1. Introduction
   1. Under section 29 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (IS Act), the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security’s (PJCIS) first function is to review the administration and expenditure of six intelligence agencies in Australia that are part of the National Intelligence Community (NIC):

• Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO)
• Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)
• Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)
• Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)
• Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO)
• Office of National Intelligence (ONI).
  2. The Defence Intelligence Group (DIG), reporting to the Chief of Defence Intelligence, encompasses and supports the functions of AGO and DIO.
  3. The NIC, and within it the agencies over which the PJCIS has oversight, operates within a strict oversight and accountability framework. This framework balances the need for public accountability and publication of information against the need for agency operations and sensitive information to remain classified to protect Australia’s national security.
  4. As a result, intelligence agencies have limited public reporting responsibilities. During the reporting period ASIO and ASD were the only intelligence agencies that produced and presented unclassified annual reports to the Australian Parliament, while the reporting of DIO and AGO was contained within broader Department of Defence annual reporting.
  5. In addition to annual reporting requirements, there are several levels of oversight to ensure that intelligence agencies are accountable to the Australian Government, Parliament and the public. These include:
• oversight by the responsible Minister for each agency;
• oversight by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS), who is an independent statutory officer who provides assurance that each agency acts legally and with propriety, complies with ministerial guidelines and directives, and acts consistently with human rights; and
• parliamentary oversight, including oversight of administration and expenditure by the PJCIS.

How the Committee undertakes its review of administration and expenditure

1.6The Committee is established pursuant to section 28 of the IS Act. As noted above, the functions of the Committee include an obligation to review the administration and expenditure of each of the six intelligence agencies listed in the Act, including their annual financial statements.[1] While other work of the Committee contributes to that function, it is fulfilled most directly through an annual review of the agencies’ administration and expenditure.

1.7For the review the Committee receives detailed classified, as well as some unclassified, information about the administration and expenditure of the agencies. Each agency under review provides classified written submissions and gives evidence to the Committee in private (classified) hearings. Much of the evidence received by the Committee must remain confidential, due to its classified nature.

1.8In addition, the Committee is able to seek evidence from any other people or organisations that it considers can assist its review, and invite submissions from the public.

1.9The IS Act places some limitations on the Committee’s functions, which apply to its conduct of administration and expenditure reviews. It is not the Committee’s role to advise what level of resourcing is appropriate for each agency to protect Australia’s national security. Similarly, the Committee has no role in determining what Australia’s national security priorities should be, nor how these priorities may be met with existing resources. The Committee also has no role in reviewing particular operations conducted by agencies, sources of information available to agencies, aspects of the activities of agencies that do not affect Australian persons, or individual complaints about the activities of the agencies.[2]

1.10Rather, the Committee analyses evidence put before it and explored further through hearings and questions, in order to report to the Parliament (and through it, to the Australian public) on the administrative arrangements and expenditure of each agency, and any changes to these that may affect an agency’s ability to continue to meet its objectives. Within these parameters, the Committee is able to set its own terms of reference for the review.

Conduct of the inquiry

1.11The Committee commenced Review No. 23 in September 2024. Submissions were sought and received from the six intelligence agencies listed in paragraph 1.1, as well as from the IGIS and the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO).

1.12A complete list of submissions for the review is at Appendix A.

1.13Private (classified) hearings were held in February 2025. Appendix B lists the witnesses who appeared before the Committee. Transcripts of these hearings are classified and not publicly available. However, unclassified portions of these transcripts are referred to in relevant sections of this report.

1.14In addition, the Committee received a classified briefing from the Department of Finance on the National Security Office Precinct project.

1.15Given that an election was due to be called in the first half of 2025, the Committee did not request that agencies provide specific additional commentary in relation to any areas of focus.

