Key points

• The purpose of the Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Omnibus No, 1) Bill 2026 (the Bill) is to amend crimes-related legislation to update and clarify the intended operation of key provisions (Explanatory Memorandum, p. 5).
• Key measures in the Bill include:
  • The extension of the sunset date for network activity warrants, data disruption warrants, account takeover warrants, and related emergency authorisations by 3 years (Schedule 1, Part 3).
  • The repeal of the purity-based method for determining drug threshold quantities and the enactment of the mixture-weight approach (Schedule 2, Part 2).
  • The introduction of an explicit power for police officers to enter premises and use reasonable force when executing an extradition arrest warrant (Schedule 4, Part 2).
• At the time of writing, the Bill had not been referred to or reported on by any parliamentary committees.

Introductory Info

Date of introduction: 11 March 2026
House introduced in: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Attorney-General
Commencement:  Sections 1 to 3 commence on Royal Assent. Schedule 1 commences the day after Royal Assent. Schedule 2, Part 1 commences 6 months after Royal Assent. Schedule 2, Part 2 commences on the earlier of proclamation or 12 months after Royal Assent. Schedules 3 to 5 commence the day after Royal Assent.

Purpose of the Bill

The purpose of the Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Omnibus No, 1) Bill 2026 (the Bill) is to amend the Crimes Act 1914, the Criminal Code Act 1995, the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983, the Extradition Act 1988, the Measures to Combat Serious and Organised Crime Act 2001, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to update and clarify the intended operation of key provisions (Explanatory Memorandum, p. 5).

Structure of the Bill

The Bill contains 5 schedules:

• Schedule 1 amends various provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 and repeals a provision of the Measures to Combat Serious and Organised Crime Act 2001 (MCSOC Act) in relation to police powers and warrants. Part 1 will enact amendments in relation to police powers at Sydney West Airport. Part 2 will allow specific search warrants and orders to be made electronically and remotely. Part 3 extends the sunset date for network activity warrants, data disruption warrants, account takeover warrants, and related emergency authorisations. Part 4 will ensure that the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Policing can continue to access the Commonwealth’s pre-charge detention and investigation scheme.
• Schedule 2 amends the schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code) to adjust the operation of serious drug offence provisions in Part 9.1. Part 1 seeks to introduce evidentiary certificates that provide prima facie evidence of continuous possession of drug exhibits. Part 2 seeks to repeal the existing purity-based method for the determination of drug threshold quantities and replace it with the mixture-weight approach.
• Schedule 3 amends the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (DPP Act) and makes consequential amendments to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (PoCA Act). Part 1 amends the DPP Act to allow the Attorney-General to authorise a person to exercise the powers or functions of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions where there is a conflict of interest. Part 2 amends the DPP Act to change the title of ‘Associate Director of Public Prosecutions’ to ‘Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions’.
• Schedule 4 amends the Extradition Act 1988 to clarify aspects of the extradition process in relation to the waiver of the right to contest and introduces new powers of entry and use of reasonable force for police officers in relation to extradition arrest warrants.
• Schedule 5 amends the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) to replace references to the ‘Victorian Inspectorate’ with ‘Integrity Oversight Victoria’ due to the agency’s name changing.

Policy position of non-government parties/independents

At the time of writing, no comments on the Bill by non-government parties or independents were identified.

Background

Schedule 1 – Police Powers and Warrants

Police powers at major airports and Sydney West Airport

The Crimes Legislation Amendment (Police Powers at Airports) Act 2019 amended the Crimes Act to enhance police powers at Australia’s major airports, including by enabling constables and protective service officers (PSOs) to (p. 2):

• direct a person to produce evidence of their identity (section 3UP)
• direct a person to leave the airport or any other specified major airport for up to 24 hours (subparagraph 3UQ(3)(b))
• direct a person to not take a specified flight or any flight from a major airport for up to 24 hours (subparagraph 3UQ(3)(a))
• direct a person to stop or do anything else necessary to facilitate an identity check or move on direction (Section 3US).

The Explanatory Memorandum stated that these expanded powers were introduced in response to international events and the disrupted terrorist plot at Sydney International Airport (Kingsford-Smith) which had demonstrated that ‘airports are a high-profile and high-impact target for terrorists’ (p. 3).

The construction of Western Sydney International (Nancy-Bird Walton) Airport (Sydney West Airport) is currently underway and the airport is on track to begin operations in 2026. The Australian Government established a Commonwealth Company, the Western Sydney Airport Corporation (WSA Co) to deliver the airport by 2026. It will be a full-service airport which will operate curfew free to deliver international, domestic and freight services.

