- Governance and risk management
Overview
4.1Public sector governance is defined as how an organisation is managed, its corporate and other structures, its culture, its policies and strategies and the way it deals with its various stakeholders. The concept encompasses the way public sector organisations acquit their responsibility of stewardship by being open, accountable, and prudent in decision-making, in providing policy advice, and in managing and delivering programs.
4.2Good governance helps Commonwealth entities maintain strategic direction in programs and policy design and implementation by ‘enabling effective and efficient decision making, providing clear lines of authority to facilitate the escalation and resolution of issues, and enabling senior leaders to guide the direction of outcomes’.
4.3In the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act), section 16 outlines a duty of accountable authorities to establish and maintain systems relating to risk and control. To promote a coherent approach to performing these duties, the Australian Government released the Commonwealth Risk Management Policy (Commonwealth Policy) on 1 July 2014 as part of the Public Management Reform Agenda (PRMA). This policy supports section 16 of the PGPA Act and sets out the principles and mandatory requirements for managing risk in undertaking the activities of government.
4.4The Commonwealth Policy defines risk as ‘the effect of uncertainty on objectives’ and risk management as ‘coordinated activities to direct and control an organisation with regard to risk’. The goal of this framework is to embed risk management as part of the culture of Commonwealth entities so that the shared understanding of risk leads to well informed decision making.
4.5In her Commonwealth Risk Management Policy forward statement, the Minister for Finance, the Senator the Hon Katy Gallagher, highlighted the importance of risk management:
Risk management is fundamental to good governance and needs to be reflected in the behaviours and culture of the Australian Public service. Good risk management supports the better delivery of government services through more effective decision-making, greater preparedness for unexpected events and supports innovation.
4.6Section 19 of the PGPA Act requires accountable authorities to assist their Minister in discharging their duties of accountability to the Parliament and the public. This includes:
- keeping the Minister informed of the activities of the entity and any subsidiaries
- providing the Minister and Finance Minister with any reports, documents, and information they require about the activities of the entity
- notifying the Minister of any significant decisions made by the entity or any subsidiaries
- giving the Minister reasonable notice of any significant issue that has affected the entity or any subsidiaries.
- The Office of Impact Analysis (OIA) operates within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) as an independent body to assist agencies in the creation of government policy. The principles for Australian Government policy makers, outlined by the OIA in the Australian Government Guide to Policy Impact Analysis advises that:
- policy makers should clearly demonstrate a public policy problem necessitating Australian Government intervention and should examine a range of genuine and viable options, including non-regulatory options, to address the problem
- each proposal must include a clear set of objectives—these are used to select the best option and to shape evaluation
- regulation should not be the default option: the policy option offering the greatest net benefit for Australia—regulatory or non-regulatory—should always be the recommended option
- policy makers should consult in a genuine and timely way with affected businesses, community organisations and individuals, as well as other stakeholders, to ensure proposed changes deliver the best possible outcomes for Australia
- the information upon which policy makers base their decisions must be published at the earliest opportunity
- the most significant policy proposals must undergo a post-implementation review reflecting on the extent to which the stated objectives have been achieved to ensure settings remain focused on delivering the best possible outcomes for Australia.
- These principles outline the core requirements that government agencies should include in the design and implementation of policies and programs. Additionally, agencies need to:
- incorporate associated risk
- establish governance arrangements
- develop appropriate performance measures, and
- determine monitoring and tracking arrangements for the performance of programs and policies being implemented.
- Adherence to the PGPA Act and other guiding principles is regarded as vital in the development and implementation of policy and programs in the Australian Public Service agencies, with the aim to ensure accountability, transparency, and good governance by federal government agencies.
Robustness of risk advice to government
Findings
4.10The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) listed key messages regarding governance and risk management that were identified as important for the successful implementation:
- it is important for regulators to maintain the currency of all supporting documentation to ensure the implementation of legislative changes is consistent with achieving intended outcomes.
- rapid implementation usually involves new, changed, and heightened risks. Entities should ensure risk management tools are easy to apply in urgent circumstances.
- entities delivering services from multiple sites should have in place governance and operational frameworks that provide consistent approaches to risk management and the measurement of efficiency to provide effective enterprise level assurance.
