1. Listing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
   1. This review of the listing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a state sponsor of terrorism is conducted under section 110.7 of the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (the Criminal Code). That section provides that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (the Committee) may review regulations specifying an entity as a state sponsor of terrorism and report the Committee’s comments and recommendations to each House of the Parliament.
   2. On 27 November 2025, regulations to list the IRGC as a state sponsor of terrorism under Part 5.3A of the Criminal Code were signed by the Governor-General. The regulations were lodged on the Federal Register of Legislation and came into effect on 28 November 2025.
   3. The regulations were tabled in the House of Representatives and the Senate on 19January 2026.
   4. This is the first time an entity has been specified as a state sponsor of terrorism following the introduction of Part 5.3A of the Criminal Code and its commencement on 8 November 2025.
   5. This report consists of a single chapter outlining the conduct of the review, an overview of the listing regime and the reasons given for the listing of the IRGC, a summary of evidence received from stakeholders, and the Committee’s comments and overall conclusion.

Conduct of the review

1.6On 2 December 2025, the Minister for Home Affairs, Hon Tony Burke MP, wrote to the Committee to advise of the listing. The letter included a copy of the relevant regulations; an explanatory statement incorporating a Statement of Reasons for the listing; and a description of the process followed for the listing. The Committee accepted the letter as Submission 1 to this review.

1.7On 4 December 2025, the Minister advised that, in accordance with clause 20 of Schedule 1 to the Intelligence Services Act 2001, he had sought and received the approval of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, and the Minister for Home Affairs to enable the Committee, to the extent possible, to conduct its review in public.

1.8The Committee commenced its review on 5 December 2025 and publicly invited submissions on its website and via media release.

1.9The Committee received 180 submissions to the review, including 48 confidential submissions, 99 for which the submitter requested that their name be withheld from publication, and 3 supplementary submissions. A list of submissions received is provided at Appendix A.

1.10The Committee held a public hearing for the review on 26 February 2026. A list of witnesses appearing at the public hearing is provided at Appendix B.

State sponsor of terrorism listings under the Criminal Code

1.11Section 110.3 of the Criminal Code provides for the Governor-General to specify an entity, by regulations, as a state sponsor of terrorism where the Minister responsible for the Australian Federal Police (the AFP Minister) is satisfied on reasonable grounds that:

1. the entity is a foreign state entity; and
2. the entity or a member of the entity:

1. has directly or indirectly engaged in, prepared, planned, assisted in or fostered the doing of a terrorist act that was targeted at Australia; or
2. has advocated the doing of a terrorist act that was targeted at Australia.[1]
   12. In considering an entity for listing, the AFP Minister may consider any relevant material which addresses these legislative criteria. An unclassified Statement of Reasons, based on unclassified, open-source information, is made publicly available. The Statement of Reasons may be supplemented by classified intelligence assessments provided to the AFP Minister by relevant agencies.[2]
   13. A key effect of regulations listing an entity as a state sponsor of terrorism is to trigger the application of a range of criminal offences in Part 5.3A of the Criminal Code (Divisions 111 to 113). These include offences for:

• engaging in state terrorist acts (section 111.2)
• providing or receiving training connected with state terrorist acts (section 111.3)
• possessing things connected with state terrorist acts (section 111.4)
• collecting or making documents likely to facilitate state terrorist acts (section111.5)
• other acts done in preparation for, or planning, state terrorist acts (section 111.6)
• providing or receiving training connected with terrorist acts (section 111.7)
• possessing things connected with terrorist acts (section 111.8)
• collecting or making documents likely to facilitate terrorist acts (section 111.9)
• other acts done in preparation for, or planning, terrorist acts (section 111.10)
• directing the activities of a state sponsor of terrorism (section 112.1)
• membership of a state sponsor of terrorism (section 112.2)
• recruiting for a state sponsor of terrorism (section 112.3)
• training involving a state sponsor of terrorism (section 112.4)
• getting funds to, from or for a state sponsor of terrorism (section 112.5)
• providing support to a state sponsor of terrorism (section 112.6)
• associating with a state sponsor of terrorism (section 112.7)
• financing state terrorist act targeted at Australia (section 113.1)
• financing person involved in state terrorist act targeted at Australia (section 113.2).
  14. These offences largely replicate offences in Divisions 101 to 103 of the Criminal Code in relation to terrorist acts, terrorist organisations and financing terrorism.
  15. Similarly to terrorist organisations, the public display of symbols used by a state sponsor of terrorism to identify itself is prohibited.[3] A non-citizen’s membership of or association with a state sponsor of terrorism forms part of the ‘character test’ in the Migration Act 1958, potentially resulting in the Minister’s refusal or cancellation of the non-citizen’s Australian visa.[4] Under the Australian Citizenship Act 2007, if dual citizen is convicted of a serious offence under Part 5.3A of the Criminal Code in relation to a state sponsor of terrorism, a court may order that the person’s Australian citizenship be revoked.[5]
  16. Regulations listing state sponsors of terrorism are exempted from the ten-year sunsetting provisions that otherwise apply to all legislative instruments. As a result, regulations listing state sponsors or terrorism under the Criminal Code do not expire. Entities can only be de-listed by a Ministerial declaration under section 110.5.
  17. The Department of Home Affairs’ description of the full process undertaken for the listing of the IRGC is provided in Submission 1.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

