1. Introduction

Referral of the Bill

1.1Division 3 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) establishes ASIO’s compulsory questioning powers. On ASIO’s request, the Attorney-General may issue a warrant requiring a person to appear before a prescribed authority to give information, or produce a record or other thing, that is, or may be, relevant to important intelligence on specified matters. The compulsory questioning regime presently provides for both adult and minor (14-17 years) questioning warrants.

1.2On 23 July 2025, the Minister for Home Affairs, the Hon Tony Burke MP, introduced two bills relating to the compulsory questioning framework into the House of Representatives:

• Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2025 (Bill No. 1)
• Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025 (Bill No. 2)
  3. On 26 August 2025, Minister Burke wrote to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) to refer both Bills for inquiry and report.
  4. Bill No. 1 sought to make only one change to the current ASIO Act: to extend the operation of the ASIO compulsory questioning warrant framework, otherwise scheduled to ‘sunset’ on 7 September 2025, for a further 18 months. The Committee tabled a short advisory report in relation to Bill No. 1 that supported the extension of the sunset date, noting that this would allow the Committee to complete its in-depth review of the compulsory questioning powers, including the reforms proposed in Bill No. 2.[1] Bill No. 1 passed both Houses on 4 September 2025 and the ASIO compulsory questioning warrant framework is now scheduled to sunset on 7 March 2027.
  5. Bill No. 2 seeks to make compulsory questioning warrants a permanent part of ASIO’s intelligence collection powers by repealing the sunset provision altogether. Bill No. 2 also seeks to make more comprehensive reforms to the ASIO Act compulsory questioning framework by expanding the scope of adult questioning warrants, changing provisions around prescribed authorities, and imposing additional reporting requirements. Additionally, Bill No. 2 would make a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (IS Act) to require the PJCIS to review the amendments contained in the Bill on the third anniversary of their commencement.

The lapsed statutory review

1.6In September 2023, in accordance with a function conferred on it by paragraph 29(1)(ce) of the IS Act, the Committee commenced a Review of Division 3 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (the lapsed statutory review). That review was to examine the operation, effectiveness and implications of the compulsory questioning regime, three years after significant overhaul of the provisions in 2020 (discussed further below).

1.7On 28 March 2025, that review lapsed when the House of Representatives was dissolved. While some evidence had been gathered for the lapsed statutory review, it was not complete and no report had been presented to Parliament.

Conduct of the inquiry

1.8On 27August 2025, the present Committee resolved to commence its inquiry into Bill No. 2 (the Bill inquiry) and re-initiate the lapsed statutory review. Noting that both concerned the same legislative scheme in the ASIO Act, the Committee resolved to conduct the two reviews cognately, with a view to presenting a single report to Parliament covering both the lapsed statutory review and the Bill inquiry.

1.9On 28 August 2025, the Committee announced the commencement of the inquiry via media release, and invited new written submissions to be directed to the Bill inquiry, by 9 October 2025. The Committee was in addition able to draw on the evidence previously collected in the lapsed statutory review, as authorised by clause 8 of Schedule 1 to the IS Act.

1.10Evidence collected during the 47th Parliament for the lapsed statutory review comprised:

• 12 submissions, including 4 supplementary submissions. Appendix A sets out a list of submissions received
• a public hearing held on 23 May 2024. Appendix B sets out a list of witnesses who appeared at the public hearing
• a private briefing from ASIO received prior to commencing the lapsed statutory review.
  11. The Committee received 6 submissions to the Bill inquiry. Appendix A sets out a list of the submissions received.
  12. The Committee held a (further) public hearing on 17 November 2025. Appendix B sets out a list of witnesses who appeared at the public hearing.
  13. Copies of submissions and transcripts of the public hearings from the lapsed statutory review and the Bill inquiry can be accessed at the Committee’s website.[2]

Report structure

1.14This report contains four chapters:

• the remainder of Chapter 1 provides an overview of Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO Act, the legislative and review history of the powers, and the current security environment
• Chapter 2 discusses evidence received in relation to the proposed amendments in the Bill, including making the powers permanent and PJCIS review powers; extending adult questioning warrants to additional heads of security; multiple amendments relating to prescribed authorities; and providing reports to the Attorney-General
• Chapter 3 examines evidence received in relation to other matters not addressed in the Bill including minor questioning warrants; entry to premises; necessity and proportionality as a statutory requirement; access to legal representation; and international alignment
• Chapter 4 offers the Committee’s comments and recommendations on the continued utility of ASIO’s compulsory questioning regime and proposals for its refinement.

