Key issues
- Politically
motivated violence is rising globally and domestically, with incidents
ranging from harassment to terrorism.
- This
includes increasing instances of vandalism, online abuse and physical attacks
against parliamentarians and their support staff.
- These
events can significantly erode trust in public institutions, reduce political
participation and deepen social polarisation.
- Australia
and other countries are responding with increased security measures and
inter-agency collaboration, but inherent challenges remain.
Introduction
In the 2025
Annual Threat Assessment, ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess warned that
the risk of politically motivated violence was ‘already flashing red’ and is
expected to remain elevated until 2030. On 14 December 2025, two gunmen
allegedly carried out an
ISIS-inspired terrorist attack during a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach
in Sydney, killing 15 people and injuring 40 others. This was Australia’s
deadliest mass shooting in nearly 3 decades and underscored ASIO’s earlier warnings,
bringing politically motivated violence into an even sharper focus.
Politically
motivated violence refers to acts or threats intended to achieve a
political objective, spanning violent protests, vandalism, assault and terrorism.
This paper examines the drivers, manifestations and implications of
politically motivated violence, situating Australia within the broader global
context and exploring current responses and future challenges.
The normalisation of
anti-democratic behaviour
Support for politically
motivated violence
Within Australia’s increasingly volatile security
environment, politically motivated violence poses a significant threat to
democracy by reducing
political participation, eroding public trust and deepening social
polarisation. Exposure to such violence
can normalise the behaviour and increase
its prevalence, particularly among younger Australians. According to the 2024
McKinnon Poll, approximately 10% of those surveyed supported the use of
threats, intimidation, violence or vandalism to advance a cause (p. 50). This
was most pronounced among Gen Z (aged 18–24) and Millennial (aged 25–44) respondents.
The 2025
McKinnon Index further reinforced these findings, with 8.9% of respondents
agreeing that ‘it is sometimes justified to use extreme measures such as
violence to advance a cause you care about’ (p. 39). This trend is not
unique to Australia; support
for and incidents of political violence are rising globally. This is
particularly prevalent in the US, where a September
2025 poll found that 30% of respondents agreed that ‘Americans may need to
resort to violence to get the country back on course’.
Social media as a key
catalyst
As the internet has become deeply integrated and pervasive
in many people’s daily lives, the increasing use of social media has made it a
key platform for violent rhetoric and threats. For example, 27% of respondents
to a 2024 Australian
Institute of Criminology survey had faced online abuse and harassment in
the past year.
Additionally, a 2019 survey by Australia’s
eSafety Commissioner found that one in seven respondents had been
victims of online hate speech, with ‘political views’ being the top reason
cited. Notably, those identifying as Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islander and/or
LGBTQI reported experiencing online hate speech at more than double the
national average.
The Australia
Institute also produced a study in 2019 showing that a third of survey
respondents had experienced online harassment or abuse and 8% experienced
‘cyberhate’, defined as:
… repeated, sustained threats or
attacks on an individual through the use of electronic devices, which result in
real-life harm to the target. These harms may be physical and/or psychological.
The attacks may be perpetrated by one or more individuals. (p. 7)
Specific targeting of
parliamentarians
Due to their public roles, politicians and senior officials are
prominent targets for politically motivated violence, with threats and physical
attacks increasing significantly over the past decade. These include the attempted
assassination of presidential candidate Donald Trump in 2024 and the
murders of British
MPs Jo
Cox (2016) and David
Amess (2021), and US Minnesota
representative Melissa Hortman (2025). Within the Australian context, in
late 2025 Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reportedly received death
threats and was the alleged target of a kidnapping
threat.
In 2023–4, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) recorded
over 1,000 threats of political violence, almost double the number from just
2 years prior (pp. 82–83). In highlighting the breadth of the issue, in March
2025 the AFP Commissioner Reece Kershaw informed a Senate
Estimates committee that ‘the politicians who’ve been targeted are across
the political spectrum, live throughout Australia and are of different
backgrounds’. Elections and other democratic events are also increasingly
flashpoints for threats of politically motivated violence, as political actors’
heightened visibility makes them more vulnerable targets. This played out in
Australia’s 2025 federal election, where threats against parliamentarians and
candidates reportedly
increased by 17% in 2025.
