requiring survivors to complete extra steps delays their outcome.
  113. Missing out on advice also carries risks:
• Accepting a redress offer is irreversible. This also means accepting that you cannot later make a civil claim for the same abuse. Some survivors are taken by surprise and do not always understand the implications.
• Accepting redress may be regretted. The survivor may feel cheated. Timely advice could avoid mistakes.

1.114The Committee recommends that the National Redress Scheme pay a fixed sum to delegated legal practitioners where a survivor elects to receive legal advice:

• Before proceeding with a redress application.
• Before accepting a redress offer.

1.115The Committee recommends that before redress offers are accepted, the Department of Social Services encourages in writing for survivors to seek:

• Legal advice.
• Financial advice or financial counselling and that the Department of Social Services publish this advice on the Scheme’s website.

1.116The Committee recommends that the Department of Social Services take additional measures to protect redress payments from inadvertent loss, including by:

• Verifying who has access to (or control over) the bank account into which money is going to be paid.
• Notifying redress applicants of which bank account into which funds are due to be deposited before the transaction occurs.
• Pausing the payment process to allow time for verification.

1.117The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth encourages state and territory governments to urgently change laws to address claim farming and exploitative practices, including by:

• Making it unlawful for lawyers to charge contingency fees for services delivered with respect to National Redress Scheme applications.
• Imposing a legal obligation on lawyers to advise a potential client of the availability of free services (knowmore Legal Service and the Redress Support Services), and to certify such advice has been provided, before executing a costs agreement for a National Redress Scheme application.
• Capping fees that lawyers can charge for services delivered with respect to National Redress Scheme applications.
• Making it an offence for any person to:

• contact a person without their consent and solicit or induce them to make a National Redress Scheme application; or
• give or receive any money or other benefit in exchange for a referral to make a National Redress Scheme application.

• Establishing a set of expected practice standards for lawyers and survivor advocates providing services with respect to National Redress Scheme applications.

1.118The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth encourages state and territory governments to codify in legislation the basis on which the courts may grant permanent stays.

1.119This should be consistent with the High Court’s ruling in the GLJ case.

Redress support services

1.120Several redress support services gave evidence and invaluable insights into the Scheme’s workings. Among things survivors are asking for:

• Understanding, flexibility, confidentiality, trust and safety, including cultural safety.
• Face-to-face contact and continuity with staff, including certainty that the same service (or staff) will remain by their side for the whole redress journey.
  121. Overall, since the Scheme started, many survivors (at least half) are likely to seek redress with limited assistance.[47]
  122. Depending on who a survivor asks for help (and whether they receive help at all), the average redress payment varies between $86 013 and $97 018.[48]
  123. Unfortunately, it can be hard for survivors to access redress support services. This can be for reasons including:
• Demand for redress support services simply exceeds available resources. Greater awareness of the Scheme is likely contributing to increased demand and longer waiting times to get support.
• Survivors present with complex issues. It is not always possible to offer individual attention and face-to-face contact.
• The Australian Government funds redress support services for two-year periods, which means clients cannot be promised continuity of support.
• Services are limited outside major cities. Specialised services for people with disability and First Nations people, for example, are relatively fewer in number.
• Services seeking to promote the Scheme risk overlapping their efforts because there is limited central coordination.
  124. We note that the Australian Government has recently budgeted more funds for knowmore and redress support services.

1.125The Committee recommends that the Australian Government:

• Fund additional redress support services to provide dedicated support to:

• Survivors from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, including for travel and translation.
• Survivors with disability.
• Survivors living in regional areas.
• First Nations survivors and culturally safe settings.
  126. The Department of Social Services should coordinate outreach efforts among redress support services.

1.127The Committee recommends that the Australian Government extend funding terms for redress support services until 2 years following the extended expiration date of the Scheme.

Balancing transparency and privacy

1.128There are competing concerns about the way secrecy governs the Scheme. While we expect that most survivors want their privacy protected, this limits transparency about how decisions are made.

1.129The Committee agrees that privacy is an important priority for the Scheme. This helps to make sure that everyone can feel safe and comfortable to access the Scheme. However, limited transparency about decision-making can lead to more trauma when the outcome is unexpected, unsuccessful or misunderstood.

