Chapter 2 - Analysis

  1. Analysis

Overview

2.1This chapter focusses specifically on the contract management aspects of each of the audits included in the inquiry and provides a brief analysis of both the audit findings and the corresponding evidence received by the Committee. Issues around the various stages of procurement conducted by each of the audited entities are not covered in any significant detail as the Committee has conducted other recent inquiries into Commonwealth procurement. The Committee’s comments, conclusions and recommendations for the inquiry are at Chapter 3.

Management of the Australian War Memorial’s Development Project

Background and audit findings

2.2The Australian War Memorial (AWM) was allocated $498.7 million in 2018 to deliver a significant development project, with a further supplementation in 2022 of $50million (plus an additional $8.8 million unspent from the business case funding). The project is due to be completed in 2028. The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) subsequently conducted an audit of this nationally significant project and presented its findings in April 2024.[1]

2.3The ANAO noted in its audit report that there were 221 contracts for project management, design, engineering, construction and specialist advice for this development project and that the procurement and contract management activities by AWM had been largely effective. Deficiencies were found only in record keeping, management of conflicts of interest, documenting value for money and in the quality of certain ministerial advice.[2] The five recommendations from the audit directed to AWM related to these shortfalls.

2.4In demonstrating largely effective contract management practices in delivering its development project, AWM were found by ANAO to have:

  • clearly documented requirements in the project contracts
  • appropriate systems to monitor contractor performance
  • largely effective management of performance to achieve value for money and deliver the project objectives.[3]
    1. The ANAO found weaknesses in AWM’s contract management in the following areas:
  • insufficient documentation of assessment of value for money considerations for contract variations
  • insufficient detail of value for money assessments in briefs to the Minister
  • one instance where the signed contract variation exceeded the value approved by the minister and had been incorrectly stated in the subsequent ministerial brief.[4]
    1. Of the five recommendations directed to AWM in the audit report, Recommendation 5 was related to contract management practices and stated:

The Australian War Memorial revise its whole of project Construction Management Plan to ensure it adequately captures requirements of the Memorial’s procurement policy and alignment with the better practice principles of the Australian Government Contract Management Guide. This should include consideration of implementing individual contract management plans for higher value procurements to manage contractor specific risks and compliance with legislative and policy requirements.[5]

2.7ANAO made this recommendation as it had noted in the audit that while AWM’s whole of project approach to managing the development project contracts ‘supports project integration and improved consistency in decision making, risk management, safety, quality and control’ it also produced inherent risks:

The absence of individual contract management plans creates risks for succession planning, management of compliance, conflicts of interest, and identifying, assessing, and managing risks specific to individual contracts or contractors. For example, the ANAO identified that the Memorial held no letters of contractor compliance with the requirements of the Workplace Gender Equality Act (2012).[6]

2.8AWM agreed to Recommendation 5, indicating in its response that it was reviewing its construction and associated project management plans to ensure improved alignment with the Australian Government Contract Management Guide.[7]

Expertise and governance

2.9In its submission to the inquiry, AWM makes the following observations in relation to its contract management experiences in the development project and opportunities for improvement that regarded as pertinent to other Commonwealth entities:

  • general contract management skills development in the business areas has not seen the same uplift as more contemporary functions such as procurement
  • contract management skills are readily available in the market through third party providers but other specialist skills required by AWM, such as the curation of national collections, are less common
  • staffing restrictions and funding constraints had forced the outsourcing of generalist skills such as contract management and had reduced in-house capacity
  • key aspects of contract management, such as probity, process and value for money are not as high profile as other key performance areas which can lead to lower urgency in skills uplift and a higher tolerance for error in these activities
  • improved whole of government guidance on essential records that must be kept during contract management would be desirable, possibly an automated solution
  • greater mobility and sharing of staff with project and contract management skills could support agencies during the implementation of complex projects and peak periods of work and foster an APS culture of sharing lessons learned.[8]
    1. At the public hearing on 13 November 2024, the AWM was asked by the Committee to provide further details of its overall governance arrangements and those specifically used for the project. AWM responded on notice that the governance structures for the development project comprised:
  • a Project Steering Committee chaired by the AWM Director that provides oversight and guides decisions by the Executive Program Director for all aspects of project delivery
  • an Inter-Departmental Advisory Committee that reviews and advises on matters relevant to the project from a whole-of-Government perspective
  • a Corporate Management Group of SES level staff that provides strategic oversight and manages the interface between the project and AWM operations
  • a Safety Working Group that manages health and safety matters for the project
  • project Communications Groups for both the Precinct (Construction) and Gallery works that facilitate a collective understanding of project delivery requirements and ensure that key user groups fully understand progress and challenges
  • an Integrated Management Team of public servants, contractors and consultants for project delivery
  • a Project Management Group that manages day to day activities.[9]
    1. Reflecting also on its experiences with the governance of the development project at the public hearing, AWM commented that:

The message that contract management is an important skill and enabler of much of our success must come from the top, supported by governance functions, rather than the governance functions being seen to tie leaders up in red tape.[10]

Policies and guidelines

2.12AWM noted in its evidence at the public hearing on 13 November 2024 that the existing guidance from the Department of Finance (Finance) was helpful in setting up the frameworks underpinning the project:

In terms of help from Finance, we didn't get any direct help in relation to this project per se, but we did find their existing guidance on the CPRs and related guidance material quite useful in setting up our governance framework. We did liaise with them about some general advice on how we were going to set up our governance framework, which was quite handy, but we didn't get any direct help on this project specifically.[11]

Performance measures

2.13AWM noted in its submission that the ANAO audit had found it ‘to be largely effective in its management of a relatively high value and complex project in an area, construction, where the Memorial did not have a depth of in house expertise’.[12] AWM commented further on its performance management, in response to written questions on notice, that:

  • a clear set of management plans were developed at the outset that outlined how the project would be managed, procured, delivered and operationalised
  • four clear project priorities were thereby established: safety, quality, maximisation of built outcomes and time
  • performance was achieved through project specific controls for these priorities that aligned with specific contract requirements and ensured that contract deliverables are met, including among others construction and design management, commissioning and testing, risk, probity and contract management, contingency and escalation management, and a responsibility matrix.[13]

2.14AWM further commented in its written responses that the controls enabled it to have effective oversight of the project’s progress and deliverables:

These controls ensure that once a contract is signed that the Memorial Council and Executive can transparently track progress against defined milestones, receive updates on risks and opportunities, and otherwise effectively oversee and guide the Project. The controls also provide the staff managing these contracts on a day-to-day basis a coherent and clear framework for how to achieve outcomes and provide management with appropriate delegation and oversight of cost, time and risk matters.[14]

