Bills Digest no. 19 2006–07
Independent Contractors Bill
2006
WARNING:
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as
introduced and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest
does not have any official legal status. Other sources should be
consulted to determine the subsequent official status of the
Bill.
CONTENTS
Passage History
Purpose
Background
Financial Implications
Main Provisions
Concluding Comments
Endnotes
Contact Officer & Copyright Details
Passage History
Independent
Contractors Bill 2006
Date introduced: 22 June 2006
House: House of
Representatives
Portfolio: Employment and Workplace Relations
Commencement: The formal provisions (clauses 1 and
2) commence on Royal Assent. The substantive provisions (clauses 3
to 43) commence six months after Royal Assent unless commenced
earlier by proclamation.
The proposed independent contractors legislation is made up of
two Bills: the Independent Contractors Bill 2006 (the Principal
Bill or Bill ) and the Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment
(Independent Contractors) Bill 2006 (the Consequential Bill ).
The purpose of the Principal Bill is to move contracting
relationships as far as possible away from the realm of employment
and to place these relationships as far as possible under
commercial regulation.
The Government made a commitment to the introduction a separate
Independent Contractors Act during the 2004 federal election
campaign. The Coalition s policy paper, Protecting and
Supporting Independent Contractors stated:
A re-elected Coalition Government will introduce
the Independent Contractors Act to prevent the workplace relations
system from being used to undermine the status of independent
contractors. [ ]
While the courts have developed tests to uncover
sham independent contractor arrangements, there is a view in the
community that these tests have gone too far and that too
frequently, the honest intentions of parties are disregarded and
overturned.
A party s freedom to contract must be upheld and
there must be certainty in commercial relationships. The
Independent Contractors Act will seek to ensure that these
principles are enshrined and protected.(1)
The Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, when
introducing the Bills to Parliament, reflected a similar commitment
to ensuring that independent contracting is encouraged without
excessive regulation, stating that:
[ ] the attraction of independent contracting is
to operate independently, not to work as an employee. The
flexibility that independent contractors provide the workplace is
an important component of a modern and dynamic economy.
The Independent Contractors Bill (the Principal
Bill) reflects the Government s commitment to ensuring that
independent contracting is encouraged without excessive regulation.
The Principal Bill is built on the principle a principle this
Government believes in that genuine independent contracting
relationships should be governed by commercial not industrial
law.(2)
The Bill:
- does not define the term independent contractor beyond its
meaning under the common law (the Personal Services Income test
used by the Australian Tax Office to identify independent
contractors was not adopted)
- applies to services contracts (contracts for the performance of
work by an independent contractor) with the requisite
constitutional connection
- overrides the deeming provisions contained within State and
Territory industrial legislation which deem certain categories of
independent contractors to be employees and provisions which bestow
employee related entitlements on independent contactors. This is
subject to a three year transitional period
- preserves existing protections for outworkers contained within
State and federal legislation
- provides a default minimum rate of pay for contract outworkers
in the textile, clothing and footwear (TCF) industry where an
outworker is not guaranteed a minimum rate of pay under State and
Territory laws
- preserves existing protections for owner drivers in the road
transport industry in Victoria and New South Wales. This is to be
reviewed in 2007 with a view to rationalising and nationalising the
laws
- establishes a national services contract review scheme for the
review of unfair contracts, and
- excludes State and Territory unfair contracts provisions as far
as constitutionally possible.
On 24 January 2005, the House of Representatives Employment
Workplace Relations and Workforce Participation Committee announced
an Inquiry into independent contracting and labour hire
arrangements (the Inquiry). The terms of reference sought
submissions regarding:
- the status and range of independent contracting and labour hire
arrangements
- ways independent contracting can be pursued consistently across
State and federal jurisdictions, and
- strategies to ensure independent contract arrangements are
legitimate.
The Inquiry received 77 submissions and the Committee s report
Making it Work: inquiry into independent contracting and labour
hire arrangements (Making it Work Report) was released
on 17 August 2005.
The proposed legislation has been referred to the Senate
Employment, Workplace Relations and Education References and
Legislation Committee (Senate Committee Inquiry) for inquiry and
report by 25 August 2006. Submissions can be found at:
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/eet_ctte/contractors06/submissions/sublist.htm
The Digest draws on material both from the Making it
Work Report and the submissions to current Senate Committee
Inquiry.(3) Since completion of the Digest, the Senate
Committee has tabled its report. For further information, the
reader is referred to the
report and to the postscript in the Concluding Comments of the
Digest.
An important task of the law of employment is to categorise the
different types of working relationships that may arise, in order
to determine how they should be regulated.
There is no fixed definition of an independent contractor,
however it is generally accepted that such workers are not
employees at law. In contrast to employees, who are subject to a
contract of service, independent contractors operate under
a contract for services to produce an agreed result. The
focus of a contract for services is the nature of the service
delivered by the contractor, rather than both the service delivered
and the manner in which it is delivered. Importantly, the
independent contractor is regarded as being in business on his or
her own account, rather than being an employee of the principal s
business.
The Bill relies on the common law to distinguish between an
employee and an independent contractor. It is therefore useful to
consider in some detail the basis of this common law
distinction.
