The Rwanda Crisis: Communal Conflict and International Responses
CONTENTS

Executive summary ........................................ i

Introduction ................................................. 1

Background: Inter-communal conflict
in Rwanda and Burundi .................................... 2

The political and humanitarian crisis in 1994 .................. 5
  Communal massacres: April-July 1994 ..................... 5
  The RPF-led government and the refugee crisis .......... 7

International involvement and responses ..................... 11
  The United Nations ....................................... 12
  France ..................................................... 14
  The United States ........................................ 15
  Neighbouring states ...................................... 17

Australia and the Rwanda crisis ............................. 18

Rwanda: the immediate and medium term challenges ........ 20

Concluding comment ....................................... 23

Annex A
Executive summary

The crisis in Rwanda since April 1994 has involved the deaths of between 500,000 and one million people, the displacement of much of Rwanda's population, massive refugee outflows, a continuing severe humanitarian situation and major ongoing problems of rehabilitation and reconciliation in Rwanda.

The paper places the current crisis in the context of long term conflicts of interest between the Tutsi and Hutu communities in both Rwanda and Burundi. Ethnic and economic animosities, developed since the 15th century, were exacerbated by the period of Belgium's colonial involvement. Since both countries attained independence in 1962, a stable accommodation of interests between the two communities has never been achieved. Both the Hutu and the Tutsi have seen their interests as being in conflict and have developed a 'psychology of victimisation' which has fuelled continuing tensions.

The crisis which erupted in April 1994 stemmed from the breakdown of United Nations supervised efforts to sponsor a peace accord between the Hutu-dominated government in Rwanda and the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) which had launched an invasion from Uganda in 1990. The peace accord had been resisted by powerful elements of the Rwanda regime led by President Habyarimana. When Habyarimana's aircraft was shot down (possibly by members of his own presidential guard) on 6 April massive organised violence broke out.

Government forces and Hutu militias led attacks against both Tutsis and moderate Hutus, killing up to one million people. However the badly organised government army was defeated in the civil war by the RPF which took power in most of the country in mid July. The government's defeat sparked an outflow of refugees, who included many of the former regime's military and also militia elements. The severe conditions suffered by the over 1 million refugees in Zaire have produced a major international humanitarian response which is still continuing.

Conditions within Rwanda remain fragile, with the prospect of famine affecting 2.5 million people within five months. The RPF-led government has few resources to try to begin rebuilding. So far few of the predominantly Hutu refugees have returned; the forces of the ousted government have been discouraging repatriation, partly because the refugees provide a screen for these forces against the new Rwandan government and/or international judicial action. The situation within Rwanda remains unstable with the government declaring that the refugees should now return. There have been some
Introduction

The crisis which has engulfed Rwanda since 6 April 1994 has seen the killings of an estimated 500 000 to 1 000 000 people, the displacement of much of the Rwandan population, a massive refugee outflow into neighbouring states, especially Zaire, and a major international effort to assist, which includes substantial Australian participation. Progress is being made in stabilising the most immediate of the problems faced by the refugees but the communal and political conflict in Rwanda which fuelled the violence is not over. A new government has taken power in Rwanda but it is dominated by a party representing the minority Tutsi community. Meanwhile the army and militias of the defeated Rwanda government, heavily involved in the mass killings from April to July, are still present in force in the refugee camps in Zaire and some of their leaders have vowed to resist the new government. The situation remains very unstable with many of the refugees afraid to return and being pressured not to by their leaders, for whom they constitute both a power base and a source of protection against identification and possible prosecution.

The Rwanda crisis has been a notable example of a conflict in the post Cold War international environment to which the international community and the United Nations have had great difficulty in responding. The conflict in Rwanda has involved a number of factors: deep inter-communal hostilities exacerbated by European colonial involvement, poverty and competition for scarce resources, and external interference and involvement. The conflict can ultimately only be resolved by an acceptable internal economic and political order in Rwanda, but the achievement of this remains very uncertain. Australia and the international community are thus involved in endeavouring to alleviate a conflict which is deep seated and which will be very hard to resolve.

This paper seeks to review the current state of the Rwanda conflict, the international response so far, and the prospects for stability and reconstruction. The paper briefly reviews the origins of the conflict, discusses the international response in provisions of aid and attempts at conflict alleviation, outlines Australia's response and assistance, and assesses the immediate and medium term prospects. The events in Rwanda are also placed in the context of Rwanda's neighbour Burundi, which has shared the same problems of inter-communal conflict and which may well be drawn further into the pattern of conflict in Rwanda in 1994.
Background: Inter-communal conflict in Rwanda and Burundi

The violence in 1994 between Hutu and Tutsi people is the latest phase of a conflict which has erupted on a number of occasions since both Rwanda and Burundi obtained independence from Belgium in 1962. At the heart of this conflict has been competition for land and resources in countries which are both poor and heavily populated. While the two countries are scenically beautiful, only 29 per cent of the land is arable and rugged countryside, great daily changes in temperature and only limited rainfall make agriculture difficult. The main cash crops have been coffee and tea and the low international prices for coffee in recent years have imposed additional hardship. Rwanda and Burundi have the highest population densities in Africa. Population growth rates have been rapid, with little or no organised efforts at population control; Rwanda's population increased from about 5 million in 1978 to over 7 million by 1994. As the British writer Charles Richards has noted: 'This sets Hutu against Tutsi because tending herds (as Tutsis still do) requires far more land than growing vegetables. Each side feels its ability to feed itself is being threatened by the other'.