ASIO’s questioning powers: an overview

1.15Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO Act allows the Director-General of Security to request, and the Attorney-General to issue, two types of compulsory questioning warrants: an adult questioning warrant and a minor questioning warrant.[3] Where a compulsory questioning warrant is obtained, the subject of the warrant is required to appear before a ‘prescribed authority’ to give information, or produce a record or other thing, that is, or may be, relevant to intelligence that is important in relation to an ‘adult questioning matter’ or a ‘minor questioning matter’, as defined in section 34A of the ASIO Act.[4]

1.16Failure to appear before the prescribed authority in accordance with the warrant or failure to give information or to produce a record or thing in response to a request is an offence under the ASIO Act, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.[5] The giving of false or misleading information is also an offence, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.[6]

1.17The subject of a questioning warrant is not excused from giving information or producing a record or other thing in response to a request made before the prescribed authority on the ground that the information, record or thing provided ‘might tend to incriminate the subject in relation to an offence’.[7]

1.18However, anything said or provided by the subject while appearing before a prescribed authority is not admissible in evidence against the subject in a criminal proceeding, except in proceedings for an offence in relation to the questioning proceeding.[8]

1.19An adult questioning warrant may only be issued to ASIO if the Attorney-General is satisfied that:

1. the person is at least 18 years old; and
2. there are reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant will substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to an adult questioning matter; and
3. having regard to other methods (if any) of collecting the intelligence that are likely to be as effective, it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the warrant to be issued; and
4. if the warrant is a post-charge, or post-confiscation application, questioning warrant—it is necessary, for the purposes of collecting the intelligence, for the warrant to be issued even though:

1. the person has been charged or the confiscation proceeding has commenced; or
2. that charge or proceeding is imminent; and

5. there is in force under section 34AF a written statement of procedures to be followed in the exercise of authority under a questioning warrant.[9]
   20. An adult questioning matter means:

a matter that relates to the protection of, and of the people of, the Commonwealth and the several States and Territories from any of the following:

1. espionage;

2. politically motivated violence;
3. acts of foreign interference;

whether directed from, or committed within, Australia or not.[10]

1.21The requirements that must be met to obtain a minor questioning warrant are more stringent than those for obtaining an adult questioning warrant: a minor questioning warrant is only available in relation to a person 14–17 years old and in relation to a minor questioning matter.[11] A minor questioning matter means:

a matter that relates to the protection of, and of the people of, the Commonwealth and the several States and Territories from politically motivated violence, whether directed from, or committed within, Australia or not.[12]

1.22Before issuing a minor questioning warrant, the Attorney-General must be satisfied that:

• the person is at least 14 years old; and
• there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person has likely engaged in, is likely engaged in, or is likely to engage in activities prejudicial to the protection of, and of the people of, the Commonwealth and the several States and Territories from politically motivated violence, whether directed from, or committed within, Australia or not; and
• there are reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant will substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to a minor questioning matter; and
• having regard to other methods (if any) of collecting the intelligence that are likely to be as effective, it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the warrant to be issued; and
• if the warrant is a post-charge, or post-confiscation application, questioning warrant—it is necessary, for the purposes of collecting the intelligence, for the warrant to be issued even though:

• the person has been charged or the confiscation proceeding has commenced; or
• that charge or proceeding is imminent; and

• there is in force under section 34AF a written statement of procedures to be followed in the exercise of authority under a questioning warrant.[13]
  23. Additionally, in deciding whether to issue a minor questioning warrant, the Attorney-General must consider the best interests of the person as a primary consideration, specifically taking into account the below factors:
• the age, maturity, sex and background (including lifestyle, culture and traditions) of the person;
• the physical and mental health of the person;
• the benefit to the person of having a meaningful relationship with the person’s family and friends;
• the right of the person to receive an education;
• the right of the person to practise the person’s religion;
• any other matter the Attorney-General considers relevant.[14]
  24. Questioning under a questioning warrant is overseen and controlled by a ‘prescribed authority’ appointed by the Attorney-General. The questioning itself is conducted by an ASIO officer or a third party on behalf of ASIO (such as a senior lawyer from the Australian Government Solicitor). A prescribed authority must be an experienced legal practitioner, being a former superior court judge, a current President or Deputy President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal or a King’s Counsel or a Senior Counsel with at least 10 years’ practicing experience.[15] The role of the prescribed authority and the appointment criteria are explored in detail in Chapter 2.
  25. Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO Act sets out a range of other provisions related to the application for, and carrying out of, a compulsory questioning warrant by ASIO. These include secrecy offences intended to ensure the secrecy of questioning warrant activity by questioning subjects and participants;[16] requirements for individuals participating in the questioning warrant process, including subjects and officials carrying out the warrant,[17] and lawyers and other representatives attending alongside the subject;[18] matters relating to court proceedings and the derivative use of questioning material;[19] the presence of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS);[20] and ASIO’s record-keeping and reporting requirements.[21]
  26. The carrying out of a questioning warrant is also governed by a written Statement of Procedures required to be prepared by ASIO, in consultation with the IGIS and the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and subject to the Attorney-General’s approval.[22] The Guidelines to ASIO issued by the Minister under section 8A of the ASIO Act also govern ASIO’s use of questioning warrants.[23]
  27. Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO Act is scheduled to sunset on 7 March 2027.[24]