What the Bill proposes

Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Bill will amend the definition of major airport in the Crimes Act, to include Sydney West Airport. This will enable powers that may be exercised at major airports (such as identity checks and move on directions) to be employed at Sydney West Airport.

Network Activity Warrants, Data Disruption Warrants, Account Takeover Warrants and Emergency Authorisations

The Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021 (SLAID Act) amended the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (SD Act), the Crimes Act and associated legislation to introduce new law enforcement powers to enhance the ability of the AFP and the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) to combat online serious crime (EM, p. 2). The SLAID Act introduced three new warrant powers for the AFP and the ACIC:

• data disruption warrants
• network activity warrants and
• account takeover warrants.

Data Disruption Warrants

The purpose of a data disruption warrant is to allow the AFP and the ACIC to disrupt criminal activity that is being facilitated or conducted online by using computer access techniques (EM, p. 3). The data disruption warrant allows the AFP and the ACIC ‘to add, copy, delete or alter data to allow access to and disruption of relevant data in the course of an investigation for the purposes of frustrating the commission of an offence’ (EM, p. 3). To assist the disruption, a warrant may authorise other facilitative activities under section 27KE which may include:

• entering specified premises (subparagraph 27KE(2)(a) and 27KE(2)(b))
• using electronic equipment to obtain access to data (subparagraph 27KE(2)(c))
• removing a computer from a premises (subparagraph 27KE(2)(f))
• copying data that has been obtained (subparagraph 27KE(2)(g)) and
• concealing access and activities (subsection 27KE(9)).

To issue a data disruption warrant an eligible Judge or nominated member of the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART) must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the suspicion founding the application and that the disruption of data is reasonably necessary and proportionate (section 27KC).

The information collected under a data disruption warrant is subject to protections. It is an offence to use or disclose the information collected except in limited circumstances, for instance:

• for the purposes of the investigation of a relevant offence
• the making of a decision about whether or not to bring a prosecution or
• the prevention of serious harm.

Information collected under a data disruption warrant can be used in evidence in a proceeding.

Network Activity Warrants

The purpose of network activity warrants is to ‘allow the AFP and the ACIC to collect intelligence on criminal networks operating online by permitting access to the devices and networks used to facilitate criminal activity’ (EM, p. 4). Network activity warrants seek to allow agencies to target the activities of criminal networks to discover the scope of criminal offending and the identities of persons involved (EM, p. 4).

Network activity warrants authorise access to devices used by members of the criminal network over the life of the warrant, which is no more than 90 days (subsection 27KN(2)). The warrant also authorises adding, copying, deleting or altering data to obtain access to data for the purpose of collecting intelligence on criminal networks operating online (subsection 27KP(2)). Actions may be taken to conceal the computer access to allow the warrant to be executed covertly (subsection 27KP(8)).

To issue a network activity warrant an eligible Judge or nominated ART member must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the suspicion founding the application and that the disruption of data is reasonably necessary and proportionate (section 27KM).

Information that is obtained under a network activity warrant is for intelligence purposes only and is not permitted to be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding. However, the information obtained may be used to support an application for other warrants which may be used to collect evidence.

Account Takeover Warrants

The purpose of account takeover warrants is to allow the AFP and the ACIC to take control of a person’s online account for the purpose of gathering evidence about serious offences (EM, p. 6). Online accounts may include social media accounts, online banking accounts and accounts associated with online forums.

An account takeover warrant authorises taking control of an online account, which means taking steps that result in the person having exclusive access to the account (section 3ZZUL of the Crimes Act). To take control of an account officers can use a computer or other electronic equipment, access account-based data, and add, copy, alter or delete credentials or other data (section 3ZZUR of the Crimes Act). Reasonable steps must be taken to restore access to a lawful account to the account holder when the warrant expires or control of the account is no longer required (section 3ZZUV of the Crimes Act).

In an emergency situation an account takeover warrant may be issued internally and be subsequently authorised by a magistrate where there is an imminent risk of serious violence to a person, or imminent risk of substantial damage to property (sections 3ZZUX and 3ZZVA of the Crimes Act).

An account takeover warrant may also permit the officer to seek an assistance order from a magistrate requiring a person with knowledge of a computer or a computer system to provide reasonable and necessary assistance to help in carrying out the warrant (section 3ZZVG of the Crimes Act).

To issue an account takeover warrant a magistrate must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the suspicion founding the application (section 3ZZUP of the Crimes Act).