- decisions to reallocate funding that has been allocated for a specific purpose should be accompanied by transparent and accountable decision making and record keeping.
- when implementing discrete measures, an overarching framework that clearly articulates the purpose of the measure at both a macro and micro level can provide the Parliament with confidence that money is being spent in accordance with legislative requirements and intended outcomes are being monitored and achieved.
- Of the six reports that have been the subject of this inquiry, the ANAO identified that the advice provided to government by the Department of Health and Aged Care (Health) on the temporary telehealth services did not present a structured assessment of risks or options for decision-making.
- The temporary proposed telehealth policy was presented to government on 10 March 2020, within seven days of Health being instructed by the Minister to be included alongside 17 other response measures to the pandemic response planning. The proposal included a generic statement that compliance risks would be adequately addressed by the existing Medicare compliance procedures and audit protocols and identified that a risk specific to telehealth would be a lack of experience among providers and patients with videoconferencing. Health received approval to implement telehealth services in line with this policy advice on 10 March 2020.
- On 16 March 2020, concerns were raised by Services Australia regarding the clarification of signature requirements for temporary telehealth items introduced in response to COVID-19. Health advised, on 24 March 2020, that due to ‘exceptional and temporary circumstances’, verbal consent was acceptable in lieu of a signature requirement on clinical notes. Health extended these temporary arrangements several times between 2020–22.
- On 23 March 2020 the government announced that eligibility for telehealth services was expected to be expanded to the whole Medicare-eligible population. The announcement stated also that the bulk billing incentive for providers would be temporarily doubled for both face-to-face and telehealth services from 30 March 2020, to promote the provision of bulk billed services to vulnerable patient groups.
- Health prepared advice to government in line with this announced approach. This advice stated that integrity risks would be adequately addressed through existing compliance arrangements. Additional detail was provided on benefits and risks of certain proposed policy settings, including the removal of a requirement for an existing provider and patient relationship to access telehealth services. Health did include in its advice concern regarding capacity constraints within Services Australia, and that a progressive implementation would be advisable to reduce this risk. To increase the implementation time, Health drafted regulatory changes in parallel with seeking policy authority.
- A risk register was not prepared by Health, as the temporary telehealth changes were not classified by Health as a project, but instead as standard MBS changes. The primary differences between standard MBS changes and project implementation are that formal approval of changes are not documented for MBS, and there are no controls to ensure staff follow current version of procedure.
- How Health classified the telehealth expansion as an MBS change is important as it meant Health did not then undertake the appropriate frameworks that would have been completed if the telehealth expansion had been classified as a project, for example, appropriate risk assessment planning would have been undertaken, as well as performance measurements. Had Health classified the telehealth expansion as a project, the potential issues of fraud might have been realised prior to the implementation.
- During the public hearing in Canberra on 2 February 2024, Health reported it had reviewed the internal processes since the audit and had started to adjust the project classification based on the magnitude of change to the MBS.
- As the Risk Management Framework was not included in their advice to government for the temporary telehealth benefits expansion, Health failed to identify the assignment of benefit for the bulk-billing telehealth services as a legal risk. The Committee sought clarification during the hearing on 2 February 2024, on the lack of risk analysis undertaken by Health, leading to issues regarding fraudulent transactions with the MBS. Health advised that:
…[M]ost of the challenges were that we didn’t write things down properly. I mentioned before that we were meeting with stakeholders weekly, if not daily in some cases. Part of that was dealing with non-compliance risks that were starting to emerge pretty quickly as we were doing both the temporary and the lead-up to permanent.
4.20Highlighted in paragraph 4.13, Services Australia raised concern regarding an inability to substantiate claims made through the MBS from providers due to a lack of physical paperwork that arose from the temporary telehealth expansion plans.
4.21The ANAO identified that processing MBS claims without signatures was not in accordance with the MBS policy.
Health did not manage implementation risks associated with temporary or permanent telehealth changes in accordance with its risk management policy.
…
Health did not conduct a risk assessment of integrity risks, such as provider fraud and non-compliance, prior to implementing the temporary and permanent MBS telehealth items. Treatments to prevent provider non-compliance with telehealth items were limited.
