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A House Divided:
The South African Elections of April 1994
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A House Divided:
The South African Elections of April 1994

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Executive Summary

Racial separation has dominated South African society and politics for nearly 350 years. Indeed, racism was legally recognised in the earliest days of European settlement in South Africa. It was, however, only in 1948 that racism assumed the overarching architecture of 'apartheid' under the National Party government of D.F. Malan. Apartheid is an Afrikaans word which literally translates into English as 'apart-hood' or separation. Apartheid survived largely intact until 1990.

Racial separation in South Africa had three major facets: physical, political and economic. Physical separation saw the allocation of lands for the different races in South Africa and resulted in the creation of the 'homelands' for black South Africans. Through the creation of the homelands, Pretoria was able to allocate only 13.7 percent of South Africa for blacks (who represent 76 percent of the total South African population) and 86.3 percent for whites, coloured and Asian South Africans (who represent 24 percent of the population). It was intended that the creation of homelands nominally 'independent' from Pretoria would reduce the number of black South Africans. This move was designed to create a white majority in the country, thereby preserving the political supremacy of white South Africa. The second aspect of apartheid, political separation, saw the disenfranchisement of black South Africans and limited representation for coloured and Asian groups. The third aspect - economic separation - resulted from the physical and political strictures of apartheid. The bulk of the country's wealth was owned by the white minority, while black South Africans lived in homelands and townships in grinding poverty.

But apartheid's grand strategy ran aground as South Africa's racist policy was challenged from numerous quarters. Internal resistance to racism increased during the 1970s and 1980s, finding expression through the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the Black Consciousness Movement. Resistance to apartheid also increased from South Africa's neighbours who were subjected to Pretoria's policy of regional destabilisation. Finally, international pressure on South Africa also reached a highpoint during the 1980s as the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the European Community and the United States all tightened sanctions against Pretoria.

For its part, Australia participated in international sanctions against South Africa, fully supporting United Nations and Commonwealth measures against Pretoria. Canberra banned trade in numerous items, including oil, military ammunition and weapons, computer equipment that could be used by the South African Defence Forces (SADF) and
the South African police, and the import of coal, iron and steel from South Africa. A wide range of financial restrictions was also placed on South Africa, including government to government loans, as well as public and private bank loans to South Africans. Canberra also enacted a code of conduct for Australian companies operating in South Africa. Sporting contacts between South Africa and the rest of the world were also restricted. To ameliorate the effects of sanctions on the black community in South Africa, Australia also put in place an extensive aid program known as the Special Aid Program for South Africa (SAPSA).

While F.W. de Klerk came to power as a proponent of apartheid, the combined effect of domestic political violence and international sanctions provided ample reminder to him that this system was untenable. Rule by apartheid theoretically came to an end with the lifting of the ban on Nationalist movements in 1990, the release of Nelson Mandela from prison after an incarceration of twenty-seven years, and the February 1991 removal of the cornerstones of apartheid - the Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act and the Separate Amenities Act.

The April 1994 elections swept aside the legalised injustices of the apartheid system. A new chapter in South African politics is now beginning. For the first time South Africa will be governed by a non-racial, democratic government and the millions of black South Africans will have a say in the running of their own country. The Independent Electoral Commission announced the final results of the election on May 6. It was reported that the African National Congress (ANC) claimed 62.6 percent of the vote, the National Party another 20.4 percent, the Inkatha Freedom Party 10.5 percent, the Freedom Front 2.2 percent, the Democratic Party 1.7 percent and the Pan Africanist Congress 1.2 percent.

All parties that obtain 5 percent or more of the vote will automatically have a seat in the new government's cabinet. However, Nelson Mandela has asserted that he would like to lead a government of national unity that will truly represent all South Africans and has indicated that he will offer the FF, the DP and the PAC (all of which have recorded less than 5 percent of the vote) a voice in the new government. There are numerous black and white extremist parties which are all set to record a total vote of less than half of one percent and will therefore have limited impact upon the new government.

Nelson Mandela's government will be eager to improve South Africa's relations with the 'frontline states' after Pretoria's destabilisation of southern Africa over the last four decades or so. But while Pretoria appears keen to shed its pariah status, some observers are claiming
that South Africa will continue to dominate the region economically by dint of the size of its economy in relation to its neighbours. Though the South African economy is less than one third the size of Australia's, it is three times larger than the combined economic output of the seven frontline states. Its economic clout in the region has been further magnified since the removal of restrictions on foreign trade and investment. Indeed, many states in Africa are already beginning to feel the effect of competition from strong, technologically advanced South African companies.

Australia is presented with the chance to participate in the rehabilitation of South Africa and assist to its conclusion Pretoria's transition from apartheid state to liberal democracy. The Australian/South African trading relationship is also likely to experience a moderate expansion but this is likely to remain limited given that both countries are exporters of agricultural and mineral products.
Introduction*

In 1990 the South African government of F.W. de Klerk lifted the ban on nationalist movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) and released Nelson Mandela after 27 years in prison. Subsequent reforms enabled South Africans to go to the polls between April 26 and 28 to elect a non-racial democratic government, formally signalling the end of Pretoria's policy of racial separation. The removal of apartheid in South Africa is one of the most significant international events of the post-Cold War era. Its significance has been likened to the removal of the Berlin Wall, the dismemberment of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the genesis of democracy in South Africa has not been without cost: violence marred the months leading up to the elections and it is unlikely that there will be a cessation of this unrest in the near future.

This paper outlines the development of racial division in South Africa. Although racially discriminatory legislation began in the days of the Dutch East India Company and accelerated with the Act of Union in 1910, the most complete form of racial segregation was implemented after 1948 under the name apartheid. Continuous opposition from the victims of these policies was mounted from 1912 by the African National Congress. In more recent years, additional pressure has been applied by the Black Consciousness Movement of the 1970s, the United Democratic Front and external sanctions. The paper gives an account of the three major facets of apartheid: physical, political and economic. Note is also made of both internal and external pressures which were placed on Pretoria to abandon its racist policies. International sanctions gathered momentum after the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) established its oil embargo in late 1973. Particular attention is devoted to Australia's implementation of sanctions, and the concomitant allocation of aid for South Africans disadvantaged by apartheid. Following this, a brief assessment of the election outcome is offered. The final section examines what impact the election outcomes are likely to have on the southern African region in the next decade.

The appendices include a map of the new electoral districts in South Africa, notes on the major political forces in South Africa as of February 1994, biographical sketches of the major political personalities and an outline of the 'Essential Statistics of South Africa'.