It is generally recognised that the common law has utilised a
number of tests in its attempt to find a suitable basis for
distinguishing employees from those performing work on some other
basis. The most durable of these centres on the concept of control
by the employer . However, the judgments in Steven v
Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd recognised as the leading
authority on the issue, confirmed a trend towards a more
sophisticated conception of employment.(4) On this
approach, the presence or absence of a right of control is just one
of a number of factual elements or indicia some characteristic of a
contract of service, others suggesting a non-employment
relationship that may be examined before a decision is reached. The
approach was perhaps best summed up by Bray CJ:
There is no magic touchstone. The court has to
look at a number of indicia and then make up its mind into which
category the instant case should be put. It is a question of
balancing the indicia pro and con But the power of control over the
manner of doing the work is very important, perhaps the most
important of such indicia.(5)
Creighton and Stewart in their text, Labour Law,
comment:
The balancing exercise is necessarily
impressionistic, since there is no universally accepted
understanding of how many indicia, or what combination of indicia,
must point towards a contract of service before the worker can be
characterised as an employee. In effect then, this multi-factor
test proceeds on the assumption that the courts will know an
employment contract when they see it!(6)
There are also no hard-and-fast rules as to which indicia should
be examined.(7) However, in addition to looking at the
extent of any authority to control, it is especially relevant to
ask whether the worker:
- supplies their own tools or equipment
- is free during the engagement to perform similar work for other
employers
- carries a risk of financial loss, or by the same token, an
opportunity to make a profit from the work, or
- is paid according to task completion, rather than receiving
wages based on time worked.
Positive answers to any of these questions will militate to some
degree against a finding that the contract is one
of service (i.e. an employee). If the answer is negative,
it is more likely the worker is an employee.
According to Creighton and Stewart, the most substantial
difficulty with the prevailing judicial approach, however, is that
it permits one or both of the parties to a work relationship (but
usually the employer) to evade obligations that would otherwise be
imposed by awards or statutes. This is a consequence that some
courts have been at pains to resist, claiming, for instance, that
the parties cannot create something which has every feature of a
rooster, but call it a duck and insist that everybody else
recognise it as a duck (8) However, as Creighton and
Stewart continue:
with a modicum of care and ingenuity it remains
possible for businesses to obtain work from individuals who are
virtually indistinguishable from employees, in terms of their close
connection to the organisation and subordination to its managers
and supervisors, yet whom the common law does not characterise as
employees . This can in most instances be achieved simply through a
well-drafted contract that is designed to look as much like a
client contractor agreement as possible. Especially if it includes
an unqualified right of delegation, few judges will be prepared to
look behind its terms.
There is nothing wrong in principle with allowing
the parties to categorise their contractual arrangements as they
choose. But in many cases it is only the employer who both
understands the nature and effect of the arrangement, and stands to
gain from it. The advantages accruing to a worker who freely agrees
to a non-employment arrangement are often illusory. While it may in
some cases be possible to earn more as a contractor than as an
employee, and even to reap certain tax advantages, it is important
not to underestimate the real value of the statutory and award
benefits foregone. This becomes all the more anomalous where the
substance of the relationship remains identical to what it would
have been had the contract been worded differently and another
label attached.(9)
The Making It Work Report noted the difficulties with
the common law distinction between employee and independent
contractor. In addition, the Report also analysed other methods
that could be used to distinguish an employee from an independent
contractor. In particular, the Report looked at the possibility of
using a statutory definition or alternatively, relying on the
alienation of personal services tests as stipulated in the
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997.(10) The reader
is referred to Chapter 4 of the Making It Work Report for
a fuller discussion of these alternate approaches.
The Making It Work Report did recommend that when
drafting independent contractor legislation, the Government
maintain the common law approach to determine employment status and
distinguish between employees and legitimate independent
contractors. However, the Report made a further recommendation that
when drafting legislation the Government should, in addition to the
common law position, adopt components of Australian income tax
assessment alienation of personal services income legislation tests
to identify independent contractors.(11) The Bill does
not implement this second recommendation the Minister in his Second
Reading Speech arguing that this test is a self-assessment test and
easily manipulated to achieve the desired outcome if a worker is
seeking to be classified as an independent contractor rather than
an employee.(12)
Deeming , in the context of employment law, involves the power
to declare persons who work under a contract for service, such as
independent contractors, to be employees. Due to concerns about
worker welfare, State Governments have introduced deeming
legislation to ensure that such workers have protections under
their industrial relations legislation. They consider that many of
these workers are dependent contractors or disguised employees
.(13)
Deeming provisions are different from common law tests because
they are designed to classify as employees groups of workers with
service contracts. Common law tests can only be applied to
individuals on a case-by-case basis.
Queensland and NSW have been the more prominent advocates in
introducing deeming legislation.
The Queensland Government states that:
The increasing move away from the conventional
employee/employer relationship towards workers engaged under labour
hire arrangements and under dependent contractor status, has
effectively taken these workers outside of the industrial relations
system and the benefits and protections associated with being
defined as an employee under relevant industrial
laws.(14)
Section 275 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld)
gives the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission the power to
declare persons who work under a contract for services to be
employees (employee deeming ). The list of criteria that section
275 allows the Commission to declare a class of contractors to be
employees includes:
- the relative bargaining power of the class of persons
- the economic dependency of the class of persons on the
contract
- the particular circumstances and needs of low-paid
employees
- whether the contract is designed to, or does, avoid the
provisions of an industrial agreement
- whether the contract is designed to, or does exclude the
operation of the Queensland minimum wage, and
- the particular circumstances and need of employees including
women, persons from a non-English speaking background, young
persons and outworkers.
