Chapter 2Key issues
2.1The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) annual report for 2023–24 speaks positively about the agency’s performance, stating that the agency ‘continued to provide high-value intelligence to combat the threats the Australian community faces from transnational serious and organised crime’.
2.2The ACIC’s Chief Executive Officer, Ms Heather Cook, drew the committee’s attention to key recent achievements, including the completion of tranche 1 of the National Criminal Intelligence System and processing of over 7.2 million police checks which was ‘the largest number of checks processed since the service was established’.
2.3This chapter examines the following key issues related to the ACIC’s performance in 2023–24 and then presents the committee’s view. The key issues examined are:
Performance framework and results
Financial performance
Staffing
National Criminal Intelligence System
National Firearms Register
External scrutiny
Independent Review of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Performance framework and results
2.4Of its 13 performance criteria in 2023–24, the ACIC reported that it fully met seven and substantially met six. Further details on the ACIC’s measures and results are in the annual report (including a summary at pp. iv–v of the Annual Report 2023-24).
Performance criterion 6
2.5Performance criterion 6 is: ‘Stakeholders agree that ACIC intelligence is meaningful and useful’. This criterion has three measures. While the performance criterion was substantially met overall with two of the three measures fully met, measure 6.2: ‘Stakeholders agree or strongly agree that the ACIC provides intelligence products that identify changes within the criminal environment’ was partially met. A stakeholder survey found that 40 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with measure 6.2. This was below the target of 82 per cent and a significant drop from 100 per cent in the 2022–23 survey.
2.6On the measures for 6.2 and 6.3, the annual report stated that ‘the reliability of the results needs to be treated with caution. We are altering how we manage the survey and will continue to explore ways to gain greater participation next year’. Providing further explanation for the results in response to a written question on notice, the ACIC stated:
For the 2023-24 reporting period, the ACIC refined its survey approach to increase participation and gain additional detail in responses.
…
A change in the providers used to deliver performance surveys and alternating methodological approaches have led to differences in format between surveys. The ACIC continues to mature and strengthen its stakeholder survey design, including the performance measure methodologies, to ensure a robust approach which supports the consistent monitoring and reporting of trends across future surveys.
2.7The ACIC also outlined the actions it has taken to address the stakeholder feedback from the survey:
The ACIC has undertaken extensive consultation with partners, and significant planning to improve service delivery following the results. In addition to implementing the Independent Review of the ACIC and associated Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements, which will better enable timely sharing of intelligence with relevant stakeholders, the ACIC has developed a future operating model which informs strategic prioritisation and resource realignment to support the ACIC to effectively deliver on its mission.
Performance criterion 8
2.8Another criterion that was not fully met was criterion 8: ‘ACIC information systems provide useful information to partners’. This criterion has three measures based on: the number of users, number of searches performed and number of positive data matches in the ACIC’s information systems. While this performance criterion was substantially met overall with two of the three measures substantially met, the measure regarding the number of searches performed (measure 8.2) was partially met.
2.9The ACIC provided the following explanation:
The overall criterion result reflects methodological issues in the measures, including the use of averages for targets. It should be noted that after the initial start-up of a system, or additions to holdings in existing systems, the numbers of users and searches are expected to increase and then plateau. Numbers of users and searches are also fuelled by staffing levels of partners and the number of partners using the service. There are issues with the target of increasing numbers of positive matches, given that searches which return no matches can equally show the usefulness of the service.
2.10The annual report concluded that ‘due to the methodological issues, these measures have been removed from the performance suite in 2024–25’.
Financial performance
2.11In 2023–24 the ACIC received $297.021 million in revenue comprising about $147 million revenue from government and about $150 million own source income. ACIC expenditure was $305.021 million. The two primary areas of expenditure were supplier and financial costs (about $147 million) and employee benefits (about $120 million).