Recordkeeping

2.15Noting the audit findings that there were some deficiencies in recordkeeping and the ANAO’s corresponding recommendation for records management policy updates, AWM stated at the public hearing on 13 November 2024 in relation to recordkeeping that it now had a more centralised process in place to address prior deficiencies:

Recordkeeping is an issue and we are tackling this in a number of ways. We have centralised part of our procurement in contract management process, which provides natural control points such as the approval of procurement plans, commitment authorisations and issuing of contracts and variations. This centralisation of part of the process brings in expert checkpoints, including confirming that records are in order, without the overhead or disconnect from the contract deliverables that come from an entirely centralised process. The memorial is pursuing automation to assist with recordkeeping and guiding staff through the procurement and contract management process.[15]

2.16AWM made a recommendation in its submission to the inquiry that there should be ‘further improved guidance and factsheets on discrete areas such as what records to keep and what is less essential.’[16] ANAO commented at the public hearing on 13 November 2024 that failure to adhere to the Archives Act1983 and keep relevant business records is an issue that comes up in its auditing work. ANAO stated:

We would be loath to support changes to recordkeeping guidance that had a tone of red tape. Recordkeeping is embedded in the law. We think it's a piece of integrity for the public service to keep good records. While we always applaud the centre—in this case, the National Archives—putting out better guidance, we would hate to see a backing off of the pursuit of good recordkeeping in the public service based on what we're seeing.[17]

2.17The Committee subsequently asked AWM in writing to comment on the ANAO’s finding that records of contract variations had not been consistently supported by value for money assessments and that this was reflected also by a lack of these details in the corresponding ministerial briefs. AWM responded that it had since implemented additional controls in its Development Project Cost Management Plan ‘to ensure value for money (VFM) is more clearly assessed and documented, including where contract values change or scope is varied, to better inform and record delegate decisions.’[18]

2.18AWM further stated in this regard:

Under these changes, for example, to vary a contract over $1 million a variation assessment is conducted which examines the history of the contract, the requirement(s) of the proposed variation, the procurement cost(s) and value for money matters. Key to the VFM assessment is a clear summary of how the proposed procurement would provide VFM when considered against the ‘Four E’s’ of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules – efficiency, effectiveness, economy and ethics.[19]

2.19AWM remarked also that it was providing additional detailed information on VFM in its ministerial briefs with regard to high value contract approval requests.[20]

Procurement of My Health Record

Background and audit findings

2.20An estimated $2 billion has now been invested into the My Health Record (MHR) system, which is managed by the Australian Digital Health Agency (ADHA) and aims to improve the availability and quality of health information nationally. Over 23 million Australians now have a My Health record.

2.21MHR has been implemented through IT supplier contracts. The largest of these contracts is the National Infrastructure Operator (NIO) contract, first executed with Accenture Australia Holdings Pty Ltd (Accenture) in June 2012. The management of contractual arrangements with Accenture from 1 January 2018 to 31 December 2023 was included in the scope of the audit.[21]

2.22The audit was undertaken due to the unique and elevated risks relating to procuring and managing large public interfacing IT systems.

2.23ANAO found that the contract management and procurement of MHR has only been partly effective, though ADHA’s governance framework was largely fitforpurpose.[22] The audit identified deficiencies regarding contract management for MHR in the following areas:

  • assessment of contract risk when contracts were varied
  • management of contractor performance, including when the contract was extended
  • the contract management plan was not reviewed as required
  • records management.
    1. ANAO made 13 recommendations, six of which related to contract management including: conducting a risk review; updating the contract management plan; ensuring performance and value for money when variations or extensions are approved; adherence to the information governance framework; reviewing contract reports and deliverables; and specifying maintenance of system architecture documentation in arrangements following the expiry of the current contract. All six were agreed to.
    2. ADHA agreed in principle to one procurement-related recommendation, which recommended that it conduct an open tender process following the expiry of the NIO contract on 30 June 2025.[23] At the 13 November 2024 public hearing, ADHA advised that:

We accepted that in principle only because we were conscious that the board is the accountable authority for that decision. So, at the time, we just didn't want to sort of bind the board.[24]

2.26ADHA further advised that since the audit, ‘that decision has been made and is fully agreed and is underway. It has been published’.[25]

Expertise and governance

2.27Regarding governance arrangements for contract management, ADHA noted the audit’s finding that its governance arrangements were largely fit for purpose.[26] ADHA advised that its key governance features include:

  • a focus on audit, risk management and fraud control strategies
  • mechanisms for stakeholder participation through representation on specialist committees
  • internal and external scrutiny through a robust planning and reporting framework which informs the Agency’s Portfolio Budget Statement, Corporate Plan and Annual Report
  • embedding ethics and integrity in the values and culture of the Agency.[27]
    1. In response to ANAO’s finding that the contract management plan was missing detail in some areas, ADHA advised that ‘the contract management plan has since been updated in line with the recommendations contained in the report’.[28] ADHA further advised at the 13 November 2024 public hearing that:

We have also undertaken an internal audit on the work that we've done on those changes to the contract management plan to ensure that we have fully worked them through. There were a couple of minor suggestions for improvement made in our internal audit, which we are also adding to that assurance.[29]

2.29Speaking more broadly about its procurement and contract management arrangements, ADHA advised in its submission to this inquiry that it adopted Finance’s BuyRight tool in 2021 ‘to embed procurement and contract management best practice and expertise within the organisation’.[30]

2.30ADHA further advised that, since June 2024, it has established a team ‘to centrally manage complex procurements, develop further specialist expertise, work collaboratively with business areas to implement our new procurement delivery model, plan complex procurements and further build capability across the Agency’.[31]

2.31ADHA, in responding to questions on notice from the Committee, provided several lessons learned from moving to a centralised procurement function, which included:

  • the need for sufficient capacity and capability in procurement and contract management to effectively drive a centralised “centre of excellence” approach, especially in the early stages when uplift may be required
  • recognising procurement as a specialised skill set
  • the need to implement a change management approach to ensure buy in and cultural change across the Agency
  • the need for an appropriate tool to guide and manage workflow to support compliant procurements.[32]
    1. Risk assessment, particularly in relation to contract variations, was another area examined in the audit. In response to questions on notice from the Committee, ADHA elaborated on how it has changed the way contract risk is assessed and managed, including by updating procurement templates and including risk management assessments.[33] In relation to risk management assessments, ADHA further advised that:

For high risk, high value procurements delegates are provided with this assessment, undertaken by a dedicated, specialist central procurement team, prior to making procurement and contract variation decisions.[34]