The Hutu and Tutsi peoples share many attributes in common in language, culture and even appearance but they have come into deep and prolonged conflict. The Hutu agriculturalists moved into the region of Rwanda and Burundi sometime before the 14th century while the Tutsi, a Nilotic pastoral people, migrated from the north from the early 15th century. Over a period of several centuries the relationship between Tutsi and Hutu became one of clientage between Tutsi overlords and Hutu 'serfs'. There were numerous petty chieftain, both Hutu and Tutsi, but generally the Tutsi exercised overall dominance. The clientage relationship between a ruling elite, largely Tutsi concentrated at the court, and the commoners - mainly, but not exclusively, Hutu - formed the basis of society.

1 The first stage of the current crisis was assessed in, Allan Shephard, The Killing Fields of Rwanda, Current Issues Brief No 10, 2 June 1994, which is now superseded by the present paper.


The 'Ruanda-Urundi' region was claimed by Germany from 1896 and the Germans were in turn replaced during the First World War by Belgium. Colonial involvement had the effect of heightening and exacerbating the distinction between Tutsi and Hutu. The Belgians consolidated the numerous smaller kingdoms under Tutsi chiefs. The Tutsis claimed 'ownership of the land and the Hutu became landless peasants'. David Dorward (Africa Research Institute, La Trobe University) has observed:

Colonial society was organised on an ethnic hierarchy of Belgian-Tutsi-Hutu. The majestic cattle-breeding Tutsi (many over seven feet tall) were Belgium's 'noble savages' in contrast to the robust Hutu farmers who were looked down upon as indolent and ungrateful - not willing to labour for dirt wages.

The Tutsis in the colonial period gained preferential access to education and this 'fostered a psychology of "superiority" among the Tutsi minority, while evoking smouldering Hutu resentment'.

Tensions and hostilities between Tutsis and Hutu have dominated the politics of both Rwanda and Burundi since independence in 1962. While the Hutu asserted a dominant role in Rwanda, the Tutsi minority were able to retain dominance in Burundi. The regular outbreaks of conflict in both countries since the early 1960s have reinforced the fears and suspicions of communities in each country and developments in one have often incited trouble and conflict in the other.

The Tutsi were able to retain a dominant position in Burundi after 1962 initially through the leadership of the King and, after his overthrow in 1966, by regimes dominated by the Tutsi-controlled army. Although Burundi regimes made at times some efforts to accommodate the interests of the Hutu, severe inter-communal violence broke out on a number of occasions (particularly 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993). In a major Hutu-led uprising in 1972 over 100,000 Hutu were massacred; the killings were led by the Tutsi-dominated army but many were carried out by civilian bands in a manner broadly similar to the violence in Rwanda in 1994. Further violent conflict in 1988 led to the deaths of at least 20,000 Hutu.

These events were followed by efforts at accommodation between Tutsi and Hutu from 1990 and a new constitution in 1992 sought to protect the interests of both major communities. Free and fair elections in June 1993 led to the election of a Hutu president (Melchior Ndadaye) and a government of national unity in which Hutu and Tutsi based parties were represented. However, communal tensions rose and the President was assassinated in a coup in October 1993 led by the Tutsi-

---

6 April: Habyarimana was killed along with the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira. It seems likely that Habyarimana was killed by members of his own Presidential Guard. While the motivation for the assassination of the Rwandan president (along with the Burundi president) have not been clarified there was substantial opposition within the Rwandan military to the Arusha accords. The agreements would have ended the monopolisation of power by the ruling MRND and the military, necessitating power sharing with the RPF, cuts in the army and possible curtailment of opportunities for corruption. The Arusha agreements were thus widely seen by the military as a threat to their interests. The new interim Rwandan government blamed the President's death on Tutsi and Hutu 'traitors' and deployed the inyarhamwe and impuzamugambi militia with death lists of both Tutsi and Hutu identified as opposing the regime.8

As is now well known, the four month period of mass killings in Rwanda has resulted in the deaths of at least 500 000 and possibly one million people. Most of these were Tutsi but many Hutu have also been killed and the minority Twa pygmies (traditionally discriminated against by both Tutsi and Hutu) are also thought to have been massacred in large numbers.9 The killings stand as one of the worst massacres in modern history and have undoubtedly inflicted great damage on Rwandan society. While the Hutu militias and military were effective at mass murder, the Rwandan government was not able to withstand the assault by the forces of the RPF. The RPF were numerically smaller than the Rwandan army they opposed but many members had extensive experience in the resistance struggle led by President Musaveni in Uganda and their morale and discipline were regarded as substantially superior to the government forces.10 The RPF made major gains in April and May; they had closed the Rwanda-Tanzania border by 1 May and by the end of May they were estimated to occupy about two-thirds of the country. By 4 July the RPF rebels had won control of Kigali and by 17 July had captured Gisenye, a town on the Zaire border, where the remnants of the Rwandan government had been based. On 18 July the RPF declared itself the government and announced a unilateral ceasefire. They now controlled the whole country with the exception of the 'safe zone' established by French troops in the southwest (see below).