* This paper has benefited from Professor Norman Etherington's seminar, The Road to Reconciliation? delivered within the Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, 4 May 1994.
The Evolution of Modern South Africa

Racial separation, the basis of apartheid, had its origins in the earliest days of European settlement in South Africa. The first white settlement was established at the Cape in 1652 when the Dutch East India Company set up a supply station to provide ships with fresh produce on their journeys between Europe and the Dutch East Indies. The settlement soon expanded and attained colonial status under the leadership of a governor. The Dutch population was augmented by Germans and Huguenots (Protestant refugees from France): from a combination of these people came the Boers (also known as Afrikaners). This expansion impacted upon the original inhabitants of the area - the Khoikoi and San hunter-gatherers. Over the next 150 years the San population was exterminated and the Khoikoi people were subjugated and enslaved. Further slaves were also imported from the Dutch East Indies.¹

The British annexed the Cape Colony during the Napoleonic Wars and the first influx of British colonists occurred in 1820. The British settlers were granted land along the eastern boundary of the Cape Colony, where they established Port Elizabeth. Between the years 1836 and 1842 a mass migration of Boers known as the 'Great Trek', carried white settlement into the territories now known as the Orange Free State, Natal and the Transvaal. When the British annexed Natal in 1845 many of the Boer settlers moved to the northern republics founded during the Trek. Discoveries of diamonds near the western Transvaal border in 1868 and gold at Johannesburg in 1886 caused the British to regret their earlier decision to recognise the independence of the Boer republics. The Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 resulted in the defeat of the Boers and the consolidation of British power in the area. Finally, the colonial territories and republics were unified into the Union of South Africa and achieved dominion status (similar to Australia) in the British Empire in 1910.

In the some forty years after unification there was considerable tension between Afrikaner and British South Africans. This was a period of oscillating political ideologies where the pendulum swung between efforts to heal the Anglo-Boer rift and attempts to strengthen Boer economic and political power. It was at this time that an all-embracing Afrikaner national identity was forged:

Afrikaans was formalised into a language distinct from the Dutch and an Afrikaner national anthem was adopted. An array of institutions promoting

Afrikaner interests was formed, spanning the economic, political and cultural realms. An Afrikaner mythology developed, drawing upon such historical events as the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War, propagating the notion that the Afrikaners were a special people, chosen by God.\(^2\)

The idea of apartheid brought together the drive for racial segregation and the aspirations of Afrikaner nationalism. In 1948 this wish was finally fulfilled when D.F. Malan's National Party assumed government and established apartheid. The institutionalisation of apartheid confirmed in law a long-held Boer belief in the inferiority of black and coloured South Africans.\(^3\)

**Establishing Apartheid**

Numerous laws were enacted by governments prior to 1948 to deprive native South Africans of their land and civil rights\(^4\) but it was in 1948 that the Malan Government introduced an overarching architecture for apartheid that remained intact until 1990.

Apartheid is an Afrikaans word which literally translates to English as 'apart-hood' or separation. Under the National Party apartheid was divided into three forms - physical, political and economic.

**Physical Apartheid**

Legislation to enforce physical separation of the races in South Africa began in the nineteenth century with the demarcation of 'Native Reserves' in the eastern Cape province and Natal. The 1913 Land Act decreed that Africans could only legally own land in those reserves and a few other territories. After the National Party came to power in 1948, it moved to extend segregation through the Group Areas Act (1950) and the conversion of the old Native Reserves into so-called 'Bantustans' or 'homelands'. Under the Population Registration Act (1950) all South Africans were classified in national groups in an attempt to divide the African population into several different smaller groups. The long standing pass laws were strengthened. Without an

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2  EIU, p.4.

3.  It is interesting to note that South Africa was the only 'white' westernised state to confirm racial discrimination in its constitution. In recent years, under the leadership of Mr Rabuka, Fiji has also sanctioned racial discrimination against its Indian population. 'Mara promises racial rethink', _Canberra Times_, March 22, 1994, p.7.

appropriate pass no one could legally travel outside the boundaries of their assigned homelands. Only whites were not subdivided in this way.\textsuperscript{5}

Physical apartheid allowed for the allocation of 86.3 percent of South African land to whites, coloureds and Asians (who represented 24 percent of the population in 1993) and 13.7 percent for the creation of the black homelands. When the homelands were established it was intended that they should be separated by a 'continental white sea'. It was hoped that this geographic disunity would prevent the black communities from gaining sufficient cohesion to challenge the supremacy of white South Africa.

In the mid-1970s it was decided that the homelands should be granted 'independence' so that their black populations would not be counted as South African citizens. However, only four of the ten homelands accepted the independence offer: Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979) and Ciskei (1981). While these homelands established their own governments, they were only nominally independent because they were reliant upon substantial financial assistance from Pretoria. From the time of their formation, many of the homelands were sources of concerted resistance to apartheid.

**Political Apartheid**

The second aspect of South African apartheid was political in nature. Political segregation was strengthened in the pre-apartheid period by the Native Affairs Act (1920) of General Smuts and then General Hertzog's legislation in 1936, which saw the development of the Natives' Representative Council. This council was abolished by the National Party Government in 1951. Coloured people left on the electoral role in Hertzog's 1936 legislation were removed after a bitter parliamentary and legal battle between 1951 and 1957. Between 1957 and 1969 African and coloured people were represented by white candidates. But as the African 'homelands' were given nominal independence in the early 1970s black South Africans were disenfranchised. In 1969 coloured South Africans also lost their last vestige of parliamentary representation and were represented by a Coloured Persons' Representative Council instead.\textsuperscript{6}


\textsuperscript{6} T.R.H. Davenport, pp. 548-549.
But the grand strategy for achieving total apartheid ran aground during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1976, school children in Soweto defied armed policemen in a massive protest against their inferior schooling. From that time forward overt opposition to apartheid could not be contained. International sanctions and the armed struggle conducted by the ANC stretched the South African Defence Forces to the limit. A number of the so-called 'homelands' refused to accept the poisoned chalice of 'independence' offered by the government. Consequently, the National Party of P.W Botha (Prime Minister 1978-83 and State President 1983-89) introduced a military style policy known as 'total strategy', which was expected to defuse the political crisis via a mixture of reform and repression. The Government drew up a new constitution in 1983, establishing a tricameral parliament which provided coloureds and Asians with limited parliamentary representation, though blacks remained disenfranchised. There was a white House of Assembly (178 seats), a coloured House of Representatives (85 seats) and an Asian House of Delegates (45 seats). Each of these assemblies had legislative and executive responsibility for the 'own affairs' of its racial group.