2.33ADHA also advised that ongoing risk management arrangements are in place for contract management including Service, Operation, and Performance Working Groups (SOPWGs) and monthly Service Review Forums, where items in the Risk, Actions, Issues and Decisions Register are examined among other operational and contractual matters.[35]

Policies and guidelines

2.34In its submission to the inquiry, ADHA stated that ‘augmenting governance and assurance processes and putting in place improvements for future delivery has been central to the Agency’s internal capability uplift’, which includes improving its contract management policies, guidelines and templates.[36]

2.35ADHA also advised that it would make further updates to address the audit report’s findings and recommendations, stating that:

Further planned initiatives include specific updates to address the recommendations and opportunities for improvement identified in the Audit Report and continued enhancement of guidance and support materials for Agency staff to improve capability and outcomes and to further improve alignment with Commonwealth best practice.[37]

2.36In response to the ANAO’s finding that value for money considerations were not documented for six contract amendments, ADHA advised that it has ‘strengthened the guidance and documentation of value for money achieved from Agency procurements and contract variations’ in the following ways:

  • introducing new templates ‘which ensure that all elements of value for money assessment are considered and analysis in relation to each of them is set out methodically’
  • introducing a new template for contract reviews and revising its internal assurance program in the first quarter of 2025 to ‘monitor and assure that all required information is captured and used correctly’
  • establishing a centralised Procurement Services Section in the Finance Branch in June 2024 for oversight.[38]

Performance measures

2.37In response to questions on notice following the 13 November 2024 public hearing, ADHA advised that it is further developing its Partner Value Index, which is ‘a strategic management tool that is helping the Agency to measure, manage and provide feedback on partner performance’.[39] ADHA further described the index as follows:

The PVI uses a survey tool provided quarterly to key Agency stakeholders to secure a score across multiple domains (e.g. contract performance, value for money, relationship, and thought leadership). The results are used to engage with the partner to discuss and improve performance, for a comparative analysis across vendors and to uplift the overall partner environment supporting the delivery of national digital health products and services.[40]

2.38The practice of advance payments, involving paying suppliers before goods or services are delivered, was commented on by ANAO in the audit in relation to how it may influence the enforcement of performance requirements. ANAO noted in the report that:

Advance payment creates the risk of weaker leverage to enforce performance requirements. This risk is partly mitigated through the ability of ADHA to claim, at its sole discretion, ‘service credits’ against payments that are paid in arrears should Accenture fail to meet certain service levels.[41]

2.39ADHA commented further on its use of advance payments in contracts in its response to questions on notice from the 13 November 2024 public hearing, stating that:

While the inclusion of advanced payments can create the risk of weaker leverage to enforce performance requirements, the Australian Digital Health Agency (ADHA) implemented contractual levers within the Accenture contract to reduce this risk from the commencement of the contract. Throughout the term of the contract, ADHA has maintained and applied these levers, including the use of service credits and other contractual levers, where delivery did not meet requirements. ADHA continues to monitor Accenture’s performance to ensure they comply with their obligations.

In relation to new contracts, the Agency would consider the costs, risks and benefits of this approach on a case-by-case basis.[42]

2.40In response to a question on notice from the Committee requesting information on lessons learned the use of service credits, ADHA advised that:

One lesson learned from the practice of capping service credits is that very close monitoring of the performance of the vendor is required, including applying the service credits consistently within the provisions of the contract. While capping of service credits is common practice, parameters and application need to be negotiated with clarity and specificity prior to contract commencement and managed carefully throughout the life of the contract, including reviews at appropriate milestones such as variations, renewals or extensions.

For example, in the case of the Agency, Accenture’s compliance against service levels is reported monthly, including details on where service levels have not been met and credits are applicable. The Agency undertakes detailed analysis of these reports to confirm the data being reported is accurate and, once accepted by the Agency, the applicable service credits are applied to the next monthly invoice. Any non-performance, risk management, service credits and other contractual matters are discussed at regular governance meetings with Accenture.[43]

Recordkeeping

2.41ADHA advised in its submission to this inquiry that it ‘has invested in significant uplift of its records management systems, supporting Agency staff to efficiently and accurately maintain project delivery, procurement and contract documentation’.[44] As part of this, ADHA advised that it implemented a legislatively compliant records management system in 2021.[45]

2.42In its submission, ADHA provided further information on actions taken in response to the audit, which include:

… refining procurement and contract management templates for complex activities, exploring the establishment of centralised contract management activities and implementing training resources for staff on record keeping standards and ethics in procurement and contract management.[46]

2.43ADHA further advised that the agency’s material contracts and known procurement activities are reported on to its Senior Executive Committee, Audit and Risk Committee, and Board.[47]

Administration of the Adult Migrant English Program contracts

Background and audit findings

2.44The Adult Migrant English Program (AMEP) was established in 1948 to provide free English tuition to eligible migrants and humanitarian entrants to Australia. The Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) has had responsibility for AMEP since 2019, along with the contracted quality assurance provider Linda Wyse and Associates (Linda Wyse).

2.45ANAO notes in its rationale for conducting an audit of the current AMEP contracts that they are valued at over $2 billion and will have been in place for seven and a half years before being replaced.[48] The audit report stated in relation to this program:

The current contracts commenced in 2017 and deliver English language lessons in over 300 locations and online, to clients in metropolitan, regional and remote locations in Australia. The 15 contracts were initially valued at $1.22 billion which had increased by 75 per cent to more $2.153 billion as at April 2024, representing an average annual contract value of $287 million.[49]

2.46ANAO further commented that the reported value of the quality assurance contract had increased to $22.52 million from $6.15 million.[50] ANAO summarised AMEP’s contractual status in the audit report as follows:

All contracts were due to end on 30 June 2023. These contract arrangements were extended in December 2022, to 30 June 2024 (with work orders under the contracts not due to expire until 31 December 2024), after a government decision to delay implementation of a further new AMEP business model. The request for tender for new AMEP contracts was to be issued in September 2023, and new arrangements to commence 1 January 2025. On 30 November 2023, the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs approved a further delay, with no new release date advised.[51]

2.47The principal ANAO findings from its audit were that the design and administration of the AMEP contracts had not been effective and that appropriate contractual arrangements were not in place with the 13 general service providers for this program.[52]

2.48Specific deficiencies found by ANAO in Home Affairs’ management of the AMEP contracts included:

  • contracts continuing to operate past their stated completion date even though there were no extension options
  • insufficient documentation to evidence that the significant contract variations represented value for money
  • weaknesses in the engagement of advisers and contracted providers to identify new ideas or innovations for service delivery
  • lack of a probity plan for the management of the contracts, and inadequate transition planning for their end
  • insufficiently robust invoice verification processes
  • failure to implement a previously agreed recommendation that complaints data from providers would be used to inform and improve service delivery for students
  • appropriate assurance not obtained over the work of the 13 contracted general service providers through the administration of the contract with Linda Wyse as quality assurance provider
  • no information technology system to support the oversight of contractor service delivery necessitating additional payments to the service providers for the additional administrative burden
  • no application of four key performance indicators (KPIs) in place upon the signing of the contracts for the first 12 months of the contract term with only one now remaining, the ‘Participation’ metric (see Table 2.1)
  • as indicated in Table 2.1, removal of the KPIs that addressed student attainment and assessment.[53]
    1. ANAO found that the work of Linda Wyse had moved significantly away from quality assurance,[54] and commented that ‘the KPI framework was changed after the completion of the procurement process to select the provider of quality assurance services and does not reflect the full scope of services expected of the contractor.’[55]
    2. Ten recommendations were made in the audit report related to contract management activities and all were agreed to by both Home Affairs and Linda Wyse. The principal action items arising from these recommendations were:
  • a complete record of all contract variations to be kept
  • a decision-making record to be developed to address whether contract variations represented value for money
  • stronger governance over the engagement with AMEP service providers to identify areas for improvement
  • a probity plan to govern the management of AMEP contracts
  • improved transition planning for future AMEP contracts
  • a comprehensive suite of performance indicators and targets for the AMEP contracts
  • a review of complaints data from the AMEP service providers to inform and improve service delivery to students
  • a strengthening of AMEP’s contractual performance management framework for the provision of quality assurance services
  • a systematic, documented, evidence-based approach to determining and targeting quality assurance activities
  • greater emphasis on monitoring the quality of services being delivered to students.[56]

Table 2.1Key performance indicators for the existing AMEP contracts

KPI

Measurement at time

contracts signed

ANAO analysis

Participation: number of eligible clients who commence in the program (only KPI that is currently in effect)

90% of eligible clients who complete a commencement process and commence AMEP learning activities

Indicator changed in 2018 to include a threshold that ‘commencement’ occurs ‘within six months of an initial assessment for in person, and six months of referral for distance learning

Attainment: client benefits from AMEP learning activities as measured by the Australian Core Skills Framework (ACSF)

80% of clients attain one ACSF indicator per 200 hours of tuition (applies to both pre-employment and social streams)

Paused during COVID-19 to allow service providers to focus on client engagement and retention but then removed following consultation with service providers with no replacement

Data timeliness: data is recorded and reported in a form required by the Commonwealth within the required timeframes.

95% of data is recorded and reported in a form required by the Commonwealth within the required timeframes.

Never used as it was reliant on a new system which was never developed. No alternative was put in place.

Accurate assessment: Client assessment is accurate in accordance with the ACSF

95% of client assessment outcomes are accurate against the ACSF

Target reduced to 80% in 2018 and KPI paused completely in 2021 with instructions that it would not be reimplemented during the contract period

Source: Auditor-General Report No.37 2023–24, Table 3.1, p. 44.

Expertise and governance

2.51Home Affairs acknowledged in its submission to the inquiry that there were opportunities for improvement arising from the audit of the AMEP contracts and that it is progressing the actions arising from the ANAO recommendations. Home Affairs did not concur however with ANAO’s overarching conclusions in the report:

The department does not agree with the ANAO findings that the design and administration of the current Agreements have not been effective, nor that the contractual arrangements in place are not appropriate. These arrangements have effectively delivered English language tuition to eligible migrants and humanitarian entrants throughout the Agreement term, including during the period of unprecedented disruption due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The arrangements established by the department have supported eligible migrants and humanitarian entrants to improve their English language skills and settle into Australia throughout the contract cycle.[57]

2.52Home Affairs further commented in its submission that its own ‘Contract Management Framework (CMF)’ ‘supports the appropriate governance, capability, risk and financial management mechanisms to ensure contracts are managed effectively and efficiently.’[58]

Policies and guidelines - Stakeholder concerns with AMEP

2.53The Australian Council of TESOL [teaching English to speakers of other languages] Associations (ACTA) expressed some strong concerns about AMEP from its current inception in 2017 to the continuing nature of its management. ACTA commented in its submission that:

… the Department of Education and Training (DET) designed the 2017 contract to serve their bureaucratic goals of aligning the AMEP with their other labour market programs – in the first instance the Skills for Employment and Education (SEE) Program. The design had nothing to do with delivering quality English language tuition to adult migrants to assist their settlement in Australia. DET was derelict in its lack of understanding of the implications for providers of the changes to the AMEP required by the contract.[59]

2.54ACTA contended in its submission that many of the failings identified by the ANAO audit of AMEP stemmed from this ‘misdirected policy’, in addition to ‘a failure to consider (much less put in place) the record-keeping and data management infrastructure necessary to support the contract, and the institution of performance measures that undermined their stated purpose’.[60]

2.55At the public hearing on 4 December 2024, ACTA outlined some of the problematic incentives that the KPIs for the existing AMEP contracts had brought, including teachers being encouraged to pass students to achieve that KPI even though they were not yet competent and would be moved to a higher level that was too difficult for them.[61] ACTA further remarked:

… there is example after example as to how that assessment system was subverted in various ways—and it's not because the teachers don't want to do their jobs. This is an anecdote from a forum that I held in Queensland. A teacher put up her hand and she said, 'I've been teaching these students for 20 years. I know what they need, so I teach them what they need. I go home at night and I make it all up to fit the KPI.' That's what was happening, and that is hugely demoralising for teachers; they don't want to do that.[62]

2.56ACTA noted in its submission to the inquiry that it did have some confidence in the outline of the new AMEP business model put forward by Home Affairs.[63] ACTA remarked at the public hearing that the KPIs in the new request for tender ‘do express the intent of the AMEP’, but that:

The devil is in the detail. Two of the KPIs, the participation KPI and the learning outcomes KPI, are subject to the same perverse incentives that I've just indicated. The problem with the participation KPI is it incentivises providers to enrol people who are not ready to learn.[64]

2.57A number of individuals who have been teaching English under the AMEP scheme made anonymous submissions to the inquiry in which they expressed a number of notable concerns including:

  • the mandated use of the ACSF for student assessment, even though this framework was designed for use with native English speakers[65]
  • the AMEP Reporting Management System (ARMS) is decades old software that was not designed for the present-day record-keeping requirements of AMEP[66]
  • the accurate assessment KPI did not reflect provider quality in any way and led to low morale amongst staff, teachers leaving the profession, and a huge administrative burden[67]
  • record keeping at the start of the AMEP contract was extremely stressful and time consuming on multiple levels, including a new system to track student hourly attendance, the cumbersome ACSF to assess student attainment, and the difficulties in using ARMS for student management and reports.[68]

Performance measures

2.58At the public hearing on 13 November 2024, the Committee queried the ANAO’s finding that the KPI concerning attainment had been removed, the data timeliness measure had never been used, and that ‘Participation’ was now the only remaining KPI out of the four that had originally been in place upon the signing of the AMEP contracts in 2017.