Information collected under an account takeover warrant can be used as evidence in a proceeding. However, it is an offence to use or disclose information collected under the warrant except in limited circumstances. These may include:

• for the purposes of the investigation of an offence
• the making of a decision about whether or not to bring a prosecution or
• the prevention of serious harm.

Emergency Authorisations

The Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (TOLA Act) and the SLAID Act introduced emergency authorisation provisions for access to data held in a computer and the disruption of data held in a computer (SD Act, subsections 28(1A) and 28(1C)). A law enforcement officer may apply for an emergency authorisation for access to data held in a computer where (EM, p. 24):

• there is an imminent risk of serious violence or substantial damage to property (subsection 28(1A))
• there are urgent circumstances relating to a recovery order (subsection 29(1A)) or
• where there is a risk of loss of evidence (subsection 30(1A)).

A law enforcement officer may apply for an emergency authorisation for disruption of data held in a computer where there is an imminent risk of serious violence to a person or substantial damage to property (subsection 28(1C)).

The SLAID Act also introduced emergency authorisation provisions for an account takeover (Crimes Act, section 3ZZUX)). A law enforcement officer may apply for an emergency authorisation for taking control of an online account if the law enforcement officer suspects there is an imminent risk of serious violence to a person or substantial damage to property (Crimes Act, section 3ZZUX)).

Sunsetting

The SLAID Act specified that data disruption warrants (SD Act s 27KAA), network activity warrants (SD Act s 27KKA) and account takeover warrants (Crimes Act section 3ZZUMA) cease to have effect 5 years after the commencement of each provision. Consequently, these provisions are due to cease on 4 September 2026.

Provisions allowing emergency authorisations for disruption of data under subsections 28(1C) and 28(1D) of the SD Act and emergency authorisations for account takeovers under section 3ZZUX  of the Crimes Act also cease to have effect 5 years after their commencement (SD Act section 27KU and Crimes Act section 3ZZUMA). Consequently, these provisions are also due to cease effect on 4 September 2026.

Review of Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt Act 2021

In accordance with subsection 6(1E) of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 (INSLM Act) the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM) reviewed the operation, effectiveness and implications of the amendments made by Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the SLAID Act, which introduced data disruption warrants, network activity warrants and account takeover warrants.

The report of the review identified that in the first three years of operation of the SLAID Act fewer than 50 of these warrants (including extensions) were sought (p. 20). Most of these warrants were issued to the AFP (Table 1, p. 21). The ACIC did not seek any data disruption warrants or account takeover warrants (Table 2, p. 21).

Table 1: AFP use of SLAID Act Warrants Issued 4 September 2021 to 31 December 2024 (Review p. 21)

	2021-22	2022-23	2023-24	1 July 24-30 Dec 24
Data disruption warrants	2 warrants issued	Nil	1 warrant issued	2 warrants issued
Network activity warrants	1 warrant issued 2 warrant extensions	1 warrant issued 5 warrant extensions	1 warrant issued 5 warrant extensions	Nil warrants issued 3 warrant extensions
Account takeover warrants	2 warrants issued	3 warrants issued	6 warrants issued	3 warrants issued

Table 2: ACIC use of SLAID Act Warrants Issued 4 September 2021 to 31 December 2024 (Review p. 21)

	2021-22	2022-23	2023-24	1 July 24-30 Dec 24
Network activity warrants	1 warrant issued 1 warrant extension	2 warrants issued 1 warrant extension	Nil warrants issued 4 warrant extensions	Nil warrants issued 2 warrant extensions

Considering evidence from private and public hearings and through the review of classified reports provided to Ministers, the report determined that the SLAID Act  warrants have been effective in understanding criminal networks and combating serious crimes (p. 29). The INSLM found that the warrants under the SLAID Act were used in situations where other types of warrants would have likely been ineffective (p. 29).

The INSLM was also satisfied that there was an ongoing need for some form of the SLAID Act powers as part of the government’s response to the ‘ever changing cyber threat landscape’ (p. 33).

The report recommended that ACIC should not retain the ability to use data disruption warrants, as this power was considered to go beyond ACIC’s intelligence functions (pp. 34-35)

What the Bill proposes

Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the Bill proposes to extend the sunset date for data disruption warrants, network activity warrants and account takeover warrants by 3 years to 4 September  2029 and remove the ACIC’s ability to obtain data disruption warrants.