2.12The ACIC’s annual report states that its financial result for 2023–24 was an operating deficit of $8.000 million. The ACIC further reported:
With the exclusion of unfunded depreciation ($5.947 million) and capital funding income ($0.895 million), the ACIC would have realised a deficit of $2.948 million for the financial year.
This is an improvement from the budgeted loss of $8.646 million.
2.13The ACIC provided further detail on the deficit of $2.948 million for 2023-24 explaining that the main contributing factors were:
an increase in employee expenses.
an increase in supplier expenses primarily due to jurisdiction fees and payments as the ACIC continue to support development and integration of partner agencies onto the National Criminal Intelligence System (NCIS).
Staffing
2.14The Australian Public Service employee census was conducted over May and June2024. The ACIC’s response rate was 87 per cent. Regarding the results, Ms Cook highlighted that ‘the biggest leap in our census results was staff satisfaction with health and wellbeing initiatives that the organisation had introduced’.
2.15Dr Angela Barrett, Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating Officer, elaborated on the work being done to enhance ACIC staff wellbeing, which has resulted in ‘an increase of 23 per cent, in the metric around staff wellbeing’. Dr Barrett highlighted the introduction of a staff counsellor:
[T]he staff counsellor is a really important [initiative]. We have people who can't talk publicly about their jobs, so having a cleared insider they can go to seek assistance from as an individual—it’s not a report back to the organisation—is a really important initiative.
2.16In terms of recruitment, Ms Cook observed that while the ACIC appeared to be ‘attracting a good quality of people’, the organisation faced issues in recruiting staff with specialist skills that are essential to the ACIC’s operations:
It's very difficult to find individuals with those high-end technical skills and ICT skills. That is a challenge for everyone across government but particularly for intelligence agencies that require quite unique technical skills. That's an in-demand area that we continue to focus on.
2.17In relation to the ACIC’s attrition rate, Ms Cook advised that it was ‘about 17 or 18 per cent’ and while she would like to see a slightly lower rate, ‘in 2022, it was much higher, so [the ACIC] had improved [its] retention rate quite considerably’.
2.18Ms Cook added that the ACIC speaks with departing staff to discuss their primary motivations in leaving:
We monitor that very closely and we have done some analysis over the past year to see what the circumstances under which people are leaving are. We certainly conduct exit interviews. What we're seeing is that a lot of people are looking for promotional opportunities in other agencies, and it has resulted in us looking very closely at how we create career paths and opportunities internally so that people aren't looking outside the organisation. We're creating more opportunities for mobility across the workforce and to transition into different job families and create multiple careers within the one organisation.
2.19Mr Rippon added that a higher attrition rate may not always be a poor outcome:
Our attrition rate might be a little bit higher than the CEO might like, but there are some benefits to that, too. We're so ingrained now in the national intelligence community and the law enforcement community that we encourage our people to get out and get broader experience and exposure in other roles, and go as a good advocate for the ACIC into the national intelligence and law enforcement communities. We know that we will probably get a better product back at a later point in time. So there are some bonuses to a higher attrition rate as well, and it's just something that we need to keep an eye on.
National Criminal Intelligence System
2.20The National Criminal Intelligence System (NCIS) is a joint project led by the ACIC with Australian police agencies and the Department of Home Affairs that ‘connects data from Australian law enforcement agencies and provides secure access to a national view of policing information and criminal intelligence’. This information and intelligence can be accessed in ‘near real-time’ which enables law enforcement agencies to better respond to and prevent criminal activity.
2.21The NCIS underwent substantive enhancements in 2023–24. The primary milestone regarding the NCIS was the completion of ‘Tranche 1’. Mr Rippon explained that the ACIC have successfully connected the early adopters: the police in New South Wales, Western Australia, Queensland and Victoria, and as a result:
their frontline officers [are] able to not only receive data nationally, on the road, to make critical decisions for officer safety and community safety but, most importantly, the incident data from each of these agencies, at every incident they attend, is now fed directly into NCIS in as close to live time as possible.