2.59Home Affairs replied on notice in relation to data timeliness that the IT system intended to be used for this by the then Department of Education and Training (DET), which had carriage of the current AMEP contracts when they were signed in 2017, known as the Skills Hub Administration and Reporting Portal (SHARP) was still under development at that time and was not pursued by Home Affairs when it was given responsibility for the program in 2019.[69] Home Affairs stated:

The department decided to not pursue the SHARP project for the AMEP, to allow consideration of the IT requirements to support AMEP and other settlement and migrant services as part of the broader IT systems environment in Home Affairs. In July 2020, the department integrated the two existing legacy systems for the AMEP – the AMEP Reporting Management System and the AMEP Reporting Facility – to streamline systems support of the AMEP. The department is currently developing a new IT management system for the AMEP, which will be implemented to support new contracts from 1 January 2026.[70]

2.60Home Affairs also responded on notice in relation to the removal of the attainment KPI that English language progression in AMEP was measured by a minimum of one ACSF indicator, commenting:

This was initially assessed every 200 hours as a separate assessment against the ACSF. In 2020, the ACSF assessment was initially paused during COVID-19 to allow service providers to focus on client engagement and retention. The ACSF assessment was subsequently replaced by the collection of Australian Vocational Education and Training Management Information Statistical Standard (AVETMISS) data. For this reporting, client progress is measured by curriculum unit achievement according to the AVETMISS data supplied by AMEP providers, which is mapped to the ACSF.[71]

2.61Home Affairs further stated that 89 per cent of AMEP clients achieved language progression and that this new approach to measuring attainment was ‘consistent with recommendations from the Evaluation of the AMEP New Business Model undertaken by Social Compass in 2019’ and had removed duplication whereby students had previously been assessed against both the curriculum and the ACSF.[72]

2.62The Committee also queried on notice the audit findings relating to quality assurance that:

  • the contractual performance framework was diminished after the quality assurance provider was selected and the contract signed
  • the approach to planning quality assurance work is not risk based
  • Home Affairs has significantly changed the nature of services provided away from quality assurance over the work of the general service providers For 2023–24, the department decided that 15 per cent of the budget for the provider would be spent on quality assurance work, down from 78 per cent in the first year of the contract.[73]
    1. Home Affairs indicated in its written response that it was monitoring the quality of service delivery under AMEP ‘via client file verifications, onsite quality assurance assessments, Settlement Language Pathways to Employment and Training (SLPET) files reviews and other QA activities’.[74] Home Affairs further commented that:

Alongside these activities, funds were available for QA focused projects which supported the transition to a national curriculum and development of content for the re-launched AMEPOnline, whilst also ensuring that every contract region was audited.[75]

Recordkeeping

2.64The AMEP audit report noted that Home Affairs had not kept adequate records to document the contract variations in this program, particularly with respect to demonstrating value for money, and made a recommendation accordingly.[76]

2.65Home Affairs indicated in a response on notice:

The department has accepted the Australian National Audit Office’s feedback on strengthening the decision-making records around value for money assessments undertaken in relation to the AMEP. The department has reviewed its process to ensure that decision records on all contract variations include a clear statement and conclusion on value for money.[77]

2.66ANAO commented specifically on the AMEP audit in relation to lessons learned and records that are kept:

Chair, you raised the point about the very vintage age of this program and what it's brought to Australian society, and five years ago it was MoG’d into Home Affairs. What we heard throughout the audit is we can't access records of another department. We can, because they are Commonwealth records. But what we're seeing here is that there's a whole framework under which MoGs have to get executed, and it doesn't sound like this one was done very well. For the recipient entity and the losing entity, it's about that real rigour around what records come over, what you're inheriting, how you administer it and about asking questions and having lines of connectivity back, because history can get lost if good records aren't kept.[78]

Provision of information to the auditors

2.67ANAO commented at the public hearing in relation to its audit of Home Affairs and the AMEP program that it had to use its ‘warrant’ powers to request information from the department, which indicated its preference to do it this way rather than provide the information cooperatively to ANAO, and that this was becoming more common:

For the committee's perspective, I wanted to draw attention to the increase in the use of our information-gathering powers across the sector. This is an example of where we've had to do that, and I'm concerned for the Audit Office but also the sector that the need to use our strong information-gathering powers is on the rise. In this one, we had to use our section 33 powers, which is sort of our warrant power, to go on site and get records, which is unusual.[79]

2.68ANAO further stated in this regard that the use of these powers was sometimes preferable but this was not the case I this particular audit:

Sometimes we find that—it's not the case in this audit—the secrecy provisions in enabling legislation are best dealt with by us using our stronger powers to ensure everyone is certain. But it's something that's on the rise, and I think this committee is the place we raise that.[80]

The management of contracts for the supply of munitions

Overview

2.69The audit of the management of munitions contracts by the Department of Defence (Defence) was conducted in two parts. Part 1 was published in June 2024 and was included in the inquiry’s terms of reference. Part 2 of the audit was expected to be reported in late 2024, and would then have also been incorporated into the scope of the inquiry, but had not yet been published at the time of writing of this report. Defence’s audited contract management activities relating to munitions supply could not therefore be fully examined by the Committee.

Background and audit findings

2.70On 29 June 2020, the Australian Government announced that Defence had signed a new agreement with Thales for the continued management and operation of the Mulwala and Benalla facilities. The agreement was for 10 years and was valued at $1.2 billion. The intended purpose of the agreement was to maintain domestic capability for munitions manufacturing and assure the supply of key munitions and components for the Australian Defence Force. The procurement process to establish the arrangements was based on a sole source approach and commenced in 2016.

2.71ANAO conducted an audit of the procurement and published part one of the report in June 2024.[81] The audit identified deficiencies in areas including procurement and probity planning, advice to decision-makers, and risk assessments. The audit also found that Defence did not manage probity effectively and that there was evidence of unethical conduct.

2.72ANAO made eight recommendations covering areas such as risk assessments, records management, and the appointment of external probity advisers for complex procurements with high probity risks.

