Chapter 2Application, coordination and alignment
2.1Australia has developed a robust sanctions regime framework allowing manoeuvrability in response to issues of global concern. When wielded effectively, Australia’s sanctions framework can be a powerful tool for promoting accountability, have a symbolic value as well as a deterrent effect, and can influence behaviour by publicly naming human rights abusers and raising the financial and reputational costs of violating international norms.
2.2In practice, however, the implementation of sanctions is complicated and their resulting effectiveness difficult to measure. Evidence provided to this inquiry indicates that Australia’s implementation of the existing sanctions regime could be improved in several ways in response to emerging challenges. This could be achieved primarily by addressing three key concerns identified by this inquiry: inconsistencies in sanctions application, underutilisation of thematic sanctions and delays in applying sanctions already applied by partner states.
2.3This chapter explores ways in which the Australian Government might refine how it applies its sanctions regime to address concerns about these perceived inconsistencies and suboptimal alignment with global partners. By doing so, the government can better utilise the available sanctions frameworks in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives.
Consistency in application
2.4Sanctions do not always appear to be applied consistently in response to recognised abuses of human rights or international law. This leads to the observation that some states can commit human rights abuses almost with impunity, while others are subject to sanctions in response to comparable behaviour. This is potentially the case because the use of sanctions as a means of exerting political influence requires consideration of a complex range of factors and a delicate balance of ethical objectives against the practical demands of Realpolitik.
2.5This was reflected in evidence presented to the committee, which indicated that many stakeholders, such as the ANU Law Reform and Social Justice Research Hub, are concerned by what they perceive as underutilisation of Australia’s Magnitsky-style sanctions:
Australia’s implementation of Magnitsky style sanctions since 2021 was a significant step forward in our ability to target human rights abusers and corrupt actors. However, we submit that the current application of these sanctions has been limited in scope and inconsistent in practice.
2.6Dr Anton Moiseienko, a Senior Lecturer in Law at the Australian National University and expert in legal aspects of Magnitsky-style sanctions, went further, submitting that Australia has ‘barely utilised’ its legal ability to impose these sanctions. He summarised their limited use:
They include sanctions against Russian officials involved in the killing of whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky (all sanctioned by the US 10 years prior to Australian sanctions), several designations of further Russian and Iranian officials for human rights abuse, the designations of Israeli settlers discussed above, and the two cyber sanctions designations also discussed above.
2.7Others, such as Walk Free and International Justice Mission Australia, agreed that Magnitsky-style sanctions have been used ‘in a very limited way, against targets in Russia, Iran and Israel’.
2.8In contrast, US designations under the Global Magnitsky Act 2016 cover 238 individuals and 305 entities.
2.9Dr Moiseienko posited that the Australian Government’s ‘reluctance to implement a vigorous sanctions policy’ in response to malign activity could be motivated by concern about diplomatic ramifications. Recognising that diplomatic considerations must be taken seriously, Dr Moiseienko was of the view that these could be mitigated in several ways, including by setting out clear criteria for imposing sanctions which would be independent of nationality.
2.10Transparency International Australia (TIA) drew particular attention to how issues around the politicisation of corruption have prevented sanctions being applied as consistently as they might be:
Overseas corruption has been seen as a security issue and in certain circumstances sanctions have been used to target particular countries. The politicisation of sanctions and the targeting of specific countries tends to lose sight of the fact that dirty money can be found in many parts of the world. This approach to addressing corruption and money laundering also means there are many opportunities for individuals engaging in criminal activity to avoid sanctions. This is demonstrated in a recent case where Russian citizens with Russian political connections have been charged with money laundering but were not on the sanctions list.
2.11Addressing this, TIA stated that Australia could take a more assertive approach to implementing thematic sanctions using the current legislative framework, which allows the Minister to sanction individuals or entities engaging in serious corruption.
2.12Submitters also raised concerns about a lack of clarity about why the Australian Government has not imposed sanctions on any officials known to be responsible for human rights abuses in other areas of the world, such as Xinjiang, an autonomous territory in northwest China where the Chinese government has committed human rights abuses against Uyghur and other Turkic peoples. This was highlighted in a joint submission provided by Australian Uyghur organisations:
Since 2017, the Chinese government has implemented policies aimed at eliminating the ethnic and religious identity of Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples, which amount to crimes against humanity and genocide. The human rights atrocities included mass detentions, torture, forced indoctrination, separation of children from their families, forced labor, confiscation of businesses and land, and forced abortion and sterilization of women.
