Chapter 3 - Upholding principles of Antarctic Treaty System

  1. Upholding principles of Antarctic Treaty System
    1. The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is integral to Australia maintaining its interests in Antarctica. The ATS administers how Australia and other Parties interact with the continent, laying a foundation for scientific endeavours, governance, environmental compliance, and international cooperation, amongst others.
    2. The governing bodies that underpin the ATS have become stressed from years of stymied progress leading to inaction on key issues such as environmental conservation. This stress has placed increasing pressure on the Treaty System. Yet, for Australia, the ATS still remains the best mechanism to progress Australia’s national interests on the continent.

Background

3.3The ATS is composed of four international agreements: the Antarctic Treaty 1959 (AT); the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals 1972 (CCAS); the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 1980 (CAMLR Convention); and the Protocol on Environmental Protection 1991 (Environmental Protocol). The ATS sets out the rules and norms which signatories must abide by including those relating to peace, international cooperation, environmental protection, nonmilitarisation, and freedom of scientific investigation.[1] All additional agreements to the AT are subsidiary agreements.

3.4Australia’s policy position on Antarctica has remained consistent since the early 1990s and maintains broad, cross-party support.[2] Australia promotes a rules-based order in Antarctica, and Australia’s interests are maintained by a whole-of-government approach. Several Commonwealth agencies work together to manage Australia’s interests including the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW), the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Department of Defence, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), the Australian Fisheries Management Agency (AFMA), the Australian Research Council, Geoscience Australia, the Bureau of Meteorology, and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO).[3]

3.5Australia is a leader in Antarctica and is often able to exert influence within the ATS. The DCCEEW considers support for the ATS as the best means to advance Australia’s national interests in Antarctica. Support for the stability of the ATS is a national priority. The Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) outlines Australia’s current interests in Antarctica as being to:

  • maintain Antarctica’s freedom from strategic and/or political confrontation;
  • preserve our sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory, including our sovereign rights over adjacent offshore areas;
  • support a strong and effective Antarctic Treaty System; and
  • conduct world-class scientific research consistent with national priorities.[4]
    1. Following the entry into force of the AT on 23 June 1961, Australia became heavily involved in Antarctic affairs. For example, Australia became the depository state for the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CAMLR Convention) in 1982.[5] The CAMLR Convention helps drive fisheries management and holds observer status in the ATS. Similarly, Australia heavily influenced the development of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 (Environmental Protocol) which bans mineral exploration in Antarctica.[6]
    2. Australia is one of seven claimant states to Antarctic territory. Other states that have made territorial claims include Argentina, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom (UK). Currently, there are 27 countries that have seasonal and year-round stations in Antarctica and there are over 70 permanent bases on the continent.[7]
    3. The CSIRO highlighted that ‘science is the major currency of influence in the ATS’.[8] Consequently, Australia asserts its presence in the continent through research that includes climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies.[9] The World Wide Fund for Nature Australia (WWF–Australia) emphasises that while the ATS has been a successful tool of diplomacy and has enabled measures that ensure peaceful cooperation and the primacy of science, it has failed to keep pace with the rate of environmental change.[10]
    4. DFAT asserts that conflict, climate change, global economic uncertainty and the demand for resources have had a destabilising effect on the ATS. However, the ATS continues to serve Australia’s national interests at a time where interest and activities in the Antarctic region are increasing. DFAT further states that the ATS provides a critical forum to discuss and manage complex issues.[11]

Antarctic Treaty principles

3.10The AT contains 14 Articles that govern Antarctica. The following Articles have the most relevance to the Inquiry and demonstrate how Australia upholds the principles of the ATS.

Article I

3.11Article I of the AT enshrines the use of Antarctica ‘for peaceful purposes only’.[12] Theestablishment of military bases or fortifications, or the use of military manoeuvres is forbidden.[13] Consequently, any state that wants to may establish a station within the AAT provided they adhere to the objectives of the AT, including Article I.[14] DFAT examines all Antarctic stations through the prism of Article I and would have the responsibility to act should this provision of the AT be breached.[15]

Article II and Article III

3.12Article II of the AT establishes ‘freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end’. To promote Article II of the AT, Article III provides for information sharing between fellow parties, the sharing of scientific personnel between stations, and the exchange of scientific observations and results.[16]

Article IV

3.13Under Article IV of the AT ‘no acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica’.[17]

