|
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page
CHAPTER 5
The Australian Criminal Intelligence Model
5.1
This chapter considers the proposed Australian Criminal Intelligence
Model (ACIM), its strategy, principles and approach.
Background to the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model
5.2
The Organised Crime Strategic Framework Overview (OCSF) identifies a
need to establish an organised crime intelligence model.[1]
The ACC was tasked by the Heads of Commonwealth Operational Law Enforcement Agencies
(HOCOLEA) to lead the development of the model. The aim of the model is to provide
clarity and consistency of standards, processes and protocols for
intelligence-led policing and law enforcement work to enhance the national
picture of organised crime. The ACIM is expected to enable the ACC and its partners
to align activities more effectively while providing guidance and understanding
of shared methodologies, ideas and goals.[2]
The vision is that of an intelligence partnership for a safer Australia with
the ACIM expected to secure the free flow of criminal intelligence across the domains
of national security, serious and organised crime, and policing and community
safety.[3]
5.3
In 2010–11, the ACC began planning the ACIM to meet the demands of all
stakeholders from national security to community policing.[4]
An Australian Criminal Intelligence Forum (ACIF) comprising representatives of
the 17 involved agencies was established with responsibility to oversee
development and implementation of the model.[5]
The ACC stated that:
[The ACIF] for the first time in Australian history, holds
the mechanism for eight states and territories and many Commonwealth agencies
to agree to principles of intelligence practice and to communicate their
sometimes unique or divergent goals of achieving excellence in the criminal intelligence
function nationally.[6]
5.4
The development of the model is closely linked to the ACID/ALEIN scoping
study which is assessing opportunities to harness technological advances to
better enable management of ACC criminal intelligence holdings. As part of this
study, the ACC has benchmarked criminal intelligence models, frameworks,
practices and procedures in Europe and North America to identify
ground-breaking intelligence standards and capabilities.[7]
Endorsement of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model
5.5
The ACC Board and the Standing Council on Police and Emergency
Management endorsed the proposed ACIM in September 2012 and November 2012
respectively.[8]
Formal endorsement represented the culmination of nearly 'two years of
developmental work, negotiation and agreement by intelligence professionals
representing seventeen Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies'.[9]
Endorsement was reached by 15 agencies represented on the ACC Board together
with CrimTrac and the Australian New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency (ANZPAA).
5.6
The ACC's State Manager, Mr Ben McDevitt, informed the committee that by
endorsing the proposal, the board 'signed off on several elements which lead to
an intent, an underlying philosophy and a desired end state for the management
of criminal intelligence'.[10]
The significance of the endorsement by all 17 agencies was highlighted by Mr
McDevitt who noted that:
The key feature of it is that those 17 agencies are drawn
from three different operating environments, so we have the policing and community
safety regime or domain, the serious and organised crime domain and the
national security domain. What we found prior to this model is that there is
significant difficulty even within those domains to get information and
intelligence flowing freely—for example, from police service to police service.[11]
5.7
Mr McDevitt explained that having signed off on the concept of the
model, the focus of the ACC Board would now shift to developing processes,
protocols, technologies, agreements and the legislative realities of sharing
information and intelligence.[12]
5.8
The ACC identified four key milestones in relation to the ACIM's
implementation with endorsement the first. The others include the establishment
of the ACIF to oversight the implementation of the ACIM and a reporting and
accountability regime by way of ACIF reporting twice yearly to the ACC Board.[13]
Vision for the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model
5.9
The model is recognised by the ACC CEO, Mr John Lawler, as the means by
which Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies can see
intelligence and intelligence processes through the same lens in order that:
...when we are talking about intelligence concepts,
intelligence processes, intelligence training and intelligence systems we have
commonality in the way that that is constructed and indeed agreed standards and
processes.[14]
5.10
Mr Lawler explained that the optimum criminal intelligence environment which
the model seeks to establish is one in which:
...technology is available to facilitate information sharing
through more-complementary systems, where there is a commitment by agencies to
quickly and effectively collect, analyse and share relevant intelligence and a
collaborative culture of intelligence sharing to support decision-making across
agencies and across operating domains.[15]
5.11
The optimal state in relation to criminal intelligence is described by
the ACC as a context in which:
-
criminal intelligence will be treated as a national asset and
agencies share a responsibility to provide information and intelligence;
-
criminal intelligence technology will be fit for purpose and
exist across agencies and jurisdictions providing efficiencies and cost
savings;
-
legislation frameworks will enable the free flow of intelligence
across agencies and jurisdictions; and
- an organisational culture will ensure a correct balance between
the principles of 'need to know' with 'responsibility to provide'.[16]
5.12
Such an optimal state will lead to:
Improved understanding of, and more effective responses to,
the threat and impact of serious and organised crime.[17]
Australian Criminal Intelligence Model principles and strategic objectives
5.13
Mr McDevitt explained that there are three underlying principles which
'help us to get a philosophy' for the model:
- intelligence must be customer focused and requirements driven;
- information and intelligence should be collected once and used
often; and
-
information security requirements should be balanced to enable
the right people to access the right information quickly, securely and from the
right sources.[18]
5.14
The model has as its guiding principles, seven strategic objectives:
1. Ensuring quality intelligence supports tactical,
operational and strategic decision-making to ensure more effective responses.
