Chapter 2Governance

2.1Evidence to the committee reflected a broad range of concerns about Australia’s energy governance arrangements and laws. This chapter discusses:

whether Australia’s energy market laws and regulations are fit for purpose, with consideration of amendments to rules and regulations, as well as state derogations;

the effectiveness and appropriateness of the three market bodies governance arrangements and functions: the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), the Australian Energy Regulator (AER), and the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC); and

the views expressed by inquiry participants in relation to the possibility of a review of Australia’s energy market governance arrangements and laws.

Energy market laws

2.2Inquiry participants discussed matters relating to Australia’s three key energy market laws – the National Electricity Law (NEL), National Gas Law (NGL), National Energy Retail Law (NERL) and associated regulations.

2.3This included concerns that the laws are outdated, as well as discussions concerning the high volume of amendments to the regulations and state derogations.[1] These matters are discussed in turn below.

Outdated and unfit for purpose

2.4Several inquiry participants noted that Australia’s energy market laws were initiated in the early 1990s and are consequently outdated.[2]

2.5Professor Penelope Crossley, Professor of Energy Law at the University of Sydney, told the committee of the change that the National Electricity Market (NEM) has seen in recent years:

Our energy regulatory framework was designed at a time when over 99 per cent of energy generated within the NEM came from fossil fuel generators, and we were seeking to introduce competition into the market through the promised privatisation and unbundling of the former state-owned energy corporations … In the last year, we have seen 38.4 per cent of all energy generated within the NEM as renewable generation.[3]

2.6The Grattan Institute similarly reflected that the laws governing Australia’s energy markets ‘reflect an era that has now passed’ as Australia’s ‘current supervisory framework over the electricity and gas systems was designed for the energy challenges of the 1990s, an era of micro-economic reform, privatisation, competition, and regulation of natural monopolies’.[4]

2.7It elaborated that at the inception of the NEM in 1998, energy markets were in a steady state and ‘the technology mix for electricity (coal, some gas, and a couple of large hydro facilities) was known with near-certainty’.[5] The Grattan Institute further observed that:

Gas and coal provided industrial heat, and gas provided home heating. Almost all cars ran on petrol or diesel. Demand growth was predictable and stable, and largely a function of GDP growth. Price reductions were gained through competitive tension and by operating existing assets more efficiently. Operational and investment risks didn’t vary much, and were well-understood.[6]

2.8Now, as the Grattan Institute explained, the physical energy system is changing ‘in ways that were not foreseen by the reformers of the 1990s’. It identified that ‘[t]echnology has changed, demand patterns are different, price signals come as much from outside the market as within it, and consumers are now active market participants’.[7]

2.9The Grattan Institute further observed that ‘the rise of wind and solar generation has challenged three assumptions that underpinned the original design of the NEM’. It outlined the consequent challenges for the NEM as follows:

Plan and build new transmission at a scale and pace not seen before.

Ensure that the market provides pricing or other financial signals for investment in dispatchable supply capacity to support a system largely built on weather-dependent wind and solar generation.

Effectively and efficiently integrate the energy resources (solar and batteries) that consumers are installing behind the meters.[8]

2.10This means, according to the Grattan Institute, that there is a need for transmission to be built at a greater pace and scale, for signals to be given for investment in dispatchable supply capacity in a market predominated by variable renewable energy (VRE), and for consumer energy resources (CER) to be efficiently integrated into this system.[9]

2.11The UNSW Collaboration on Energy and Environmental Markets similarly underlined two fundamental shifts specifically within the NEM: a greater desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated with electricity generation and a dramatic reduction in the last two decades of renewable energy costs.[10]

2.12The UNSW Collaboration on Energy and Environmental Markets raised that despite these ‘transformative’ shifts within the NEM, there has been ‘little change’ to the governance arrangements or institutional settings to ensure that the system is better equipped to respond to a ‘rapidly changing system’.[11]

High volume of amendments and derogations

2.13Some inquiry participants observed that the energy market is also characterised by a high volume of regulations.[12] For instance, Dr Ron Ben-David, an associate of the Monash Energy Institute and Monash Sustainable Development Institute, explained that the overarching legislation empowers the market bodies (AEMO, AER, and AEMC) to create rules and regulations ‘to enliven the national energy objectives’.[13] Dr Ben-David noted that these instruments are more flexible than the overarching legislation which ‘require complex parliamentary agreements to amend’.[14]

2.14However, Dr Ben-David considered that this flexibility has resulted in a ‘stream of never-ending amendments’ due to the market bodies making changes to reflect ‘contemporary regulator and industry priorities, as well as ongoing market developments’.[15]

2.15Australian Financial Markets Association similarly observed that the collective rules governing the energy market have substantially grown over the past decade and that the rules ‘currently come to just under 3000 pages with the NER coming to over 1900 pages’.[16] Australian Financial Markets Australia concluded that the growth of the rules has resulted in ‘substantial duplication’ and ‘unnecessary bulk and complexity’.[17]

2.16In addition to a high volume of regulation, Professor Crossley also observed that states ‘are increasingly choosing to derogate, or diverge, from these cooperative legislative schemes to better suit their specific circumstances, policy objectives and local conditions’.[18]

2.17Mr Tony Wood, Energy and Climate Change Program Director at the Grattan Institute, told the committee that derogations are a major challenge:

One of the challenges we have right now is that the systems are awash with derogations from the rules, and that’s not a great place to be. We’re getting inconsistent policies, and industry just hates it at the moment.[19]

2.18Professor Crossley drew the committee’s attention to research published by the AEMC in 2023, which noted that there have been over ‘400 derogations identified to the suite of regulations that make up the National Energy Retail Law, the National Energy Retail Rules, the National Electricity Rules and the National Gas Rules’.[20]

2.19Professor Crossley also observed that ‘over one 12 day period earlier in the year, 4 separate versions of the NER applied, with one version (212) only in force for 3 days’. Professor Crossley concluded that the ‘frequency of piecemeal changes’ coupled with the ‘hundreds of State and Territory derogations’ amplifies the ‘problems associated with the complex regulatory and institutional arrangement’.[21]

Governance of Australia’s energy market bodies

2.20As discussed in Chapter 1, the Australian Energy Market Agreement (AEMA) is an intergovernmental agreement between the Commonwealth, states and territories that provides for the three national energy market institutions under the umbrella of the Energy and Climate Change Ministerial Council (ECMC).[23]

2.21The Australian Energy Council noted that the AEMA was last amended in December 2013. It explained that under the AEMA, the market bodies’ governance roles were intentionally separated along the following lines:

AEMC – responsible for market design and rule changes.