3.14In essence, the AT ‘does not extinguish Antarctic territorial claims, nor does it confirm them, and provides among other things that no new claims, or extensions to existing claims can be made during the life of the Treaty’.[18] The AT in effect freezes all claims as they were in 1959 for the life of the Treaty. Article IV allows other parties to recognise or not existing Antarctic claims and prevents any other state from asserting its own claim during the life of the Treaty.[19] As such, the research activities of other Parties within the AAT does not affect the legal status of the AAT as an Australian external territory.[20]

Article VI

3.15Article VI of the AT sets out the area governed by the Treaty and states that ‘the provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60º South Latitude including all ice shelves’.[21]

Article VII

3.16Under Article VII, representatives of each Contracting Party are entitled to designate observers to carry out inspections of a member Party’s station, including all stations, installations, equipment, ships, and aircraft at any time.[22]

3.17DFAT and DCCEEW consider inspections to be a key compliance and transparency measure that monitors conformity to the ATS principles.[23] Australia’s inspections tend to focus on East Antarctica and inspections have found a high level of compliance.[24] The results of each inspection are presented as a report at the ATCM each year.[25] TheAT Secretariat maintains a database of all inspections that have occurred, and the data is publicly available.[26]

Article IX

3.18Article IX of the AT establishes the ATCM as the Treaty’s governing body.[27]

Australia and ATS

3.19Australia is heavily involved in the governance of Antarctica with Hobart acting as Australia’s Antarctic Gateway and host of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) secretariat.

ATS economy

3.20Australia, and in particular Tasmania, benefits from its status as an Antarctic Gateway and depository state for the CAMLR Convention. The Tasmanian Government Department of State Growth remarked that the state benefits from the presence of the international secretariat due to the influx of cold climate researchers the international secretariat attracts to the state, and because of those researcher’s expertise and contributions to the Tasmanian economy.[28]

3.21The Tasmanian Government noted Tasmania’s importance to fellow ATS Parties who utilise the Port of Hobart to operate their logistics. Nations that have used the Hobart gateway include France, the US, Korea, Japan, China, and Italy. Germany may become a future collaborator in the Hobart port. In particular, the Tasmanian Government highlights its relationship with France, who have operated their summer resupply program through the Hobart gateway since 1948. Tasmania signed a fiveyear Memorandum of Understanding agreement for use of the port with France in 2019.[29]

3.22DCCEEW’s submission states that Australia continues to advance its broader international bilateral relationships that align to its activities within the rules and norms of the ATS. Australia has maximised its influence and leadership by forming close bilateral relationships with France, New Zealand, Japan, the UK, the US and China. DCCEEW further outlines that Australia is building closer bilateral ties with its fellow Antarctic Gateway states of Argentina, Chile, and South Africa. It is DCCEEW’s view that enhanced bilateral ties will benefit ‘Hobart’s status as Australia’s Gateway City’.[30]

Australian leadership in ATS

3.23Adjunct Professor DrTony Press contends that Australian leadership stems from the ability to ‘demonstrate leadership in diplomacy and science’, the ability to project leadership that ‘lies in the strength of Australia’s Antarctic institutions,’ and the capacity of the Australian Government to ‘engage broadly and deeply in Antarctic affairs’.[31]

3.24In its submission, the DCCEEW outlines Australia’s leadership position in the ATS:

Australia has played a leading role on priority issues in Treaty forums, including area protection, clean-up and remediation of environmental damage from past activities, tourism management, liability for environmental emergencies, marine environmental protection, combatting Illegal Unreported and Unregulated fishing, and responses to the impacts of climate change on the Antarctic region.[32]

3.25The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) notes Australia’s recent leadership in the ATCM and CCAMLR on biosecurity, protected areas, fisheries management, and MPAs.[33]

3.26For Monash University (Monash), Australia’s ongoing influence and leadership is heavily dependent on ‘consistent demonstrations of leading science’, and Monash considers the university sector an important aspect of that scientific leadership.[34]

3.27Both the CSIRO and Monash reported issues that negatively influence Australia’s leadership. The CSIRO highlighted that a lack of access to an icebreaker had hampered research in the East Antarctic region from 2016–17, which had correlated to a decline in Australia’s Southern Ocean research efforts.[35] While the CSIRO’s marine research facility the RV Investigator is able to carry out Southern Ocean research, it cannot operate in Antarctic waters.[36] Monash also reported a lack of participation by the AAD in international fora due to staff attrition and travel restrictions, leaving the university to represent Australian contributions at bodies such as the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research Open Science Conferences.[37]

Upholding ATS principles

3.28Australia has been active upholding the principles of scientific research, fisheries management, undertaking base inspections, non-militarisation, and international cooperation.