2. Inculcating a culture where security requirements are
balanced and information generated and held by individual jurisdictions and the
Commonwealth is valued as a national asset for all.
3. Establishing common standards, processes and protocols for
managing intelligence assets, enabling more effective sharing across domains.
4. Professionalising the intelligence discipline through
development of national standards for intelligence practitioners and analysts,
leading to improved quality of intelligence outputs.
5. Embedding an agreed national threat, harm and risk
assessment methodology to ensure a consistent approach across jurisdictions.
6. Pursuing common technical and security architectures for
information and intelligence holdings to improve intelligence collection,
analysis and sharing.
7. Maximising the value of fusion and technical analysis
capabilities.[19]
5.15
Each of the strategic objectives is underpinned by a series of action items
which are collectively directed at embedding the model. The ACIF, as the body
responsible for managing the development and implementation of the model, is
currently drafting an implementation plan which will include the action items
required to achieve the strategic objectives.[20]
Figure 2: Australian Criminal
Intelligence Model
Source: Australian Crime
Commission, Submission 10, p. 25.
Intelligence cycle
5.16
The intelligence cycle under the ACIM is a process which 'describes the
standard steps used to transform raw data and information into value-added
intelligence'.[21]
The ACC noted that the ACIF focused its first five meetings around the issue of
the intelligence cycle, identifying best practices and issues that required
resolution at each phase of the cycle.[22]
5.17
The ACIM intelligence cycle is a five step process:
1. plan, prioritise and
direct––discussions are held to identify the issue or theme that requires further
investigation;
2. collect and collate––searching
for data and information which is grouped to identify intelligence gaps and
convergences for further analysis;
3. analyse and produce––assessing,
validating, adding value to and judging information to transform it into
intelligence for reporting purposes;
4. report and disseminate––sharing
intelligence to support and advance the decision making process vis-à-vis the
formal dissemination of reports and products; and
5. evaluate and review––re-examination
of activities and the value of intelligence outcomes with a view to identifying
opportunities for improvement.[23]
5.18
These five steps were endorsed by all involved agencies. The ACC stated
that this 'common approach improves understanding of the phases of the intelligence
cycle, ensures consistency, facilitates sharing and improves the flow of
intelligence across and between agencies'.[24]
The ACC provided details of each of the five steps using a previous illicit
drug project. The planning phase will consider information already gathered through
other relevant inquiries and the collection phase may entail physical
surveillance, coercive hearings, financial investigations and the use of covert
sources. Collation involves evaluation of the material gathered to establish
its accuracy and reliability and the organisation of that material in a way to
reveal the links and associations across individuals, organisations and
methodologies. The third phase requires agencies to analyse the material and
produce briefings and information reports. The fourth phase, reporting and
dissemination, involves provision of material to involved stakeholders while
the final phase entails feedback on quality, value to decision-makers and
outcomes for intelligence clients.[25]
Governance arrangements
5.19
A number of ACIF subgroups have been established to manage
implementation of the action items and initiatives identified within the
Australian Criminal Intelligence Strategy and the implementation plan (which is
currently under development). Each subgroup is responsible for a phase of the
intelligence cycle.
