3. Benefits of nuclear powered submarines

Overall benefits

3.1Submarines have long been a critical part of Australia’s defence strategy.[1] The Royal Australian Navy currently possesses six diesel electric Collins class submarines which came into service in the 1990s and were initially meant to be coming to the end of their useful lives in the 2020s. However, a transition program is currently in place to extend their use until the submarines acquired under the AUKUS program are in operation.[2]

3.2The Committee heard from the Australian Submarine Agency (ASA) that ‘Australia is facing the most complex and challenging strategic circumstances in our region since the Second World War’, circumstances which led the Australian Government to commit to acquiring nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines to refresh its fleet.[3]

3.3Nuclear-powered submarines have a number of benefits over conventionally powered submarines, including being faster and more manoeuvrable.[4] One of the biggest benefits of nuclear power is that the submarines do not have to surface to recharge on fuel, as is the case for the Collins class, greatly extending their range capabilities.[5] Instead, the range of nuclear-powered submarines is only restricted by the need to restock provisions for the crew. Nuclear-powered submarines also offer superior amenities for crew members, which further increases the time a vessel can stay submerged.[6]

3.4As explained by Commodore Michael Jacobson from the Department of Defence at a public hearing for the inquiry:

‘As far to the utility of a nuclear-powered submarine, it's a combination of stealth, range, endurance and its ability to operate undetected. It can choose where it operates and when in a way that a conventional, or diesel powered, submarine can't. That nuclear-powered submarine will be able to maintain our requirements into the future, where the relative capability of our current diesel submarines will start to wane into the decades to come.’[7]

3.5The Committee did receive conflicting evidence on the stealth of a nuclear-powered submarine versus a conventionally powered one. The Australia Institute stated that ‘conventionally powered submarines can be significantly quieter than their nuclear-powered counterparts’,[8] however acknowledged that a nuclear-powered submarine whose location was compromised would be able to get away easier.[9] In contrast, the ASA maintains that nuclear-powered submarines are stealthier than their conventional counterparts.[10]

AUKUS partner’s experience

3.6Although nuclear-powered submarines are an established technology in several other countries,[11] it is acknowledged that the Australian Navy will require the assistance of its AUKUS partners to learn how to operate and maintain them. This is due to the state of nuclear science not being as developed here in Australia as it is in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (US).[12]

3.7While Australia does have some nuclear industry,[13] the extra challenges presented by designing and building nuclear-powered submarines will require an advanced level of expertise and experience not currently available in Australia.[14]

3.8Mr Robin Gehling, Australian Division Secretary of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects explained:

‘It's been 30 years since the Collins class was built, and, of course, nuclear-propelled submarines are another step further advanced than the conventional Collins class. The skills gap needs to be addressed right through the project.’[15]

3.9It is for this reason that the cooperation of the US and UK in training Australian personnel is instrumental to Australia gaining sovereign nuclear-powered submarine capacity. This is being achieved by Australian personnel traveling overseas to train in the US and UK, as well as the facilitation of US and UK submarines traveling to Australia for training opportunities.

3.10The Committee heard evidence of the following training cooperation between the AUKUS members:

• US laws have been changed to enable Australians to work in US shipyards and for maintenance to be done on US submarines in Australia;[16]
• 40 people from ASC Pty Ltd. are working in the Pearl Harbour Naval Shipyard;[17]
• Preparations are underway for US Virginia class and UK Astute class submarines to be docked at HMAS Stirling from 2027;[18]
• 260 Australians have received ‘nuclear-specific training and familiarisation briefings’;[19]
• 60 Royal Australian Navy personnel are currently training in the US, with a further 100 starting in 2025;[20]
• Six officers have finished their training and are working on Virginia class submarines;[21]
• More Australian sailors who have finished their studies are expected to join US submarine crews by the end of 2024;[22]
• In the UK, three Royal Australian Navy officers have finished a UK nuclear reactor course and are now working on UK Astute class submarines, with more officers expected to begin that training later in 2024;[23]
• The UK's Royal Navy work with the ASA by delivering naval nuclear propulsion training for more than 250 Australian personnel;[24]
• Australians are embedded in program-delivery teams in the UK Ministry of Defence.[25]
  11. These initiatives further the Agreement’s intention to ‘support Australia’s development of the infrastructure, technical capabilities, industry, and human capital necessary to produce, maintain, operate, and steward a sovereign fleet of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines’.[26]

Conventionally armed

3.12Several witnesses presented evidence to the Committee with concerns that the radioactive material contained in submarine reactor units could be weaponised, due to the belief that it would be ‘weapons grade’ uranium.[27]

3.13The Agreement articulates that the submarines acquired by Australia will be conventionally armed,[28] and that Australia is not seeking nuclear weapons:

The Agreement obligates Australia to only use nuclear material transferred under the Agreement for naval nuclear propulsion, to not enrich or reprocess any nuclear material received.[29]

3.14Furthermore, the nuclear reactors located within the submarines will be powered by a different type of nuclear technology than that required to create nuclear weapons.[30]

3.15Dr Craig Everton from the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office explained that ‘weapons grade’ uranium does not have an internationally standard definition and is not a term used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who instead use the terms ‘low-enriched’ and ‘high-enriched’. As explained by Dr Everton:

