- Timeframes for nuclear power generation in Australia
- This chapter considers evidence received throughout the inquiry regarding the potential timeframes for deploying nuclear power technology in Australia.
- For the purposes of this chapter, the 'deployment timeframe' is the period ‘… from the initial consideration of the nuclear power option by a country to the operation of its first nuclear power plant’, as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
- This definition excludes the timeframes for other critical components of nuclear power generation, such as the planning and development of emergency and waste management facilities and processes, which will require further consideration.
- This chapter discusses:
- the milestones for a nuclear build and a range of estimates for the deployment of nuclear power in Australia as presented in the evidence;
- some of the key challenges associated with pre-construction and construction deployment timeframes in Australia that were raised by witnesses and submitters;
- commentary on the history of construction delays in the nuclear power generation sector; and
- the views expressed by inquiry participants about the implications of the deployment timeframe for achieving Australia’s decarbonisation agenda and climate commitments, as well as the redeployment of the coal power workforce.
- The chapter concludes with Committee comment on the issue of deployment timeframes for nuclear power generation in Australia.
Deployment timeframe milestones and estimates
End-to-end estimates
2.6The Committee heard the timeframe for the generation of nuclear power in Australia would depend on the time taken to complete ‘deployment timeline milestones’.
2.7The IAEA report, Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, provides ‘guidelines and assistance with regard to deployment timeline milestones’, and ‘outlines both the ‘hard’ infrastructure (i.e., electrical grid, siting, etc.) and ‘soft’ infrastructure (i.e., nuclear law, training, etc.) necessary for a nuclear power program’.
2.8The IAEA report states ‘experience suggests’ a 10-15 year timeframe for the deployment of nuclear power plants, noting the timeframe depends ‘on the resources devoted to the programme and the type of technology chosen, whether a large NPP [nuclear power plant] or an SMR [small modular reactor]’. The Committee heard other factors impacting on timeframe include ‘licensing, financing, fuel, the supply chain and social licence and engagement’.
2.9The Committee reviewed proposals ranging up to 50 years concerning the likely end-to-end timeframes for the deployment of nuclear power in Australia, contingent upon the lifting of the current moratorium on nuclear power. As Australia has no nuclear power construction or generation experience, timeframe estimates and issues were largely proposed with reference to the deployment of nuclear power reactors internationally.
2.10Ms Helen Cook, a nuclear consultant who gave evidence in a private capacity, proposed a 10-to-12-year deployment timeframe, suggesting, ‘Australia is one of the best-positioned countries in the world to move ahead with a nuclear energy programme and to do so expeditiously and responsibly’.
2.11However, the majority of submitters and witnesses pointed to a timeframe of at least 15 years for nuclear deployment in Australia. This aligns with the ‘15-year-plus timeline’, proposed in the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Australian Energy Market Operator’s (AEMO) GenCost 2023–24: Final Report (GenCost) (see Box 2.1).
Box 2.1 GenCost 2023-24 timeframes The 2023-24 GenCost report by CSIRO and AEMO provides detailed cost estimates for nuclear power in Australia and considers the timeline for deploying nuclear energy generation in Australia. The report found that nuclear power would take at least 15 years to deploy in Australia, considering the absence of a development ‘pipeline’ for the sector in Australia, and the need for extensive regulatory approvals. |
2.12In its submission, SMR Technology Pty Ltd explained deployment time can be broken into two parts – pre-construction preparations and construction – with the construction period commencing ‘… when the first nuclear concrete is laid’.
2.13Evidence received about specific aspects of the pre-construction and construction milestones for the deployment of nuclear power that may affect timeframes for the deployment of nuclear power generation in Australia is detailed in the sections below.
Pre-construction timeframe challenges for Australia
2.14SMR Nuclear Technology Pty Ltd submitted pre-construction would require ‘… around 5 years for community consultation, site selection, feasibility studies, environmental and development approvals and arranging financial facilities’.
2.15However, the Committee heard that the pre-construction period is ‘typically lengthy’. Mr Jim Scott, the Chief Regulatory Officer and Head of Regulatory Services of Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) told the Committee that ‘… seven years for construction might pale’, compared to pre-construction activities, including siting, obtaining approval and social licence.
2.16The section below considers some of the key pre-construction milestones that will impact on timeframes for nuclear deployment in Australia, including:
- establishing social licence for nuclear power in Australia, and locations of nuclear power facilities including plants and waste facilities;
- the current legal and regulatory framework; and
- developing a nuclear workforce.
Social licence for civil nuclear power generation in Australia
Community perceptions and concerns about nuclear power
2.17This section considers evidence the Committee received on social licence as a key early and ongoing milestone – and challenge – for the deployment of nuclear facilities.
2.18The Ethics Centre defines ‘Social licence’ as the acceptance granted by the community to a company or organisation to operate, and explains it ‘is made up of three components: legitimacy, credibility, and trust’. Ms Tania Constable, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) told the Committee that ‘… if you don't start with community consultation, there is no social licence to operate’.