2.13The Australian Uyghur organisations expressed deep concern about Australia’s failure to apply Magnitsky-style sanctions in this case despite Australia acknowledging the findings of UNHCR investigations into these human rights abuses, which include internment of people for simply practising their religion and maintaining cultural traditions.
2.14Representatives from the ANU Law Reform and Social Justice Research Hub were of the view that this omission exemplifies inconsistency and cited diplomatic reasons as the probable reason:
The United Kingdom, the US, the EU and Australia are purportedly champions of the rule of law, but we're so inconsistently applying these for presumably diplomatic reasons. That's probably a reason why the Australian government hasn't significantly sanctioned the Chinese government with respect to its treatment of the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. There are probably political reasons why we haven't sanctioned Israel to a very large extent, and I think the submissions that have been made by other people to this inquiry make that clear.
2.15The Australia Tibet Council expanded on this, making the point that Australia has not imposed any sanctions on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials in response to human rights violations against multiple cohorts of people, including those in Tibet, the Uyghurs, Hong Kong, or indeed any Chinese democracy activists. They highlighted:
There are human rights violations in Tibet that include extrajudicial killings, physical abuse, arbitrary arrest, mass detentions in Tibet, forced sterilisation, coerced abortion, restrictions on religious and political freedoms, and torture of prisoners. These are grievous human rights abuses.
2.16This omission, representatives from the Australia Tibet Council added, is deeply concerning:
We are afraid that the Australian government is allowing the Chinese government to commit these crimes with impunity by failing to impose any Magnitsky sanctions on individuals.
2.17They went on to explain that this is especially the case given the fact that sanctions are one of a very limited number of ways to influence the CCP:
Magnitsky-style sanctions on CCP officials are one of the few tools that Australia has that could deter officials from their brutality towards Tibetans and punish their abuses of Tibetan human rights. It's something that we feel strongly about because it's something that could create a behavioural change in Tibet. There are very few mechanisms for creating that.
2.18The Australia Tibet Council added that Australia’s inconsistent application of sanctions where the CCP is concerned stands in stark contrast to the approach taken by partner states:
The USA has also issued visa bans for CCP officials relating to the Chinese government run colonial boarding school system. This is a system that has resulted in the separation of up to one million Tibetan children from their families into Chinese state-run institutions. The banned officials are responsible for this policy of forced assimilation that is designed to eliminate Tibetans' distinct linguistic, cultural and religious traditions, as well as affect children as young as four years old and up to 18 years old.
2.19Another example cited by Walk Free and International Justice Mission Australia was of a Cambodian businessman and Senator sanctioned by the US, but not Australia. They submitted that this case is an excellent example of circumstances in which thematic sanctions would be appropriate:
Most recently, on 12 September 2024, the US sanctioned powerful Cambodian businessman Ly Yong Phat and his associated companies “for their role in serious human rights abuse related to the treatment of trafficked workers subjected to forced labor in online scam centers.” Mr Ly is a Senator in the Cambodian government, a senior Cambodian People’s Party leader and acts as an advisor to the Prime Minister, making him “virtually untouchable”.
These are precisely the types of cases that thematic sanctions are designed for, being those where there are no prospects that perpetrators of egregious human rights abuses will be held to account. This may be because of lack of domestic government will to act, or even complicity in the abuses.
Ways to improve consistency
2.20The ANU Law Reform and Social Justice Research Hub suggested that this perceived inconsistency in the application of thematic sanctions could be ameliorated by implementing a clearer set of principles to guide decisions about when sanctions should be imposed as a way of improving consistency. Defining actions which trigger sanctions would, it was suggested, reduce inconsistency and help to avoid diplomatic fallout from this inconsistency:
So it operates as more of a trigger which prevents diplomatic fallout, which might come, or the political backlash from having inconsistently applied many of the Magnitsky sanctions to countries who obviously do have human rights abuses but aren't being targeted under our sanctions program for that. So our submission is that there should be clearer criteria by which the Australian government implements Magnitsky sanctions, and we should coordinate those criteria with like-minded allies.
2.21Human Rights Watch echoed this and similar calls for consistency:
The government should apply targeted sanctions in a principled, more consistent and transparent manner so that rights violators, even in powerful countries like China, do not evade scrutiny.