2.22Mr Rippon clarified that this did not mean that other jurisdictions which were not ‘early adopters’ cannot currently access the NCIS. Other jurisdictions also have access, but ‘through a web interface, until [the ACIC] connect [the jurisdictions’] frontline system[s] directly to the NCIS’.
2.23Mr Rippon reported that most ‘mid to late adopters’: Tasmania Police, South Australia Police, and the AFP, are making strong progress and are ‘heavily engaged in connecting’. The committee heard that the ACIC hopes to have these jurisdictions connected by mid-2025. However, Mr Rippon noted that the Northern Territory are experiencing ‘some issues in maintaining the speed of connection that our other mid-to late adopters are achieving’.
2.24Ultimately, Mr Rippon stated regardless of whether a state was an early or late adopter, being able to utilise the NCIS meant that all jurisdictions would:
…have access to this rich incident data that is being put into the system in as close as possible to live time, to be able to make cross-border decisions or decisions that impact entities, vehicles, locations, people, histories and firearms in a much speedier fashion than before NCIS was created.
2.25An update was also provided on the uptake and reception of the NCIS from law enforcement agencies:
[W]e've now got well over 50,000 users of the system, on the street, using this, and it grows every week. We have had over 25 million searches occur in the last year. If I'm frank, law enforcement officers are very fast to talk down a system, if they are not getting what they need. They're certainly talking up the National Criminal Intelligence System and are very positive about it. I know it's a focus of the CEO with the board, with all of the commissioners of police around the country, whenever they meet.
2.26The annual report noted that the NCIS did not meet its benchmark for system availability as it experienced ‘several short outage events in the last quarter of 2023–24’. The ACIC explained:
Each incident related to one set of components of the system. A number of vendor-recommended changes were implemented, which reduced the outage duration to approximately 15 minutes on each occasion with the system self-recovering. Additional actions will be taken in 2024–25 to decrease outages in NCIS, focusing on the components experiencing instability.
Integration of AFIN data
2.27Australian Firearms Information Network (AFIN) ‘helps police and other law enforcement agencies manage the registration, licensing and movement of firearms coming into Australia and moving between our states and territories’. It ‘provides intelligence and information on a national level about each firearm in Australia known to police and law enforcement agencies, enhancing the current intelligence available’.
2.28In November 2023, AFIN data was integrated into NCIS. This integration will provide:
information about known firearms, firearms licences and permits in Australia alongside comprehensive operational policing data already in NCIS. With integration of AFIN data into NCIS, users can view any known relationships between firearms, persons, locations, events and incidents. Integration of AFIN data with NCIS is a key interim step to enhance frontline officer access to national firearms information, and to bridge the gap between today and the completion of the National Firearms Register.
2.29With the work underway on the National Firearms Register, Mr Rippon explained:
I make the point that, while the NFR is being built, we're not standing stagnant around firearm data. AFIN is now being piped into the National Criminal Intelligence System; state data is available now. On top of that, you have that rich incident data from the states and territories wherever a firearm is even mentioned; it will be imported into the system and will be accessible to other states and territories and the AFP. We hold great hope and positivity around the program.
National Firearms Register
2.30On 6 December 2023, National Cabinet agreed to implement a National Firearms Register (NFR) and ‘to work together to ensure that the Register is fully operational within four years’. The Attorney-General’s Department and the ACIC will lead national efforts to establish the NFR with the ACIC developing and operating the NFR’s central register. The program is expected to be operational by mid-2028.
2.31The development of the NFR ‘will be a substantial and complex project over the next 4 years’. Mr Jeremy Johnson, Executive Director Business and Partnerships Division provided the committee with a general update on progress with establishing the NFR:
At this stage we're going quite well. We've had one Finance sponsored gateway review…The program came out at amber, which I think is pretty good for a relatively complex, multi-stakeholder program right at the start. The next one will be at the end of May this year. It's not without risk, of course; there are lots of moving parts. But we think it's going quite well.
