- Nuclear-Powered Submarine Partnership and Collaboration Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- The Nuclear-Powered Submarine Partnership and Collaboration Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was referred to the Committee on 29 July 2025.
- The Committee received thirteen submissions and two supplementary submissions and held a public hearing in Canberra on 2 October 2025. A list of submissions can be found in Appendix A and the details of the hearing and witnesses can be found in Appendix B. The transcript of evidence from the public hearing can be accessed through the Committee’s website.
Overview and background
2.3On 15 September 2021, Australia, the UK, and the US announced a new security partnership called AUKUS, with its first initiative focused on helping Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines for its navy. This plan, known as the Optimal Pathway, was formally outlined by AUKUS leaders on 14 March 2023.On 5 August 2024, the three countries signed the Agreement among the Government of Australia, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion [2025] ATS 5 (ANNPA), which allows them to share nuclear propulsion information and transfer nuclear materials and equipment to Australia.On 26 September 2024, Australia and the UK began negotiating a new agreement to carry out their parts of the Optimal Pathway, including building a new class of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). At the public hearing, the Australian Submarine Agency (ASA) explained that the Optimal Pathway was the result of an extensive 18-month consultation between Australia, the UK, and the US. Through this process, it was agreed that Australia would build its nuclear-powered submarine capability via a staged approach beginning with rotational visits from UK and US submarines, followed by the acquisition of three Virginia-class submarines, and culminating in the joint development of the SSNs, to be built by Australia and the UK.
2.4The purpose of the enabling Agreement, the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Partnership and Collaboration Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, is to create a legal framework for Australia and the UK to work together on all aspects of the SSN-AUKUS submarines from design and construction to operation and disposal. The Agreement will also support UK submarine visits and rotations in Australia.
2.5Submarines play a key role in Australia’s defence strategy, and nuclear-powered submarines offer better stealth, speed, endurance, and survivability than traditional diesel fuelled models, helping protect Australia’s interests and maintain regional stability. In addition, the Agreement will also help Australia build its own submarine capability by the early 2040s, grow its industrial capacity, and strengthen its presence in the Indo-Pacific region.
Justification
2.6The proposed Agreement will enable Australia to successfully carry out the Optimal Pathway and to build the necessary workforce, infrastructure, and systems to support a sovereign SSN capability. It strengthens Australia’s long-standing defence partnership with the UK by establishing legally-binding commitments to jointly develop a new class of submarines, SSN-AUKUS, which will be based on the UK’s next-generation design and incorporating technology from all three AUKUS partners. The Agreement also reinforces Australia’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, aligning with international non-proliferation obligations, including under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [1973] ATS 3, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty [1986] ATS 32 and safeguards Agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At the public hearing, officials clarified how this bilateral treaty will interact with the broader AUKUS framework, particularly ANNPA, which enables the transfer of nuclear materials and technology from the US and the UK to Australia:
The reason that the ANNPA was a legal requirement both for the US and the UK was that… this is an enabling treaty that allows a nuclear-weapons state to transfer nuclear material, equipment and information to a non-nuclear-weapons state. The US is required, under its Atomic Energy Act, to have a treaty in order to transfer that type of material and equipment to another state, and the UK is also obliged, under the mutual defence agreement that it has with the US, to also have a treaty to enable it to do so. However, it is just an enabling treaty. It doesn't require the transfers to happen under that treaty. That's where the Geelong treaty [Nuclear-Powered Submarine Partnership and Collaboration Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland] comes in. This is a bilateral treaty that does oblige the parties to transfer material, equipment and information that's reasonably required for the build of the SSN-AUKUS. There are a number of ways that the two treaties interact. Once there is a transfer of nuclear equipment or material, all of the conditions and requirements applicable to that under the ANNPA also apply to the transfer of that material and equipment.
Obligations
Scope
2.7The Agreement allows Australia and the UK to work together on their nuclear-powered submarine programs under AUKUS, including the support of UK submarine visits and a rotational UK presence in Australia (Article II). It outlines areas of cooperation and sets up governance and program management frameworks to ensure effective implementation (Article III and Article VII). Under the Agreement both countries must share necessary information with each other and relevant third parties, under agreed conditions, while protecting classified material according to existing laws and agreements like the ANNPA (Article XIII and Article XVI.A). Australia and the UK are also required to transfer equipment, materials, and services needed for the program, and coordinate how and when these transfers happen (Article XIV.A and Article XIV.B).