4.22The ANAO findings determined that Health didn’t assess the legal risk associated with the temporary expansion policy, didn’t consider whether the risk could be mitigated through additional controls, or formally assign responsibility for monitoring the risks, as required by its management framework. This risk was identified in ANAO’s audit report findings. ANAO highlighted this issue in Recommendation 2, stating that Health needs to ‘develop procedures that ensure proposed material changes to the Medicare Benefits Schedule are subject to structured and documented risk assessment that covers implementation, integrity, and other risks’.
Agency response
4.23Although Health acknowledged the ANAO’s findings, it stated in its response that it identified relevant risks to in its advice to government, including policy proposals. The ANAO concluded that the risk identification and treatment strategies in relation to policy development and monitoring advice provided to government were incomplete.
4.24Health agreed to ANAO’s recommendation two and provided a progress update to the Committee in its submission. Health outlined the work that the Medicare Integrity Taskforce is currently undertaking to implement reforms to strengthen Medicare integrity and facilitate improved risk-based decision-making.
4.25Health confirmed to the Committee that it was working to develop better risk models for the MBS:
[W]e are developing a full risk model for the MBS that will look at thresholds where potential policy changes might increase fraud risk with our compliance colleagues; look at other parts of the department, where they’re making policy changes that interact with Medicare and what that means as well; make sure that, if we think there are risks with that, it’s well described and documented in regard to what they have to do in order to engage with that process; and then work with other parts of government, like Service Australia, to make sure that we continue to refine the systems that support Medicare and the integrity of the payments that they provide to Australians as well.
4.26The ANAO findings highlighted that Health did not make plans to conduct an evaluation of temporary telehealth settings at the time of initial implementation in March 2020. Additional advice provided to Government contained little detail.
In response to the ANAO findings noted in paragraph 4.18 and 4.19, Health acknowledged that not assessing the legal risk introduced uncertainty about the legal authority for payments, specifically uncertainty about the requirements of Section 20 of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (HII Act) which defines the requirements a person entitled to Medicare benefits must meet, and if not fulfilled, then there is a risk that no bulk-billed benefit is payable.
4.27Health went on to highlight that the risks associated with non-standard assignment of benefit were referenced in advice to government on options to make the expansion of MBS telehealth permanent, with Health of the opinion that its advice could have been more detailed and robust if legal advice had been sought sooner.
Committee comment
4.28The Committee acknowledges the unprecedented circumstances that Health faced during the rapid implementation of the telehealth expansion during the COVID-19 pandemic. The ANAO found in its audit that there were shortfalls in the governance and risk management of the expansion. The Committee appreciates the circumstances during the pandemic and reaches its conclusions in the spirit of learning for future such events, not undermining the work of committed public servants during the incredibly difficult time of the pandemic.
4.29Significant changes were made to the MBS, and although the type of changes were common practice for Health, the context of the changes should have been treated differently.
4.30The Committee’s primary concern on reviewing the evidence is that because the changes to the MBS that enabled the telehealth expansion were not treated as a project, appropriate risk assessments were not undertaken, and appropriate advice was not provided to government. This led to an increased risk of fraudulent transactions under the MBS and is still currently an issue that needs to be addressed with changes made to current legislative requirements.
4.31The Committee requests that the Department of Health and Aged Care reports back to it on its progress in implementing legislative changes to allow digital assignment of benefit for the MBS.
4.32The Committee recommends that the Australian Government prioritises any necessary legislative changes in order to address the current structure of the Health Insurance Act 1973 to align with the modern technological requirements of telehealth.
Quality of evidence to inform policy advice
Overview
4.33The Australian Policy Handbook, states that robust evidence is critical to the Impact Analysis process. The Office of Impact Analysis (OIA) provides guidance to federal government agencies on Impact Analysis through their website to assist policy makers. Relevant data that is or is not available must be identified. Where relevant data is not available, explanatory information must be provided. As robust data underpins evaluation, the evaluative process in the final report must set out a plan to close any data gaps that remain in the post-implementation phase.
4.34The Australian Government Guide to Policy Impact Analysis, provided by OIA, defines the need to implement impact analysis when:
Any policy proposal or action of government, with an expectation of compliance, that would result in a more than minor change in behaviour or impact for people, business or community organisations.
The public service has an obligation to ensure that the most significant decisions are supported by robust evidence and analysis covering the available options and how they could reasonably be expected to play out in the community.