The 1983 'reform' measures were too little and too late. They failed to provide black South Africans with political rights but were sufficient to provoke black communities to seek further reform in their favour. Opposition to apartheid continued to increase and Pretoria was forced to impose two consecutive states of emergency, lasting a total of five years (1985-1990). The drastic laws of 'the Emergency' limited the effects of these political reforms.

The Commonwealth and the rest of the international community were dismayed at the way the Emergency applied the brakes to processes of reform. Commonwealth members sought to restart political reform via two means: a regime of punitive sanctions (detailed in a following section), and through negotiation. To promote negotiation it established the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group in October 1985. The group was co-chaired by former Australian prime minister Malcolm Fraser. It was hoped that a successful outcome of the EPG would avoid the need for further sanctions against Pretoria. However, the group failed to convince the South African government to continue with political reform and further sanctions were necessary.8

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7. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), p.5.

Economic Apartheid

The roots of economic apartheid can be traced back to the development of commercial agriculture and mining in the nineteenth century. The containment of the black population within the borders of impoverished reserves forced families to supplement their incomes by sending their young single men out to work in the mines and on the farms of whites. The system of migrant labour destroyed the family life for large sections of the population and made self-sufficient agriculture impossible in the black homelands. As a consequence of the strictures of both physical and political apartheid, non-whites, and especially black South Africans, suffered considerable economic hardship. But the divisions in the South African economy were not only caused by apartheid but also the cultural inheritance and institutions of the white community.

In 1986 the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was disturbed at the economic disparity between the white and African communities. In its report the EPG noted that 80 percent of the country's economic activity was located in the white areas, that whites (representing 15 percent of the population) received nearly 60 percent of the country's disposable income in 1984, and black unemployment was estimated at between 40 and 45 percent. It was observed that some of the harshest economic conditions were located in the 'homelands'. Given that four of the homelands were independent of Pretoria, the South African Government claimed that it was not responsible for the poverty in these areas.

Six years subsequent to the Commonwealth report, an International Monetary Fund publication noted that there had been an overall increase in the income accruing to non-white South Africans at the expense of white incomes. Between 1960 and 1988 the white income share declined from 72.5 percent to 53.9 percent of total income in South Africa, while blacks saw an increase from 19.9 percent to 36.6 percent over the same time-span. The IMF report warned, however, that these figures were misleading insofar as they did not take into account the higher birth rate of blacks in South Africa. While the IMF report did conclude that there has been a significant improvement in income distribution between South Africa's racial groups, coloured and black South Africans remain economically disadvantaged in South


Africa. The following table gives some indication of the distribution of income in South Africa in 1991.

Monthy household income: 1991*11

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<tr>
<td>R/month</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-399</td>
<td>36,1%</td>
<td>17,5%</td>
<td>4,1%</td>
<td>1,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-699</td>
<td>22,0%</td>
<td>13,8%</td>
<td>5,6%</td>
<td>3,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700-1 199</td>
<td>25,8%</td>
<td>21,8%</td>
<td>19,9%</td>
<td>6,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 200-1 999</td>
<td>9,1%</td>
<td>20,5%</td>
<td>20,5%</td>
<td>9,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 000-2 499</td>
<td>3,1%</td>
<td>7,4%</td>
<td>11,2%</td>
<td>8,1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 500-3 999</td>
<td>2,6%</td>
<td>10,4%</td>
<td>24,0%</td>
<td>20,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 000-5 999</td>
<td>1,0%</td>
<td>6,7%</td>
<td>9,3%</td>
<td>24,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 000 +</td>
<td>0,2%</td>
<td>1,8%</td>
<td>5,4%</td>
<td>27,0%</td>
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* As figures have been rounded, columns may not add up to 100%.

Apartheid Under Pressure

The following section notes the sources of domestic and international opposition to apartheid. Internal resistance to apartheid was initiated in 1948 and reached its highpoint in the 1970s and 1980s with the Black Consciousness Movement. Apart from this internal resistance, international opposition also gathered strength from the early 1970s in the form of sanctions. The international community also registered its displeasure via a number of other less publicised means, including through the activities of a plethora of human rights organisations, and through the writings of South African authors such as Alan Paton, Peter Abrahams and Ezekiel Mphahlele.

Domestic Responses

As well as international outrage, from the enactment of apartheid in 1948 there was considerable internal resistance. This resistance led to the strengthening of some political groupings and the formation of others. In the 1950s the African National Congress (ANC) met the Government's actions with fierce opposition. The first target was the hated pass law system. When thousands of non-violent protesters gathered to burn their passes outside the Sharpville Police Station in 1960, the police opened fire, leaving 69 dead and hundreds wounded. Pretoria responded in 1960 by banning the South African Communist Party (SACP), the ANC, and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The fierce repression convinced many leaders that the non-violent strategy
had failed and that armed struggle would have to begin. As a result leaders such as Nelson Mandela were imprisoned, and yet others went into exile:

Over the next thirty years these organisations conducted a low intensity, and generally unsuccessful, armed struggle against the government, operating from bases in newly independent states in the region.12

During the 1970s and 1980s resistance to apartheid developed in black townships such as Soweto13, where grinding poverty and political activism grew in a symbiotic relationship. This political awareness manifested itself in the Black Consciousness Movement and saw the development of a number of black radical groups, including the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO). School boycotts, and strike action organised by the newly emerging black trade union movement, resulted in an increase of violence. South African forces were largely preoccupied with curtailing the spread of black anti-apartheid violence. By 1986 'political mobilisation had grown to unprecedented scale and importance'14 but it became evident that the many black groups did not possess common political goals. Indeed some historians have noted that the early years of P.W. Botha's Government were characterised by the variety of black political activity rather than its coherence.15

But black groups were not alone in their political fragmentation in the 1970s and 1980s. Many in the National Party thought that the 'power sharing' reforms that Botha advocated (and instituted in the 1983 Constitution) undermined Afrikaner ideology. As a consequence there was a hardening of the lines between the National Party and the more reactionary Conservative Party. It was at this time that the AWB and a number of other radical right-wing movements were established to reassert the Afrikaner 'ethnic nationalism'.16 The splintering of white political opinion further threatened the stability of the South African

12. EIU Report, p.5.

13. Townships grew outside the black homelands (usually close to areas that required black labour) and did not have the 'independent' status of the homelands. The lowest living standards were located in the townships. Soweto was located just outside Johannesburg.


state and the system of apartheid. Some African leaders were also inspired to pursue nationalist programs. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi attempted to mobilise Zulu feeling against apartheid by reviving a 1920s movement known as Inkatha. Under Buthelezi's leadership, Inkatha grew quickly into a highly disciplined organisation claiming more than a million members. As it moved to seize control of local government structures in the KwaZulu homeland it grew increasingly hostile to the ANC.