AER – responsible for economic regulation, market monitoring and compliance.

AEMO – responsible for market/system operation.[24]

2.22The Australian Energy Council further observed that this separation represented ‘best-practice governance, providing confidence for investors and consumers in the roles and responsibilities of each body’.[25]

2.23The institutional and governance structure of the energy market is illustrated in the figure below:

Source: Professor Penelope Crossley, Submission 58, p. 2.

2.24The UNSW Collaboration on Energy and Environmental Markets submitted that the current institutional arrangements were initially codified with the aim of improving and streamlining governance arrangements for the energy sector.[26]

2.25However, despite the intentions of the AEMA, some inquiry participants raised that the current governance arrangements of the market bodies require reform, and that the AEMA needs to be updated.[27]

2.26Renew Illawarra Network submitted that the established market bodies ‘theoretically have clear powers, functions and accountabilities that supposedly support the efficient operation of the market in the long term interests of consumers. In practice nothing could be further from the truth’.[28]

2.27Similarly, Senex Energy, a supplier of natural gas, submitted that there is a ‘proliferation of bodies with regulatory functions’ and that this is ‘increasing regulatory uncertainty, redundancy and imposing direct costs to business through duplicative reporting’. Senex Energy concluded, ‘uncertainty, confusion and other distractions amongst regulatory bodies (such as reporting) has been at the expense of implementation of important market design changes…’.[29]

2.28Professor Bruce Mountain submitted that in his view, ‘the main problem explaining much of the failure, is the centralisation of regulation and administration under a system that fails to hold regulators to account effectively’.[30] Professor Mountain further argued that the lack of accountability for market bodies is underpinned by their oversight by the ECMC. Professor Mountain stated:

…the ministerial council of nine jurisdictional government energy ministers chaired by the Commonwealth energy minister and supported by a committee of jurisdictional government officials with rotating leadership, has resulted in diffuse, opaque and consequently weak accountability of the AEMC, AER and AEMO. To be accountable to everyone is to be accountable to no-one. The consequence of this is a deeply entrenched culture of blame-shifting, risk aversion, empire-building and stifled innovation in the regulation and oversight of the electricity industry.[31]

2.29The Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) also noted that the framework of Australia’s energy governance, contained within the AEMA and associated laws, ‘were never conceived to keep pace with the largest industrial revolution in history – the transition to net zero’.[32]

2.30As such, ACOSS contended that it is therefore ‘unsurprising that the legacy energy frameworks that are currently relied on for delivering the [net zero] transition aren’t fit for that purpose’.[33]

2.31Professor Crossley also argued that the AEMA needed a ‘refresh’, noting that it has not been amended since 2013 and that it does not reflect Australia’s priorities or current arrangements,[34] which Mr Wood echoed by emphasising that the Grattan Institute recommends a review of the AEMA.[35]

2.32The several suggestions and critiques made by submitters regarding the ECMC, the Energy Advisory Panel (EAP), and the three market bodies are discussed in the following sections.

Energy and Climate Change Ministerial Council

2.33As discussed in Chapter 1, the ECMC has oversight of the AEMO, AER and AEMC.[36] Some inquiry participants discussed the role of the ECMC, as well as its accountability and transparency.[37]

Policy role

2.34Discussing the ECMC’s role, Mr Wood observed that in some cases, the federal, state and territory governments have abrogated some policy obligations and responsibilities to the market bodies. Mr Wood argued that when the market bodies consequently tried to develop policy, ‘the governments didn’t like that very much, so you end up with an unfortunate tension between these two’.[38]

2.35Mr Wood concluded that it is therefore appropriate for the ECMC to ‘take broader control of where policy should go, and then provide that clear policy direction’ to the market bodies to ‘ensure they get what they have asked for’.[39]

Transparency

2.36Professor Crossley told the committee that she believes there is a lack of transparency within the energy governance system, and highlighted specific points related to the operations of the ECMC.[40] Professor Crosley noted that:

…there is an absolute lack of transparency within our governance framework. We do not get forward agendas for the ECMC and we have no information on how my democratically elected representatives are representing in this space. This is a committee of cabinet. You do not know what topics are being discussed and you do not know what points my state representatives are making. There is no clarity on which jurisdictions are leading particular work programs under the ECMC.[41]

2.37In January 2020, the Council of Australian Governments Energy Council published a Strategic Energy Plan in response to a recommendation from the Independent Review into the Future Security of the National Electricity Market (Finkel review).[42] Nexa Advisory recommended that the ECMC publish a renewed Strategic Energy Plan, and that it should include:

…a mechanism which embeds national coordination and accountability for delivering the critical nation-building projects that underpin the success of the transition. This would provide a clear market signal that the policies included within AEMO’s Integrated System Plan will be delivered on time – including coal closure certainty - supporting investor confidence by strengthening the alignment between federal and state policies and this roadmap.[43]

Accountability

2.38The Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (the Department) said AEMO was accountable to ECMC as they report twice yearly against their priorities and undertook to provide those reports on notice to the committee. These reports appear to reflect the very limited accountability to which AEMO is held. These would not be acceptable in the private sector, particularly not in an ASX Listed environment, which the public sector should at least make effort to match. They are highly illustrative of the clear lack of accountability that exists in the energy system.

Energy Advisory Panel

2.39Evidence to the committee discussed the role of the EAP and the need for greater transparency from the EAP. These matters are considered below.

EAP role

2.40As discussed in Chapter 1, the EAP is a regular meeting of the three market bodies, as well as the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and senior official observers from jurisdictions, in which matters relating to key energy market issues are discussed.[44] As it is an advisory body, it has no governance function.