Outline of the Bill

1.28The amendments made by Bill No. 2 are contained in a single Schedule consisting of 6Parts.

Part 1 – Sunsetting

1.29Since their introduction in 2003, the compulsory questioning powers have been subject to ‘sunset’ provisions, under which the laws will expire after a certain period, unless the legislation is amended to extend them.

1.30Part 1 seeks to remove the sunset provisions, which would make the powers permanent.

1.31Additionally, Part 1 proposes amendments to the IS Act to empower the PJCIS to commence a further statutory review within three years of commencement of the amendments.[25]

Part 2 – Extending adult questioning warrants to additional heads of security

1.32Currently, an adult questioning warrant can be issued where the matter involved relates to protecting Australia and Australians from espionage, politically motivated violence or foreign interference.

1.33Part 2 would repeal the definition of adult questioning matter under section 34A of the ASIO Act and substitute it with an expanded definition which would allow adult questioning warrants to be issued in relation to all seven elements of the definition of security in the ASIO Act (known as ‘heads’ of security):

1espionage

2sabotage

3politically motivated violence

4promotion of communal violence

5attacks on Australia’s defence system

6acts of foreign interference

7protection of Australia’s territorial and border integrity from serious threats.[26]

Part 3 – Expanding disqualifying matters for appointment as a prescribed authority

1.34Currently, the ASIO Act provides for certain categories of person who are ineligible to be appointed as a prescribed authority. These categories include the Director-General of Security, ASIO employees, staff members of other intelligence and security agencies, IGIS officials and staff members of law enforcement agencies.[27]

1.35Part 3 proposes amendments to subsection 34AD(2) of the ASIO Act to expand the categories of people ineligible for appointment as a prescribed authority: to include members of the defence force, Australian Public Service (APS) employees, APS agency heads and others.[28]

Part 4 – Termination of appointment of prescribed authorities

1.36Currently, the Attorney-General may terminate the appointment of a prescribed authority for various prescribed reasons, including misbehaviour, bankruptcy, failing to disclose conflicts of interest, or because they are unable to perform their duties due to physical or mental incapacity.[29]

1.37Part 4 would amend subsection 34AD(9) of the ASIO Act to repeal and substitute reasons the Attorney-General may and must terminate the appointments of prescribed authorities. The proposed amendments would:

• maintain discretionary powers in relation to misbehaviour and physical or mental incapacity
• prescribe circumstances in which the Attorney-General must terminate the appointment of a prescribed authority, including the prescribed authority becoming bankrupt, having a pecuniary or other conflict of interest, failing to disclose a conflict of interest or ceasing to be eligible for appointment.
  38. The amendments are intended to align the termination provisions for prescribed authorities with those of comparable oversight roles, such as Public Interest Advocates under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979and regulations, and examiners under the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 [30]

Part 5 – Providing reports to the Attorney-General

1.39For every questioning warrant executed, the Director-General of Security must give the Attorney-General a written report containing certain information listed in section 34HA.[31]

1.40Part 5 inserts a new paragraph into subsection 34HA(1), which provides additional reporting requirements for such reports. These are details of any action taken in relation to the warrant that:

• did not comply with guidelines given by the Minister under section 8A
• contravened a written statement of procedures in force under section 34AF
• contravened the warrant
• contravened a condition or restriction in the warrant, or
• contravened a direction given by a prescribed authority in connection with the warrant.