Indeed, the factionalising of black and white political groups in the 1970s and 1980s explains the complexity of the political situation in South Africa in the months leading up to the April 1994 elections. This political fragmentation was the cause of much of the violence in the pre- and post-election periods.

Simultaneously with this internal resistance to apartheid there was a campaign of resistance by the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) to expel South African Defence Forces (SADF) from the territory of present-day Namibia. Pretoria had been granted a mandate over the former German territory of South West Africa at the conclusion of WWI by the League of Nations and the UN had later awarded it a trusteeship over the territory. South Africa's mandate was formally withdrawn in 1969 but Pretoria refused to relinquish its hold over Namibian territory. Playing upon Western Cold War phobias, South African leaders argued that they needed to retain a presence in the area to control communist activities. The SADF was stretched to its limit in Namibia and in the other 'frontline states' as Pretoria tried to counter 'communist' insurgency groups and generally destabilise its neighbours.

International Responses

The international community increased its opposition to apartheid after South Africa became a republic in 1961 and then withdrew from the Commonwealth. Sanctions were the main international weapon against apartheid. Among the states or groups of states that imposed sanctions on South Africa were the United States, the European Community, the Commonwealth, the United Nations and Australia.

It was not until the OPEC oil embargo of late 1973 that international sanctions gathered momentum as a weapon against apartheid. The OPEC embargo was not effective, however, as ample quantities of oil continued to reach South Africa from Iran until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. After that time Pretoria was able to extract much of its oil

requirements from coal. Subsequent embargoes on arms transfers by the United Nations and the United States were more effective but these actions prompted Pretoria to establish its own defence industries and by the mid-1980s it had become a large arms producer and exporter.

The 1985 decision of a number of international banks not to renew short-term credits to South Africa was probably the most effective of the international sanctions. This action resulted in a debt crisis for the country, indicating that the South African economy could not continue to operate in isolation from the world economy. A plethora of international economic sanctions during the 1980s prompted more than 350 companies to quit South Africa: more than 200 of these were US companies which divested because of the US's Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (1986) and other legislation.

Australia's Policy on South Africa

Australia has been at the forefront of attempts to have apartheid laws rescinded by Pretoria. While Australia supported the Commonwealth's 1977 Gleneagles Agreement which placed some restrictions on sporting activities between the Commonwealth nations and South Africa, Canberra strengthened these bans in October 1983 by forbidding all representative sporting contact with South Africa. At the same time the Australian Government announced that the southern African nationalist movements - including the African National Congress (ANC), the Southwest African People's Organisation (SWAPO) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) - would be permitted to establish information offices in Australia.

Sanctions

Most of the sanctions enforced by Australia were originally agreed to at a number of Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings. For instance, Canberra adopted the sanctions proposed at the


21 This special relationship was noted in, 'Hawke urges Mandela to cash in on goodwill', Sunday Herald, 4 March 1990, p.9.
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held at Nassau in October 1985 and agreed to at the Heads of Government Meeting held in London in August 1986. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, these sanctions included bans on: government loans to the South African Government, government funding for trade missions/promotions in South Africa, sale or export of computer equipment capable of use by South African security forces, new contracts for the sale or export of nuclear goods and oil to South Africa, the import of military ammunition and weapons from South Africa, military cooperation with South Africa, and the discouragement of all cultural and scientific events except where they do not support apartheid. At the London meeting of August 1986 it was further decided to ban: all new public and private bank loans to South Africa, the import of uranium, coal, iron and steel from South Africa and withdraw all consular facilities in South Africa.

In June of 1987 an additional block of Commonwealth sanctions was announced against South Africa. These included the imposition of bans on: air links with South Africa, new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa, the import of agricultural products from South Africa, all government assistance to, investment in, and trade with, South Africa and ban the promotion of tourism to South Africa.

While these resolutions were adopted by Commonwealth members, including Australia, Canberra went even further, introducing a code of conduct for Australian companies operating in South Africa. Following earlier codes of the United States, the EC and Canada, Australia sought to ensure that racial discrimination was not practiced by Australian companies that employed black South Africans. Australia also accepted all three UN Security Council resolutions relating to the embargo of arms sales to South Africa.

According to Prime Minister Bob Hawke, Australia used sanctions against South Africa not to bring South Africa to its knees but to its senses. The sanctions were designed to inflict hardship on the white minority in South Africa rather than the black majority. There is, however, some speculation as to whether sanctions did achieve this.

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23 Bob Hawke, *Speech by the Prime Minister*, Luncheon in honour of Mr Nelson Mandela, Canberra, 23 October 1990, pp.1-4.
In particular Australia has restored trading and sporting links with South Africa given what was deemed to be satisfactory progress toward the reform of government and society upon democratic and non-racial principles. While bilateral trade between Australia and South Africa dropped from $A\ 343\ million\ in\ FY\ 1984-85\ to\ $A\ 232\ million\ in\ FY\ 1989-90\ it\ is\ set\ to\ expand\ rapidly\ in\ the\ wake\ of\ the\ lifting\ of\ trade\ sanctions\ and\ in\ FY\ 1992-93\ bilateral\ trade\ was\ worth\ about\ $A\ 525\ million.\ Similarly,\ Australian\ sporting\ links\ with\ South\ Africa\ are\ now\ expanding\ as\ has\ been\ demonstrated\ by\ the\ 1993-94\ Australian/South\ African\ cricket\ series\ played\ in\ Australia\ and\ South\ Africa.

Aid

To ameliorate the possible effects of sanctions on the underprivileged black and coloured communities in South Africa, the international community also initiated an aid program. For its part, Australia introduced numerous aid packages to assist the underprivileged black community in South Africa. As early as 1983 Australia began a scholarship program for the education and training of disadvantaged black South Africans. Senator Evans announced in October 1990 that by May of that year some $8.75 million had been allocated for the following assistance programs under the Special Assistance Program for South Africans (SAPSA):

- $3.6 million for a new scholarship program
- $2.0 million for assistance with repatriation and resettlement of exiles

24. Some observers have argued that sanctions had little negative effect upon the lifestyle of white South Africans but were more damaging to blacks. One critic has argued that Pretoria was able to adjust economic planning for a 'siege economy' created by the implementation of sanctions. Christopher Coker, 'Divestment and the South African "Siege Economy": A Business Perspective', in Shaun Johnson (ed.), South Africa: No Turning Back, 1989, pp.299-300.

