Current Issues Brief No 21 2002-03
Media Under Fire: Reporting Conflict in Iraq
Sarah
Miskin
Politics and Public Administration Group
Laura Rayner &
Maria Lalic
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
24 March 2003
Contents
Executive Summary
Introduction
Conflict in Iraq 2003: Likely Media
Coverage
Democratic principles: a free media
Battling for hearts and minds: the media versus
the military
Handling the media: lessons from the
past
Embedded or embroiled, enmeshed and
entombed?
Technology
I) From body bags to the bloodless
war
Technology-driven jargon
II) 'Gee-whiz gizmo technology reporting'
III) Alternative sources of information
War correspondents or witnesses?
Conclusions
Endonotes
News that the United States military has
'embedded' 500 journalists in its fighting units to cover the
conflict in Iraq suggests that the public will receive a fuller
picture of this conflict than it received of both Operation Desert
Shield and Operation Desert Storm (the 'Gulf War') of 1990-91.
In that conflict, journalists were confined to
'pools' over which Allied forces exercised complete control. 'Pool'
journalists were scattered among the Allied military units and fed
their stories and pictures back to a rear headquarters where they
were shared among the world's journalists. Reporters who broke the
rules were threatened with losing their accreditation, being held
in military barracks and being deported. The result was limited
coverage that was heavily censored.
A major concern with such coverage is that it
contravenes a basic tenet of democracy: that the press must be free
to provide information so that people know, understand, and can
make informed judgments of the actions undertaken by the government
on their behalf. In times of conflict, a free media ensures that
the public are not dependent on the military or political view of
the campaign, but receive an independent description of events in
order to make an informed choice as to whether or not to support
the conflict.
The problem is that the media's claim to right
of access to information on the basis of the public's right to know
conflicts with the military's desire to win a war and to do so with
minimum casualties. 'Bad' press, especially of bloody engagements
and body bags, may cost the military valuable public support. A
common explanation in the United States military for its disastrous
loss in Vietnam in 1975 is that the war was lost at home before it
was lost in the field.
The consequences of losing public support for
any war can be severe and long-term for both a government and the
military. Thus, in wartime, a new battle emerges on the home
front-that for public opinion. Information is an essential weapon
in this battle and whoever can control what 'facts' the public
receives has a distinct advantage. It is here that the clash
between the military and the media becomes apparent: it is,
essentially, a battle between the right to win-and win with the
support of the people 'back home'-and the right to know.
A key element of the conflict between the media
and the military is that their underlying 'reasons for being' as
well as their motivations and aims are quite different. While the
military and the media both consider themselves professions, they
have very distinct-and some might argue opposing-characters and
professional attributes, not least of which is that the military
values patriotism and loyalty, while the media's loyalties can be
variable, depending on the ownership of-and the nationalities that
make up-the news organisation.
Since the Vietnam War, various militaries have
experimented with controls over the media in times of conflict in
order to win the battle for the hearts and minds of the public.
These were perfected by the 1990-91 Gulf conflict and critics argue
that little has changed in the subsequent conflicts in Kosovo and
Afghanistan.
In 2003, the United States military has decided
on a more open approach to media reporting of the conflict, partly
in an attempt to 'counteract the potential for Iraqi disinformation
that could be distributed by Arab news outlets'. Some have argued
that 'embedding', combined with smaller, better digital cameras
hooked to portable satellite dishes, may result in viewers and
readers receiving 'some of the most graphic and revealing war
footage and reporting ever'.
However, 'embedding' can have a significant
effect on journalists, resulting in feelings of camaraderie that
may affect a journalist's ability to be independent and objective.
The potential for the public to be subjected to an 'information
war' to win over their opinion suggests that it would be prudent to
maintain a level of scepticism about the aim of the 'embedding' of
journalists with military units.
News organisations have acknowledged that
'embedding' may 'raise questions' about journalistic independence,
but they argue that these frontline reports will form only part of
much broader coverage that will incorporate expert analysis and
reports from non-'embedded' journalists. It appears there will be
few restrictions imposed on these reporters. While this suggests
that non-embedded journalists will remain free to go where they
want and report what they want, there are concerns that American
officials have given 'no convincing guarantees' that non-embedded
journalists will be allowed to report without interference.
A difficulty for both 'embedded' and
non-'embedded' journalists is that there are no guarantees of
safety. At least four journalists, including an Australian
cameraman, have been killed in the opening days of the war.
Outside Iraq, the number of journalists in the
region is high, with one report claiming that there are 7000
journalists and crews scattered throughout the Middle East in
Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey and Israel. It is hard to know how much of
what happens inside Iraq these journalists will be able to report,
given that their knowledge will not be obtained 'first-hand', but
will have to be gleaned from a variety of sources who may have
their own information-or misinformation-agendas.
What does all of this mean for the Australian
public? Can Australians expect to be more fully informed of the
'truth' in the conflict in Iraq? Will 'embedded' journalists ensure
a more complete picture that allows the public 'back home' to 'know
what their sons and daughters are doing on behalf of the
nation'?
The Australia military has taken a different
approach to the United States military in handling the media,
partly because many of Australia's troops are top secret ground
forces, such as the Special Air Service personnel. Whereas the
American military is 'embedding' journalists and is talking of
supplying the maximum amount of information possible, the
Australian Defence Force has rejected 'embedding' on the grounds
that it is 'impractical'. Those journalists reporting on
Australia's contribution to the conflict will have to follow some
'ground rules', although it appears that these have not been made
public.
Overall, however, the restrictions may mean that
Australians receive an overwhelming amount of information from
American sources about the war in Iraq, but little information
about Australia's contribution to the conflict.
Meanwhile, the modern technologies available to
today's reporters raise another issue that, thus far, has received
little attention: that the technology that gives journalists
mobility and allows them to record every aspect of a conflict opens
the possibility of their being called as witnesses in any
subsequent war crimes trials.
Introduction
This Current Issues Brief canvasses some of the
issues involved in today's media coverage of conflict. It discusses
the role of a free media in a democracy before examining the
division that this role creates between a media intent on the
public's right to know and a military intent on winning any
conflict in which it is involved. The paper then discusses whether
'embedding' can be seen as an attempt by the military to bring the
media on side in its battle for public support for its endeavours.
In the final sections, the paper notes the various impacts that new
technologies have, both on coverage of a conflict and public access
to alternative points of view, and comments on an emerging problem
for the modern war correspondent that 'embedding' may exacerbate:
being called to give evidence to a war crimes tribunal.
Conflict in Iraq 2003: Likely Media
Coverage
The United States military has taken 500
journalists with its military units to the conflict in Iraq,
embedding the journalists with its troops going to the front line.
Of these 500, 100 are non-American and include at least three
Australian journalists (two from the Australian Broadcasting
Corporation and one from The Age) as well as Arabic
satellite station Al Jazeera, which the Bush Administration has in
the past called 'anti-American'.(1)
What is 'embedding'?
'Embedding' does not mean unrestricted access
and reporting. Although the controls are apparently not as
stringent as those applied in the earlier Gulf War (see below),
there are rules-violation of which 'could result in termination of
that media's embed opportunity'.(2) The Pentagon's
guidelines for 'embedded' journalists include:
-
- no information on ongoing engagements will be released unless
authorised by an on-scene commander, and information about previous
engagements and results will be released only if described in
general terms
-
- reports giving specific information on 'friendly force' troop
movements and deployment are prohibited
-
- information regarding future operations is strictly prohibited
and no information identifying postponed or cancelled operations
will be allowed
-
- journalists 'inadvertently exposed' to 'sensitive' information
will be briefed on what to avoid covering in their reports;
journalists allowed to see sensitive information that would
normally be restricted will be denied access to that information
unless they agree to a security review of their coverage
-
- journalists (including photographers and camera crew) are
assigned to a specific unit and must stay with that unit unless
permitted to leave (that is, they cannot rush off to another area
where there may be more 'action')
-
- no private transport
-
- no personal firearms
-
- all interviews with service personnel are to be 'on the
record'
-
- there are no specific prohibitions on media communications
equipment; however, journalists must seek approval to use
electronic devices in a combat/hostile environment and unit
commanders may impose temporary restrictions on electronic
transmissions.(3)
Limitations to media freedom
What does this mean for the reading and viewing
public back home, whether in the United States or Australia?