Australian Criminal Intelligence
Forum subgroups and activities
|
Subgroup
|
Strategic objective
focus and initiatives
(ongoing & implemented)
|
|
Plan, prioritise and
direct
|
- Strategic objectives 1 and 5.
-
National Criminal Intelligence Priorities and 'setting the
framework through negotiation across agencies'.
-
Introduction of a National Target System (NTS) for assessment
of individuals and groups.[26]
Realising strategic objective 5, processes and protocols for national threat,
harm and risk assessment have been agreed to and implemented through the NTS.
|
|
Collect and collate
|
-
Strategic objectives 6 and 7.
-
Development of the Request for Information (RFI) capability including
a standard definition of RFIs, priority rating scale, set of key words, naming
conventions, metadata standard fields and business rules.
-
Development of a National Criminal Intelligence Product
Directory including a standard product definition, set of key words, naming
conventions, metadata standard fields and business rules.
|
|
Analyse and produce
|
-
Training standards, competencies, common product definitions,
common terminology and key words, liaison with ANZPAA which is developing
Education and Training Guidelines for Police Intelligence. Establishment of
national training standards and competencies which are expected to guarantee
that analysts have the skill sets required to provide accurate and
justifiable intelligence.[27]
|
|
Report and disseminate
|
-
Legislative issues for information sharing.
|
|
Evaluate and review
|
All strategic objectives to examine lessons learned and
methodologies to measure the value of intelligence. This will provide additional
checks and balances for the accuracy of data, information and intelligence on
the system.[28]
|
Source: Australian Crime Commission,
Answers to written questions on notice, No. 4 and No. 6, received 28 March
2013.
Identified challenges
5.20
Noting that the model's basic strategy and structure are in place, Mr
Lawler informed the committee that the model as it currently stands is a concept
agreed on paper which needs practical implementation.[29]
5.21
The previous chapter provided some insight into the numerous challenges
before the ACC and stakeholder partners in developing the model. Mr Lawler
explained that the model would have to address matters at the highest level to
ensure that 'the infrastructure underpinning intelligence processes is
recognised and agreed to by everybody' to the lowest and most basic level of
establishing a universal understanding of 'how you describe the intelligence
cycle'.[30]
Given the complexities involved, development of the model is expected to take
several years. Mr McDevitt commented that this is a considerable task and he recalled
the difficulties in establishing a national DNA database which is, by
comparison, 'simply a very small slice of intelligence'.[31]
5.22
The ACC identified a number of key challenges in relation to criminal intelligence
which the proposed model could address. While promoting recognition of criminal
intelligence as a national asset—something that is collected once and used
often for the benefit of many and therefore adds value to the decision-making
process—the challenges to establishing a national holding identified by the ACC
include:
(a) securing
national agreement and commitment to secure the free flow of all criminal
intelligence as identified in the ACIM;
(b) establishing a
culture whereby security requirements are balanced and information generated
and held by individual jurisdictions and the Commonwealth is shared as a
national asset;
(c) providing the
appropriate technology, policy and legislation to support the sharing of
intelligence between agencies across the three domains of national security,
serious and organised crime, and policing and community safety; and
(d) greater
recognition of the transnational and borderless nature of contemporary
organised crime.
5.23
The three critical success factors which will determine whether these
challenges are met include:
- a policy and legislative framework to facilitate information
sharing;
-
improved technical capabilities; and
- a culture of national intelligence sharing.[32]
5.24
This chapter considers each of these challenges and their components,
current discussions in relation to them and progress made towards addressing
them.
Securing the free flow of all criminal intelligence
5.25
The ACC argued that addressing the various challenges to the collection,
use and sharing of intelligence will require changes to the way in which stakeholders
view criminal intelligence and how they go about collecting, collating,
analysing, producing, disseminating and sharing it. According to the ACC, the
proposed solution to these varied challenges is the ACIM and supporting strategy.