Elections and other democratic events are also increasingly
flashpoints for threats of politically motivated violence, as political actors’
heightened visibility makes them more vulnerable targets.
A 2023
University of Melbourne study reported that almost all Victorian state MPs
using social media suffered online abuse, predominantly regarding their
political positions or through more general defamatory statements. Gender-based
abuse was also particularly prevalent, with 85% of female MP respondents
reporting such occurrences. This aligns with the
Inter-Parliamentary Union’s recent analysis, which highlighted
rising online gender-based violence against women in parliament. Specifically,
60% of those women surveyed had been directly impacted by hate speech,
disinformation, image-based abuse or unwanted disclosure of personal
information (doxing).
One of the most common public displays of politically
motivated violence in Australia has manifested as electorate
office vandalism, occurring across the political spectrum. This has
included smashed windows, abusive graffiti and other politically motivated threats
against Liberal
and Labor
parliamentarians. The August 2025 Independent
review of resourcing in parliamentarian offices revealed a sharp rise in
politically motivated hostility towards electorate offices (pp. 17–18). It found
that 85% of offices experience high levels of abusive or violent behaviour from
constituents, with nearly half facing such incidents multiple times per month.
Common acts include verbal threats, intimidation, spitting and throwing
objects, while 72% of respondents reported an increase in security incidents.
Measures in response to
rising threats
Enhanced security measures
for parliamentarians
Escalating security threats can often lead to increased
investment in protective measures and expanded law enforcement capabilities.
For example, following the killings of Jo Cox and David Amess, British
authorities undertook comprehensive
reviews of parliamentary security. These resulted in
strengthened local security arrangements, the creation of a dedicated
police unit to investigate threats and enhanced protections at MPs’ homes and
offices. Spending on MPs’ personal security also rose sharply—from £170,576 in
2015–16 to £4.5 million in 2017–18—with an additional £31 million allocated in
2024 (via the Defending
democracy policing protocol). New Zealand has similarly expanded
parliamentary security, granting additional training and statutory
powers under the Parliament Act 2025 (NZ).
In Australia, Parliament House in Canberra has undergone
significant security upgrades over the past decade, costing nearly $150
million. A key catalyst was the National Terrorism Public Alert level rising
from ‘medium’ to ‘high’ in September 2014,
leading a Parliamentary Security Taskforce to establish the Security Upgrade
Implementation Plan. This reportedly
incorporated the ‘most complex security investment in the building’s history’
and included
perimeter fencing, turnstiles and barriers, enhanced security at building
entrances and security system upgrades. Following this project’s completion in
December 2020, additional
security improvements have included almost $30 million allocated for
further security infrastructure and security process upgrades, responding to
recommendations in the Foster
Review into parliamentary workplaces.
Parliament House’s sheer scale of engagement makes security
particularly challenging, with more than 1.6 million people passing through its
security points in 2024–25,
more than double the 750,000 recorded in 2018–19.
However, parliamentarians’ security outside of Parliament House is also an
important consideration. Accordingly, in 2024 the AFP and Department of Home
Affairs reviewed public officers’ personal and physical security and
subsequently established National
Security Investigations teams to enhance protection measures.
The 2025
review into parliamentarians’ office resourcing also noted requirements to
strengthen physical security measures, including reinforced infrastructure,
advanced surveillance systems and controlled access points. Additional resources
will likely be required to support personal security services and provide
training for managing aggressive behaviour. These developments highlight the
need for a comprehensive strategy combining security upgrades and other support
services to protect parliamentary staff while safeguarding democratic
processes.
This imperative of balancing security requirements with
democratic engagement and openness can present significant challenges.
Excessive security measures risk creating
perceptions of elitism and detachment among politicians. Intelligence
gathering, while essential, raises
privacy concerns and the potential for political misuse. Moreover, heightened
focus on threats can inadvertently inspire copycat behaviour or amplify
extremist narratives.