Scientific research

3.29Monash asserts that the success of the ATS can be attributed to the ‘international understanding that comes from collaborative scientific endeavour’ with other ATS Parties. To Monash, shared scientific endeavour can foster ‘solutions for regional environmental and governance challenges’. Due to the ‘foundational significance of sciences in the ATS’, Monash observes that science-founded outcomes presented in ATS governing bodies ‘can provide the basis for upholding the rules and norms of the ATS’. Monash further cautions that a failure to demonstrate research leadership within the ATS would suggest that Australia is not interested in, nor does it possess the understanding required to make, governance and strategic decisions in the Antarctic region.[38]

3.30Professor Steven Chown, Director, Securing Antarctica's Environmental Future, Monash, has stated that respect and influence in ATS meetings has evolved to become highly dependent on scientific capability:

If you're doing leading science that's societally significant and clearly so, then all of the other nations at the table will listen to you. For that reason, research has to remain the centre point of our activity in the region.[39]

3.31Dr Matthew England, Deputy Director, Australian Centre for Excellence in Antarctic Science, reported that Australia is internationally renowned for its research in Antarctica. Australia’s research expertise includes ‘observations and modelling, spanning the biology, the physics, the chemistry, the atmosphere, the ice sheets, the oceans and the geosphere as well’. Australia has an incredible and critical presence in Antarctic research and Australia has an obligation to grow science, not just maintain the status quo.[40]

3.32As articulated by the CSIRO, science is a currency of influence in the ATS. Consequently, Professor Rufus Black, Vice–Chancellor and President, University of Tasmania, asserts that Australia needs to have ‘a very substantial volume of compelling science that supports Australia's position’ on difficult, complex, and sometimes contentious issues. Professor Black claims that a strong Australian position will leave less room for Parties that oppose Australia’s interests to manoeuvre within the ATS and accept the commonly agreed positions that Australian diplomacy is based on. This, Professor Black maintains, will ensure that the values of the AT are upheld.[41]

3.33Dr England asserts that scientific research has largely been demarcated geopolitically and reported to the Committee that the primary nations undertaking research in the West Antarctic sector include the US, the UK, and most European nations including France and Germany. He further states that Japan, Korea, and China are all active in East Antarctica. However, Australia is the clear leader in the region.[42]

3.34Likewise, the CSIRO describes that Australia has both an opportunity and a responsibility to lead in East Antarctica. The CSIRO states that Australia’s leadership in East Antarctica has been largely unchallenged, but the region’s ‘scientific and geopolitical importance has sparked substantial scientific interest and engagement from other nations’. The CSIRO notes the Parties that have increased their engagement in East Antarctica between Mawson Station and the Ross Sea are China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, and Korea.[43]

3.35Professor Black raises that Antarctica should be a long-term policy prospect for Australia, noting the University of Tasmania’s view that ‘Australia is there to govern Antarctica for the centuries, not just till 2050 and arguably not even just till 2100’.[44]

3.36Dr Tony Press, similarly, states that it is important for Australia to remain deeply engaged in Antarctic science as Antarctica plays a key role in the global climate system and Antarctica has a direct influence on Australian climate and weather. DrPress observes that Antarctic ice core records show a direct correlation between droughts in south-western Australia and heavy snowfall in Antarctica, and that weather events in Antarctica influence the Murray-Darling Basin system, including rainfall, drought and extreme events.[45]

Fisheries

3.37Australian fishing in the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic region is managed by DAFF and AFMA and overseen by CCAMLR. Australia currently operates three fisheries:

  • Heard and McDonald Islands Fishery which operates under conditions consistent with CCAMLR requirements;
  • Macquarie Island Toothfish Fishery, which is a sub-Antarctic fishery adjacent to CCAMLR, but generally managed within their requirements; and
  • exploratory fisheries within CCAMLR jurisdiction.[46]
    1. DAFF reports that these are among some of the ‘most valuable Commonwealth managed fisheries’.[47]
    2. As its depository state, Australia is heavily involved within CCAMLR. DAFF advised that Australia’s involvement with CCAMLR ‘contributes to a better understanding of global environment and climate science through collection of fisheries and independent data, fish stock assessment, targeted research projects and the undertaking of ecosystem risk assessments.’[48]
    3. Under CCAMLR, DAFF has regularly engaged with CCAMLR Parties on fisheries issues and the department reports its effective cooperation has contributed both to achieving the objectives of the CAMLR Convention and cemented the Convention as an integral part of the ATS.[49]
    4. Australia regularly works with CCAMLR members to combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in Antarctic waters. DAFF noted that the IUU fishing of Antarctic Toothfish and Patagonian Toothfish significantly impacted fish stock and aroused concerns of overfishing and negative impacts on bycatch species, including threatened seabirds.[50] DAFF attributes the subsequent decline of IUU vessels to the efforts of CCAMLR, Australian leadership, and the introduction of a catch documentation scheme that ‘allows catches to be tracked from point of landing throughout the trade cycle’.[51] Through Australia and CCAMLR’s efforts, DAFF notes that IUU fishing of toothfish has declined from a peak of 35,000 tonnes in the mid1990s to less than 250 tonnes per annum since 2016.[52]
    5. AFMA is the lead Commonwealth agency responsible for the management and sustainable use of Australia’s Antarctic fisheries. The Maritime Border Command (MBC) from the Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) is ‘responsible for onwater enforcement activity on behalf of AFMA’. Home Affairs advised that the MBC has ‘not conducted regular patrols in the Southern Antarctic region since 2010’ and does not maintain a physical presence in the area. Instead, the MBC monitors the region through its marine domain awareness systems and collaborates with like-minded international partners such as the United States Coast Guard to ‘address shared concerns related to the Southern Oceans’. Home Affairs notes that it is not the MBC’s role to monitor and enforce penalties for overfishing or exceeding licensed quotas, unless it is on conjunction with AFMA.[53]
    6. According to DAFF, CCAMLR uses harvest strategies that incorporate ecological links in setting catch limits and recognises the Southern Ocean as many interlinked ecological systems. CCAMLR’s harvest strategies have resulted in ‘precautionary catch limits that maintain stock sustainability’, and aims to reduce the effects of the fisheries on predators of the target species. DAFF states that it takes measures to ensure the health and viability of Antarctic fisheries by taking data from Vessel Monitoring Systems, shot-by-shot logbook records, high levels of observer coverage, port monitoring of unloads’, and the requirement to comply with CCAMLR catch documentation and fish tagging requirements to make future assessments.[54]

Inspections

3.44Inspections are a key mechanism in the implementation of the AT. Under Article VII, as a Party to the AT, Australia has the right to inspect other Parties’ Antarctic stations and other Parties can, in turn, inspect Australia’s Antarctic stations. DFAT outlines the purpose of station inspections as being a mechanism to ensure that stations comply with the objectives and provisions of the AT, including environmental provisions, non-militarisation provisions, and that stations are only used for peaceful purposes.[55]

3.45DCCEEW reported that Australia has undertaken 11 inspection programs over a number of years, all of which have included a representative from DFAT, and that Australia conducted its first inspection in 1963–64.[56] Dr Tony Press highlighted that the original inspection regime was innovative due to the capacity to conduct aerial inspections and the ability to inspect another state’s facility without prior notice.[57] DFAT also remarked that nothing has ever been presented to the ATCM as a breach of the AT; rather, comments are generally made about improving the environmental impact of management of a given station in inspection reports.[58]

3.46DCCEEW appoints inspectors each year and advises other countries about Australia’s intent to inspect a base.[59] When the AAD undertakes an inspection, it is not required to give notice and does not generally talk publicly about its inspection plans ,thereby reducing the amount of time a state may have to prepare for it.[60] Conversely, Mr Adam McCarthy from DFAT told the Committee that although Australia can undertake a no-notice inspection, the reality of operating in Antarctica often requires extensive conversations to discuss logistics.[61] Dr Tony Press also articulated that inspections are subject to weather interferences.[62]

3.47In 2019–20, Australia inspected six locations; in 2023–24, Australia inspected three. Australia focuses its inspections on East Antarctica, the remotest part of the continent. DFAT relayed that any state that wants to inspect an Australian base would likely need to be deployed on Australia’s icebreaker, the RSV Nuyina or fly in.[63]

3.48Ms Emma Campbell, Head of Division, AAD, DCCEEW, advised that DCCEEW and DFAT attended an inspection of a French station in 2023–24.[64] This inspection was undertaken as a reciprocal arrangement with France, who inspected an Australian station. The French inspection focused on an Australian legacy site, making findings about known issues surrounding waste management, especially for legacy sites.[65] Consequently, the AAD has allocated funding to understand the full scope of the area and develop a remediation plan.[66]