25. Ean Higgins, 'We're going to South Africa: Libs' The Sunday Age, 11 November 1990, p.33. These dollar figures were obtained from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

- $1.5 million for Australian Non-Government Organisation projects (both in country and in Australia)
- $0.9 million for post-identified in-region training, and
- $0.75 million for in-Australia training

Since Senator Evans' October 1990 announcement, Australia has committed further aid to South Africa. For example, Evans noted in August 1991 that Australia had allocated $2.3 million for scholarships, exchanges and institutional assistance to strengthen economic decision-making processes in South Africa. Assistance in this last area was provided because it was pointed out that South Africa would have to radically adjust the structure of its economy in the post-apartheid era. In the period 1990-1993 Australia's assistance totalled $17 million. Funds were not transferred to the ANC or any other liberation movement but channelled through non-government organisations and educational institutions to specific projects identified in consultation with the ANC. Numerous Australian NGOs have also allocated assistance to South Africa.

Australia has also made a significant contribution to the financing and conduct of the elections. In October 1993 Australia committed $A890,000 to the cost of the South African elections, representing about

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27 News Release, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, M177, 23 October 1990.
29 Prime Minister's speech in honour of Nelson Mandela, 23 October 1990, p.2. Australia's International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) noted in the March edition of its journal Focus that Australia had provided more than $34 million in aid to disadvantaged South Africans and Namibians between 1986 and 1993.
30 Coalition members were critical of the Hawke Government's decision to allocate most of Australia's SAPSA aid in consultation with the ANC and not other groups as well. Dr John Hewson, Leader of the Opposition, Media Release, 'South Africa', 13 November, 1990. The government responded to Opposition concerns by stating that the ANC was a broad-based liberation movement which represented a wide range of political and ideological views in South Africa. Senator Gareth Evans pointed out that: "My decision to earmark for the ANC the majority of the new funds recognised the pivotal role that the ANC will play during South Africa's difficult process of social and political change", Question No.77, 'South Africa: Humanitarian and Development Assistance', Hansard (Senate), 17 September, 1990, p.2496.
The End of Apartheid and the 1994 Elections

While F.W. de Klerk came to power as a proponent of apartheid, the combined effect of domestic political violence and international sanctions provided ample reminder to him that this system was untenable. In theory, rule by apartheid came to an end with the lifting of the ban on nationalist movements in 1990, the release of Nelson Mandela from prison on February 11, 1990 (after an incarceration of 27 years), and the February 1991 removal of the cornerstones of apartheid - the Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act and the Separate Amenities Act. In practice however, it will take a deal longer to rectify the poverty and injustice created by the apartheid system.

Negotiations Leading to the 1994 Elections

1991-1993

Once the legal underpinnings of apartheid were removed, it became possible for the South African Government and other political parties to negotiate for the creation of a non-racial South Africa. The Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was convened in December 1991 to negotiate the form of a future democratic constitution for South Africa. Nineteen political groups attended the meeting but only seventeen signed a 'declaration of intent' calling for a unitary South Africa with a common citizenship. The Inkatha

31 Geoffrey Barker, 'Australia's $1 million for South Africa election', *The Age*, 26 October 1993, p.5.


34 Peter Clack, 'AFP policemen to aid South African poll', *Canberra Times*, February 26, 1994, p.4.
Freedom Party (Inkatha) and the Government of Bophuthatswana opposed the declaration on the grounds that it would preclude the creation of a federal state. Furthermore, a number of political parties, including the extreme right-wing Conservative Party (CP) and the far-left PAC, boycotted the convention. It was alleged that the de Klerk Government did not possess a mandate from the white community to make constitutional changes. However, a referendum was conducted in March 1992, the 68.6 percent 'yes' result providing the government with a clear endorsement to continue negotiations for constitutional change.36 But the CODESA talks broke down in May 1992 after the government and the ANC could not agree on the size of the majority needed to pass constitutional amendments in a post-apartheid political system. The ANC negotiators withdrew from CODESA, organising mass action in tandem with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU - the country's largest trade union federation), including a two-day general strike.36

A combination of United Nations intervention and a rising level of violence brought the National Party (NP) and the ANC back to the negotiating table with the signing of the Record of Understanding in September 1992.37 This move, however, had the effect of increasing Inkatha and CP hostility to the negotiating process - they claimed that the government and the ANC were carving up the country between them. Despite this, Inkatha, the CP and the PAC were present at the inaugural meeting of the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MFP), which was established on 1 April 1993 to replace CODESA. This third phase of negotiations was marred by the assassination of the popular SACP leader Chris Hani in April 1993. The CP and Inkatha again withdrew from the negotiations because of an inability to agree on the 'unitary' versus 'federal state' issue. In October 1993 the CP, Inkatha and their allies established the Freedom Alliance (FA), which continued to press for the establishment of a federal constitution prior to the elections.

1994

In the several months immediately prior to the elections there was a heightening of tensions between the opposing political groupings. In early 1994 the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party, the homeland of Bophuthatswana and the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF), all vowed that they would not only boycott the April 1994 elections but actively


disrupt it. But the South African government warned that it would not allow any organisation to hinder the election process. Futile attempts by white para-military groups such as the nazi-like Afrikaner Resistance Movement of Eugene Terreblanche to prop up Lucas Mangope's Bophuthatswana regime backfired.\(^{38}\) Their ignominious failure prompted the founder of the AVF, General Constand Viljoen, to quit the Afrikaner alliance and contest the elections at the head of the new Freedom Front party.

Despite the speculations of the media about the possibility of extensive violence from extremist white groups, this did not occur. In mid-March President de Klerk warned that the extreme right and the homeland of KwaZulu might experience a similar fate to that of Bophuthatswana if they obstructed the political process leading up to the elections.\(^{39}\)

In March and April the level of political violence rose to levels that were without precedent in recent years. In March alone the Human


Rights Commission said that at least 552 people had died in politically-motivated violence. To curb the level of disorder a state of emergency was introduced on March 31. By mid-April some 3,000 SADF troops had been deployed to the Zulu homeland. Yet, despite the efforts of the SADF more than 150 people were killed in the first two weeks of the emergency. These deaths were motivated by the unwillingness of Chief Buthelezi to accept the terms of the April elections: indeed Buthelezi stated that nothing short of a miracle would prompt him to support the elections.

Demonstrating this intransigence, Buthelezi rejected the attempts of both the Kruger National Park summit and international mediators (Henry Kissinger and Lord Carrington) to draw him into the election process.

But Buthelezi's refusal to participate in the elections began to sap the political strength of the Inkatha in the weeks prior to the elections, with opinion polls indicating that Inkatha had the support of no more than 20 percent of the eight million Zulus. Of that 20 percent, it was claimed that 52 percent would like to vote in the elections. Further pressure was applied by the decision of the de Klerk and ANC leadership to recognise the Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithini, as constitutional monarch of the KwaZulu Natal province. Mindful that he and his party were in imminent danger of political marginalisation should they fail to contest the elections, Buthelezi declared on 20 April that his party would participate in the poll. However, Inkatha's pre-election intransigence may well rebound on it in post-apartheid South Africa and result in its political emasculation.