2.8The submarines will follow a common design, collaboratively developed by all three countries, and incorporating technologies from each nation (Article IX.A and Article IX.B). The UK shall lead the development and approval of the common design (Article IX.C). The Agreement also requires Australia to enable UK submarine visits to Australian ports, a rotational presence at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia (Articles X.A-B), and to support personnel exchanges between the two countries and with relevant third parties (Article XI.A).
2.9All activities must comply with international nuclear non-proliferation rules, ensure that any expenditure under the Agreement is consistent with these rules and that Australian personnel do not assist in the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices (Article V, Article XIX.E and Article XI.B). Additionally, the management, storage, operation, use, transportation and disposal of any nuclear materials or equipment must be handled safely and securely, in line with domestic and international obligations (Article VI.A).
Intellectual property
2.10The Agreement requires both Australia and the UK to allow licensing of government-owned intellectual property (IP) related to any information, equipment, materials, or services shared under the Agreement (Article XVIII.B). This includes enabling third parties to grant such licences, under terms agreed between the two countries. They may also set up arrangements to manage, protect, or divide IP rights that arise from activities under the Agreement (Article XVIII.F).
Costs
2.11The Agreement states that if one country incurs costs on behalf of the other or both, those costs must be mutually determined in a proportionate, justifiable, fair, and mutually transparent manner (Article XIX.A). If the Agreement is terminated, cost recovery will be pursued on the same basis (Article XXIII.G). If no specific arrangement has been made regarding a cost, each country will cover its own costs (Article XIX.D). Readily identifiable UK and Australian value added taxes, excise and customs duties, similar charges and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, will not be imposed on activities under the Agreement (Article XXI.A). If such charges are imposed, the Parties will administer them in the manner most favourable to the implementation of the Agreement and they will be borne by the Party that administers them (Article XXI.B).
Claims and liability
2.12The Agreement does not manage liability related to nuclear risks, which are governed under the ANNPA (Article XX.A). It states that when one government transfers equipment, materials, or services to another, the receiving country gives up any claims for liability (Article XX.B.). To minimise additional risk or liability, the Agreement requires the Parties to set up arrangements that include mutual protections and risk-sharing measures for these transfers (Article XX.D). Additionally, the Parties are required to indemnify the other regarding any shared information under the Agreement (Article XX.E).
Disputes
2.13In the event that Australia and the UK have any differences or disputes about how the Agreement is implemented or interpreted, they must resolve them through mutual consultation, without outside dispute settlement mechanisms (Article XXIII.E).
Consultation
2.14The Australian Submarine Agency consulted a wide range of Commonwealth departments. No issues were raised. The departments are listed below;
- Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
- Treasury
- Department of Defence
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- Department of Finance
- Attorney-General’s Department
- Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
- Nuclear Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency
- Australian Border Force.
- State and Territory Governments were also consulted through an interjurisdictional working group and a standing agenda item on international treaties, and to date, no further information or comments have been requested.
- Public, industry, and non-governmental groups were not consulted, as the Agreement deals with national security and operational matters.
Implementation
2.17Australia will implement the Agreement through the Australian Submarine Agency, working closely with several Government departments including Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Finance, Treasury, Home Affairs, and the Attorney-General’s Department. The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office will oversee nuclear-related obligations.
2.18To meet therequirements of the Agreement, Australia will need to amend the Customs Tariff Act 1995, to include a duty-free concession for UK-procured goods used in Agreement-related activities, similar to provisions for the Joint Strike Fighter program.Australia will also need to issue a determination under the Taxation Administration Act 1953 – specifically, the Minister for Defence must issue a determination to allow tax refunds to the UK for activities under the Agreement, detailing who receives refunds, for what goods and services, and how payments will be made.
2.19Implementation may also require using powers under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013. To that effect, the National Interest Analysis (NIA) states that the Submarine Agency will work with the Department of Finance to address indemnity and other provisions, though these do not need to be in place before the Agreement starts.
Termination
2.20The Agreement will stay in effect until 31 December 2075, matching the expiry date of the ANNPA. Either country can end the Agreement by consulting with the other and by giving at least one year’s written notice. If one country decides to terminate the Agreement, both sides must work together to manage the consequences in a fair, reasonable, and transparent way. Ending or letting the Agreement expire will not affect existing responsibilities related to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear stewardship, export controls, security of information, responsibility for use, intellectual property rights, arrangements related to costs, liability, and dispute resolution.