2.41Ms Clare Savage, both Chair of the EAP and Chair of the AER, told the committee that the EAP coordinates the market bodies’ advice to government under the National Energy Transformation Partnership regarding the security, reliability and affordability of Australia’s east coast energy system. Ms Savage emphasised that the advice EAP provides to the ECMC is confidential.[45]

2.42Ms Savage noted that the EAP is a non-statutory body that has no formal regulatory or policy decision-making powers, and that it is underpinned by a charter and operating principles, which provide the EAP’s three key roles:

…identifying, anticipating and providing advice on emerging and future energy market developments, focusing on providing early advice on policy and regulatory changes to sustain security, reliability and affordability through the energy transformation; providing a sounding-board for energy ministers on policy and regulatory reforms under consideration or development, including through the National Energy Transformation Partnership; and facilitating continued coordination, collaboration and information sharing between member agencies.[46]

EAP transparency

2.43Professor Crossley and Erne Energy both identified a need for greater transparency from the EAP. For instance, Erne Energy contended that the EAP ‘has no established governance or transparency’.[47]

2.44Professor Crossley also discussed that the EAP does not have a website and consequently called for more insight into its activities:

I would like to know what the AEP [sic] is doing. I would like to know about the senior officials on the various working groups. I'd like to know who they are. I would like to know who the lead jurisdiction is on each of those priorities under the National Energy Transformation Partnerships and their priorities nationally. Depending on who the lead jurisdiction is, could actually have quite a marked influence on the outcome of policy.[48]

2.45Professor Crossley remarked that increasing EAP transparency could be achieved by publishing information online:

I think they could probably just build a website. I would actually argue that, in this space, we don't need more legislation. They should just go and do it. It doesn't need to be legislated.[49]

2.46Ms Savage explained that the EAP does not publish its work due to its confidential nature, but considered that the publication of the EAP’s terms of reference and operating charter was a matter for government.[50]

Australian Energy Market Operator

2.47Several inquiry participants observed areas in which AEMO’s governance arrangements could be strengthened, including matters related to oversight, potential conflicts of interest and independence.[51] These are explored below.

Governance and transparency

2.48In its submission, AEMO explained that it is registered under the Corporations Act 2001 as a member-based not-for-profit company limited by guarantee.[52]

2.49Erne Energy critiqued these arrangements by observing that AEMO is ‘unusual as a power system operator in that it is unregulated in the NEM’ and contended that a company being not-for-profit ‘does not mean AEMO operates efficiently or in the best interests of its consumers, or its “shareholder”’.[53]

2.50Further, Mr Alexander Bainton, Senior Policy Analyst in the Energy Program at the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS), raised the difficulty of obtaining information about planning processes through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests due to AEMO being a corporation:

On the issue of finding out key discussions that drive the outcomes for the whole system and our planning processes for the next 30 years between, for instance, DCCEEW and AEMO, those have largely been limited because AEMO is essentially a corporation and so doesn't come under the Freedom of Information Act. AER and AEMC do, but, because AEMO is a corporation, even their interactions with AEMO—there's pretty limited visibility on that. There's some transparency around some parts of the AEMO model and the ISP planning process, but the lack of FOIs limits the transparency and limits the accountability.[54]

2.51Further, Professor Mountain told the committee that he does not believe that AEMO is transparent and accountable. He commented that AEMO has been ‘given an actionable ISP, which makes them accountable essentially to themselves’.[55] Professor Mountain further raised that:

The AER can dot the i's and cross the t's on what the transmission companies think will be the cost of the approved program, but AEMO have an absolute authority, and the rules have intended that. That's by explicit intention, which was not, I should stress, the recommendation of the Finkel review. That was not what Alan Finkel's review had said ought to happen. So the only effect of policy governance that one might have of AEMO is hoping that, through government's involvement on AEMO's board, it can have some sway. But the governance processes for there are highly imperfect. So a decision of substantial public policy content has no proper forum for policy accountability.[56]

2.52Professor Mountain also submitted that AEMO governance ‘has not kept up with the ever-greater responsibilities it now has’. Professor Mountain criticised that AEMO remains a private company limited by guarantee, despite ‘its now huge role in the development and implementation of policy’. He argued that AEMO’s governance processes are opaque ‘to the public and presumably also to AEMO’s members and possibly also even to much of its Board’.[57] Professor Mountain concluded that:

It seems to me that this arrangement results in an organisation that seems to be answerable to everyone and so answerable to no-one, and thus a law unto itself and to those of its Directors able to drive their agendas behind closed doors.[58]

Potential conflicts of interest

2.53Some inquiry participants observed that AEMO appears to have multiple roles that could cause potential conflicts of interest.[59] For instance, Mr Ted Woodley, former Managing Director of GasNet, PowerNet and EnergyAustralia, who participated in the inquiry in a private capacity, submitted that AEMO has become ‘an increasingly influential player in the Australian energy sector’ that has responsibility for electricity operations, electricity markets, electricity planning, transmission construction, contracting (via AEMO services), Regulatory Investment Test for Transmission (RIT-T) advice, gas operations, gas markets and gas forecasts.[60]

2.54Mr Woodley commented that he doubts ‘it was ever envisaged that AEMO would cover such a wide range of responsibilities…with many conflicts of interest’. He concluded that AEMO’s responsibilities have grown far beyond just ‘energy market operations’.[61]

2.55Erne Energy echoed similar concerns and contended that ‘AEMO is a deeply conflicted organisation’ that has ‘many conflicting roles, well outside the original intent at the establishment of the NEM’.[62]

2.56Nexa Advisory also submitted that AEMO is seen as a ‘highly conflicted monopoly entity, that strays considerably outside its core role of system operation and market operation, into policy and market design which are key AEMC functions policy and market design’.[63]

2.57The CIS specifically identified that in Victoria, AEMO performs the function of designated transmission planner in addition to its market operator functions. Further, CIS noted AEMO has taken on additional role by creating a for-profit company in Victoria, ‘Transmission Company Victoria’, to undertake early works for VNI West.[64]

2.58The CIS contended that these dual roles create a potential conflict of interest:

With AEMO being responsible for transmission planning in Victoria, as well as having a statutory function in approving the economic case for linked projects such as HumeLink, there is a clear incentive to reduce risk of the projects not proceeding for its subsidiary, which AEMO could do by manipulating the planning process.[65]

2.59CIS further submitted that ‘AEMO’s role as NSW Consumer Trustee also lacks transparency, putting consumers at risk’.[66]

2.60These concerns were echoed by Coalition for Conservation, which drew the committee’s attention to, in its view, AEMO’s lack of independence:

We draw attention to AEMO’s lack of independence in its multiple roles as the system operator, the system planner (including as the transmission planner), and as a proponent for transmission projects. We highlight the importance of AEMO not taking on the role of promoting specific technologies, or development approaches that favour specific technologies.[67]

2.61AEMO told the committee that it operates within National Electricity Rules (NER) when performing its dual planning functions and operational functions. Ms Merryn York, Executive General Manager of System Design at AEMO, explained that:

…In terms of the planning functions separate from the operational functions, we obviously have the scope of what it is that we plan for set out through the National Electricity Rules. We're really just meeting the obligations that we have in terms of the things that we need to—the way in which we need to perform our planning function as [set] out in the National Electricity Rules, in the same way that the operational dispatch and market operations are also set out in the National Electricity Rules. The rules really prescribe what it is that we're required to do.[68]

2.62In its submission, AEMO noted that it is envisaged that Transmission Company Victoria will be ‘ultimately transferred to a transmission network service provider to construct and operate the transmission line’.[69]

2.63However, Erne Energy contended that ‘any other functions that sit outside the remit of system and market operation, such as auctioneer for Capacity Incentive Scheme, Customer Trustee (NSW), Planner (Victoria), transmission developer (Victoria) should be overseen by a different entity to provide clear separation between commercial operations and NEM wide only functions’.[70]

Questions of independence

2.64In line with potential conflicts of interest concerns, some inquiry participants also questioned AEMO’s independence.[71] For example, the Coalition for Conservation contended that ‘AEMO’s multiple roles as operator, system planner and transmission proponent, together with its reporting line to government stakeholders risks compromising its independence’.[72]

2.65Adjunct Professor Stephen Wilson, Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Public Affairs, questioned AEMO’s independence from government when he told the committee:

I think there's a higher level question here…I think the question is whether AEMO is truly independent. Is its role independent of government or not? I had understood it was intended to be, but I think that is an open question now.[73]

2.66This was echoed by Dr Dylan McConnell, Senior Research Associate at the University of New South Wales, who noted that AEMO reflects government policy whilst also being regarded as an independent planner:

There is this issue of AEMO reflecting government policy and being held up as an independent source of advice, when in actual fact it may just be reflecting government decisions. That in itself is not necessarily a bad thing, except for this sort of accountability and transparency point where it's held up as an independent system planner when it is very much doing planning activities for different jurisdictions.[74]

2.67Submitters also raised questions on AEMO’s independence when discussing the ISP. These matters are addressed in Chapter 3 within the context of energy market planning processes.

Australian Energy Regulator

2.68Inquiry participants considered the following key themes in relation to AER’s governance arrangements:

AER’s separation from the ACCC;

AER’s monitoring of AEMO’s activities; and

The possibility of introducing AER independent performance assessments.

2.69Matters related to the HumeLink project rules and ISP consultation requirements are also discussed below.

Separation from Australian Competition and Consumer Competition

2.70As mentioned in Chapter 1, the AER is a combined entity with the ACCC for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013.[75]When considering the AER’s governance arrangements, Nexa Advisory submitted that the AER must have clear governance arrangements and regulatory structures that are robust, with a distinct role from the ACCC.[76]

2.71Similarly, Professor Crossley identified that the relationship between the AER and the ACCC ‘is often cited as a significant area of concern in relation to NEM governance’. She noted that in particular, the states and territories deem that transparency and accountability is ‘best served by the separation of the AER from the ACCC’.[77]

2.72As highlighted in Chapter 1, the AER is preparing for full legal separation from the ACCC in 2025, where the AER Board will be the accountable authority and the AER Chair will be the head of the agency.[78]

Monitoring of AEMO’s activities

2.73The Coalition for Conservation raised that the AER should be monitoring and regulating AEMO’s activities to ensure that it ‘does not deviate from its defined role as the independent Operator of the energy system’.[79]

2.74In its submission, the AER drew the committee’s attention to the specific compliance activities that it undertakes in relation to AEMO’s ISP. The AER is required to review the transparency of inputs and assumptions that AEMO determines when developing the ISP to ‘provide greater stakeholder confidence in the ISP’. The AEMO is also required to submit a compliance report outlining how it has complied with the guidelines in preparing the ISP.[80]

Independent review of performance

2.75Dr Gabrielle Kuiper raised accountability concerns about the AER by highlighting to the committee that the AER’s performance has never been independently assessed:

…this is an important point on governance, accountability and transparency—the AER's performance as an economic regulator has never been independently assessed. There was a National Audit Office report several years ago, but they did not look into issues like this.[81]

2.76Similarly, the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis believed that the Commonwealth should develop and apply a performance evaluation framework to the AER. Further, it recommended that the NEL revenue and pricing principles should be amended to set ‘clear and testable benchmarks for testing whether [the] AER is effective in constraining network monopoly pricing power’.[82]

HumeLink Project rules

ISP consultation requirements

2.77The CIS also claimed that the AER waived the AEMO’s obligation to consult on the Draft 2024 ISP.[91] However, the AER asserted that it does not ‘waive’ obligations under the National Energy Laws and that its focus is ‘to continue to perform our statutory role rigorously, and independently, with the long-term interest of consumer[s] in mind’.[92]

Australian Energy Market Commission

2.78Inquiry participants primarily discussed the AEMC’s rule-making powers when discussing governance arrangement concerns.[93] Professor Crossley explained that the AEMC’s rule-making powers are unique as they do not receive usual levels of parliamentary oversight:

…AEMC’s rulemaking power is that unlike other forms of delegated legislation, it is expressly enshrined in the National Electricity Law, the National Energy Retail Law, and the National Gas Law that these legislative instruments are not to be subject to any parliamentary oversight, or disallowance procedure. This was an intentional feature in the design of the rulemaking process.[94]

2.79Professor Crossley also outlined that the National Energy Rules and associated regulations are not subject to parliamentary disallowance, as it is not considered appropriate for the parliament of one jurisdiction to disallow an instrument that applies to all other jurisdictions.[95]

2.80In line with Professor Crossley’s evidence, the Australian Financial Markets Association identified that there is a valuable opportunity for Post Implementation Reviews (PIRs) across major policy changes within the NER. It commented that PIRs would ‘enhance the opportunity for Parliamentary scrutiny and oversight, as well as highlight any policy gaps that required attention’.[96]

2.81The Australian Financial Markets Association stated that PIRs would also enable governments, regulators and industry ‘to collaboratively assess and measure benefits delivered’.[97]

2.82The Australian Energy Council was similarly supportive of introducing PIRs and submitted that the AEMC should have a positive obligation to conduct PIRs on any major rule changes. The Australian Energy Council also deemed that the PIRs would benefit from an expectation that reforms sunset periodically, with the ability to extend rules and regulations where a PIR identifies net benefits.[98]

Reviewing the effectiveness of energy market body and laws

2.83Considering the shortcomings of the current energy market settings, submitters identified the need for a review of the energy market’s governance arrangements and laws.[99] Submitters discussed which entity should conduct the review and what the review should focus on.

