Chapter 3News Media Bargaining Code
Overview
3.1There were mixed views on the success of the News Media Bargaining Code (Code), with multiple participants acknowledging the positive intent of the Code and the significant funding secured via commercial agreements with Google and Meta. However, the committee also heard its implementation had led to inconsistent outcomes, with the bulk of the funding going to legacy media outlets. According to some, this disparity has served to deepen existing competitive disadvantages for new or smaller publishers.
3.2Against a backdrop of potential market failure, Meta's decision not to renew deals under the Code was met with dismay by most participants, with a number predicting that the financial pressure in the news media sector would lead to further closures and job losses. For some, Meta's actions were seen as illustrative of its general disregard for Australia's laws and people.
3.3While multiple participants disputed the rationale put forward by Meta—that only a small percentage of people use its platforms to access news—some also acknowledged that for Meta, news is a highly substitutable product.
3.4For this reason, while there was overwhelming support for designation of Meta under the Code, there were also fears Meta would respond by removing news from its platforms in Australia, as it has done in Canada.
3.5In addition to the financial impact of a news ban on Australian publishers—particularly small or digital-only publishers—there were concerns that a ban would see factual reporting replaced by non-verified and/or entertainment-based content, which could make it easier for mis- and disinformation to circulate unchallenged.
3.6To this end, participants advocated for a broad-based approach to any potential government intervention, with a range of measures put forward to ensure the sustainability of the news media sector and to hold digital platforms to account.
3.7The remainder of this chapter focuses on Meta's decision not to renew deals under the Code, the rationale for government intervention in the news media sector, and discusses options put forward by inquiry participants to support public interest journalism in Australia—including in the event of a potential news ban on Meta platforms.
Meta's decision not to renew deals under the News Media Bargaining Code
Views on the operation of the Code
3.8As set out in Chapter 1, the Code governs commercial relationships between Australian news businesses and 'designated' digital platform service providers that benefit from a significant bargaining power imbalance. Introduced in March 2021 by the former Australian Government, the Code includes minimum standards, including standards relating to recognition of original news content.
3.9In addition to addressing the bargaining power imbalance between platforms and publishers, the intent of the Code is to promote the circulation of news—and particularly public interest journalism—throughout the community.
3.10According to Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts (DITRDCA), the incentives created by the designation mechanism (backed by mandatory negotiation and arbitration), have resulted in significant payments that support the sustainability of Australian journalism.
3.11This was reflected in evidence from various participants, including the Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA), which stated that the Code had brought 'a much-needed injection of funds' into the media sector, via 30agreements estimated to be worth over $200 million.
3.12According to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), its agreements with Meta and Google allowed it to 'significantly expand and strengthen its regional news services, including the employment of 60 additional journalists and establishing a presence in 10 new locations'. The positive impact on regional publishers was also noted by Mr Andrew Schreyer of Country Press Australia (CPA):
There is no doubt that there would be fewer regional and local papers in Australia without the code. There is no question about that. The revenue that's provided from the agreements to those under the agreements is absolutely vital. I'm not able to share the numbers, but I can say that it's significant enough that, if those payments weren't being made, the papers would not be around.
3.13However, views among most participants—including those who recognised the funding secured under the Code—were mixed. For example, Private Media suggested that the Code had made things worse in terms of media choice, trust and sustainability. Digital Publishers Alliance (DPA) described the Code's intention as 'noble' but its execution as 'flawed'. Independent Multicultural Media Australia (IMMA) called it 'a valiant first attempt' but 'flawed in the detail'.
3.14Similarly, Broadsheet Media called the Code 'an important piece of regulation' but also viewed it as 'deeply flawed' with 'significant unintended consequences that risk the long term health and diversity of the media'. Further, the Local & Independent News Association (LINA) called the Code an 'admirable attempt to force platforms to be responsible corporate citizens' but stated that it had 'not been the panacea … the government hoped it would be'.
3.15The primary criticism of the Code was its inconsistent outcomes—with legacy media outlets receiving the majority of funding—which fuelled concerns the Code had worsened competitive disadvantages in the sector. These disadvantages were seen to impact most on new and small publishers, as well as online-only and regional news providers. Man of Many explained:
… we highlighted several operational failures and competitive disadvantages imposed by the [Code]. The most significant issue is the inequitable distribution of funds. While larger legacy media companies have secured substantial financial agreements with digital platforms, independent publishers like Man of Many have been largely excluded from these deals despite being an ACMA-registered news business. … This failure is not due to a lack of effort or relevance but rather due to the systemic biases and barriers inherent in the current framework.
3.16The outsized impact on new and small publishers was recognised by a range of participants, with at least one calling for the revenue test under the Code to be halved from $150 000 to $75 000.
3.17The committee also heard concerns about a perceived lack of transparency around the agreements struck by platforms, as well as whether the funds received by media outlets have directly supported the production of journalistic content. The MEAA explained:
Yes, there has been money for media companies, but there has been little accountability and little transparency. We have no idea how much money has been directed to newsrooms rather than boardrooms. These deals were done corporation to corporation, with little regard for the people doing the work—that is, the journalists—or the public, who have a right to access ethical public interest journalism.
The rationale for Meta's decision
3.18According to Meta, it entered commercial deals with a number of Australian news publishers in order to support both Facebook Video and the Australian release of Facebook News in August 2021.
3.19At the same time, Meta also launched two funds to 'support innovation, public interest journalism and smaller publishers who would not be suitable for commercial agreements'. These were the:
three-year Newsroom Sustainability and Digital Transformation Fund (with Country Press Australia) to support regional news, which supported 106 regional mastheads in the first round, 137 mastheads in the second round and 137 newsrooms in the third round; and
the three-year Meta Australian News Fund (in partnership with the Walkley Foundation) to fund regional newsrooms, digital first publications and public interest journalism projects. This fund provided $15 million over three years and supported 150 projects in three tranches.
3.20However, in February 2024, Meta announced it would discontinue Facebook News in Australia, consistent with its discontinuation in the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. In line with this decision, Meta also announced it would not renew the commercial deals underpinning Facebook News in Australia once they expired.
3.21In explaining its decision to discontinue Facebook News, Meta argued that it was part of efforts to better align Meta's investments with the products most valued by its users. To this end, Meta pointed to a shift in consumer behaviour since 2021, with users engaging increasingly with non-news content:
As a general rule, most people do not come to our services for news and news is highly substitutable on our services – this means that when news is not on our services, people continue to engage with other content. However, even allowing for this, since 2021, people have engaged increasingly with more non-news content, specifically short form video.
