- Introduction
- On 30 July 2025, the Attorney-General, the Hon. Michelle Rowland MP, introduced the Strengthening Oversight of the National Intelligence Community Bill 2025 (the Bill) into the House of Representatives. The Attorney-General subsequently wrote to the Committee on 26 August 2025 referring the Bill for inquiry and report.
Purpose of the Bill
1.2On introducing the Bill, the Attorney-General explained that it is ‘critical’ that the powers entrusted to national security agencies to detect, disrupt and respond to threats are ‘balanced with the necessary oversight to ensure that public trust is maintained and the rule of law is upheld’. While the Attorney-General characterised the current regime as ‘strong’, she emphasised that ‘as the national intelligence community evolves to meet the complex and dynamic security challenges it faces, the oversight framework must move with it’.
1.3The Bill amends the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act), the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (IS Act) and other legislation to expand the jurisdiction of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) and this Committee to include oversight of:
- the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC); and
- the intelligence functions of:
- the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC);
- the Australian Federal Police (AFP); and
- the Department of Home Affairs.
- The Bill also includes:
- provision for the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) to review proposed reforms to counter-terrorism and national security legislation, and all such expiring legislation, on its own motion
- provision for the PJCIS to request the IGIS to conduct an inquiry into certain operational activities of intelligence agencies within its purview
- clarification of the provision allowing the PJCIS to request a briefing from the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM)
- provision for the IGIS and the Office of National Intelligence (ONI) to provide an annual briefing to the PJCIS
- a broadening of the own-motion review remit of the INSLM.
Bill structure
1.5Schedule 1, Part 1 contains the main amendments proposed by the Bill which comprise amendments to the IGIS Act, the IS Act, the Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Act 2010 to give effect to the enhanced oversight of the National Intelligence Community (NIC).
1.6Schedule 1, Part 2 makes amendments consequential to Part 1 to provide for necessary information disclosure to the IGIS, and to address overlapping jurisdiction between the IGIS and other bodies.
1.7Schedule 2 contains provisions to amend the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 in relation to reviews of access to ACIC criminal intelligence assessment records.
1.8Schedule 3 contains provisions to amend the Criminal Code Act 1995 to include exemptions from civil and criminal liability for defence officials (and others) for certain computer-related conduct.
1.9Schedule 4 contains amendments to the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 to broaden the INSLM’s own-motion review powers and to streamline and consolidate the INSLM’s reporting functions.
Conduct of the inquiry
1.10Most provisions of Schedules 1 to 3 are identical, or very similar, to those previously contained in the Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Bill 2023 (ISLAB), which was before the House of Representatives and under review by the Committee before it lapsed on dissolution of the 47th Parliament. In conducting its review of the current Bill, the Committee considered the evidence and submissions received by the previous Committee during its review of ISLAB in the 47thParliament. Evidence received in relation to both Bills is cited in this report.
1.11The Committee announced this inquiry on 27 August 2025 and invited further submissions addressing the new or amended elements of the Bill to be provided by 25 September 2025.
1.12In addition to the 10 submissions and 6 supplementary submissions received to the review of ISLAB, the Committee received 6 new submissions and one new supplementary submission. Appendix A sets out a list of submissions received.
1.13In addition to the public hearing on ISLAB held on 12 December 2023, the Committee held a public hearing on 2 October 2025. Appendix B sets out a list of witnesses who appeared at the public hearings.
1.14Copies of the submissions, the transcript from the public hearing and links to the Bill and Explanatory Memorandum can be accessed from the Committee’s website.
Report structure
1.15This report comprises five chapters:
- The remainder of Chapter 1 contains a discussion of the independent reviews that gave rise to the Bill.
- Chapter 2 outlines the provisions of the Bill, and the evidence received by the Committee, relating to the functions and powers of the IGIS, the PJCIS and the INSLM.
- Chapter 3 addresses the provisions of the Bill concerning the operation of the PJCIS, and evidence received in relation to them.
- Chapter 4 outlines the remaining provisions of the Bill and evidence received about them.
- Chapter 5 sets out the Committee’s comments on the Bill and its recommendations.
History of intelligence oversight reviews
1.16Intelligence oversight has developed in Australia largely through the conduct of various Royal Commissions and independent intelligence reviews since the 1970s. The establishment of an IGIS was recommended in 1984 by the second of two Royal Commissions undertaken by Justice Robert Hope. This recommendation was implemented through the IGIS Act, which gave the IGIS oversight of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and Defence Signals Directorate (DSD; now Australian Signals Directorate, ASD); and a more limited oversight role in relation to the Office of National Assessments (ONA; now the Office of National Intelligence, ONI) and the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO; now the Defence Intelligence Organisation, DIO).