1.18The IRGC was established in 1979 by decree of former Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini, following the Iranian Revolution. Its core goal and mission is to ‘protect Iran’s Islamic Revolution and its achievements’ and to ‘struggle with agents and currents which aim to sabotage or destroy the Islamic’.[6]

1.19The Statement of Reasons describes the IRGC is a ‘hybrid military-security institution’. The IRGC maintains its own armed forces, mirroring the structure of Iran’s conventional armed forces, but operating independently and reporting directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[7]

1.20Key elements of the IRGC include the Quds Force, which operates as a de facto external affairs branch and conducts military campaigns abroad and asymmetric operations against Iran’s enemies abroad, and the Basij Resistance Force, which is a paramilitary volunteer militia combatting internal dissent and protests within Iran. The IRGC also hosts ground, aerospace and naval forces, an intelligence organisation and a counter-intelligence organisation.[8]

1.21The IRGC is estimated to have more than 190,000 personnel under its command, around half of which are conscripts. The Quds Force maintains between 5,000 and 15,000 personnel, and the Basij Resistance Force claims to be able to mobilise around 600,000 volunteers.[9]

Legislative criteria for listing

1.22The Australian Government assesses that the IRGC is a foreign state entity, and that the entity or a member of the entity has directly or indirectly engaged in, prepared, planned, assisted in or fostered the doing of a terrorist act that was targeted at Australia.[10]

1.23Section 110.1 of the Criminal Code defines ‘foreign state entity’ as

1. the government of a foreign country or of part of a foreign country;

2. an authority of the government of a foreign country;
3. an authority of the government of part of a foreign country;
4. a foreign local government body or foreign regional government body;
5. an entity prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph.
   24. As the Statement of Reasons sets out, the IRGC is under the control of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and receives a significant share of Iran’s budget. In 2025, this consisted of more than twice the budget allocation of Iran’s conventional armed forces.[11] The IRGC is also deeply embedded in Iran’s broader economy, with between one and two thirds of Iran’s Gross Domestic Product estimated to be controlled by the IRGC.[12]
   25. In 2025, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) assessed that the IRGC as responsible for directing, assisting in and fostering the doing of at least two attacks in Australia. These included:

• On 20 October 2024, an arson attack was conducted on the Lewis’ Continental Kitchen in Sydney, Australia. An assailant broke into the Lewis’ Continental Kitchen at approximately 2:30am and used petrol to set fire to the kitchen. No one was injured in the attack which is estimated to have caused $1million AUD in damage.
• On 6 December 2024, an arson attack was conducted at the Orthodox Addas Israel Synagogue in Melbourne, Australia. Two masked individuals were witnessed spreading accelerant at the synagogue, where people were inside for morning prayer, before the fire. At least one person was injured and the fire caused extensive property damage.[13]
  26. The attacks took place in the midst of a wave of incidents between October 2024 and February 2025 in which Jewish religious institutions, and businesses, residences and vehicles linked to Jewish individuals, were targets of arson and/or vandalism across Australia, particularly in Sydney and Melbourne.[14]
  27. ASIO assessed that these attacks were fostered by the IRGC through a complex scheme of proxies, in an attempt to conceal IRGC involvement.[15] ASIO further assessed that the IRGC ‘sought to create the perception of a greater groundswell of anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli activity in Australia to generate a political response’ and ‘aimed to stoke fear and tensions within the Australian community and to harm the Jewish and Israeli community specifically’.[16]

Other factors

1.28The IRGC has been subject to targeted sanctions under Australia’s autonomous sanctions framework since 7 March 2012.[17] Individuals with links to the IRGC have also been sanctioned due to their connection to the Quds Force, their engagement in terrorist acts, and actions related to the IRGC’s support for Russian activities in Ukraine.[18]

1.29The Statement of Reasons lists several other jurisdictions that have taken action against the IRGC. These include:

• On 15 April 2019, the United States designated the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation under its Immigration and Nationality Act 1952. It previously added the IRGC to its State Sponsors of Terrorism framework on 19 January 1984.
• In January and July 2023, the European Parliament passed a non-binding resolution to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organisation.
• On 19 June 2024, Canada listed the IRGC as a terrorist entity under its Anti-Terrorism Act 2001.
• In May 2025, the United Kingdom announced that it intends to introduce legislation to enable its Government to place ‘proscription-style restrictions on the operations of state-linked organisations such as the IRGC’.[19]
  30. Additionally, on 29 January 2026, European Union (EU) foreign ministers agreed to include the IRGC on the EU’s list of terrorist organisations.[20]
  31. The IRGC is known to provide financial and other material support, training, technology, weapons, guidance and direction to several other listed terrorist organisations, including Hizballah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The IRGC also provides support to listed terrorist organisation Ansar Allah (also known as the Houthis) in its conflict with the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.[21]

Stakeholder views

1.32The Committee received a large number of submissions from members of the Australian-Iranian community, as well as groups representing the Jewish community. The vast majority of individual submitters requested that their submissions be kept confidential, or that their names be withheld from publication, to protect themselves or their family members from being targeted by the regime for speaking out against the IRGC.