1.130There are legitimate reasons why protected information might need to be shared with law enforcement, such as when someone is in danger. We are concerned about reports that law enforcement agencies may be using personal information to pursue outstanding fines. The Committee believes this risks a breach of trust between the Scheme and survivors, which may deter survivors from engaging with the Scheme.

1.131Issues associated with the Scheme’s protected information provisions that can affect the way the Scheme provides survivor-focused, trauma-informed redress.

1.132The Committee recommends that:

• The Department of Social Services review the basis on which survivor names and addresses are shared with law enforcement agencies.
• The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission should cease sharing information about survivors if this is predictably done for purposes such as pursuing outstanding fines or debts.
• Protected information provisions should be amended to prevent survivor information from being used in this way.

1.133The Committee recommends that the Department of Social Services develop a framework for enforcement of protected information provisions.

1.134The framework must be published on the Scheme’s website together with advice on how to report suspected breaches.

Eighth Year Review

1.135There is wider frustration that recommendations intended to fix many ongoing issues have been partially implemented or unsupported by governments.

1.136On the eighth anniversary of the Scheme, a review is due to be conducted. That review ‘must consider’ topics listed in legislation and ‘the results of any other review of evaluation’ of the Scheme.[49] We have listed some additional matters in Recommendations 26 and 27.

1.137The Committee recommends that the Eighth Year Review of the National Redress Scheme consider:

• Possible alternative options if redress cannot be offered to a survivor because a responsible institution does not fulfil its intention to join the Scheme by 30 June 2027.
• The effectiveness of Queensland laws intended to address claim farming, including whether there is scope to refine or improve similar laws.
• The Scheme’s capacity to finalise all applications before the Scheme closes.

1.138The Committee recommends, that subject to the National Redress Scheme being extended, the Eighth Year Review of the Scheme consider:

• The preferred basis on which the Scheme should eventually close; for example, based on a fixed date or when application numbers drop below a fixed threshold.
• The best option for an eventual closure if governments are likely to agree on only some aspects of the Scheme being extended.
  139. If an extension is not possible, the Eighth Year Review should consider what is needed to close the Scheme as planned, including how to ensure all existing and future redress applications are processed on time.

1.140The Committee recommends that the respective Senate and House of Representatives procedural committees should inquire into the accessibility of parliamentary committee processes, including:

• Protocols for receiving, handling and publishing evidence received from witnesses who have experienced trauma.
• The suitability of House and Senate standing orders and statutory requirements when committees take evidence from witnesses who have experienced trauma or are otherwise vulnerable.
• The accessibility of committee information.

Other matters

Other redress schemes

1.141There are a growing number of redress or reparation schemes around Australia. Their scope, eligibility and design have variations (or possibly overlap). Each is administered separately. This adds complexity to options available to survivors.

1.142The Committee recommends that the Australian Government work with state and territory governments on a national framework for redress and/or reparation schemes. This could include developing knowledge around best practices, scheme design and administration.

Footnotes

[1]National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Act 2018 (Redress Act), s. 3.

[2]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, response IQ24-000173 and IQ24-000177.

[3]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, response IQ24-000165.

[4]National Redress Scheme, ‘National Redress Scheme – August update 2024,’www.nationalredress.gov.au/news/august-update-2024, viewed 20 September 2024. See also: National Redress Scheme, ‘National Redress Scheme – June update 2024,’www.nationalredress.gov.au/news/june-update-2024, viewed 20 September 2024.

[5]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.8, response IQ23-000142.

[6]Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Final Report Preface and Executive Summary 2017, p. 176.

[7]Aunty Glendra Stubbs, knowmore, Committee Hansard, 12 April 2023, p. 4.

[8]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, response IQ24-000175.

[9]The National Redress Scheme’s reporting functionality was not completely developed in the first year of operation. Data for the first 2 financial years (2018–19 and 2019–20) has therefore been combined.

[10]Department of Social Services, Submission 9, p. 2.

[11]Australian Government, The Australian Government Response to the Final Report of the Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme 2023, p. 23.

[12]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, response IQ24-000167.