3.22Indeed, Ms Mia Garlick of Meta told the committee that '[f]or the vast majority of people using Facebook, less than three per cent of their feed is news links'. Meta also cited declines in referral traffic to Australian news publishers from Facebook Feed—from 5.1 billion referrals in 2020 to more than 2.3 billion in 2023—as well as a drop of over 80 per cent in the number of daily active users of Facebook News in 2023.
3.23There was some discussion about the source of the three per cent figure. For example, both Mr Michael Miller of News Corp Australasia (News Corp) and Mr Anthony Kendall of Australian Community Media (ACM) suggested that the three per cent related to the proportion of users using the Facebook News tab.
3.24However, Meta told the committee that the percentage related to the Facebook feed—not the Facebook News tab—and had been consistent since 2018:
I'm really grateful for the opportunity to correct the record, because there was a lot of miscommunication about some of the statistics in previous pieces of testimony given to the committee. The three per cent number has been a consistent number dating back to 2018. Prior to 2018, I think the number was four per cent. In 2018, we made a change—to reduce the amount of public content on our services, which included news content—and then it dropped down to three per cent.
3.25Regardless of the source of the figure, there was a widespread view that Meta's claim was at best inaccurate, and at worst, disingenuous. For example, Mr Miller disputed the truthfulness of Meta's analysis and provided alternative figures:
When Meta and the other tech monopolies appear before you, they will tell you people don't use their platforms for news. That is absolutely not true. Meta says that news makes up less than three per cent of what people see on Facebook. That is also not true. Actually 48 per cent of Australians get their news using a Meta platform. In America, it is 31 per cent, and in Canada, before Meta blocked the news, it was 41 per cent.
3.26Similarly, Mr Mike Sneesby of Nine Entertainment told the committee that the consumption of its news content on social media had 'never been greater' and that Meta had been a significant beneficiary of this:
Nine's news and current affairs, sport, entertainment, publishing and radio businesses will account for close to 5 billion video views on Meta's platforms alone this financial year, with consumption of Nine's video content having increased at a compound annual rate of around 50 per cent since financial year 2022. The substantial majority of those video views that I'm talking about are on our news.
3.27Meta's claims were also challenged by the results of the University of Canberra's 2024 Digital News Report: Australia, which indicated that:
49 per cent of Australians use social media as a source of news;
25 per cent of Australians use social media as their main source of news;
60 per cent of Gen Z audiences rely on social media as their main source of news;
45 per cent of Australians use Meta platforms as a source of news; and
while Facebook for news is a declining trend in Australia, the combined use of Meta platforms for news has not declined.
3.28These figures were consistent with those of an Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) survey, which found that 20 per cent of Australian adults reported that social media as their main source of news. This varied by age, with social media being 'the main source of news for 46 per cent of those aged 18–24 years and 38 per cent for those aged 25–34 years, higher than any other source'.
3.29When questioned about the disparity between its figures and the Digital News Report: Australia findings, Meta suggested that there were 'challenges with that survey evidence':
… as I understand it, it's asking people based on their impression of what they recall has happened in the last week. Also, I think that the challenge is that it's not looking at the overall volume of what's happening on the platform.
3.30However, Ms Anna Draffin suggested that the discrepancies between Meta's figures and the University of Canberra survey data pointed to the need for greater independent interrogation and assessment of Meta's data.
3.31In addition, Mr Kendall stated that Meta's claim that people don't want to see news 'is difficult to prove when it is Meta that controls the algorithms that determine what its users see'.
3.32To this end, some participants suggested that Meta had deliberately de-prioritised news content ahead of its decisions to discontinue Facebook News and not renew deals under the Code. For example, Mr Kendall spoke about a dramatic decline in traffic over the last six months:
… our traffic has been falling dramatically over the last six months, as we believe they've tweaked the algorithm in the lead-up to them making a decision to pull so that they can say that this news was not being surfaced.
3.33SBS also noted the de-prioritisation of its news content, with the percentage of Facebook-driven views of its news videos nearly having between July 2023 and May 2024.
3.34While unable to establish a causal link, ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society (ADM+S) pointed to its research showing that engagement with news posts has trended downwards since 2022, which aligns with 'Meta's public statements that they are no longer interested in news content and have changed their algorithms accordingly'.
3.35This appeared to align with evidence provided by the ABC, which noted that 'Facebook and other platforms have been deprioritising content from news organisations to an increasing extent over the past year'. It continued:
Meta has made no secret of the fact that it has adjusted the algorithms for content recommendations on both Facebook and Instagram. In early 2024, Meta announced it had changed the Facebook algorithms to favour content that attracted user interactions, such as comments. At the same time, Instagram algorithms were changed to deprioritise content it identified as political or related to politics. Such measures have meant that, across the major platforms, aggregate Facebook traffic to news and media properties has declined by 48% … and lnstagram by 10%.
3.36While Meta disputed the charge that the intent of its algorithmic changes was to decrease the value of news on its platforms, it also stated that the changes represented 'a commercial decision to de-prioritise this content as a result of user feedback'.
3.37Separate to the issue of whether Meta had deprioritised news content, Private Media saw Meta's decision as evidence that the Code has failed 'because it assumes that there is a fair value exchange that Meta is just trying to avoid paying for'. It went on to explain:
This makes a degree of sense with Google, because their search engine genuinely does need news in order to properly operate – hence, they are renewing their deals. Meta doesn't need news, therefore they are not.
3.38The relative value of news to different platforms was also highlighted by ADM+S—which noted that Google and Open A.I. value news more highly than Meta—as an underlying issue with the Code:
The fact that digital platforms value news content differently points to fundamental problems associated with the Bargaining Code. The model wrongly presumes that certain digital platforms consistently need news content to provide a service, and subsequently establishes an artificial market for a public good. As we have seen with Meta's recent strategic shifts and the dynamic nature of the platform ecosystem more broadly, this state of affairs does not always hold.
3.39This also appeared to be reflected in evidence about the difference in approaches between Google and Meta, with some participants reflecting positively on their interactions and negotiations with Google.
3.40However, the MEAA contended that this ignored Meta's use of news content to train its AI:
If there's this theory that Meta does not find value in news and does not need to pay for it, this use of news content to train AI flies in the face of that a little bit, given how important and critical news has been shown to be for that process of training. The fact that that process, for the most part, is going without any compensation to those news providers and without the consent of news providers, or the journalists who wrote the content, is incredibly important. I just throw that in there as another way in which Meta is continuing to use news content and not being perhaps forthright about that.