2.73The findings and recommendations of part one of the audit do not specifically relate to contract management. In its submission to this inquiry, Defence advised that ‘management of performance against the contract is the focus of the second audit report’.[82] The second report had not yet been published at the conclusion of this inquiry.

Expertise and governance

2.74Defence advised in its submission that it is making use of whole of Government training resources administered by the Finance to uplift staff capability in contract management.[83] Defence further advised that it offers its own contract management training programs, including an Effective Contract Management workshop, described as ‘a practical contract management program to assist the learning and development of officials involved in the management of complex contracts’.[84]

2.75Defence also commented that it has developed a Procurement Lifecycle Capability and Skilling Matrix that ‘provides learning opportunities and training which aligns to a continuous learning model’.[85] Defence further stated that it is ‘benchmarking the current skill level across Groups and Services, prior to developing a targeted work plan to upskill officials in procurement, contract management and commercial acumen’.[86]

Policies and guidelines

2.76In its submission to the inquiry, Defence provided information on the policies and guidelines it has established to support staff involved in managing contracts.

2.77The main document referred to by Defence is the Defence Commercial Framework, which comprises ‘mandatory policies, instructions, procedures and operational guidelines that apply to all Defence officials’.[87] Defence advised that it is updating components of the framework that relate to requests for tender and complex procurements in response to recommendations from the ANAO audit.[88]

2.78Defence advised that it has also established a Contract Management Framework under the Defence Commercial Framework to ‘support Defence officials from the planning stage of a contract, through the performance management stages and to the contract closure activities’.[89] Defence further remarked that the Contract Management Framework ‘captures all operational guidance contained in the Australian Government Contract Management Guide’[90] and provides specific guidance on:

  • undertaking contract record keeping
  • managing contract performance
  • managing contract risk
  • managing contract changes
  • managing delivery and acceptance.[91]
    1. Defence indicated that it has a Defence Financial and Integrity Policy Framework in place that includes mandatory requirements relating to:
  • enforcing contractual obligations
  • managing debt owed by contractors
  • making payments only when contract deliverables are provided according to the contract’s terms
  • managing integrity and conflicts of interest at all times.[92]
    1. Defence provided more information on its contract management arrangements in response to questions on notice arising from the 13 November 2024 public hearing and submitted that:

Defence’s procurement and contract management policies emphasise value for money, ensuring that contract variations or extensions are executed only in accordance with the contract’s terms and conditions and when they demonstrate appropriate value.[93]

2.81Defence also stated in its responses on notice that ‘the mandated My Procurements System facilitates compliance with the Commonwealth Procurement Framework. It incorporates automatic workflows that require value for money justifications for contract variations’.[94]

Performance measures

2.82The audit report does not specifically cover performance measures established for the contract. Defence advised in its submission to this inquiry that it:

… has commenced an internal review and analysis of the existing governance arrangements, recordkeeping, performance measures and probity arrangements to support both current and future contracting arrangements.[95]

Recordkeeping

2.83Defence provided information in its submission on changes to its record keeping arrangements made since the ANAO audit. Defence advised that it updated its Defence Records Management Policy in August 2023 and that:

The policy aligns with a principles based approach and balances accountability with more prescriptive guidance to strengthen the integrity of Commonwealth records during the entire lifecycle, including procurement and contract management.[96]

2.84Defence also advised that it has undertaken the following activities:

  • releasing e-learning courses in 2023 to support the updated policy
  • appointing a Chief Information Governance Officer to ‘drive enterprise-wide accountability across information assets’.[97]

Procurement and implementation of the myClearance System

Background and audit findings

2.85In October2016, the Australian Government agreed to reforms to improve how government entities manage threats posed by malicious insiders. One of these reforms was upgrading the Australian Government Security Vetting Agency’s (AGSVA) ICT system. The new whole-of-government security vetting system, myClearance, went live on 28 November 2022 with an approved acquisition budget of $138.6 million.

2.86ANAO conducted an audit of the procurement and implementation of the myClearance system, the findings of which were published in July 2024.[98] The audit identified deficiencies in areas including project governance arrangements, compliance with Defence’s procurement policy framework and Accountable Authority Instructions, and implementation of the myClearance system.

2.87The audit did not examine Defence’s administration or management of its contracts with service providers associated with the myClearance system project.[99]

2.88ANAO made two recommendations relating to risk management and the development of arrangements to ensure management of the myClearance system complies with the Information Security Manual.

Expertise and governance

2.89Information on Defence’s expertise and governance arrangements is presented earlier in this chapter in the context of Defence's management of contracts for the supply of munitions.

Policies and guidelines

2.90Information on Defence’s overarching policies and guidelines is presented earlier in this chapter in the context of Defence's management of contracts for the supply of munitions.

2.91Regarding the myClearance system procurement, the audit report found that the design of the procurement ‘did not comply with Defence’s procurement policy framework and was inconsistent with the Commonwealth Procurement Rules’.[100] No specific findings were made regarding policies and guidelines for contract management.

Performance measures

2.92In response to questions on notice from the 13 November 2024 public hearing, Defence stated that the Defence Commercial Division within the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group is the owner of procurement and contracting policy and ‘regularly advises new strategies for performance management’.[101]

2.93Defence also advised that its new Defence Digital Group Commercial Branch ‘has applied lessons from the myClearance system audit to optimise contract performance measures, ensuring the selection of measures that generate desired behaviours and outputs from industry’.[102]

2.94Defence further advised that in late 2023 a Strategic Engagement Framework was established, which included Account Review Forums held three times a year. The forums ‘focus on contract performance, overall vendor performance and behaviours, 360-degree feedback reporting, and accountability for both Defence and industry in achieving strategic partner goals’.[103]

2.95ANAO spoke further on the concept of strategic partnerships during the 13November2024 public hearing and stated that:

One the big issues is this kind of nomenclature of strategic partnership. You're actually not in partnership. You have a contract that you need to hold them to account, but you need to build a professional relationship around that and do it in a way that's professional but doesn't go near lines that the community changes its thinking about over time. One of the things that's very hard for Defence is that there are these big international contractors that do very important heavy lifting in defence specialist military equipment and munitions, and we are reliant on them because of their specialisations, but how do we actually form the appropriate distance in our relationships and closeness in our relationships that doesn't put value for money at risk?[104]

Recordkeeping

2.96The audit report included an opportunity for improvement regarding the procurement of the myClearance system, stating that ‘Defence would benefit from ensuring that records of conversation with potential suppliers during a procurement are documented and retained in accordance with Defence’s procurement policy framework’.[105] The report did not specifically cover record keeping during contract management.