2.19The issue of social licence for the nuclear sector appears to be complicated and polarised. While some submitters pointed to overseas countries successfully utilising proven nuclear power technology and changing sentiment regarding nuclear power, other submissions expressed concerns about nuclear power due to perceptions it ‘poses significant risks to both the environment and communities’.
2.20Some of the key concerns raised in the evidence included nuclear power water demand and the risk of contamination, as well as nuclear waste management, including consideration of intergenerational equity. Health and safety, in particular the health of workers and communities living near nuclear facilities, and risk and safety in the event of accidents or catastrophic events were also raised, with some submissions also pointing to recent global attacks on nuclear plants.
2.21The Clean Energy Investor Group stated:
Currently, there is no social licence for nuclear power operations in the country. A minority of Australians support nuclear energy, while the majority oppose it.
2.22A joint submission from Queensland Conservation Councils put forward the comparison that ‘Queensland communities have also shown little support for nuclear energy, with 76% of Australians preferring to live near wind or solar farms over nuclear power stations’.
2.23The Committee also received evidence that reflected on the history of First Nations experiences with nuclear activities carried out on their lands, and expressed concerns that future nuclear activities ‘may continue to disproportionately affect First Nations people’.
2.24Multiple First Nations representatives across the country expressed their opposition to nuclear activities in Australia during testimony to the Committee. For example, in his testimony in Collie, Western Australia (WA), Mr Karim Kahn, Land and Heritage Manager at Gnaala Karla Booja Aboriginal Corporation, and a Traditional Owner representing the Noongar people, expressed concern about the ‘devastation of that utilisation of nuclear’ and the risk nuclear accidents could impact Country and access to Country compared to accidents with non-nuclear projects on traditional lands.
2.25Evidence received by the Committee reflected on gaining First Nations peoples consent for projects on traditional lands for nuclear projects. For example, the First Nations of South Australia Aboriginal Corporation criticised the ‘lack of consultation and consent from the First Nations and the broader community before making announcements’.
Timeframes and key considerations for obtaining social licence for nuclear site locations
2.26In its submission, the Clean Energy Investor Group noted the ‘likely obstacles in securing social licence for plant locations and nuclear waste management’. It submitted, ‘most people are unwilling to reside near a nuclear power plant’. It referred to the recent example of ‘clear opposition to nuclear waste management sites, as demonstrated in June 2023 when efforts to construct a low-level nuclear waste site in South Australia were successfully blocked’.
2.27Professor Maria Rost Rublee from the University of Melbourne and Executive Committee member of Women in Nuclear-Australia gave evidence to the Committee in a private capacity and commented that because so many nuclear projects have not succeeded due to lack of community consent, the social licence process in this context has ‘… acquired its own acronym. The acronym is DADA. You 'decide' on the site for a nuclear project, you 'announce' it, you 'defend' it and you 'abandon' it’.
2.28On timeframes for consultation, Mr Shaun Jenkinson, CEO of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) which operates Australia’s only nuclear reactor, the Open Pool Australian Light-water (OPAL) research reactor, advised that:
…when you are looking to site a [nuclear] facility anywhere, engaging with the community would be one of the most important things you’d do. You’d start early and you’d engage long.
2.29Mr Jenkinson also highlighted the time needed to obtain social licence and explained that building social licence ‘can take longer in some communities than others’, and is dependent on the ‘local area, their current level of knowledge around nuclear and what their acceptance of nuclear is as a baseline’.
2.30Mr Nate Smith, Managing Director and CEO, Tellus Holdings which operates ‘Australia’s first and only facility for the disposal of low-level-radioactive waste’, reflected that ‘building social licence is the foundation of our approach and success’.
2.31The Australian Nuclear Association recommended ‘follow[ing] the best practice international siting standard developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency’, noting:
… the siting of nuclear plants is a rigorous process involving multiple stakeholders and assessment of social licence and technical suitability of sites. It includes outreach programs involving local communities in the decision-making process so as to gain support near potential sites.
2.32Mr Smith advised that Tellus Holdings had reviewed past nuclear waste projects to learn how best to obtain social licence. He summarised that ‘one of the biggest things that we saw was that they [overseas governments] announced [site locations] and then did consultation’. Mr Smith advised the Committee that the process they follow, is to ‘create trust first, bring people on the journey and then announce’.
2.33Professor Rublee advised the Committee that due to the risks associated with nuclear power, ‘social licence, community consent, has to be non-negotiable, particularly for our First Nations communities’.She explained that ‘consultation is very different from social licence’, and clarified:
For it to be a genuine social licence, communities have to be able to say no. If a community cannot say no, it is not a genuine social licence.
