Australia’s National Security: a Defence Update 2003, 2005 and 2007


Synopsis:
Introduction
2003 Defence Update
2005 Defence Update
2007 Defence Update

 

Australia’s National Security: a Defence Update 2003, 2005 and 2007

Special Response Team, Afghan National Security Forces

Special Response Team, Afghan National Security Forces (Source: Australian Defence Image Library)

Synopsis:

  • The 2003 Defence Update was prompted by the changing security environment following the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001 and Bali, Indonesia in 2002, and focused on threats posed by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
  • The 2003 Defence Update was released just prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and emphasised support for Australia’s interests in the region and overseas, especially the alliance with the United States.
  • Despite the ADF’s increased operational tempo—Afghanistan, Iraq and border protection—the 2003 Defence Update concluded that the principles of the 2000 Defence White Paper remained unchanged.
  • The new focus on counter-terrorism and WMD operations prompted the establishment of new capabilities including a Special Operations Command, a Tactical Assault Group and an Incident Response Regiment.
  • The 2005 Defence Update was mostly triggered by US expectations of its allies in the Asia-Pacific region to do more to support regional security. However, this Update maintained the same strategic objectives as the 2000 Defence White Paper.
  • The 2005 Defence Update combined the main elements of its predecessor—threat of terrorism and WMDs—with concerns about instability caused by failing states.
  • By 2005, an alteration in the concept of self-reliance was beginning to emerge from one of primarily focusing on the Defence of Australia to one that also included a focus on Australia’s interests.
  • In 2005, Defence policy also began to shift from the 2000 Defence White Paper assertion that the ADF remain trained and equipped for armed conflict, to a broader acknowledgement of the ADFs contribution to whole-of-government activities.
  • The 2007 Defence Update was released prior to the 2007 federal election and reflected the expanding activities involving the ADF beyond warfighting, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, whole-of-government activities in support of border protection operations and Indigenous communities.
  • The pervading threat of terrorism, WMDs and failing states continued to influence ADF commitments and capabilities.
  • By 2007 there was a greater focus on China’s military development and security in the Asia-Pacific.
  • It was recognised that the ADF needed to expand its forces over the coming decade from just over 51,000 to around 57,000 personnel.
  • The conceptual shift in defence policy from the year 2000 through to 2007 was quite stark in view of major global events, the negative effects of globalisation, unconventional threats to Australia’s security and national interests, and the development of more sophisticated capabilities in the Asia-Pacific.

Introduction

Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and in Bali, Indonesia in October 2002, the Howard Government initiated a review of Australia’s national security arrangements, the results of which provided a defence update in 2003.[348] Subsequent reviews provided further defence updates in 2005 and 2007.[349]

2003 Defence Update

The first of three defence updates, Australia’s National Security: a Defence Update 2003 (2003 Defence Update) was released on 26 February 2003 and assessed Australia’s ‘changing security environment: the emergence of new and more immediate threats from terrorism and increased concerns about the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (WMD).[350] The 2003 Defence Update concluded that there was potentially a ‘great risk’ of terrorists getting and using WMD.[351] In this context, Prime Minister John Howard and Defence Minister Robert Hill had both previously endorsed the possibility of employing ‘anticipatory self-defence’ against potential terrorist threats. In light of the hostile regional reactions to this possibility, it was not surprising to find them absent from the 2003 Defence Update (although phrases such as ‘there may be increased calls for ADF operations in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood’ might have alluded to the concept).[352]

The 2003 Defence Update did not mention self-reliance. Its focus, inevitably, was on the growth of global terrorism following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, as well as the potential for the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organisations or rogue states. This in turn meant the Update focused on Australia’s role as part of the US-led alliance combating these issues. While the ADF still needed to be adequately prepared to defend Australia, the focus of the 2003 Defence Update, given the previously stated potential threats, was on Australia’s interests—especially in the region and in alliance with the United States.[353]