The RPF-led government and the refugee crisis

The RPF declared itself to be forming a government for the whole country and gave Hutus three of the top four positions, including President and Prime Minister. However the RPF faces a difficult task in establishing itself as a credible focus for national reconciliation. The RPF originated with the Tutsi who fled to Uganda after the overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy in 1959. Ninety per cent of the RPF's troops are estimated to be Tutsi and most Hutus regard it as an exclusively Tutsi organisation. The key figure in the government is considered to be Paul Kagame, vice president and Defence Minister. Kagame has lived in Uganda since he was two years old and like many of the RPF leaders speaks English rather than French, which constitutes a further barrier in Rwanda where French remains the primary foreign language.\footnote{Richards, loc cit.}

The capture of Gisenye by the RPF on 17 July was immediately followed by a mass exodus of people across the border into Zaire. Tens of thousands of Hutu had been sheltering in the area near Gisenye, the only remaining area of the country that had not been brought under the control of the RPF or under French protection. With the capture of Gisenye thousand of Hutu fled to Zaire; those fleeing included ministers, soldiers, and militiamen as well as ordinary citizens and at one point the exodus was crossing the Zaire border at a rate of 30 000 an hour. Most refugees headed for the towns of Goma and Bukavu which were wholly unprepared and unable to cope. The refugees located on the volcanic rock surrounding Goma fell victim to lack of food, water and sanitary facilities; cholera broke out and is estimated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to have claimed about 45 000 lives. A major humanitarian relief effort has been mounted (see below) but the refugees situation still remains precarious and in late August it was estimated that up to 500 people were continuing to die each day in the camps.

In addition to suffering grievous deprivation and disease, the refugees in Zaire have remained embroiled in the Rwanda conflict. The refugees included many members of the military and militias who had perpetrated the massacres since April. Elements of the ousted government have been actively discouraging the refugees from returning to Rwanda and the regime's radio station, 'Milles Collines', has continued to broadcast propaganda aimed at preventing the refugees return. In late July and early August some refugees began to return but most have remained unwilling to do so despite the continuing dangers and losses of life suffered in Zaire; aid agencies estimated in mid-August that of the over 1 million refugees in Zaire and other neighbouring states, only about 150 000 had returned so far. Many of the leaders of the ousted government clearly see it as being in their interest that the new RPF government in Kigali should have as few people to govern in Rwanda as possible. The refugees thus remain enmeshed in the continuing conflict.

At the time of writing (25 August) the situation of the refugees in Zaire remains precarious with deaths from disease continuing but with most people nonetheless regarding a return as unsafe. By mid August, the UNHCR was beginning to be concerned that many Rwandan


14 'New rulers continue campaign to woo refugees back home', AFP, 21 August 1994.
refugees might remain in Zaire on a long term basis. The UNHCR's spokesman, Panos Moutzis, said that 'Goma is becoming a new Gaza Strip where refugees will stay for a long time'. He considered that it might take a generation before many of the refugees returned home and said that UNHCR had never before encountered such a reluctance to repatriate: 'The unwillingness to return is the strongest we have seen in such crises, even in Somalia'. By late August, aid agency representatives and the UNHCR were expressing concern that large numbers of people might remain in camps in Zaire for at least 6-12 months.

In the weeks since it declared a new government for Rwanda the RPF has sought to begin to try to restore some stability and encourage Rwandans to return. The government faces immense problems. Kigali in early August had a population of 40 000 to 90 000 compared with 350 000 before the massacres. Almost every building has been damaged, there is no running water or electricity and no operating governmental administration. In an interview in early August, Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu said that the government did not expect a harvest for two years and that the country would depend on food aid. He emphasised that the return of the country's population was the most immediate priority. 'We cannot pretend we are going to have a stable country until we have a stable population - it is impossible. And we cannot pretend to have an economy or political situation without a population'. The Prime Minister stated that the new government had no funds since all of Rwanda's financial resources had been taken by the ousted regime. The government also had no effective communications with the country. He criticised the international community for its inaction during the period of the massacres and complained that the government had received no assistance to obtain a radio transmitter to broadcast to the refugee population.

The RPF has recognised from the outset the need to share power with other political parties; of the 22 top posts in the government, the RPF has taken only 8. However the RPF and its chief figure Paul Kagame remain the clearly predominant force. Representatives of the UN in Kigali have been reported to have attempted to persuade the RPF to accept some members of the former ruling party the MRND as government members to promote confidence among Hutus but the RPF has refused this.

---

15 'UN fears Rwanda refugee crisis has no end', Reuters, Goma, 12 August 1994.


17 'A sort of peace', The Economist, 6 August 1994.
The RPF has consistently declared that its forces will not conduct reprisals against returning refugees or supporters of the former government. It has also indicated that it wishes to see those responsible for the massacres in 1994 brought to trial and has estimated that the total numbers involved in this process could reach 30,000. In August there have been some reports of reprisals against Hutus by the RPF's forces and the RPF itself announced that it was holding 60 of its own personnel who were suspected of having committed abuses and that two had been executed. The RPF has also consistently indicated its willingness to have international human rights monitors stationed in Rwanda. In a comment on 24 August, the UN special envoy to Rwanda, Ambassador Shahyar Khan, told a news conference in Nairobi that the RPF's forces had committed retribution killings in parts of the country but that ministers had promised to clamp down: he said, 'It is not a general pattern. It is not a terror campaign but there have been occasions of retributional killings.'