The ACC argued that the model meets the requirements of OCSF capability 1.3 to provide
clarity and consistency of standards, processes and protocols for intelligence-led
policing and law enforcement work to enhance the national picture of organised
crime. Further:
The Model and Strategy support management of criminal
intelligence more holistically through collaborative use of best practices,
standards and competencies, technology, committees and forums (culture), and
policy and legislation initiatives to empower information sharing and enhance
criminal intelligence capabilities at all levels of law enforcement (including
policy and regulatory agencies) in Australia.[33]
5.26
In relation to the evolution of the model and supporting strategy, the
ATO noted that as the strategy is still under development, 'the full
identification of impediments and opportunities to maximise the usefulness of
criminal intelligence are, at this time, yet to be fully realised'.[34]
However, some important steps have already been taken. The 17 involved agencies
have agreed that all their intelligence products be subject to a universal
classification system and put into broad categories of strategic, operational
and tactical products. To underpin this agreement, common templates and common
language will be used to describe the products. As part of this important step
towards establishing common arrangements, the agencies have agreed to:
...create a place where we can actually put those products, or
at least put metadata relating to those products, so that we can each search on
the collective repository of intelligence that actually resides there.[35]
Request for Information capability
5.27
Efforts are also underway to establish a national Request for
Information (RFI) capability which was identified by witnesses to the inquiry
as a fundamental requirement. Under the current system, information regarding
criminal histories and warnings regarding persons of interests for operational
police are delivered through the CrimTrac National Police Reference System
(NPRS). The ACC argued that while the NPRS provides 'accurate and timely
information to operational police which greatly assists in ensuring officer
safety', the RFI capability is a 'more complex capability aimed at streamlining
the sharing of value-added intelligence products'.[36]
Furthermore, currently, agencies develop their own questions and then send them
to the relevant agency for a response. Under the proposed RFI arrangements, an
agency will be able to send their questions to multiple agencies and the
information generated through the question and answer process will be accessible
to all agencies. Mr McDevitt explained:
The problem for us as a collective is that the questions
asked are not retained, and neither are the answers that are given. So what we
are doing is creating a lot of movement and activity, and intelligence and
information is moving between agencies, which is a good thing, but it is
happening in a very inefficient way. We do not have the re-usability factor
that we are after. We want intelligence and information to be collected once
and then utilised often for multiple purposes.[37]
A culture of national intelligence
5.28
Culture is one of the key areas of focus under the model. The ACC argue
that the agreement of 17 agencies to develop a national criminal model to
achieve a freer flow of intelligence across and between agencies and domains is
a 'big step forwards in terms of culture'.[38]
5.29
The strategy is directed at producing an accurate picture of criminality
in Australia through 'cultural norms to instil a collaborative attitude which
ensures sharing is business as usual'.[39]
One of the primary cultural shifts required to achieve this strategy will be
for agencies to view intelligence as a national asset rather than belonging to
a single agency. Mr McDevitt noted that the model would not get far if,
despite potentially having the 'best automated technologies around', agencies
made a decision not to contribute.[40]
5.30
Mr McDevitt also emphasised that a culture currently exists whereby the principle
of the 'need-to-know' overrides any sort of principle of a 'responsibility to
provide' intelligence. This culture has contributed to a situation in which the
bulk of what is currently shared is transactional-type data and information. He
explained that:
It might be information on things like criminal history,
missing persons or people who are wanted on warrants, which is very
transactional data that moves around.[41]
5.31
Notwithstanding this reality, Mr McDevitt recognised that the cultural
trends in relation to intelligence sharing are fluid:
We are seeing a shift on that scale now and an
acknowledgement of the fact that we actually do need to move more closely
towards a responsibility to provide criminal intelligence so that the right
agencies and the right individuals have the right intelligence in front of them
at a particular point in time. We saw this as an issue that has come out
inquiry after inquiry, including the 9/11 Commission of Inquiry. You see that
snippets or pieces of intelligence, if brought together, would have given
decision makers an advantage that they did not otherwise possess because the
intelligence tended to be siloed.[42]
Appropriate technology, policy and legislation
5.32
The model's management strategy recognises the need for policy and
legislation to 'underpin effective powers and processes for agencies to quickly
and effectively collect, analyse and share relevant intelligence'.[43]
Technology
5.33
Technology is recognised as one of the key elements underpinning the
model. A number of initiatives have been undertaken to understand existing and
required technologies.