Part 6 – Prescribed authority for post-charge questioning

1.41While ASIO’s compulsory questioning powers exist specifically for the purpose of collecting intelligence, not collecting evidence for law enforcement purposes, the ASIO Act allows for the Attorney-General to issue a questioning warrant at a time when the subject of the warrant has been charged with a related offence or when such a charge is imminent (post-charge questioning warrant).[32] The ASIO Act also allows for ASIO to require a person to give information, or produce records or other things, in relation to the subject matter of any charge, or imminent charge, against the person.[33]

1.42Part 6 seeks to make amendments to sections 34BD and 34BE of the ASIO Act, for warrants in circumstances where a warrant is a post-charge questioning warrant, or where the subject of a warrant has otherwise been charged with an offence or such a charge is imminent. In these circumstances, Part 6 proposes that ASIO can:

• only question the person before a prescribed authority who is a former judge of a superior court, and
• if the warrant requests the subject to produce a record or thing, have that thing produced only before a prescribed authority who is a former judge of a superior court.
  43. Part 6 proposes another minor amendment to section 34DE of the ASIO Act (not specifically about post-charge questioning), to allow for a prescribed authority to direct any person subject to a compulsory questioning warrant to return for questioning before a different prescribed authority.[34]

Legislative and review history

1.44Compulsory questioning warrants have been available to ASIO since 2003. The provisions were inserted into the ASIO Act following an internal review of Australia’s legal and operational counter-terrorism capabilities in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001.[35] Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO Act originally included the power for the Attorney-General to authorise the detention of a subject of a questioning warrant, but this was removed from the ASIO Act in amendments made to the questioning warrants provisions in 2020.

1.45Despite a range of other warrant-based intelligence collection powers available to ASIO under Division 2 of Part III of the ASIO Act and in other Acts, the introduction of compulsory questioning warrants represented the first time ASIO was given the ability to question people who were unwilling to cooperate voluntarily.

2002–2006: Introduction of the powers, PJCAAD reviews and amendments

1.46In March 2002, the Australian Government introduced the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (2002 Bill), containing the first iteration of proposed questioning and detention powers. The 2002 Bill proposed to provide ASIO with the power to detain, search and question persons before a prescribed authority. It also proposed to include the definition of a ‘terrorism offence’ in the ASIO Act and to permit personal searches in conjunction with detention warrants.[36] The purpose of the proposed powers was, according to then Attorney-General the Hon Daryl Williams KC, ‘to strengthen Australia’s counter-terrorism capabilities by enhancing ASIO’s investigative powers’.[37]

1.47The original 2002 Bill was subject to considerable debate and was reviewed by the precursor to the PJCIS, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD (PJCAAD),[38] as well as both the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee[39] and the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee.[40] At the time, the PJCAAD said that the 2002 Bill was ‘the most controversial piece of legislation ever reviewed by the Committee’ with over 150 submissions opposing the Bill. The key issues that arose in that inquiry included:

• the status of the prescribed authority
• access to legal representation
• the maximum duration of the detention period
• the need for protocols governing the detention of persons
• application of the Bill to persons under 18
• the issue of self-incrimination
• access to judicial review
• a range of proposed stronger accountability measures including adequate reporting of the number of warrants issued and the use of a sunset clause to strengthen public confidence.[41]
  48. The PJCAAD made 15 recommendations, and the Government accepted 10 of those recommendations in full. However, the 2002 Bill was ultimately laid aside on 13December 2002 due to a failure to reach agreement after an all-night sitting in the House of Representatives. The Bill was reintroduced in the House of Representatives in March 2003 with amendments, and was passed by the Parliament in June 2003. The legislation as passed included provision for the powers to sunset three years after their commencement, on 23 July 2006, and for their review by the PJCAAD prior to the sunset date.[42]

2005 PJCAAD Review

1.49In November 2005, the PJCAAD completed its first statutory review of Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO Act, as required at the time by the IS Act.[43] From the introduction of the powers in 2003 until the first sunset date in September 2006, 15 warrants were issued. Appendix C lists all compulsory questioning warrants issued to ASIO since 2003.

1.50The PJCAAD supported the continuation of the powers beyond 2006, finding that they had been useful. However, it considered that such powers should be subject to ongoing scrutiny and should not be made a permanent part of the ASIO Act:

…the powers are extraordinary and should not be seen as a permanent part of the Australian legal landscape … They are subject to the quality of the administration of the service at any particular time.[44]

1.51The PJCAAD made a total of 19 recommendations in its 2005 report. The recommendations predominantly related to improving safeguards around the warrants and clarifying the legislation. The Government agreed to six of the recommendations in full and six in part but rejected seven of the Committee’s recommendations outright. Instead of the PJCAAD-recommended five years, the Government extended the sunset date by 10 years to 22 July 2016.[45]

2006-2017: lowering the threshold

1.52Following the 2005 PJCAAD statutory review, the questioning warrant provisions were not reviewed again in their entirety by the PJCIS until 2018,[46] although the powers were reviewed between 2011 and 2016 by successive Independent National Security Legislation Monitors. The PJCIS also reviewed aspects of the questioning warrant provisions as part of its inquiry into the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014.