Ostensibly, the public will receive a more complete picture than
that offered in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in
1990-91. One report argues that the 'embedding', combined with
smaller, better digital cameras hooked to portable satellite
dishes, may result in viewers and readers receiving 'some of the
most graphic and revealing war footage and reporting
ever'.(4)
However, the restrictions may limit coverage
more than is perceived. Some American journalists claim that the
rules could allow the US military to 'enforce draconian
restrictions on coverage of any operations in the
region'.(5) For example, on-scene commanders have the
right to restrict information on ongoing engagements; as it is not
clear what constitutes an 'ongoing engagement', some journalists
fear that 'unit commanders could interpret it in an extremely broad
manner as a basis to restrict reporting'.(6) The same
concern applies with regard to what constitutes 'sensitive'
information. 'On the record' interviews may prevent service
personnel from 'telling the truth' for fear of disciplinary action
for saying too much.(7)
In addition, as was discovered in the Falklands
War, 'embedding' can have a significant effect on journalists,
resulting in feelings of camaraderie that may affect a journalist's
ability to be independent and objective. (This will be discussed
further below.)
That said, it is possible that overall coverage
will be considerably different from that of the previous Gulf
conflict in that it appears there will be few restrictions imposed
on those reporters not 'embedded' with American troops. This
suggests that non-embedded journalists will remain free to go where
they want and report what they want. Again, however, some
journalists are concerned that American officials have given 'no
convincing guarantees' that non-embedded journalists will be
allowed to report without interference.(8)
A more significant problem for those journalists
working independently of the military is that there are no
guarantees for their safety: Allied commanders have talked about
unleashing 3000 bombs and missiles on Iraq in the first 48 hours of
the campaign. While it initially appeared that a more 'balanced'
view of events than in the last Gulf conflict could come from the
increased number of media correspondents based in Iraq, many of
these journalists have since left the country for fear of being
killed in the threatened bombing. (While it cannot be assumed that
information from the Iraqi side would be any less biased than that
obtained from the United States-led forces going into Iraq, the
argument here is that it at least allows for an alternative range
of information. For example, Peter Arnett's reports from Baghdad in
1991 were condemned as Iraqi propaganda, but they offered viewers
an opposing view to that supplied by the Allies.)
The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade has urged Australian media in Iraq to leave; the Australian
Broadcasting Corporation and the Nine Network have both withdrawn
their reporters from Baghdad.(9) Nine Network
correspondent Hugh Riminton gave his last report from the city on
18 March, noting: 'Much of the world's media is packing up or has
already left, scared off by increasingly shrill warnings from the
United States and the increasing restrictions being applied by the
Iraqis'.(10) However, he highlighted that many reporters
were reluctant to leave because 'they feel it's vital to tell the
story from the Iraqi side'.(11)
American news executives are reported to be
'anguishing' over whether to order their staff to flee Baghdad or
to remain in the city. New York Times journalist Jim
Rutenberg reported that the decision involved 'weighty moral and
ethical questions' for executives, who want the widest possible
coverage from Baghdad but who do not want to endanger their
reporters.(12)
A difficulty for reporters who want to remain in
Iraq is that some of their number fear that the United States will
deliberately target the positions from which they are filing their
reports or will jam their transmissions. BBC correspondent Kate
Adie, who covered the previous conflict in the Gulf, claims that
the Pentagon is 'entirely hostile to the free spread of
information' and has gone so far as to threaten to 'bomb areas in
which war correspondents are attempting to report from the Iraqi
side'.(13) Adie also alleges that the Americans are
vetting the journalists accompanying the military units, rejecting
any who are sceptical of the need for the conflict, and claims that
they are intending to take control of the American journalists'
satellite equipment.(14)
Outside Iraq, the number of journalists in the
region is high, with one report claiming that there are 7000
journalists and crews scattered throughout the Middle East in
Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey and Israel.(15) It is hard to
know how much of what happens inside Iraq these journalists will be
able to report, given that their knowledge will not be obtained
'first-hand', but will have to be gleaned from a variety of sources
who may have their own information-or misinformation-agendas.
Reports on Australia's contribution
It is not known what reports Australians will
receive of their country's troops. While several Australian
newspaper groups and television networks have sent correspondents
to the Gulf, one difficulty they have faced in covering Australia's
contribution to the conflict so far is that 'many of the troops are
top secret ground forces, such as Special Air Service soldiers and
commandos, who cannot be reported on'.(16)
Australian Defence Force spokesman Brigadier
Mike Hannan has been quoted as saying that journalists reporting on
Australian troops will have to abide by 'some ground rules'; these
do not appear to have been placed on the public record. However,
Hannan has said that journalists will not be censored, partly
because: 'We learned a long time ago that you might as well be
up-front because the chances of getting away with anything dodgy
are nil these days.'(17)
The issue of information about Australian troops
is particularly important given the outcry over coverage of
Australia's contribution to the war in Afghanistan in 2001, when
Australians found out what the SAS troopers were doing from
Pentagon briefings.(18) An editorial in The
Australian noted that 'the US public had freer information
about Australia's deployment than our own [the Australian public],
a situation that was disgraceful and must not be allowed to
recur'.(19)
There is potential for this to happen again. The
Australia military has taken a different approach to the United
States military in handling the media, partly for the reasons noted
above to do with the nature of some its forces in the
region.(20) Whereas the American military is 'embedding'
500 journalists and is talking of supplying the maximum amount of
information possible, the Australian Defence Force has rejected
'embedding' on the grounds that it is 'impractical' because service
personnel are in 'specialised units spread over a number of
countries'.(21) In addition, many of the countries
hosting Australian forces are sensitive about the
media.(22)
At a media briefing on 20 March 2003, Hannan
reiterated that the Australian Defence Force would not give the
location of its troops in the war, and would not comment on
'current or future operations'.(23) When pushed as to
when information about Australian forces' actions would be
released, Hannan said details would be given 'when reporting on it
will have no effect on current or future operations'.
Another major difference in approach is the
policy towards identification of service personnel. The United
States Defense Department guidelines say that the names and home
towns of interviewed personnel can be reported, 'with the
individuals' consent'.(24) The Australian Defence Force
restricts the identification of personnel to their rank and first
name. The results so far are somewhat odd: an Australian
Broadcasting Corporation World Today report on 19 March
interviewed the one Australian working in the central 'war room',
the Joint Operations Centre in Qatar, and noted that 'because of
Defence Force reporting restrictions', they could identify the
29-year veteran of the Australian Army only as 'Major
Tony'.(25) It remains to be seen whether the Australian
public will take seriously-or find credible-military personnel
identified in this way.
Overall, the restrictions may mean that
Australians receive an overwhelming amount of information from
American sources about the war in Iraq, but little information
about Australia's contribution to the conflict.
Why is a free media important to Australia now
that it has joined the war in Iraq in 2003?
According to the basic tenets of democracy, a
free press provides information to the public so that people know,
understand, and can judge the actions undertaken by the government
on their behalf, and can therefore make informed choices based on
the facts. In this way, the media play a vital role in helping
people to decide whether or not they approve of what their
government is doing in their name.
This principle is reflected in the right to
freedom of expression enshrined in Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), an international
human rights treaty binding on both the United States and
Australia. The right to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas is an element of the right to freedom of expression that goes
beyond the private right to hold opinions and is aimed at the
safeguarding of the public right to information. The media have a
special mandate under Article 19. As such, the obligation to ensure
public access to information, which is primarily an obligation of
the state, is also shared with media corporations who play a
central role in guaranteeing the public right to
know.(26)
In theory, the media recognise their
responsibility of providing information to the public, and strive
for objectivity ('exhibiting actual facts uncoloured by the
exhibitor's feelings or opinions'(27)). In times of
conflict, this means ensuring that the public are not dependent on
the military or political view of the campaign, but receive an
independent description of events in order to make an informed
choice as to whether or not to support the conflict.
Such independent descriptions have become more
important given the changing nature of war. In the nuclear era, the
threat of mutually assured destruction decreased the likelihood of
a total war, or a war of survival. Since the end of World War II,
and especially since the end of the Cold War, Western democracies
have been involved in a series of 'limited' wars that have not
threatened their immediate survival or sovereignty. It has been
argued that, as a result, the social contract between the citizen
and the government-whereby the citizen has an obligation to support
the government during wartime-has changed.(28) With
limited wars, citizens have the relative luxury of judging whether
to support each war or peacekeeping operation on the 'merits of the
situation' without concern for personal or national survival
(although political appeals for support for such conflicts can be
couched in these terms). A free media supplies the information that
allows such judgments to be made.
Of course, it cannot be assumed that a free
media means a fully informed public for two reasons: the media may
not pass on all information to the public and, depending on the
circumstances, the public may prefer not to be fully informed.