1.33All submissions and other correspondence received by the Committee strongly supported the IRGC’s listing.

Nature of IRGC

1.34Several contributors to the inquiry commented on the hybrid nature of the IRGC and its complex relationship to the Iranian state and various economic and military enterprises. For example, the Australian-Iranian Community Organisation described the IRGC as a ‘military-economic empire’ with control of major sections of Iran’s economy:

The IRGC’s core function is the preservation of the Islamic Republic through coercion, including the suppression of dissent, enforcement of ideological conformity, and the export of influence and violence beyond Iran’s borders.

The same entity responsible for internal repression is also tasked with external operations, proxy warfare, and covert interference abroad.

Its economic dominance directly finances this system, funding domestic repression and enabling the IRGC’s overseas operations and transnational activities.[22]

1.35The unusually far-reaching nature of the IRGC was also emphasised by other contributors to the inquiry. For example, at the public hearing, Dr Rana Dadpour of Australian United Solidarity for Iran (AUSIRAN) told the Committee:

The IRGC is not a normal military organisation; it is a powerful and deeply embedded arm of the Islamic republic's regime, with roles that reach far beyond defence. Its activities extend to military operations, intelligence work and extensive financial networks both inside and outside Iran. The IRGC's record has been widely reported. It includes support for armed groups, involvement in violent operations beyond Iran's border and participation in campaigns of intimidation and repression worldwide. These actions are not isolated, either; they reflect the nature and the function of this organisation itself.[23]

1.36Ms Tina Kordrostami told the Committee that the hybrid nature of the IRGC—being ‘part military, part intelligence agency, part business network, part ideological machine’—presents a challenge for Australian legislation:

It operates parallel institutions that blur the line between state and non-state actors, and, importantly, it maintains powerful media and propaganda arms that shape narratives far beyond Iran's borders. This complexity is precisely what makes it difficult to regulate under traditional security frameworks.[24]

1.37Several inquiry participants also discussed the IRGC’s involvement in transnational criminal activities, including money laundering, human trafficking and smuggling of drugs and arms.[25] Ms Sara Rafiee, of the Australian Iranian Community Organisation, told the Committee that the IRGC both protects and is empowered by the Islamic Republic regime and ‘makes huge amounts of illegal money in the process’.[26]

IRGC-related atrocities in Iran

1.38Many individuals expressed their distress about the current situation in Iran and provided harrowing personal accounts of brutality and injustice attributed to the IRGC or the Islamic Republic regime more broadly. Submitters particularly commented on the regime’s violent suppression of protests in January 2026, which is estimated to have resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians, with many others seriously injured.

1.39Participants in the inquiry gave the Committee disturbing accounts of mass atrocities, including the potential use of chemical weapons, attacks on schools and students, sexual violence, civilians being removed from hospitals and executed whilst receiving medical treatment, and large numbers of protestors being deliberately blinded as a result of shots to the face.

1.40The HAMRAH Health Alliance, which describes itself as a ‘non-partisan and apolitical network of Australian-based health professionals advocating for medical neutrality and human rights in Iran’, discussed the ‘collapse in medical neutrality’ in Iran, with hospital administrators being pressured to hand over patient details and doctors and nurses being threatened for providing care.[27] Pointing to similar evidence, the Medical Alliance for Health Services Abroad (MAHSA) submitted that:

A regime that tortures, blinds, abducts, and kills civilians inside hospitals cannot be expected to exercise restraint beyond its borders. The same organisational culture that enables mass atrocities domestically underpins the IRGC’s overseas activities, including intimidation, proxy violence, terrorism, and foreign interference.

Maintaining the IRGC’s listing is therefore not only a moral response to overwhelming medical evidence of mass human-rights violations, but a necessary national-security measure to protect Australians, uphold international norms, and deter state-sponsored violence.[28]

1.41Professor Amir-Mobarez Parasta, an ophthalmologist and medical doctor based in Munich, Germany, appearing on behalf of HAMRAH Health Alliance, told the Committee about his work to produce defensible estimates of the number of people killed and injured in the recent violence. Professor Prasata’s most recent report estimated 33,130 nationwide deaths in Iran, mostly occurring between 8 and 11 January 2026, and 97,645 injured survivors.[29] Professor Parasta noted that these were ‘conservative’ estimates, and that a forthcoming updated report based on further data analysis was expected to upwardly revise the estimated number of fatalities to around 45,000.[30]

1.42Some submitters shared deeply personal stories with the Committee about the impact of the regime’s suppression of the protests on themselves and their loved ones, particularly during a nationwide blackout of internet and mobile communications during the unrest. For example, one submitter wrote:

For those of us with family members in Iran, this is not just another newspaper headline we read about and then get on with our daily lives. It causes ongoing emotional trauma. Many of us live with constant anxiety, sleepless nights, and a feeling of indescribable helplessness. Every day we carry the fear that we may receive a message telling us a loved one has been arrested, tortured, or killed — that we may never hear from them again. Even though we live safely in Australia, the excruciating psychological impact hunts us. It affects our mental health, our families, and our ability to feel at peace.[31]