Commonwealth Pre-Charge Detention and Investigation Scheme

The Crimes (Investigation of Commonwealth Offences) Amendment Act 1991 introduced pre-charge detention periods for a person under arrest in relation to a Commonwealth offence (EM, p. 2). The Commonwealth pre-charge detention and investigation scheme is enacted under Part IC of the Crimes Act.

Section 23C allows a person who is lawfully arrested for a Commonwealth offence to be detained for a ‘reasonable time’. The limit is a maximum of 2 hours for a person who is or appears to be under 18 years or an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person (subparagraph 23C(4)(a)). All other persons may be detained for a maximum of 4 hours (subparagraph 23C(4)(b)).

Item 10 of Schedule 4 of the Measures to Combat Serious and Organised Crime Act 2001 (MCSOC Act), if proclaimed, would repeal subsection 23A(6) of the Crimes Act. This provision allows the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Policing to access the Commonwealth pre-charge detention and investigation scheme contained in Part IC of the Crimes Act where the offence is against a law of the ACT and is punishable by imprisonment for a period exceeding 12 months and an investigating official is a member of the AFP (Crimes Act, s 23A(6) and EM, p. 6).

Item 10 was introduced as the ACT Government intended to enact its own scheme to replace the Commonwealth scheme (EM, p. 6). At the time the MCSOC Act was enacted the ACT had not determined its pre-charge detention and investigation scheme (EM to the MCSOC Bill, p. 43). Consequently, Item 10 was to commence on a date to be fixed by Proclamation to ensure that the ACT provisions had commenced prior to the repeal of subsection 23A(6) (EM to the MCSOC Bill, p. 43). However, the ACT Government has since determined that it is not necessary to establish its own scheme and that it remains appropriate to rely on the Commonwealth scheme (EM, p. 6).

What the Bill proposes

Part 4 of Schedule 1 to the Bill proposes to repeal item 10 of Schedule 4 to the MCSOC Act, with the effect that ACT Policing will retain access to the Commonwealth pre-charge detention and investigation scheme contained in Part IC of the Crimes Act.

Resources

• Parliamentary Library, Bills Digest Crimes Legislation Amendment (Police Powers at Airports) Bill 2019
• Department of Home Affairs, Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021
• Department of Home Affairs, Account Takeover Warrants
• Department of Home Affairs, Data Disruption Warrants
• Department of Home Affairs, Network Activity Warrants
• Parliamentary Library, Bills Digest Surveillance Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020
• Stephen Merchant and Greg Wilson, Independent Review of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and associated Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements - unclassified report, May 2024
• Australian Government, Government Response - Independent Review of the Australia Criminal Intelligence Commission and associated Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements, November 2024
• Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Identify, takeover and disrupt – special powers of the AFP and the ACIC
• Law Council of Australia, Questioning and detention powers (p. 24-28)

Schedule 2 – Amendment of the Criminal Code

Evidentiary Certificates

• Australian Federal Police, Australian Government Investigations Standard (p. 12)
• NSW Legislation, Drug Misuse and Trafficking Regulation 2021 Part 3 Division 5

Determination of Drug Threshold Quantities for Serious Drug Offence Provisions 

Serious drug offences are established under Part 9.1 of the Criminal Code. The four main categories of drug prosecutions are:

• trafficking, selling and cultivation
• manufacturing
• importing and exporting and
• possession.

The penalty imposed for serious drug offences generally depends on the quantity of the illicit substance involved in the offence. The three tiers of quantities used under the Criminal Code are:

• commercial quantity
• marketable quantity
• trafficable quantity.

Part 3 Division 1 of the Criminal Code Regulations 2019 sets out the drug threshold quantities for serious drugs and precursors for offences under the Criminal Code. Currently, the purity based method is used to determine drug threshold quantities (EM, p. 3).

Purity-Based Method

Section 312.1 of the Criminal Code implements a purity-based method for the determination of drug threshold quantities for criminal offences. Section 312.1 was introduced by the Law and Justice Legislation Amendment (Serious Drug Offences and Other Measures) Act 2005. It introduced the purity-based method currently used, requiring that quantities of controlled drugs and border controlled drugs be specified as a pure quantity, dilute quantity, or both (EM to the 2005 Bill, p. 98). A pure quantity means the amount of the pure drug that is involved in the commission of an offence, whether or not that pure quantity is contained in a mixture including other substances (EM to the 2005 Bill, p. 98).

Mixture-Weight Method

The mixture-weight approach for determining drug threshold quantities allows the quantity of drugs to be established by reference to the total weight of any substance containing a prohibited drug or precursor (EM, p. 3). This method removes the need for purity testing as the threshold quantity is determined by the total weight of a substance as opposed to the pure drug content of a substance (EM, p. 3).