ACID and ALEIN Scoping Study
5.34
A Proceeds of Crime funded scoping study was initiated in 2010 to
examine further options for the provision of ACID and ALEIN capabilities. As
part of the scoping study, the ACC is exploring the technology requirements for
a criminal intelligence database which will inform the model's development. Matters
including interoperability with existing capabilities, connectivity between
agencies' databases and the technologies required to exploit data on current
systems are some of the issues under consideration. Mr McDevitt noted that
there were three requirements in relation to technology:
...we want to be able to enrich the data that we have and
exploit it, we want to be able to add value to it, and we want to be able to
generate new leads and opportunities out of the data. We also want to be able
to have some sort of monitoring and alerting capability.[44]
5.35
Mr McDevitt recognised the diversity of approaches on the part of
participating agencies which apply different technology and use different
databases for intelligence purposes. He went on to comment that the Tasmania
Police made a policy decision to use ACID as its primary database for
collecting and analysing criminal intelligence rather than establish a separate
intelligence database. As noted in the previous chapter, other states and
territories have different approaches to criminal intelligence and different
systems for capturing, storing and sharing it which is reflected in the volume
of information and intelligence passed on to ACID. Mr McDevitt explained:
So they [Tasmania] would contribute everything, nationally,
whereas other jurisdictions and other agencies have already established
databases of their own that they tend to utilise, and they make their own
decisions about what they might choose to upload from their own databases into
the national holdings.[45]
5.36
Similarly, at the time the national DNA database was established, a
number of police jurisdictions maintained their own DNA databases. However, Mr
McDevitt informed the committee that the stage has been reached now where:
...almost all police services have recognised that the best
benefit—the best bang for the buck financially and otherwise—is to have a
single national repository that they all contribute to.[46]
5.37
A report on the final scoping study is expected by the end of June 2013
with the implementation of any recommendations subject to funding availability.[47]
National Information and
Intelligence Needs Analysis
5.38
Alongside the ACID and ALEIN scoping study, a National Information and
Intelligence Needs Analysis (NIINA) was undertaken by the ACC, National
Counter-Terrorism Committee's Intelligence and Information Management System
Working Group and CrimTrac. The NIINA agencies consulted over 200 practitioners
about their needs and examined the intelligence systems used by each agency.
5.39
In addition to these initiatives, the AFP's Spectrum Program is under
assessment in light of ACIM user requirements.[48]
As part of the Spectrum Program, the AFP is reviewing the information
technology requirements and business processes to enhance its intelligence and
case management capability. Through the program, the AFP is developing
interoperable systems to facilitate secure information sharing with partner
agencies.[49]
5.40
Mr McDevitt noted that while the phases of the model have already been agreed
upon, 'we require smart technologies to be able to collect and collate the
masses of information and data that we are actually dealing with'. In addition,
smart technical tools are also required to ensure that the intelligence
captured can be fully exploited.[50]
5.41
In relation to the storage of information and intelligence under the
model, Mr McDevitt informed the committee that:
What is being proposed under this model is not so much to
look specifically at any existing database or system but more to design,
develop and implement the technologies that are required at each stage of the
model. So, for collection and collation, for example: what automated collation
abilities do we need, what connectivity to what existing systems and databases
do we need to actually be able to collect automatically where possible that
intelligence and information? You then go on to the analysis and production,
and that is about smart analytical tools.[51]
5.42
The system should enable the police officer on the street to access a database
to upload information onto it as well as withdraw information from it without
having to enter data into multiple databases. The challenge is to draw on
emerging technology as well as technology currently in use. One example of technology
currently in use is a default on intelligence databases. The NSW Police, for example,
have set up such a default on their systems in order that data uploaded on
their system will automatically upload onto ACID.[52]
5.43
The committee understands that there are a number of initiatives
underway to consider the information technology requirements of the ACIM including
the ACID/ALEIN scoping study and review of the AFP's Spectrum Program. The
committee recommends that the ACC provide it with a detailed report on the
findings and recommendations of these respective studies and how they will
inform the development of a national criminal intelligence repository.