The impact of Meta's decision
3.41There was widespread concern and disappointment about Meta's decision not to renew commercial deals entered into under the Code. For example, Free TV Australia (Free TV) pointed to the costs involved in producing high-quality news are argued that 'Meta's decision will have detrimental impact on employment and production'. This view was echoed by others, including Mr Kendall, who told the committee that Meta's decision would result in further closures and an increase in news deserts:
… ACM will be forced to make hard decisions on the future of many of our mastheads and the jobs they support. Make no mistake, Meta's decision will mean ACM and many other publishers will be forced to close titles. The decision will create more news deserts. Meta's decision will rob communities of independent, credible and trusted voices. But Meta does not care about any of this, it does not care about local communities, it does not care about democracy and it doesn't care about the safety and well-being of our children.
3.42The impact on regional areas was also highlighted by Mr Schreyer, who stated Meta's decision would lead to 'closures of mastheads in regional and rural Australia'. Likewise, the MEAA spoke of the concerns of its regional members who rely on Facebook to distribute content:
We know our members, particularly in the regions, are extremely concerned. They rely on people going to social media and clicking through, and that leads to subscriptions. If there's nobody doing that anymore then their jobs are definitely under threat.
3.43Further, the ABC expressed concern about the growth of news deserts and the sustainability of the regional positions it had created with the funding received from Meta:
The loss of this revenue from the Meta deal would create a financial challenge for the ABC that would need to be resolved on a whole–of–ABC basis. Every effort will be made to maintain the regional news positions it created. This position reflects the importance of regional news services, especially in response to the decline of commercial news outlets in regional areas. The problem of local 'news deserts' in Australia continues to grow, and the ABC will continue its efforts to address it.
3.44The NSW Service for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture and Trauma Survivors (STARTTS) also raised concerns about the impact of Meta's decision on people from refugee backgrounds, a majority of whom use social media as their 'main access point and conduit to news and information'.
3.45In addition to the financial impact, a range of participants felt that Meta's decision was indicative of its broader disregard for Australian law and the Australian people.
3.46For example, Mrs Mariam Veiszadeh of Media Diversity Australia argued that 'the financial implications of the fallout from the decision by Meta has meant that the issue of diversity, equity and inclusion, which is really broad, is taking a back seat'.
3.47Further, Mr Schreyer said that Meta's decision showed 'complete disdain for Australian media outlets, the News Media Bargaining Code and the Australian Government'. Broadsheet Media agreed:
Meta has made clear that they will not renew or make any new deals with publishers without being further compelled to. They are telling the government, the industry and the Australian public that it has no respect for our laws or our people.
3.48Mr Miller told the committee that Meta's decision reflected its modus operandi:
This parliament passed a law saying that they should pay for content. They're refusing to. They didn't even negotiate. … The parliament was united in passing that law, and they've walked away from that. They didn't even negotiate; they didn't even try. That is, in part, the way they behave. Mr Miller, 21 June, p15
3.49This point was underscored by IMMA, which described how digital platforms have been able to circumvent Australian law in the pursuit of commercial aims:
The digital giants have clearly commoditised and dominated the media landscape over the past 15 years. Protected by foreign laws they have circumvented the rules and laws that all publishers here in Australia must abide by.
This protection has allowed the tech giants to pursue their primary interest of competitive dominance against each other.
The rationale for government intervention in the news media sector
3.50According to Free TV, technological, social and economic changes have 'fundamentally disrupted' the 'business models that once supported the production of quality, public interest news and journalism'.
3.51Similar views were expressed by Mr William Hayward of Private Media, who highlighted the 'large structural changes' that were leading to significant redundancies across all major media companies—despite the $600 million injected into the sector under the Code. Structural challenges facing the sector were also noted by others, including Capital Brief, which observed that they were:
… well documented, and characterised by declining legacy revenue streams, falling audience across traditional media platforms, and the emergence of new channels for discovering and consuming content.
3.52For some participants, market failure was seen as a very real possibility, if not a current reality. For example, the PIJI contended that 'news market failure is becoming a more likely prospect across the country' and that the industry was 'showing early signs' of failure.
3.53Against this backdrop, multiple participants underscored the need for stronger government intervention to support public interest journalism—particularly given its function as a public good. For example, PIJI argued that government investment was warranted in the short term given the importance of news as a public good. Likewise, LINA suggested that:
Public interest journalism is well established as a public good and merits government support for the benefits it delivers to democracies on a macro and micro level. As such, financial support should be provided to newsrooms to offset the impact of Meta's step back from news ...
3.54The case for government intervention was also recognised by Mr Tony McDonald of the Department of the Treasury, who noted the 'incredibly important' part that journalism plays 'in the functioning of Australian society'.
3.55According to the University of Sydney's Department of Media and Communications (USYD MECO), key factors driving the need for government intervention in the platform-publisher relationship include:
Asymmetric interdependence – a large number of news publishers are dependent for content distribution on a far smaller number of digital platforms that do not have the same reliance upon news content;
Power of digital platforms – the impact of platforms' dominance of digital advertising on the viability of advertiser-financed news production, including public interest journalism;
Unequal bargaining power – publishers bear the cost of producing news content but a significant amount of the resulting revenue goes to the digital platforms;
Social licence to operate – the 'newness' of big tech business models often allows them to evade existing regulation, for example digital platforms have been able to argue that they are not media companies and so are not subject to traditional media regulation;
this means traditional media remain subject to positive obligations (such as content requirements or must carry rules), while at the same time losing revenue and market share to digital platforms; and
Social media as a source of news – social media remains an important source of news, despite claims by digital platforms.
Existing government support for the news media sector
3.56DITRDCA's submission outlined the range of measures currently in place to support the public interest news and journalism sector in Australia, including:
funding for the national broadcasters, including $6.0 billion for the ABC and $1.8 billion for SBS over five years from 2023–24;
$11 million in 2023–24 and $12 million in 2024–25 to enable the Australian Associated Press newswire service to continue servicing retail news outlets;
$20 million over three years from 2022–23 to improve resilience of ABC sites used for emergency radio broadcasting which are at high risk of service failure due to natural disasters;
$21.89 million per year (indexed) for the Community Broadcasting Program, to support a range of activities, including transmission and equipment costs and new content development;
$22.7 million over four years from 2023–24 for the Amplifying Australia's Voice in the Pacific program to provide partner Pacific broadcasters with access to a range of Australian television content;
$0.9 million in 2022–23 and $0.8 million in 2023–24 to PIJI, to support provision of its data activities relating to public interest news and journalism in Australia;
$1.5 million in 2022–23 and 2023–24 to LINA, to support capacity building for small, hyperlocal news businesses and to collect data on the state of local and hyperlocal news;
$5 million over two years from 2022–23 to the Journalist Fund, to support news businesses to hire new cadet journalists to produce locally relevant core news content in regional areas;
$15 million in 2022–23 to the Regional and Local Newspaper Publishers Program, to assist print news publishers to absorb newsprint price increases by providing financial assistance including for printing costs, assets and equipment directly related to printing.