2012 INSLM review

1.53The first Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM), Bret Walker SC, reviewed Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO Act in 2012, including reviewing all the files associated with every questioning warrant. His 2012 review of ASIO’s questioning powers concluded:

The efficacy of the [questioning warrant] provisions and their worth as an intelligence collection tool has been established through review of the files and discussions with relevant agencies.[47]

1.54Despite this endorsement, INSLM Walker noted that:

…[questioning warrants] should continue to be scrutinized, particularly as to the products of their actual use, for the practical assistance they lend (or not) to the prevention, detection and eventual prosecution of terrorist offences.[48]

1.55INSLM Walker made nine recommendations for amendments to the existing safeguards to improve the efficacy of questioning warrants.[49] Notably, he recommended lowering the threshold for the issue of ASIO questioning warrants, so as to eliminate the ‘last resort’ test[50] and replace it instead with the requirement that the Attorney-General be satisfied that the use of a questioning warrant is reasonable in all the circumstances.[51] This recommendation was reiterated in the INSLM’s 2013 Annual Report, where INSLM Walker commented that retaining the ‘excessive last resort test’ was unjustified, ‘given the unpredictable urgency with which [opportunities to collect intelligence] are apt to arise’.[52]

1.56In 2012, the INSLM concluded that detention warrants were ‘not necessary as less restrictive alternatives exist to achieve the same purpose’ and recommended that the provisions allowing ASIO to detain a questioning subject should be repealed.[53]

Foreign Fighters Act 2014

1.57The ‘last resort’ requirement was removed in 2014 as part of the amendments contained in the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Act 2014 (Foreign Fighters Act). The Act replaced the ‘last resort’ test for an ASIO questioning warrant with a requirement that the Attorney-General be satisfied that, having regard to other methods (if any) of collecting the intelligence that are likely to be as effective, it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the warrant to be issued. The changing of the criteria effectively lowered the threshold for ASIO to obtain a questioning warrant. Despite this, no questioning warrants were sought or issued in the years following the change.

1.58The Foreign Fighters Act implemented two of the INSLM’s nine recommendations in full and one in part.[54] It did not remove (combined) questioning and detention warrants from the ASIO Act despite the INSLM’s recommendation to do so. The Foreign Fighters Act also introduced a new offence for destroying or tampering with ‘records or things’ requested to be produced under a questioning warrant and removed the specific threshold governing the use of lethal force by a police officer during execution of a warrant to bring it into line with the rest of the use of force requirements within the ASIO Act.[55]

1.59The Foreign Fighters Act also extended the sunset date for Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO Act. The original bill had proposed to extend the sunset date by a further 10 years from 22 July 2016 to 22 July 2026 and proposed to defer the review of the powers by this Committee a further 10 years until 22 January 2026.[56] However, following a recommendation from the Committee, the sunset date was changed to 7September2018, with a requirement for further review by the INSLM and the PJCIS before that date.

2016 INSLM review

1.60The 2016 review by the INSLM, the Hon Roger Gyles AO KC, was conducted alongside the INSLM’s review of Part IC of the Crimes Act 1914.[57]

1.61The INSLM’s review found that, while a compulsory questioning power was a useful tool for ASIO’s counter-terrorism work, the provisions were no longer fit-for-purpose and could not be regarded as effective.[58] INSLM Gyles made three recommendations:

• questioning and detention warrants should be removed from the ASIO Act
• ASIO’s questioning powers should be replaced by a questioning power resembling the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission’s (ACIC’s) powers as closely as possible and with no sunset clause
• the Government should broaden the circumstances in which a questioning warrant may be sought by expanding the definition of ‘terrorism offence’ in the ASIO Act and allowing ASIO to obtain a warrant where it is ‘important in relation to an actual or threatened terrorism offence’ rather than ‘important in relation to a terrorism offence’.[59]

2018-2020: PJCIS review and the ASIO Amendment Act 2020

1.62The 2018 review conducted by the PJCIS was the first parliamentary review of Division 3 of Part III in its entirety since the 2005 PJCAAD statutory review. The 2018 review concluded that there was a clear necessity, given the security context, for ASIO to retain the power to obtain a questioning warrant. However, the Committee found that questioning and detention warrants were unnecessary and should not be retained for ASIO’s use. The Committee found that the questioning warrant provisions needed to be redrafted for clarity and to include additional safeguards.[60]

1.63The Committee made a range of recommendations, informed by INSLM Gyles’ report and other proposals put forward by ASIO, to guide the development of a reformed compulsory questioning framework. The Committee recommended the extension of the sunset date by 12 months to 7 September 2019 to enable the implementation of these recommendations.[61] This was again extended by another 12 months to 7 September 2020.[62]

2020 ASIO Amendment Act

1.64In 2020, ASIO’s compulsory questioning powers underwent considerable change, via the passage of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Act 2020. This formed part of the Government’s response to the Committee’s 2018 review of Division 3 of Part III, as well as ASIO’s changing organisational requirements. The 2020 Act repealed and replaced Division 3 of Part III of the ASIO Act in its entirety.