2.34Ms Karina Lester, a Yankunytjatjara Anangu woman from north-west South Australia, repeatedly pointed to the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states in Article 29 that:
States shall take effective measures toensure that no storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples without their free, prior and informed consent.
2.35Mr Smith also explained that while Tellus has ‘received Traditional Owner approval for three separate radioactive waste disposal projects in the last 10 years’, an achievement which he said was ‘unprecedented globally’, some of Tellus’ waste projects have taken eight and 13 years to get approval.
2.36Reflecting on Tellus Holdings’ successful approval from Traditional Owners for low-level radioactive waste facilities in Australia, Mr Smith highlighted the importance of being open to changing site locations based on consultation with community and First Nations peoples, and reflected it may be more challenging for a government to ‘make that decision on the spot and say, “If you're not happy, if you don't want it on your land, there's no way it's ever going to happen”’.
2.37Professor John Quiggin, appearing in a private capacity, speculated on the risk of losing social licence during the construction of nuclear power plant. He cautioned:
… there's a further possibility that we could go three to five years down the track with those types and then discover that, once people find out about the exclusion zones and forth, the emergency evacuation zones, the project will run into social licence issues.
2.38On the timeframes to obtain and maintain social licence, Mr Jenkinson of ANSTO told the Committee about its experience building social licence at the Lucas Heights reactor in New South Wales and explained this was ‘built … up over 70 years, not just for 10 years of construction of the building’.
Timeframe for lifting the moratorium and establishing a robust nuclear power generation and safety regulatory framework
2.39As raised in Chapter 1, Australia has a long standing, bipartisan moratorium on nuclear power, and theCommonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) prohibits the Minister for the Environment from approving the construction or operation of nuclear power plants. The lifting of prohibitions on nuclear activities at federal, state and territory levels is required to commence construction of a nuclear power facility in Australia.
2.40A robust regulatory framework for nuclear power generation in Australia would then be needed, noting, as submitted by ARPANSA, ‘lifting prohibitions will only eliminate an obstacle, not make the system fit-for-purpose’.
2.41Ms Claire McLaughlin, Head, Energy Performance and Security Division, Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW), touched on some of the pre-construction steps, if the moratorium were to be lifted:
- developing ‘governance, legal and other frameworks to ensure the safety and security of any plants, as well as any environmental impacts’; and
- establishing the ‘regulatory structures that would be required to operate a civil nuclear industry’.
- The Committee received evidence on the preparedness and suitability of Australia’s existing regulatory framework and institutions of Australia’s current nuclear activities, which include medicine and research, were the moratorium were to be lifted.
- While one submitter alleged that ‘Australia has no such [regulatory] experience, and would have to develop it from scratch’, some nuclear experts expressed confidence that adopting nuclear power in Australia would be ‘both feasible and straightforward’ and require ‘only minimal’ regulatory adjustments.
- Mr Ian Grant, a nuclear expert appearing in a private capacity, proposed that ARPANSA, the current regulator for Australia’s nuclear activities, would be well positioned to regulate nuclear power generation in Australia. In his view:
… [ARPANSA] has in place a legal framework. It has in place regulations that do not, in our view, need to be changed. The only requirement would be to adopt the relevant IAEA standards, which exist today, in place of the standards that they use for the research reactor.
2.45Dr Gillian Hirth, CEO at ARPANSA, also posited that ‘ARPANSA would be well based to grow,’ were a civil nuclear power sector to be established in Australia, and acknowledged some of its ‘existing regulatory guidance’ would be ‘applicable’.
2.46Energy specialist, Dr Adrian Paterson, founder and principle of Siyeva Consulting suggested, ‘You would have to increase the number of people at ARPANZA (sic). … You could beef up that regulatory structure in six months’.
2.47In her testimony, Ms Helen Cook, appearing in a private capacity, disagreed with proposals that ‘the entire regulatory framework is needed on day one’. She told the Committee the regulatory framework and necessary human resources can be developed over time. In her submission, Ms Cook suggested ARPANSA ‘could be ready to receive a construction license application for nuclear reactors within three years of a policy decision to start a civil nuclear energy program’.
2.48However, Dr Hirth of ARPANSA reflected that while ‘Australia does have many things in place, but we would still require significant review of our regulatory framework and the development of a clear national position’. She concluded that ‘Even if you have those things in place, I still think it is in the 10-to-15-years range’.
2.49On the time needed to review the regulatory framework, Ms Clare Savage, Chair of the Australian Energy Regulator, advised the Committee it would take eight to 10 years for ‘the removal of the prohibition and getting the agreements of the various states and territories’.
2.50To estimate that timeframe, Ms Savage reflected on analogous experience ‘developing lots of different types of policy and regulation in Australia’. In her experience, the long timeframe would come from the requirement for the ‘underwriting of new generation investment work’, and obtaining ‘agreement between levels of government on technical detail with sufficient consultation of industry stakeholders, consumer stakeholders and the general public’.