This imperative of balancing security requirements with
democratic engagement and openness can present significant challenges.
Inter-agency
collaboration
As a whole-of government initiative, Australia’s
Counter-terrorism and violent extremism strategy 2025 prioritises education
and early intervention to address youth radicalisation, alongside coordinating
intelligence efforts and building community resilience. However, given the
digital and decentralised nature of the threats faced, international
coordination is also required. Accordingly, Australia maintains strong
inter-agency partnerships, including the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee and broader Five
Eyes partnership. The Australia-UK Online
Safety and Security Memorandum of Understanding also supports a coordinated
approach to combating online harm. These partnerships provide critical
intelligence sharing, response coordination and capacity building.
Following the December 2025 attack at Bondi Beach, Prime
Minister Albanese announced the establishment of a Royal
Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion. Former High Court Justice
Virginia Bell will serve as commissioner. The terms
of reference include providing recommendations to assist law enforcement,
border control and security agencies to prevent and respond to similar future
attacks. The previously
announced review of Australia’s federal law enforcement and intelligence
agencies—led by the former Secretary of the Defence and Foreign Affairs departments, Dennis
Richardson—will deliver an interim report in April 2026 to inform the
commission’s work. The royal commission is scheduled to present its final report
in December
2026.
Critical issues in countering
political violence
Despite persistent security threats, parliamentarians need
to maintain
direct engagement with constituents, particularly outside election periods.
However, escalating risks to politicians and their staff are increasingly
constraining these opportunities. In some cases, parliamentarians have reportedly
been advised
to reduce public appearances, while measures such as pre-screening
constituents further limit access and risk eroding public trust.
Growing hostility towards parliamentarians undermines the
principle of open and accessible representation. When elected officials feel
compelled to restrict engagement for safety reasons, it weakens the feedback
loop that shapes policy and diminishes opportunities for meaningful
participation. Persistent threats and abuse also deter individuals—particularly
women
and minority groups—from entering or remaining in public office. This not
only narrows the diversity of representation but fosters a political
environment dominated by those willing to tolerate extreme hostility, further
polarising discourse.
Growing hostility towards parliamentarians undermines the
principle of open and accessible representation.
Improving the tone of political
discourse adds another layer of complexity, with research suggesting it
requires coordinated effort across multiple actors, even as some benefit from
heightened conflict. When political leaders frame opponents as misguided rather
than malevolent, acknowledge legitimate concerns and denounce violent rhetoric
from their own supporters, this can set a standard for constructive debate.
Conversely, inflammatory language or tolerance of extremism normalises
hostility and undermines democratic norms.
Another core challenge lies in balancing
public safety with freedom of expression. Excessive regulation risks
silencing legitimate political debate or marginalising certain viewpoints,
while insufficient regulation allows violent rhetoric to spread unchecked.
Democracies approach this balance differently, shaped by their legal traditions
and societal values.
Equally critical is determining who defines violent speech. Absent
a codified bill of rights—statutory
or constitutional—should
the responsibility rest with parliamentarians, judicial bodies or a
combination of these? Each option carries distinct implications for
transparency, accountability and democratic protections.
Given the current social and legal environment, politically
motivated violence is likely to remain a pressing challenge well beyond 2026.
The central issue will be finding a sustainable balance between preserving
democratic ideals and ensuring that senior office holders can engage publicly
without compromising their safety.
Further Reading
- Australian
Electoral Commission (AEC), AEC
2025 Federal Election Report, (Canberra: AEC, 2025).
- Inter-Parliamentary
Union, Sexism,
Harassment and Violence Against Women in Parliaments in the Asia-Pacific Region,
issue brief, (Inter-Parliamentary Union: Geneva, March 2025).
- European
Parliamentary Research Service, Violence
Against Women Active in Politics in the EU, briefing, (European
Parliament: Strasbourg, November 2025).
- Commonwealth
Parliamentary Association, Parliamentary
Security: An Introductory Guide, (Commonwealth Parliamentary
Association: London, January 2025).