[13]Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Redress and civil litigation 2015, p.120.

[14]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, response IQ24-000174.

[15]See: Robyn Kruk AO, Final Report Second year review of the National Redress Scheme 2021. Available at: www.nationalredress.gov.au/about/about-scheme/reports-and-statistics/second-anniversary-review.

[16]Robyn Kruk AO, Final Report Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme 2021, recommendation 3.6; Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme, Second Interim Report of the Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme 2021, recommendation 13.

[17]Australian Government, The Australian Government Response to the Final Report of the Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme 2023, p. 8.

[18]Robyn Kruk AO, Final Report Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme 2021, recommendations 3.7, 3.8 and 7.2; Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme, Second Interim Report of the Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme 2021, recommendations 3, 15 and 16.

[19]Australian Government, The Australian Government Response to the Final Report of the Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme 2023, p. 26.

[20]Robyn Kruk AO, Final Report Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme 2021, recommendation 3.9; Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme, Second Interim Report of the Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme 2021, recommendations 6, 7 and 8.

[21]Australian Government, The Australian Government Response to the Final Report of the Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme 2023, p. 10.

[22]Robyn Kruk AO, Final Report Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme 2021, recommendation3.13

[23]Australian Government, The Australian Government Response to the Final Report of the Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme 2023, p. 16.

[24]Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme, Second Interim Report of the Joint Select Committee on Implementation of the National Redress Scheme 2021, recommendation 17.

[25]Department of Social Services, Submission 9, p. 9.

[26]Robyn Kruk AO, Final Report Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme 2021, p. 9.

[27]knowmore, Supplementary Submission 14.5, p. 43.

[28]Reported totals may be revised or updated. Applications could be subject to an institution joining the National Redress Scheme, withdrawn, paused (or recommenced) and this may influence yearly figures. Small differences may be noticeable among averages, totals and figures reported depending on the source. Data for the financial years 2018–19 and 2019–20 is often only available when combined and counted together.

[29]National Redress Scheme, ‘July update 2024’, www.nationalredress.gov.au/news/july-update-2024, viewed 8 October 2024.

[30]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.9, response IQ23-000162.

[31]Examples of templates for standard letters used by the Scheme to contact redress applicants (including redress offer, direct personal response, payment options) are available at Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.24, response IQ24-000189.

[32]Jackie Mead, knowmore Legal Service, Committee Hansard, 2 August 2024, p. 27.

[33]Redress Act, s. 10. ‘Officers’ includes independent decision makers and staff performing duties at the Department of Social Services.

[34]Ray Griggs AO CSC, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 1.

[35]Ray Griggs AO CSC, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 21 August 2024, p. 10.

[36]Evidence from the Department of Social Services advised that the current number of institutions participating in the Scheme is lower than the total number of institutions declared into the Scheme as some institutions have been revoked or have merged into participating groups. Historical applications data may vary slightly from what was previously provided as it excludes any duplicate applications. See: Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, response IQ24-000173.

[37]Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 12 April 2023, p. 18.

[38]Robyn Kruk AO, Final Report Second Year Review of the National Redress Scheme 2021, p. 199.

[39]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, response IQ24-000169; Supplementary Submission 9.24, response IQ24-000185.

[40]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.8, response IQ23-000140.

[41]The National Redress Scheme’s reporting functionality was not completely developed in the first year of operation. Data for the first 2 financial years (2018–19 and 2019–20) has therefore been combined.

[42]Department of Social Services, Strategic Success Measures 2023, p. 9.

[43]The National Redress Scheme’s reporting functionality was not completely developed in the first year of operation. Data for the first 2 financial years (2018–19 and 2019–20) has therefore been combined.

[44]Redress Act, s. 75(4).

[45]Australian National Audit Office, Annual Report 2023–24, p. 45.

[46]GLJ v Trustees of Roman Catholic Church for Diocese of Lismore (2023) 414 ALR 635; (2023) 97 ALJR 857; [2023] HCA 32; BC202315504.

[47]Department of Social Services, Strategic Success Measures 2023, p. 12.

[48]Department of Social Services, Supplementary Submission 9.23, response IQ24-000178.

[49]Redress Act, s. 192(4).