Costs
2.21Any costs that may arise in connection with this Agreement will be negotiated in mutually determined arrangements between Australia and the UK on a proportionate, justifiable, fair, and mutually transparent basis.
Future treaty action
2.22The Agreement may be amended as agreed in writing by the Parties. Any amendment is subject to Australia’s usual domestic treaty making process.
Ratification status
2.23The Agreement was presented to the UK Parliament in September 2025.
Issues
Submarine delivery
2.24The Agreement supports the UK to deliver its first SSN-AUKUS submarine by the late 2030s, with Australia receiving its first domestically built SSN-AUKUS submarine by the early 2040s. Over the course of the inquiry, the Committee considered evidence about the types of submarine being delivered under the Agreement and the timeframe for their delivery, including concerns regarding potential delays.
2.25The Committee examined the delivery plan for Australia’s proposed nuclear-powered submarine fleet under the AUKUS agreement. The current pathway involves acquiring two second-hand Virginia-class and one new-build Virginia submarine from the US, followed by the joint development of the five SSN-AUKUS submarines with the UK, which the Agreement addresses. At the public hearing, Rear Admiral Briggs expressed concerns about Australia’s nuclear submarine fleet consisting of three design variations:
…we would have three Virginias, but they would not be the same. The second-hand ones will come with 15 years of life left in the reactor. The new one will come with 33 years… So there are two different versions of Virginia and then five of SSN-AUKUS, when it finally arrives. … That is an impossible equation for a navy as small as Australia's—trying to operate two different versions of the Virginia and a completely different design from the Brits. There are different standards and different schedules.
2.26The Committee received evidence questioning the strategic necessity of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines of this type. Dr Green from Friends of the Earth Australia and Dr Beavis from the Medical Association for Prevention of War Australia, suggested that other types of submarines would be more cost-effective, better suited to Australia’s defence and surveillance needs, and easier to operate:
…since the diesel-electric submarines are vastly cheaper and you could get far more of them for considerably less funding… if the primary purpose was defence and surveillance, we would be going down that path, which is diesel-electric submarines for coastal surveillance, whereas the AUKUS program seems to be about fighting alongside the US in a war…
If [the Government] wants to have nuclear propulsion subs, it should be looking at the low-enriched uranium versions that both China and the French use… we would be better off with submarines that are better suited for defence, rather than long-range attack vehicles. These are very big, complicated objects, and both the US and the UK are having significant problems with operational availability… about one third of the [US] fleet are out of action at any one time because of maintenance issues… there’s no point having a Ferrari if you can’t get it out of the garage.
Concerns were also raised about the long lead times for submarine delivery and the risk of obsolescence due to emerging technologies. Dr Beavis warned that ‘oceans are most likely to become transparent by the 2050s,’ citing advances in smart sea mines, unmanned underwater vehicles, and underwater sensors that could compromise submarine stealth. In contrast, Rear Admiral Briggs acknowledged the technological risks but maintained that manned submarines would continue to play a role, stating that they would “complement” unmanned systems rather than be replaced by them:
…predictions that the oceans will be transparent by 2070 or something have been a bit ambitious….manned submarines will still be around for a long time. They will be using unmanned underwater drones and above-water drones to extend their reach and provide information for them. They will complement each other. They do not replace each other.
2.27When asked to respond to the concern that the model of submarine being delivered may quickly become obsolete, Government officials argued that nuclear-powered submarines will remain a strategic priority for many nations:
In terms of technological advances and development, which is one of the reasons that people sometimes put forward that claim, I think it's important to remember that technology advances not only in detection but also in counter detection and stealth. We see many countries investing significantly in nuclear powered submarine capabilities given assessments about their superior qualities and their superior advantages, and all of those countries have long-term programs similar to the duration of this program. So I think the collective assessment is that they will continue to be an important and potent capability for defence forces around the world.