The leadership of the RPF is considered by the UN to be taking a firm stand on opposing reprisals and is clearly concerned to maintain the discipline of its forces. However the reports of possible retribution killings have probably helped to dissuade some Hutu refugees from returning to Rwanda and they highlight the importance of increasing the international monitoring of human rights conditions within the country.

The new government has continued to make efforts to contact and attempt to reassure the refugees. On 10 August President Bizimungu and most of the cabinet travelled to the northwestern border region to meet refugees in Gisenye and other representatives met refugees in the southwest. Prime Minister Twagiramungu said that 'We want to prove that the people of the RPF are not killers, contrary to what the militias of the former government claim.'

The situation in late August remained highly uncertain. The RPF-led government was continuing efforts to reassure the refugees that they should return while elements of the former regime maintained strong influence in the camps in Zaire and were firmly opposing such a return. Conditions in the camps in Zaire continued to be severe with

---

18 Julian Bedford, 'More than a million may have died in Rwanda - UN', Reuters, 25 August 1994.


21 'Rwandan president makes trip to coax refugees home', AFP, Kigali, 10 August 1994.
substantial violence and threats from the militias to both refugees and
to international aid workers. A spokesman for UNHCR in Bukavu,
Kris Janowski, said on 24 August that the security situation in the
Goma camps was increasingly worrying and was 'almost out of control'
and he said on 25 August that 'The violence is being instigated quite
ruthlessly by people with enormous clout in the camps who are turning
people against those trying to help them. These are the same thugs
who control the Goma camps. They are hostile to the UN and hostile
to the principle of return'. The withdrawal of the French forces
from the zone they had occupied in the southwest had added a new
source of tension as many people sought to enter Zaire near Bukavu.
At the time of writing, however, the flows of people from the southwest
into the Bukavu area had not reached the levels feared earlier by aid
officials and the UNHCR. Nonetheless health conditions in the camps
in and near Bukavu were already bad and officials feared a further
deterioration of conditions and a rapid spread of potentially fatal
diseases as the wet season approaches.

Meanwhile within Rwanda itself, the World Food Program (WFP) and
the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) have warned that 2.5
million people face famine unless they receive urgent food aid. A joint
mission reported after a ten day survey that only about 5 million
people were now living in Rwanda (compared with the mission's
estimate of the pre-April 1994 population of 7.9 million), with only 4.2
million living in their homes. A joint statement said that

Some 2.5 million people in Rwanda, including 70 000 orphans, will face grave
food shortages for the next five months and will need food assistance. Civil war
and past outbreaks have caused crop losses, estimated at 50 percent, especially
of cereals, beans, bananas and tubers.

Further losses are anticipated with the coming wet season and the
report found that Rwanda would need 164 000 metric tonnes of food
before the next harvest, due in September, as well as seed and grain
supplies.

International involvement and responses

The United Nations became involved in Rwanda in an attempt to
support the peace process which led to the Arusha agreements in

---


23 Karin Davies, 'Aid workers fear epidemics among Rwandans in Bukavu', The

24 '2.5 million Rwandans face famine: UN', AFP, 24 August 1994.
August 1993. The UN, however, proved notably ineffective in responding to the crisis after 6 April and, after withdrawing most of its forces, has been slow to organise a revised force approved in May. In addition to the UN, France has had a considerable interest in Rwanda as a principal backer of the former Habyarimana government and from June it pursued with UN agreement a controversial military involvement which secured a 'safety zone' in southwest Rwanda. The United States, in the wake of the unpopular and unsuccessful involvement in Somalia, was highly reluctant to endorse international involvement in the Rwanda crisis after April although it has contributed substantially to the humanitarian efforts since mid July. Neighbouring states have been affected extensively by the conflict, with Uganda having served as the base for the RPF and Zaire now hosting over 1.5 million refugees along with the armed forces of the ousted government. The role of Zaire in particular will be especially important in the search for a durable resolution to the Rwanda conflict.

The United Nations

The United Nations became involved in Rwanda in 1993 at the request of the major Rwandan parties involved in the Arusha agreement peace process. After the agreements were signed in August 1993, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali appointed a Special Representative (Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, former foreign minister of Cameroon) who arrived in Rwanda in October and the UN deployed the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). UNAMIR endeavoured to monitor the peace process although it was clear by the end of 1993 that major elements in the Rwandan government were highly dissatisfied with the Arusha agreements.