IRGC terrorist acts targeted at Australia

1.43Many submissions commented on the IRGC’s involvement in attacks targeting the Jewish community at Lewis’ Continental Kitchen in Sydney and the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne. For example, multiple individuals from the Australian-Iranian community expressed their concern for and solidarity with the Jewish community. One submitter wrote that ‘[a]s someone who deeply cares for my Jewish friends and community, witnessing this fear, loss, and erosion of security has been devastating’.[32] Another wrote that ‘[i]t has been heartbreaking and confronting to witness the suffering of Iranian and Jewish communities, who feel targeted and unheard’.[33]

1.44The Executive Council of Australian Jewry told the Committee that the IRGC-linked attacks represented a ‘qualitative shift from intimidation and vandalism to state‑directed violence, fundamentally altering the threat environment for the Australian Jewish community’.[34] Pointing to past IRGC-orchestrated attacks on Jewish communities overseas, it described the IRGC’s involvement in antisemitic terrorism as ‘enduring, well‑documented, and multi-jurisdictional’,[35] and concluded:

The evidence demonstrates a clear, continuing, and state‑directed risk posed by the IRGC to the safety of the Australian Jewish community and, more broadly, to Australian society. The listing is proportionate, consistent with international best practice of several allied states, and essential to Australia’s capacity to prevent and respond to state‑sponsored terrorism.[36]

1.45Australia’s Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism submitted that, in view of the attacks, the IRGC ‘squarely meets the legal criteria for listing’, but added that the attacks ‘form part of a long list of antisemitic conduct that have caused fear, anxiety and real harm to the Jewish community’:

As every new attack or threat manifests itself, Jewish Australians find themselves attending schools, religious services and community gatherings behind ever-tighter security. As a consequence, many have questioned their ongoing place in a country that, for generations, Jewish Australians believed was a haven from the antisemitism experienced elsewhere in the world.[37]

1.46The Australian Iranian Community Organisation said that confirmation that the IRGC was behind the attacks in Melbourne and Sydney was ‘deeply troubling’ for the Australian-Iranian community, as it demonstrated that the IRGC is willing to target civilians abroad, can operate through proxies and covert structures, and does not respect national borders or sovereignty.[38] It added:

These attacks were not random acts of vandalism; they were assessed as foreign-directed terrorism, intended to intimidate a specific community, inflame social tensions, and undermine Australia’s multicultural cohesion.[39]

1.47This sentiment was echoed by the Iranian Society of Queensland, which noted the marked escalation of extremist incidents and hostile activity affecting minority communities, particularly the Jewish community, in recent years:

While investigative and judicial processes continue in relation to individual incidents, their cumulative effect has underscored the reality that Australia is not insulated from transnational extremist ecosystems, nor from the influence of foreign state actors with a documented record of targeting Jewish, dissident, and civilian populations abroad.[40]

Other IRGC activities targeted at Australia

1.48Submissions from the Australian-Iranian community described incidents in which Australian persons critical of the Islamic Republic regime have been subject to surveillance, harassment, intimidation and threats. AUSIRAN blamed such activities on the IRGC’s ‘global intelligence and enforcement networks’.[41] Another submitter reported that Iranian embassy officials and individuals tied to the IRGC had been caught engaging in such behaviour.[42]

1.49The Council of Australian Postgraduate Associations (CAPA) highlighted the increased wellbeing challenges faced by Iranian students in Australia, including due to ‘significant anxiety and fear’ in relation to IRGC activities:

Particularly, our members are concerned that their activities, whether in support or opposition to the Islamic Republic, are monitored and reported to the IRGC. As well, due to the internet blackout, they are unable to contact their loved ones, further impacting their wellbeing.

CAPA recommends that the committee takes whatever measures necessary protect and support Iranian students in Australia from reprisal by the IRGC.[43]

1.50Some submitters told the Committee that their family members in Iran had been threatened after they participated in protests or criticism of the Islamic Republic regime while in Australia. For example, one submitter told the Committee about a letter their parents in Iran received instructing them to ‘pressure me to stop participating in protests and warning that consequences would follow if I did not comply’.[44] Another submitter wrote about menacing phone calls their parents in Iran had received from individuals identifying themselves as connected with the IRGC:

The callers, using unknown numbers, instructed my parents to pressure me to cease any involvement in activities critical of the Islamic Republic. They explicitly warned that failure to do so would result in consequences for my parents in Iran and potentially for me and my young family in Australia.