The 2003 Defence Update highlighted the need to curb the spread of WMD, particularly in Iraq.[354] In turn, the perceived WMD threat prompted military action against Iraq in March 2003, which involved the ADF.[355]

Closer to home, the 2003 Defence Update considered that Australia’s neighbourhood constituted ‘a troubled region’, faced with ‘major economic, political, governance and social challenges’.[356] This aligned with the 2000 Defence White Paper’s conclusion that countries in the immediate neighbourhood ‘face large economic and structural challenges’.[357]

In examining the posturing of the United States, Russia, and China, the 2003 Defence Update concluded that ‘major power relations have generally become more stable’, although ‘the Korean peninsula remains a potential flashpoint’.[358]

The 2003 Defence Update did not, however, address other developments in the region which also impinged on Australia’s strategic interests, such as the suspected illegal entry vessels (SIEVs) in Australia’s northern maritime approaches. In the years 2000–01 through 2002–03, arrivals of these ‘boat people’ totalled more than 7,000. These numbers raised questions about Australia’s ability to control its borders.[359]

Surveillance of SIEVs was an activity in which the ADF had assisted Coastwatch and the Department of Immigration since June 1997. With increasing numbers of SIEVs, the ADF’s contribution to these activities increased and the ADF adopted a greater role in supporting what the 2000 Defence White Paper described as ‘civil law enforcement and coastal surveillance’.[360] From September 2001 under Operation Relex, the ADF moved from a supporting role to the lead agency.[361] This took the ADF’s role beyond that envisioned in the 2000 Defence White Paper’s conclusion:

... using the ADF — trained and equipped for armed conflict — is not necessarily the most cost-effective way to address new non-military security concerns. Civilian responses may be more appropriate. Our approach is to draw on the expertise of the Defence Force where it is most appropriate to do so, but not to allow these roles — important as they are — to detract from the ADF’s core function of defending Australia from armed attack.[362]

In 2002–03, new ADF operations such as Slipper (Afghanistan war from 2001), Falconer and Bastille (lead-up to Iraq war in 2003), and Relex II (air and sea patrols of Australia’s northern waters to deter SIEVs) saw the reduction or suspension of ADF activities in Australia’s further maritime approaches. Surveillance in the northern Indian Ocean and South China Sea was ‘conducted at a reduced rate of effort due to assets being assigned to Operations Relex II, Slipper and Falconer, and the AP-3 [Orion] aircraft upgrade program’.[363] Operations to patrol the South West Pacific, the Coral Sea, Torres Strait and the Timor Gap were characterised as ‘dormant’ by the ADF.[364]

Despite these new demands, the 2003 Defence Update concluded that the principles set out in the 2000 Defence White Paper ‘remain sound’.[365] What the ADF required was a ‘rebalancing of capability and expenditure’. This implied there would be no funding increases—apart from those already planned in the 2000 Defence White Paper—and promised no fundamental alteration to the ADF’s size, structure and role while placing an emphasis on ‘readiness and mobility, on interoperability, on the development and enhancement of important new capabilities and, where sensible and prudent, a reduced emphasis on capabilities of less importance’.[366]

Given that the 2003 Defence Update devoted one third of its text to terrorism and WMD, the Government’s adjustments of the ADF’s posture focused on new capabilities relevant to those threats. These comprised a Special Operations Command, a new Tactical Assault Group, and an Incident Response Regiment (IRR) to address the potential threat of WMD.[367] The new IRR was the innermost component of what was part of Australia’s ‘layered defence’, with no indication that those layers were integrated into a ‘whole-of-government’ approach.[368]

Related capability enhancements also included increasing the size of the Special Forces, acquiring more troop lift helicopters, improved communications systems, electronic warfare self-protection measures, landmine protection/clearance/detection, and ballistic protection for certain ADF assets.[369]

Looking ahead, the 2003 Defence Update noted that the ADF’s ability to operate with allies such as the United States would be enhanced by future decisions on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, AEW&C surveillance aircraft and Collins Class submarines.[370]