Recommendation 1
5.44
The committee recommends that the Australian Crime Commission and the Australian
Federal Police provide it with a detailed report on the findings and
recommendations of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Database (ACID) and Australian
Law Enforcement Intelligence Network (ALEIN) scoping study, National Information
and Intelligence Needs Analysis, and assessment of the AFP's Project Spectrum. The
report should provide details on:
- the recommendations regarding ACID and ALEIN and how they will
be implemented including a timeframe;
- the outcome of the National Information and Intelligence Needs
Analysis;
- the assessment of the AFP's Spectrum Program; and
- how the recommendations of each respective review and
assessment will inform the development of the Australian Criminal Intelligence
Model and maximise interoperability between existing databases and systems.
Recommendation 2
5.45
The committee recommends that the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) as
the lead agency on criminal intelligence and the Australian Criminal
Intelligence Model (ACIM) provide it with a report on how the ACC will ensure
that all current information technology systems are fully utilised and
accessible under the ACIM.
Legislation
5.46
One of the primary challenges to a national criminal intelligence model
is the complex legislation at state, territory and Commonwealth level whereby
negotiation with the different, overlapping and multiple legislative regimes is
required to get intelligence in and out.[53]
Another key matter is that of intelligence obtained under different regimes and
powers. There are strict rules concerning intelligence gleaned from coercive
hearings while different regimes exist in relation to intelligence obtained
from telephone intercepts or other electronic surveillance. Mr McDevitt
described the current situation as one in which:
...you get a very rich picture in the middle, but it is
extremely difficult to share that because of the rules that are attached to
each piece of intelligence that comes in to make up that picture.[54]
5.47
Mr Lawler also noted the complexities in addressing legislative barriers
and obstacles at the Commonwealth, state and territory levels. He informed the
committee in September 2012 that while the model was at that time about to be
presented to the Standing Council on Police and Emergency Management (SCPEM),
the legislative requirements themselves in relation to implementing the model
were anything but clear:
There is a question, even, about whether police ministers
have the jurisdictional authority to commit to such a significant endeavour and
whether there is a compact of some other nature that is required here to ensure
that what the board of the Australian Crime Commission, and its 15 representatives,
believe to be in the national interest, is actually set on very solid
foundations.[55]
5.48
However, in response to a written question on notice, the ACC clarified
that formal endorsement by the SCPEM and ACC Board resolved the issue of
authority to commit. The ACC further noted that while agencies have already
committed to the ACIM, any uncertainty that emerges is in relation to
'compatibility of legislative frameworks that govern agency ability to share'. The
dynamics are such that:
- No single agency has authority over all of the multiple legislative
frameworks.
- States and territories must comply with their own jurisdiction's
legislative framework and they only have authority over their own jurisdiction.
- Commonwealth agencies must comply with a different set of Commonwealth
legislative frameworks.
5.49
In light of these dynamics, the challenge for the ACIM becomes how to
coordinate the legislative requirements of each framework to align and
facilitate a freer flow of intelligence and information among agencies.[56]
5.50
Mr Lawler commented that the legislative challenges are multifaceted and
that many such challenges originate with the ACC itself:
Some of the legislative challenges actually start within the
commission itself and some of the legislative challenges have a very sound
basis. Of course, the commission in the exercise of its powers—we have very
intrusive powers that have been entrusted to us by parliament—has constraints
on whom that information can be shared with. There are very strict legislative
arrangements in place. I would like to give the committee, if I could, a sense
of the legislative constraint within the commission itself.