1.65Key changes in the new Division 3 included:

• retaining questioning warrants, but abolishing questioning and detention warrants
• lowering the minimum age at which an individual may be subject to a questioning warrant from 16 to 14 years of age
• enabling the use of questioning warrants for adults in relation to espionage, politically motivated violence and acts of foreign interference, rather than only in relation to terrorism offences
• replacing the detention power with the power to apprehend individuals for the purpose of bringing them before a prescribed authority for questioning
• permitting the Attorney-General to issue questioning warrants directly in place of an independent issuing authority
• permitting ASIO to request, and the Attorney-General to issue, questioning warrants orally in specific circumstances
• broadening the range of persons eligible to be appointed a prescribed authority to include experienced lawyers in addition to former superior court judges and the President or Deputy President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
• introducing a prohibition on individuals possessing certain items (dangerous items or communication devices) where questioning is taking place, and associated screening powers for police officers
• retaining the prescribed authority’s power to limit contact with a subject’s lawyer of choice or to remove a lawyer for unduly disrupting questioning and permitting the prescribed authority to appoint a lawyer for the subject in some circumstances
• introducing provisions to explicitly permit a questioning warrant to be executed where a subject has been charged or a charge is imminent.
  66. Between 2007 and 2020, just one warrant was issued, in the year ending 30 June 2010. Since the 2020 amendments came into effect, four warrants have been issued in relation to three individuals, all during the 2020–21 and 2021–22 financial years.[63] Two of those individuals were questioned in relation to counter-espionage cases and one was in relation to a counter-terrorism matter.[64] No questioning warrants were issued in the 2022-23, 2023-24 or 2024-25 financial years.[65]

The current security environment

1.67In the early 2000s, the security environment was dominated by the threat from religiously motivated violent extremism, following the September 11 terrorist attacks and Bali Bombings in 2001 and 2002, respectively. In 2020, when the questioning warrant framework was overhauled, terrorism was still considered the most pressing security concern although ASIO commented that it was also facing unprecedented levels of espionage and acts of foreign interference.[66]

1.68The security environment has changed significantly in recent years. In February 2025, the Director-General of Security, Mr Mike Burgess AM, warned that espionage and foreign interference were already at extreme levels and were anticipated to intensify over the next five years, driven by an increasingly complicated and competitive world, and enabled by advances in technology.[67]

1.69Meanwhile, Australia’s national Terrorism Threat Level, which was first raised in 2014 during the height of the Islamic State caliphate, was lowered in November 2022,[68] but again raised from POSSIBLE to PROBABLE in August 2024, with ASIO assessing there is ‘a greater than fifty per cent chance of an onshore attack or attack planning in the next twelve months’.[69] Consequently, politically motivated violence re-joined espionage and foreign interference among ASIO’s principal security concerns.[70]

1.70In addition to the enduring threat of religiously motivated violent extremism, ASIO has in recent years observed the emergence of domestic actors who are increasingly driven to action by socio-political issues, intersecting with personal grievances. According to ASIO, there is an increase in extremism fuelled by conspiracy theories and anti-authority ideologies. Some actors hold a blend of ideologies, including those that justify acts of violence to influence change.[71]

1.71The representation of minors in ASIO’s terrorism investigations has also continued to increase. In his 2025 annual threat assessment, the Director-General of Security reported that the median age at which minors are first subject to ASIO investigation is now 15 years old and that, in 2024, almost all potential terrorist matters involved minors.[72]

1.72However, current security threats are not confined to espionage, foreign interference and politically motivated violence. In his 2025 annual threat assessment, Mr Burgess said that the ‘most confronting’ aspect of the current security environment is that ‘there is no single security concern’. While Mr Burgess described the threats of espionage, foreign interference and politically motivated violence as already ‘flashing red’, he warned that three more threats could join them in the next five years:

• acts of communal violence, stemming from a ‘polarised, grievance-rich’ environment in which violent protest and intimidating behaviour have been normalised
• attacks on Australia’s defence system, with the Australia—United Kingdom—United States (AUKUS) submarine project likely to be a particular target for intelligence collection
• sabotage, with authoritarian regimes growing more willing to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure to impede decision-making, damage war-fighting capabilities and sow social discord.[73]
  73. In relation to ASIO’s final head of security, Mr Burgess said that serious threats to border integrity had diminished, but not disappeared, in recent years. ASIO expected ‘small scale people-smuggling operations’ to continue over the coming five years.[74]

Footnotes

[1]Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS), Advisory report on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2025, August 2025.