Apart from the problems resulting from widespread violence in South Africa, there were also a number of concerns expressed about logistical preparations for the elections. The head of the Commonwealth observer group to South Africa, Mr Russell Marshall, noted that there were indications that the elections would be a shambles because there was inadequate preparation in five of the nine electoral districts (for a map of the nine districts see Appendix B). Indeed, in many areas voting did not proceed with the desired alacrity because of a shortage

40. 'South Africa mediators arrive too late', The Australian, April 13, 1994, p.6.

41. 'We've failed in South Africa, say mediators', Sydney Morning Herald, April 15, 1994, p.8.

42. Allister Sparks, 'Mouse who roars will lose his voice', The Australian, April 13, 1994, p.11.

43. Pattrick Smellie, 'Incompetence will lead to poll shambles', Weekend Australian, April 9, 1994, p.13.
of ballot papers and larger-than-expected voting queues. Many voters were required to wait for hours before casting their votes.

Constitutional Arrangements for the 'New' South Africa

Constitutional reforms for the new South Africa commenced with the convening of CODESA in December 1991. A majority of the political groups in attendance signed a 'declaration of intent' calling for a unitary South Africa with a common citizenship. But opposition to the declaration from Inkatha and the CP resulted in the collapse of the CODESA talks in May 1992. Constitutional discussions resumed in April 1993 when the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPF) was established. And in December 1993 the Transitional Constitution was agreed to by the National Party, the ANC and most of the political groups in South Africa. As noted, however, Inkatha, the CP and several of the homelands refused to agree to the constitution because it appeared to advocate a unitary form of government, precluding a federalist system or the establishment of an independent white homeland.

The Constitution of 1983 remained in force until the 1994 elections but a number of significant changes were made to it. While the tricameral parliament remained in force until April 27, 1994, the three houses did lose responsibility for the 'own affairs' of the racial groups that they represented. The incumbent government cabinet also remained in
place but shared its responsibilities with the Transitional Executive
Council (TEC). The TEC was comprised of political parties
participating in the elections and was primarily responsible for the
oversight of the elections. Furthermore, decisions once made by the
Cabinet or Ministers' Councils were allocated to multi-party national
forums, including the National Electricity Forum, the National
Housing Forum and the National Education Forum. 44

Beyond the elections, the Transitional Constitution provides for an
elected constituent assembly comprised of a 400-member National
Assembly and a 90-member Senate. As a constitutional assembly, the
two bodies will frame the final constitution within a two year period
and will act as a legislature during the five year transitional period.
The National Assembly will be elected by proportional representation
and the Senate is to be comprised of representatives of the nine
regional governments elected at the same elections by a second ballot.
Furthermore, it has been agreed in the transitional constitution that
all parties with five percent or more of the vote will be entitled to
representation in the new cabinet. 45

Though the interim constitution has tactfully remained silent as to
whether the new South Africa will be a unitary or federal state,
considerable power has been reserved for the regional governments.
Regional government will have powers over taxation, local government
finance, town planning, local policing, housing, education, roads and
language policy. They will also have the power to enact their own
legislation and constitutions on the proviso that these activities do not
conflict with national laws or the national constitution. The strength
of the regional governments was further enhanced by the eleventh
hour decision to authorise changes to the interim constitution that
would preserve the political strength of the Zulu King (Goodwill
Zwelithini) and the KwaZulu province. 46

Local government changes have been negotiated in tandem with
national and regional constitutional changes through the establishment
of the Local Government Negotiating Forum in early 1993. Many
right-wing municipalities are resisting moves to have them merged
with black and coloured communities because of the fear that they will

44. Economist Intelligence Unit, p.8.
45. Economist Intelligence Unit, p.8.
be subsidising the regeneration of civil infrastructure in poorer areas for many years to come.47

**Election Policies of the Major Parties**

It became apparent in April 1993 - when the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MFP) commenced its mission to bring most political groupings together to negotiate a new constitutional system for South Africa - that there were numerous issues that profoundly divided the different parties. The most important division that emerged related to the argument over the form of the government for the 'new' South Africa. While the ANC favoured a unitary system that concentrated political power in Pretoria, Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha advocated federalism with stronger regional government because its support base is almost completely confined to the Natal/KwaZulu region.48 In the lead-up to the elections the NP indicated that it also favoured a federal system of government. It has been suggested that this shift from its earlier emphasis on a unitary form of government was an attempt to limit the power of the black majority in post-election South Africa.49 CP and Freedom Alliance demands were for an independent white Afrikaner homeland, linked by confederation to South Africa.50

In the lead-up to the elections the NP was concerned to stress to the electorate that it had genuinely shifted its policies from apartheid to a non-racial party concerned with human rights and democracy. Furthermore, it argued that it was the only party that had the know-how to manage the economy. This message was not lost on voters: an increasing number of blacks and coloured South Africans believed that the ANC did not have the competence or a coherent economic policy to manage the country.51 To counter this perception the ANC issued a manifesto in January 1994 setting out the party's economic objectives. It claimed that it intended to spend 39 billion rand (S$15.04 billion) to build one million houses over five years, create 2.5 million jobs over ten years and improve the country's civil infrastructure.52 To fund this program the ANC stated that it would

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47. Economist Intelligence Unit, p.9.
49. Economist Intelligence Unit, p.10.
50. EIU Report, p.7.
51. John Edlin, p.27.
52. *Background Brief*, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, p.3.
abandon a pledge to limit government deficits to 6 percent of GDP. The ANC has also stated that it will reduce defence spending to help fund its economic programs.53

The Election Results

As of Friday 6 May, the ANC had gained 62.6 percent of the count, the NP 20.4 percent, Inkatha 10.5 percent, the FF 2.2 percent, the DP 1.7 percent and the PAC 1.2 percent of the poll. None of the other twenty or more parties that contested the poll obtained more than 0.5 percent of the vote, and many of them were less than 0.1 percent.54

Predictably, the ANC result was a landslide victory. Even a National Party result of 20 percent had been widely tipped by analysts, despite the fact that the Nationals had been the architects of the apartheid system. But some of the other results were a surprise to political observers. The Freedom Front was the only white race party to contest the elections and it achieved a low 2.2 percent of the vote: the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) believed that had the CP (the main white radical party) contested the elections, it would have gained about 5 percent of the vote. Similarly, the black radical groups performed much worse than was expected. The EIU tipped that the Pan Africanist Congress would receive about 10 percent of the vote. The final result, however, was just 1.2 percent. Inkatha, it was claimed, would attract no more than 6 percent of the vote - the final poll revealed that they gained 10.5 percent.