Findings
4.35The ANAO audits undertaken as part of this inquiry identified two departments which did not provide effective advice to government on their programs, due to poor information management and a lack of clear evidence of stakeholder consultation—the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Home Affairs.
Department of Home Affairs
4.36Auditor-General Report No. 16 (2022–23) Management of Migration to Australia—Family Migration Program examined information provided to the government by Home Affairs to inform decision-making on the size and composition of the annual migration program. Home Affairs’ representatives conducted community meetings however there was no clear evidence that family migration policy and specific proposals were routinely discussed or analysed. The ANAO suggested that Home Affairs more clearly explain how advice prepared for government takes account of community views on family migration.
4.37ANAO re-affirmed in its audit report that advice to government on Australia’s Family Migration Program should be based on evidence and include information about the views of those affected by policy proposals and the program’s implementation.
4.38The ANAO highlighted that effective planning of the Family Migration Program better prepares Home Affairs to deliver against priorities set by government and meet the intent of its policies. The ANAO emphasises that planning should be complemented by appropriate governance arrangements to ensure effective implementation of the program.
4.39The ANAO determined that Home Affairs did not engage directly with community representatives or organisations. Home Affairs advised the ANAO that it brings its public discussion paper to the attention of community networks through its Regional Directors and Community Liaison Officers. Basic details of meetings are recorded in spreadsheets, but there was no specific record of consultation on Family Migration Program proposals.
Application waiting times
4.40Home Affairs’ advice to government regarding visa application waiting times is provided on a regular basis to assist in providing data on decision making around resource allocation. Home Affairs affirmed its process on application capacity forecasting, stating that:
[W]e’re forecasting application rates, which is not a precise science, but that is something that we do look at. In previous years I think the impacts in terms of the whole migration program were certainly considered. I’d suggest probably the fiscal impacts are the strongest consideration.
4.41The public hearing on 1 February 2024 in Canberra, highlighted what the Committee considered, the lack of transparency created by the introduction of the methodology used to calculate average processing times for visa applications. This has arisen due to the historic data collection and representation of KPIs, as the average processing times and figures have excluded visa applications not actively being processed.
4.42Home Affairs provided evidence that staffing levels had improved in recent times, specifically in the processing of partner and child visa applications thanks to an increase in resourcing by the government in the last two years. This has resulted in a tangible improvement in productivity.
Visa planning levels
4.43In Auditor-General Report No. 16 (2022–23) the ANAO concluded that advice to support the review of the Home Affairs’ performance against annual Family Migration Program planning levels was not complete in its analysis of effectiveness and efficiency.
4.44The government determines the scale and composition of the permanent migration program each year as part of the Budget process. It considers advice and options for granting Skilled and family program visas for the next financial year set out in an annual submission.
4.45The current practice is for the government to set an overall limit (‘planning level’ or ‘ceiling’) specifying the number of places for each of the visa categories within the limit. From 2012–12 to 2018–19, the total number of visas available under the permanent migration program was 190,000. This level was reduced to 160,000 between 2019–20 and 2021–22. On September 2022, the government announced a planning level of 195,000 for 2022–23.
4.46In 2016–2017, the government agreed to a proposal to adopt the term ‘planning ceiling’ to establish an upper limit rather than a minimum number of visas to be finalised by the end of the financial year. In 2018–19, Home Affairs advised the government to reduce the planning ceiling for the following year from 190,000 to 150,000 to better reflect its capacity to process visas. The government agreed to a planning level of 160,000, with the original level to be reinstated in 2023–24.
4.47The ANAO observed that the use of annual planning ceilings may increase uncertainty about the actual number of visas likely to be granted by the end of the year, reducing the government’s ability to determine if its policy and fiscal objectives will be achieved. Advice to government should indicate Home Affairs’ confidence in being able to achieve targets and deliver against its policy objectives.
4.48The ANAO highlighted an opportunity for improvement in providing complete information to the government relating to the department’s performance against planning levels and its management of the visa caseload, as part of its reconciliation of performance in delivering the annual migration program.