The callers also claimed that the IRGC has informants within the Iranian community in Australia and stated that “they have open eyes everywhere” and are monitoring people’s activities. These threats created a profound sense of fear and insecurity for me and my family.[45]

1.51The Australian Iranian Community Alliance submitted that concern about these types of activities had caused come community members to cease participating in lawful protests, public forums, media engagement and advocacy, with broad implications for democratic participation. It argued that this reduced participation ‘weakens the diversity of voices in public discourse’ and could ‘exacerbate social fragmentation’, thereby ‘undermining the inclusive character of Australia’s democratic system’.[46]

1.52The Department of Home Affairs advised that the most effective way in which community members can report information about IRGC activities in Australia to law enforcement and security agencies is through the National Security Hotline. The Department added that the Translating and Interpreting Service is available to assist with these calls if there is a language barrier.[47]

1.53However, at the public hearing, Ms Sara Rafiee told the Committee that there was a level of ‘disheartenment’ in the community in relation to the National Security Hotline due to instances in which detailed information had been reported but no subsequent action had been evident.[48] Ms Rafiee supported a dedicated National Security Hotline team being established, with additional resources allocated, but said that the ‘most critical thing’ would be to improve the ‘feedback loop’:

The community needs to be made aware: 'Yes, we have taken your report seriously, and, yes, we are working on it.' Without it, the community, as I mentioned, feels disheartened. They feel that they are gathering—they're putting time and resources into putting together these very detailed reports, then they never hear back.[49]

Effect of the listing

1.54A number of submissions commented on the value of Australia’s listing of the IRGC as a state sponsor of terrorism, and the negative effect that any de-listing would have. For example, Mrs Zeinab Zahiri told the Committee that the listing ‘sends an important message that violence, repression, and state-sponsored terror will not be ignored or legitimised’ and that ‘[r]emoving or weakening this listing would cause deep concern among victims and those who continue to suffer under repression’.[50]

1.55Another submitter observed that the listing had already had a ‘clear and positive impact’ on Australia’s national security:

Based on my own observations and monitoring since that date, individuals and networks with known or apparent links to the IRGC have ceased their activities on social media platforms almost entirely. This sudden and complete disappearance is, in my view, clear evidence that the listing has disrupted extremist influence and reduced the space for intimidation, propaganda, and coordination within Australia.[51]

1.56Other submitters highlighted the role of the listing in strengthening Australia’s capacity to respond to security threats. For example, one submitter wrote that the listing is ‘not symbolic’ and provides ‘real tools for law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and the justice system to prevent harm’.[52]

1.57Another wrote that maintaining the listing is ‘not only an act of solidarity with the Iranian people, but also a necessary step toward a safer global future’.[53]

1.58However, at the public hearing, multiple witnesses told the Committee about a need to improve enforcement of the framework.[54] For example, Mr Nader Zoljalali, Co-convener of Amnesty International Australia’s Iran National Network, told the Committee that the listing must be ‘more than symbolic’ and ‘enforcement must be real’:

That includes serious monitoring of financial flows and proxy structures. It also requires vigilance in relation to individuals who may act knowingly or unknowingly as facilitators, intermediaries or influence channels on behalf of sanctioned persons and entities.[55]

1.59Mohammad Sadeghpour, President of Association to Defend Freedom and Human Rights in Iran – Australia, similarly said that Australia should:

… strengthen monitoring and enforcement measures to identify and disrupt regime linked financial networks and businesses operating in Australia and the Oceania region that support or facilitate harassment, intimidation, threats of violence or related unlawful activities.[56]

1.60Dr Parisa Glass, representing the International Community of Iranian Academics, told the Committee that IRGC symbols and flags had been displayed at public rallies in Australia over the past two years and that, for many in the Iranian diaspora, these encounters ‘profoundly retraumatising and reinforce the reality that the IRGC's reach extends well beyond Iran's borders’.[57] A similar concern was raised by Ms Tina Kordrostami.[58] In part citing these concerns, Dr Kylie Moore-Gilbert called for a taskforce to be established to enforce the proscription regime and prohibit individuals in Australia from providing support to the IRGC. She also called for this work to be undertaken with enough transparency ‘to give the community an assurance that something is being done’.[59]

Other matters raised by stakeholders

1.61While supporting the IRGC’s listing, some submitters disputed the notion that the IRGC is part of the Iranian state, but rather argued that the IRGC is an organ of a broader non-state ‘Islamic Revolution’ movement which is distinct from the Islamic Republic of Iran. These submitters argued that the IRGC should have been listed as a terrorist organisation under existing Division 102 of the Criminal Code and criticised Government processes and decisions that prevented such a listing from taking place.[60]

1.62At the public hearing, the Australian Iranian Community Organisation similarly argued for the IRGC to be listed as a terrorist organisation ‘on its own merit, not just as a state sponsor of terrorism,[61] pointing to differences between the two regimes in relation to migration and citizenship laws.[62]

1.63Some submitters called for additional measures to be introduced further to the current listing. For example, the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC) recommended that country-specific designations under Australia’s existing autonomous sanctions framework be broadened to include any entity owned by, controlled by or acting for the benefit of the IRGC; and any person who is a member of, acts for or on behalf of, or is under the direction or control of, the IRGC or its affiliates.[63] AIJAC also recommended the strengthening of regulatory safeguards to require Australian persons and entities trading with Iran to make formal declarations that ‘to the best of their knowledge and after appropriate due diligence, they are not dealing with entities owned, controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of the IRGC or its associated bodies’.[64]

1.64The Australian Iranian Community Alliance called for certain other ‘practical considerations’ to accompany the listing to ensure that it has a ‘meaningful domestic impact’, including:

• clear and accessible reporting pathways for intimidation and harassment concerns, including guidance on which agencies to approach;
• visible and sustained community engagement by relevant authorities to build trust and understanding;
• coordination across law-enforcement, migration, financial and regulatory systems to avoid gaps or inconsistencies; and
• ongoing parliamentary oversight to ensure proportionality, accountability and public confidence.[65]
  65. Some contributors to the review urged a degree of caution in implementation of the listing framework, arguing that it is necessary to distinguish between individuals who are leaders or committed supporters of the IRGC, and ordinary Iranian citizens who have been involuntarily conscripted into the IRGC.[66] For example, the Unheard Conscripts Advocacy Network (UCAN), a volunteer network of former Iranian conscripts and their families based in Canada, told the Committee that when the IRGC was listed in Canada, mandatory conscription had been treated as equivalent to IRGC membership, resulting in refusals of immigration applications; barriers to work and study permits; loss of employment due to prolonged uncertainty; and the inability to travel internationally for fear of being denied re-entry.[67] Whilst supporting the listing of the IRGC, UCAN submitted that:

Conscripts already serve under the coercive, punitive, and often degrading authority of the Islamic Republic regime. They are treated not as organisational members but as free labourers, routinely assigned to menial, humiliating tasks regardless of their skills or education.

A responsible framework must ensure that democratic systems do not inadvertently reproduce the injustices imposed upon these individuals in Iran.[68]

1.66At the public hearing, Ms Bahareh Jamali, representing the Iranian Australian Republicans, told the Committee:

It is critical that Australia's enforcement and migration frameworks distinguish between two groups: first, senior leaders and commanders responsible for repression and extremist activity; and, second, conscripted individuals administratively assigned to IRGC units who did not participate in violence. Failing to make this distinction could unfairly affect processing of student applications and family visas, and migration pathways. Safeguards are needed to ensure individual assessment, intent based evaluation and proportionality, and to protect innocent conscripts while strengthening the legitimacy of the IRGC listing.[69]

Committee comment

1.67At the outset, the Committee notes that this report is being finalised at a time at which the situation in Iran is rapidly evolving. Following mass atrocities committed by the Islamic Republic regime in response to the January 2026 uprising, on 28February 2026, the United States and Israel commenced large scale strikes against IRGC and Islamic Republic targets, resulting in the death of Ayatollah Khamenei and many of the regime’s other senior leaders. This has been followed by retaliatory military action by Iranian forces and, at the time of writing, ongoing conflict across the region. At the time of writing, the long-term effect of this conflict on the IRGC and the wider Islamic Republic is unclear.

1.68However, the Committee recognises that this is both a time of considerable distress and a time of hope for the Australian-Iranian community. The Committee stands with the Australian-Iranian community at this time of uncertainty.

1.69The Committee is concerned by reports of the IRGC’s role in serious human rights abuses within Iran. Evidence before the Committee pointed to the IRGC’s involvement in the violent suppression of protests in January 2026, including the use of lethal force against civilians. The Committee notes that such actions form part of a longstanding pattern of repression attributed to the IRGC and affiliated forces and reinforce concerns about the organisation’s willingness to employ violence to maintain regime control and silence dissent.

1.70The Committee thanks individual submitters who shared their personal experiences of suffering at the hands of IRGC elements by themselves or their loved ones. The Committee recognises the courage and conviction of these individuals who have willingly contributed to the parliamentary process and spoken out against the repressive activities of the IRGC despite potential risks to their own safety.

1.71Evidence received during this review characterised the IRGC as a hybrid military-security organisation that extends well beyond the functions of a conventional armed force. Submitters and witnesses described the IRGC as operating as a ‘military‑economic empire’, exercising substantial control over significant sectors of Iran’s economy, including construction, energy, telecommunications and logistics, as well as being engaged in transnational criminal activities. The Committee is concerned that this economic reach provides the IRGC with both the resources and autonomy to pursue activities that undermine international security, while insulating it from accountability and reinforcing its role as a central pillar of the Islamic Republic regime’s power.

1.72To be listed as a state sponsor of terrorism, an entity must be a ‘foreign state entity’ for the purposes of Part 5.3A of the Criminal Code.The Committee notes that the IRGC is an officially recognised entity in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s security apparatus, is formally recognised in its constitution and is ultimately controlled by its Supreme Leader. The IRGC also receives a significant share of the Islamic Republic’s budget. The Committee therefore accepts the Government’s position, informed by legal advice, that the IRGC is a foreign state entity for the purposes of the state sponsors of terrorism framework.

1.73The Australian Government’s first priority with respect to the IRGC is to protect the community from hostile activities directed at Australia. The Committee condemns the IRGC’s involvement in attacks targeting Australia’s Jewish community, including the firebombing of Lewis’ Continental Kitchen in Sydney and the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne. The Committee is deeply concerned by evidence suggesting IRGC involvement in acts designed to intimidate, threaten and undermine the safety of Australians on the basis of their religion or community identity.