Need for a review

2.84Ms Stephanie Bashir, Chief Executive Officer of Nexa Advisory told the committee that Australia needs a ‘strategic energy plan with bipartisan support’ and that the Federal Government must commission an independent review of:

… the boards of the AER, AEMC, AEMO and Energy Consumers Australia to ensure alignment with the strategy and clarity of roles and to ensure that they have the right mix of skills and knowledge and are appropriately independent. The federal government must also commission an independent review of the electricity networks.[100]

2.85Additionally, the Coalition for Conservation submitted that Australia’s energy market design and governance framework should be reviewed to ‘ensure a fair, reliable and sustainable energy supply into the future’. It argued that the current market design is ‘ineffective’ and that the ‘current planning framework is prone to biased and inadequate outcomes’.[101]

Potential review by the Productivity Commission

2.86Some submitters identified the Productivity Commission as an entity that could conduct this review. For example, the Justice and Equity Centre supported a ‘well scoped’ Productivity Commission review, that is ‘undertaken systematically, encompassing wide consultation and with a timeline adequate to wholistically consider the needs of the energy system in transition’.[102]

2.87The Justice and Equity Centre also submitted that the review should examine the energy laws and how to promote community and consumer interests:

The JEC supports a substantive PC [Productivity Commission] review which encompasses a review of the overarching framework of energy laws, to ensure they are fit for purpose and reflect our contemporary understanding of what is required to ensure decisions in energy promote the interests of all consumers and communities.[103]

2.88The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) highlighted its support for a Productivity Commission review but suggested that it should be a ‘first-principles review into the economic regulation of electricity networks, to ensure both that network costs are efficient’ and that the regulatory environment is suited to a high-distributed energy resources (DER) world.[104]

2.89The Superpower Institute similarly raised that it is of the view that the Productivity Commission is the appropriate institution to undertake a review of the National Energy Market, and the required arrangements to ‘ensure Australia’s future prosperity underpinned by the energy system’. It submitted that this review should be broad, cover ‘electricity networks, generation and wholesale markets and the retail market that end users engage with’.[105]

2.90Dr Dylan McConnell, Senior Research Associate at the University of New South Wales, discussed the possibility of the Productivity Commission conducting such a review. He considered that the Productivity Commission would ‘not be a bad choice’ but emphasised that the ‘main thing is that [the review] needs to be independent of the current market institutions – that’s the key.’[106]

Future Market Design of the National Electricity Market review

2.91The AEC noted that at the ECMC meeting on 1 March 2024, the federal, state and territory energy ministers agreed to take forward a review of the Future Market Design of the National Electricity Market.[107]

2.92On 26 November 2024, the government announced that an independent expert panel will review the National Electricity Market wholesale market settings. It stated that the purpose of the review is ‘to recommend wholesale market settings to promote investment in firmer, renewable generation and storage capacity in the NEM following the conclusion of Capacity Investment Scheme tenders in 2027’.[108]

2.93The Australian Financial Markets Association believed that the review ‘has the opportunity to consider and address the industry’s many challenges and present a clear direction of future policy and regulation’.[109]

Market power and competition

2.94The NEM ‘is intended to be a competitive and efficient market where energy consumers “should pay no more than necessary for energy to their homes and businesses”’. However, a ‘basic assumption of a competitive market is that there are enough sellers to prevent any single one from controlling prices or output, with ownership spread widely to avoid market power concentration’. The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), however, argued that ‘market concentration of the ownership and operation of generation capacity has been a characteristic across the NEM’.[110]

2.95The ACTU submitted that the ability for energy generators to exercise market control is ‘facilitated by the bidding and rebidding rules’ mandated by the NER. It explained:

The NER mandates that generators over 30 MW must sell all electricity through the NEM, with AEMO managing demand, forecasting supply, and scheduling generation every five minutes based on bids from generators, which can include up to ten price bands, while also setting maximum bid prices for their generation. The rules also allow the process of rebidding to address unexpected plant breakdowns, but this allows dominant generation companies to manipulate their initial generation capacity bids, exploiting insufficient competition to fill gaps at the time of dispatch.[111]

2.96The ACTU pointed to a lack of transparency in the work of the AEMC and AER in defining and overseeing the exercise of market power by generators and retailers. As a result, ‘uncompetitive behaviour’ is resulting in high electricity prices for consumers.[112] The ACTU also noted the recommendations of the Inquiry into Price Gouging and Unfair Pricing Practices chaired by Professor Allan Fels AO which tabled its final report in February 2024, including:

An independent expert should review the wholesale market’s design and operation, considering refinements or a shift to a ‘capacity market,’ while monitoring electricity generation concentration, competition impacts, and addressing recent price shocks and evidence of price gouging.

ASIC should receive a Ministerial Direction to investigate the energy derivatives market to prevent participants from misusing their position to gain unfair advantages or influence energy prices.

Network prices should continue to be subject to close regulatory scrutiny with the long-term interests of consumers put first.

There should be a regulatory review of the high degree of price discrimination in the retail electricity and gas markets.

Governments and regulators should continue to introduce initiatives to improve retail outcomes brought about by current market imperfection.[113]

2.97The Grattan Institute also noted the difficulties associated with the monopoly exerted by Transmission Network Service Providers (TNSPs). Mr Wood, Grattan Institute, told the committee market forces through increased competition should be implemented. Mr Wood stated:

I think the role of the government in having a planning body—as it does in most infrastructure—is absolutely appropriate, but making sure that, where possible, you introduce real commercial tension into this is the right way to go.[114]

2.98Mr Wood further commented:

The history of investment in these regulated businesses is that there is a fundamental role for planning in the first place, because infrastructure being built just all over the place is not what anyone is suggesting. So there is a role for government to say, 'Well, this is broadly what we need to achieve,' and then you use some form of bidding process to provide the competitive tension to ensure that you get the lowest cost. There are some good examples, I think, in what's been done most recently in New South Wales, where we're seeing the use of competitive bidding looking as though it's helping to reduce costs below what they might otherwise have been. So that's one way to do this.