4.49Evidence provided confirmed that the Migration Act 1958 does not allow a cap to be applied to partner and child visas. Home Affairs over several years has repeatedly acknowledged there is no power to impose a cap on partner and child visas, in departmental documents, Parliamentary hearings and in responses to questions on notice through the Senate Estimates process. However, the Committee recognises additional evidence through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests that show internal directives from Home Affairs to stop granting partner visas until the start of a new financial year, highlighting the use of de-facto ‘capping’ methods by Home Affairs.
Department of the Treasury
4.50Auditor-General Report No. 39 (2022–23) Implementation of the Government response to the Black Economy Taskforce identified that Treasury had poor information management practices which created risks around its ability to provide quality and timely advice and reporting on the shadow economy to the Government, and to create an effective shadow economy policy environment. The audit identified specific issues including incomplete advice provided inconsistently to government creating difficulty in tracking the progress of the implementation. Regular status updates of the implementation were not provided to government by Treasury.
4.51Treasury made seven submissions to government between July 2018 and December 2022. The ANAO determined that there were issues with the quality of this advice, advising that:
- Treasury didn’t include five of the Taskforce’s supplementary recommendations due to an oversight and then assumed that government would note these recommendations.
- reporting to government was inconsistent with submission format and timing, creating difficulty with implementation progress tracking. An example used by the ANAO was that:
In January 2019, Treasury reported that 12 of the 80 recommendations had been ‘completed’. In this context, ‘completed’ meant implemented. Then in September 2019, Treasury reported that 53 recommendations had been ‘actioned’ instead of ‘completed’. In this context, ‘actioned’ included recommendations that were both implemented and being implemented.
- Treasury suggested to government that several recommendations had been implemented in updates provided in October 2019, but the ANAO found they had not.
- as of February 2023, Treasury had not provided updates to government since June 2021.
- ANAO found also that Treasury did not provide evidence to government when its executive board paused the work of the Black Economy Division, but retained the funding provided of $12.5 million and redistributed those funds to other programs. Treasury did not document this decision, or document the potential impact of this decision on the implementation of the taskforce report, failing to adhere to section 15 of the PGPA Act around requirements to document key decisions.
Agency responses
4.53Home Affairs and Treasury both acknowledged the ANAO findings in their submissions to the inquiry.
4.54Home Affairs agreed with the ANAO recommendation to establish processes for capturing meaningful client feedback from all sources to enable it to identify opportunities to improve and to inform government. However, Home Affairs maintained in its response to the recommendation that it is satisfied that such processes are already in place but will work to strengthen the way feedback is used to inform potential service delivery improvements.
4.55When asked by the Committee during the public hearing in Canberra on 1 February 2024 about the ANAO’s audit findings around community consultation, Home Affairs confirmed this in response:
There has been a significant increase in the terms of consultation we do in respect of the program and also outreach to affected communities. That information is fed back into the wider process by which government determines what the Migration Program composition may be each year.
4.56In response to the Committee’s questions on average wait times for visa applications, Home Affairs clarified the situation, stating that:
The processing times are calculated based on the date of finalisation, so from the date of application to the date of finalisation…We have changed our approach—with partners, in particular. One of the challenges with partners is that we had this chunk of case load that we were not able, through a ministerial direction, to move. What I would characterise as a healthy case load would have, if you like, a sloping graph from shorter application periods to longer. You’d have more applications recently lodged and fewer applications lodged a long time ago.
4.57Home Affairs provided information on recent visa application processing times in a response to questions on notice, emphasising an overall reduction across comparative years for partner visa applications. Home Affairs highlighted that it was unable to replicate the calculations used by ANAO to determine the average processing times outlined in Auditor-General Report No. 16 (2022–23) table 3.7 and provided its results in the response.
4.58In response to the issues with planning levels for partner and child visas, as well as ambiguous terminology used to describe planning levels, Home Affairs stated in the public hearing that:
We’re working towards the planning level that government has set for us.
…
It’s not a cap…the Migration Act doesn’t allow for the application of a cap to the partner and child visas. Caps apply on other case load, like parent. What does happen though, is government sets a planning level in respect of a program, and the department allocated resources accordingly.