2.51Dr Hirth advised the Committee that ARPANSA’s regulatory capacity to oversee nuclear power generation would depend on the location and ownership of nuclear facilities, noting ARPANSA’s ‘remit is to regulate Commonwealth entities’. Ms Savage also touched on this issue in her evidence to the Committee, reiterating:
My understanding is that ARPANSA has Commonwealth functions and that there would still need to be state based safety, environmental and technical frameworks, and to do the combination of those things would take eight to 10 years.
2.52On the timeframe implications of undertaking this work, Ms Savage speculated that creating the enabling regulatory environment ‘would take you to 2035 before you commence building’. Looking further ahead, Mr John Grimes, CEO, Smart Energy Council, reflected that factoring in the required regulatory reforms, nuclear deployment by 2045 was, in his view, ‘deeply ambitious’.
Workforce preparedness for a new nuclear power industry
2.53The Committee received evidence about the workforce requirements and preparedness to support the deployment of nuclear power generation in Australia noting it has ‘no existing nuclear power generation industry’.
2.54The Australian Nuclear Association submitted Australia can scale up existing expertise it has in key fields including nuclear engineering, management, and regulation to establish and manage a civil nuclear power industry. Ms Heather Hoff, founder of Mothers for Nuclear, also highlighted that engineers and electricians would be able to transition to jobs in nuclear plants, and noted her plant also hires people for various positions without requiring a degree.
2.55However, the Australian Nuclear Research and Education Network (ANREN) advised that a nuclear workforce would ‘cover a diverse range of professions’, and noted, ‘The European Human Resources Observatory for the Nuclear Sector defines 50 different roles essential for the nuclear sector, many of which require postgraduate-level nuclear training’.
2.56There may also be limited to the transferability of skills and experience from existing nuclear operations in Australia. Regarding the nuclear research reactor at Lucas Heights, Mr Scott from ARPANSA explained there:
…is quite a significant difference between the research reactor and a nuclear power reactor operating at pressures, and the complexities of engineering that may be involved.
2.57Dr Hirth from ARPANSA reflected that:
Across safety, security and safeguards, we do have excellent expertise in place for the nuclear industry…. It’s just about the scale that would be required for a nuclear program, and the experts and the lead time to develop that capacity within the system.
2.58Mr Jenkinson from ANSTO advised the Committee of the need to ‘make sure that there is an available workforce’, for a new nuclear power industry. He reflected that Australia currently has a ‘small sophisticated nuclear workforce’, of ‘about 1,400 employees’, including 550 staff in ‘scientific and technical’ roles and ‘about 250 people with PhDs’.
2.59In comparison, ANREN referred to workforce capacity in the US of approximately 100,000 people, and the UK which estimates it will require ‘inflows’ of 14,300 to 21,500 full time staff per year for the civil and defence nuclear sectors. ANREN stated that:
…. given the international demand for nuclear expertise, Australia cannot rely on other nations to provide suitably qualified and experienced workers; we will need to train our own to ensure sovereign capability.
2.60Dr Hirth further reflected that with the AUKUS program, which also requires a workforce with nuclear capacity, running concurrently, ‘the workforce would present challenges for Australia in the current landscape’.
Construction timeframe challenges for Australia
2.61In its submission, ANSTO notes the IAEA’s Commissioning Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants, states the construction period goes ‘from the first pouring of structural concrete to grid connection’. ANSTO referred to the Guideline’s advice that the construction schedule ‘“can range from less than five years to longer than twenty years”’.
2.62This section considers evidence received about two factors that may increase the deployment timeframes for nuclear power generation in Australia:
1Jurisdictional factors about Australia, including its democratic political ideology and its lack of previous nuclear power generation build experience; and
2The design and availability of the reactor chosen, and scale of the program.
Jurisdictional factors influencing construction times
2.63ANSTO submitted that construction timeframes are ‘dependent on multiple factors specific to the jurisdictions in which they operate’.
2.64Professor Andrew Whittaker, Director, Institute of Sustainable Transportation and Logistics, University of Buffalo proposed it ‘should’ take five to 10 years to build a plant with two-gigawatt scale reactors in Australia, ‘taking advantage of the lessons learned’ from the recent construction in the United States of America (USA) with Plant Vogtle and the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) construction of four units at the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant.
2.65However, Mr Grimes from the Smart Energy Council cautioned estimating timeframes using comparisons with countries ‘where there’s existing nuclear energy’. He pointed to comparisons with the USA, and explained:
California has the advantage of having done nuclear since it was invented in World War II, with an industry and a whole ecosystem around that. Australia has no such experience.
2.66ANSTO also pointed to the impact on timeframes of the immaturity of Australia’s nuclear power industry compared to other jurisdictions, submitting:
The design and construction of a nuclear power plant in Australia and the associated regulatory approvals would be more complex and time-consuming. Even in jurisdictions with comparable regulatory settings, environmental laws and community expectations the deployment time would be dependent on factors such as the existence of an already established nuclear energy capability.