1.16At the dissolution of the House of Representatives on 28 March 2025 all membership of this committee ceased and, accordingly, this inquiry lapsed. The inquiry, with the same terms of reference, was re-adopted by the Committee of the 48th Parliament on 27 October 2025. New submissions were not called for and, in accordance with Schedule 1, clause 8 of the IS Act the Committee accepted all evidence received for the previous inquiry as evidence to the 48th Parliament inquiry.

1.17All submissions received from intelligence agencies, as well as the IGIS and ANAO, were classified. Accordingly, these submissions are not publicly available. However, unclassified versions of their submissions were provided by ONI, IGIS and ANAO and published on the Committee’s website. This report draws on the classified and unclassified submissions and unclassified excerpts or summaries of other evidence provided.

1.18ASIO provided the Committee with information concerning authorisations for telecommunications data pursuant to paragraphs 94(2A)(c)–(j) of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act). It is a function of the Committee to review matters related to the retained data activities of ASIO that are included in this part of ASIO’s (classified) annual report,[3] for the sole purpose of assessing and making recommendations on the overall operation and effectiveness of the mandatory data retention regime.[4] Unlike its other functions, the Committee is authorised to review particular ASIO operations for the purpose of performing this function.[5]

1.19This report is divided into two chapters:

• The remainder of Chapter 1 provides an overview of the security environment for the 2023-24 review period, and provides a Committee comment relating to agencies’ engagement with the Review.
• Chapter 2 discusses the administration of intelligence agencies, the expenditure and financial position of intelligence agencies, and any related issues that were identified during the course of the inquiry.

The security environment during 2023-2024

1.20ASIO indicated that Australia’s security environment remained ‘complex, challenging and changing’[6] during the reporting period.

1.21On 5 August 2024, ASIO raised the national terrorism threat level from ‘possible’ to ‘probable’,[7] with ASIO’s Director-General stating that

Australia’s security landscape has entered a vulnerable period. My decision to raise the threat level followed a concerning increase in politically motivated violence (PMV), and the likelihood of more politically motivated violence in the immediate future.[8]

1.22In addition, ASIO stated in evidence to the Committee that

During 2023–24, both here and overseas, there were spikes in political polarisation and intolerance, uncivil debate and unpeaceful protest. Anti-authority beliefs grew; trust in institutions eroded; provocative and inflammatory behaviours were normalised.

This trend began before COVID, but accelerated in response to lockdowns and other government actions. It accelerated further after the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel, and again after Israel’s military retaliation.

These dynamics raised the temperature of the security environment and created a climate more permissive of violence, making acts of terrorism more likely.[9]

1.23ASIO said that:

The spread of encryption continues to pose a challenge to ASIO’s activities, with malicious actors routinely using commercially available secure messaging apps and virtual private networks to hide their activities.[10]

1.24ASIO advised that multiple nations, including some considered friendly, had

sought to covertly understand and shape Australia’s politics and decision-making; our alliances and partnerships; our defence capabilities; and our economic and policy priorities.[11]

1.25ASIO also reported that multiple nations, including some considered friendly, had

continued their efforts to recruit government officials, interfere in our political processes, and monitor, harass and intimidate members of diaspora communities.[12]

1.26ASD referred to the 2024 National Defence Strategy,[13] which provides the following summary of Australia’s strategic environment:

The Defence Strategic Review observed that Australia faced its most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War. It also reaffirmed that Australia no longer enjoys the benefit of a ten-year window of strategic warning time for conflict. Since then, our strategic circumstances have continued to deteriorate, consistent with the trends the Defence Strategic Review identified.

Entrenched and increasing strategic competition between the United States (US) and China is a primary feature of our security environment. It is being accompanied by an unprecedented conventional and non-conventional military build-up in our region, taking place without strategic reassurance or transparency. The challenges to regional stability and prosperity arising from this competition are being compounded by a range of other security risks, including climate change, grey-zone activities and technological advancements.