Professor Norman Etherington, in a lecture held within the Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, argued that the election results suggest that race is no longer a major issue for the new South Africa.55 Voters did not vote for the party that represented their race. Etherington suggested that South Africa would now move away from race and become a society based upon class. Indeed, he suggested that South Africa was structured in such a way that it was already very much a society based upon class.

53. 'Jobs and housing feature in ANC spending program', *Canberra Times*, April 14, 1994, p.10.


55. Professor Norman Etherington, Professor of History, University of Western Australia, *The Road to Reconciliation*, address delivered at the Parliamentary Library Seminar Series, 4 May 1994.
Nelson Mandela has already proclaimed victory in the elections, and will be sworn in as the new South African president on May 10. The following day Mandela is due to announce the composition of his cabinet. There will be two Vice-Presidents - de Klerk and probably the Secretary-General of the ANC (Cyril Ramaphosa). The ANC Vice-Presidential nominee will, in all likelihood, succeed Mandela at the next national elections.56

The New South Africa and the Region

The Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group noted in its 1986 report that in its dealings with other regional states, South Africa had 'wielded the stick of military and economic sanctions to bend neighbouring nations to its will.57 Angola and Mozambique suffered acutely from Pretoria's military aggression, though Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia and present-day Namibia did not escape attack. Furthermore, all of these states were targeted by Pretoria's economic coercion. This latter form of aggression was primarily by covert means but the Eminent Persons Group argued that evidence was, nonetheless, present. It pointed to the destruction of crucial transport infrastructure in Angola and Mozambique which increased the reliance of these states on the South African transport system. This dependence gave Pretoria enormous economic and political power over its neighbours, which it was not afraid to use.58

Nelson Mandela will be eager to improve South Africa's foreign policy with the 'frontline states'. Indeed Pretoria appears eager to renounce its pariah status and assume the role of a 'good neighbour'. But some observers are already predicting that South Africa will continue to exercise economic dominance in southern Africa by dint of the size of its economy in relation to the rest of the region. South Africa's economy, which has a GDP of $US 101 billion, is three times larger than the combined output of the seven 'frontline states'. Its economic clout in the region has been further magnified since the restrictions on foreign trade and investment were removed.59 Many states in Africa are already beginning to feel the effect of stiff competition from strong, technologically advanced South African companies. Further afield,


57. Mission to South Africa, p.126.


even some Australian companies claim that they are preparing for a battle to retain traditional markets in the face of South African competition.60

Conclusion

The elections have passed, ending more than three centuries of government based upon racial prejudice but the future of South Africa remains uncertain. Nelson Mandela, the ANC and the NP face the daunting task of undoing the damage caused by more than forty years of apartheid: unifying the country and raising the living standards of all South Africans to a level that the South African economy can sustain. The violence that has gripped South Africa in the months prior to the elections suggests that these objectives will not be easily achieved.

It has become evident that the April elections have meant different things to different people. Black South Africans, who have never known any other life but poverty and oppression, see the polls as the beginning of a bright new future and are eager for these reforms to be made literally overnight. Radical whites are fearful of the implications of the elections. The prospect of a South Africa dominated by blacks and coloured peoples does not accord with Afrikaner ideology of racial segregation. Coloured and Asian South Africans, however, are seemingly caught between the two, not wanting a return to apartheid but apprehensive of what a black dominated government will mean for them.

The new government will need to carefully manage the differing expectations of the various political groups in South Africa. Contrary to hopes of many black South Africans, the ANC/NP government will not be able to make significant changes overnight. Racial prejudice will not disappear with the change in government and it will take decades to significantly raise the current third world living conditions of most black South Africans. Change will be hindered by the need of the government to direct some of its energies to the formulation of the new constitution by 1996, and by the ability of the economy to finance the upgrading of the civil infrastructure. Even the suggested redistribution of white wealth is unlikely to pay for the massive

60. Australian company, SPC Limited, has claimed that its nett profits dropped during 1993 because of competition from South African canneries. But in this instance it would seem that the threat was short-lived because the South African canneries could not supply the market with the required quantity of canned products. John Hurst, 'South Africa threat affects SPC's year', Australian Financial Review, 4 March, 1993.
changes needed. South Africa will require generous aid from the international community to hasten the reforms that the post-apartheid government has vowed that it will enact.

Australia is now presented with the chance to participate in and see to its conclusion, South Africa's rehabilitation from an apartheid state to that of a liberal democracy. The Australian/South African trading relationship is also likely to expand given Canberra's long-term support for reform in South Africa.
Appendices

Appendix A:
The Essential Statistics of South Africa

South Africa covers just over 1.2 million square kilometres, including the theoretically independent homelands of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda. It has a population of 37.7 million, although the South African Urban Foundation estimated the population as 39.3 million in FY 1992-93. Of this latter total, some 6.75 million people live in the four 'independent' homelands. Based upon the Urban Foundation estimation of South Africa's population, there were 29.9 million (76 percent) blacks, 3.4 million (8.5 percent) coloureds, 1 million (2.5 percent) Asians and 5.1 million (13 percent) whites. In the period 1985-1990 blacks had the highest growth rate of all racial groups in South Africa: 2.39 percent per annum as opposed to the 0.68 percent per annum of the white population.

The South African economy is a mixture of first world development and third world poverty. Between 1962 and 1972 the South African economy grew at an average of 5.5 percent, though this average fell below 3 percent for the following decade. Then in 1982 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped for the first time since the Second World War. During the 1980s the country's real economic growth rate dropped below 2 percent, which was less than the population growth rate, resulting in a per capita drop of living standards. In the period 1990 to 1992 the GDP has continued to decline in real terms: in 1992 it was down 2.1 percent on the previous year. This drop in economic performance indicated that apartheid was not commercially and economically viable. Domestic and international pressure exerted on Pretoria sought to prove this point.

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Appendix B:
The Major Political Actors

With the dismantling of apartheid, the lifting of bans on many of the black liberation groups and the release of political prisoners, the number of political actors in South Africa has burgeoned. There were 26 political parties at the time that party registration closed in early March. The following section first identifies the main political actors and associated personalities in post-apartheid South Africa. The list includes registered political parties as well as unregistered political groupings which have impacted upon the lead-up to the April 1994 elections. It is not an exhaustive list. Following this, an account is given of the policies of the principal parties and how these policies have created division within South Africa.