3.57DITRDCA also promotes media literacy in the community via its Supporting Media Literacy in Culturally and Linguistically Diverse Communities grant program.
3.58At the same time, the government is also developing the News Media Assistance Program (News MAP), which is 'a program of work committed to delivering principles-based and evidence-informed solutions to address the difficult structural challenges facing the sector which prevent news organisations from adequately providing public interest news and journalism'.
3.59Public consultations on News MAP were undertaken between December 2023 and February 2024. According to DITRDCA, advice on the outcomes of the public consultation process is due to be provided to the Government shortly.
3.60While there was a high degree of support for the News MAP process, some participants also expressed uncertainty about its intended timing and operation.
Participant views on existing interventions
3.61There was support for existing interventions. However, submitters such as Capital Brief contended that recent media policy has tended to support legacy news outlets and regional publishers, rather than encouraging new entrants and innovative business models:
… the recent history of Australian media policy is of a series of initiatives designed to support structurally challenged legacy businesses. In addition, certain interventions have favoured regional and local publications over others, and have done little to promote diversity and business model innovation by incentivising new entrants.
3.62The interventions mentioned as examples by Capital Brief included the:
Journalist Fund ($5 million to help regional news businesses hire cadets);
Regional and Local Newspapers Publishers Program ($15 million to support structurally challenged newspaper producers);
Public Interest News Gathering Program ($50 million to support commercial television, radio and newspaper businesses in regional Australia during the COVID-19 pandemic);
Regional and Small Publishers Jobs and Innovation Package (eligibility based on pre-existing revenue, not investment in journalism, and at least two-thirds of funding mandated for regional publishers);
Broadcast licence fee relief (abolition of broadcasting licence fees, saving incumbent networks around $130 million per year); and
Changes to media ownership laws (the Nine Entertainment/Fairfax Media merger reduced media diversity while favouring legacy businesses with scale-driven models).
3.63Beyond direct media policy interventions, legacy media was also seen to be favoured by governments in terms of advertising spend.
3.64As mentioned earlier in this chapter, various participants felt this imbalance was evident in the funding secured under the Code, with some small and independent publishers stating that the Code as currently structured has not provided equitable outcomes . For example, Man of Many pointed to 'systemic biases and barriers inherent in the current framework' which secured new revenue streams for larger media companies, while independent publishers 'struggle to keep up, despite playing a crucial role in maintaining media diversity'.
3.65Capital Brief concurred and highlighted the increased profit margins of Nine Publishing following introduction of the Code:
In FY21, prior to the code taking effect, Nine Publishing reported earnings of $117 million on revenue of $505 million, a 23 per cent profit margin. In FY22, following … commencement of deals with Google and Meta, profits increased to $179.5 million at a margin in excess of 30 per cent. This is more than three times the profit margin of The New York Times, widely recognised as the global leader in the transition from newspapers to digital publishing.
3.66According to some participants, including Mr Tim Duggan of the DPA, 'the impact of funding on independent publishers is extremely oversized and important compared to its impact on legacy media that have received the majority of the funds'.
3.67More broadly, several participants queried whether the Code is the right vehicle to support sustainability of the Australian media sector. For example, Digital Rights Watch (DRW) warned against tethering the sector's sustainability to 'the profits and whims of digital platforms'. DRW suggested that this would further entrench 'curatorial opacity … and data-extractive business models based on surveillance capitalism and behavioural advertising'.
3.68A similar view was expressed by ADM+S, which argued that issues with the Code reflect a 'broader problem with relying on bargaining codes under competition and consumer law without addressing underlying market and public interest issues'.
3.69Accordingly, some participants argued for a more holistic, broad-based approach to supporting the news media sector and regulating digital platforms. For example, IMMA noted the importance of looking holistically at 'the media eco system in our country and support mechanisms'.
3.70In a similar vein, both the Centre of the Public Square at Per Capita (CPS Per Capita) and ADM+S urged consideration of the recommendations from the ACCC Digital Platforms Inquiry Preliminary Report, which proposed 'holistic regulatory oversight … that directly remedied the information asymmetry news organisations are currently facing', as well as holding social media companies and digital platforms to account 'for their consumer and broader harms to society'.
3.71Others, such as USYD MECO, suggested that the government should 'reassess the relationship between underlying policy principles and the use of the Code as the primary mechanism for ensuring compliance with those principles'.
3.72To this end, the New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties (NSW CCL) submitted that the government should 'pursue strengthening the media as a policy objective, which means maintaining an economic system where there is a place for journalism', including 'a healthy private market which has been challenged by the power imbalance between digital platforms and news media companies'.
3.73Further, Capital Brief suggested the 'overarching goal should be to promote a diverse media ecosystem, not just address a revenue gap faced by certain large players due to the expiry of particular commercial arrangements'.
3.74The need for interventions to support diversity was also highlighted by MrDuggan, who proposed three principles—news availability, compensation for publishers, and diversity in media—that could guide the next phase of the Code.
3.75The necessity for a broad-based response was also recognised by Mr James Chisholm of DITRDCA, who spoke about the role of government in securing an 'enduring stream of support for public interest journalism that might be multipronged' and 'doesn't rely entirely upon expecting that platforms and publishers will be able to resolve it completely'.
Options to support public interest journalism and the news media sector
3.76Participants put forward a range of potential options to support public interest journalism and the news media sector more broadly. These ranged from designation of digital platforms under the Code, revisions to the scope and operation of the Code, the introduction of must carry provisions, requirements around algorithmic transparency, new taxation and funding mechanisms, and a greater focus on media literacy.
3.77In addition, some participants advocated for a new ministry to coordinate regulation of digital platforms—similar to Taiwan's Ministry for Digital Affairs—as well as the creation of publicly funded news apps and online spaces.
3.78The remainder of this section focuses on the following options canvassed by participants, including:
designation under the Code;
designation 'plus' additional support;
'must carry' provisions; and
media literacy.