That is, the space and time limits within which
the media operate mean they cannot publish or broadcast all
information they receive-there is simply too much to be
accommodated within the pages of a newspaper or in the viewing
hours in a day. As a result, journalists and news managers must
choose what information they will publish and transmit. This makes
them gatekeepers who have the power to decide what information the
public receive. While the media demand that their access to
information be guaranteed, they reserve the right to decide what
and how much of that information is passed to the public.
The media and the public may differ on this-it
may be that, in certain circumstances, the public considers their
interests are best served by a degree of secrecy undertaken on
their behalf. For example, in times of conflict, the public may be
more prepared to accept limits to their 'right to know' in order to
prevent perceived risks to their 'sons and daughters' serving in
the military.
This argument has been made in relation to the
Gulf conflict of 1990-91, when surveys found that many Americans
favoured restrictions imposed on the media and were content to hear
the news of the war from military briefers.(29) Far from
being dissatisfied with the restrictions on the media, one survey
showed that 80 per cent of respondents supported restrictions on
the media and 57 per cent were in favour of harsher controls being
imposed.(30) Opinion polls showed that the public wanted
war news, but they also wanted the war to be won quickly and
cleanly and were willing to trade off the former for the
latter.
The consequences of losing public support for
any war can be severe and long-term for both a government and the
military. A government may be ousted from office at the next
election; the military may face the humiliation of a retreat and/or
a loss. Thus, in the absence of an obligation to support the
government's choice for war, a new battle emerges-that for public
opinion. Information is an essential weapon in this battle and
whoever can control what 'facts' the public receives has a distinct
advantage. It is here that the clash between the military and the
media becomes apparent: it is, essentially, a battle between the
right to win-and win with the support of the people 'back home'-and
the right to know.
Democratic societies require both a capable
military and a free press. The first physically protects, under
government direction, the sovereignty of the state and its
democratic values and national interests, and thereby, the safety
and democratic freedoms of its citizens. The second performs a
similar, if more disputed function, independent of the government,
in countering threats (including threats from the government
itself) to the democratic fabric of the society and to the freedom
of its citizens. These roles, and the different agendas and
characters of each group, often place the military and the media in
opposition, especially in time of war.
The conflict rests on arguments about the
citizens' 'right to know'; that is, the requirement that citizens
in a democracy should be kept informed of what their government is
undertaking in their name, even if the majority supports
constraints imposed on the media. This notion is often linked to
the claim that a country's taxpayers have a right to be fully
informed about what their taxes are being used for.(31)
The media argue that for information to have more value than
propaganda, citizens should be informed through sources independent
of the government. The military argue that the public's right to
know cannot be placed above, or allowed to threaten, their right to
win with minimum casualties. While the public's right to know can
be limited on national security grounds, the limitation must be
strictly confined to that which is absolutely necessary. If the
restrictions are more than is required for that purpose, the media
and the public have a legitimate complaint that their right to
know, and therefore their right to freedom of expression, is being
breached.(32)
Opposing professions
A key element of the conflict between the media
and the military is that their underlying 'reasons for being' as
well as their motivations and aims are quite different. While the
military and the media both consider themselves professions, they
have very distinct-and some might argue opposing-characters and
professional attributes:
-
- the military 'are trained to be very careful in their treatment
of information and, as a regular practice, to withhold material
from those not authorised to receive it'.(33) The media
claims that all citizens in a democracy have a 'right to know' what
is undertaken in their name
-
- for the military, 'secrecy and surprise' can be vital for
successful operations, whereas the role of the media is to gather
information for the widest possible
dissemination(34)
-
- the military would prefer to publicise only its successes,
whereas the media make public the successes and failures of both
sides
-
- the media will gather and disseminate a range of
interpretations of events. The military gathers information for a
focused purpose
-
- he military values patriotism and loyalty, while the media's
loyalties can be variable, depending on the ownership of-and the
nationalities that make up-the news organisation.
-
- the military 'demands team play', 'is hierarchical' and 'values
loyalty and confidence in superiors' whereas journalists in Western
democracies compete with one another, 'have no rank', and value
'objectivity and scepticism'(35)
-
- the military 'depends on chains of command and people carrying
out instructions precisely; journalism relies on latera1
thinkers'.(36)
An American survey demonstrated the conflict
between the military professionalism (focused on victory) and media
ethics (focused on 'truth') when it found that 60 per cent of
military officers, compared to less than 10 per cent of news
organisations, were in favour of disinformation tactics even if
their own citizens also were deceived.(37)
Handling the media: lessons from
the past
The result of this conflict between the military
and the media can be seen in the controls that have been exercised
over the media in several wars since Vietnam. In fact, the
development of the restrictions imposed on the media in the 1990-91
Gulf conflict can be traced to the alleged impact of the media on
the outcome of the Vietnam War, which ended in 1975.
According to this explanation, the United States
military felt that negative stories from the field as well as those
highlighting the increasing death toll and cost of the war had
caused public support for operations in Vietnam to decline,
resulting in public demonstrations and calls for the United States
to leave Vietnam. In other words, the war had been lost at home
before it was lost on the front line. (Of course, there are many
competing explanations for the outcome of the Vietnam War; these
are outside the scope of this paper.)
The Falklands War between the United Kingdom and
Argentina in 1982 offered the US military an example of how a
controlled media could become part of a successful war effort. The
British military had an immediate advantage in that the media could
not get to the site of the war in the remote islands in the South
Atlantic Ocean without military transport. Travelling with the
Royal Navy, the journalists were completely reliant on the
military, not only for access to the battle zone but for food,
shelter, protection, and transmission of their reports, a task the
Navy placed well down its list of priorities.(38)
This total dependence on the military was
important in three respects that are relevant to 'embedding' in
2003:
-
- it created an esprit de corps between the journalists and the
military. As academics David Morrison and Howard Tumber later
observed: 'It was not just a question of sharing the moods of the
troops through shared experience, but of actively beginning to
identify with them by being part of the whole exercise'. The
journalists on board found there was 'simply no escaping the
military's embrace'(39)
-
- it allowed the military complete dominance of the media
coverage. With stories sent through the ships' communications
channels, military "minders" had direct access to copy and could
decide how urgently stories would be transmitted, if at all, and in
what order(40)
-
- it led to an emphasis on the minutiae of the conflict at the
expense of the big picture. That is, the focus on stories at the
troop level-individuals under stress, acts of heroism, cameos
highlighting single actions-tended to obscure what was happening
elsewhere.
The Falklands War gave the US military a
practical example of successful control of the media, and a link
began to be drawn between military success and media control. The
US military used the lessons to develop its own controls over the
media and applied its new restrictions when invading Grenada (1983)
and Panama (1989). Journalists were excluded from the immediate
actions in both countries, gaining belated access under rigid
controls. To this day, many details of these conflicts are not
publicly known.
By August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the US
military had tested and perfected a completely new policy for
dealing with the media so that when President George Bush Sr said
the Gulf conflict 'would "not be a new Vietnam" and that this time
U.S. forces would not have to fight with one arm tied behind their
backs', it was clear what this meant-a 'free' media would not be
allowed to ruin the campaign.(41) As noted earlier,
journalists were confined to pools, they were barred from battles
without a military escort and their reports and photographs were
cleared by Allied military censors.
The result, as one journalist covering the
conflict observed, was that: 'Not a single eyewitness account,
photograph or strip of video of combat between 400 000
soldiers in the desert was produced by this battalion of
professional observers'.(42) The grisly pictures late in
the conflict of the Basra Road 'turkey shoot', when Allied war
planes targeted fleeing Iraqi soldiers, were the work of
independent journalists in an area free of military
handlers.(43)
Only after the war did it emerge that many of
the stories relayed to the public were not true. An oft-cited
example is that of the 'neo-natal incubators'. This story-in which
Iraqi soldiers invading Kuwait were reported as throwing Kuwaiti
babies out of their hospital incubators 'to die on the cold
floor'-was later revealed to be a deliberate figment of the
imagination of a public relations firm employed to generate
sympathy for the planned war. Other stories grossly exaggerated the
success of the Allied military's sophisticated high-technology
weaponry; for example, the 'Patriot' missiles were much less
successful in intercepting Iraq's 'Scud' missiles than was claimed
at the time.(44)
Although there were many complaints about the
results of such media controls, especially in light of the untruths
revealed after the war, little changed in the 1990s. Journalist
Phillip Knightley, who has written a history of war correspondents
(The First Casualty), argues that the results for
reporting of conflicts were significant:
The lies, manipulation, propaganda, spin,
distortion, omission, slant and gullibility of the coverage of
Kosovo and Chechnya, so soon after the media debacle in the Gulf,
has brought war correspondents to a crisis point in their
history.(45)
Journalists continued to complain at the lack of
information in the 'war on terrorism' and the limited access to the
action in Afghanistan in 2001.(46) No provision was made
for journalists to accompany the American and Northern Alliance
military forces in Afghanistan. United States Defence Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld has said that Afghanistan was 'too volatile to try
and accommodate media' but reporters were not stopped from 'going
into Afghanistan on their own and reporting from anywhere they
want'.(47)
However, journalist Joel Campagna notes that
journalists faced 'an array of restrictions' from both sides that
hampered their ability to report.(48) While the Taliban
barred most foreign media from areas under its control, the United
States military 'provided very limited access to journalists
covering the military campaign and on occasion curtailed
journalists' movements and censored or intimidated those who tried
to report developments on the ground'.(49)
What does this mean for the current conflict in
Iraq? Arguably, the battle for the hearts and minds of the public
is even more important in this conflict because the 'war' does not
have the wide support of the actions taken in the Gulf in 1990-91.