2.32The key work for the ACIC includes:
development of the AFIN and integrating information from that system into the National Criminal Intelligence System (discussed above); and
uplifting states and territories firearms licensing and registration systems.
2.33In relation to the second aspect, Mr Johnson provided further explanation of the arrangements and funding:
[F]irearms are quite a multifaceted thing, and licensing and registration is a state-based activity…Obviously, at the start of this process, it was clear to everyone that there was variability in the maturity of the systems across states and territories. So the Commonwealth, through the Attorney-General's Department, has a fair bit of the funding for the NFR program, which flows to states and territories through agreements with the Commonwealth to uplift their own systems. Obviously, they will all feed into the centre.
2.34Mr Johnson added that data quality has been identified as an issue which the ACIC, in partnership with the states and territories, is currently working to resolve:
Data quality…has been an issue across firearms licensing and registration for many, many years, because, obviously, firearms treated correctly have quite a long lifespan; they can last for a long time. And there are firearms in the community that are 100-plus years old. Over time, the collection of descriptors for those weapons has been up and down in terms of how much people cared about and wanted it and how good the quality was.…so we've got a particular focus on that, between us and the states and territories—to uplift that.
2.35The committee was advised that the ACIC was ‘very close’ to finalising agreements on national data standards for firearms and suppressors which will assist in the capturing of firearms where they move across state and territory borders.
2.36Mr Johnson also advised the governance arrangements include a ‘deputy-secretary-level steering group’ as well as a ‘program group’ which oversee the coordination of the various components required in setting up the NFR and include connection with the programs in in each state.
2.37More recently, the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD), appearing before the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs in Senate estimates on 25 February 2025, provided further detail on the work that will be required to establish the NFR. Ms Sarah Chidgey, Deputy Secretary, National Security and Criminal Justice Group emphasised the significant amount of work required to redesign existing systems across all jurisdictions:
The national firearms registry is a significant national project that will require changes to every state and territory's data collection systems and the connection of all of those systems with real-time data to a central registry that the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission will have. All of that work is very significant in terms of the practical implementation and the systems and data changes that will need to take place in every jurisdiction.
…
That will mean, in some cases, uplifting paper based registries to a digital one, building registries from scratch in a number of jurisdictions and changing all of the data standards for collection. At the moment there is no real-time availability of this data. So there is enormous work across six streams—systems work, data work, legislation, governance—to enable all of this. Having myself met with counterparts across all states and territories, I can say there is a very high level of commitment and a lot of work that has started, but it is a very significant project.
2.38Mr Alex Engel, Assistant Secretary, Transnational Crime Branch, Criminal Justice Division, AGD, provided an update on work to date:
key governance structures have been set up involving 13 agencies across the Commonwealth and states and territories;
the Commonwealth has received funding for the Commonwealth agencies as well as contributions to the states and territories;
states and territories are working on funding profiles through their own budget processes;
states and territories are finalising their project plans and procurement for the project; and
work is nearing completion on the national data standards which will feed into building the system.
2.39Mr Andrew Warnes, First Assistant Secretary, Criminal Justice Division, AGD, added that another aspect of the work was getting federated funding agreements in place. AGD has begun distribution of funding in accordance with the agreements with $6.2 million paid to state and territory governments as at 7February 2025.
External scrutiny
Commonwealth Ombudsman
2.40The Commonwealth Ombudsman has the power to examine and report on the ACIC’s use of certain powers, including those under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004. The annual report mentions on-site inspections by the Ombudsman in April and May 2024 but that, as at 30 June 2024, the preliminary inspection report had not been received.
2.41The most recent report by the Ombudsman is dated September 2024 and was made available in November 2024. The Ombudsman made two key findings for the ACIC, which resulted in five recommendations and seven suggestions which were accepted or accepted in part. The findings were that:
internal safeguards should be improved to ensure the ACIC use covert powers within Special Operations lawfully; and
warrants were not reviewed and were allowed to expire instead of being revoked.