1.74Beyond physical attacks, the Committee received concerning evidence of other IRGC‑linked activities targeting individuals in Australia who are critical of the Islamic Republic regime. This included accounts of surveillance, harassment, intimidation and threats directed at members of the Iranian‑Australian community, and others. The Committee recognises the serious personal and psychological impact of such conduct and notes concerns raised by submitters about a perceived lack of feedback once incidents are reported.

1.75The Committee notes that threats, harassment and intimidation directed at individuals engaging in democratic processes and speaking out against the Islamic Republic regime is conduct that may constitute serious criminal offences in Australia, including foreign interference offences. The Committee considers such behaviour to wholly unacceptable and condemns it in the strongest terms. The Committee encourages individuals who experience such conduct to continue to report it to relevant authorities, including via the National Security Hotline and the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce, so that appropriate action can be taken.

1.76The Committee heard a consistent message from contributors to the review about the importance of the IRGC’s listing being more than symbolic and being supplemented with real measures to ensure that the criminal law is enforced, incidents of harassment are investigated, migration risks are managed and financial flows in support of the IRGC are stopped. The Committee also heard concerns that this enforcement has been lacking to date. While acknowledging that the listing has only been in place since November 2025 and that this review has not examined in detail the extent of resourcing that Australian Government agencies have allocated to its enforcement, the Committee considers it essential that agencies are appropriate resourced to undertake these functions.

1.77The Committee recommends that the Government consider whether sufficient resources have been allocated to law enforcement and security agencies to enable them to appropriately respond to information about Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) activities in Australia, including in relation to financial flows, the display of prohibited symbols and intimidation and harassment by the IRGC of Australian residents who are critical of the Islamic Republic regime.

1.78In relation to community concerns about a lack of feedback in relation to how reports in relation to IRGC activities are dealt with, the Committee considers that, where operationally possible, improved communication by agencies such as the AFP and ASIO could assist in ‘closing the loop’ so that affected community members are assured their concerns have been taken seriously and appropriately addressed.

1.79To promote continued reporting by community of information about Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) activities in Australia, the Committee recommends that the Government consider how communication can be improved, including in relevant languages other than English, to provide assurance to the community that reports to the National Security Hotline are acted upon by relevant authorities.

1.80At the same time, the Committee agrees with contributors to the inquiry that people who have been previously conscripted into work for the IRGC should not face the same adverse enforcement actions as persons who are ideological supporters and voluntary members of the IRGC, including in relation to migration decisions. It is essential that this distinction is understood and taken into account by Australian authorities in their implementation of the listing framework.

1.81The Committee recommends that, in enforcing criminal offences and implementing any migration decisions related to the listing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a state sponsor of terrorism, Australian Government agencies distinguish between genuine members and supporters of the IRGC and persons who were involuntarily conscripted into the IRGC as part of compulsory service in Iran.

1.82Having regard to the totality of the evidence, the Committee supports the continued listing of the IRGC as a state sponsor of terrorism under the Criminal Code. The Committee considers that the IRGC’s demonstrated willingness to engage in violence, intimidation and transnational repression, including against Australian targets, meets and exceeds the threshold intended by the Parliament when establishing the state sponsor of terrorism framework.

1.83The Committee considers that the listing strengthens Australia’s ability to disrupt and deter IRGC‑linked activity within Australia, including financing, facilitation and intimidation, and sends a clear signal that hostile state‑directed activity targeting Australian communities will not be tolerated.

1.84The Committee acknowledges the views of some contributors to the inquiry that the IRGC should have been listed under the Criminal Code’s existing terrorist organisation framework. It is not a role of this Committee to review whether such as listing would be legally permissible. However, the Committee is satisfied that the effect of a listing is the same under both frameworks. Both frameworks give rise to a range of substantially similar criminal offences, as well as the ability for the Minister for Home Affairs to refuse or cancel a person’s visa or for a court to cancel a person’s Australian citizenship in certain circumstances, due to their membership of, or association with, the IRGC.

1.85Overall, the Committee is satisfied that the IRGC meets the legislative criteria for listing as a state sponsor of terrorism and that the listing has been properly made. As such, the Committee supports the listing of the IRGC as a state sponsor of terrorism under the Criminal Code and finds no reason to disallow the legislative instrument.

Senator Raff Ciccone

Chair

10 March 2026

Footnotes

[1]Criminal Code, s 110.3(3).

[2]Australian Government, ‘State sponsors of terrorism’, Australian National Security, 27 November 2025, https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/state-sponsors-of-terrorism (viewed 1 March 2026).

[3]Criminal Code, ss. 80.2E, 80.2HA.

[4]Migration Act 1958, s. 501.

[5]Australian Citizenship Act 2007, s. 36C.

[6]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, p. 10).

[7]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, p. 10).

[8]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, pp. 10–11).

[9]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, p. 12).

[10]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, p. 14).

[11]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, p. 12).

[12]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, pp. 12–13).

[13]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, pp. 13–14).

[14]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, p. 13).

[15]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, p. 13).

[16]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, p. 14).

[17]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, p. 9).

[18]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, p. 12).

[19]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, p. 14).