3.49DFAT reported that China has five bases in Antarctica, three of which fall within the AAT. DFAT reiterated that Australia expects all countries who have stations on Antarctica to ‘comply with the provisions of the Treaty’ and noted that Australia has regularly inspected Chinese stations and has never found evidence that would place China in breach of the AT.[67]

3.50Dr Tony Press raised the potential for Australia to modernise its inspection regime by embracing remote inspections. Dr Press asserted that Australia could conduct a remote inspection by using satellite imagery and drones to conduct aerial inspections.[68]

Non-militarisation

3.51Article I of the AT provides for the peaceful use of Antarctica that is free from militarisation. The ‘peaceful use’ of Antarctica has largely benefited Australia, and DCCEEW states that the ATS is integral to upholding peace and regional stability:

Given its proximity, as the largest landmass to Australia’s south, the peace and stability of the Antarctic region is of great importance to all Australians. In a time of rising geostrategic uncertainty, the Treaty system continues to serve our national interests by providing a robust and flexible framework for the stability of the Antarctic region.[69]

3.52Dr Tony Press states that the ATS ‘protects Australia’s Antarctic interests, including our sovereign position regarding the AAT’ and provides a ‘non-militarised region proximal to Australia’.[70] Professor Steven Chown is quite optimistic about Australia’s southern approach, noting:

Our southern approach—the Southern Ocean, the Antarctic continent and all those areas south of 60 degrees—is effectively free of military conflict, by agreement of the world's nations. I think that that, in a world that's so contested, is of inestimable value.[71]

3.53Monash similarly articulates that Australia’s southern approach is informed by the ATS and the ongoing success and stability of these agreements is paramount.[72] Monash also noted the absence of ‘Antarctica’ from the National Defence Strategic Review (NDSR), which, ‘likely reflects the geopolitical significance of the ATS’.[73] Despite the absence of Antarctica in the NDSR, the University of Wollongong stated that due to the proximity of Antarctica to Australia, the ATS provided Australia greater regional stability and security, and is of ‘direct importance to Australia’.[74]

3.54Dr Tony Press advised the Committee that some Parties to the AT have established satellite ground stations in Antarctica and employed ambiguous scientific research and technologies that could have military or resource extraction capabilities under the guise of science.[75]

3.55The Committee heard that the ATS is subject to additional diplomatic issues, including challenges to the AT. In 2023, Iran made claims that it had ‘ownership of Antarctica’ and intended to establish a permanent naval base on the continent to control ‘ballistic missiles and enemy uses in the area’.[76] Under international law, there is nothing Iran or any other state or actor can do whilst Article 1 of the Treaty is in force, unless Iran resorts to belligerence.[77]

International cooperation

3.56In his submission, Dr Press notes that some of the ‘current global geopolitical tensions are spilling over onto the Antarctic governance arena’. Dr Press cited the Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent ‘diplomatic demarches and walkouts’ at ATCM and CCAMLR meetings as an example. To Dr Press, the leaching of geopolitical changes into Antarctic governance means that decisions made by the AAD in relation to Antarctica need to be informed by a whole-of-government approach.[78]

3.57According to ASOC, since 1959 the ATS has been responsible for many conservation victories, which have been made possible due to ‘the strong conservation principles and tools embedded in the Environment Protocol and CAMLR Conventions’. Although these tools are still fit for purpose to address environmental issues within the ATS, ASOC cautions that this capacity has diminished due to the inability of the ATCM and CCAMLR to reach consensus.[79]

3.58WWF–Australia similarly asserts that international progress to uphold the principles of the ATS has been stymied for more than seven years. The ATS governing bodies have failed to reach consensus on a number of proposals in the ATCM and CCAMLR. The Organisation highlights the failure to reach consensus over proposals to establish new ASPAs and designate Emperor Penguins as a Specially Protected Species in the ATCM, and the designation of the proposed Antarctic Peninsula, Weddell Sea, and East Antarctica MPAs in CCAMLR. WWF–Australia contends that opposition to these measures comes from one or two Parties, namely China and Russia, who ‘often erroneously claim that the science behind the proposal is insufficient, or there is not enough of an imminent threat’.[80]

3.59Professor Marcus Haward attributes the attrition of the governing bodies to the use of veto power within ATS meetings.[81] Professor Haward asserts that a small number of countries (usually Russia and China) will veto an agenda item rather than accept the generally agreed upon consensus-building approach, which undermines Australia’s objectives in the region.[82] At the 43rd CCAMLR meeting in October 2024, consensus was not reached on any agenda item that was brought forward during the meeting.[83]