Persons or workers that this deeming applies to includes:
outworkers, lessees of equipment or vehicles, drivers wholly or
partly owning their vehicles and persons working as partners in a
business or association.(15)
In New South Wales, schedule 1 of the Industrial Relations
Act 1996 (NSW) deems certain types of workers to be employees.
The NSW Government states that the deeming provisions recognise
that a number of categories of workers exist who are often in weak
negotiation positions. In many instances, the relationship which
exists is not substantively different to that of employee and
employer, and hence should be covered by the protection of
generally accepted standards of industrial
regulation.(16) The NSW legislation includes:
- a range of specific occupations, such as cleaners, carpenters,
bread and milk vendors, joiners or bricklayers, plumbers, drainers
or plasterers, painters and clothing outworkers deemed to be
employees
- power to deem others to be employees by regulation
- a system of contract determination, and
- a process to test if employment contracts are unfair.
The NSW Government considers that if there were not deeming
provisions, there may be a significant degree of inequality in
bargaining power between the worker and the provider of
work.(17)
As an aside, it is also common to find lists of deemed employees
in other laws. For example, workers compensation legislation and
statutes dealing with discrimination of various kinds also tend to
apply to independent contractors and other workers who would not be
employees at common law. Legislation dealing with occupational
health and safety likewise imposes duties that extend beyond the
traditional concept of employment in a variety of ways. The Bill
will not override State legislation containing deeming provisions
in matters such as workers compensation, occupational health or
discrimination. However the Bill does contain provisions that would
enable regulations to be made to do this. (18)
These are summarised well in the Making It Work
Report:
Supporters of deeming
provisions generally point to the need to protect workers from
unequal bargaining power to negotiate reasonable contract
conditions. Submissions of support were mainly received from state
governments and unions. The advocates of deeming highlight that
this approach overcomes some of the shortcomings of a rigid
definition and case law to identify who is an
employee.(19)
In contrast, detractors
of deeming approaches included employer organisations, independent
contracting bodies and some in the law profession. Critics cite the
piecemeal approach, disregard of the common law distinction, and
the lack of consideration of the substantive nature of working
relationships as being of considerable concern.(20)
There are currently a range of protections available to
outworkers in the textile, clothing and footwear (TCF) industry
both in the federal and State jurisdictions and applying to both
employee and contract outworkers. As the Explanatory Memorandum
states, these special arrangements are in place for TCF outworkers
as they are considered to be particularly vulnerable because they
tend to lack bargaining power in relation to their rights and
entitlements. The Explanatory Memorandum also states:
As most jurisdictions currently deem contract
outworkers to be employees, overriding State deeming laws through
the Independent Contractors legislation may particularly
disadvantage contract outworkers who are currently entitled to
employee protections under State industrial relations laws.
Further, it would not be consistent with the approach taken under
the Work Choices legislation which has maintained special
arrangements for TCF outworkers.(21)
It is on the basis, that the Bill makes special
arrangements for outworkers designed to preserve existing
protections for outworkers contained within State and federal
legislation.
However, submissions to the Senate Committee Inquiry indicate
reaction to these provisions has been mixed. While State
Governments, unions and organisations representing outworkers
generally support preservation of outworker protections, several
submissions have questioned whether the drafting of the provisions
is wide enough and whether it actually supports the Government s
stated intention to retain existing State and federal protections
relating to contract outworkers .(22) A fuller
discussion of the provisions affecting outworkers is found in the
Main Provisions section of the Digest.
The most common type of independent contractors in the transport
services industry are owner-drivers. Owner-drivers supply their own
vehicle to deliver goods for a client. In 1998, 5.4 per cent of all
self-employed contractors worked in the transport and storage
industry.(23) Submissions to the Inquiry noted that
owner-drivers have working conditions similar to employees, and are
often referred to as dependent contractors (as opposed to
the traditional notion of independent contractors who work
for many clients) or as disguised employees . State Government,
particularly Victoria and New South Wales, have specific
legislation setting rates and other employment-like conditions for
independent contractors in the road transport industry, including
truck owner drivers and taxi drivers. The Explanatory Memorandum
states that overriding state protections for owner-drivers in New
South Wales and Victoria would represent a significant cost for
independent contractor owner-drivers in these jurisdictions. It is
on this basis that there is provision in Part 2 of the Bill to
protect Victorian and New South Wales owner driver legislation from
the general override provisions. This protection is subject to
review in 2007.
An unfair contract is a contract that is harsh, unconscionable
or is against the public interest. Factors considered when deciding
whether a contract is unfair are: the relative bargaining power of
the parties, whether any undue influence or pressure or unfair
tactics has been exerted, or whether the contract became unfair due
to the conduct of the parties or variation to the
contract.(24)
Under sections 832 and 833 of the WR Act, the Federal Court of
Australia is empowered to examine contracts for services binding on
an independent contractor which relate to performance of work and
provide appropriate remedies. The remedy is currently limited to an
independent contractor who is a natural person. There are also
Constitutional limits it is also required that one of the parties
be a Commonwealth authority, or a financial trading or foreign
corporation, or relate to matters that take place in or are
connected with a Territory.