I am not saying that this is inappropriate constraint; I am
just saying that this is the totality. [The ACC has]... a 21-page draft
disclosure checklist, which is a checklist in relation to the fact that each
piece of information that leaves the commission has to be completed and signed
off. It takes into account the multitude of various acts and provisions that
have to be considered and what the implications of those provisions are before
information can be disseminated to our partner agencies.[57]
5.51
The disclosure checklist is designed to identify the point of origin of
information that is received by the ACC and to ensure adherence to any laws
around that information. This process becomes complex when that information
contributes to a package that is disseminated by the ACC to other agencies.[58]
5.52
The legislative requirements of contributing agencies will determine
what is shared and how it can be shared. Data is also held by the ACC and can
be used by other agencies under the ACC's legislation. As the ability to share
intelligence differs according to legislative requirements relating to each
partner agency, the challenge for the model will be to ensure that all agencies
have equal rights to access information generated under the model. The ACC's Mrs
Harfield explained:
That is why it is not necessarily about putting all the
information into one place, where everybody has equal rights of access, but
making sure that you construct your architecture so that it deals with all
those nuances. Over time, you might then decide that you want to deal with the
differences from a legislative perspective so that you have some
standardisation, but you would not necessarily have to do that at the
beginning...It would not make it an open-ended opportunity for anybody to access
any information: all the protocols around rights of access, levels of
classification of the material—and we deal with those issues all the time now.[59]
5.53
The ACIF report and dissemination subgroup has collected information
regarding agency legislative requirements as they relate to sharing data,
information and intelligence. It will examine these legislative requirements
with a view to reconciling the various legislative requirements and to identify
possible solutions to enable the freer flow of intelligence and information.[60]
Policy
5.54
It was noted by the ACC that one of the most critical moments in
relation to the development of the model was the agreement reached on the part
of all 17 agencies to contribute intelligence and factual data. The ACC
commented that the collective contribution of raw data alone from the 17
agencies without any analysis of it would 'probably give us a richer picture
than what we had' about an entity.[61]
To this extent, data and information will be contributed to the centre for
utilisation by respective agencies. In addition:
Where possible, agencies like the Australian Crime Commission
try to add value to the contributions that are brought in from multiple
sources, analyse that and subsequently develop products that can be shared. As
an example of an agreement on what we are going to share, the Australian
Criminal Intelligence Forum has now agreed that all agencies will put all of
their strategic products into the middle.[62]
5.55
Mr McDevitt informed the committee that most of the participating
agencies have their own strategic products such as environmental scans and
criminal analysis of particular themes which they have agreed to contribute
under the model to enable agencies to search against that information.[63]
5.56
The ACC argued that the ACIM and its strategy are the first steps
towards the development of a universal methodology for criminal intelligence.
Within these key documents, the NTS has been implemented, an intelligence cycle
which represents a standard methodology for analysis of criminal intelligence
has been agreed to and ACIM principles underpin criteria for how criminal
intelligence should be treated across agencies. Furthermore, the ACC argued
that:
The agreed ACIM strategic objectives (once all actioned) will
provide rules for regulating how intelligence is managed.[64]
Dealing with transnational and borderless contemporary organised crime
5.57
The current intelligence landscape comprises state, territory and
federal law enforcement agencies (including policy and regulatory agencies)
which operate within and across three intersecting domains—national security,
serious and organised crime, and policing and community safety. Criminal
intelligence, as the linkage between the three domains underpins an ability to understand
these complex criminal environments and to identify threats, determine
priorities and develop preventive response strategies.[65]
5.58
Mrs Harfield explained the rational for drawing in the three domains
under the model:
Crime is linked through those domains in a way that means
that information is separate, even though those paths move in parallel, means
that there are gaps. It is about how you can make the relevant things
accessible to the relevant people based on the intel questions that they need
answered, even if they do not necessarily recognise them as intelligence
questions. They might describe them in some other way as information or data,
but actually it adds to an intelligence picture for people that they can then
use in a practical circumstance.[66]
5.59
The ACC's submission emphasised the need for 'increased sharing with the
ACC and its partners (including those offshore) of intelligence regarding
foreign criminal groups, individuals and non-state actors that impact on
Australia'.[67]
Dr David Lacey, ACC Executive Director, People, Business Support and