2.99Nexa Advisory also submitted that the interaction between distribution network service providers (DNSPs) and retailer tariffs is a ‘critical contention within pricing’. It suggested that:

…there is an opportunity to explore governance arrangements, roles and responsibilities of these parties, as well as new entrants such as resource aggregators and other service providers. There is also a clear need for representation of the innovative, disruptive business models – and investor perspectives – within decision-making of all market bodies. This would help any ‘incumbency bias’ towards existing processes’.[115]

Ring-fencing

2.100Ring-fencing refers to the separation of the regulated and competitive business activities of an electricity service provider. The purpose of this mechanism is to prevent regulated businesses from:

favouring their own competitive activities to the disadvantage of other competitors operating in the market; and

using revenue earned from regulated services to cross-subsidise their contestable services.[116]

2.101Nexa Advisory highlighted gaps in regulatory monitoring of competition in the wholesale and retail markets. It stated that

Under existing regulatory monitoring, the ACCC plays an informal role in assessing the competitiveness across the wholesale and retail markets, and the AER oversees network, retail and wholesale market performance as part of its performance reporting function.

Despite these regulatory monitoring efforts, there is a notable gap around the role of distribution network service providers (DNSPs). While there is a focus on wholesale and retail market competitiveness, the governance arrangements and specific roles and responsibilities of DNSPs is not adequately considered in the context of the CER and innovation currently underway.[117]

2.102Nexa Advisory concluded:

This is exemplified by the recent AER’s recent ring-fencing class waiver for Community batteries, which though limited in application, set a precedent which could undermine the intention of ring-fencing to protect competitive market dynamics and consumer outcomes for regulated network monopoly businesses.[118]

2.103Erne Energy also submitted that ‘the weakening of ringfencing through the application of class waivers is detrimental to consumers while benefiting the NSPs’.[119]

2.104The committee also heard criticism of AER’s ring-fencing framework and the impact it is having on competition and subsequent electricity prices for consumers. For example, the Electrical Trades Union of Australia (ETU) submitted that cross-subsidisation and vertical integration can drive down operational costs for taxpayer funded network service providers and reduce costs for consumers. It stated ‘the inability to cross-subsidise means that network costs are incurred which, within a pre-set determination, must be passed on to consumers in the form of network charges’.[120]

2.105The ETU also alleged that ring-fencing ‘drives several wasteful operational inefficiencies for workers on power networks’ with multiple service providers being required to complete work for customers. It stated, ‘not only is this inconvenient and unproductive for customers and workers alike, but it adds an additional and wholly unnecessary layer of costs to maintenance and repair programs’.[121]

Incumbency

2.106The committee received evidence in relation to a perceived ‘incumbency bias’ that ‘favours the status quo, inhibiting innovation, investment and new models’.[122] For example, Nexa Advisory pointed to the Finkel Review,[123] which noted that submitters ‘complained of the ‘incumbency bias’ in favour of the status quo on the part of energy market bodies to the detriment of consumers and new market participants’. Similarly, Erne Energy submitted that:

The federal government and state governments in the National Electricity Market (NEM) need to recognise that the market bodies, the market operator, market participants (retailers and gentailers) and electricity network service providers (NSPs, both distribution and transmission) are very comfortable with the governance regime that has been in place since the start of the NEM.[124]

2.107Erne Energy told the committee that these incumbent entities are ‘in direct competition with Australians who are generating their own electricity through their rooftop solar [photovoltaic] PV’. As such:

Nearly every rule change proposal in the last 5 years has been an attempt by the incumbents to reign in the advance of rooftop solar, typically by treating these small generators just as the large-scale generators are treated (apart from the anomalous charging of rooftop solar PV to export to the distribution network, while large-scale generators do not pay to use the transmission network to export electricity).[125]

2.108It noted that ‘incumbents dominate’ both rule change proposals and consultation processes.[126] Erne Energy stated that ‘the bulk of submissions to rule changes are from market participants’ and that:

Governments need to recognise that incumbents, including the market bodies and the market operator (AEMO) are in the battle for their (status quo) lives and as a result they should not be shaping the future of the energy market and its governance.[127]

2.109Erne Energy noted that through its engagement in industry technical working groups it has observed that:

…many of the “innovation” projects funded and rule change proposals have been to support outcomes that have already been decided by the industry, the market bodies and the market operator behind closed doors, with consultation processes tacked on afterwards. This is particularly true of the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) Distributed Energy Integration Program (DEIP), where key initiatives include export tariffs for rooftop solar PV, flexible exports and now flexible load. While consumers are represented through Energy Consumers Australia (ECA), they are the only consumer voice at the table and too often the “incumbent” voice dominates saying “this has to happen”.[128]

2.110Nexa Advisory similarly observed that the interests of consumers are not being prioritised due to incumbency bias. It submitted:

Despite ‘long term interests of consumer outcomes’ being a critical objective within the existing electricity rules and policy framework, and consumer preferences being the focus of current rule change processes, this segment is becoming increasingly marginalised in the decision-making process…This is exacerbated by an incumbency bias that prevents this segment being adequately included in decision-making.[129]

2.111Erne Energy was also critical of a lack of constraints on AEMO, and the impact this is having on consumers. It submitted:

The argument that at a time of transition AEMO should not be “constrained” in the areas in which it operates is leading to growing costs, no need to minimise those costs and a drive to centralise power system operation (as an “integrated system operator”) when it is not physically or technically possible for a transmission system operator to manage operations from top to consumer living room on the sub-second (frequency) timescales needed to keep the system reliable. Other transmission system operators are dealing with the energy transition and are still required to meet economic efficiency regulations.[130]

2.112Erne Energy concluded:

AEMO costs are rising, and all of the fees AEMO charges participants will be passed on to consumers of electricity. While much attention has been paid to other contributors to the cost-of-living crisis, AEMO is the one entity in the energy industry that is not required to show any constraint on costs, while using the funding provided by consumers to cross-subsidise commercial activities.

If there is to be no reform of the governance of AEMO, which would be a missed opportunity, a revised statement of role is urgently needed, which should be published as soon as possible.[131]

2.113Submitters also pointed to the interests of incumbents stifling innovation in regulation. For example, Erne Energy stated ‘innovation and adoption of international approaches to system management, both by AEMO and the NSPs, has been poor and slow, and not helped by the AER failing to support innovation (for which it has no framework)’. It submitted that ‘too often “power system security” is the reason given to drive changes to the rules and frameworks and the winners are always the incumbents at the cost of consumers (e.g. power of choice, emergency backstops)’.[132] Similarly, Nexa Advisory submitted:

…the current regulatory framework often favours incumbents, limiting the evolution and competitiveness of new entrants and the development of consumer-centric technology solutions. There is a critical need to reassess the roles of traditional and innovative players in the energy retail and distribution network landscape.[133]

2.114The committee notes the work carried out by the AEMC in 2022 on ‘Transmission Planning and Investment – Contestability’ and encourages the implementation of the paper’s finding to incorporate a healthy competitive tendering process to manage incumbency bias seen in the system.

