Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page
Bills unlikely to raise
human rights incompatibility
Aboriginal
Land Rights and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2013
Introduced into the House of
Representatives on 21 March 2013
Portfolio: Families, Community
Services and Indigenous Affairs
Overview
1.1
This bill seeks
to add the town of Jabiru and two adjacent portions of Northern Territory land
to Schedule 1 to the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976.
This will enable the land to be granted as Aboriginal land to the Kakadu
Aboriginal Land Trust. The bill provides that the land will not be granted as
Aboriginal land until leaseback arrangements for the Jabiru town land and for
the two adjacent non-township portions are put in place.
1.2
The bill adds a
further parcel of land for Patta to Schedule 1 to the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976. This will enable the land to be granted as
Aboriginal land to the relevant Aboriginal Land Trust.
1.3
Finally, the
bill makes amendments to the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation
Act 1999 to ensure that the world heritage, natural and cultural values of
Kakadu National Park continue to be protected in relation to Jabiru, as well as
amending existing management plan and town plan requirements for development of
towns in Commonwealth reserves.
Compatibility with human
rights
1.4
The bill is
accompanied by a self-contained statement of compatibility which notes that the
bill engages and advances the right to self-determination of Aboriginal
peoples,[1]
the right to equality and non-discrimination and the right to enjoy and benefit
from culture.[2]
1.5
In her second
reading speech the Minister for Families,
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs noted:
These
amendments arise from the landmark agreement struck in November 2009 to resolve
the Jabiru native title claim, which is the longest-running native title claim
in the history of the Northern Territory. The intention of this measure is to
give effect to the settlement agreement reached between the parties to the
native title claim. Importantly, this bill recognises the traditional ownership
of Jabiru by the Mirarr people.[3]
1.6
The statement of
compatibility states:
This Bill is
necessary to recognise and ensure that relevant Aboriginal people have the
right to own and control their traditional Aboriginal lands. The limitation on
the rights of non-Aboriginal Australians is reasonable, necessary and
proportionate to the policy desire to promote the equal enjoyment of the
engaged rights by Aboriginal Australians.
[4]
Rights
engaged and promoted
1.7
The
implementation of the agreement with the traditional owners of the land
advances the enjoyment of the right to self-determination, as control over
their traditional lands is a central component of the enjoyment of that right.
It also advances the right of Aboriginal people to participate in and practise
their culture.
Right
to equality and non-discrimination: land rights measures as ‘special measures’
1.8
The statement of
compatibility notes that under international and Australian law measures that involve
differential treatment based on race may be permissible if they satisfy the
criteria of being a ‘special measure’, that is if they are designed to ‘secure
to disadvantaged groups the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.’[5]
This is made clear by article 1(4) of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)[6]
and the practice under that treaty, as well as jurisprudence under the ICCPR
and the ICESCR.
1.9
The statement of
compatibility goes on to state:
The Aboriginal
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 is discriminatory in nature as it
confers rights and privileges upon Aboriginal Australians, which are
discriminatory as against non-Aboriginal Australians. That discrimination is
the essence of the Act; it is the foundation on which it is structured.
However, the beneficial nature of this discrimination enables the Aboriginal
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 and this Bill to be each
classified as a ‘special measure’ within the meaning of paragraph 4 of article
1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (the CERD) (and subsection 8(1) of the Racial Discrimination
Act 1975).
1.10
This approach to
the analysis of land rights is similar to that adopted by the High Court of
Australia in its influential 1985 decision in Gerhardy v Brown.[7]
In that case the
court held that South Australian legislation which limited access to
traditional lands was consistent with the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (RDA) and the ICERD. The court’s
reasoning was that, although the legislation involved differential treatment
based on race and was therefore prima facie discriminatory, it constituted a
‘special measure’ within the meaning of both the RDA and the ICERD.[8]
1.11
The differential
treatment of traditional owners in relation to their lands is more
appropriately analysed in terms of substantive equality. In other words,
although there is differential treatment based on race, that difference in
treatment is based on objective and reasonable grounds and pursues a legitimate
objective,[9]
namely the recognition of the relationship of Indigenous peoples to their land
and the legitimacy of recognising this difference through a different legislative
regime.
1.12
This analysis is
supported by the views of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination in relation to the meaning of the concept of ‘special measures’
under the ICERD:
Special
measures should not be confused with specific rights pertaining to certain
categories of person or community, such as ... the rights of indigenous
peoples, including rights to lands traditionally occupied by them... Such
rights are permanent rights, recognized as such in human rights instruments,
including those adopted in the context of the United Nations and its
specialized agencies. States parties should carefully observe distinctions
between special measures and permanent human rights in their law and practice.
The distinction between special measures and permanent rights implies that
those entitled to permanent rights may also enjoy the benefits of special
measures.[10]
1.13
The logic of a
substantive equality analysis is underlined by the fact that articles 1(4) and
2(2) of the ICERD anticipate that there will come a time when measures which
provide for beneficial or preferential treatment of one racial or ethnic group
over another will have achieved their objective and will then be required to be
discontinued. However, the recognition of Indigenous peoples' connection with
their lands is something that would be envisaged as continuing indefinitely, as
compared with, for example, a program of scholarships or employment targets to
redress Indigenous underrepresentation which would be discontinued once reasonable
proportions were achieved. Even accepting that such measures may take years or
even decades to redress disadvantage, they are different in kind from
recognition of Indigenous peoples' relationship to their lands.
1.14
The committee
considers that the better approach to assessing the human rights compatibility
of measures which recognise the rights of Aboriginal people over their
traditional lands is that such measures are non-discriminatory because the
racially based differential treatment involved is based on objective and
justifiable criteria, and is a reasonable and proportionate means of pursuing a
legitimate goal. Accordingly, such measures do not need to be justified as
'special measures', which provide another way of pursuing substantive equality
but which require the special measures adopted to be discontinued once their
goals of redressing disadvantage are achieved.
1.1
The committee considers that the bill does not
appear to give rise to any human rights concerns.
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page
Top
|