Designation
3.79Following Meta's decision, one of the primary tools available to the government to ensure the sustainability of the Australian news media sector through the Code is designation. This measure would require digital platforms to enter into negotiations with news providers for funding agreements or potentially be subject to mandatory arbitration. The arguments for and against designating digital platforms were not necessarily around whether they could be designated under the Code, but rather whether they should, given possible consequences.
3.80According to the legislation underpinning the Code, the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, in deciding whether to designate a digital platform, the Minister must consider:
(a) whether there is a significant bargaining power imbalance between Australian news businesses and the group comprised of the corporation and all of its related bodies corporate; and
(b) whether that group has made a significant contribution to the sustainability of the Australian news industry through agreements relating to news content of Australian news businesses (including agreements to remunerate those businesses for their news content).
3.81The case for designation is premised on the fact that social media platforms are unavoidable business partners for news media companies. Free TV explained that commercial free-to-air TV companies were reliant on the distribution channel on social media provides to attract as many viewers as possible:
…free-to-air broadcasters need to connect with audiences across all available platforms from terrestrial broadcast delivery, owned and operated digital assets and other platforms such as social media channels. The need to maximise audience reach means that any platform with a material number of users is an unavoidable business partner for local media businesses.
3.82Who to designate was also a prominent point of discussion. There was significant support for the designation of Meta platforms under the Code, which is not a surprise given that they have announced their intention not to renew its agreements with publishers.
3.83Free TV supported extending designation to other platforms such as YouTube and TikTok, 'and any relevant digital platform where there is evidence of unwillingness to engage in fair and appropriate remuneration for television or video-based news content'. This view was supported by Mamamia who pointed to the growth of TikTok and the risk of only concentrating on Meta:
The danger at this point would be to focus purely on Meta, and it's not just about Meta. In fact, if we think about the next five years, probably the greater risk is TikTok.
3.84Business News Australia also recommended that designation be extended to include Google and Microsoft.
The impact of a 'news ban'
3.85The decision whether to designate and the impacts were discussed extensively, as were the likely outcomes of designation. The general view was that designation will result in Meta deciding to 'remove news from Facebook as they have done in Canada'.
3.86The impact of such a decision is significant and substantiated by Meta's previous news ban in Australia in 2021, and its current action in Canada. However, the impacts on publishers are not uniform, with small, local and independent publishers being affected disproportionately.
3.87The DPA explained the likely impact on smaller digital publishers:
Direct [impacts] would be things like the loss of traffic and also the fact that revenue is generated through these platforms, particularly Instagram, which for many digital publishers is a large source of revenue—to be able to amplify content. There are even more indirect ones: most of our members rely on advertising from media agencies and brands, and we are already seeing an impact to some members due to brands and agencies holding back some of their revenue and some of their campaigns in the anticipation that a news ban will come into effect in the next few months.
3.88DPA also told the committee that the impact of Meta's news ban in Canada has had substantially less impact for larger publishers:
For most of the bigger publishers, it hasn't had that much of an effect. Large legacy media have many revenue streams and many tentacles in different areas, and that hasn't affected them much. They have large brand names, and people will go to their websites.
3.89A further reported impact of the news ban in Canada was that news from reputable sources was replaced by mis- and disinformation. The Australian Associated Press (AAP) cited analysis carried out by The Conversation of the impacts of the ban in Canada:
According to The Conversation's analysis of the Canadian news ban, 'the main replacement for news coverage on Facebook has been political discussion that doesn't directly reference or link to the news it draws on. This disconnection also opens the door for the circulation of well-meaning misinformation or deliberate disinformation'.
3.90AAP also submitted that when Meta disabled News in 2021, their FactCheck accounts were also disabled, which are used to 'directly address misinformation and disinformation known to be circulating in the region, including de-bunks, pre-bunks and media literacy campaigns'.
3.91STARTTS also reported research from Canada which said that the ban has 'resulted in a 90 per cent reduction in views of official news outlet pages (amounting to approximately 5 million views per day), with news links replaced by non-verified or opinion content and less-informative content like memes'.
3.92More pertinently for STARTTS, this would have a significant impact on people from refugee backgrounds:
… it may make it more difficult for people to distinguish fact from fiction, which may be particularly problematic for groups who identify social media as their primary means of news consumption. … people from refugee backgrounds are highly susceptible to the effects of misinformation and disinformation.
3.93The question for many contributors to the inquiry was how to mitigate the impacts of a news ban if Meta were to go down that road. Given that many of the publishers who are likely to be impacted receive little or no funding under the Code in the first place, the proposals and recommendations to support small, independent and digital publishers encompass revising the Code in general, as well as what to do to ameliorate the consequences of a news ban by Meta.
Designation 'plus' additional support
3.94Designation, plus measures to support the news media sector was advocated by many contributors. Most witnesses and submitters agreed there was no option but to designate Meta, and potentially others, but that the government had to step in to ensure that there was still access to independent media if Meta banned news on its platforms.
3.95The argument for providing support is that a strong, healthy news media supports a healthy democratic society. DPA highlighted the consequences of depriving Australians of access to a diverse public interest media:
If you start cutting off that access to public interest journalism, to vital information important to niche communities, you are then affecting what happens in these digital public squares. As I said, the twofold effect of that are, firstly, the effect on Australian society and democracy, which will be worse off for it, and secondly the effect on Australian businesses, in particular small, independent media.
3.96Private Media also encouraged the committee look at ways to support public interest journalism given its importance to Australian society:
If the starting point is that the market has failed to cover the costs of public interest journalism, and that Australian society requires public interest journalism, that means we need an alternative long term funding mechanism.
3.97DRW submitted that consideration should be given to ensuring media does not have to solely rely on advertising revenue:
If we are interested in a robust media sector to underpin Australia democracy, it would be more beneficial to turn to funding mechanisms that minimise the role played by advertising, rather than making vital news media more reliant on the invasive and largely unaccountable model of data-driven ad targeting.
3.98A range of potential funding mechanisms were proposed by participants. For example, Mr Duggan of DPA proposed establishment of a temporary transition fund under News MAP. This fund would allow news media businesses affected by a possible Meta news ban to 'transition their revenue and their audiences off these platforms into other areas'. The idea of transition funding was also supported by participants such as The Conversation, LINA, We Are Explorers, and Broadsheet Media.
3.99Further, Broadsheet Media suggested the creation of a digital platform levy, 'to be distributed to eligible publishers by a third party at arm's length from government'. According to Broadsheet Media, this could 'ensure a more equitable outcome for all publishers, relative to their scale, by determining objective parameters for distribution of funds, rather than having the digital platforms use their outsized bargaining power'.