2.28To clarify how the submarine model was selected, Government officials outlined the extensive consultation process that informed the final decision. They explained that following the AUKUS announcement in September 2021, an 18-month trilateral review was undertaken to evaluate various options. This process culminated in the March 2023 announcement of the ‘optimal pathway’. At the public hearing the Committee heard:
After AUKUS was announced in September 2021 there was an 18-month consultation period between the three countries that ultimately landed with an announcement in March 2023 with the optimal pathway. Over that 18-month period a range of options were investigated and explored. It was agreed after that intense body of work between the three nations that the optimal way for Australia to achieve a nuclear powered submarine capability in the timeframes required and to uplift the trilateral industrial base and ultimately ensure a greater deterrent was through the optimal pathway that was landed. That sees the US and the UK increasing visits to Australia from 2023 and then from 2027, seeing the rotational presence of US and UK submarines through the initiative called Submarine Rotational Force—West, and then Australia acquiring from the US three Virginia class submarines and then us working on the SSN AUKUS submarine, a trilateral collaboration building off the US design, and Australia and the UK would both build that submarine. That intense body of work for 18 months landed on that as the best option after exploring a range of different avenues.
Workforce and industry readiness and development
2.29The Committee heard concerns about Australia’s workforce and industry readiness to support the SSN-AUKUS program of work. Nuclear-powered submarines require significantly more personnel and specialised roles than the Collins class of submarines Australia currently operates, with one submitter suggesting the workforce needs to operate and maintain submarines may need to double in size from what is currently available. The Committee heard that Australia must rapidly build sovereign expertise across nuclear stewardship, engineering, platform integration, sustainment, and supply chain management:
The workforce challenge is acute... Without strong and swift action, we risk serious delays, capability gaps and the very real prospect of repeating the challenges faced by the United States Navy on the readiness of its SSNs.
2.30The Committee heard that a visa exchange program, particularly one that streamlines workforce mobility from partner countries such as the UK, could help address workforce capacity challenges. It was suggested that such a program be considered for inclusion in the Agreement. The Committee also heard evidence calling for stronger local build mandates and minimum workforce participation requirements to be included in the Agreement. This would ensure Australian industry is not sidelined in favour of overseas priorities.
2.31The Government advised that the AUKUS program is expected to create approximately 20,000 jobs over the next 30 years, spanning defence, public service, industry, and advanced trades. Australia is committed to developing a workforce with the skills and capacity to deliver the program and strengthen domestic industry. The Committee heard:
…on the industry side, ASC currently has about 170 workers in Pearl Harbour learning from and training with the US so they can bring those skills back to Australia and perform work on the submarines. From a Navy perspective, Navy has about 170 personnel as well in the US training pipeline learning those skills, again so they can bring them back to Australia. There is lots of movement of individuals between the three countries, with a focus on building Australia's sovereign capacity to operate and sustain the nuclear-powered submarines.
Stewardship of nuclear material
Pollution
2.32Several entities provided evidence to the Committee expressing concerns about the nuclear aspects of the Agreement. Drawing on a commissioned report analysing the UK’s experience operating nuclear submarines, Friends of the Earth Australia highlighted potential environmental risks associated with their use. In particular, they raised concerns about radiological pollution, noting that even submarines designed with ‘lifetime reactors’, intended to operate without repair or replacement for the vessel’s lifespan, have nonetheless required maintenance, which poses risks:
Once you open up a PWR [Pressurised Water Reactor], you've got to deal with quite a lot of radioactivity. In particular, there are three or four nuclides which are a major issue for the environment… you can't avoid having discharges to the atmosphere and discharges to water—sometimes purposeful, but very often as a result of accidents in the handling and management of the process.
Because we now know that marine radioactivity can transfer from the sea to the land in detectable quantities, people have now begun to realise that we are getting marine radioactivity into the terrestrial coastal zone... I think the nearest that it has technically been proved is that you can find the stuff 10 miles inland in pasture grass and agricultural produce, which people are then going to be consuming, so that's a major concern.
2.33Submitters identified that the management of nuclear waste is also an issue. In the UK, where nuclear submarines have been operational since the 1960s, waste management continues to be problematic, as the Committee heard at the hearing:
…what do you do with reactors and their used fuel when the boat has exceeded its lifetime and has been laid up and you've got to decommission it? This is a major problem because then you have your radioactive fuel, being uranium based fuel. As a result of burning the stuff, you've got plutonium and americium and these radionuclides, which are alpha emitters which can have a half-life of hundreds of thousands of years.
All of this costs an enormous amount of money because you've got to be watching the stuff...We have not managed to do any of this in the UK, despite having many decades of nuclear submarines. Our reactors are still either stored in the boats, which are now rotting afloat, at a place called Sellafield, above ground…So the waste problem is a live issue in the UK. It's ongoing, it's getting worse and so far I've seen no sign from the Australian government's nuclear program, or AUKUS program, that they've really begun any form of work on that.