[2]www.aph.gov.au/ASIOAct2023 and www.aph.gov.au/ASIOBill22025

[3]Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, s 34B (ASIO Act).

[4]ASIO Act, s 34BD.

[5]ASIO Act, s 34GD(1)–(3).

[6]ASIO Act, s 34GD(8).

[7]ASIO Act, s 34GD(5).

[8]ASIO Act, s 34GD(6). Section 34GF of the ASIO Act contains secrecy offences relating to warrants and questioning. Sections 137.1 and 137.2 of the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code) make it an offence to provide false or misleading information or false or misleading documents in certain circumstances.

[9]ASIO Act, s 34BA(1).

[10]ASIO Act, s 34A (definition of ‘adult questioning matter’).

[11]ASIO Act, ss 34BB.

[12]ASIO Act, s 34A (definition of ‘minor questioning matter’).

[13]ASIO Act, s 34BB(1).

[14]ASIO Act, ss 34BB(2)–(3).

[15]ASIO Act, s 34AD(1).

[16]ASIO Act, s 34GF (‘secrecy relating to warrants and questioning’).

[17]ASIO Act, pt. III, div. 3, sub-div. D (‘matters relating to questioning under questioning warrants’).

[18]ASIO Act, pt. III, div. 3, sub-div. F (‘lawyers and minor’s representatives’).

[19]ASIO Act, pt. III, div. 3, sub-div. E (‘particular uses or disclosures of questioning material and derivative material’).

[20]ASIO Act, s. 34JB (‘IGIS official may be present at questioning or apprehension’).

[21]ASIO Act, pt III, div 3, sub-div H.

[22]ASIO Act, s 34AF (‘written statement of procedures’); Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (Statement of Procedures) Instrument 2025.

[23]See Guidelines to be observed by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation in the performance of its functions and the exercise of its powers, 4 March 2025. The Guidelines provide a mechanism for the Minister responsible for ASIO to outline their expectations as to how ASIO achieves its purpose, performs its functions and exercises its powers. The Director-General of Security is responsible for ASIO’s compliance with the Guidelines: see https://www.asio.gov.au/ministers-guidelines.

[24]ASIO Act, s 34JF.

[25]Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025 (Bill), Part 1 – Sunsetting.

[26]See ASIO Act, s 4 (definition of ‘security’). It is noted, however, that the proposed new s 34A would not explicitly extend compulsory questioning matters to include paragraph 4(b)’s reference to ‘the carrying out of Australia’s responsibilities to any foreign country in relation to the heads of security’.

[27]ASIO Act, s 34AD(2).

[28]Explanatory Memorandum, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025, (EM) p. 7.

[29]ASIO Act, s 34AD(9).

[30]EM, pp. 8—9.

[31]ASIO Act, s 34HA.

[32]ASIO Act, ss 34BA(1)(d); 34BB(1)(e). According to section 34A of the ASIO Act: a charge against a person is imminent if: the person is under arrest for an offence, but has not been charged with the offence; or a person with authority to commence a process for prosecuting the person for an offence has decided to commence, but not yet commenced, the process; or a confiscation proceeding against a person is imminent if a person with authority to commence the proceeding has decided to commence, but not yet commenced, the proceeding.

[33]ASIO Act, ss 34BD(4), 34DB. A ‘confiscation proceeding’ means a proceeding under the Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 or the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; or a corresponding law within the meaning of either of those Acts; but does not include a criminal prosecution for an offence under either of those Acts or a corresponding law: ASIO Act, s 34A (definition of ‘confiscation proceeding’). A ‘criminal proceeding’ means a prosecution for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory; or a confiscation proceeding: ASIO Act, s 34A (definition of ‘criminal proceeding’).

[34]EM, p. 11.

[35]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 2, para. 3. (lapsed review)

[36]Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD (PJCAAD), Completed Inquiry: An Advisory Report on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002, 5 June 2002, p. 3.

[37]The Hon Daryl Williams KC MP, Attorney-General, House of Representatives Hansard, 21 March 2002, p.1935.

[38]PJCAAD, An Advisory Report on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002, 5 June 2002.

[39]Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Provisions of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002, report, 2002.

[40]Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 and Related Matters, report, 2002.

[41]PJCAAD, Completed Inquiry: An Advisory Report on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002, 5 June 2002, p. 10.

[42]Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003, sch 1, items 24 and 27D.