3.100The need for greater transparency around the distribution and use of funds was also raised by participants such as Private Media. In a similar vein, PIJI argued that 'the appropriate protocols and vehicle for the distribution of funds … will require further investigation' and noted it was currently conducting research to inform an appropriate model.
3.101Ms Seidler of The Daily Aus suggested that any new funding mechanism should recognise the diversity in the sector:
… if there was the opportunity there to rethink the way that money is redistributed, we would want there to be an acknowledgement that there are diverse players with diverse audiences. We would want to see that reflected in any distribution. We wouldn't want to influence the work of anyone who is currently undergoing that. We would really just want to see the fact that the legacy media players represent some part of the industry but we and our colleagues in the Digital Publishers Alliance are part of a broader ecosystem and play a really meaningful role in the industry.
3.102In the event of a Meta news ban, Mr Kendall of ACM suggested that the threshold be set at 20 per cent of Meta's revenue, with the funds to be divided between the provision of mental health services and support for public interest journalism. A tax on Meta's revenue, with support for mental health services, was also supported by CPA.
3.103To this end, the committee heard that the Department of the Treasury has been considering the way in which a taxing power could be used to encourage compliance with the Code. Treasury also told the committee that there was multilateral work underway in the OECD to try and more fairly allocate taxation rights.
3.104However, as an alternative to the Code, USYD MECO proposed a levy on digital advertising to support public interest journalism and the provision of news to underserved communities and regional, rural and remote areas.
3.105According to USYD MECO, an advertising levy would 'target the core business model of major digital technology platforms—digital advertising—which is fuelled by data generated by and about Australian citizens'. It would also circumvent debate around whether platforms derive revenue from news content, and avoid the need to determine whether platforms are 'actors or neutral intermediaries in the news publishing economy'.
3.106USYD MECO suggested two possible models for such a levy:
a digital services tax, like the two per cent tax introduced in the United Kingdom and France; or
a Public Interest Journalism Levy (PIJL), like the Telecommunications Industry Levy under the Telecommunications Act 1997, whereby holders of a newly devised type of content licence—that also meet a revenue threshold—would need to contribute to the PIJL.
3.107A levy on digital advertising revenue was also supported by Private Media, Playhouse and PJII, which—like USYD MECO—highlighted the 'content-agnostic' nature of a levy, which may make it a more attractive option for platforms. PIJI noted that similar mechanisms have been used in Canada, as well as several EU countries and US states such as California.
3.108Further, some participants such as Private Media, LINA and DPA suggested that the government allocate a percentage of its advertising spend to local and independent publishers.
3.109While advocating for additional support, Broadsheet Media said that they were simply looking to compete with other media organisations on an equal footing:
We're not looking for handouts, here. We're not looking to be sustained through government funding. What we're looking to do is compete on an even playing field.
3.110Indeed, many submitters pointed to the need for a suite of measures to ensure the sustainability of independent news media. Daily Aus was one of the smaller independent digital platforms that recommended several measures to support the industry:
Revisit and Amend the NMBC: Ensure equitable support for all news organisations, including independent media, to prevent market concentration.
Safeguard News Access on Social Media: Implement measures to compel platforms like Meta to maintain news content availability without commercial agreements.
Support Independent Journalism: Provide targeted support and funding for independent news outlets to ensure a diverse media landscape.
Establish a Digital Media Literacy Fund: Improve digital media literacy among young Australians to help them critically evaluate news sources.
Incentivise Public Interest Journalism: Ensure timely and accurate news dissemination during crises to prevent misinformation.
Incentivise Cross-Platform Collaboration: Facilitate partnerships between traditional and social-first news organisations to enhance news coverage and reach broader audiences.
3.111The first measure recommended by the Daily Aus to ' Revisit and Amend the NMBC' to reflect the needs of all players in the industry, echoed similar suggestions from many in the independent publishing sector.
3.112Private Media were of the view that the Code was, by design, intended to provide funding to large media companies for their own benefit, rather than to support public interest journalism:
This is part of the 'original sin' of the code, but is by design, not mistake. In order for the big media companies to pass the bargaining code funds straight back to shareholders, the payments had to be described as some sort of payment, rather than a genuine attempt to support public interest journalism.
3.113Broadsheet Media did not necessarily agree that the Code was not designed with smaller publishers in mind, as the principles of the Code apply equally to all publishers:
We're a member of this ecosystem—all the same bargaining and balances that apply to the Australian Financial Review also apply to Broadsheet, if not more so. When the code was set up, it looked at the ACCC's report on imbalanced bargaining, and that applies to us as much as anyone.
3.114However, they discussed how the Code's design meant that publishers would have 'to go back, hat in hand, every three years' to social media platforms, which is not a sustainable model. Broadsheet Media proposed a framework which says, ''These are the rules of engaging in our country with our media,' that is the best-case outcome'.
News availability – 'must carry' provisions
3.115Compelling digital platforms to maintain news content was also a topic of discussion in submissions as well as in the public hearings.
3.116The concept that the news publishers or broadcasters must carry specific quotas of content is not a new one, and applies in Australia, as well as in overseas jurisdictions.
3.117In Australia there are various content obligations placed on broadcasters. For example, to comply with the transmission quotas set out in the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (BSA), all commercial television licensees must broadcast at least 55 per cent Australian content between 6:00 am and midnight on primary channels, and 1,460 hours of Australian content between 6:00 am and midnight on non-primary channels.
3.118In addition, broadcasters must meet a certain quota of first-release Australian programme based on a points system which is set out in the Broadcasting Services (Australian Content and Children’s Television) Standards 2020 (Cth)(ACCTS).
3.119Subscription TV broadcasters and channel providers are subject to the New Eligible Drama Expenditure scheme. Under that scheme, at least 10 per cent of total programme expenditure for each drama channel must be on new Australian drama programs.
3.120However, the same obligations do not currently apply to large streaming providers.
3.121Streaming services voluntarily report their level of investment in Australian content to the ACMA but are not otherwise subject to any obligations in respect of Australian content.
3.122Currently, the BSA—which deals with content regulation and media ownership—does not generally regulate content provided on internet services. However, DITRDCA told the committee that the potential regulation of digital platform services is under consideration as part of the broader media reform agenda.
3.123Many contributors to the inquiry proposed that some form of 'must carry' obligations be inserted into the Code to ensure that platforms continue to permit news on its platforms, if they are designated. CPA cited the Canadian experience:
The Canadian experience tells us, once designated, Meta may drop news from its platform and refuse to negotiate with publishers. In this instance, we encourage the government to insert a 'must carry news' clause in the code, forcing them to negotiate with publishers.