The 2003 Defence Update concluded that because of ‘the increased deterrent effect of the US-Australia alliance flowing from US primacy ... for the near term there is less likely to be a need for ADF operations in defence of Australia’.[371] This continued a trend established in the 2000 Defence White Paper, that Australia would ‘continue to support the United States in the major role it plays in maintaining and strengthening the global security order’.[372]

2005 Defence Update

The Howard Government launched the second defence update, Australia’s National Security: a Defence Update 2005 (2005 Defence Update), on 15 December 2005.[373] According to the Government, the update was prompted by shifts in the strategic environment since 2003, such as the United States’ expectation that its key allies in the Asia-Pacific—Japan, South Korea and Australia—would contribute more to the region’s security.[374] China and India were increasing their strategic and economic importance and Japan was becoming more actively involved in global security issues.[375] The rapid pace of globalisation was creating greater unpredictability and the diffusion of technology meant that maintaining the ADF’s technological advantage was becoming more difficult. National borders were less secure with the increased threat of terror tactics and the potential spread of WMD.[376]

Despite the recent shifts in the strategic environment, the 2005 Defence Update asserted the ‘Government’s strategic judgments’ in the 2000 Defence White Paper and the 2003 Defence Update had, ‘to a considerable extent, been substantiated and confirmed by subsequent events’.[377] The 2003 Defence Update had expressed concerns about ‘the challenge to Australia’s security presented by global terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and the risks posed by failed or failing states’.[378] The 2005 Defence Update brought these elements together, stating the ‘convergence between failing states, terrorism and the proliferation of WMD remains a major and continuing threat to international security’.[379]

It was noted that since Australia was unlikely to face any direct conventional military threats in the near future, the need to address international security issues—counter-terrorism, countering proliferation of WMDs, and bolstering regional security—remained a priority (as previously stated in the 2003 Defence Update).[380] While the Government stated that its ‘first duty’ was the defence of Australia, this also included the defence of Australia’s interests, which featured more prominently in the update—as had been the case in the 2003 Update, the terminology of self-reliance was no longer used.[381]

The update did not examine or explain how the stated national priorities might interact or even compete in the future. The potential for competing demands signalled that the task of defending Australia and its interests was becoming more complex as military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region grew and the nature of terrorist actions eroded Australia’s geographic advantage as an island.[382]

The 2005 Defence Update stated that the ongoing threat posed by terrorism was being countered through the ADF’s presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, and by the whole-of-government efforts to ‘prepare, prevent, respond to and recover from terrorism within Australia’.[383] These efforts also meant Australia needed to work more closely with national and international organisations, increase funding for intelligence activities and amend the Defence Act 1903 ‘to ensure that the ADF can be deployed effectively and easily to support law enforcement agencies in responding to terrorist incidents’.[384]

The 2005 Defence Update was blunt about WMD stating ‘The threat of proliferation ... has yet to be defeated’.[385] In addition to their potential use by terrorist groups, ‘some countries may be tempted to resort to asymmetric solutions, such as WMD ... to bridge their capability gaps’. In that context, Iran’s nuclear and missile programs were identified as a threat to the strategic balance in the Middle East.[386]

In 2005, the ADF was still operating in Timor Leste, Solomon Islands, Iraq and other areas in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Overall, 1,700 military personnel were deployed on a total of eight ‘significant’ operations.[387] In addition to those already mentioned, these included operations in northern Australia and its northern approaches, and patrols of the maritime approaches in Bass Strait and the Southern Ocean. Surveillance in the South West Pacific had been re-activated but ‘conducted at a reduced rate of effort due to higher operational commitments’.[388] Three previously separate patrol operations in the Indian Ocean, Coral Sea, and Torres Strait had been amalgamated into one operation in June 2004.[389] A Joint Offshore Protection Command was set up in March 2005.[390] However, as in 2003, the:

Northern Indian Ocean and South China Sea maritime surveillance patrols... continued to be conducted at a reduced rate of effort due to assets being assigned to Operations Relex II [suspected illegal entry vessels] and Catalyst/Slipper [Iraq/Middle East], and the P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft upgrade program.[391]