3.60Professor Haward ascribes this stagnation to conflicting views on the interpretation and implementation of the CAMLR Convention. As an example, Professor Haward states that the majority view, which is supported by Australia is that:

The conservation obligation extends beyond species of commercial fishing interest and requires consideration of the Antarctic marine ecosystem as a whole and the adoption of management measures for protecting species and areas for scientific study or non-fishing values.[84]

3.61This view has been challenged by a handful of states, notably China and Russia, ‘who insist that a more extractive approach of sustainable rational use is the objective’.[85]

3.62Dr Press asserts that China is currently attempting to recast the ATS to its own liking, which is also known as lawfare. Under lawfare, China has stated that it is acting consistently with the Treaty but has reinterpreted the AT to suit its goals in the region. Dr Press contends that Chinese and Russian reinterpretation has begun to infiltrate discussions in CCAMLR and influence discussions in the ATCM. Dr Press predicts this pattern to continue with the evolution of geopolitics over the next 10–20 years.[86]

3.63ASOC highlights issues with krill fisheries as an example of the inability for CCMALR to reach consensus in the ATS. ASOC describes the Antarctic Peninsula as ‘one of the fastest warming areas on the planet’, and states that ‘its marine ecosystem is experiencing increasing human impacts in the form of industrial krill fishing’. This issue is compounded by an increase in the populations of several species of whale, including Humpback Whales and Fin Whales, who feed in the same areas that krill fishing vessels operate. ASOC cautions that if krill fishing continues at its current levels it could hinder the recovery of whale populations, and implores the designation of the Antarctic Peninsula MPA to safeguard the biodiversity of the region.[87]

3.64On the blocking of conservation initiatives at CCAMLR, WWF–Australia expressed concern that there are ‘diverging perspectives’ in discussions about the relationship between conservation and ‘rational use’ of marine life in the CAMLR Convention Area, which increasingly contradicts the original intent of the Convention. This is because rational use forms just one part of conservation efforts.[88]

3.65DAFF reported that there were significant challenges within CCAMLR. The Department highlighted its disappointment that the efforts of Australia and other likeminded countries to improve the management of fisheries, including krill fisheries, received broad support, yet continued to be stymied by a small number of Parties.[89]

3.66WWF–Australia outlines how CCAMLR has failed to reach consensus on the establishment of MPAs within the ATS. WWF–Australia claims that CCAMLR has been working towards the establishment of a network of Southern Ocean MPAs following the consensus adoption of the South Orkney Islands Southern Shelf MPA in 2009 and the Ross Sea region MPA in 2016.

3.67Three Antarctic MPAs proposals remain before CCAMLR: the East Antarctic, Weddell Sea and Antarctic Peninsula. Australia, alongside France, is the main proponent of the East Antarctic MPA; Australia is also a co-proponent of the Weddell Sea MPA and contributes to the Antarctic Peninsula MPA proposal negotiations. WWF–Australia notes that CCAMLR ‘is now a decade behind on honouring their commitment to designate a representative system of MPAs’. WWF–Australia also states that the East Antarctic MPA proposal has evolved since it was presented to the Scientific Committee of CCAMLR in 2011, and has had parts of the core proposal removed, activities accommodated, and new zones clarified since its introduction. WWF–Australia attributes the approval delay to some Parties ‘imposing a higher burden of proof on the current MPA proposals than they are on proposals for fishing, which is contrary to the conservation objective of the Convention’.[90]

3.68To combat the issues resulting from an inability to reach consensus in the ATS, DrTony Press has recommended investing in capacity and capability building, and engagement with Australia’s international partners. Dr Press suggests Australia should increase its engagement with:

  • Japan and Korea who area increasing their engagement with Antarctic diplomacy;
  • the original claimant states of Antarctica;
  • the US on Antarctic affairs even though the US does not recognise any existing claim to Antarctica; and
  • the Southern Hemisphere and gateway partners.[91]

Committee comment

3.69The Committee recognises Australia’s history and presence as a continuous and stable leader in the ATS. A strong and effective treaty system will help realise Australia’s national interests on the Antarctic continent and ensure these interests are maintained for decades to come. Australia’s national interests are best served by remaining an involved Party to the ATS, and the Committee acknowledges the importance of Australia’s continued presence in Antarctica.

3.70The Committee is pleased that Australia is the depository state of the CCAMLR Secretariat; however, it acknowledges the geopolitical constraints that have impacted the ability of the governing body to reach consensus on Antarctic conservation measures, including the East Antarctic MPA.