The UN had 2500 troops in Rwanda when the current crisis erupted on 6 April but it played a very limited role in events in the next few weeks. The UN Security Council decided that its mandate to implement the Arusha agreements was untenable and suspended it until 29 July. Belgium called for more troops to be supplied to UNAMIR and when none were forthcoming withdrew its own forces on 15 April. Most of UNAMIR's forces were withdrawn, leaving a residue of only about 470. The Security Council considered the Rwanda issue on 6 April and again on 21 April but members made it clear that they would not support a mandate to deploy forces to try to contain the violence. In Rwanda, the residual UN presence continued efforts to achieve a ceasefire between the Rwandan government and the RPF but although talks were held at the end of May both sides
were intent on continuing the conflict to try to maximise their positions and the efforts failed.\textsuperscript{25}

On 17 May the UN Security Council did agree to send a force of 5500 to be provided by African states to Rwanda and the US, Britain and France pledged to provide logistic support. However, as Secretary General Boutros-Ghali reported to the Security Council on 3 August, deployment of this force has been subject to what he has described as 'deplorable delays'. He added:

I shall not repeat my comments beyond stressing that the failure of member States to reinforce the military component of UNAMIR severely limited its capacity to reduce the human suffering that accompanied the civil conflict and the deliberate massacre of civilians, mainly members of the Hutu opposition and supporters of RPF.\textsuperscript{26}

In his 3 August report, the Secretary General outlined four key tasks for UNAMIR:

- to ensure stability in the north-western and south-western regions of Rwanda;
- to stabilise and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda in order to encourage the return of refugees and the displaced population;
- to provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda as humanitarian organisations arrange the return of refugees;
- to promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda.

The UNAMIR commander, General Dallaire, prepared a plan of operations for the force on the assumption that it is able to attain its approved strength of 5500 (the plans will be overseen by General Dallaire's successor as Commander, Maj-Gen Guy Tousignant, also from Canada). However by late August, the estimated force strength of UNAMIR was still only about 2600.

In addition to promoting the expansion of UNAMIR, the UN has moved to organise rehabilitation aid for Rwanda by establishing a


United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda covering emergency and rehabilitation needs until the end of this year. US$434.8 million is being sought for this appeal, launched by the Secretary General on 22 July. The UN is also endeavouring to assist in efforts to bring to justice those people responsible for the massacres in Rwanda from April. A Commission of Experts has been established at the direction of the Security Council which is charged with the gathering of evidence on specific violations of international humanitarian law and acts of genocide, on the basis of which identification of those responsible could be made. The Commission is also empowered to address the question of the jurisdiction, national or international, before which such persons should be brought to trial: the Commission is to report by 30 November.

The Commission of Experts has emphasised the importance of gaining international support for the provision of 200 forensic experts and investigators to pursue inquiries into the mass killings in Rwanda. Another senior UN official, Rene Degni-Segui, UN special rapporteur on Rwanda, has proposed sending a separate team of 200 monitors to help calm ethnic tensions and deter violence. The concept of international human rights observers for Rwanda has been strongly supported by Amnesty International and by Medicines Sans Frontieres. The proposed team of monitors has also been supported by the head of the Commission of Experts, Atsu-Koffi Amega, who said that the network of monitors sought by Degni-Segui would be 'very useful' and added: 'otherwise this commission would be paralysed'. The Commission is due to visit Rwanda, Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania between 27 August and 13 September to pursue its inquiries.\textsuperscript{27} The willingness of the international community to support the tasks of human rights monitoring and investigation in Rwanda is likely to be one of the most important factors affecting the prospects for stability in Rwanda in the next few months.

\textbf{France}

France has had an extensive role in Rwanda both in recent years and during the current crisis. France became closely involved as a supporter of the MRND regime of President Habyarimana, supplying military assistance and equipment to the Rwandan armed forces and several hundred troops to assist the government in the face of the RPF invasion. The French newspaper \textit{Liberation} claimed that it was French artillery support which played a key role in halting a major RPF offensive in early 1992. Relations with France were bolstered by the friendship between President Habyarimana and President

\textsuperscript{27} Stephanie Nebehay, 'UN seeks 200 experts to probe crimes, 200 monitors', Reuters, 24 August 1994.
Mitterrand's son Jean Christophe, a key figure in France's Africa policies (the aircraft in which the President was shot down on 6 April had been a gift from Mr Mitterrand jnr). France's role in assisting the Habyarimana government brought strong criticism from the RPF.\textsuperscript{28}

In response to the crisis from April 1994 France moved to intervene in western Rwanda utilising some of its substantial Africa-based military forces (France, as part of its extensive associations with a number of francophone African states has maintained military forces in several countries, including 4000 troops in Djibouti).\textsuperscript{29} On 20 June France announced that a force based in Zaire would operate in western Rwanda to provide protection to civilians dislocated by the fighting. This intervention was authorised by the Security Council under the UN Charter's Chapter Seven (which allows 'such action as may be necessary' to respond to any 'threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression'). On 2 July, France announced that 'Operation Turquoise' would establish a 'humanitarian protected zone' in the southwest, covering about one-fifth of Rwandan territory. The RPF expressed strong opposition to the French move but did not confront the French action. Close liaison and cooperation was established between the French forces and UNAMIR. The French involvement, however, has been controversial because the Rwandan refugees who sought protection in the southwest are thought to include some of the former government's forces and militia elements who may have participated in massacres.

The Security Council authorised the French to operate in Rwanda until 21 August and the French government announced its intention to withdraw by this date. The UN was highly concerned at the possible impact on the many internally displaced people (predominantly Hutus) in the French zone and asked the French to remain for an extra several weeks but the French held to their schedule and moved to withdraw by the target date. The French forces were replaced by UNAMIR military units (from Ethiopia and Ghana). As noted above, the withdrawal of the French forces was accompanied by a further movement of refugees across the border into Zaire and at the time of writing the situation in the southwest remains particularly uncertain.