Just as there are verbal battles between countries at the United
Nations over the necessity for action against Iraq, there are
similar battles within countries between those in favour of ousting
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein-with or without United Nations
backing-and those who are against such action and who want their
nation to follow the dictates of the international body.
Where no decision has been made, and public
support is wavering, there is a potential for information in the
media to sway public opinion. The United States has acknowledged
this, but only from the perspective of misinformation coming from
'the other side'. It says that it is allowing broader media
coverage of this conflict in order to demonstrate its 'commitment
to supporting our democratic ideals'.(50) That is, 'We
need to tell the factual story-good or bad-before others seed the
media with disinformation and distortion ... Our people in the
field need to tell our story'.(51)
Journalist Robert Fisk takes a more cynical
view, arguing that the United States is providing access because it
fears that Saddam Hussein will commit an atrocity and blame it on
the Americans. He claims that 'embedded' journalists can be 'rushed
to the scene to prove that the killings were the dastardly work of
the Beast of Baghdad rather than the "collateral damage" ... of
fine young men who are trying to destroy the triple pillar of the
"axis of evil"'.(52) Fisk is not alone in holding this
view: journalist Hampton Sides, writing in the New Yorker,
cites an unnamed military officer saying reporters were needed to
document the weapons in Saddam Hussein's arsenal because 'the
world's not going to believe the U.S. Army. But they'll believe you
[the media]'.(53)
This can be seen as a response to what Rumsfeld
alleged occurred in Afghanistan, when he complained that those
journalists who were in Afghanistan were often 'hoodwinked by
Taliban and al-Qaeda propaganda'.(54) He claimed that
the Taliban 'would lie and drag people out of a hospital over to a
neighbouring building and claim we hit the hospital or killed
innocent civilians, when we didn't, and the press would carry it as
though it were true'.(55)
There appears to be little recognition here that
the use of the media to supply 'propaganda' for broad
dissemination-targeting especially the public on 'the other
side'-applies equally to both camps. It is noteworthy that in the
Gulf conflict of 1990-91, the Allied forces used the media to send
messages to Saddam Hussein and can be argued to, at times, have
negotiated with him through it. An attempt at a similar exercise
may underlie the Bush Administration's complaint in February 2003
that it was not allowed airtime to rebut claims the Iraqi leader
made in an interview with an American television network. (See
below.)
The potential for the public to be subjected to
an 'information war' to win over their opinion suggests that it
would be prudent to maintain a level of scepticism about the aim of
the 'embedding' of journalists with military units. Commenting on
the plans to 'embed' journalists, CBS News anchor Dan Rather
observed, 'There's a pretty fine line between being embedded and
being entombed'.(56) A correspondent to the New York
Times neatly summarised the potential problems of
'embedding':
The training and group psychology of combat
military units, not to mention combat itself, usually result in the
most intense feelings of loyalty and comradeship that soldiers will
ever experience. I suspect the Pentagon hopes that this same group
psychology will rub off on 'embedded' reporters.
Those who try to report hard, messy facts and
ask uncomfortable questions will not only risk ostracism,
censorship or expulsion. They may even find themselves
rationalizing away and stifling their better journalistic
instincts, because their loyalty will have shifted to their
military unit and away from us, their reading
public.(57)
As noted above, such camaraderie occurred in the
Falklands War and the lessons were applied in the 1990-91 Gulf
conflict. Having learned the advantages of subsuming the media into
the military and making the journalists feel like soldiers, the
Allied military initially supplied journalists with uniforms and
gear similar to the soldiers. Although this was later withdrawn as
rebel journalists used the uniforms as camouflage in their attempts
to work outside the pools, it had the desired effect in that
journalists begin to phrase their questions in terms of 'we', 'us',
and 'our troops'.(58) Journalists identified with the
military spirit and goals, took part in training and fitness tests
provided by the army, and adopted military slang. The relationship
worked both ways with military commanders considering the pool
attached to their units as 'their journalists' and an integrated
part of their own forces.(59)
Knightly argues that it is 'useless' to expect
the truth from the 'war correspondent-soldier' because any such
truth 'might damage the army, the war effort, and the national
interests'.(60) He claims that such correspondents would
not write a damaging story, would put a positive twist on a
negative story and would probably lie to their readers if the
military asked them to. Thus, friendliness between individual
journalists and military personnel can result in self-censorship
that blunts the media's independence, as can fear of losing access
to a source if the source is within the military or the government
and is displeased with the journalist's style, content or
analysis.(61)
It is likely that 'embedding' journalists in
military units involved in the conflict in Iraq in 2003 will
produce similar effects, as has been noted by at least one reporter
currently in the Gulf. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
correspondent Paul Workman queried the ability of journalists to be
independent and objective when they are 'sleeping and living with'
the soldiers they are trying to cover: 'What happens if there's,
say, a friendly fire accident [and] there's a lot of casualties on
the field? Is the American military going to let us transmit those
pictures?'(62)
News organisations have acknowledged that
'embedding' may 'raise questions' about journalistic independence,
but they argue that these frontline reports will form only part of
much broader coverage that will incorporate expert analysis and
reports from non-'embedded' journalists.(63) In
addition, at least one news organisation (CNN) will not allow its
reporters to dress in uniforms and equipment supplied by the US
military. Rather, CNN says it will issue its journalists with flak
jackets and possibly helmets on the basis that 'This differential
is essential to maintain objectivity and
independence'.(64)
Patriotism and self-censorship
A problem, of course, is that objectivity and
independence are not always appreciated at home. Those journalists
and media organisations who do not 'go along' with the war effort
may find themselves under verbal fire. Media organisations are
regularly accused of lacking patriotism and even of treason. Such
accusations come from the military, politicians and sections of the
media themselves. In 1991, CNN's Peter Arnett was condemned as the
'Joseph Goebbels of Saddam Hussein's Hitler-like regime' for
reporting the Allied bombing of a baby-milk plant in
Baghdad.(65) In February 2003, CBS news anchor Dan
Rather was denounced for interviewing Saddam Hussein for the
network. Critics felt he had been too soft on the Iraqi leader and
'some conservative leaders even went so far as to cast doubts on
the 71-year-old newscaster's patriotism'.(66) As noted
above, the Bush Administration criticised the network itself for
not giving the White House airtime to rebut Saddam Hussein's
claims.
In a democratic society, wars are open to a
discussion of their merits. Such analysis by the media is often
labelled as a lack of patriotism. For example, during the 1990-91
Gulf conflict, the accredited journalist with the Australian task
force was criticised by the military for the 'negative' tone of his
stories and for suggesting that Australia was participating for
political and not military reasons.(67) The Australian
Broadcasting Corporation was heavily criticised for a perceived
anti-war bias in the selection of its
commentators.(68)
Those who demand a 'patriotic' media argue that
journalists should not forget that the most important thing in a
war is not to send reports home, but to win: 'This means that in a
war there are greater tasks than news reporting, and you have to
know which side you are on.'(69) Daily Express
editor Max Hastings succinctly expressed his view of such media
patriotism during the Falklands War, when he quoted his war
correspondent father's well-known observation regarding World War
II: 'When one's nation is at war, reporting becomes an extension of
the war'.(70)
The result is that journalists may impose
self-censorship where they consider themselves to be part of the
war effort, and in order to protect the operation and its
participants. In the 1990-91 conflict, many journalists had no
problem with this partly because they, too, had been immersed in
the myth of media responsibility for the loss in Vietnam. This may
have made them reluctant to question many of the 'facts' the
military supplied in case they were seen to harm the war effort.