The contract management guide

Overview

2.97In its submission to the inquiry, Finance emphasised the importance of effective contract management, stating that:

The contract management phase is where the value for money that is identified in the procurement is realised. Poor contract management can result in a loss of that value for money for the Commonwealth, whereas successful contract management will drive the realisation of value for money.[106]

2.98Finance administers the Australian Government Contract Management Guide (the Guide), which was last updated on 12 July 2023.[107] It states that:

This guide provides practical process guidance to support effective contract management at a practitioner level for Commonwealth entities. The information contained in this guide provides general advice only, does not form Commonwealth policy, is not a substitute for legal advice and should be read in conjunction with your entity-specific policy or guidance on contract management.[108]

2.99The Guide defines a contract as ‘a legally enforceable agreement between two or more parties that details each party’s rights and obligations in performance of that contract.’[109] The Guide describes the four elements of contract management as:

  • the contract governance that establishes the stakeholder engagement mechanisms, oversight arrangements, systems, processes, decision making and reporting
  • measuring, monitoring, and assessment against agreed performance measures to detect and respond to performance issues, and monitoring and assessment of deliverables to enable acceptance and achievement of contract outcomes
  • managing supplier relationships including collaborative engagement mechanisms with contractors
  • contract administration activities that will support day-to-day contract activities, meet legislative requirements for records management, and establish an audit trail to meet transparency requirements.[110]
    1. The Guide also outlines the three main phases in which contract management activities take place, with planning recommended to take place before the contract is signed:
  • Contract start up: contract manager identifies the key roles and activities needed to effectively manage the contract; allocation of accountability
  • Contract performance: main part of the contract is performed and the required goods or services are delivered; includes consideration of variations, extensions and renewals
  • Contract closure: contractual obligations and liabilities between the parties are finalised; may also include transitioning to a new supplier for goods or services.[111]
    1. Contract management planning, including elements such as considering how the contract is drafted and the types of performance measurement activities that will be used, is included as ‘Phase 0’ of the contract management process.[112]
    2. Finance advised that the Guide is updated on an as-needs basis and has been updated six times since 2019.[113] In its submission to the inquiry, Finance noted that it is updating the Guide with ‘additional content including guidance addressing supplier performance management, ethical behaviour and maintaining value for money when considering contract evaluations and extensions’.[114] In response to questions on notice from the Committee, Finance detailed its proposed changes including:
  • refocussing the guidance to further promote the lifecycle approach to procurement, instead of a linear process
  • greater information on assessing, identifying and addressing procurement risk
  • updating information on types of contracts and associated documentation required for risk management and due diligence
  • greater practical advice for each step of the procurement lifecycle, focussing in particular on ensuring value for money and on stakeholder management
  • practical advice on managing supplier relationships
  • updating information on ethical behaviour to include content on the Supplier Code of Conduct, conflicts of interest, and the National Anti-Corruption Commission
  • advice on conducting a ‘lessons learnt’ process at the closure of a contract
  • an expanded appendix, including a larger glossary of terms, with more details on whole of Australian Government arrangements and on standing offers.[115]

Role of the Department of Finance

2.103In its submission to the inquiry, Finance also described the nature of its role as a policy steward of the Commonwealth procurement framework, which includes contract management.[116]

2.104Finance advised in its submission that accountability for the use of public resources is devolved to entities and their Accountable Authorities under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013.[117] Further information on this and how it relates to contract management was provided by the department in response to questions on notice from the Committee:

Procurement and contract management are the responsibility of each accountable authority under the devolved Resource Management Framework, and each entity is responsible for implementing its own procurement and contract management processes in order to meet its business needs.[118]

2.105In addition to its work on the Contract Management Guide, described earlier in this chapter, Finance advised in its submission that it undertakes the following additional activities to uplift public sector contract management capability:

  • convening the Chief Procurement Officers Round Table to ‘discuss issues related to Commonwealth procurement and to test potential policy impacts with stakeholders’
  • convening the Commonwealth Procurement and Contract Management Community of Practice to ‘promote collaboration and knowledge sharing as well as ensuring officials are kept updated on procurement policy, guidance, systems and tools’
  • providing contract management support through a Procurement Agency Advice inbox
  • delivering courses on procurement and contract management as part of the Commonwealth Procurement and Contract Management Training Suite
  • engaging with public service officials on contract management through the Centre of Procurement Excellence.[119]
    1. Finance also noted that it conducts an annual Commonwealth Procurement and Contract Management Capability Self-Assessment Survey. At the 4 December 2024 public hearing, the department described the survey in the following way:

We go out to all the agencies to get them to self-assess their competencies around procurement and contract management, and then we provide that report back to senior executives at the end of each year to indicate either where an agency is moving or where there are areas for improvement.[120]

2.107Finance offered some analysis of these survey results in response to a question on notice from the Committee. Its observations included a gradual capability increase since 2021 under the Contract and Supplier Management Sub-Category, and that larger entities with a central procurement function show greater capability in the Contract and Supplier Management Sub-Category.[121]

Footnotes

[1]Auditor-General Report No.21 2023–24 Management of the Australian War Memorial’s Development Project.

[2]Auditor-General Report No.21 2023–24, p. 6.

[3]Auditor-General Report No.21 2023–24, p. 53.

[4]Auditor-General Report No.21 2023–24, p. 53.

[5]Auditor-General Report No.21 2023–24, p. 59.

[6]Auditor-General Report No.21 2023–24, p. 59.

[7]Auditor-General Report No.21 2023–24, p. 59.

[8]Australian War Memorial (AWM), Submission 12, pages 8–10.

[9]AWM, Supplementary submission 12.2 (response to questions on notice), Attachment A. p. [2].

[10]Ms Leanne Patterson, Assistant Director, Corporate Services, AWM, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13November 2024, p. 2.

[11]Ms Helen Petrovski, Chief Finance Officer, Corporate Services, AWM, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13November 2024, p. 3.

[12]AWM, Submission 12, p. 3.

[13]AWM, Supplementary submission 12.1 (responses to written questions on notice), pages [6], [9].

[14]AWM, Supplementary submission 12.1 (responses to written questions on notice), p. [7].

[15]Ms Patterson, AWM, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 November 2024, p. 2.

[16]AWM, Submission 12, p. 9.

[17]Ms Rona Mellor PSM, Deputy Auditor-General, Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 November 2024, p. 7.

[18]AWM, Supplementary submission 12.1 (responses to written questions on notice), p. [3].

[19]AWM, Supplementary submission 12.1 (responses to written questions on notice), p. [3].

[20]AWM, Supplementary submission 12.1 (responses to written questions on notice), p. [3].

[21]Auditor-General Report No.36 2023–24 Procurement of My Health Record, paragraph 1.10.