The unfair contracts review jurisdiction proposed by Part 3 of
the Principal Bill is in similar terms to the scheme for unfair
contracts as set out in sections 332-4 of the WR Act. The Bill
differs from the current provisions in certain respects
including:
- the reach of the unfair contracts regime will be extended from
natural persons to include incorporated independent contractors
(although access to the remedy is limited to circumstances where a
director or family member of a director is personally required to
perform work under the contract)
- an obligation on the Federal Court when determining the issue
of unfairness to consider relevant contract rates when comparing
remuneration under the contract with that of an employee in similar
circumstances (clause 15(2))
- excluding contracts relating to the performance of work for the
private and domestic purposes of another party to the contract,
and
- excluding industrial organisations of employers or employees
from access to the jurisdiction on behalf of their members.
Unfair contracts legislation also exists at State and Territory
level.(25) Part 2 of the Principal Bill contains
provisions that propose to generally exclude State and Territory
law that allows services contracts to be reviewed, varied or
amended on unfair grounds.(26)
The New South Wales Government, in its submission to the Senate
Committee Inquiry states that its unfair contracts jurisdiction is
a broader and more flexible jurisdiction than that proposed under
the principal Bill. The submission provides the following
comparison:
Pt 3 of the Bill:
- only applies to services contracts (not employment
contracts)
- has a more limited scope for review of unfair or harsh dealings
in that it applies to legally valid contracts and not to the
broader concept of arrangements for the performance of work
- ðdoes not expressly give the Federal Court or Federal
Magistrates Court the power to make orders for the payment of
money
- allows an applicant to seek an injunction to protect his or her
position but, unlike the IRC in the New South Wales scheme, does
not give the Court the more extensive power to make orders
prohibiting absolutely or conditionally a party or associated
person from entering into further unfair contracts
- ðdoes not permit industrial organisation of employers or
employees to access the jurisdiction on behalf of their respective
members
- does not specifically proscribe contracts designed to avoid
industrial instruments in contrast to the statutory concept of
unfair contract under the New South Wales scheme
- assigns the jurisdiction to the Federal Court rather than a
body such as the IRC with specialised industrial knowledge and
arbitral experience.
The submission notes that the obligation imposed on the Federal
Court to effectively take market rates into account may be
difficult to discharge since evidence of relevant contract rates
and conditions will be difficult to gather because of commercial
confidentiality considerations and the lack of transparency in
these types of arrangements.(27)
By way of contrast, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry (ACCI), in their submission to the Senate Committee
Inquiry argue that these provisions, along with the State unfair
contracts provisions are not needed. They note with concern the
fact that the proposed new federal unfair contracts jurisdiction is
in fact broader than the existing scheme and argue that an
excessively broad jurisdiction can undermine contractual certainty.
(28)The submission states:
Freedom to contract and contractual certainty,
together with property rights, are cornerstones of a functioning
market economy.(29)
The expected costs associated for both the Principal Bill and
the Consequential Bill are $15 million over the next four
years.(30)
Clause 3 sets out the objects of the Bill. The
objects are:
- to protect the freedom of independent contractors to enter into
services contracts
- to recognise independent contracting as a legitimate form of
work arrangement that is primarily commercial, and
- to prevent interference with the terms of genuine independent
contracting arrangements.
Central to the new legislation is the term services contract .
Both Bills apply to services contracts as defined in clause
5 of the Principal Bill. A services contract is a contract
for services to which an independent contractor is a party, that
relates to the performance of work by that contractor and has the
requisite Constitutional connection. The Bill does not provide a
definition of independent contractor; instead the term takes it
common law meaning.
A contract for services is only subject to the Bills if it has
the requisite constitutional connection . This
requires(31):
- at least one party of the services contract to be either a:
- constitutional corporation
- commonwealth authority, or
- body corporate incorporated in a Territory, or
- the services contract to have a sufficient connection to a
Territory which requires one of the following conditions to be
satisfied:
- the work under the services contract is wholly or principally
to be performed in a Territory in Australia
- the services contract was entered into in a Territory in
Australia, or
- at least one party to the services contract is a natural person
who is resident in, or body corporate that has its principal place
of business in, a Territory in Australia.
Part 2 deals with the exclusion of State and
Territory laws. Under clause 7(1)(a) and (b) of
the Bill, a State or Territory law that affects the rights,
entitlements, obligations or liabilities of a party to a services
contract will be excluded to the extent that it either:
- takes or deems a party to that contract to be an employer or an
employee for the purposes of a workplace relations matter,
or
- confers or imposes rights, entitlements, obligations or
liabilities on a party to that contract in relation to matters that
would be workplace relations matters if the parties were in an
employment relationship.
The meaning of workplace relations matter is critical to the
operation of these exclusion provisions. A State or Territory law
cannot be excluded under these provisions unless it affects the
parties to the services contract for the purposes of a
workplace relations matter.
Clause 8 provides definitions of what is and what is not a
workplace relations matter.
A workplace relations matter is:
- remuneration and allowances
- leave entitlements
- hours of work
- enforcing or terminating contracts of employment or agreements
determining terms and conditions of employment
- disputes between employees and employers
- industrial action
- matters relating to employees or employers that are dealt with
by or under the WR Act or State or Territory industrial law,
or
- any other matter specified in regulations (subclause
8(1)).