2.34At the public hearing, Government officials reassured the Committee that environmental monitoring programs which ‘build on existing transparency and safety measures and leverage our partners' experience,’ are in place. The Agency also noted that Australia has sufficient time to develop an appropriate strategy for managing nuclear waste, given that:
A facility for high levels of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel will not be required until the 2050s, when Australia's first nuclear powered submarine is expected to be decommissioned. Determining those suitable locations and methods for safe and secure disposal will take time and will require community consultation, including with First Nations people. There will be detailed consideration of technical requirements. That work is underway.
2.35Further reassurance was provided that there are clauses in the Agreement that state ‘Australia will not receive spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste from the United Kingdom—nor the US’.
Non-proliferation and safeguards concerns
2.36In their submissions to the Committee, the Australian Conservation Foundation and the Medical Association for Prevention of War (MAPW) in Australia, raised concerns about nuclear proliferation and the use of weapons-grade uranium:
My understanding is that the material is about 93 per cent enriched. The actual composition of the fuel is regarded as one of the jewels in the crown of the US submarine capacity, and so it's highly secret. However, my understanding is that 93 per cent enriched uranium is weapons grade… I understand that once these submarines are decommissioned, the waste is still weapons grade and will still need high level security even as waste.
2.37Dr Beavis, from MAPW, further outlined the potential risks that nuclear-submarine use raises with regards to entangling Australia in international conflicts:
…this is a precedent where a non-nuclear-weapon state is acquiring nuclear-weapons-grade material. There are other countries, such as South Korea, Japan, Pakistan and Iran, who have looked at the precedent that Australia is setting and said, 'Yes, we may wish to acquire highly enriched uranium for a submarine program.' Now, it doesn't really matter what safeguards Australia undertakes. This material will be on a stealth platform that can disappear for about six months at a time. So to say that it can be properly safeguarded is fine on paper but, practically, these are stealth vehicles that can disappear for six months at a time. I'm not saying Australia is going to get nuclear weapons out of these submarines, but I'm saying it's a very bad precedent in terms of non-proliferation.
2.38Dr Beavis also raised concerns that the Agreement ‘runs counter to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty’, which Australia has long advocated for.
2.39Government officials responded by emphasising Australia’s commitment to international safeguards. Dr Everton, from the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade said:
…we're applying and regulating international standards of safeguards and security, and those international standards set the threshold at 20 per cent and then set the guidelines, arrangements, requirements in a conservative way to meet every enrichment level from 20 per cent upwards… the IAEA will be verifying and ensuring that we abide by our commitments. My office has the responsibility of upholding Australia's international non-proliferation commitments and doing that through robust regulation. Part of that will be IAEA activities in Australia, headquarters analysis. They will design and set those in a way that not just protects the information but also ensures that the risks are mitigated for whatever the enrichment level would be.
Committee comment
2.40The Committee acknowledges the strategic importance of this Agreement, welcoming its role in formalising the elements of Australia’s bilateral relationship with the UK that fall under the AUKUS program. The Agreement builds upon and complements Australia’s existing defence treaties with the UK, further strengthening this longstanding strategic partnership.
2.41Given the complexity of the proposed submarine delivery schedule, which includes multiple variants of Virginia-class submarines and a new SSN-AUKUS design, The Committee encourages continued scrutiny of delivery timelines and capability planning to ensure Australia’s strategic needs are met.
2.42The Committee proposes that the government consider work pathways to facilitate the transfer of skills to the Australian workforce, including inbound and outbound movement between AUKUS partners.
2.43Acknowledging community concerns regarding radiological pollution, nuclear waste management, and non-proliferation, the Committee welcomes the Australian Submarine Agency’s commitment to social licensing. Continued public engagement is encouraged, including the management of disinformation and provision of accessible online resources. It is noted that Australia will not receive high-level radioactive waste from the UK or the USA, and that planning for domestic waste management is underway.
2.44Recognising the importance of upholding Australia’s international non-proliferation obligations, the Committee welcomes the Government’s commitment to robust safeguards and oversight, including verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
2.45The Committee supports the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Partnership and Collaboration Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and recommends that binding treaty action be taken.