The ADF was operating at a much higher tempo than it had in almost twenty-five years.[392]

The 2005 Defence Update shifted defence policy away from the initial 2000 Defence White Paper assertion that ‘using the ADF—trained and equipped for armed conflict—is not necessarily the most cost-effective way to address new non-military security concerns’, to:

[w]hether it is the whole-of-government response to terrorism, WMD, fisheries and resource protection, or in meeting the needs of neighbouring states, the contribution of Defence is expected to go far beyond warfighting [emphasis added].[393]

Some initiatives in the 2005 Defence Update included upgrading the Army’s light armoured vehicles (ASLAVs) and further developing the Army Reserves ‘with specific roles and tasks to support Australia’s domestic security effort’.[394] The RAN would continue to develop previously approved maritime force capabilities such as the air warfare destroyers, Collins Class submarine upgrades and the ANZAC Class frigates.[395] The RAAF were to get improved precision weapons and better survivability for its aircraft and the Government would ‘consider the option of a heavy transport aircraft’.[396]

Australia’s involvement in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq had prompted the acceleration of upgrades to the Army’s light armoured vehicles which were to be deployed to the Middle East and Afghanistan, as well as a new tank capability.[397] The $550 million acquisition of 59 new M1A1 Abrams battle tanks from the United States had been announced in March 2004 and the vehicles were expected to be introduced into service from 2007.[398] At the time of the announcement, the Government stated that ‘the decision to purchase the Abrams M1A1 reflects the same strategic rationale which the Government outlined in the2000 Defence White Paper’.[399] However, the 2000 Defence White Paper also rejected developing heavy armoured forces that would be ‘suitable for contributions to coalition forces in high intensity conflicts’ as it was considered too costly and ‘most unlikely to be needed in defence of Australia or in our immediate region’.[400]

The Government admitted that the cost of equipment, particularly that needed to produce a networked force, coupled with the costs of personnel which were rising faster than the rate of inflation, were:

... putting extra pressure on the Defence Capability Plan... Since the Defence White Paper in 2000, the Government has met these cost pressures with a three per cent real growth inflator and by providing extra funding for operations, logistics, infrastructure and accommodation. Cost pressures will remain and will demand increasing efficiencies across the portfolio.[401]

This was also the message in 2000 and 2003—government funding would only go so far. In his review of the 2005 Defence Update, Hugh White concluded that its claim to ‘continue the principles’ of the 2000 White Paper and the 2003 Defence Update, while stressing changes in the strategic environment since the terrorist attacks in 2001, was ‘a bob each way’.[402] Paul Dibb also commented on a perceived lack of strategic guidance, noting however that the 2005 Defence Update was ‘the most comprehensive ... since the 2000 Defence white paper’.[403]

Both commentators noted that the Army was growing in importance in comparison to the other arms of the ADF, evidenced by the lesser ‘protective bubble’ role assigned to the RAN and RAAF.[404] Both expressed concern that this protection was being lavished on a small force, although as White noted, ‘we will not be able to rely on the new army to deliver the strategic weight we need’.[405] Dibb warned that ‘if we are not careful this will produce a one-shot ADF with nothing left over after we have protected such a small and vulnerable force’.[406] White concluded that ‘the army ... is not big enough to alone protect Australia’s interests, either close to home or far away ... air and naval forces deliver more strategic weight per dollar’.[407]

2007 Defence Update

The third defence update, Australia’s National Security: a Defence Update 2007 (2007 Defence Update) was released by the Government on 5 July 2007, four months prior to the federal election.[408] At that time, the ADF had approximately 4,300 military personnel deployed on 14 operations; mainly in the Middle East (1,450); East Timor (990); Afghanistan (840); Australia’s northern borders (450); and Solomon Islands (140).[409]