2.67Various witnesses referred to the example of the UAE where another ‘nuclear newcomer country’ went from ‘zero experience and zero expertise in nuclear to what now amounts to 20 or 25 per cent of their electric grid being nuclear in 12 years’.
2.68Professor Whittaker suggested ‘Australia could do much better than 12 years because it has a nuclear regulator and operating research reactor’.
2.69SMR Nuclear Technology Pty Ltd also pointed to Australia’s previous nuclear research reactor experience, noting ‘the deployment time of the complex OPAL research reactor at Lucas Heights from the initial announcement … in 1997 to full power operation in 2006 was less than 9 years’.
2.70However, the Committee heard that even where a jurisdiction has nuclear experience, the recency of that experience can also impact on the timeframe for construction of new reactors. ANSTO referred to the blowout of the construction timeframe for the UK Hinkley Point C reactor from a 6-year expected timeframe to a projected 10-12 year timeframe. ANSTO submitted:
Delays are attributed to an initial 15-month delay due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, and difficulties with uplifting the country’s nuclear workforce and supply chain after a 20-year pause in nuclear construction.
2.71On differences between jurisdictions and how that can impact on timeframes, Mr Paul Graham, Chief Economist, Energy, CSIRO and Professor Quiggin, appearing in a private capacity, both reflected on the different political ideology and ‘labour markets’ between Australia and the UAE. Professor Quiggin expanded,
The United Arab Emirates mentioned 13 years, but of course they don't have to worry about social licence or anything of that kind whatsoever; the guy in charge says, 'We're building it here,' and it happens. Those difficulties of the time scales have been massively glossed over.
2.72The Australian Nuclear Association reported shorter reactor construction times in China, another non-democratic country.
2.73Mr Graham of CSCIRO advised the Committee that Australia’s lack of experience and political ideology were factors in the CSIRO’s 15-year timeframe estimate. He summarised:
… we’re talking about [Australia’s] first nuclear build here. Some of those countries also have the advantage of not being democracies, so they don’t have to consult as much. So that speeds things up as well. We couldn’t really find a solid example where someone had achieved better than 15 years that was a democracy, and that was their first time. So I think it would be at least 15 years, with the risk that it would be longer than that.
2.74Professor Mark S. Winfield, a nuclear expert from Canada, posited a longer timeframe for Australia. He reflected that:
… from start to completion the timeline for the Canadian nuclear program from a standing start, analogous to Australia's current situation, exceeds half a century.
Choice of reactor design
2.75The Australian Nuclear Association explained a key factor influencing construction timeframes comes from the ‘type and size’ of the reactor selected and, ‘whether the design is a first-of-a-kind or nth-of-a-kind and whether the design is finalised before construction starts’.
2.76On developments in large nuclear reactor design, ANSTO submitted that:
The current generation of nuclear power reactors known as Generation III+ have operated reliably for several decades. Advances in materials science, engineering and numerical modelling are driving the development of next-generation (Generation IV) reactor systems.
2.77In its submission, the Australian Nuclear Association mentioned recent delays and cost overruns in ‘construction of some first-of-a-kind power reactors in Finland, France and the USA’.
2.78Professor Quiggin reflected on recent large reactor designs and observed:
When we look at the current generation designs, generation III and generation III plus, only a handful have been constructed, all running over time and over budget, and we only have a tiny amount of operating experience.
2.79Professor Quiggin commented that ‘we really are taking a leap in the dark to the extent that we say, “Let's build one of these”’.
2.80SMR Nuclear Technology Pty Ltd submitted an end-to-end timeframe for construction of a large nuclear power plant would be ‘up to 10 years’, including five years of construction time for a ‘proven design’.
2.81Mr John Hallam, a nuclear disarmament campaigner, referred to the 2019 report of the Australian House of Representatives’ Standing Committee on Environment and Energy - Not without your approval: a way forward for nuclear technology in Australia in his submission. He noted the report,‘in its most prominent finding, wisely said Australia should acquire NOT a 'FOAK' (First of a Kind) technology but 'NOAK' (Nth of a kind)’. He cautioned that ‘…even “Nth of a kind”, “evolutionary” reactors … seem to suffer from similar woes to other reactors’.
2.82Potential construction time efficiencies arising from repurposing existing energy infrastructure and coal power plant sites depending on the choice of reactor were raised by some witnesses. Ms Constable of the MCA suggested that the ‘decommissioning of a coal-fired power station can happen alongside the planning and building of SMRs [small modular reactors] or bigger facilities’. Mr Nowakowski from Rainforest Reserves Australia, suggested, ‘Nuclear facilities could go alongside retiring coal plants and we can utilise all of their existing infrastructure’.