2.22International experience indicates that clearly identifying designation criteria as suggested can help in implementing a more consistent, robust sanctions policy and in doing so minimise diplomatic fallout. As put by Dr Moiseienko:
Setting out clear and consistent criteria for considering designations can help reframe Australian sanctions as a matter-of-course response to certain categories of wrongdoing rather than as an extraordinary, politically motivated measure. In particular, Australia may wish to consider the publication of designation criteria similar to those published by the UK government for corruption and human rights sanctions.
2.23Dr Moiseienko also pointed out that community input plays a significant role in how sanctions designations are made in the US and UK, making the process more transparent and contributing to an increased perception of consistency:
A significant proportion of US and UK sanctions designations are triggered by civil society submissions that are evaluated by the respective government to ascertain whether sufficient grounds exist for the imposition of sanctions. This regular consideration of civil society submissions organically results in multiple designations of targets all over the world without selective focus on any particular country. This contributes to the fairness and credibility of the designations process while minimising the potential for diplomatic fallout.
2.24Australia, by contrast, lacks a transparent way for civil society organisations to engage with the sanctions designation system. The Australian Wrongful and Arbitrary Detention Alliance (AWADA):
AWADA co-founder Kylie Moore-Gilbert submitted a list of known Iranian officials who played a direct role in her wrongful detention to the offices of former Foreign Minister Marise Payne and current Foreign Minister Penny Wong, requesting that sanctions be considered… The UK-based NGO REDRESS also submitted a lengthy report, based on comprehensive research with victim-survivors of Iranian hostage diplomacy including Moore-Gilbert, to the Foreign Minister’s office and DFAT in December 2022. The report recommended imposing Magnitsky sanctions on an initial tranche of 10 individuals directly implicated in Iran’s hostage-taking business model... Both Dr Moore-Gilbert and REDRESS did not receive a response to their request for sanctions from either Minister’s office…The process by which individuals and civil society organisations are able to submit requests for consideration of sanctions is opaque and lacks transparency.
Sanctions as a tool for foreign policy
2.25Other submitters suggested that sanctions for human rights abuses should be considered through a more objective lens, less influenced by the nationality of those responsible for breaches of human rights law. The committee heard from Geoffrey Robertson KC, whose joint submission with the Australian Centre for International Justice argued that conceptualising sanctions as predominantly a tool of foreign policy results in sacrificing consistency for diplomacy:
There is a concern that, by making it a tool of foreign policy and by making government policy the dominant concern, you never look at a human rights abuser from an allied country. You never consider the abusers that come from our friends. You perhaps go along with condemnations of the International Criminal Court—although Australia has been very supportive of it to date—but you don't hold with the idea that human rights abusers should leave the stage with an amnesty in their back pocket and a Swiss bank account intact. This is the way diplomats think. It's not the way human rights aficionados think. That is where diplomacy and human rights come into clash.
2.26International Legal Scholars against Genocide similarly advocated for the Act to be amended ‘to reorient the key objective of Australia’s sanctions regime towards promoting fundamental principles of international law, in particular the right of all peoples to self-determination.’
2.27This argument goes to the core of sanctions being a tool of foreign policy. Mr Robertson elaborated:
I think it reduces the significance of the Magnitsky law if DFAT gives a shoulder-shrugging statement, 'Oh, it's just a tool of our foreign policy.' It's not. It's a tool of justice, aiming to deter people—particularly people like lawyers, doctors, policemen and state officials acting contrary to international law—from acting in that way.
2.28DFAT, however, highlighted the fact that sanctions are not an end in themselves and are a part of a suite of tools available for responding to egregious actions. This suggests that, while the actions of an individual or entity might well meet the criteria for imposing sanctions, they may not always be the most appropriate response to a situation:
[Sanctions] are only one tool. They're not always the most appropriate, they're not always the most effective and they're complex. They're complex to apply, they're complex to comply with, they're complex to monitor and to enforce, and they impose costs beyond those intended for the target of the action. We give careful consideration every single time we impose a sanction.
Just for broader awareness, one of the things we take into account is, of course, the objective. What's the objective we're trying to achieve? We have other levers and other tools we can use. Are sanctions the most effective tool? Should we try other levers in advance of sanctions? Should sanctions be part of a consolidated strategy and should we actually partner up with other countries?