The United States

The United States has played a leading role in the humanitarian effort from July but was unwilling after April to either support or participate directly in UN involvement in Rwanda. US reactions to the Rwanda


\textsuperscript{29} 'France and Africa: Dangerous liaisons', \textit{The Economist}, 23 July 1994.
crisis were influenced strongly by the problems experienced by US peace-keeping forces in Somalia. In the aftermath of extensive criticism of the Somalia involvement, President Clinton had authorised 'Presidential Decision Directive 25' which had laid down a series of national interest criteria which had to be met if the US was to become involved in peacekeeping operations. The US was thus unwilling to endorse the efforts by the UN Secretary General to deploy an expanded UN force in Rwanda and was not prepared to participate in UNAMIR.  

When the mass refugee exodus became evident from mid-July, President Clinton directed a major US military effort to support humanitarian assistance. The program involved deployment of over 3000 personnel to arrange airlifting of supplies and their distribution to both the border areas in Zaire and to Kigali. In a statement on the US operations on 31 July, Defense Secretary William Perry emphasised that he expected no threats to US personnel: he stated that 'I want to emphasise that the United States is not part of the peacekeeping operation here'. The US was contributing to the UN's activities through its contributions to the UN budget and through specialised logistic support.  

The limited initial response of the US to the Rwanda crisis has been seen as another example of the dilemmas faced by US policymakers in developing appropriate approaches to post Cold War security problems. The Economist for example, in an editorial comment (20 August), has recently criticised the slow pace of the response by both the UN and the United States to the Rwanda crisis:

America's solo effort was announced, with a fanfare, when cholera was claiming hundreds of refugee lives. American soldiers are getting clean water to the camps and helping at Rwanda's main airport. Fine. But in the spring America led the opposition to sending any UN force at all: not because its own men would be involved - they would not - but because the operation would be open-ended and America would be billed for 30 per cent of the cost. The administration quibbled over $5m-worth of UN transport charges - and is now having to ask Congress for more than $300m for the cost of its own operation.  

32 'Learning from Rwanda', The Economist, 20 August 1994.
Neighbouring states

The attitude and role of neighbouring states is also a key element in the Rwanda crisis. The new RPF-led government has held talks with the leaders of all four immediate neighbours (Tanzania, Burundi, Zaire and Uganda). A major question remains whether the new government will face continued opposition from the surviving military of the ousted Rwanda government. That government faced for many years resistance from the RPF, with extensive help from the government of Uganda. A key issue now is whether the government in Zaire will be willing and able to restrict the activities of the ousted Rwandan government's forces now based on its territory.

Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko has taken advantage of the Rwanda conflict and the refugee crisis to improve his relations with major Western countries, especially France, which have been weakened in the post Cold War period by widespread criticism of Mobutu's allegedly highly corrupt regime. President Mobutu so far has not yet taken a clearly discernible position on the status of the ousted Rwandan government's forces. Just after the inauguration of the new Rwanda government, President Bizimungu met Mobutu in Mauritius; President Mobutu agreed that there should be no new armed assaults on Rwanda from Zaire territory and said that the Rwandan soldiers on his territory should be disarmed. However, no decisive moves to carry out a thorough disarming of the thousands of Rwandan soldiers in the refugee camps have been reported. Chris McGreal (The Guardian, London) has commented

Not unusually, Mr Mobutu is playing two hands. He is trying to rebuild his credibility with the international community while using the divide and rule tactics he favours at home. Not only has he failed to disarm the Rwandan troops but Mr Mobutu is protecting the former Rwandan leadership... A regional solution is key to any lasting settlement and it is within Mr Mobutu's grasp to help entrench it, or to destabilise any agreement.

Helping prop up a deal would help build credit with his African neighbours. But his domestic strategy has been to destabilise his opponents at every turn. Mr Mobutu must at least be tempted to try to undermine the new RPF administration - which may come to offer an unwelcome example of decent government to Mr Mobutu's subjects - and its friends in the Ugandan leadership, by keeping alive the possibility of fresh conflict.\[33\]

---

Australia and the Rwanda crisis

Australia at both a public and official level has responded strongly to the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda. Contributions to assist the humanitarian situation in Rwanda began very soon after the crisis erupted from 6 April and Australia ranks highly among the major contributors to Rwanda (see attached statistics). Australia has also made a contribution to UNAMIR with a military medical team and associated protective forces but provision of this assistance was delayed for a number of weeks because of the government’s concerns at the low level of international commitment for support of the UN in relation to Rwanda and the lack of a concerted plan of action.