[20]Lili Bayer and John Irish, ‘EU designates Iran's Revolutionary Guards a terrorist organisation in policy shift’, Reuters, 29 January 2026.

[21]Minister for Home Affairs, Submission 1 (Statement of Reasons, p. 13).

[22]Australian-Iranian Community Organisation, Submission 24, pp. 1–2.

[23]Dr Rana Dadpour, Spokesperson, Australian United Solidarity for Iran, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 31.

[24]Ms Tina Kordrostami, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 4.

[25]Ms Bahareh Jamali, Member, Iranian Australian Republicans, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 35; Dr Behzad Molavi, Governance Support Officer, Iranian Society of Queensland, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, pp. 29-30.

[26]Ms Sara Rafiee, Lawyer and Community Advocate, Australian Iranian Community Organisation, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 17.

[27]HAMRAH Health Alliance, Submission 25, pp. 3.–4

[28]Medical Alliance for Health Services Abroad, Submission 23, p. 22.

[29]Professor Amir-Mobarez, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 11. See also HAMRAH Health Alliance, Submission 25.1 (Attachment 3).

[30]Professor Amir-Mobarez, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 13.

[31]Submission 28 (name withheld), p. 141.

[32]Submission 28 (name withheld), p. 125.

[33]Submission 28 (name withheld), p. 140.

[34]Executive Council of Australian Jewry, Submission 26, p. 2.

[35]Executive Council of Australian Jewry, Submission 26, p. 3.

[36]Executive Council of Australian Jewry, Submission 26, p. 6.

[37]Australia’s Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism, Submission 17, p. 2.

[38]Australian Iranian Community Organisation, Submission 24, p. 3.

[39]Australian Iranian Community Organisation, Submission 24, p. 3.

[40]Iranian Society of Queensland, Submission 22, p. 2.

[41]Australian United Solidarity for Iran, Submission 6, p. 2.

[42]Submission 28 (name withheld), p. 6.

[43]Council of Australian Postgraduate Students, Submission 19, pp. 5–6.

[44]Submission 28 (name withheld), p. 146.

[45]Submission 28 (name withheld), p. 84.

[46]Australian Iranian Community Alliance, Submission 20, pp. 3–4.

[47]Mr Hamish Hansford, Head, National Security, Department of Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 48.

[48]Ms Sara Rafiee, Lawyer and Community Advocate, Australian Iranian Community Organisation, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 19.

[49]Ms Sara Rafiee, Lawyer and Community Advocate, Australian Iranian Community Organisation, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 19.

[50]Mrs Zeinab Zahiri, Submission 7, p. 1.

[51]Submission 28 (name withheld), p. 164.

[52]Submission 28 (name withheld), p. 142.

[53]Submission 28 (name withheld), p. 161.

[54]Dr Kylie Moore-Gilbert, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 2; Ms Tina Kordrostami, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 4; Ms Sara Rafiee, Lawyer and Community Advocate, Australian Iranian Community Organisation, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 17; Mr Mohammad Sadeghpour, President, Association to Defend Freedom and Human Rights in Iran-Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 25; Mr Mahdi Athari, Member of Main Committee and Treasurer, Australian Iranian Council Inc., Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 32; Mr Nader Zoljalali, Co-convener, Amnesty International Australia, Iran National Network, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 33; Mr Ali Hosseini, Secretary and Public Officer, Australian Iranian Council Inc., Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 37; Mr Dennis Suro, Community Manager, Assyrian National Council Australia Inc, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 40.

[55]Mr Nader Zoljalali, Co-convener, Amnesty International Australia, Iran National Network, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 33.

[56]Mr Mohammad Sadeghpour, President, Association to Defend Freedom and Human Rights in Iran-Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 25.

[57]Dr Parisa Glass, Member, International Community of Iranian Academics, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, pp. 3, 5.

[58]Ms Tina Kordrostami, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 7.

[59]Dr Kylie Moore-Gilbert, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 8.

[60]Mr Reza Parsaee, Submission 21;Mr Arash Behgoo, Submission 31; Nasrin Marmarchi, Submission 30.

[61]Ms Sara Rafiee, Lawyer and Community Advocate, Australian Iranian Community Organisation, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 19.

[62]Mr Faraz Maghami, Barrister and Community Advocate, Australian Iranian Community Organisation, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 20; Ms Sara Rafiee, Lawyer and Community Advocate, Australian Iranian Community Organisation, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 21.

[63]Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), Submission 16, p. 4.

[64]Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), Submission 16, p. 4.

[65]Australian Iranian Community Alliance, Submission 20, p. 4.

[66]Unheard Conscripts Advocacy Network, Submission 9; International Center for Human Rights in Iran – Canada, Submission 18, pp. 1–2; Mr Ardeshir Zarezadeh, Submission 15, p. 4; Dr Kylie Moore-Gilbert, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, pp. 2–3; Ms Bahareh Jamali, Member, Iranian Australian Republicans, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 35.

[67]Unheard Conscripts Advocacy Network, Submission 9, p. 2.

[68]Unheard Conscripts Advocacy Network, Submission 9, p. 1.

[69]Ms Bahareh Jamali, Member, Iranian Australian Republicans, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 26 March 2026, p. 35.