Footnotes

[1]See, for example, Australian Energy Council, Submission 2, pp. 1–2; Renew Illawarra Network, Submission 5, p. 3; Nexa Advisory, Submission 26, p. 5; Energy and Water Ombudsman Victoria, Submission 35, [p. 4]; ACOSS, Submission 52, Attachment 1, p. 16; Professor Penelope Crossley, Submission 58, p. 6, 14 and 15; Dr Ron Ben-David, Submission 64, p. 9.

[2]See, for example, Renew Illawarra Network, Submission 5, p. 3; Institute of Public Affairs, Submission 44, p. 1; ACOSS, Submission 52, Attachment 1, p. 16; Professor Penelope Crossley, Submission 58, p.14.

[3]Professor Penelope Crossley, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 22.

[4]Grattan Institute, Submission 48, p. 8.

[5]Grattan Institute, Submission 48, p. 8.

[6]Grattan Institute, Submission 48, p. 8.

[7]Grattan Institute, Submission 48, p. 8.

[8]Grattan Institute, Submission 48, p. 10.

[9]Grattan Institute, Submission 48, p. 10.

[10]UNSW Collaboration on Energy and Environmental Markets, Submission 80, p. 3.

[11]UNSW Collaboration on Energy and Environmental Markets, Submission 80, p. 3.

[12]See, for example, Professor Bruce Mountain, Submission 8, p. 4; Professor Penelope Crossley, Submission 58, pp. 5–6; Dr Ron Ben-David, Submission 64, p. 9; Australian Financial Markets, Submission 66, [p. 4].

[13]Dr Ron Ben-David, Submission 64, p. 9.

[14]Dr Ron Ben-David, Submission 64, p. 9.

[15]Dr Ron Ben-David, Submission 64, p. 9.

[16]Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission 66, [p. 4].

[17]Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission 66, [p. 4].

[18]Professor Penelope Crossley, Submission 58, p. 15.

[19]Mr Tony Wood, Program Director, Energy and Climate Change, Grattan Institute, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 20.

[20]Professor Penelope Crossley, Submission 58, p. 15.

[21]Professor Penelope Crossley, Submission 58, p. 6.

[22]Note, for discussions of demand side participation and economic curtailment, see: ACOSS, Submission 52, Attachment 1, p. 10; Ms Marilyne Crestias, Head of Policy and Advocacy, Clean Energy Investor Group, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 68; Mr Daniel Westerman, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), Committee Hansard, 23 October 2024, p. 20; Ms Anna Collyer, Chair, Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), Committee Hansard, 23 October 2024, pp. 56–57.

[23]DCCEEW, Submission 12, p. 2.

[24]Australian Energy Council, Submission 2, [pp. 1–2].

[25]Australian Energy Council, Submission 2, [p. 1].

[26]UNSW Collaboration on Energy and Environmental Markets, Submission 80, p. 2.

[27]See, for example, Clean Energy Investor Group, Submission 17, p. 3; ACOSS, Submission 52, p. 1; Erne Energy, Submission 32, [p. 2]; HumeLink Alliance Incorporated, Submission 53, p. 34.

[28]Renew Illawarra Network, Submission 5, p. 3.

[29]Senex Energy, Submission 34, p. 1.

[30]Professor Bruce Mountain, Submission 8, p. 5.

[31]Professor Bruce Mountain, Submission 8, p. 5. Citation omitted.

[32]ACOSS, Submission 52, Attachment 1, p. 16.

[33]ACOSS, Submission 52, Attachment 1, p. 16.

[34]Professor Penelope Crossley, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 27.

[35]Mr Tony Wood, Program Director, Energy and Climate Change, Grattan Institute, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 20.

[36]Professor Penelope Crossley, Submission 58, p. 3.

[37]See, for example, Professor Bruce Mountain, Submission 8, p. 5; Professor Penelope Crossley, Submission 58, pp. 3–4; Mr Tony Wood, Program Director, Energy and Climate Change, Grattan Institute, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 12.

[38]Mr Tony Wood, Program Director, Energy and Climate Change, Grattan Institute, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 12.

[39]Mr Tony Wood, Program Director, Energy and Climate Change, Grattan Institute, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 12.

[40]Professor Penelope Crossley, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 23.

[41]Professor Penelope Crossley, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 23.

[42]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW), Strategic Energy Plan, 20 January 2020, www.energy.gov.au/energy-and-climate-change-ministerial-council/energy-ministers-consultations/strategic-energy-plan (accessed 11 December 2024).

[43]Nexa Advisory, Submission 26, p. 6.

[44]AEMC, Submission 16, [p. 3].

[45]Ms Clare Savage, Chair, Australian Energy Regulator (AER), Committee Hansard, 5 December 2024, p. 2.

[46]Ms Clare Savage, Chair, Australian Energy Regulator, Committee Hansard, 5 December 2024, p. 2.

[47]Erne Energy, Submission 32, [p. 7].

[48]Professor Penelope Crossley, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 28.

[49]Professor Penelope Crossley, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 28.

[50]Ms Clare Savage, Chair, AER, Committee Hansard, 5 December 2024, pp. 6–7.

[51]See, for example, Centre for Independent Studies, Submission 3, Supplementary Submission 2, pp. 32–33; Mr Ted Woodley, Submission 6, p. 5; Professor Bruce Mountain, Submission 8, p. 6; Coalition for Conservation, Submission 25, p. 1; Nexa Advisory, Submission 26, p. 6; Erne Energy, Submission 32, [p. 4]; Energy Grid Alliance, Submission 54, [p. 2]; Mr Hadyn Carmichael, Submission 67, p. 6.

[52]AEMO, Submission 14, p. 2.

[53]Erne Energy, Submission 32, [p. 4].

[54]Mr Alexander Bainton, Senior Policy Analyst, Energy Program, Centre for Independent Studies, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 40.

[55]Professor Bruce Mountain, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 4.

[56]Professor Bruce Mountain, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 4.

[57]Professor Bruce Mountain, Submission 8, p. 26.

[58]Professor Bruce Mountain, Submission 8, p. 26.

[59]See, for example, Centre for Independent Studies, Submission 3, Supplementary Submission 2, pp. 32–33; Nexa Advisory, Submission 26, p. 6. References omitted; Erne Energy, Submission 32, [p. 4].

[60]Mr Ted Woodley, Submission 6, p. 5.