Since 2005, and in line with the 2005 Defence Update’s assertion that ADF activities would ‘go far beyond warfighting’, the ADF had also conducted short-notice humanitarian and disaster relief operations in Lebanon, Tonga, Indonesia and Solomon Islands.[410] The ADF was also planning to provide support to ‘whole-of-government activities in Indigenous communities in the Northern Territory’.[411] This level of operational tempo had not been experienced by the ADF since Vietnam.[412] This resulted in core Army skills becoming ‘adversely affected by operational demands’.[413] Maritime patrols in the South-West Pacific were (still) being conducted at ‘a reduced rate of effort due to higher operational commitments’ and surveillance patrols of the Indian Ocean and South China Sea comprised just ‘one P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft for four patrols a year’.[414]

The 2007 Defence Update examined the ‘challenging and dynamic’ strategic environment that would shape the ADF’s commitments and capabilities. Australia’s strategic interests would be influenced by relations between the United States, China and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region.[415] Similar to the 2003 and 2005 Defence Updates, the 2007 iteration summed up Australia’s strategic focus in the following terms:

Globalisation, terrorism, the challenges posed by fragile states and the threat of WMD proliferation... relations between the major powers in our region and the changes in the use of force by states and terrorists... the Middle East and Asia–Pacific will continue to focus our attention for some time.[416]

There were, however, some new statements on Australia’s strategic environment, including China’s economic role in the Asia-Pacific and ‘the pace and scope of its military modernisation ... [which] could create misunderstandings and instability in the region’, and the asymmetric use of force, which would lead the ADF to be increasingly ‘called on to fight irregular opponents’.[417]

Defence analysts were divided over whether the policy contained in the 2007 Defence Update was the same formula as before; a hedged bet or a new approach. Dibb maintained that it retained the ‘Defence of Australia’ approach.[418] According to Prime Minister Howard, it ‘abandoned the narrow, misguided and ultimately self-defeating nostrum that our force structure should be determined only or even mostly for the defence of Australia narrowly defined—our coastline and its near approaches’.[419] Although in this the Prime Minister may have been setting up an election-year straw man, others saw ‘a whole new ball game’, partly as a consequence of the blunt comments about the potential of China’s military developments to create ‘misunderstandings and instability’.[420] Rod Lyon found three important conceptual shifts in the 2007 Defence Update, when compared to the 2000 Defence White Paper:

  • the view of globalisation had shifted from proclaiming its benefits in 2000 (strengthen global security) to awareness in 2007 of its negative capacity to bring potential threats closer to Australia.
  • the acceptance that, in 2007, the ADF had to be prepared to combat ‘irregular opponents’ in addition to the conventional warfare envisaged in 2000 and
  • the depiction of Australia’s interests as declining with distance from Australia (the ‘concentric circle’ view of 2000) had been replaced in 2007 by a realisation that ‘Australia’s national interests are not spread uniformly across the globe, but neither do they decline in proportion to the distance from our shoreline’.[421]

The 2007 Defence Update concluded that there was no suggestion that Australia faced a direct military threat:

... either now or in the foreseeable future. However, military forces in the Asia-Pacific region are becoming increasingly sophisticated and Australia must work harder to ensure that our forces retain an edge in leading military capabilities’.[422]

The 2007 Defence Update identified some capability developments that had not been mentioned in the preceding updates. The most significant of these was the March 2007 decision to acquire 24 F/A–18F Super Hornet multi-role aircraft to ‘guarantee our combat edge through the period of transition from the current fleet of F/A–18 A/B and F–111 aircraft’.[423] It was thought that without this purchase, a potential capability gap could arise from delays to the Joint Strike Fighter program, and the earlier than expected retirement of the F-111 aircraft.[424]

According to the 2007 Defence Update, the ADF needed to expand its forces to about 57,000 full-time military personnel over the coming decade.[425] In 2007, the permanent ADF force was 51,198, noting that the 2000 Defence White Paper target for 2010 had been up to 54,000, from that year’s base of 51,500.[426]

 



[348].      Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2003, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2003, p. 5, accessed 13 January 2015.