2.29DFAT also pointed to the impact of sanctions beyond their target. This suggests that imposing sanctions must also be weighed against their impact on the Australian community on a case-by-case basis, as well as other countries and communities the Australian Government is not seeking to disadvantage even where the criteria for imposing sanctions might be met. As put by DFAT:
There are, of course, costs and impacts intended for the targeted audience, but the costs will be borne by the Australian community. It's important to remember that sanctions are effectively constraining action by the Australian community. Australians and the Australian community have to comply with sanctions. They have to undertake due diligence that potentially loses supply chains, markets and the like, and we have to take into account what those costs might be. It is not just about the intended impacts, but the costs on Australia and Australians. We also need to take into account unintended impacts of sanctions. For example, unintended impacts might be on other countries in our region, the local communities who may not be the intended target but are impacted nevertheless, and things like impacts on humanitarian supply and the like.
2.30These considerations are extremely difficult to weigh, but include the burden placed on Australian financial institutions, businesses and individuals to comply with sanctions placed on individuals and entities whose actions they have no influence over.
2.31One of these challenges is in understanding the sanctions regime and the obligations it creates. A submission from the Australian Banking Association (ABA), for example, described how Australia’s sanctions regime is complex and challenging to interpret, with inconsistent definitions across multiple legislative frameworks. The ABA pointed to Britain’s two-tiered sanctions framework and suggested that a similar simplification would be beneficial for Australia:
To achieve a similar level of simplicity, we recommend Australia adopt a framework like the UK’s, merging the COTUNA and ASA into a single Act, supported by sub-regulations that consolidate restrictions based on specific countries (e.g., Russia, North Korea) or themes (e.g., terrorism, human rights).This preferred two-tiered system would simplify compliance by making it easier for regulated entities to navigate their obligations.
2.32Allens, which has considerable experience working with domestic and international business clients in relation to Australia’s sanctions regime, also identified ways in which a lack of clarity around the operation of financial sanctions complicates compliance for the Australian community. The reasons for this lack of clarity and possible mitigations through better alignment with global partners suggested by Allens are discussed later in this chapter.
Committee view
2.33The committee is concerned that Australia is barely utilising its ability to impose thematic sanctions in circumstances which appear to warrant taking such a step. In particular, the committee notes the lack of clarity on the reason why sanctions have not been applied to CCP officials responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang, when the Australian Government has acknowledged the findings of UNHCR investigations and other jurisdictions have already sanctioned the individuals responsible.
2.34Given these inconsistencies, the committee is of the view that stakeholders have valid concerns about the application of sanctions where sensitive diplomatic considerations are involved. While the committee recognises that the multifaceted flow-on effects of imposing sanctions are a strong argument against an overly simplified approach to imposing sanctions whenever a certain number of ‘trigger’ events occur, at the same time, failing to impose sanctions in circumstances which clearly warrant them also has consequences. Such underutilisation of thematic sanctions first and foremost allows perpetrators of human rights abuses to continue to act with impunity. It also has a negative effect on the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by Australia’s global partners and could even potentially undermine the credibility of Australia’s existing sanctions regime in the eyes of the Australian community.
2.35This being the case, the committee considers it worthwhile for the government to explore how it might address perceived inconsistencies in its application of sanctions. This could include developing clear and transparent principles to guide decisions on when sanctions will be applied.
2.36The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider its application of thematic sanctions and explore ways to further strengthen consistency where appropriate.
Alignment with allies
2.37Australia broadly seeks to align its sanctions regimes with those imposed by key international allies, most notably the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU). Aligning the implementation of sanctions optimises effectiveness. This has particularly been the case since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, when the Australian Government stated that it would work in lock step with allies in response to the crisis. Since then, the Australian Government has repeatedly re-affirmed its commitment to alignment with allies.
2.38However, many submitters raised insufficient alignment with global partners as a key shortcoming of Australia’s sanctions regime.
2.39Ukrainian diaspora organisations in Australia, for example, believe that Australia trails its international partners in imposing sanctions. The Ukrainian Council of New South Wales (UCNSW) identified numerous discrepancies and delays between sanctions imposed by Australia and its allies, illustrating the need to ensure closer and more timely cooperation:
[B]ased on the UCNSW’s monitoring of the sanctions regime, it is evident that Australia’s implementation of sanctions has been slower and more selective than that of its counterparts. For example, in mid 2022, the UCNSW identified 50 Russian oligarchs and numerous major Russian companies that had been sanctioned by at least two of the UK, US, and NZ, but not Australia.
2.40UCNSW added that this suboptimal alignment with allies also indicates gaps in coverage, weakening the potential impact of international sanctions:
Australia’s approach of excluding individuals and entities deemed economically or geographically remote from Australia weakens the collective international effort and creates loopholes that Russian elites and businesses can exploit.