3.124The Conversation were supportive of taking all necessary measures to ensure that platforms facilitate news content 'during public emergencies particularly fires, floods, terrorist and large-scale cyber-attacks, armed conflicts and pandemics'.
3.125Broadsheet Media recommended that platforms be required to ensure 'that 5% of any one person's feed must consist of content from eligible news publishers'. Australians for a Murdoch Royal Commission also supported legislating for a right to news access, to ensure that '[n]o local government area in Australia […] miss out on access to relevant community news'.
3.126Ms Zara Seidler of The Daily Aus stressed the importance of news availability for young people:
It is of the utmost importance that that fact based, accurate information remains on the platforms where those young people are. They will not leave the platforms. They will not be able to get news elsewhere—or, rather, they will not feel inclined to, and we believe that we must be able to cater to those audiences. Otherwise, as we've alluded to, we think that there will be really dire consequences for democracy.
3.127The MEAA also noted the potential role of 'must carry' provisions in helping to combat mis- and disinformation:
One option that we explored was to mandate the carriage of news on social media. I think that's important as well for the issue of mis- and disinformation. If we see journalism as an important counterbalance to mis- and disinformation, then we understand that it's really crucial that social media continues to carry news, even though it might come with a certain price to those social media companies.
3.128Other submitters pointed out that while requiring platforms to carry content is one thing, ensuring that content is discoverable and not hidden due to algorithmic factors is something else:
There's a concept of the 'must carry' on lots of different infrastructure platforms. We could talk about a must carry regime […] Must carry on digital technology platforms, from a TV perspective, is a very important step, but consumers being able to find it is the more important issue.
3.129This theme was picked up by Mr Miller, who saw carry provisions as part of the solution but—on their own—as 'an analog solution in a digital world' given that platforms' algorithms mean that simply carrying content would not provide the 'surfacing and the discoverability' required.
3.130The Department of the Treasury did say that they had been investigating 'the potential application of must-carry rules and whether or not they would be compatible with the code and the extent to which they would be enforceable'.
Media literacy
3.131Various participants pointed to media literacy as a key part of any response to countering mis- and disinformation on digital platforms. For example, the Australian Media Literacy Alliance (AMLA) stressed that 'successful media literacy initiatives empower citizens to become competent and responsible media producers and consumers'.
3.132For Ms Stuchbery of LINA, 'strengthening media literacy in our communities will help counter mis- and disinformation in a systematic way'.Similarly, the ABC highlighted the importance of improving media literacy given the impossibility of verifying or fact checking all claims.
3.133Given this, participants such as Dr Tanya Notley called for a national approach to media literacy that 'builds on the strengths of existing, relevant national public institutions, universities and educational and cultural organisations'.
3.134According to Dr Notley, this approach has been used with success in countries like the Netherlands and Finland. It also provided a model for the creation of the AMLA, which comprises seven public cultural institutions and two university partners.
3.135A national strategy was also proposed by AMLA, which has a 'primary goal' of developing and promoting 'a government-endorsed national media literacy strategy for Australia'. It was also supported by the Australian Library and Information Association (ALIA), which suggested there was 'an urgent role for Government in supporting and funding a national approach to media literacy and media literacy education'.
3.136Calls for additional investment in media literacy featured in evidence from other submitters such as The Daily Aus, which suggested that a fund be established to 'improve digital media literacy among young Australians to help them critically evaluate news sources'. Similarly, PlayHouse called for investment in 'comprehensive media literacy programs across all levels of education, from primary school to adulthood'.
3.137To this end, several participants highlighted the work of Squiz Kids and its Newshounds media literacy program for primary school children. Squiz Kids itself stated that providing media literacy education for young children is 'consistent with international best practices' and advocated for funding to continue the Newshounds program beyond 2025—noting that funding for the pilot was provided by the Google News Initiative.
3.138Ms Lucinda Longcroft of Google Australia and New Zealand highlighted the importance of being able to find 'accurate, credible information' and told the committee about its work in this area:
… we've partnered with Australian organisations like AAP and Squiz Kids to build our children's media literacy and combat misinformation. We have teams of experts around the world working in the fight against misinformation. We work to ensure that Google provides users with high-quality and trusted information, rewarding the publishers and creators who produce it and surfacing more authoritative sources.
3.139While there was significant focus on media literacy for young people, DrAndrea Carson of La Trobe University reminded the committee that older people were often most at risk. Dr Carson also suggested that the focus of media literacy efforts should be on identifying 'credibility features of information', rather than seeing traditional media as the baseline for credible information:
… I don't think we should just single out young people. In fact, digital natives can actually be very good at being able to pick up what's credible information and what isn't—nor do I think we should necessarily use traditional news sources as the baseline. Rather, we should look for credibility features of information. That's something that can expand to older generations. Studies show that those that are often most taken in with mis- and disinformation aren't the young generations; they're the older generations.
3.140This was reflected in evidence from LINA, which pointed out that adults aged over 55 'are some of the most likely to share mis- and disinformation on social media' and that local news outlets were well-placed to improve adult media literacy in their communities. In line with this, LINA highlighted a program it put forward in the context of the 2024–25 Budget, which would involve:
LINA partnering with a registered training organisation to develop a media literacy curriculum for adults;
local newsrooms delivering media literacy programs to their own communities (using a centralised curriculum and teaching resources); and
newsrooms partnering with community organisations (such as libraries, schools and Councils) to deliver programs locally.
3.141Likewise, Dr Notley noted the current lack of resources supporting adult media literacy and advocated for 'sustained public funding' to 'promote and extend AMLA’s work and to develop media literacy research, resources and programs more generally – particularly for adults'.
3.142In a similar vein—given the role of libraries in providing digital access and literacy support in local communities—ALIA proposed that the government work with ALIA and its partners to ' update and expand evidence-based media literacy programs, with emphasis on segments of the community with the highest needs'.
Committee View
3.143A significant driver for the establishment of the committee was to examine how best to protect and promote public interest journalism in Australia.
3.144Social media companies impact the civic space through the distribution and access of news, which also comes at times intertwined with mis- and disinformation. This can have far-reaching consequences to the democratic principles of many countries, including Australia, especially if elections become a focus of mis- and disinformation.
3.145The committee heard how social media has become of increasing importance as a source of access to news and public interest journalism for many Australians.
3.146In terms of news, the inquiry explored how the platforms exercised their market power, particularly through the News Media Bargaining Code (the Code), and the impact this has on public interest journalism in Australia.