The IAEA…categorised nuclear material into source material and special fissionable material and then subcategorises that between less than 20 per cent, which is low-enriched, and more than 20 per cent, which is high-enriched.[31]

3.16While the uranium used in the submarine reactors will be high-enriched, it will not be in a form that could be used to create weapons. To do so would require further chemical processing in facilities that Australia ‘doesn’t have and will not seek out’, according to the ASA.[32]

3.17The Agreement also includes the following specifications prohibiting the use of information, material or equipment provided under the Agreement from being used in pursuit of nuclear weapons:

Information, Material, and Equipment communicated, exchanged, or transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall not be used for any nuclear explosive device, or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device.[33]

Information (including information incorporated in a production or utilization facility or important component part thereof) that is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of heavy water shall not be communicated or exchanged pursuant to this Agreement.[34][35]

Committee comment

3.18The Committee was interested to hear of the distinct advantages of the nuclear-powered submarines in contrast to the existing Collins class vessels.

3.19While acknowledging public concern that the material used to power the submarine reactors will highly enriched, the Committee was pleased to hear that it will not be in a form that could be used to create weapons.

The Committee recommends that the Government and the Australian Submarine Agency expand and enhance community education activities to inform the general population on how AUKUS is in the national interest, including the distinct advantages of nuclear-powered submarines.

Footnotes

[1]The Australia Institute, Submission 230, Attachment 1, p. 14.

[2]Ms Alexandra Kelton, Head of Policy, Strategy and Engagement Division, Australian Submarine Agency (ASA), Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p. 9.

[3]Ms Alexandra Kelton, Head of Policy, Strategy and Engagement Division, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p.6.

[4]National Interest Analysis [2024] ATNIA 14 with attachment on consultation, Agreement among the Government of Australia, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion [2024] ATNIF 20 (NIA), para 5; Ms Alexandra Kelton, Head of Policy, Strategy and Engagement Division, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p.6; Commodore Michael Jacobson, Director General, Submarines, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p. 12.

[5]Mr Robin Gehling, Secretary, Australian Division, The Royal Institution of Naval Architects (RINA), Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p. 1.

[6]Mr Robin Gehling, Secretary, Australian Division, RINA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p.2.

[7]Commodore Michael Jacobson, Director General, Submarines, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p. 12.

[8]The Australia Institute, Submission 230, Attachment 2, p. 19.

[9]The Australia Institute, Submission 230, Attachment 1, p. 17.

[10]Ms Alexandra Kelton, Head of Policy, Strategy and Engagement Division, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p.5.

[11]Dr John Harries, Secretary, Australian Nuclear Association (ANA), Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 October 2024, p.1.

[12]Answers to questions on notice provided by the ASA at a public hearing in Canberra, 24 October 2024, p. 1.

[13]Dr John Harries, Secretary, ANA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 October 2024, p.2.

[14]Dr John Harries, Secretary, ANA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 October 2024, p.2; Mr Robin Gehling, Secretary, Australian Division, RINA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p. 2.

[15]Mr Robin Gehling, Secretary, Australian Division, RINA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p. 1.

[16]Ms Alexandra Kelton, Head of Policy, Strategy and Engagement Division, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p.11.

[17]Ms Alexandra Kelton, Head of Policy, Strategy and Engagement Division, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p.13.

[18]Ms Alexandra Kelton, Head of Policy, Strategy and Engagement Division, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p.11.

[19]Ms Alexandra Kelton, Head of Policy, Strategy and Engagement Division, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p.6.

[20]Ms Alexandra Kelton, Head of Policy, Strategy and Engagement Division, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, pages12-13.

[21]Ms Alexandra Kelton, Head of Policy, Strategy and Engagement Division, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p.12.

[22]Ms Alexandra Kelton, Head of Policy, Strategy and Engagement Division, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, pages12-13.

[23]Ms Alexandra Kelton, Head of Policy, Strategy and Engagement Division, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p.13.

[24]Ms Alexandra Kelton, Head of Policy, Strategy and Engagement Division, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p.13.

[25]Ms Alexandra Kelton, Head of Policy, Strategy and Engagement Division, ASA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, p.13.

[26]Agreement among the Government of Australia, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion, p. 2.

[27]Mr David Sweeney, Nuclear Policy Analyst, Australian Conservation Foundation, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16October 2024, p. 19; Friends of the Earth Adelaide, Submission 5, p. 3; Caring for South Australia, Submission 159, p. 3.

[28]Agreement among the Government of Australia, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion, Article IV (A).

[29]NIA, para 27.

[30]Dr John Harries, Secretary, ANA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 October 2024, p.3.

[31]Dr Craig Everton, Assistant Secretary, Non-Proliferation, Technology and Partnerships, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24October 2024, p. 7.

[32]Ms Sophia Blix, Acting Head, Stewardship and Security Division, Australian Submarine Agency, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 24 October 2024, pages 7-8.

[33]Agreement among the Government of Australia, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion, Article VI (C).

[34]Heavy water is used in nuclear reactors.

[35]Agreement among the Government of Australia, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion, Article VI (F).