2.41The Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations (AFUO) agreed:
The decision not to be fully aligned on sanctions based on the perceived economic or geographic remoteness to Australia of certain individuals or entities translates to gaps in Australia’s response and feeds perceptions around a fragmented international response. Active, ongoing alignment with international partners, as well as Ukraine, is key to demonstrating unity in applying pressure on Moscow and confronting the threats posed by Russia’s aggression. NATO’s guiding principle of collective defence —where an attack on one member is an attack on all members — is instructive here, as it speaks to an opportunity for Australia and Ukraine’s partners to calibrate and coordinate sanctions as part of a joined-up deterrence effort.
2.42AFUO suggested that Australia could improve its alignment with allies and broader sanctions response to Russia’s invasion by engaging with the Ukrainian Government to address gaps in sanctions declarations made by Ukraine and Australia:
The Australian Government must liaise with the Ukrainian Government to ensure the Australian sanctions list is as comprehensive as possible, and includes persons and entities identified by the Ukrainian Government as supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine.
2.43A submission from the Australian Wrongful and Arbitrary Detention Alliance (AWADA) cited Iran as another prime example of an opportunity to align sanctions policy with that of allies, positing that key global partners could benefit from a ‘collective defence’ approach to imposing sanctions:
Given Iran’s extensive record of targeting the citizens of a variety of Western democracies, including the US, Canada, the UK, Japan, New Zealand and the European Union states, the scope for multilateral foreign policy responses is considerable. AWADA strongly encourages the Australian government to coordinate its sanctions regimes with its 5 Eyes partners and other affected states to mount a collective response to Iranian hostage-taking. This could include an ‘Article 5’ style response to Iranian hostage diplomacy, whereby when the national of one allied country is taken hostage by Iran, all partner countries impose the same costs.
2.44Australia has applied extensive sanctions against Iran in relation to its nuclear and missile programs, as well as activities relating to the sponsorship of terrorism, and has recently added a number of Magnitsky-style sanctions in relation to the suppression of protests and persecution of women. However, AWADA identified areas of potential improvement:
Australia has however declined to sanction Iranian officials specifically involved in the wrongful detention and state hostage-taking of Australian citizens. In not doing so, we have missed out on better coordinating our Iran sanctions regime with our allies the UK and US who have specifically sanctioned Iranian hostage-takers. This represents a missed opportunity to both deter future Iranian hostage-taking and send a strong signal that Australia will not tolerate out citizens being used for diplomatic leverage.
2.45Representatives from the Australian National University Law Reform and Social Justice Research Hub cited ways in which Australia, despite its significant Iran-related sanctions, continues to lag behind allies in ways which suggest that a bigger issue might be at play explaining the lack of optimal alignment with global partners even in cases where a designation listing should be straightforward:
For example, Eisa Zarepour, who was the Iranian minister for communications until a few weeks ago, pioneered nationwide shutdowns of Iran's communications network to suppress, track and punish protests. He is but one example of an individual, sanctioned by the European Union, the United States and the UK, who has remained missing from our list. Nor has Australia sanctioned Russian individuals involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainians, including children. We note that the United Kingdom and the United States have added them to their sanctions list. Despite this being a fairly non-contentious designation listing, we would suggest that this selective alignment with overseas allies suggests there might be administrative concerns or problems coordinating our sanctions with allies, which allows individuals to fall through the cracks.
2.46Others were of the view that Australia should fundamentally alter its approach to imposing sanctions. Dr Moiseiensko described Australia’s alignment with sanctions imposed by allies as ‘a selective copying of earlier US, EU or UK sanctions’ and highlighted the importance of Australia acting proactively rather than simply responding to actions taken by global partners:
While acting in concert with allies and partners is desirable, Australia can and should go beyond practices that could be criticised as amounting to little more than copying others. As a regional rule of law champion, Australia should use sanctions vigorously to address corruption, human rights abuse and other malign activity in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia’s emerging use of cyber sanctions against cybercriminals attacking Australian infrastructure is an example of best practice that should be expanded to other contexts.
2.47Dr Moiseienko also described the ‘almost complete absence of any truly Australia-initiated corruption or human rights designations.’ He described how lagging behind allies is counter-productive because it gives targeted individuals time to pre-emptively remove existing assets from Australian jurisdictions, thereby limiting the potential effectiveness of Australia’s sanctions. It also gives the impression of ‘a halting, timid and reluctant sanctions policy.’