2.83Dr Geoffrey Bongers, Director, Gamma Energy Technology acknowledged grid and transmission upgrades would be required if ‘nuclear was placed that was larger than the current facility’.
2.84However, on reusing existing infrastructure Mr Scott of ARPANSA cautioned making assumptions about compatibility and transferability:
You have to look at external events: floods and other natural events that could occur. That is part of the siting process. Yes, building around existing transmission infrastructure can save time, but the potential issue is that the site of a current coal-fired plant may not be adequate for a nuclear plant.
2.85Dr Hirth of ARPANSA also noted the construction timeframe ‘depends on the scale of the program you are rolling out and the technologies that you choose’. She contended that the benefit of using ‘proven technology that was running effectively’, is that it ‘bring[s] efficiency in technologies which have been constructed multiple times and which are effective and well understood in their use, as well as with their regulation’.
2.86Regarding scale, Professor Whittaker referred to time efficiencies from multiple builds in Barakah in the UAE where it took eight years to construct one unit, with four units constructed in ‘less than 12 years’.
2.87The Nuclear Energy Institute submitted ‘the increased economies of scale and growing expertise [from global nuclear projects] are expected to drive down the cost curve and improve project delivery timelines’.
2.88Mr Graham of CSIRO also acknowledged ‘there were a lot of countries that can do below 15 years. But they're often countries that have continuous building programs’.
Design and availability impacts on timeframes for Small Modular Reactors
2.89On the choice of design, the Committee received evidence specifically about the potential timeframe for deployment of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) in Australia.
2.90SMRs are ‘nuclear power reactors designed to generate less than 300 MWe, regardless of the underlying technology (e.g., Gen III+ or Gen IV)’. SMRs are seen by some to ‘present a compelling alternative to ensure a consistent, reliable, and sustainable energy supply’. For example, the Committee heard there is increasing interest from US companies in ‘pursuing plans are centered on reactor[s] that are smaller and more modular’.
2.91On timeframes, SMR Nuclear Technology Pty Ltd noted GenCost ‘lists the construction time of an SMR as 4.4 years’. ANSTO similarly submitted that ‘SMR units … have expected deployment timeframes of around 5-years from construction start to electricity (or heat) generation’. ANSTO also acknowledged ‘deployment timeframes are less certain for SMR modules in their current state’.
2.92The ‘current state’ of SMRs, and its impact on timeframes, received significant comment from submitters and witnesses. Professor Lachlan Blackhall, a Fellow with Engineers Australia, noted that while large scale ‘conventional nuclear is proven internationally’:
Small modular reactors are still effectively in a research and development experimental phase. You can't go out today and buy one of those.
2.93In its submission, the Blueprint Institute stated, ‘Contrary to the claims of some overly enthusiastic public commentators, SMRs also have a technology-readiness problem. Most SMRs are currently in conceptual design phases’. It stated, ‘92% of the SMR projects globally remain in elementary, prototypical stages of design’. In his submission, Professor John Quiggin noted, ‘It will be unclear for some years which, if any, of these designs are technically feasible’.
2.94ANSTO advised the Committee that while there are SMRs ‘planned or currently under construction’, the only operational SMRs are in China and Russia. However, the joint submission from the 16 national and state/territory environment groups was critical of those examples, noting ‘Small modular reactors (SMRs) do not exist. The so-called operating SMRs in Russia and China were not built using serial factory production methods’.
2.95On deployment timelines specifically, the joint submission from 16 national and state/territory environment groups summarised:
Construction timelines for the so-called SMRs in Russia and China were protracted: 9 years in China and 12 years in Russia. In both countries, planning plus construction took 20 years or more.
2.96The Blueprint Institute also noted the timeframe blowouts in the development of the Chinese and Russian SMRs, stating, ‘Russian modules were completed nine years later than originally scheduled, and their performance has been described as “mediocre”’.
2.97Various submitters pointed to the lack of recent progress in SMR commercialisation In his submission, Mr Steve Gates put forward that while SMRs are being identified as a ‘“new generation” of nuclear reactors’, they ‘have been promised for over 20 years and yet nothing “commercial” exists’.Mr Simon Holmes à Court, Australian businessperson and political activist, also submitted that ‘SMRs are barely any closer to commercialisation than they were claimed to be five years ago’.
2.98The joint submission from 16 national and state/territory environment groups referred to above summarised that, ‘the SMR sector is littered with failed and abandoned projects, false claims and false dawns’. Greenpeace Australia pointed out that as the ‘technology…doesn’t even exist yet’, it would be ‘unrealistic’ to imagine them being deployed in Australia ‘by 2037’. Similarly on timeframes, Mr Geoffrey Miell told the Committee, ‘Currently [SMRs] are vapourware, and there are unlikely to be any until at least the 2030s, if ever’.