Thus, the US military's rigid control was hardly necessary by
January 1991 because, with few exceptions, the media undertook
their own self-censorship.(71) One author claims the
level of self-censorship in the United States probably exceeded the
military's blackout of battlefield news. During the Gulf War:
There was ... a substantial symbiosis between
the media and the military authorities with regard to perspectives,
partiality, and values. Dressed in combat uniforms, the journalists
fought in the very same war on the very same side and for the very
same aims as the soldiers, who were responsible for the
journalists' security and whose activities the journalists were
supposed to be watching.(72)
There are already signs of the potential for a
repeat of the earlier media patriotism and thus self-censorship in
the conflict in Iraq in 2003. In the post-September 11 world, many
American journalists are openly patriotic, or as one veteran
reporter observes: 'Some editors and reporters in American media
now see themselves as "patriot police", engaging in jingoism and
self-censorship'.(73) With regard to the current
conflict, Associated Press Washington bureau chief Sandy Johnson
has acknowledged that the media's goal is to 'let the American
public know how their sons and daughters do at war', but also
notes, 'Our goal is to win, also'.(74)
An important question is whether such a
'positive' stance on the part of the media is appropriate during
wartime, when the media's role in presenting alternative opinions
is vital. For example, much of the discussion with regard to the
conflict in Iraq is centred on the issue of whether such action-if
undertaken by the United States alone or in partnership with others
without United Nations approval-is a just or an unjust war. The
media should have a considerable role in presenting all of various
viewpoints to the public.
Modern technology has raised a number of issues
for media coverage of the conflict in Iraq.
I) From body bags to the
bloodless war
Convinced that the media portrayal of Vietnam as
a bloody, endless conflict with a rising toll of young Americans
coming home in body bags had weakened the public's resolve to win
the war, the US military turned the Gulf War into a clinical,
bloodless campaign. As one commentator on media coverage in the
Gulf conflict observed:
Human suffering during the war was conspicuous
for its absence in the news, there was no body count as in Vietnam,
and the image of a clinical, computerised war, which glorified the
technological superiority of the alliance, penetrated the
media.(75)
Two ideas came to dominate the media coverage of
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm:
-
- that the war was being waged against the world's 'fourth
largest army', which comprised a 'highly-trained elite Republican
Guard'
-
- that this justified the Allies putting on history's first
high-technology 'Nintendo-like' electronic war complete with 'smart
bombs' and night-time transmission of light
shows.(76)
The US military placed heavy emphasis on
presenting sanitised images of this new kind of high technology war
between machines, not men. Information given out at media briefings
concentrated on 'Patriot' missile interception successes and 'smart
bomb' statistics, with purposeful avoidance of casualty figures.
Few corpses from either side were seen, not just to keep
information on casualty figures from the enemy but to prevent
pictures of the dead and injured reaching relatives back home. Only
at the end did more bloody images appear-recall, for example, the
aforementioned gruesome pictures of the Allied 'turkey shoot' of
the fleeing Iraqi forces on the road to Basra.
Technology-driven
jargon
The importance of a new military-technical
jargon in creating the image of a bloodless war cannot be
over-emphasised. The military's 'un-bloody' clinical jargon to
describe all aspects of the 1990-91 conflict became part of the
media's-and thus the public's-daily language.
Australian Broadcasting Corporation producer
Trevor Bormann, who was in a media pool in Saudi Arabia at the
time, says journalists were 'fed this diet of great spin terms'
that 'sounded very impressive':
We were told about 'collateral damage', which
meant that the bomb missed and hit a house and probably killed a
few kids. We heard about 'target-rich environments', which meant
that they had plenty of things to shoot at. All of these terms
served to desensitise war to a certain extent. Before we know it,
it becomes part of mainstream journalistic language
...(77)
Bormann says that, although journalists think
that they are 'too smart ... to be seduced by this kind of
language', it easily becomes part of the language that they use in
their reports.
Already, in March 2003, the blitz of new
terms-and the resurgence of old terms-has started. Media reports
note that the United States plans a 'quick, surgical intervention'
in Iraq, with the 'unleashing [of] 3000 precision-guided bombs in
the first 48 hours of a short air campaign'.(78) It is
worth recalling here that the claims about the 'precision' of such
weapons in the earlier conflict later turned out to be greatly
exaggerated. A Reuters story published in the New Zealand media
reports that the US military aims to minimise civilian casualties
in the conflict in Iraq 'by using guided weapons and a mathematical
formula known as "bug splat"'.(79) This report notes
that, in addition, the military will 'use "non-lethal" weapons,
such as "offensive electronics", when appropriate'.
II) 'Gee-whiz gizmo technology
reporting'
Modern technology has dramatically changed the
nature and type of reports that are filed from a conflict zone.
Veteran war correspondent Peter Arnett describes how, in the early
days of the Vietnam War, journalists had to send their copy by
Morse code to Tokyo to be sent on to the United
States.(80) By the 1990-91 Gulf conflict, the media had
access to equipment that enabled stories and pictures to be
transmitted in real time to hundreds of millions of people around
the world.
Two points can be made about technology and
reporting in the 1990-91 conflict that remain applicable today:
-
- in the absence of 'live war' copy to fill space, the media
focused on the new weapons of the Allied forces and bombarded the
public with information about what the technology could achieve.
Arguably, however, what the media needed was neither its own
high-technology to cover the war nor information about the
sophisticated weaponry of the Allied forces, but an ability to
digest and make some sense of the huge amount of data generated in
the conflict.(81) An appreciation of the broad strategic
picture is essential in order to place the individual skirmishes in
context. A difficulty is that the media suffer from the 'fog of
war' in which their focus on single or multiple narrow actions
obscures the bigger picture
-
- the media's new technologies, which allowed 'live'
round-the-clock broadcasts and an overwhelming amount of news,
tended to obscure the fact that most broadcasts were still Western
in character and bias, and relatively devoid of facts and
substance.(82)
Today, the technology is even more sophisticated
than in 1990-91: reporters are not weighed down with heavy camera
equipment, nor do they require large numbers of crew to compile
their reports. Rather, 'All the gadgets a reporter needs can be
carried in a single suitcase that fits in the overhead compartment
of most planes'.(83) This means that journalists will be
able to transmit a myriad of reports from the front, almost
instantaneously. The danger is that such reports will be shallow,
based on '"gee-whiz gizmo technology reporting" with little
substance'.(84)
This is especially likely given the increased
use in news reports of 'lipstick' cameras and 'helmet-mounted'
cameras, which create the 'you are there' feel of reality
television shows. The United States guidelines for 'embedded'
journalists say that the use of such cameras on 'combat sorties' is
to be 'approved and encouraged to the greatest extent
possible'.(85) The problem is that such stories are
likely to comprise footage of a military unit in action that is
devoid of context and meaning. In this way, it reduces the coverage
of conflict to 'infotainment' of the kind offered by such shows as
'Survivor' and 'Big Brother'.
'Embedded' reporters will be able to supply
detailed information on the units within which they are stationed,
but for the public to receive a complete picture of what is
happening in the conflict, it is essential that such reports be
placed within a broader analytical framework.
III) Alternative sources of
information
Modern technology raises a new problem for both
the military and the mainstream media: today's communications
technologies allow the public to seek and receive a range of
alternative views of any conflict. Readers and viewers are
increasingly technologically literate and are able to
cross-reference the information they receive from their own media
with that supplied by other sources, including those from
non-Western media. An Arabic version of CNN, Al Jazeera, has a crew
'embedded' in an American military unit, thus offering a
non-Western perspective from the Western side. CNN chief news
executive Eason Jordan has credited Al Jazeera with supplying for
American viewers many of the battle images from the war in
Afghanistan in 2001, including those of civilian casualties from
American bombing raids.(86)
Of course, access to multiple sources of
information is not a panacea to propaganda as the dissemination of
untruths, half-truths and misinformation is more insidious:
increased access to a broader range of information is no guarantee
that any of the information obtained is 'the truth'. That said,
journalist Owen Gibson notes that today's world of 'instant views
and news at the click of a mouse' is a hostile environment for
propaganda and it is harder to control a public's perception of a
conflict:
When Allied forces were last on their way to the
Gulf in 1991, the internet was little more than a gaggle of bearded
academics swapping information on their latest computer programs.
... But now 24-hour news is commonplace, it is the web that is
opening up a world of different perspectives and viewpoints.