[349].      Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2005, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2005, accessed 13 January 2015; Minister for Defence, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2007, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2007, accessed 13 January 2015.

[350].      R Hill (Minister for Defence), Australia’s national security: a defence update, media release, 26 February 2003, accessed 13 January 2015.

[351].      ‘There remains a great risk that the mass casualties inflicted in recent attacks have set the terrorists’ sights even higher, possibly including the acquisition and use of WMD’, cited in Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2003, op. cit., p. 12.

[352].      Editorial, ‘Diplomacy the best weapon‘, The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 December 2002, accessed 13 January 2015; Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2003, ibid., p. 23; G Barker, ‘Hill clarifies stand on strikes‘, The Australian Financial Review, 21 June 2002, accessed 13 January 2015; S Kearney and S Hodgson, ‘PM: strike terror first‘, Herald Sun Sunday, 1 December 2002, accessed 13 January 2015.

[353].      Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2003, ibid., pp. 5, 7, 9, 13, 16.

[354].      ‘The prospect that Saddam Hussein might threaten to use WMD against his enemies in the region or supply WMD to terrorists reinforces the international community’s efforts to ensure Iraq is disarmed’, cited in ibid., p. 15.

[355].      Department of Defence (DoD), Defence annual report 2002–03, DoD, Canberra, 2003, pp. 97–98, accessed 13 January 2015.

[356].      Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2003, op. cit., p. 18.

[357].      2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. ix.

[358].      Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2003, op. cit., p. 8.

[359].      J Phillips and H Spinks, Boat arrivals in Australia since 1976, Background note, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, updated 2011, 2012 and 2013 pp. 4, 18 and 19, accessed 13 January 2015.

[360].      2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 88.

[361].      Senate Select Committee for an inquiry into a certain maritime incident, The Senate, Canberra, 23 October 2002, p. 13, accessed 13 January 2015.

[362].      2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 13.

[363].      Defence annual report 2002–03, op. cit., p. 97.

[364].      Ibid., p. 101.

[365].      Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2003, op. cit., p. 5.

[366].      Ibid., pp. 5–6.

[367].      Ibid., p. 24.

[368].      Comprising international cooperation, diplomacy, coalition military operations, intelligence, state and federal law enforcement authorities and the ADF—cited in ibid., p. 16.

[369].      Ibid., p. 24.

[370].      Ibid., p. 24.

[371].      Ibid., p. 23.

[372].      Ibid., p. x.

[373].      R Hill, (Minister for Defence), Australia’s national security: a defence update 2005, media release, 15 December 2005, accessed 13 January 2015.

[374].      Ibid., p. 6.

[375].      Ibid., p. 1.

[376].      Ibid., pp. 3–4.

[377].      Ibid., p. 2.

[378].      Ibid., p. 2.

[379].      Ibid., p. 4.

[380].      Ibid., p. 2.

[381].      Ibid., p. 1.

[382].      Ibid., pp. 4–5.

[383].      The issues of terrorism had been addressed in detail in Australia’s national counter-terrorism policy and arrangements (2004) and in Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2005, op. cit., pp. 2 and 10.

[384].      Ibid., pp. 10–11.

[385].      WMD had been considered in Weapons of mass destruction, Australia’s role in fighting proliferation: practical responses to new challenges (2005); ibid., pp. 1 and 10, accessed 13 January 2015.

[386].      Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2005, ibid., p.10.

[387].      Tsunami relief operations in Indonesia and Thailand had concluded in April 2005, prior to the release of the 2005 Defence Update—ibid., pp. 2 and 160–162.

[388].      Department of Defence, Defence annual report 2004–2005, DoD, Canberra, 2005, p. 165, accessed 13 January 2015.

[389].      Operations Burbage, Osteal and Mellin, respectively, became part of Operation Cranberry (‘to coordinate the intelligence and provide surveillance information to the civil authorities that are operating in northern Australia’). Cited in Department of Defence, Defence annual report 2003–2004, DoD, Canberra, 2004, pp. 96–100, accessed 13 January 2015.