2.48Allens, a company with extensive experience advising clients on trade and financial sanctions, cited the lack of clarity on how targeted financial sanctions apply to entities which are only partially owned or controlled by listed individuals as a prime example of where Australia could significantly improve its sanctions regime:
…Australia does not apply a brightline rule when assessing whether targeted financial sanctions flow through from a designated person to another entity. For example, the 50% rule is a feature of the sanctions frameworks of the European Union, United Kingdom and United States. Though it takes differing forms, the 50% rule generally provides that if a designated person owns 50% or more of an entity (or additionally in the case of the European Union and United Kingdom, exercises certain forms of control over an entity), that entity is also considered to be a designated person.
2.49The absence of such a rule, Allens stated, creates uncertainty and compliance challenges for Australian companies by making it difficult to know when sanctions flow from a listed individual through to their related entities. In practice, Allens added, this means that many Australian companies may conclude that they are unable to enter transactions when their international counterparts may reach the opposite conclusion when subject to similar sanctions listings.
2.50Allens listed several other inconsistencies between Australia and its global partners which would benefit from improved alignment to better serve the interests of Australian companies, including:
The application of import sanctions, where Australian sanctions laws have a broader application than those in place in the EU, US and UK;
the lack of a wind-down period, such as that in place in the US, which allows a 90-day wind-down period under some sanctions to allow companies to take necessary steps to wind down relevant transactions; and
the absence of a civil liberty mechanism, which in Australia prevents better differentiation for penalties in response to sanctions breaches which do not involve wilful violation of laws.
2.51These differences place Australian companies at a distinct disadvantage relative to their global counterparts, and are areas Allens suggested would benefit from better alignment with sanctions laws in like-minded countries.
Obstacles to sanctions alignment
2.52Allens discussed how differences in allies’ legislative frameworks can complicate alignment in practice. This is because differing frameworks may result in respective sanctions programs having substantially different applications and consequences. This, Allens submitted, suggests that better alignment of the legal frameworks is also required:
In our experience, this creates material difficulties for Australian companies, as well as Australian citizens employed for foreign entities, and can impact their ability to compete globally. As sanctions are most effective when they are consistently and widely adopted, we consider that Australia's sanctions law framework should be aligned – so far as is possible – with those the European Union, United Kingdom and particularly the United States (as the jurisdiction that most actively imposes sanctions and enforces sanctions laws).
2.53AFUO also touched on the legal loopholes which undermine the effectiveness of Australia’s sanctions against Russia, reporting how alarmed the Ukrainian diaspora in Australia was to learn that Australia’s trade with Russia, despite the sanctions imposed, amounted to approximately $984 million in 2022–23. This amount, AFUO submitted, is not far from the value of support provided by Australia to Ukraine since the invasion.
2.54Noting this, AFUO called on the Australian Government to ensure that all sanctions are as effective as possible as a matter of principle.
Committee view
2.55The committee notes that Australia has at times lagged many months behind its allies in imposing sanctions. This is concerning, particularly in circumstances where the same intelligence on individuals and entities is likely available to the US, UK and Australian governments. The reasons for this are not clear from evidence provided by government agencies.
2.56While the committee agrees that Australia should always make its own judgments about circumstances warranting the imposition of sanctions, a united front is paramount in situations where Australia’s foreign policy and concerns about human rights align with those of our allies. The committee is buoyed by the Australian Government’s decision to finally re-open the Australian embassy in Ukraine. While this decision should have been made in concert with allies over two years ago, it does indicate that the government has understood how harmful the delay and absence of Australia’s diplomatic presence in Ukraine have been. It is the committee’s hope that the Australian Government will similarly recognise the importance of timing its sanctions in concert with allies where our objectives and the intelligence available align, to maximise the effectiveness of sanctions and avoid further deepening the detrimental effect of delays.
2.57Furthermore, the committee considers it imperative that Australian businesses are provided with clear, timely information on steps they need to take to remain compliant with Australia’s sanctions regime.
2.58The committee recommends that, in circumstances where foreign policy objectives allow, the Australian Government, while continuing to make its own judgments concerning the imposition of sanctions, prioritise the alignment of sanctions with allies to maximise effectiveness and place greater emphasis on imposing such sanctions promptly.
2.59The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider establishing a mechanism for engagement with civil society on Australia’s sanctions regime.