1.17While Hope recommended against the establishment of a parliamentary committee to inquire into the activities of the intelligence agencies—considering that the responsible Minister, supported by IGIS oversight, would be sufficiently accountable to the Parliament—the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO was established by legislation in 1986, and the first committee formed in 1988. The Committee functioned by receiving referrals from a Minister or a House of Parliament to conduct inquiries relating to ASIO.
1.18The passage of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 expanded the Committee’s oversight to include ASIS and DSD. This followed the 1995 recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into ASIS conducted by the Hon. Gordon Samuels AC QC and Michael Codd AC, and subsequent amendments made during the parliamentary review process.
1.19The 2004 Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies, conducted by Mr Philip Flood AO, (‘Flood Review’) recommended that the respective responsibilities of the IGIS and the Parliamentary Joint Committee be expanded so that both would cover all six agencies which at that time formed the Australian intelligence community: ASIO, ASIS, DSD, ONA, DIO and the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO, now the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation, AGO).
1.20The Flood Review also recommended the expansion of the ‘own motion’ powers of the IGIS to apply to all agencies under its oversight.
1.21These recommendations were implemented, resulting in the formation of the PJCIS as it now exists and putting in place the oversight responsibilities of both the PJCIS and the IGIS as they have largely continued to date.
1.22No further significant recommendations to amend intelligence oversight were made until the Independent Intelligence Review in 2017 (2017 IIR). The 2017 IIR considered the functions of the six ‘core’ Australian intelligence agencies and their engagement and relationship with a broader group of agencies—the AFP, Department of Immigration and Border Protection (now the Department of Home Affairs), ACIC and AUSTRAC—which along with the original six, constitute the group now known as the NIC.
1.23While one of the key outcomes of the 2017 IIR was the establishment of ONI, replacing ONA and taking on new responsibilities for coordination of the NIC, the IIR also recommended that the oversight functions of the IGIS and the PJCIS be expanded to include the whole of the NIC, with each NIC agency to be overseen by these bodies in whole or in part.
1.24Further recommendations were made two years later by the Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community (Comprehensive Review) undertaken by Mr Dennis Richardson, which concluded in 2019 and published its report in 2020. That review was silent in relation to whether the oversight responsibilities of the PJCIS should be expanded to include the entirety of the NIC, either in whole or part. However, in contrast to the findings of the 2017 IIR, the Review recommended that the IGIS should not have operational oversight of the intelligence functions of the AFP or the Department of Home Affairs.
1.25Meanwhile, the Surveillance Legislation (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021 expanded IGIS’ oversight powers to include the use of network activity warrants by the ACIC and the AFP; and the PJCIS has had authority to review specific counter-terrorism related functions of the AFP since 2014.
1.26The Intelligence Oversight and Other Legislation Amendment (Integrity Measures) Bill 2020 (Integrity Measures Bill) proposed to expand the Committee’s jurisdiction to include the intelligence functions of AUSTRAC and the IGIS’s jurisdiction to include the intelligence functions of the ACIC and AUSTRAC. However, the Integrity Measures Bill lapsed at the end of the 46th Parliament following a review by this Committee.
1.27The ISLAB, which was introduced into the House of Representatives on 22 June 2023, proposed to give full effect to the recommendations of the 2017 IIR in relation to expanded IGIS and PJCIS oversight of the NIC. The Committee commenced a review of ISLAB and received evidence from a range of submitters and witnesses. However, that Bill too lapsed, at the end of the 47th Parliament.
1.28The 2024 Independent Intelligence Review (2024 IIR) noted the differing approaches proposed by the previous reviews in 2017 and 2019 and both the benefits and complexities of the approach taken by ISLAB. The 2024 IIR was finalised while ISLAB was still before Parliament and the Committee, and did not make any new recommendations concerning the extent to which the oversight jurisdiction of the IGIS and the PJCIS should be expanded. However, it did recommend that the next independent review of the intelligence community should, subject to Parliament’s consideration of relevant legislation, consider the effectiveness of the expanded jurisdiction. The 2024 IIR also recommended that the remit of the INSLM be expanded to ensure the INSLM is able to conduct own-motion inquiries into any Commonwealth legislation relating to counterterrorism or national security, rather than being limited to the current defined list of specific terrorism-related laws.
1.29Like ISLAB, the current Bill proposes to give full effect to the recommendations of the 2017 IIR in relation to the oversight jurisdictions of the IGIS and the Committee. The Bill additionally implements the 2024 IIR recommendation to expand the own-motion remit of the INSLM.