[43]PJCAAD, ASIO’s Questioning and Detention Powers: Review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of Division 3 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, 30 November 2005.

[44]PJCAAD, ASIO’s Questioning and Detention Powers: Review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of Division 3 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, 30 November 2005, p. 107, para. 6.44.

[45]Australian Government, Report on the operation, effectiveness and implications of Division 3 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979: Government response—March 2006, p. 8 (Recommendation 19).

[46]Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS), ASIO’s questioning and detention powers: Review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of Division 3 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, March 2018.

[47]Bret Walker SC, Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM), Declassified Annual Report, 20December 2012, chs IV–V.

[48]B Walker SC, INSLM, Declassified Annual Report, 20 December 2012, p. 70.

[49]B Walker SC, INSLM, Declassified Annual Report, 20 December 2012, p. 70.

[50]The original requirement for the Attorney-General to issue a warrant was that they had to be satisfied that, amongst other things, ‘relying on other methods of collecting that intelligence would be ineffective’: Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003, sch 1, Item 24 (s34C(3)(b)).

[51]B Walker SC, INSLM, Declassified Annual Report, 20 December 2012, pp. 71–74.

[52]B Walker SC, INSLM, Declassified Annual Report, 7 November 2013, p. 5.

[53]B Walker SC, INSLM, Declassified Annual Report, 20 December 2012, pp. 105–106.

[54]Recommendations IV/1 and IV/6 were implemented in full; recommendation IV/3 was implemented in part through the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014.

[55]PJCIS, Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014, 17 October 2014, pp. 122–130.

[56]PJCIS, Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014, 17 October 2014, pp. 70–75.

[57]The Hon Roger Gyles AO KC, INSLM, Certain Questioning and Detention Powers in Relation to Terrorism, October 2016, p. 3, para. 2.6.

[58]The Hon Roger Gyles AO KC, INSLM, Certain Questioning and Detention Powers in Relation to Terrorism, October 2016, p. 43, paras. 9.13–9.14 and p. 51, para. 9.48.

[59]The Hon Roger Gyles AO KC, INSLM, Certain Questioning and Detention Powers in Relation to Terrorism, October 2016, pp.1-2, paras. 7–9.

[60]PJCIS, ASIO’s questioning and detention powers: Review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of Division 3 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, March 2018.

[61]PJCIS, ASIO’s questioning and detention powers: Review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of Division 3 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, March 2018, p. 42; Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2018, sch 1, pt 4, item 18.

[62]Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment (Sunsetting of Special Powers Relating to Terrorism Offences) Act 2019, sch 1, item 1.

[63]ASIO, Annual Report 2021–22, p. 135.

[64]Mr Mike Burgess, Director-General of Security, ASIO, Committee Hansard (lapsed review), Canberra, 23 May 2024, p. 24.

[65]ASIO, Annual Report 2024–25, p. 113.

[66]ASIO, ‘Director-General’s Annual Threat Assessment’, 24 February 2020, https://www.asio.gov.au/publications/speeches-and-statements/director-general-annual-threat-assessment-0, viewed 15 August 2024.

[67]Mr Mike Burgess AM, Director-General of Security, ASIO ‘Director-General's Annual Threat Assessment 2025’ (Speech, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, 19 February 2025) https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2025 (accessed 27 November 2025).

[68]ASIO, ‘National Terrorism Threat Level’, 28 November 2022, https://www.asio.gov.au/resources/speeches-and-statements/national-terrorism-threat-level, viewed 15 August 2024.

[69]Australian National Security, ‘Current National Terrorism Threat Level’, 5 August 2024, https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/national-threat-level/current-national-terrorism-threat-level, viewed 15 August 2024.

[70]Mr Mike Burgess AM, ASIO, ‘National Terrorism Threat Level’, 5 August 2024, https://www.asio.gov.au/national-terrorism-threat-level-2024, viewed 2 October 2024.

[71]Australian National Security, ‘Current National Terrorism Threat Level’, 5 August 2024, https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/national-threat-level/current-national-terrorism-threat-level, viewed 15 August 2024.

[72]Mr Mike Burgess AM, ASIO, ‘Director-General's Annual Threat Assessment 2025’ (Speech, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, 19 February 2025) https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2025 (accessed 27 November 2025).

[73]Mr Mike Burgess AM, ASIO, ‘Director-General's Annual Threat Assessment 2025’ (Speech, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, 19 February 2025) https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2025 (accessed 27 November 2025).

[74]Mr Mike Burgess AM, ASIO, ‘Director-General's Annual Threat Assessment 2025’ (Speech, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, 19 February 2025) https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2025 (accessed 27 November 2025).