2.42In response to questions on notice, the ACIC pointed to the independent review of the ACIC (discussed below) which has identified that comprehensive reform is required to ‘provide the strongest foundation for its critical national criminal intelligence role into the future’. The ACIC added that it has been able to ‘undertake some immediate steps in respect of internal policies, procedures and training to address the Ombudsman’s findings’ and ‘[f]urther uplift is planned over the coming months’.
March 2024 Ombudsman Report – Review and Destruction of Protected Information
2.43As part of the inspection process, the Ombudsman reviews progress with issues detailed in previous reports. The March 2024 report raised concerns regarding ‘the inadequate review and destruction of protected information held by the ACIC’.
2.44The report advised that the Ombudsman was ‘pleased with the efforts by the ACIC to respond to our recommendations’ in the March 2024 report as, on 28June 2024, the ACIC informed the Ombudsman that all identified records had been reviewed and those which were no longer required for the original purpose under the Act had been destroyed. The Ombudsman said it would confirm the ACIC’s review and destruction of these records during its next inspection.
Independent Review of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
2.45In 2023, the Government commissioned an Independent Review of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) and associated Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements, undertaken by Mr Stephen Merchant PSM and Mr Greg Wilson.
2.46The review was a ‘first principles review‘ intended to ‘examine the operation and effectiveness of the [ACIC] as Australia’s national criminal intelligence agency within the context of Commonwealth law enforcement and criminal intelligence arrangements more broadly’.
2.47On 14 November 2024, the Attorney-General published the unclassified report from the review as well as the Government’s response. The Government agreed (or agreed in principle) to 27 out of the report’s 29 recommendations.
2.48The review reported that there ‘is significant benefit in Australia having a specialised and highly skilled national criminal intelligence organisation supporting the disruption work of law enforcement agencies’. However, the review concluded that ‘at present the ACIC is inhibited from fulfilling this intelligence mandate by a lack of clarity about its role, complicated legislative frameworks and uncertainty about its funding’. The review found that ‘comprehensive reform of the ACIC and the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002’ is required.
2.49Key recommendations which would give effect to the review’s findings are:
the repeal and replacement of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Recommendation 2).
a reduction in the duplication of efforts between the ACIC and the AFP (Recommendation 3).
existing powers under the telecommunications and surveillance devices legislative framework be shifted from an evidentiary collection and investigative threshold to a threshold that aligns with the ACIC’s role in intelligence collection (Recommendation 4).
incorporating a ‘double lock’ approval process requiring authorisation from the Attorney-General and an independent examiner for the use of coercive powers (Recommendation 5).
the parliamentary oversight of the ACIC being moved from this committee to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (Recommendation 15).
the establishment of a High-Risk Oversight Committee that focuses on significant organisational risk (Recommendation 20).
2.50Ms Cook told the committee that the ‘ACIC review is probably the most significant area of focus for the organisation’ and that its recommendations ‘set out a blueprint to strengthen the ACIC's ability to combat the significant threat posed by serious and organised crime’.
2.51Ms Cook provided further detail on the need for comprehensive legislative reform:
The broad thrust and rationale…is a recognition that over many years, …[the ACIC] has been an organisation that has been set up to perform the functions of an intelligence organisation but is operating under a piece of legislation that is more fit for purpose for a law enforcement agency. That means that, in using our collection capabilities, or the authorities and powers that we've been afforded through our legislation, the purposes for which we're able to deploy those powers and authorities—not exclusively but in large part—are tied to law enforcement purposes and evidence collection, rather than intelligence purposes. The review recognises that that is a difficult place to be and doesn't allow the ACIC to really operate in a very unique space where it can add unique insights and add value. It puts us squarely in a very similar position to what our law enforcement partners can already do for themselves.