3.147The Code facilitated direct deals between social media and digital platforms and larger news publishers, and also granted lump sums for other entities to distribute to smaller news publishers.However, the distribution of funding under the Code was uneven across the sector.
3.148At its inception, the Code was intended to address the bargaining power imbalance of various parties in the news sector, and to ensure that appropriate compensation was paid by social media platforms for content produced by news publishers big and small.
3.149However, the business model of many of the platforms has changed in recent years, to models that do not rely on carrying news from established news publishers. This has illustrated a fundamental problem with the Code. The Code presumes that social media platforms want to carry news, or that certain digital platforms consistently need news content to provide a service.
3.150Meta have claimed that news accounts for an ever-decreasing portion of its content, and that it is not necessary to carry it at all. If they do not see any commercial disadvantage from not carrying news, as they have done in Canada, the Code becomes irrelevant to them.
3.151For this reason, the committee has considered that alternative or additional mechanisms other than the Code should be explored to both regulate the digital environment when it comes to news and the propagation of information, and protect and promote public interest journalism.
3.152The committee heard compelling evidence from digital publishers that designation might not only be ineffective but might also do harm to Australian society if platforms, particularly Meta, block news altogether thereby depriving users from the carriage of news media, which plays a crucial role in underpinning democratic society.
3.153To ensure that access to news remains a key element of users' consumption of media, the committee supports further exploration of 'must carry' requirements to social media platforms. This further exploration should include an assessment of any legal or regulatory barriers to such a requirement.
3.154Without designation, the logical step is that the nexus between the support for public interest journalism and the commercial arrangements with digital platforms under the Code is broken and should be replaced with alternative revenue mechanisms, such as a levy system, on the broader operations of the digital platforms.
3.155The committee envisages that a levy drawn from the revenues of the digital platforms could be used to support public interest journalism, improve media literacy, and provide for mechanisms to ensure technical transparency in the operation of algorithms and recommender systems which drive the content that users are exposed to.
3.156That is not to say that the Code should be abolished. The committee foresees the Code remains in force, for now. While the exact design of a levy system should be left to government, the Code could be utilised as a vehicle to disseminate funds from a levy system to the news media publishers, with a revised registration criteria that does not present an unreasonable barrier to registration for small, independent or digital only publishers. When considering the design of a levy system, consideration should be given to preserving commercial deals already in place between digital platforms and publishers, and in supporting those deals to continue.
3.157The committee is also aware of the various strands of government activity across the broad spectrum that is the digital environment. Given this range, the committee is of the view that a stand-alone ministry should be established with the responsibility of coordinating the regulation, monitoring and research activities required to ensure that the digital environment meets the expectations of Australian society.
3.158The committee understands fully the value that social media platforms bring to a democratic society. The platforms have developed rapidly to take the place of many traditional pillars of society, but without the protections and responsibilities that are required to ensure that their operation acts in accordance with Australia’s values, laws, or way of life.
Interim report recommendations
3.159Recognising the scope of this interim report, the recommendations below focus on the decision of Meta to abandon deals under the Code and the important role of Australian journalism, news and public interest media on a healthy democracy in countering mis- and disinformation.
3.160The committee's final report will consider issues relating to online safety; algorithms and recommender systems; the impacts of the mental health of users; lack of accountability of social media platforms; and age verification.
3.161The committee recommends that the Australian Government establish a Digital Affairs Ministry with overarching responsibility for the coordination of regulation to address the challenges and risks presented by digital platforms. The Ministry could also play a role in coordinating monitoring and research activities to assess the ongoing impact of digital platforms on Australian society, as well as the effectiveness of existing and future regulation. Because matters relating to the regulation of social media are broad, the new Digital Affairs Ministry should be given an equally broad remit so that it can regulate matters such as, but not limited to, privacy and consumer protection, competition, online safety, and scams.
3.162The committee recommends that, acknowledging the limitations of the News Media Bargaining Code, the Australian Government explore alternative revenue mechanisms to supplement the Code, and contribute to systems oversight, such as a digital platform levy. Exploration should include consideration for preserving current and future commercial deals to sustain public interest journalism over the longer term, and to support digital media literacy initiatives.
3.163The committee recommends that the Australian Government develop an appropriate mechanism and protocols to guide the fair and transparent distribution of revenue arising from any new revenue mechanisms. This work could have reference to relevant research and should include protocols aimed at ensuring the sustainability of small, independent and digital only publishers, as well as those operating in underserved communities and rural, regional and remote areas. Consideration should also be given for a portion of any revenue raised through such mechanisms to be used for funding an independent body to oversee systems, accredit researchers to access data and other related functions.
3.164If the News Media Bargaining Code is to be redesigned, the committee recommends that the Australian Government revisit the tests for registration of news businesses under the News Media Bargaining Code to ensure their design does not present an unreasonable barrier to registration for small, independent or digital only publishers.
3.165Given Meta's decision not to renew deals under the News Media Bargaining Code, and the de-prioritisation of news on Meta platforms, the committee recommends that the Australian Government establish a short-term transition fund to help news media businesses to diversify and strengthen alternative income streams and news product offerings. The fund should have a particular focus on supporting small, independent and digital only publishers, as well as those operating in underserved communities and rural, regional and remote areas.
3.166The committee recommends that the Australian Government investigate the viability and effectiveness of 'must carry' requirements for digital platforms in relation to Australian news content from large and small news providers, including an assessment of the legal pathways and barriers to such requirements.
3.167The committee recommends that the Australian Government establish a Digital Media Competency Fund (to be funded via alternative revenue mechanisms to be explored at Recommendation 2). While this fund should have a strong focus on the digital media literacy of young Australians, it should also fund initiatives aimed at improving the digital media literacy of other groups at risk of being taken in by mis- and disinformation, including older Australians and those in regional areas.
3.168The committee supports the need for legislation to combat mis- and disinformation.
3.169To improve transparency around digital platforms' systems and processes use, the committee recommends that the Australian Government adopt transparency requirements similar to the measures in the European Union's Digital Services Act, which includes transparency around recommender systems, as well as mandatory access to platform data and algorithms to facilitate research. This should also include measures to require digital platforms to provide notice of changes to algorithms and the rationale for those changes.
3.170The committee recommends that the Australian Government examine options to respond to the use of algorithms and recommender systems to deprecate news by digital platforms with significant power.
3.171The committee recommends that the Australian Government review the effectiveness of the industry co-regulation model for digital platforms in Australia.
Ms Sharon Claydon MP
Chair
Member for Newcastle