As we've seen over the past two years, from
September 11 to the subsequent war on terror and the current
countdown to war, after the initial rush towards recognised news
sources such as the BBC and CNN, web users started to cast their
net far wider as they searched for explanation and context. ...
just last week, interested parties were able to flick from the
French press to the US tabloids and back again to see how differing
views on the war were taking shape.(87)
Gibson argues that the Internet provides access
to 'a greater diversity of viewpoints and a more international
viewpoint':
Put simply, when you have a worldwide depository
of millions of points of view, the propaganda war becomes a lot
harder to win. ... The key thing is that it now only takes a few
minutes to search through several lifetimes' worth of
information-and access to that huge archive is not restricted to
journalists, academics or government officials, but open to
all.(88)
While Gibson's points are valid, he overlooks a
major difficulty with information accessed via the Internet: that
is, that the World Wide Web presents all stories and all
information as equal. In addition, many web sites are either
overtly or covertly biased in the selection of information they
present and those responsible for establishing and maintaining the
site are not always easily identifiable. This is a problem if a
public suspicious of official information coming through mainstream
media turns to that coming through alternative, 'bottom up' rather
than 'top down' sources without maintaining the same degree of
scepticism.
In an interesting twist, some of the alternative
information available online may come from members of the United
States military themselves. A March 2003 New York Times
report notes that some military units in the 'Persian Gulf region,
Afghanistan and elsewhere' have started to clamp down on the email
communications of their soldiers and sailors for fear that they
might be leaking sensitive information in their messages to family
and friends.(89) The report noted:
What worries computer and military experts is
the possibility that enemy forces may obtain a soldier's message
home that ends up being forwarded to someone sympathetic to Iraq,
or that outsiders might simply view a picture published on a
publicly accessible Web site.(90)
An air force memorandum cited in the report
claims that 'sensitive photos of forward operating bases' had been
posted on the Internet-some on an anti-American web site-and warns
that 'adversaries could collect these photos and use them to plan
attacks against United States forces'. The report notes that, as a
result of these concerns, service personnel have been warned not to
include their location, current or future operations, and 'comments
about troops morale' in their communications back home.
The inability of the United States military to
control all forms of modern communication may underlie its decision
to ease its attempts to control the media. That is, Pentagon
officials are reported to have said that it is 'in their interests
to provide Western news media access to combat zones to counteract
the potential for Iraqi disinformation that could be distributed by
Arab news outlets'.(91) But it is not only the Arab news
outlets that may concern the military-there are many alternative
forms of communication, including the Internet, email and mobile
phones.
Thus, today's readers, viewers and listeners may
not be as vulnerable as they were previously to media manipulation
because they can access alternative sources of information. Of
course, this raises a new problem: that of 'information overload',
which may have two consequences:
-
- people will 'tune out' rather than 'tune in'
-
- people will turn back to traditional forms of media, which
specialise in prioritising, and thereby limiting, the amount of
information passed to the public.
Another reason that the public may choose to
'tune out' is that modern technology allows the media to supply
information that viewers may prefer not to see. That is, the images
that portable satellite dishes and video-phones allow journalists
to beam back home from the battlefield almost instantaneously may
be too graphic, even for audiences accustomed to 'reality TV'.
While ratings and newspaper sales demonstrate that the public wants
the right to be thrilled, horrified and otherwise titillated by
armed conflict as infotainment, it is possible they will find that
too many images of blood and carnage are unpalatable.
The modern technologies discussed in the
previous section raise another issue that, thus far, has received
little attention: that the technology that gives journalists
mobility and allows them to record every aspect of a conflict opens
the possibility of their being called as witnesses in any
subsequent war crimes trials. Traditionally, the notions of
neutrality and independence have protected war correspondents, but
this appears to be changing and has considerable implications for
the future safety of journalists in the field.
However, while news organisation managers
sending their staff to the Gulf in 2003 have recognised-and are
excited at the prospect-that 'those little digital cameras ...
could end up documenting this war', they have not explored the
potential repercussions for journalists.(92) Thus, when
Newsweek editor Mark Whitaker says, 'Anybody who is sort
of in the right place at the right time-a firefight, for
instance-could end up playing a major role', he does not appear to
consider that the 'major role' could be as a witness in
court.(93)
Whether or not journalists can-or should-testify
in war crimes courts has become a significant issue for journalists
who covered the Balkan wars, many of whom have been subpoenaed to
appear in the courtrooms of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia.(94) While some have agreed to appear,
saying they have a 'moral duty' to bear witness, others have
declined, citing professional principles, such as 'impartiality'
and the 'watchdog role of the news media'. Those who decline claim
that it is enough for prosecutors to 'read our stories', but one
report notes that war-crimes investigators are more interested in
evidence proving 'command and control responsibility' for
atrocities than in 'eyewitness accounts of
atrocities'.(95)
The Rules of Procedure for the International
Criminal Court provide no special exemptions for journalists,
although they allow for a range of other exemptions.(96)
Therefore, the principles to be applied to journalists will need to
be developed in the context of future cases. No doubt, if privilege
is claimed, the International Criminal Court will look to the
practice of the existing International Criminal Tribunals for
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunals for
Rwanda. In December 2002, the former ruled on appeal that reporters
may not be subpoenaed routinely to testify in war crimes cases
before the court.(97) The ruling established a two-part
test before a war correspondent may be subpoenaed. First, it must
be shown that the testimony 'is of direct and important value to
determining a core issue in the case', and second, it must be
demonstrated that the evidence cannot reasonably be obtained
elsewhere.(98) The International Press Institute in
Vienna praised the ruling and said that it hoped the ruling would
be a precedent for other courts.
But it is here that a danger for 'embedded'
journalists may lie. Not only will their portable cameras give them
access to 'some of the most graphic and revealing war footage ...
ever', but they will observe-and possibly capture on film or in
digital image-every detail of their unit's daily operations,
including those details that may prove responsibility for
atrocities. While some of that material will find its way into the
public arena, and is arguably available to a future war crimes
tribunal, not all material will do so. Most of those journalists
who have resisted giving evidence in The Hague have been American,
but British journalists 'took the stand early and wrote proudly
about it'.(99) The US military has given 100 of the 500
'embedded' placements to non-American media, including British
journalists. The question is whether, should a war crimes tribunal
be established over actions in Iraq, whether these journalists
could be called as witnesses.
The potential for journalists to be called as
witnesses in war crimes investigations may increase the danger to
their personal safety. CNN international networks president Chris
Cramer says today's journalists 'are being killed at an
unacceptable and unprecedented rate':
They are doing a professional job, but are being
confused with representatives of their native countries'
governments. Gone are the days when journalists were looked on as
members of a sacred profession and not to be harmed. Indeed, they
are more likely, some say, to be killed in the line of duty than
are members of the armed forces.(100)
As an example, eight reporters were killed in a
16-day period while covering the war in Afghanistan in
2001.(101)
Knightley notes that war reporting has always
been a 'risky job', but today it is even more dangerous because
combatants are targeting journalists. War correspondents seen as
'the bearers of bad news' and 'vultures who exploited human
suffering' are now considered to be legitimate targets. (This is
not to argue that journalists have not been 'targets' in earlier
wars. Journalist Jack Shafer notes that unarmed journalists were
not 'protected' until after World War II when the Geneva Convention
proscribed soldiers from targeting or detaining
them.(102))
The war in Iraq again raises the issue of media
coverage of conflict and the public's right to know. While the news
that the United States military will 'embed' 500 journalists,
including 100 non-American journalists, with its front-line forces
implies that readers and viewers world-wide will receive a full
picture of any action undertaken, past evidence suggests that this
may not necessarily be the case.
An inherent tension between the goals of the
media and those of the military gives the latter an incentive to
attempt to control the information transmitted to the public in
order to ensure public support for the conflict. Such controls have
proved successful over the past two decades, and were especially so
in the previous Gulf conflict in 1990-91. In hindsight, it was
obvious that many of the stories relayed to the public were not
true and were, in fact, part of a deliberate campaign of
misinformation.
The United States military has argued that
'embedding' is a way for the truth to be told, with reporters able
to observe 'the factual story' first hand. However, as was clear
from the experience of 'embedding' in the Falklands War and the
'pools' of the Gulf War, there is a tendency for journalists
accompanying military personnel to be seconded to the cause in ways
that may impair their objectivity and result in self-censorship.
The result is that the public may not be offered the alternative
views that would help them to decide whether or not to support a
conflict.
The implications of this identification and
sympathy with the military in today's conflict in Iraq are
especially important given the split in public opinion as to
whether such action is justified. Australian poll results published
on 18 March 2003 showed that 68 per cent of respondents were
against Australia's involvement in military action against Iraq
without United Nations approval.(103) Only 25 per cent
of respondents were in favour of such action. As the United
States-led forces began their moves against Iraq, New York
Times commentator Thomas Friedman stressed the importance to
the United States of convincing its traditional friends that its
actions are legitimate, noting: 'we need to patch things up with
the world'.(104) Such patching up will require winning
not just the hearts and minds of Americans, but of citizens in
other countries, including Australia. Information is a key weapon
in this battle.