3.71Scientific research is an important currency of influence in the ATS. It can be used to bolster Australia’s position and make evidence-based policy recommendations and decisions in ATS governing bodies. The Committee is of the view that Australia can continue to exercise its influence and uphold the values of the ATS through scientific investigation and cooperation.

3.72Australia’s Antarctic fisheries are of immense value to conservation and sustainability practices, as well as Australia’s financial interests in the region. Given the value of the Antarctic fisheries, the Committee considers more frequent patrolling from the MBC at Home Affairs is needed to preserve Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone and the value of Australia’s sub-Antarctic fisheries.

3.73The inspection of Antarctic bases undertaken as part of Article VII of the AT is integral to the success of the ATS as a mechanism to enforce environmental and security compliance. The Committee would like to see DCCEEW and DFAT work together to undertake more base inspections over 2025–26 and beyond.

3.74The Committee is aware of the waste management issues that were found by French inspectors during an inspection of the deactivated Wilkes Station. The Committee considers that the AAD must take responsibility for legacy waste and remediate the site by 2030.

3.75Due to the nature and complexity of the ATS, the Committee is of the view that management of Australia’s Antarctic affairs should adopt a wholeofgovernment approach, centrally coordinated by the AAD. This approach will help manage Australia’s multiple and often diverging interests on the continent.

Recommendation 1

3.76The Committee recommends that the Australian Government continue its efforts to establish an East Antarctic Marine Protected Area through the Antarctic Treaty System.

Recommendation 2

3.77The Committee recommends that the Australian Government should resume patrolling Australia’s sub-Antarctic fisheries.

Recommendation 3

3.78The Committee recommends that the Australian Government increase the frequency of its inspections of other Antarctic Treaty Parties’ Antarctic stations over 2025–26 and beyond.

The Australian Government should consider other methods of inspection such as satellite imagery and drone use.

Recommendation 4

3.79The Committee recommends that the Australian Government undertake remediation works on the deactivated Wilkes Station. These works should be completed by 2030.

Footnotes

[1]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW), Submission 28, p. 8.

[2]Adjunct Professor Dr Tony Press, Submission 19, pages 1–2.

[3]Ms Emma Campbell, Head of Division, Australian Antarctic Division (AAD), DCCEEW, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 2.

[4]DCCEEW, Submission 28, p. 5.

[5]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Submission 16, p. 1; Dr Tony Press, Submission 19, p. 3.

[6]Mr Adam McCarthy, Chief Counsel, First Assistant Secretary, Legal Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 28August 2024, p. 1.

[7]Mr Paul Schofield, Assistant Secretary, International Law Branch II, Legal Division, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 28 August 2024, pages 4–6.

[8]Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Submission 38, p. 6.

[9]DFAT, Submission 16, p. 2.

[10]World Wide Fund For Nature Australia (WWF–Australia), Submission 4, p. 2.

[11]DFAT, Submission 16, p. 1.

[12]The Antarctic Treaty, (Washington D.C., 1959) [1961], ART I.

[13]The Antarctic Treaty, (Washington D.C., 1959) [1961], ART I.

[14]Mr Adam McCarthy, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 28 August 2024, p. 4.

[15]Mr Adam McCarthy, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 28 August 2024, p. 3.

[16]The Antarctic Treaty, (Washington D.C., 1959) [1961], ART II and ART III.

[17]The Antarctic Treaty, (Washington D.C., 1959) [1961], ART IV.

[18]Dr Tony Press, Submission 19, p. 3.

[19]University of Wollongong (UoW), Submission 23, p. 1.

[20]Dr Tony Press, Submission 19, p. 3.

[21]The Antarctic Treaty, (Washington D.C., 1959) [1961], ART VI.

[22]The Antarctic Treaty, (Washington D.C., 1959) [1961], ART VII.

[23]DFAT, Submission 16, p. 2; DCCEEW, Submission 28, p. 8.

[24]DFAT, Submission 16, p. 2.

[25]Ms Emma Campbell, DCCEEW, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 10.

[26]Mr Paul Schofield, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 28 August 2024, p. 2.

[27]The Antarctic Treaty, (Washington D.C., 1959) [1961], ART IX.

[28]Tasmanian Government Department of State Growth, Submission 29, p. 2.

[29]Tasmanian Government Department of State Growth, Submission 29, pages 2–3, p. 5.

[30]DCCEEW, Submission 28, p. 9.

[31]Dr Tony Press, Submission 19, p. 5.

[32]DCCEEW, Submission 28, p. 9.

[33]Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), Submission 25, p. 2.