[22]Auditor-General Report No.36 2023–24, paragraphs 9–12,

[23]Auditor-General Report No.36 2023–24, Recommendation no. 10, paragraph 4.38.

[24]Ms Amanda Cattermole, Chief Executive Officer, ADHA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 November 2024, p. 14.

[25]Ms Cattermole, ADHA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 November 2024, p. 14.

[26]Australian Digital Health Agency (ADHA), Submission 2, p. 4.

[27]ADHA, Submission 2, p. 4.

[28]ADHA, Submission 2, p. 4.

[29]Ms Cattermole, ADHA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 November 2024, p. 9.

[30]ADHA, Submission 2, p. 3.

[31]ADHA, Submission 2, p. 3.

[32]ADHA, Supplementary submission 2.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [6].

[33]ADHA, Supplementary submission 2.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [6].

[34]ADHA, Supplementary submission 2.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [6].

[35]ADHA, Supplementary submission 2.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [6].

[36]ADHA, Submission 2, p. 9.

[37]ADHA, Submission 2, p. 9.

[38]ADHA, Submission 2, pages 9–10.

[39]ADHA, Supplementary submission 2.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [8].

[40]ADHA, Supplementary submission 2.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [8].

[41]Auditor-General Report No.36 2023–24 Procurement of My Health Record, paragraph 3.59.

[42]ADHA, Supplementary submission 2.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [8].

[43]ADHA, Supplementary submission 2.1 (responses to questions on notice), pages [13–14].

[44]ADHA, Submission 2, p. 7.

[45]ADHA, Submission 2, p. 7.

[46]ADHA, Submission 2, p. 7.

[47]ADHA, Submission 2, p. 7.

[48]Auditor-General Report No.37 2023–24 Administration of the Adult Migrant English Program Contracts, p. 6.

[49]Auditor-General Report No.37 2023–24, p. 7.

[50]Auditor-General Report No.37 2023–24, p. 7.

[51]Auditor-General Report No.37 2023–24, p. 7.

[52]Auditor-General Report No.37 2023–24, p. 6.

[53]Auditor-General Report No.37 2023–24, pages 8–11.

[54]Auditor-General Report No.37 2023–24, p. 6.

[55]Auditor-General Report No.37 2023–24, p. 11.

[56]Auditor-General Report No.37 2023–24, pages 12–14.

[57]Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs), Submission 4, p. 5.

[58]Home Affairs, Submission 4, p. 5.

[59]Australian Council of TESOL [teaching English to speakers of other languages] Associations (ACTA), Submission 14, p. 5.

[60]ACTA, Submission 14, p. 5.

[61]Dr Helen Moore, Vice-President, ACTA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 4 December 2024, p. 2.

[62]Dr Moore, ACTA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 4 December 2024, p. 2.

[63]ACTA, Submission 14, p. 5.

[64]Dr Moore, ACTA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 4 December 2024, p. 2.

[65]Name withheld, Submission 7, p. 2.

[66]Name withheld, Submission 8, p. [1].

[67]Name withheld, Submission 9, p. 3.

[68]Name withheld, Submission 10, p. [1].

[69]Home Affairs, Supplementary submission 4.1 (responses to questions on notice), pages [5–6].

[70]Home Affairs, Supplementary submission 4.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [6].

[71]Home Affairs, Supplementary submission 4.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [7].

[72]Home Affairs, Supplementary submission 4.1 (responses to questions on notice), pages [7–8].

[73]Auditor-General Report No.37 2023–24, p. 52.

[74]Home Affairs, Supplementary submission 4.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [28].

[75]Home Affairs, Supplementary submission 4.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [29].

[76]Auditor-General Report No.37 2023–24, pages 8, 12.

[77]Home Affairs, Supplementary submission 4.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [27].

[78]Ms Mellor, ANAO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 November 2024, p. 27.

[79]Ms Mellor, ANAO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 November 2024, p. 27.

[80]Ms Mellor, ANAO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 November 2024, p. 27.

[81]Auditor-General Report No.47 2023–24 Defence’s Management of Contracts for the Supply of Munitions — Part 1.

[82]Department of Defence (Defence), Submission 15, p. [1].

[83]Defence, Submission 15, pages 5–6.

[84]Defence, Submission 15, p. 6.

[85]Defence, Submission 15, p. 6.

[86]Defence, Submission 15, p. 7.

[87]Defence, Submission 15, p. 4.

[88]Defence, Submission 15, p. 4.

[89]Defence, Submission 15, p. 4.

[90]Defence, Submission 15, p. 4.

[91]Defence, Submission 15, p. 4.

[92]Defence, Submission 15, pages 4–5.

[93]Defence, Supplementary submission 15.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [8].

[94]Defence, Supplementary submission 15.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [8].

[95]Defence, Submission 15, p. 2.

[96]Defence, Submission 15, p. 7.

[97]Defence, Submission 15, p. 7.

[98]Auditor-General Report No.1 2024–25 Defence’s Procurement and Implementation of the myClearance System.

[99]Auditor-General Report No.1 2024–25, paragraph 11.

[100]Auditor-General Report No.1 2024–25, paragraph 17.

[101]Defence, Supplementary submission 15.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [9].

[102]Defence, Supplementary submission 15.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [9].

[103]Defence, Supplementary submission 15.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [9].

[104]Ms Mellor, ANAO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 13 November 2024, p. 35.

[105]Auditor-General Report No.1 2024–25, paragraph 3.34.

[106]Department of Finance (Finance), Submission 3, p. 3.

[107]Finance, Contract Management Guide, https://www.finance.gov.au/government/procurement/contract-management-guide, viewed 10 February 2025.

[108]Finance, Australian Government Contract Management Guide, Canberra, 2023, p. 1.

[109]Finance, Australian Government Contract Management Guide, Canberra, 2023, p. 2.

[110]Defence, Defence Contract Management Handbook Version 1.0, referred to in Finance, Australian Government Contract Management Guide, Canberra, 2023, p. 2.

[111]Finance, Contract Management Guide, p. 12.

[112]Finance, Contract Management Guide, p. 12.

[113]Finance, Supplementary submission 3.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [8].

[114]Finance, Submission 3, p. 4.

[115]Finance, Submission 3.1 (responses to questions on notice), pages [5–6].

[116]Finance, Submission 3, p. 3.

[117]Finance, Submission 3, p. 3.

[118]Finance, Supplementary submission 3.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [13].

[119]Finance, Submission 3, pages 4–5.

[120]Mr Andrew Danks, First Assistant Secretary, Finance, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 4 December 2024, p. 9.

[121]Finance, Supplementary submission 3.1 (responses to questions on notice), p. [11].