Meanwhile, the anticipated benefits of modern
technology that frees reporters to wander around the front line,
unencumbered by heavy equipment and extra crew members, may not
materialise. While the media now has the ability to transmit
reports almost instantaneously from the battlefield to the readers
and viewers back home, the military has the ability to control such
transmissions, by jamming signals or seizing equipment. In
addition, some non-embedded journalists fear that their
sophisticated equipment may make them easy targets for both the
United States-led forces and the Iraqi military.
For the reading and viewing public, there is a
danger that coverage will once again rely heavily on the appealing
footage of fireworks-like modern weaponry and the bloodless jargon
in which its use is described. The result may be too much detail
and not enough substance.
For journalists, there is a danger that their
'embedded' access to the battlefield combined with their ability to
capture on film or in digital image graphic and revealing footage
will make them vulnerable to being called as witnesses in cases of
alleged war crimes. Such outcomes fundamentally alter the role of
war correspondents and may jeopardise their 'neutral' status.
While Australia's contribution to the attack on
Iraq will be physically small in comparison to that of the United
States or the United Kingdom, the action will be undertaken with
Australian agreement. Australia may have different 'rules of
engagement', as Defence Minister Robert Hill has made clear, but it
will be no mere bystander.(105) Australians have a right
to expect to be kept fully-and factually-informed about what is
being done by the Australian Defence Force and coalition forces in
their name.
-
- Sally Jackson, 'Baghdad Blitz', The Australian, 6
March 2003, Lindsay Murdoch, 'Close-up view for media at the
front', The Age, 14 March 2003, and Phillip Coorey,
'Shooting the action', Daily Telegraph, 1 March 2003.
- The guidelines document, 'Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on
embedding media during possible future operations/deployment in the
U.S. Central Commands (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR)', can
be found on the United States Department of Defense Defense Link
web site at: www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/d20030228pag.pdf
- ibid.
- Peter Johnson, 'Media's war footing looks solid', USA
Today, 17 February 2003.
- Patrick Barrett, 'US reporters condemn Pentagon press
controls', The Guardian, 27 February 2003.
- See, for example, the Committee to Protect Journalists' letter
to US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, www.cpj.org/protests/03ltrs/USA06march03pl.html.
The Committee to Protect Journalists is a non-partisan, non-profit
organisation founded in 1981 to monitor abuses against the press
and promote press freedom around the world.
- Barrett, op. cit., and Greg Mitchell, 'Schanberg's take on the
Pentagon's media rules', Editor & Publisher, 24
February 2003. As military academic Douglas Porch observes: 'Loose
lips sink not only ships but careers'. See Douglas Porch, '"No bad
stories": the American media-military relationship', Naval War
College Review, vol. LV, no. 1, Winter 2002, p. 98.
- Committee to Protect Journalists, op. cit.
- Mark Forbes, 'Australians urged to flee or risk being
hostages', The Age, 18 March 2003.
- Hugh Riminton, 'Hugh Riminton in Baghdad', Today Show
transcript, ninemsn, http://news.ninemsn.com.au/Special/story_46770.asp.
- ibid.
- m Rutenberg, 'U.S. news organizations tell employees to leave
Baghdad', New York Times, 19 March 2003, www.nytimes.com/2003/03/19/national/19MEDI.html.
- Kate Adie, transcript of interview with Irish national
broadcaster Tom McGurk on the RTE1 Radio 'Sunday Show', www.gulufuture.com/news/kate_adie030310.htm
- ibid.
- Robert Fisk, 'The war of words and pictures has begun',
Canberra Times, 18 March 2003.
- Jackson, op. cit.
- ibid.
- Coorey, op. cit.
- 'Free reporting is best defence', The Australian, 5
March 2003.
- Hannan says the way the SAS operates must be kept secret
because of the role they play in countering terrorism in Australia.
See Murdoch, op. cit.
- ibid. This report cites Hannan saying: 'If it [embedding] was
doable we would have done it'.
- Jackson says Hannan would not say where the forces were based
and which countries he was talking about, but she speculates that
they include Qatar and Saudi Arabia: 'neither is renowned for press
freedom'. Jackson, op. cit.
- Australian Defence Force, Media Briefing, 'Australia's
commitment to global operations', transcript, 20 March 2003,
www.defence.gov.au/media/2003/temp/200303.htm
- Public Affairs Guidance, op. cit.
- ABC Online, The World Today, 19 March 2003, www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2003/s810958.htm
- The right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of
all kinds is a constituent element of the right to freedom of
expression (Art.19 ICCPR). The right to seek information protects
the right of active inquiry and is particularly relevant to the
media. However, the right to freedom of expression, which is often
discussed as a absolute right, may be subject to limitations on the
grounds of national security. Such a limitation must be strictly
limited to that which is necessary and must also be provided for by
law if it is to be consistent with the obligation under Article 19.
- J. B. Sykes (ed.), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current
English, sixth edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976,
p. 752.
- See the discussion in Chapter 1, 'The changed nature of war and
duties of the citizen in time of war', in Peter Young and Peter
Jesser, The Media and the Military: From Crimea to Desert
Strike, Macmillan Education Australia Pty Ltd, South
Melbourne, 1997.
- Richard Mchamer, 'Avoiding a military-media war in the next
armed conflict', Military Review, vol. LXXIII, no. 4,
April 1993, p. 44.
- In another poll of American television station ABC coverage in
early February 1991, 83 per cent of 652,000 respondents were
critical of the media, complaining that journalists were
endangering lives and undermining the war effort.
- Canberra bureau chief for News Limited Ian McPhedran complained
in early March 2003 about the lack of information about Australian
troops deployed in the Middle East, arguing: 'From the point of
view of the Australian public, who pay for this, I think that's
pretty appalling.' In a similar vein, Australian Broadcasting
Corporation head of news and current affairs Max Uechtritz argued
for Australian media to have access to the conflict: 'When
Australia is sending its sons and daughters off to war we have an
obligation to give Australians every bit of information we can
about their involvement.' See Jackson, ibid.
- Article 19, ICCPR.
- Frank Aukofer and William Lawrence, America's team: the odd
couple-a report on the relationship between the media and the
military, Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, Nashville,
Tennessee, 1995, p.24.
- ibid.
- Philip Taylor, War and the media: propaganda and persuasion
in the Gulf War, Manchester University Press, Manchester,
1992, p. 273. Re journalists having 'no rank': While there is a
hierarchy within any corporation, including media organisations, a
group of journalists on the battlefield representing different
organisations will have no hierarchical structure.
- Clem Lloyd, 'The case for the media', in Peter Young (ed.),
Defence and the Media in Time of Limited Conflict, Frank
Cass & Co. Ltd, London, 1992, p. 64.
- Aukofer and Lawrence, op. cit. p. 29.
- Valerie Adams, The Media and the Falklands Campaign,
Macmillan Press, London and Basingstoke, 1986, p. 47
- David Morrison and Howard Tumber, Journalists at War,
Sage Publications, London, 1988, p. 97. See Chapter 6, '"It's all
right; I am British, after all"-a theory of change and change in
theory', for interviews with journalists about their growing
sympathy with the troops.
- For newspaper journalists, colour stories -- the only
opportunity for individual coverage within the pool system in which
all hard news stories were shared -- were seen as a burden by the
Navy, whose communications facilities were limited. At one point
about 30 per cent of the daily work load of the HMS
Invincible's communications centre was devoted to media
reports, which led to journalists being limited to 700 words each
per day.
- Stig Nohrstedt, 'Ruling by pooling', in Hamid Mowlana, George
Gerbner and Herbert Schiller, Triumph of the Image: the Media's
War in the Persian Gulf, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado,
1992, p. 118.
- Journalist Patrick Sloyan, who was reporting the 1990-91
conflict, writes: 'More than 70 operating outside the pool system
were arrested, detained, threatened at gunpoint or chased from the
front line.' See Patrick Sloyan, 'What I saw was a bunch of
filled-in trenches with people's arms and legs sticking out of
them. For all I know, we could have killed thousands', The
Guardian, 14 February 2003.
- ibid.