Beyond the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s support for Hamas and other proxies are examples of how revisionist states continue to challenge the rules and norms that are so important to our interests and our own region’s continued security, stability and prosperity. While a major conflict is not inevitable, this new reality is making the pursuit of Australia’s interests more challenging.[14]

Committee Comment

1.27The Committee makes the following comment in relation to the classification of evidence provided to the Committee and return of classified documents.

Classification of evidence

1.28The requirement that relevant Ministers review PJCIS reports prior to tabling is a power granted by the Parliament via the IS Act. Relevantly, schedule 1, clause 7 states that:

7(1) The Committee must not disclose in a report to a House of the Parliament:

(a) the identity of a person who is or has been a staff member of ASIO or ASIS or an agent of ASIO, ASIS, AGO or ASD; or

(b) any information from which the identity of such a person could reasonably be inferred; or

(c) operationally sensitive information that would or might prejudice:

(i) Australia’s national security or the conduct of Australia’s foreign relations; or

(ii) the performance by an agency of its functions.

…

7(3) The Committee must obtain the advice of the responsible Minister or responsible Ministers concerned as to whether the disclosure of any part of the report would or might disclose a matter referred to in subclause (1).

7(4) The Committee must not present a report of the Committee to a House of Parliament if a responsible Minister concerned has advised that the report or a part of the report would or might disclose such a matter.

1.29This provision is accepted by the Parliament as an exception to long-established principles of parliamentary privilege and practice, justified by the particular need to protect national security classified and sensitive information dealt with by the PJCIS from inadvertent publication.

1.30It was clear to the Committee that some paragraphs of submissions received from certain NIC agencies were over classified. It is difficult for the Committee to explain, in an unclassified report, the exact circumstances where this occurred but two examples are:

• one agency classified as SECRET the statement that it was subject to the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (PID Act). This is information that is publicly available on the IGIS’s website and on the Federal Register of Legislation. The agency suggested to the Committee that this classification error had been inadvertent.
• one paragraph in a submission paraphrased words from an Australian Government document that is publicly available online. The paraphrasing in the submission could not have amounted to the PROTECTED classification given to the paragraph in the agency’s submission.
  31. During the vetting process for the Committee’s Review of Administration and Expenditure No. 22, one agency identified that information which had been labelled as unclassified (OFFICIAL) in its submission was in fact classified information. The same information was again labelled as unclassified in its submission to the present review. This was brought to the agency’s attention but it took no action to correct the record or explain the inconsistency.
  32. The Committee considers it timely to, again, remind all agencies of the appropriate use and limitations of the vetting process, as well as drawing attention to the importance of consistent approaches to classification of information.
  33. For its part, the Committee takes seriously its responsibility to protect national security classified and sensitive information. The Committee emphasises that it is equally important that:
• information provided to it by agencies is appropriately and consistently classified, to assist the Committee draft its reports accurately; and
• any changes to draft reports requested as part of the vetting process must be limited to the matters provided for in clause 7 of Schedule 1 to the IS Act and must be included in a Minister’s letter.

Footnotes

[1]Intelligence Services Act 2001, s. 29.

[2]Intelligence Services Act 2001, s. 29(3).

[3]IS Act, para. 22(1)(bd).

[4]IS Act, s. 29(5).

[5]IS Act, s. 29(4).

[6]Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), Submission 1, p. 2.

[7]ASIO ‘National Terrorism Threat Level’ www.asio.gov.au/national-terrorism-threat-level-2024 accessed on 16 January 2025.

[8]ASIO, Submission 1, p. 2.

[9]ASIO, Submission 1, p. 2.

[10]ASIO, Submission 1, p. 3.

[11]ASIO, Annual Report 2023-24, p. 3.

[12]ASIO, Annual Report 2023-24, p. 3.

[13]Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), Submission 7, p. 8.

[14]Australian Government, Department of Defence, 2024 National Defence Strategy, pp. 9-10, accessed at https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-program on 16 January 2024.