Stakeholder Relations, further clarified that:
One of the key mitigating strategies in looking at finding
common points of interface of information and intelligence for all to benefit
from is to mitigate the prospect that there might be an alleged criminal act in
one state while another enforcement agency may have pertinent information that
connects critical pieces of information, intelligence and evidence. Without
having that national nexus point, the risk of not joining dots is significantly
great. That is also a critical component of having the strategy in place—to
risk-mitigate that prospect. We have a violence and sexual offending
information repository that seeks to serve that purpose where perpetrators
cross borders. And key information and intelligence is available for others who
are part of that particular networking system to connect to.[68]
National Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability
5.60
Mrs Harfield drew a parallel between the Fusion capability and the ACIM in
terms of vision and operability rather than scale. She noted that Fusion
contained an alerting and monitoring capability which could be targeted at
specific groups, individuals, network or targets. This capability is
complemented by an ability to search across data and collect information from
agencies that will then 'build an automated pattern for you that will trigger
alerts'.[69]
Therefore:
... if you have a particular issue that a partner organisation
wants to look at, we can construct through the data architecture a way to automatically
trigger an alert against that issue when you see it. That might be a piece of
information about how somebody is managing a particular aspect of their
finances, for example.[70]
5.61
The model recognises the importance of drawing on Fusion and other technical
analysis capabilities under its seventh strategic objective. The objective
notes the importance of assessing opportunities and deploying technologies to
'better exploit federated technologies to collect, collate and share
intelligence across domains'.[71]
Supporting initiatives
5.62
The ACC lists five key initiatives that go to the national interest of
which the ACIM is the first. Others include an upgrade of ACID which the ACC
recognised as:
...essential in order to ensure it is capable of maintaining
and exploiting national criminal intelligence holdings as envisaged in the ACC
Act, noting that resources will be required to realise such an upgrade.[72]
5.63
ACID and ALEIN, as well as other databases and networks including the
child sex offenders register, DNA database and the National Police Reference
System database of persons of interest will remain separate resources to the
model database.[73]
ACID is used in relation to serious and organised crime whereas the model
impacts on a wider range of criminality across different domains.
5.64
Mr McDevitt explained that accessibility was another reason for this
decision. He emphasised that interoperability between databases and systems and
accessibility to them was more important than providing a single repository of
intelligence:
Under this model you may have something whereby, for example,
some of the discussions we have had have been where I go onto a factually based
data set like the National Police Reference System and I look up the name Ben
McDevitt. If it is there, I will see the factual data, I will see the link to
the fingerprint database that I can then follow to the fingerprint database. I
can see that DNA has been taken and that can be linked back to where the DNA
identifying information is held. And I can perhaps see a link to ACID or
another intelligence database that is held by the ACC. So the information
intelligence does not have to be in one repository; in fact there is good
reason for it not to be. I think the key is accessibility to it for those who
have good reason to need to be able to see it.[74]
5.65
Other key initiatives include the establishment of an administrative
accountability mechanism. Legislative change can remove barriers to sharing of
intelligence, particularly to those agencies that can help deliver long-term
prevention outcomes. However, administrative mechanisms must also be
established to ensure that high levels of accountability are imposed upon
agencies which contribute intelligence to the national holdings.[75]
Stakeholder views
5.66
Notwithstanding the fact that most stakeholders before the committee are
represented on the ACC Board and have endorsed the proposed model in its
current largely undeveloped state, some placed qualifications on that support. Acting
Deputy Commissioner Hudson of the NSW Police Force informed the committee that
there would be widespread support for the ACIM if it is able to establish some
consistency in relation to what is captured, how it is treated and delivered to
a central depository as well as how that intelligence is then utilised.[76]
5.67
Other police jurisdictions including the Queensland Police Service and
Victoria Police were concerned as to how to balance their own priorities in
relation to volume crime with that of organised crime.[77]
Acting Deputy Commissioner Pope of the Victoria Police emphasised that while
his police force was committed to national consistency in relation to criminal
intelligence and considered organised crime to be a priority (for which a
significant part of its intelligence capability had been committed) the reality
is that volume crime is the most significant issue before the Victoria Police.[78]
These and other concerns raised by law enforcement stakeholders as well as the ACC's
response to them are the subject of the following chapter.
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page
Top
|