4.59Treasury was also asked about the issues identified by the ANAO regarding its advice to government and documented evidence of decision-making by the Black Economy Taskforce during the 1 February 2024 hearing. The Committee highlighted the issue regarding the re-allocation of $12.3 million of funding by Treasury, without evidence of approval by the Minister or executive government. Treasury reflected on this situation, stating that:
There were a number of briefs that were sent to the government on deprioritisation, so it wasn’t as if Treasury didn’t understand its responsibilities in this area—it certainly did. We don’t have a record on this, so I’m unable to provide a fulsome explanation, but it just so happens that this particular program appears to have been overlooked in those briefing documents.
4.60In their submission to the inquiry, Treasury offered a justification for the issues outlined by the ANAO’s findings. Treasury agreed that the ANAO findings determined that information management and program governance was not effective. Treasury’s submission stated that the issues were compounded by the impact of COVID-19, which required a reallocation of resources from the shadow economy response, to be put toward designing and implementing the response to COVID-19.
Committee comment
Department of Home Affairs
4.61The Committee paid particular attention to the family migration program audit both due to the significant administrative issues raised, and also because of the enormous importance of partner and child visas to numerous Australians. In a multicultural society such as Australia, a family migration program that operates efficiently and effectively with integrity and compassion is not a luxury – it’s an essential service to those Australians who fall in love and seek to exercise a basic right as an Australian to bring their genuine partner (and children where relevant) to build a life in our nation. When this core government function fails, it devastates individuals who are forced to endure for years the daily pain of separation from loved ones. In many cases Australians have missed months or years of their children growing up or lost the chance to start a family due to sustained delays in having a partner visa granted.
4.62The ANAO report coupled with evidence to the inquiry makes clear that in many respects the family program had been badly administered and under resourced by Home Affairs over many years. This, however, is overwhelmingly not the fault of the dedicated public servants. While there are clearly improvements required including in relation to policy advice to government, reporting of waiting times, client service and program evaluation, the primary issues are a combination of policy decisions in the way in which the program is conceived, exacerbated between by the impact of significant past cuts to staffing numbers in visa processing.
4.63A significant number of staff were cut from visa processing between 2013 and 2022. This led to the peculiar situation where staff resourcing became the limiting factor to the nation’s entire migration program in 2018-19. Home Affairs advised the then government to cut the permanent migration program to 150,000, not with reference to economic, social or other policy objectives, or an assessment of the human impacts of further delays to partner and child visas, but just because that was all that the resourcing permitted. Despite the fact that Australia’s partner visa charge is amongst the highest, if not the highest, in the world.
4.64The Committee welcomes the significant improvements in family and partner visa processing over the last two years. This appears to be partly a genuine response to the audit, but primarily due to the allocation of additional staff to Home Affairs and changes in policy which have led to a very significant reduction in the backlog of partner and child visas on hand and aggregate waiting times.
4.65To build recent improvements, the Committee makes a series of findings and recommendations regarding issues raised in the ANAO audit report and proposes additional actions for Home Affairs and government to consider.
4.66With regard to stakeholder consultation, the Committee considers that the community and stakeholder consultation undertaken by Home Affairs for many years to inform its advice to government regarding the Family Migration Program was inadequate. The stakeholder consultation effort was unbalanced, and overwhelmingly focussed on the skills and economic aspects of the permanent migration program without adequately considering the impacts of the family program.While it can be reasonably expected that most Members and Senators have some exposure to the family migration program through their electorate offices, governments should have very clear and well-informed advice regarding community views and the human as well as economic impacts of its policy choices and resourcing decisions. It is disappointing to the Committee that this clearly had not occurred for many years and the Committee welcomes Home Affairs evidence that improvements have been made.
4.67The Committee is concerned at the impact on Australians by excessive and highly variable delays and processing times for Partner and Child Visas. This is a complex issue that has arisen due to a combination of factors including:
- The previous Ministerial Direction 80 (now revoked) which in effect consigned thousands of partner and child visa applications to be stuck in permanent limbo, with little prospect of ever being granted.
- The practical impact of annual ‘planning levels’ – while not technically a ‘cap’ in strict legislative terms, it has a similar practical impact as it is strictly applied by the Department in practice as part of the overall permanent migration program: it is a hard limit so that when the ‘planning level is reached then the queue and waiting times just starts growing.
- Highly variable performance across the globe impacted by staff resourcing levels as well as caseload complexity.