Amongst other things, a workplace relations matters
is not:
- superannuation,
- workers compensation,
- occupational health and safety
- taxation, or
- any other matter specified in regulations (subclause
8(2)).
As a result, contracting parties with a relationship of
independent contractor and employee, may still continue to be
deemed employers or employees for the purposes of making workers
compensation insurance premium payments, liability for payroll tax,
superannuation guarantee liability, or liability under equal
opportunity and OHS legislation. However, where a common law
independent contractor relationship exists, State laws will no
longer be able to deem a party to be an employee for the purposes
of annual leave, sick leave, long service leave, termination and
redundancy payments, minimum hourly rates and allowances, and many
other common employee entitlements.(32)
Clause 7(1)(c) excludes State or
Territory laws that allow services contracts to be set aside or
varied on the grounds of unfairness. An unfairness ground is
defined in subclause 9(1).
Subclause 9(2) clarifies that the override of
State and Territory unfair contracts jurisdiction will not affect
matters that are not workplace relations matters. For
example the State unfair contracts jurisdiction would still be
available in relation to a services contract in an occupational
health and safety matter.
Subclause 7(2) provides that the exclusion
provisions in subclause 7(1) do not apply in certain circumstances.
In particular, the Commonwealth override does not apply to:
- State and Territory laws that apply to a services contract to
which an outworker is a party and which make
provision in relation to such a contract (paragraph
7(2)(a))
- State laws concerning contract owner drivers in the transport
industry in New South Wales and Victoria, specifically Chapter 6 of
the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) and the Owner
Drivers and Forestry Contractors Act 2005 (Vic)
(paragraph 7(2)(b)).
The Explanatory Memorandum states that outworkers in services
contracts and owner drivers will not have access to State and
Territory unfair contracts legislation in relation to workplace
relations matters. The rationale being that the new federal unfair
contracts regime to be established under Part 3 of the Bill would
apply.
Regulations can be made to add further categories
of State and Territory laws that would not be affected by the
exclusion provisions (paragraph 7(2)(c)).
Regulations can also be made to further exclude State and
Territory laws in relations to the rights and obligations of a
party to a services contract (clause 10).
Subclause 10(2) clarifies that override by
regulation could also effect the outworker and owner driver
exemptions.
The Explanatory Memorandum states that the effect of clause
7(2)(a) is to preserve State and Territory laws that affect
outworkers who are party to a services contract. However, several
submissions to the Senate Committee Inquiry expressed concern that
the drafting of this clause is more restrictive than the
Explanatory Memorandum has indicated. For example the TCF Union of
Australia states the exception for outworkers is deficient because
it will only apply where:
- there is a direct services contract with an outworker (this
means that laws which regulate services contracts between parties
further up the contracting chain, such as a fashion house and a
head contractor are overridden)
- the law in question applies to and makes provision in relation
to that services contract (as opposed to the rights and liabilities
of the parties to it), and
- insofar as the law applies and makes provision in relation to
the services contract, it does not provide for the services
contract to be varied, set aside or rendered unenforceable on
fairness grounds, including grounds that the contract seeks to
avoid industrial laws, awards or other instruments.
The submission goes on:
Put simply, the range of laws which are protected
by section 7(2)(a) is such a small subset of the range of laws
which are excluded by 7(1) that the effect will be to render
outworker protection regimes under state laws largely
ineffective.(33)
The Victorian Government noted a similar problem with the
drafting and argues that significant sections of the Outworkers
(Improved Protection) Act 2003 (Vic) would be excluded,
leaving outworkers in a far more vulnerable position than is the
case under State law.(34) The Victorian Government
further states that the provisions as drafted appear to be contrary
to the intention in the Explanatory Memorandum which confirms the
need to maintain special arrangements for TCF outworkers. In view
of this perceived problem, the Submission proposes the following
amendments:
a) Clause 7(2)(b) of the IC Bill should be amended
to include the Outworkers (Improved Protection) Act 2003
(Vic) (and other State outworker Acts), as laws that are not
excluded; and
b) Clause 7(2)(a) of the IC Bill should be
amended to provide, in effect, that clauses 7(1)(a) and 7(1)(b) do
not apply to the extent that the State or Territory law applies to
outworkers.(35)
Part 3 provides a scheme permitting a relevant
Court (either the Federal Court of Australia or the Federal
Magistrates Court) to order that services contracts be wholly or
partly set aside or varied on the grounds that they are harsh or
unfair. The existing unfair contracts review provisions in the WR
Act located in sections 832-834 are to be repealed by the
accompanying Consequential Bill.
Clause 11 provides that Part 3 applies in
relation to a services contract, although it excludes contracts
relating to the performance of work for the private and domestic
purposes of another party to the contract. The Part will apply to
incorporated independent contractors, but access to the remedy is
limited to circumstances where a director or family member of a
director is personally required to perform work under the contract.
The Explanatory Memorandum states that large bodies corporate would
be excluded from accessing this Part as directors would not usually
personally perform all or most of the work under their services
contracts.(36)
Clause 12 provides that an application could be
made to the Court to review a services contract on the grounds that
the contract was unfair and/or harsh. The concepts of unfair or
harsh would take their common law meanings. Subclause12(2) provides
that an application may only be made by a party to the services
contract. By way of comparison the existing provision in the WR Act
provides that an application may also be made by an industrial
organisation of the employee or employer on behalf of the
party.