The National Party (NP): formed in 1914, and currently led by F.W. de Klerk. The NP instituted apartheid and has dominated South African politics for the last four decades. Since 1990 the NP has attempted to change its image from a party based upon racial segregation to a liberal, non-racial party: a move that was essential if the party was to contest the elections. This move has alienated many of its Afrikaner supporters, although there is a surprising rise in support from black and coloured South Africans who see the NP as a viable alternative to the more radical black nationalist parties which do not have the proven skills in national management. 62

African National Congress (ANC): founded in 1912. President: Nelson Mandela. Secretary-General: Cyril Ramaphosa. The party was banned by the South African Government between 1960 and 1990. The ANC has been the primary opponent of apartheid and challenged Pretoria's racist policies via its military arm, Umkonto we Sizwe. The party has mass support from the black population. The ANC's basic policy document, the 1955 Freedom Charter, argued for a non-racial democracy and proposed the nationalisation of lands, mines and industry. Since the ANC's legalisation in 1990 it has converted its

62. In the weeks prior to the election reports noted that an increasing number of black and coloured South Africans favoured the National Party because they feared that an ANC-dominated government would not guarantee their interests. "President Savours adulation of thousands of his former enemies: Mandela Lashes de Klerk", Canberra Times, April 12, 1994, p.5. Also John Edlin, 'Not Black and White: Minority Asians face tough choice in first all-race polls', Far Eastern Economic Review, April 21, 1994, pp.26-27.
outlook to that of a party committed to a mixed economy with room for free enterprise and foreign investment.  

**Inkatha Freedom Party (Inkatha):** has been the ruling party in the KwaZulu homeland since its foundation in 1974 (but only registered as a political party in 1990), and is led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Buthelezi is also the uncle of the Zulu king Goodwill Zweithini. Inkatha is a beneficiary of the apartheid system which fostered division along race, colour and ethnicity. Inkatha was opposed to the elections and refused to participate in them until the week prior to the poll. It was concerned that Zulu interests would be subordinated in the new South Africa and therefore called for an independent homeland for the Zulu people.

**Pan Africanist Congress (PAC):** President - Clarence Makwetu. Secretary-General - Benny Alexander. The party was founded in 1959 by a breakaway faction of the ANC which was at variance with the ANC's non-racial policy. PAC was banned at the same time as the ANC and engaged in armed struggle against the South African Government through its military wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA). Unlike the ANC military wing, APLA continues to engage in armed conflict with the South African Government. PAC is an extremist anti-white party which believes that the ANC has become too 'soft' in its policies. Unlike the ANC, support for the PAC is more narrowly based.

**The Conservative Party (CP):** Leader: Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg. The party was established in 1982 from an NP splinter group, which argued that P.W. Botha had betrayed Verwoerdian apartheid when he called for power sharing with the Asian and coloured communities. During the 1980s the CP assumed the Progressive Federal Party's (founded in 1959) role as the official opposition. It was so successful in municipal elections that there were fears that it might defeat the NP in a general election. The CP, Inkatha and their allies formed the Freedom Alliance (FA) in October 1993 after the election date was announced, which argued for a federal constitution to be concluded prior to the elections to protect the powers of the provinces that are to be established under the transitional government.

**South African Communist Party (SACP):** established in the 1920s as the Communist Party of South Africa, it was outlawed in 1950 and

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64. *Background Brief*, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, p.7.

went underground, assuming its current name. It has always been in alliance with the ANC and there is a considerable overlap between office-bearers in the two parties. Once committed to the overthrow of both apartheid and capitalism, the party distanced itself from the second objective after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. It has adopted a more conservative political platform in line with that of the ANC. The party contested the elections in coalition with the ANC.

**Afrikaner Weerstands beweging (AWB):** a white extremist group founded in 1974, led by Mr Eugene Terre'Blanche, is not a registered political party. In 1993 it formed an alliance with the CP and other right-wing organisations to establish the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF). AWB members refuse to participate in the April 1994 elections, seeking instead an independent Afrikaner homeland. Though long the butt of jokes in South Africa, it is known that the AWB has a well-armed military group called the Ystergarde (Iron Guard) and has conducted a 'serious program' of terror over the last several years.\(^\text{66}\)

**Democratic Party (DP):** leader - Dr Zacharias de Beer. The party was formed in 1989 from an amalgamation of the Progressive Federal Party, the Independent Party and the National Democratic Movements - the latter two being left-wing splinters of the NP. The DP has always advocated universal franchise in a federal state: a position now adopted by the NP and which has consequently led to the marginalisation of the DP in South African politics. Nevertheless, the party has played a significant role as a mediator in national negotiations for a post-apartheid constitution.

The **Freedom Front (FF):** leader - General Constand Viljoen. Registered as a political party in mid-March 1994. Viljoen, former head of the SADF, splintered from the AVF after the collapse of the Bophuthatswana government and decided to contest the elections under the FF.\(^\text{67}\)

The **United Democratic Front (UDF)** and the **Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU):** linked to, but independent of, the banned liberation movements. While not political parties, these organisations dominated extra-parliamentary politics in the late 1980s.\(^\text{68}\) The UDF raised considerable resistance to apartheid and in some instances made the townships ungovernable. Likewise, the power

\(^\text{66.} \) Economist Intelligence Unit, p.12.


\(^\text{68.} \) Economist Intelligence Unit, p.12.
of COSATU grew during the 1980s, becoming the most important political and economic voice of disenfranchised black South Africa.\textsuperscript{69} When the ANC was legalised in 1990, COSATU aligned itself with the ANC and the SACP.

\textsuperscript{69} Economist Intelligence Unit, p.13.
Appendix C:
A Dictionary of Apartheid

The following list defines some of the terms used in the course of this paper and perhaps require some definition.

Apartheid - an Afrikaner word which literally means 'apart-hood' or separation.

Black - black South Africans were racially classified according to the colour of their skin under apartheid in South Africa.

Bantu - a group of black southern Africans. The term refers to the people and their language.

Coloured - refers to South Africans who were neither black nor white. In its widest definition it included Indians, Malays and other Asians.

Homelands - created from the old Native Reserves. The 'homelands' were the only places that black South Africans could legally own land.

Kaffir - originally a term that described a particular group within the Bantu group of Africans but in more recent times was used as a derogatory label.

Pass Laws - laws that forbade non-white South Africans to move outside their reserved lands without an authorising pass.

White - a racial label that described European settlers of Dutch and English descent in South Africa.

Volk - an Afrikaner word that literally translates as 'folk' or the people. 'The volk' is a term often used by Afrikaners to describe their own people.
Appendix D: Map of the new Provinces of South Africa
Appendix E:
Map Showing the New Provinces of South Africa