A history of delays
2.99The Committee also heard that construction schedules for nuclear power generation projects are susceptible to ‘extensive delays and cost blowouts’. The Independent and Peaceful Australia Network directed the Committee to note the World Nuclear Industry 2024 Status Report, which they submitted found:
… every reactor currently under construction has exceeded the five year construction estimate. Many have suffered significant delays. Of those operational in recent years, time from construction to grid connection is 7 to 15 years.
2.100Ms Jennifer Brown, Climate Lead, Queensland Conservation Council, stated the Council ‘does not think nuclear is the way forward’. Ms Brown pointed to:
… international examples where the UAE has taken 18 years to build one nuclear power plant. The UK has taken 16 years just for construction and over eight years for contracting and policy—and that's in a country that already has nuclear facilities.
2.101Mr Holmes à Court suggested the recently completed UAE build was not without delays. He stated in his submission that ‘the first unit was expected to reach commercial operation in 2017 but that milestone was not achieved until 2021, a delay of four years’. Regarding the UAE example, Dr Hirth of ARPANSA told the Committee, ‘there was about an 18-month delay in actually switching on, and that was associated with workforce demands’.
Implications of nuclear deployment timeframes on critical climate and industrial reforms
2.102AEMO’s Integrated System Plan (ISP) ‘step change’ scenario sets out key timelines for Australia’s energy grid transition out to 2050, including the staged decommissioning of all coal power plants by 2038. It also addresses investment in renewable power generation and infrastructure as part of meeting emissions reductions targets to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.
2.103Many inquiry participants shared their views about the tension between the likely timeframes for nuclear power deployment in Australia and the timeframes for Australia’s decarbonisation and climate commitments.
Nuclear ‘not a timely or practical solution’ for emissions reduction in Australia
2.104Ms Constable from the MCA told the Committee, ‘in the age of climate change there is persistent and growing net public support for the legitimate consideration of nuclear energy in Australia’.[149] She continued, ‘Nuclear power has been operating safely for over 60 years, almost 70 years. Nuclear power is needed to completely decarbonise the economy by 2050’.[150]
2.105Similarly, Dr Barry Green, a nuclear expert appearing in a private capacity, told the Committee:
Many Western countries have had sporadic nuclear-power-building programs and are now in the process of restarting and ramping up those programs as part of their climate change mitigation strategies.
2.106Submitters and witnesses also drew the Committee’s attention to international commitments to nuclear power in the context of reducing emissions at recent United Nations Climate Change Conferences.
2.107However, the Australian Nuclear Free Alliance was critical of attempts to ‘promote nuclear power as a response to the climate emergency’.[153] The Climate Change Authority similarly submitted:
It is simply not feasible that nuclear energy could be brought online fast enough to replace Australia’s retiring coal-fired power stations and contribute to cutting emissions in the next two decades – the critical window for limiting climate harm while also maintaining grid reliability and security.
2.108The Cairns and Far North Environment Centre stated ‘nuclear power is not a practical or timely solution’, because the Far North Queensland (FNQ) region is:
…already experiencing the impacts of climate change, highlighting the urgent need for rapid emissions reductions by 2035 to protect the Great Barrier Reef, Wet Tropics Rainforest and our other unique ecosystems across FNQ.
2.109Noting the expected long deployment timeframe for nuclear power generation in Australia, Solutions for Climate Australia submitted that delays in emissions reductions until the late 2040s would mean ‘catastrophic impacts would be almost certain’ and, cautioned that it ‘would take Australia out of international agreements on climate, likely triggering future trade restrictions and costs on Australia’.
2.110Climate Tasmania submitted ‘developing nuclear power stations in Australia is way too slow to address climate change,’ and cautioned:
Selling nuclear power as a solution to climate change is really a recipe for greater greenhouse gas emissions by requiring continued coal, oil and gas burning rather than rapid deployment of renewables over the critical next few decades.
2.111The Climate Council of Australia submitted it would not be feasible to ‘extend the life of Australia’s ageing coal-fired’ plants and ramp up the use of gas powered stations, to fill the transition time to the point where nuclear power is being successfully generated in Australia.
2.112On that topic, the Electrical Trades Union of Australia (ETU) noted the ‘declining reliability of [coal power stations] as they reach the end of their life’. It submitted that ‘many power stations would require a complete rebuild to keep them open long enough for even the first nuclear reactor to be opened’.
2.113The Clean Energy Council submitted:
Nuclear power would not be ready in time to substitute our aging coal-fired power fleet, creating further risks of higher energy prices, potentially supply-side shortfalls and jeopardising system reliability.
2.114The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) also cautioned that shifting focus to nuclear would depress overall energy investment, affecting supply and reliability.
2.115Mr Westerman, CEO, AEMO, highlighted that nuclear power would not be operational soon enough to address future energy reliability risks, emphasising the need for immediate investment in generation, storage, and transmission:
… without additional investment in generation, storage and transmission, several states in the National Energy market will breach that regulated reliability standard over the decade ahead. I’m not here to debate the time line of nuclear. I don’t think anyone is suggesting it would be here within the next couple of years for the first state to breach that reliability standard, and probably not in the 10-year period either.