Clause 13 authorises the making of regulations
to prescribe circumstances in which applications could not
be made to the Court to review a services contract. The Explanatory
Memorandum explains that for example, the regulations could
prescribe a mechanism, such as a financial cap, to limit the scope
of applications made under subsection 12(1).(37) As an
aside, the Master Builders Australia, in their submission to the
Senate Committee Inquiry recommends that the Regulations should
provide a monetary cap of $200,000 over which sum contracts cannot
be reviewed.(38)
Clause 14 would have the effect of preventing
an application to review a services contract where other review
proceedings have also commenced in another jurisdiction in relation
to the same contract.
Clause 15 provides a number of matters that the
Court may have regard to in determining whether a services contract
is unfair and/or harsh. The Court would be permitted to
consider:
- the relative strength of the bargaining positions of the
parties to the contract, and if applicable, any persons acting on
behalf of the parties
- whether a party to the services contract was subjected to any
unfair tactics, undue influence or pressure in determining if the
contract was unfair and/or harsh
- whether the total remuneration under the services contract was
less than the total remuneration under a contract where an employee
performs similar work, and
- any other relevant matter.
In addition subclause 15(2) provides that, if the Court has
regard to comparative employee remuneration as provided in
paragraph 15(1)(c), it must also consider:
- whether the terms of, and the total remuneration provided under
the services contract are proportionate with the terms of, and
remuneration provided under, other services contracts relating to
the performance of similar work in the particular industry.
Subclauses 15(3) to 15(5) replicate existing
provisions in the WR Act and relate to the responsibilities on the
Court in forming an opinion about whether the contract is unfair
and/or harsh.
As far as remedies are concerned, the Court is able to set aside
or vary part or all of the contract (subclause
16(1)). The Court also has the power to make interim
orders so as to preserve the position of a party to a services
contract. The Court may also enforce an order by injunction or
otherwise as the Court considers appropriate. The orders that the
Court may make are essentially the same as those set out in the
existing unfair contracts provisions in the WR Act.
Clause 17 provides that proposed Part 3 creates
a no costs jurisdiction except in relation to proceedings which
have been vexatiously brought.
The object of Part 4 of the Bill as set out in
clause 18 is to ensure that individuals who are
independently contracted textile, clothing and footwear (TCF)
outworkers are afforded a minimum rate of pay as determined by what
an employee would received under the Australian Fair Pay and
Conditions Standard or the applicable minimum rate of pay the TCF
outworker would receive under State or Territory law.
Australian law recognises two types of outworkers: employee
outworkers and outworkers who are independent contractors or
contracted outworkers.
Under the WR Act as amended by the Work Choices legislation,
minimum wages for employee outworkers are set under the Australian
Fair Pay and Conditions Standard. For contracted outworkers, Part
22 of the WR Act provides a minimum remuneration guarantee to
contracted TCF outworkers in Victoria, again set at the Australian
Fair Pay and Conditions Standard. Part 22 does not apply to
outworkers engaged outside Victoria.(39)
State protections for contracted TCF outworkers are different.
Most State legislation contains provisions that deem contracted
outworkers to be employees and thus award and agreement making
systems in those states will apply to those workers. In addition to
deeming provisions, Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria have
specific legislation to further protect contracted outworkers.
As stated above, the Government in the Explanatory Memorandum
acknowledges that TCF outworkers are a particularly vulnerable
class of workers who deserve greater protections than are afforded
to other workers. The Explanatory Memorandum further states that
the Government does not wish to replace or interfere with the
existing State frameworks, and therefore, the outworker provisions
in the Bill (which are based on the Victorian provisions) are
minimalist and designed to operate as a default in states and
territories which have not put their own outworker protections in
place.
The provisions in Part 4 will therefore essentially replicate
the Part 22 provisions of the WR Act, currently designed to protect
only Victorian TCF contracted outworkers. Part 22 of the WR Act is
to be repealed by the accompanying Consequential Bill.
Clause 20 imposes an obligation on a person who
engages contract TCF outworkers to pay those workers at least the
statutory amount as set by the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions
Standard. Contract outworkers are defined so that only those TCF
outworkers who are engaged as independent contractors under a
services contract would be included. TCF outwork is defined as work
that comprises packing, processing or otherwise working on articles
for the textile, clothing or footwear industry performed in or
about private residential premises or premises that are not
business or commercial premises of anyone who is obliged under the
contract to pay for the work performed.
Clause 21 provides that the minimum rate of pay
proposed would not apply where a State or Territory law provides
contract outworkers a minimum rate of pay for TCF outwork. In these
cases the minimum rate of pay specified by the State or Territory
law would operate.
Division 3 (clauses 22 29)
provides workplace inspectors with certain powers to investigate
compliance with the minimum rate of pay obligations in clause 20.
The provisions substantially replicate the provisions in
Subdivsions C and D of Part 22 of the WR Act which provide for
inspector powers and an enforcement regime in Victoria.
It is of note, that there are indications the Government is
proposing amendments that would remove Part 4 of the Bill. For
further detail, the reader is referred to the Postscript in the
Concluding Comments of the Digest.