- Journalist Ronald Brownstein writes:
After the gulf war, several studies challenged
the image of precision, high-tech bombing that dominated the
official briefings and television coverage of the war. Contrary to
dramatic footage at one briefing that apparently showed U.S. bombs
destroying a mobile launcher carrying Iraqi Scud missiles, the
official Air Force review of the war found no evidence any mobile
Scuds were destroyed in the air.
Ronald Brownstein, 'Wartime briefings can be
subjective, history shows', Chicago Tribune, 11 October
2001.
- Phillip Knightley, 'No more heroes: war correspondents retreat
from the front line', IPI Report no. 1, 2000, www.freemedia.at/IPIReport1.00/IPIRep1.00_Truth.htm,
and Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: the War
Correspondent as hero and myth-maker from the Crimea to
Kosovo, Prion Books, London, 2000, p. 525.
- See, for example, Associated Press, 'War on terrorism revives
tension between press, government', freedomforum.org, 25 September
2001.
- Coorey, op. cit.
- oel Campagna, 'Introduction: Build-up in the Gulf', Committee
to Protect Journalists, www.cpj.org/Briefings/2003/gulf03/gulf03.html.
- ibid.
- Public Affairs Guidance, op. cit.
- ibid.
- Robert Fisk, 'The media column: war journalists should not be
cosying up to the military', The Independent, 21 January
2003.
- Hampton Sides, 'Unembedded', The New Yorker, 24 March 2003,
posted on the Internet 17 March 2003,
www.newyorker.com/talk/content/?030324ta_talk_sides
- Coorey, op. cit.
- ibid.
- Johnson, op. cit.
- E. M. Cowardin Jr, 'Letter to the Editor', New York
Times, 19 February 2003.
- There is a great deal of overlap between the comments of the
journalists cited in Morrison and Tumber, op. cit., and those of
the journalists in the 'pools' in the Gulf conflict of 1990-91. See
for example, Nohrstedt, op. cit.
- Rune Ottosen, 'Truth: the first victim of war', in Mowlana et.
al., op. cit., p. 140.
- www.geocities.com/cpa_blacktown/20000709zzzpkcpbuk.htm
- Taylor, op. cit., p. 174. Taylor quotes a British journalist
who, during the Gulf War, was one of a group of journalists who
shared a hotel-and became friendly-with RAF Tornado crews to the
extent that the journalists, wishing not to offend their new
friends, operated under 'such a stringent form of self- censorship
... that the Squadron Leader PRO could put his feet up'.
- 'Correspondent's Report', Australian Broadcasting Corporation,
23 February 2003, www.abc.net.au/correspondents/s790551.htm.
Of the roughly 150 Americans killed in Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, about 35 died as a result of 'friendly fire'.
- Coorey, op. cit.
- Chris Cramer, 'Danger: media at work', The Guardian,
24 February 2003. Cramer is the president of CNN international
networks.
- Peter Arnett, 'You are the Goebbels of Saddam's regime',
The Guardian, 14 February 2003.
- Jason Deans, 'Rather's Hussein scoop draws 17m', The Guardian,
28 February 2003.
- Terry O'Connor, 'Personal experience of Australia's public
information in time of war,' in Peter R. Young (ed.), Defence
and the media in time of limited conflict, Frank Cass &
Co. Ltd, London, 1992, p. 263.
- The ABC was also threatened with funding cuts for initially not
agreeing to Radio Australia, whose reputation depends on its being
seen to be independent of government, being used to transmit
messages to RAN sailors in the Gulf. See Rodney Tiffen, 'The second
casualty: the ABC and the Gulf War', Current Affairs
Bulletin, April 1991, pp. 13-14.
- Ottosen, op. cit., p. 138.
- Cited in Kevin Foster, 'The Falklands War: a Critical View of
Information Policy', in Jesser, op. cit., p. 158.
- Herbert Schiller, 'Manipulating hearts and minds', in Mowlana
et. al., op. cit., p. 25.
- Nohrstedt, op. cit., p. 126.
- Robert Wiener, 'Truth may sink in desert sand', Los Angeles
Times, 20 January 2003. Wiener has been a journalist for more
than 30 years and was CNN's executive producer in Baghdad when the
Gulf War erupted. On the post-September 11 'patriotism', recall
also the American talk-show host who was slated in the media, and
whose show was dropped from several television stations, because he
said the September 11 hijackers were not cowards because they had
the courage to stay in the planes that they crashed into the World
Trade Centre.
- Johnson, op. cit.
- Nohrstedt, op. cit., p. 118.
- Andre Gunder Frank, 'A Third-World War: a political economy of
the Persian Gulf War and the New World Order', in Mowlana, et. al.,
op. cit., p. 21.
- Trevor Bormann interview with Mick O'Regan, 'The Media Report',
Radio National, 6 February 2003, www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/8.30/mediarpt/stories/s777173.htm.
- Dan Plesch, 'Quick, surgical intervention is the plan', The
Age, 20 February 2003, and Eric Schmitt and Elisabeth
Bumiller, 'Top general sees plan to shock Iraq into surrendering',
New York Times, 5 March 2003. Military officials are
quoted as saying that 'precision weapons' will account for about 70
per cent of the weapons used in this conflict compared with 20 per
cent in the 1991 Gulf War and US forces would 'match weapons with
targets to avoid civilian casualties'.
- Tabassum Zakaria, '"Bug splat" formula to minimise civilian
casualties', Reuters report carried in the New Zealand
Herald, 7 March 2003.
- Peter Arnett, 'Reflections on Vietnam, the Press and America',
Nieman Reports, vol. 26, no. 1, March 1972, p. 6.
- For example, there was a distinct lack of analysis comparing
the sheer number of bombing raids over Iraq with the claims that
the Allies were targeting only military-related facilities. After
the war, one journalist cited a United Nations report noting that
the attacks on power plants, oil refineries and other elements of
Iraq's infrastructure suggested a more destructive plan than simply
annihilating Iraq's military facilities-one designed to return Iraq
to a 'pre-industrial age'. See Michael Massing, 'Another front',
Columbia Journalism Review, vol. 29, May/June 1991, p. 24.
- Taylor, op. cit., p. 34.
- Johnson, op. cit.
- ibid.
- Public Affairs Guidance, op. cit., clause 7B.
- Josh Getlin, 'The war beat-up: will "embedding" slant
reporting', Seattle Times, 16 March 2003.
- Owen Gibson, 'Spin caught in a web trap', The
Guardian, 17 February 2003.
- ibid.
- Matt Richtel, 'Military to clamp down on e-mail', New York
Times, 12 March 2003.
- ibid.
- Gorman, op. cit.
- Johnson, op. cit.
- ibid.
- Nina Bernstein, 'Can war reporters be witnesses, too?', New
York Times, 14 December 2002.
- ibid.
- The rules exempt privileged communications between witnesses
and their lawyers and grant the court a discretion to exempt
communications made in the context of other confidential
relationships. See Rule 73. Medical doctors, psychiatrists,
psychologists, counsellors and the clergy (especially confessions)
are given special recognition and the officials of the
International Committee of the Red Cross are generally, although
not entirely, exempt from giving evidence.
- The ruling came in the genocide trial of Bosnian Serb Radoslav
Brdjanin, and excused UN reporter Jonathan Randal from being
required to testify.
- In this case, the evidence of Brdjanin's intention to commit
genocide (a crucial element of the crime) was already in the public
arena as he had been quoted in a Washington Post article
in 1993 as saying that anyone unwilling to defend Bosnian Serb
territory should be moved out to achieve an 'ethically clean
space'.
- Bernstein, op. cit.
- Cramer, op. cit.
- Campagna, op. cit.
- Jack Shafer, 'Full metal junket: the myth of the objective war
correspondent', Slate (an online magazine), www.slate.msn.com/id/2079703/.
- Denis Shanahan, 'Howard winning own war at home', The
Australian, 18 March 2003. The poll was conducted in the week
14-16 March 2003.
- Thomas Friedman, 'D-Day', New York Times, 19 March
2003.
- See Cosima Marriner, 'Legal landmines confronting troops',
Sydney Morning Herald, 22 March 2003; Cosima Marriner,
'Australia will fight by its own rules, Hill vows', Sydney
Morning Herald, 20 March 2003; Don Woolford, 'Our soldiers
will not attack civilians', Canberra Times, 20 March 2003;
and John Kerin, 'Troops wrestle with different war rules', The
Australian, 19 March 2003. A report of 24 March indicated that
Australian air force pilots had refused to bomb a target in Iraq
despite orders from American commanders because they feared the
target 'was not legitimate under the separate rules of engagement
for Australian forces in the war'. See Ross Peake, 'Aussie pilots
defy US orders to bomb target', Canberra Times, 24 March
2003.
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