- The most critical thing that drives waiting times in aggregate for partner and child visas is that the annual ‘planning level’ is currently managed as part of the permanent migration program just like every other permanent visa category. This is despite the legislation not permitting capping and queuing. In practical effect, partner and child visas are traded off against permanent humanitarian, skilled and business visas within whatever annual headline number government decides.
- One argument that is sometimes made for limiting or reducing the permanent visa program is the impact on housing. This is simply nonsensical in relation to partner visas as the spouse or partner lives in the same house (and usually bedroom) as their Australian partner.
- The key practical impact of a planning level that does not match demand is that waiting times increase but the impacts of this on individual Australians varies enormously across the caseload. Many applicants get a temporary visa and wait onshore with their partner however this has routinely been a key cause of the blowouts in the number of onshore bridging visas as seen over previous years. In essence, cutting the annual allocation of partner visas is in reality a fake cut to migration as numerous people are still living onshore, just waiting for a partner visa due to arbitrary planning levels. If, however, an applicant comes from a country where it is difficult or impossible to get a temporary visa to wait onshore (as they cannot meet the Genuine Temporary Entrant test) then the couple endure the pain of separation for months or often many years.
- The Committee welcomes the Department’s evidence of a shift in recent years to what they have termed ‘a demand driven system’. This appears to be a belated acknowledgment of the legislative reality. The current approach, however, is not truly demand driven and further reforms could be contemplated.
- Specifically, the Committee recommends that the Department give further consideration to excising the partner and child visa streams from the annual headline permanent visa number and separately report and resource them to make it truly a demand driven system. The key policy driver here would be to accept not just the letter but the spirit of the Migration Act provisions that do not permit partner or child visas to be capped and queued. Such a change would finally make real the illusory promise of a demand driven system whereby Australians could expect a visa for their Partner and children to be granted in a reasonable timeframe (for example within an average of one year or so maximum).
- Obviously, there would still need to be annual planning levels but these could be linked to projected demand forecasting and anticipated processing resources, rather than the policy and political trade-offs against other parts of the permanent migration program. Governments could still take account of the anticipated economic and fiscal impacts of partner and child migration in establishing the annual planning level.
- With regard to processing times, the Committee stresses the need for greater transparency given the confusion and stress for applicants and their families, including an ability to start a family and plan for the future. Future reforms to the system should seek to provide greater insights for applicants—in aggregate and individually. The Committee appreciates however that unfortunately this is unlikely to be possible until major upgrades are undertaken in future years to the Home Affairs’ antiquated IT and visa processing systems.
- The Committee is firmly of the view that greater attention to ongoing program and policy evaluation in family migration is warranted. Advice to government regarding policies that have such significant impacts on the lives of Australians should include far richer qualitative information about the benefits, failings and opportunities in the program, ensuring also that the human impacts on Australians are incorporated intopolicy analysis and advice.
4.76The Committee recommends that the Department of Home Affairs ensures thatqualitative factors (including processing times and their impacts) are considered in the analysis of effective direct stakeholder consultation with the Family Migration Program, to better inform and advise the Australian Government and the Parliament.
4.77The Committee requests that the Department of Home Affairs reports back to it on its progress in including more qualitative data and engaging directly with stakeholders within 12 months of the date of this report.
4.78The Committee recommends that the Australian Government consider further reforms to make the partner and child family visa programs truly demand driven with reasonable waiting times, excising these streams from the annual headline permanent migration cap and allocating sufficient processing resources annually to meet projected demand with a reasonable average processing time.
Department of the Treasury
4.79The Committee acknowledges Treasury’s advice regarding ‘de-prioritisation’ briefs that were sent to Government during this period and the substantive issues and arguments. Nevertheless, the Committee remains concerned that there is no evidence available that indicates advice was provided or approval received from the Government to discontinue and reallocate funding from the Shadow Economy work.
4.80On that basis the only conclusion the Committee can draw was that the justification to re-allocate funding by Treasury was inappropriate, and the situation made worse by the lack of records surrounding the lead up to, and after, the decision. The issue has been compounded by the need for Treasury to ask for the funding at a future date to complete the original task of the Black Economy Taskforce coordination.
4.81The Committee requests that the Department of the Treasury reports back to it on its progress in strengthening its information management processes, including providing the procedural documentation within 12 months of the date of this report.