Part 5 creates transitional arrangements for those who, at the
time of commencement of the legislation are independent contractors
at common law but who have been deemed under State or Territory law
to be employees, or who are afforded employee style entitlements by
State or Territory laws that are to be disapplied by the Bill. The
provisions would provide that, where the transitional arrangements
cover a person, the relevant State or Territory laws continue to
have effect in relation to the contract between the
parties.(40) The transitional period lasts up to 3 years
unless the contract ends earlier (subclause
35(4)). The parties to a services contract can elect to
opt into the federal system at any time during the transitional
period by executing a reform opt-in agreement (clause
33). If no such agreement is reached and the contract
period runs until the transition date the deemed employment
arrangement will be terminated at the end of the period
(subclause 35(8)). The transitional provisions are
complex and for further detail the reader is referred to the
Explanatory Memorandum at pages 52 63.
The New South Wales Government in its submission to the Senate
Committee Inquiry noted the complexity of these transitional
provisions stating:
Independent contractors caught up in these complex
and potentially confusing arrangements will very likely need legal
advice to clarify their rights and obligations during the
transitional period and in relation to entitlements which will
arise under State law as a result of the operation of Part 5. The
provisions are highly prescriptive, technical and introduce a
confusing array of concepts. There are, for example, pre-reform
commencement contracts, continuation contracts, related
continuation contracts, remedy contracts, test contracts and a
contractor law test designed to clarify the continued application
of the State contractor law (deeming provisions) to relevant
services contracts.(41)
Part 6 provides a general
regulation making power for the purposes of the Independent
Contractors Act. Subclause 42(2) clarifies that
the regulations may include modifications of the Transitional
provisions contained in Division 1 of Part 5 of the Bill (the
provisions affecting State and Territory laws). These modifications
may also have retrospective application (subclause
42(3)). The Explanatory Memorandum states that the
rationale for such a broad regulation making power is that the
transitional provisions are complex and novel: [ ] a broad
regulation making power allowing retrospective legislation to be
made is desirable to ensure that the accrued entitlements of
formerly deemed employees are not unintentionally lost
.(42)
Concluding comments
Some of the issues that the proposed independent contractors
legislation raises are as follows.
- The legislation relies on the corporations power, section
51(xx) of the Constitution, to essentially oust States from
exercising their concurrent powers over industrial relations. How
successful in ousting the States the Commonwealth can be, will
depend upon the findings of the High Court in relation to the scope
of this power in the challenge to its Work Choices legislation: a
broad reading of the power will expand the reach of this law, a
narrower construction will contract it.(43) It is widely
expected that this decision will be handed down later this year.
The constraints of this Bills Digest prevent a more detailed
discussion of the often very complex constitutional arguments and
analysis surrounding section 51(xx). Instead, the reader is
referred to the following publication of the Parliamentary Library
which provides a detailed discussion of the constitutional
background to the workplace relations reform: P. Prince and T.
John, The
Constitution and industrial relations: is a unitary system
achievable? , Research Brief, no. 8, Parliamentary
Library, Canberra, 2005 06).
- This legislation complicates an area of law unnecessarily. The
preservation of State laws in some areas and in some States,
reliance on the common law test of employee/independent contractor
and the introduction of very complex transitional provisions, which
will last for three years, will compromise the hope that this
legislation will cut through red tape for business.
- Related to this complexity, the legislation also provides a
costly system of redress for small business and workers. While the
Bills contain protections to prevent unfair contracts and sham
arrangements, they only provide the remote option of taking an
employer/contractee before the Federal Magistrates Court or the
Federal Court, both costly jurisdictions and therefore unlikely to
be available to the majority of workers who these Bills should be
protecting.
- Finally, the legislation leaves open the opportunity to
significantly expand its scope by a heavy reliance on regulation
making. The legislation confers very broad law-making power upon
the Executive, including provisions which enable the Executive to
make, for example, regulations capable of overriding states laws as
well as of changing this proposed law itself.(44)
Since completion of the Digest, the Senate Committee report has
been tabled. The Reader is referred to the
full report for further detail. Significantly, the report notes
that the Committee, which took the unusual step of convening
private negotiations between the Department of Employment and
Workplace Relations (DEWR) and outworker lobbyists on August 17,
said it had been reassured by strong indications from the
Department that the removal of Part 4 of the Principal Bill is
likely to be agreed to by the Government. The report also suggested
the Government would change clause 7(1)(c) of the Principal Bill to
clarify that it would not override State anti-avoidance provisions
protecting TCF outworkers. It said DEWR had proposed confidential
draft amendments directly excepting outworkers, or a legislative
note or extra explanatory memorandum on the
section.(45)
- Federal Government Election 2004 Policy, Protecting and
Supporting Independent Contractors.
- Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, Independent
Contractors Bill 2006, House of Representatives, Hansard,
22 June 2006, p. 5.
- Since completion of the Digest, the Committee has tabled its
report. A copy can be found at:
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/eet_ctte/contractors06/report/index.htm
- (1986) 160 CLR 16.
- R v Allan; Ex parte Australian Mutual Provident Society
Ltd (1977) 16 SASR 237 at 248.
- Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law,
4th ed., Federation Press, 2005, p. 286.
- Creighton and Stewart do however suggest that the list in
Abdalla v Viewdaze Pty Ltd (2003) 122 IR 215 at 229 31 is
very helpful.
- Re Porter (1989) 34 IR 179 at 184.
- Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, op. cit., p. 293.
- The Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 provides that
certain independent contractors are to be taxed as employees.