2.52Ms Cook stressed that the review does not recommend that the ACIC be granted any further powers than it currently holds:
[T]he review does not, in any way, recommend any increase in powers or authority for the ACIC. It simply recommends that we maintain the powers and authorities that we currently have, including our covert collection capabilities. But the intended use is for an intelligence purpose, not a law enforcement purpose. So there is no increase in powers and there are no extra authorities for the agency.
2.53Responding to questions on notice, the ACIC advised that the Attorney-General’s Department ‘will lead the repeal and replacement of the ACIC legislation in close consultation with the ACIC and other stakeholders’. In addition, a ’strategic workforce plan, including the ACIC’s approach to recruitment, will be developed in alignment with the recommendations from the Independent Review’.
Committee View
2.54Overall, the committee is satisfied with the performance of the ACIC in 2023–24. It takes this opportunity to thank the ACIC’s officers for their important work during this reporting period.
2.55The 2023-24 annual report, and the evidence gathered by the committee, reflect several notable achievements. In particular, the completion of tranche 1 of the National Criminal Intelligence System (NCIS) is a significant advancement in information sharing among law enforcement agencies and the committee looks forward to hearing how this will assist police on the frontline. The national police checking service processing its largest number of checks since its establishment at over 7.2 million is also a significant achievement.
2.56The committee notes that the ACIC fully met seven of its 13 performance criteria and substantially met six. The committee appreciates the explanations provided in the annual report, and in response to questions on notice, in relation to the measures that were not fully met. The committee supports the work being undertaken, particularly in relation to performance criterion 6 (stakeholders agree that ACIC intelligence is meaningful and useful) to ensure all measures can be evaluated as effectively as possible. The committee acknowledges the challenges with using surveys to measure performance, for example, ensuring a high return.
2.57The committee commends the ACIC for efforts in the area of staff wellbeing with the recent employee census showing wellbeing initiatives, including a staff counsellor, have been welcomed by staff.
2.58The committee is pleased to see the progress with more jurisdictions connected to the NCIS. This initiative will make a significant difference to information available to frontline officers to make critical decisions. The integration of Australian Firearms Information Network data into the NCIS is a key achievement for providing frontline officers with access to national firearms information ahead of the completion of the National Firearms Register.
2.59An ongoing interest for the committee is the establishment of the National Firearms Register. The register is an important measure that will benefit law enforcement and improve community safety. The committee was pleased to hear of the progress to date. The committee appreciates this is a complex, multi-faceted initiative to provide real time data which will uplift current jurisdictional systems, some of which are paper based. The committee will continue to monitor progress with the program which is expected to be operational by mid-2028.
2.60The committee has an interest in the oversight work of the Commonwealth Ombudsman in relation to the use by agencies of certain powers. The committee notes the findings in relation to the ACIC in the most recent report on agencies’ compliance with the Surveillance Devices Act 2004. It notes the positive response by the ACIC to addressing the findings. The committee also acknowledges the work undertaken in relation to addressing findings in the previous report.
2.61The committee recognises that the Independent Review of the ACIC carried out by Mr Merchant and Mr Wilson has been a significant undertaking. The committee supports this work to ensure the ACIC is an effective agency with clarity about its role and legislative framework to combat transnational, serious and organised crime. The 29 recommendations of the Review provide a blueprint for comprehensive reform to the ACIC. The committee notes that the government has agreed to 21 of the recommendations, agreed in principle to six and noted two.
2.62The committee notes recommendation 15, which was agreed by the government, and would move the parliamentary oversight of the ACIC from this committee to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. The committee is pleased to see that the government response noted this change would not ‘prevent the ACIC appearing before PJCLE inquiries. For example, it would be appropriate for the ACIC to provide submissions, or appear before the PJCLE, for inquiries relating to serious and organised crime’.
2.63The committee thanks the senior leadership and all officers in the ACIC for their important contribution to reducing the harm from serious criminal threats to Australia.
Senator Helen Polley
Chair