Within ten days of the outbreak of violence in Rwanda after 6 April, Australia had contributed $500 000 for civilians displaced by fighting.\(^{34}\) As the extent of the conflict became more clear an additional $1 million was contributed in early May, to be distributed through UNHCR, World Vision Australia and Community Aid Abroad.\(^{35}\)

In mid May, Australia was requested by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to contribute 300 personnel to the UN mission in Rwanda. Australia was requested to supply movement control officers, communicators, engineers and medical personnel.\(^{36}\) However the Australian government was reluctant to consider a commitment unless, in the words of Defence Minister Ray, there was a 'clear role for Australian troops in Rwanda and a finite period for a deployment'.\(^{37}\)

Consideration of a possible contribution continued but was affected crucially by the slow pace of international response to the Rwanda crisis. Foreign Affairs Minister Senator Evans stated on 18 June that the government remained willing to consider sympathetically an Australian contribution 'provided we can be satisfied that... an operationally viable concept of the UN operation emerges'. Senator Evans said that Australia wanted to do something appropriate about the situation in Rwanda. 'But on the basis of recent experience of UN operations, the last thing we want to do is plunge into a situation for the sake of being seen to be doing something when it is not

\(^{34}\) 'New talks planned but Rwanda fighting goes on', *Canberra Times*, 17 April 1994.


operationally viable and when we are putting our own people's lives at risk, without any compensating benefit or advantage. In line with this emphasis Senator Evans and Senator Ray announced in a joint statement on 22 June that a five person Australian Defence Force reconnaissance mission would be sent to Rwanda and New York to report on a number of questions in relation to a possible contribution to UNAMIR, a contribution which would probably be in the form of a medical unit with accompanying support elements.

The highly publicised outflow of refugees from Rwanda after mid July brought a further substantial public and government response. NGOs increased their relief efforts to assist the refugees with what became a very substantial amount of public donations and the government announced a further $2 million in assistance on 21 July. On 25 July Australia's response was upgraded with a commitment of an additional $6.5 million in aid which would include $3.5 million to NGOs, $3 million to the UN’s appeal and $500 000 in emergency medical supplies and water purification equipment and the provision of two Hercules aircraft. The government also announced the commitment of a medical and protective contingent (including 111 medical personnel, 110 soldiers, 60 logistics support staff, 25 headquarters staff and five personnel to be attached directly to UNAMIR) which would be located at the central hospital in Kigali. The decision brought the government's total contribution to Rwanda to over $35 million and was welcomed by NGOs. The Opposition also welcomed the commitment but said that the forces should have a more active role: the Leader of the Opposition Mr Downer said that, 'I think that the Australian Defence Force could provide substantial assistance in the distribution of food and medical supplies, not just in and around Kigali, but to the refugees.'

The overall Australian response to Rwanda by late August had reached a level of over $61 million, with contributions from the public now exceeding $26 million (see Annex A). Australian NGOs were continuing to emphasise the urgency and scope of the Rwanda situation and on 2 August issued a joint statement with further proposals. In a 'four point action plan' the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Community Aid Abroad, Austcare, World Vision Australia, UNHCR, and UNICEF argued that Australia should urge the UN to double the size of the proposed force for UNAMIR, consider


40 'PM's dramatic aid increase', Canberra Times, 26 July 1994.
providing an Army communications unit to assist internal communications within Rwanda, called on the UN to provide human rights monitors to safeguard returning refugees, and called for a further Australian contribution of $10 million to assist economic recovery and refugee reintegration. A government spokesman commented that further assistance had not been ruled out but noted that Australia's contributions to date 'have been generous, timely and appropriate'.

Australia's response to the Rwanda crisis was reviewed by a joint government-NGO seminar in Canberra on 24 August in which the operations of government and private agencies were assessed. In public comments at the meeting the Minister for Development Cooperation Gordon Bilney and senior NGO representatives expressed general satisfaction at the Australian aid operations in Rwanda and neighbouring countries. Speakers emphasised the need for continuing assistance and the severe challenges facing Rwanda in seeking recovery and reconstruction. Mr Bilney announced that he would visit Rwanda in early September to assess Rwanda's immediate and future needs.

Rwanda: the immediate and medium term challenges

In his report of 3 August, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali emphasised the enormous tasks facing both the international community and the new Rwandan government in trying to cope with the current overwhelming crisis. In addition to continuing international assistance, Mr Boutros-Ghali commented,

The recently installed government in Rwanda also bears responsibility for bringing its people together again in national reconciliation. Even in the wake of the tragedy that it has confronted, it must show magnanimity and not allow its military success to create a desire for permanent dominance. It must ensure there are no reprisals. It must enable families to regain their homes and individuals to return to their professions and livelihoods. It must accept in the national army those soldiers of the former armed forces and gendarmerie who did not deliberately engage in wanton killings. It must install an equitable and transparent system of justice to try those suspected of instigating or participating in the massacres of their compatriots.

These are overwhelming tasks for a fledgling government which has taken power in a wrecked and devastated country.

As these comments suggest, the international community and the Rwandan government and people face massive immediate and medium

41 'Relief agencies urge double Rwanda effort', The Age, 3 August 1994.

42 'Report of the Secretary General', op cit, p 10.
term problems. For the immediate future there is an ongoing need to continue the aid flows both to the refugee camps and within Rwanda. The UN is also trying to increase emphasis on the encouragement of Rwandan refugees to return to Rwanda although this has made only limited progress so far and the opportunity to quickly attempt to restore agriculture and plant crops for the next season may in many areas already have been lost.

The current efforts to try to reassure the people in the zone just vacated by French forces in the southwest and to encourage them not to move across to Zaire is also of the greatest importance. Numerous reports have emphasised that the area in Zaire towards which people from the southwest would head, around the town of Bukavu, is already crowded and quite unsuitable to accommodate another mass influx of people. Another and related urgent priority is the need to help persuade the government of Zaire not to acquiesce in the presence in the camps on its territory of the army of the ousted Rwandan regime.