[390].      Involving Defence, the Australian Customs Service and the Australian Federal Police to ‘protect our borders and critical infrastructure’—ibid., p. 11; Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2005, op. cit., p.10.

[391].      Department of Defence, Defence annual report 2004–2005, op. cit., p. 160.

[392].      Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2005, op. cit., p. 2.

[393].      Ibid., p. 10; 2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 13.

[394].      Ibid., pp. 11 and 22.

[395].      Ibid., p. 23.

[396].      Ibid., pp. 22, 23 and 24.

[397].      R Hill (Minister for Defence) and P Leahy (Chief of the Army), Press conference: new tanks for Army, Parliament House, transcript, Canberra, 10 March 2004, accessed 13 January 2015.

[398].      Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2005, op. cit., p. 22; R Hill, (Minister for Defence), M1 Abrams chosen as Australian Army’s replacement tank, media release, 10 March 2004, accessed 13 January 2015.

[399].      Ibid.

[400].      The then current Leopard tank weighed 42.4 tonnes. The Abrams M1A1 AIM (D) weighed a minimum of 57 tonnes. Cited in R Hill (Minister for Defence) and P Leahy (Chief of the Army), Press conference: new tanks for Army, op. cit.; Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2005, ibid., p. 79; 2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 79.

[401].      Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2005, op. cit., p. 25.

[402].      Ibid., p. 26; H White, ‘Defence review threatens to diminish Australia’s strategic clout‘, The Age, 20 December 2005, accessed 13 January 2015.

[403].      P Dibb, ‘Radical new defence policy or Hill’s smoke and mirrors?‘, The Australian, 16 December 2005, accessed 13 January 2015.

[404].      Ibid.; H White, ‘Defence review threatens to diminish Australia’s strategic clout’, op. cit.

[405].      Ibid.

[406].      P Dibb, ‘Radical new defence policy or Hill’s smoke and mirrors?’, op. cit.

[407].      H White, ‘Defence review threatens to diminish Australia’s strategic clout’, op. cit.

[408].      B Nelson (Minister for Defence), Defence update 2007: protecting our people, interests and values, media release, 5 July 2007, accessed 13 January 2015; Minister for Defence, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2007, op. cit.

[409].      Department of Defence, Defence annual report 2006–2007: volume 1, DoD, Canberra, 2007, pp. 56, accessed 13 January 2015.

[410].      Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2005, op. cit., p. 10; ibid., p. 52.

[411].      Department of Defence, Defence annual report 2006–2007: volume 1, op. cit., p. 58.

[412].      Ibid., p. 52.

[413].      Ibid., p. ii and 52.

[414].      Ibid., pp. 58 and 56.

[415].      Minister for Defence, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2007, op. cit., pp. 9 and 19.

[416].      Ibid., p. 23.

[417].      Ibid., p. 16 and 19.

[418].      P Dibb, ‘Homeland still more vital than the Middle East‘, The Australian, 10 July 2007, accessed 13 January 2015.

[419].      J Howard (Prime Minister), Address to the ASPI ‘Global Forces 2007’ conference, Canberra, speech, 5 July 2007, accessed 13 January 2015.

[420].      G Sheridan, ‘A whole new ball game, but some don’t see‘, The Australian, 12 July 2007, accessed 13 January 2015.

[421].      R Lyon, ‘Assessing the defence update 2007’, op. cit. ; Minister for Defence, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2007, op. cit., p. 28.

[422].      Ibid., p. 10.

[423].      B Nelson (Minister for Defence), $6 billion to maintain Australia’s regional air superiority, media release, 6 March 2007, accessed 13 January 2015.

[424].      Ibid.; Minister for Defence, Australia’s national security: a defence update 2007, op. cit., p. 52; G Barker, ‘Surprise shift on fighter aircraft‘, Australian Financial Review, 15 December 2006, accessed 13 January 2015.

[425].      Ibid., p. 57.

[426].      Department of Defence, Defence annual report 2006–2007: volume 1, op. cit., p. 21; 2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 62.

 

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