[34]Monash University (Monash), Submission 21, p. 4.

[35]CSIRO, Submission 38, p. 6.

[36]CSIRO, Submission 38, p. 6.

[37]Monash, Submission 21, p. 4.

[38]Monash, Submission 21, pages 5–6.

[39]Professor Steven Chown, Professor and Director, Securing Antarctica’s Environmental Future, Monash Committee Hansard, 25 September 2024, p. 18.

[40]Dr Matthew England, Deputy Director, Australian Centre for Excellence in Antarctic Science, Australian Research Council (ARC), Committee Hansard, 25 September 2024, p. 12.

[41]Professor Rufus Black, Vice-Chancellor and President, University of Tasmania, Committee Hansard, 1August 2024, p. 20.

[42]Dr Matthew England, ARC, Committee Hansard, 25 September 2024, p. 15.

[43]CSIRO, Submission 38, p. 6.

[44]Professor Rufus Black, University of Tasmania, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 21.

[45]Dr Tony Press, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 26.

[46]Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), Submission 26, p. 1.

[47]Mr Matt Lowe, Deputy Secretary, DAFF, Committee Hansard, 28 August 2024, p. 8.

[48]DAFF, Submission 26, p. 3.

[49]Mr Matt Lowe, DAFF, Committee Hansard, 28 August 2024, p. 8.

[50]DAFF, Submission 26, p. 3.

[51]DAFF, Submission 26, p. 3.

[52]Mr Matt Lowe, DAFF, Committee Hansard, 28 August 2024, p. 8.

[53]Department of Home Affairs, Supplementary Submission 7.1, pages 3–9.

[54]DAFF, Submission 26, pages 2–3.

[55]Mr Adam McCarthy, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 28 August 2024, p. 2.

[56]Ms Kelly Buchannan, Branch Head, AAD, DCCEEW, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 10; DCCEEW, Supplementary Submission 28.1, p.4.

[57]Dr Tony Press, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 27.

[58]Mr Adam McCarthy, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 28 August 2024, p. 2.

[59]Ms Emma Campbell, DCCEEW, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 10.

[60]Ms Emma Campbell, DCCEEW, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 10; Ms Kelly Buchannan, DCCEEW, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 10.

[61]Mr Adam McCarthy, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 28 August 2024, p. 2.

[62]Dr Tony Press, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 27.

[63]Mr Paul Schofield, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 28 August 2024, p. 5; Mr Adam McCarthy, DFAT, CommitteeHansard, 28 August 2024, p. 5.

[64]Ms Emma Campbell, DCCEEW, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 10.

[65]Ms Emma Campbell, DCCEEW, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 11.

[66]Ms Emma Campbell, DCCEEW, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 11.

[67]Mr Adam McCarthy, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 28 August 2024, p. 2.

[68]Dr Tony Press, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 27.

[69]DCCEEW, Submission 28, p. 8.

[70]Dr Tony Press, Submission 19, p. 5.

[71]Professor Steven Chown, Monash, Committee Hansard, 25 September 2024, p. 18.

[72]Monash, Submission 21, p. 5.

[73]Monash, Submission 21, p. 5.

[74]UoW, Submission 23, p. 1.

[75]Dr Tony Press, Submission 19, p. 4.

[76]Professor Marcus Haward, Submission 6, p. 3.

[77]Dr Tony Press, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 27.

[78]Dr Tony Press, Submission 19, p. 4; Dr Tony Press, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 26.

[79]ASOC, Submission 25, p. 3.

[80]WWF–Australia, Submission 4, p. 3.

[81]Professor Marcus Haward, Submission 6, p. 2.

[82]Professor Marcus Haward, Submission 6, p. 2.

[83]Ashleigh Barraclough, ‘Russia and China block every proposal at Antarctic marine life conservation conference in Hobart’, ABC News, 28 October 2024; Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic MarineLiving Resources, Report of the Forty-third meeting of the Commission — Preliminary Version, 25October2024, pages 1–75.

[84]Professor Marcus Haward, Submission 6, p. 3.

[85]Professor Marcus Haward, Submission 6, p. 3.

[86]Dr Tony Press, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, pages 27–28.

[87]ASOC, Submission 25, p. 4.

[88]WWF–Australia, Submission 4, p. 2.

[89]Mr Matt Lowe, DAFF, Committee Hansard, 28 August 2024, p. 9.

[90]WWF–Australia, Submission 4, pages 3–4.

[91]Dr Tony Press, Committee Hansard, 1 August 2024, p. 27.