2.116The Australian Marine Conservation Society expressed similar sentiments in its submission:
Diverting investment and focus on building a nuclear industry, with its expense, extensive water demands, and long timelines, would delay the rollout of renewable energy that is already deployable and effective.
Barriers to the redeployment of the coal workforce to nuclear power plants
2.117The Committee received evidence on the feasibility of transitioning the coal power plant workforce to nuclear plants, as coal plants are decommissioned by 2038.
2.118Professor Jacopo Buongiorno, Director, Science and Technology, Nuclear Reactor Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Director, Center for Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, told the Committee that in addition to the benefit of reusing infrastructure from coal plants for nuclear plants, ‘you also get to rehire the workforce’, although he noted retraining is necessary due to the differences between coal and nuclear plants.
2.119However, many submitters and witnesses questioned the credibility of ‘big promises [that] have been made about job creation’, and identified critical barriers to the viability of transitioning of coal jobs to the nuclear sector, such as the changing nature and number of jobs, and the timing of the availability of jobs if nuclear plants were to be built. These issues are canvassed below.
2.120Firstly, on the nature and number of jobs, Mr Trevor Woolley, a retired engineer with experience in the electrical supply industry, appearing in a private capacity, told the Committee that ‘technology will change jobs and remove jobs’, and noted:
The average job in a coal-fired plant is all about materials handling. It's about ash, dust, coal and milling. Those don't exist anymore. I don't think a lot of people really add up the number of jobs that aren't going to be there in a nuke. They're different types of jobs, but a lot of the jobs aren't going to exist.
2.121In its submission, the ETU included its 2024 Nuclear Power Report, which noted the declining workforce requirements of the nuclear sector over time compared to renewables:
The average 1GW nuclear reactor needs approximately 3,500 jobs at the construction peak and approximately 400 direct jobs once its operating. However, because the regulation, building and development phases are riddled with so many problems, those jobs are not guaranteed. Even if they are built, we would not see the first nuclear reactor job until at least 2040.
2.122The ETU’s report stated that, in comparison, ‘By 2030 there will be more than 1.8 million people employed in renewable energy jobs, growing to over 2.2 million by 2050’. The ACTU’s submission also stated:
… the jobs created [in nuclear power plants] … would represent only a fraction of the jobs that would have been created through equivalent investment in renewables, and would pose dangerous, long-term health risks for workers.
2.123Secondly, on the timing of the availability of jobs in nuclear plants, Mr Robin Williams, District President, Northern Mining and NSW Energy District, Mining and Energy Union stated:
Our members won't have a nuclear industry to go to. My understanding is that it'll take in excess of 15 years. We have people who are losing their jobs in 2027. Bayswater Power Station closes in 2033, if not before, and we've got the Mount Arthur coal mine closing in 2030. Their nuclear jobs are not there; there are no jobs.
2.124Finally, on the risk jobs may never eventuate, Mr Daniel Sherrell, Senior Climate and Energy Policy Officer, ACTU, stated:
… the reality is that nuclear power is unlikely to ever create a single job in Australia, for the simple fact that the economics don't stack up. Every single nuclear project that has commenced construction in a comparable economy over the past 20 years has been subject to massive cost blowouts and long delays.
Committee comment
2.125It is clear to the Committee from the evidence it received that there would be significant challenges associated with establishing a nuclear power generation sector in Australia before the mid-2040s, at the earliest.
2.126While the Committee received evidence from some submitters about the shifting nature of the public’s perception of nuclear power in Australia and globally, it observed that overall, there continues to be a lack of broad support for nuclear power generation in Australia. The Committee also received compelling evidence about the historic challenges and potentially long timeframes to obtain social licence for siting nuclear facilities, including power plants and waste facilities, and the need to consult and gain consent prior to making announcements about locations.
2.127The Committee heard it could take up to a decade to lift the moratorium on nuclear power generation and establish an enabling regulatory environment for a new nuclear power industry, even recognising the skills and expertise of Australia’s existing nuclear industry. Australia's lack of nuclear power generation construction supply chain, experience and workforce capacity undermine its capacity to quickly deploy a new civil nuclear power sector. Further, SMRs do not yet exist at a level of commercial readiness suitable for contemplating their deployment.
2.128Many submitters and witnesses also drew the Committee’s attention to the frequent history of delays in nuclear power builds internationally, particularly for countries commencing a new nuclear power program.
2.129Based on these timeframes, the Committee has formed an interim view that there is limited utility in pursuing nuclear power at this point as it cannot be deployed in time to support Australia's critical energy transition targets and climate commitments, or to assist the coal workforce and communities in their transition away from the coal industry.