Australian Jurisdictions

A report produced for the Criminology Research Advisory Council in 2021 indicates that of the states and territories in Australia only two still implement the purity-based system, while the other jurisdictions implement a mixture-weight method (p. 11).

What the Bill proposes

Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the Bill proposes to repeal the existing purity-based method for the determination of drug threshold quantities and replace it with the mixture-weight approach.

Resources:

• Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Serious Drugs
• National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, Legal Thresholds for Serious Drug Offences: Expert advice to the ACT on determining amounts for trafficable, commercial and large commercial drug offences (2011) (p. 19-20)
• Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes, Nicholas Cowdery and Alison Ritter, Deemed Supply in Australian Drug Trafficking Laws: A Justifiable Legal Provision? (2015). (See this extract)

Schedule 3 – Director of Public Prosecutions

• Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions – Associate Director
• Australian Public Service Commission, Conflict of Interest

Schedule 4 – Extradition

Extradition is a process by which one country apprehends and transfers a person to another country for the purposes of criminal prosecution or to serve a sentence of imprisonment. Australia’s extradition regime is established under the Extradition Act 1988.

Waiver of right to contest extradition

Under the Extradition Act once a person is remanded in custody or on bail they may elect to waive the extradition process. Waiver of the extradition process may reduce the time that a person spends in custody in Australia as the waiver will mean that not all stages in the extradition process will need to be completed. An application for waiver is made under section 15A of the Extradition Act.

The person wishing to waive the extradition process must inform a magistrate that they wish to waive extradition in relation to the extradition offence or offences (p. 1). The magistrate must inform the person waiving extradition that (s 15A(5)):

• once the order is made the person cannot apply for the order to be revoked
• the foreign state may not have given, and if the order is made, will not be required to give, a specialty assurance
• requirements that would otherwise apply under the Extradition Act will not apply if the order is made (including in relation to extradition objections)
• the person will be surrendered to the extradition country concerned after the order is made if the Attorney-General makes a determination that the person is to be surrendered.

If the magistrate is satisfied that the person confirmed that they wish to waive extradition after being informed of the above and the magistrate is satisfied that the person was legally represented, or was given adequate opportunity to be legally represented, the magistrate must make an order committing the person to prison pending a surrender determination by the Attorney-General.

What the Bill proposes

Part 1 of Schedule 4 to the Bill proposes to clarify that a person who waives their right to contest extradition is to remain in prison until they are physically surrendered to the requesting country, or until they are released pursuant to an order made by the Attorney-General under subsection 15B(4) of the Extradition Act.

Police Powers

The Extradition Act authorises the arrest of a person who is the subject if an extradition arrest warrant, and search and seizure upon arrest, but does not grant police the power to enter premises to execute an extradition arrest warrant (s 12 and 13). Furthermore, the Act does not grant the power to use reasonable force in executing a search warrant.

This is contrary to the power granted to police under other Acts in relation to arrest warrants.

Section 3ZB of the Crimes Act provides police with the power to enter premises to arrest an offender. Subject to limitations, under a warrant a constable has the power to arrest a person for an offence and if the constable believes on reasonable grounds that the person is on any premises they may:

enter the premises, using such force as is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, at any time of the day or night for the purpose of searching the premises for the person or arresting the person.

This provision is subject to the restriction that a constable must not enter a dwelling house to arrest a person under a warrant at any time during the period commencing at 9pm on a day and ending at 6am the following day unless the constable believes on reasonable grounds that:

• it would not be practicable to arrest the person at another time at either the dwelling house or elsewhere or
• that it is necessary to enter within that time period in order to prevent the concealment, loss or destruction of evidence relating to the offence.

Section 3ZC requires that in the course of arresting a person for an offence, a person must not use more force or subject a person to greater indignity, than what is necessary and reasonable to make the arrest or to prevent the escape of the other person after the arrest.

What the Bill proposes

Part 2 of Schedule 4 to the Bill proposes to provide police officers with an explicit power to enter premises where they reasonably believe the subject of an extradition arrest warrant is located, and to use reasonable force in executing the warrant.

Resources:

• Attorney-General’s Department, Extradition
• Attorney-General’s Department, Fact Sheet 3 – Waiver of Extradition

Schedule 5 – Telecommunication

• Department of Home Affairs, Telecommunications interception and surveillance
• Integrity Oversight Victoria