[61]Mr Ted Woodley, Submission 6, p. 5.

[62]Erne Energy, Submission 32, [p. 4].

[63]Nexa Advisory, Submission 26, p. 6. References omitted.

[64]Centre for Independent Studies, Submission 3, Supplementary Submission 2, p. 32.

[65]Centre for Independent Studies, Submission 3, Supplementary Submission 2, p. 32.

[66]Centre for Independent Studies, Submission 3, Supplementary Submission 2, p. 2.

[67]Coalition for Conservation, Submission 25, p. 1.

[68]Ms Merryn York, Executive General Manager, System Design, AEMO, Committee Hansard, 23 October 2024, p. 23.

[69]AEMO, Submission 14, p. 4.

[70]Erne Energy, Submission 32, [p. 5].

[71]See, for example, Adjunct Professor Stephen Wilson, Visiting Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs, Committee Hansard, 29 October 2024, p. 21; Mr Ted Woodley, Submission 6, pp. 5–6; Coalition for Conservation, Submission 25, p. 1; UNSW Collaboration on Energy and Environmental Markets, Submission 80, p. 6.

[72]Coalition for Conservation, Submission 25, p. 1.

[73]Adjunct Professor Stephen Wilson, Visiting Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs, Committee Hansard, 29 October 2024, p. 21.

[74]Dr Dylan McConnell, Senior Research Associate, University of New South Wales, Committee Hansard, 29 October 2024, p. 10.

[75]AER, Submission 15, p. 2.

[76]Nexa Advisory, Submission 26, p. 6.

[77]Professor Penelope Crossley, Submission 58, p. 8.

[78]AER, Submission 15, p. 2.

[79]Coalition for Conservation, Submission 25, p. 2.

[80]Australian Energy Regulator, Submission 15, p. 14.

[81]Dr Gabrielle Kuiper, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 51.

[82]Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), Submission 20, p. 6.

[83]Transgrid, What we do, www.transgrid.com.au/about-us/what-we-do/,(accessed 6 December 2024).

[84]Transgrid, HumeLink – Transgrid, www.transgrid.com.au/projects-innovation/humelink, (accessed 6 December 2024).

[85]AER, Submission 15, p. 7.

[86]AER, Transgrid HumeLink contingent project stage 2, 2 August 2024, www.aer.gov.au/industry/networks/contingent-projects/transgrid-humelink-contingent-project-stage-2, (accessed 9 December 2024).

[87]Centre for Independent Studies, Submission 3, Supplementary Submission 1, p. 8.

[88]Centre for Independent Studies, Submission 3, Supplementary Submission 1, p. 8.

[89]AER, right of reply to adverse comments, Submission 3, Supplementary Submission 1, [p. 1].

[90]AER, right of reply to adverse comments, Submission 3, Supplementary Submission 1, [p. 1].

[91]Centre for Independent Studies, Submission 3, Supplementary Submission 1, p. 10.

[92]AER, right of reply to adverse comments, Submission 3, Supplementary Submission 1, [p. 2].

[93]See, for example, Australian Energy Council, Submission 2, [p. 3]; Professor Penelope Crossley, Submission 58, p. 6. Citation omitted; Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission 66, [p. 4].

[94]Professor Penelope Crossley, Submission 58, p. 6. Citation omitted.

[95]Professor Penelope Crossley, Submission 58, p. 6. Citation omitted.

[96]Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission 66, [p. 4].

[97]Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission 66, [p. 3].

[98]Australian Energy Council, Submission 2, [p. 3].

[99]See, for example, Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, Submission 20, p. 7; Coalition for Conservation, Submission 25, p. 1; Nexa Advisory, Submission 26, p. 2; Energy and Water Ombudsman Victoria, Submission 35, p. 4.

[100]Ms Stephanie Bashir, Chief Executive Officer, Nexa Advisory, Committee Hansard, 30 October 2024, p. 8.

[101]Coalition for Conservation, Submission 25, p. 1.

[102]Justice and Equity Centre, Submission 28, p. 3.

[103]Justice and Equity Centre, Submission 28, p. 6.

[104]Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, Submission 20, p. 7.

[105]The Superpower Institute, Submission 24, pp. 4–5.

[106]Dr Dylan McConnell, Senior Research Associate, University of New South Wales, Committee Hansard, 29 October 2024, p. 3.

[107]Australian Energy Council, Submission 2, p. 2.

[108]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, National Electricity Market wholesale market settings review, 26 November 2024, www.dcceew.gov.au/energy/markets/nem-wms-review (accessed 4 December 2024).

[109]Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission 66, [p. 4].

[110]Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), Submission 51, p. 5.

[111]ACTU, Submission 51, p. 5.

[112]ACTU, Submission 51, p. 5.

[113]ACTU, Submission 51, p. 7. See also, Inquiry into Price Gouging and Unfair Pricing Practices, February 2024, InquiryIntoPriceGouging_Report_web9-1.pdf, (accessed 11 December 2024).

[114]Mr Tony Wood, Program Director, Grattan Institute, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2024, p. 13.

[115]Nexa Advisory, Submission 26, p. 13.

[116]Australian Energy Regulator, Ring-fencing | Australian Energy Regulator (AER) (accessed 11December 2024). See also, Electrical Trades Union of Australia, Submission 4, p. 4.

[117]Nexa Advisory, Submission 26, pp. 12–13.

[118]Nexa Advisory, Submission 26, pp. 12–13.

[119]Erne Energy, Submission 32, p. 2.

[120]Electrical Trades Union of Australia, Submission 4, p. 4.

[121]Electrical Trades Union of Australia, Submission 4, p. 4.

[122]Nexa Advisory, Submission 26, p. 8.

[123]Nexa Advisory, Submission 26, p. 8. See also, Independent Review into the Future Security of the National Electricity Market, p. 179, Independent Review into the Future Security of the National Electricity Market - Blueprint for the Future, (accessed 12 December 2024).

[124]Erne Energy, Submission 32, p. 1.

[125]Erne Energy, Submission 32, p. 1.

[126]Erne Energy, Submission 32, p. 1.

[127]Erne Energy, Submission 32, p. 7.

[128]Erne Energy, Submission 32, p. 2.

[129]Nexa Advisory, Submission 26, pp. 4–5.

[130]Erne Energy, Submission 32, p. 5.

[131]Erne Energy, Submission 32, p. 5.

[132]Erne Energy, Submission 32, p. 2.

[133]Nexa Advisory, Submission 26, p. 12.