However, they will not be taxed as employees if they are found to
be running a personal services business, which will be the case if
any of the following applies:
- They satisfy the results test for at least 75 per cent of
income, that is:
- they work to produce a specified result or outcome(s) under the
contract or arrangement
- they provide the tools and equipment necessary (if any) to
produce the result(s) (if no tools or equipment are required they
meet this component of the test)
- they are liable for the cost of rectifying any defective
work
- less than 80 per cent or more of personal services income (PSI)
in an income year comes from each client and must meet one of the
other three personal services business tests. These are the:
- unrelated clients test: having two or more unrelated
clients
- employment test: having employees or subcontractors that
perform 20 per cent of the work, or apprentices for at least half
of the year
- business premises test: having business premises that are
physically separate from their home, or from premises of the person
for whom they are working, or
- receive a personal services business determination from the
Commissioner of Taxation. (Extracted from the Making It
Work Report, pp. 61-62).
- Recommendation 3.
- Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, Independent
Contractors Bill 2006, House of Representatives, Hansard,
22 June 2006, p. 5.
- A dependent contractor is generally recognised as one who works
for only one employer as opposed to an independent contractor who
works for many different employers.
- Queensland Government submission to the Making It Work
Inquiry, paragraph 5.9 of the Report.
- Making It Work Report, paragraphs 5.10 5.11.
- NSW Government submission to the Making It Work
Inquiry, paragraph 5.13 of the Report.
- ibid., paragraph 5.15.
- For further discussion see the Main Provisions section of the
Digest.
- Making It Work Report, paragraph 5.16.
- ibid., paragraph 5.17
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 13.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 1.
- Making it Work Report, paragraph 2.46.
- Making it Work Report, paragraphs 5.76 5.77.
- The Making It Work Report provides a summary of unfair
contracts legislation across the States and Territories, pp.
111.
- For further information see page 14 of the Digest.
- NSW Government submission to the Senate Committee Inquiry,
paragraph 136.
- The current scheme affects only natural persons.
- ACCI Submission to the Senate Committee Inquiry, paragraph
84.
- DEWR Submission to the Senate Committee Inquiry, p. 16.
- The constitutional powers underpinning the legislation are the
corporations power, section 51(xx) and the Territory power, section
122. The corporations power enables the Commonwealth to make laws
with respect to foreign, trading and financial corporations in
Australia. The scope of this power will depend upon the findings of
the High Court in relation to the challenge to the federal
Government s Work Choices legislation: a broad reading of the power
will expand the reach of this law, a narrower construction will
contract it. It is widely expected that this decision will be
handed down later this year. The constraints of this Bills Digest
prevent a more detailed discussion of the often very complex
constitutional arguments and analysis. The reader is referred to
the following publication of the Parliamentary Library which
provides a detailed discussion of the constitutional background to
the workplace relations reform: P. Prince and T. John, The
Constitution and industrial relations: is a unitary system
achievable? , Research Brief, no. 8, Parliamentary
Library, Canberra, 2005 06).
- CCH industrial law news, issue 7, 31 July 2006, p.
6.
- TCF Union of Australia submission to the Senate Committee
Inquiry, paragraphs 77 81.
- Industrial Relations Victoria submission to the Senate
Committee Inquiry, paragraph 14.
- ibid., Recommendation 2.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 38.
- ibid., paragraph 61.
- Master Builders Australia submission to the Senate Committee
Inquiry, Recommendation 3.
- This is because Victoria referred its workplace relations
powers to the Commonwealth and therefore is covered by federal
legislation.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 52.
- NSW Government submission to the Senate Committee Inquiry,
paragraph 246.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 64.
- Professor Greg Craven in an article, Industrial Relations, the
Constitution and Federalism , UNSW Law Journal, v.29(1),
2006, pp. 203 214, refers to the concept of opportunistic
federalism when he says that a comprehensive finding by the High
Court in favour of WorkChoices will have long-term implications for
Australian federalism both theoretically and practically. In a
practical sense it would render Australia s federal balance vastly
more flexible and realistically, there could be relatively few
desirable objects within the Commonwealth s ambitions that could
not be approached via a combination of the corporations power and
some other power contained in section 51 of the Constitution.
Professor Craven continues: The potential of these realities would
be to usher in a period of opportunistic federalism , under which
the Commonwealth would be free to cherry-pick those areas of
activity which it chose to regulate. These choices often would be
made not primarily on the basis of specific constitutional
responsibility, or indeed settled policy objectives, but rather by
reference to impermanent considerations of political advantage and
convenience. Under such a regime, the position of the States would
be substantially undermined by Canberra in an on-going and random
manner. Australia doubtless would continue to be a federation, but
one in which the federal balance was a political calculation to be
made on a weekly basis.
- Examples are: clauses 8(1), 10, 13 and 42(2). In so far as
these provisions permit subordinate legislation to change the law
of the enabling Act, the provisions can be referred to as Henry
VIII clauses. A fuller discussion of this concept is found in the
Digest for the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices)
Bill 2005 at pp 120 122.
- Reported in Workplace Express, 28 August 2006, Senate
inquiry recommends changes to Independent Contractors Bill to keep
state protections for clothing outworkers .
Mary Anne Neilsen
4 September 2006
Bills Digest Service
Parliamentary Library
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of the Parliamentary Library, nor do they constitute professional
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ISSN 1328-8091
© Commonwealth of Australia 2006
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