A further immediate priority should be efforts to assist the new Rwandan government to establish basic capacities as soon as possible. The government for example has virtually no effective means of communication which it can use within the country. Efforts to provide the government with assistance in preparing for the establishment of a judicial system with international monitoring is another urgent requirement if the risk of further alienation between Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda is to be minimised as the government attempts to bring to justice those responsible for the massacres since April.

Rwanda and the international community also face very difficult medium term problems. The central issue for the future of Rwanda is whether the new RPF-dominated government can establish a durable accommodation of interests between Tutsis and Hutus. The RPF clearly realises that cooperation between the major communities is integral to the prospects for any viable Rwandan government. The RPF had substantial contacts with Hutu-based parties in Rwanda before the current crisis and it has attempted from the start to visibly incorporate Hutu leaders into its government. The RPF has a commitment to reconciliation and to international monitoring of human rights in Rwanda.

Nonetheless, the challenges facing the RPF in achieving a basis for reconciliation in Rwanda are massive. Given its character as a movement developed in exile in Uganda primarily among Tutsis and with a leadership which has English as its major foreign language rather than French, the RPF will inevitably begin its period as the dominant force in the new government with deeply ingrained suspicions among many Hutus to overcome. There has unfortunately been as yet no record of genuine power sharing between the major
security in the post Cold War environment.

World states pose one of the most potent challenges to peace and

resource pressures and political and ethnic conflict in many Third

countries is another reminder that the conditions of poverty, population

and a more rapid response to emergency situations. Overall the Rwandan

NGOs should establish a standing security force which would enable

the UN to respond to the needs of the population at any time.

The Rwandan crisis is likely to focus additional attention on whether

the United Nations and the United Nations peacekeeping force and its

administrative capabilities to respond to the escalating conflict and

A fourth medium-term issue is the lessons the international

new government can draw from the Rwandan crisis. The United Nations was slow to

issue a final major statement on whether neighboring states will support the

Rwandans.

refugees.

Within and outside Rwanda, which will encourage the return of

refugees. Some believe that the government needs to provide the

refugees with a sense of national reconciliation and that the human rights

issue has not yet been addressed. The international community

should focus on the needs for the return of the refugees. The importance of this

issue has not yet been recognized. The need for the

refugees to be provided with the

international

community

with

the

International

UNHCR

and

and

encouraged

back

in

Rwanda.

and

encouraged

back

in

Rwanda.

A second key issue is whether the Rwandan refugees can be returned

term assistance to develop administrative and judicial capacities in

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led

Gobierno. The government under the new government needs to develop

needs to develop. The government needs to develop the RpP-led
Concluding comment

The key immediate challenges to Rwanda and to the international community are to encourage the rapid return of the refugees, to attempt to bring under supervision and control the forces of the ousted Rwandan government, to implement proposals and requests for international monitoring of human rights conditions and international observation of the judicial process of investigating the massacres in 1994, and to promote an atmosphere of stability and recovery in Rwanda so that reconciliation can be fostered.

In the immediate aftermath of the recent conflict there is a 'window of opportunity' to promote the stabilisation which international assistance and neighbouring countries should help Rwandans achieve. It is especially important that every effort be made to discourage the continuation of a long term refugee presence outside Rwanda, a development which seems likely to fuel continuing hostilities and possible future conflict. All these steps would also help minimise the prospects of further conflict in neighbouring Burundi. The obvious danger for Rwanda is that if progress in these areas is not achieved rapidly, international attention will wane and Rwanda may remain in a state of debilitation and as an ongoing focus of conflict.

The most important longer term question confronting Rwanda and those involved in providing assistance remains whether the 'psychology of victimisation' among both the Tutsi and Hutu can be alleviated and ultimately ended through a long term commitment to political reconciliation and power sharing and sustainable economic development benefiting both communities.
## RWANDA EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE: KNOWN INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS AT 22 AUGUST 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Humanitarian ($Am)</th>
<th>Military ($Am)</th>
<th>Private ($Am)</th>
<th>Total ($Am)</th>
<th>Per Capita ($Am)</th>
<th>Percent of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Israel</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>0.0287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Ireland</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>0.0252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 The Netherlands</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>0.0172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Australia</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>0.0153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 United Kingdom</td>
<td>125.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>175.9</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>0.0144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sweden</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>0.0144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Norway</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>0.0125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Belgium</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>0.0114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Canada</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>0.0106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Germany</td>
<td>214.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>229.7</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>0.0395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Denmark</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>0.0059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Austria</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>0.0047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Switzerland</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 United States</td>
<td>165.0</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>114.9</td>
<td>314.5</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.0039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 France</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.0032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 New Zealand</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.0030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Finland</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Spain</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.0017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Italy</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Japan</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Greece</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Russia</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 South Africa</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** | 835.0 | 137.9 | 295.1 | 1268.0 |
**NGO Collections for Rwanda as at 23 August 1994.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Collections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>$5,579,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>$610,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTCARE</td>
<td>$766,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Catholic Relief</td>
<td>$1,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Red Cross</td>
<td>$1,149,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Aid Abroad</td>
<td>$1,460,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE Australia</td>
<td>$14,312,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Council of Churches</td>
<td>$120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total $25,996,000