Chapter 4Human rights assessment

4.1This chapter outlines and analyses the international human rights law associated with compulsory income management (under Part 3B of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (the Act)) and compulsory enhanced income management (under Part 3AA).

4.2Where a person voluntarily elects to be subject to income management this does not raise concerns from a human rights perspective. This inquiry examines the human rights implications of being compulsorily subject to income management, a matter which the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (the committee) has previously considered on numerous occasions.[1]

4.3This chapter sets out the rights that may be promoted and limited by income management, and how those human rights apply. For those rights that are limited, this chapter assesses whether the limitation is permissible under international human rights law, such that it pursues a legitimate objective, is rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate means of achieving that objective.

4.4This chapter concludes that compulsory income management appears to impermissibly limit the rights to social security, a private life and equality and non-discrimination, and may impermissibly limit further rights (including the right to an adequate standard of living, right to health and the rights of the child). This conclusion accords with the committee’s prior consideration of bills and legislative instruments providing for compulsory income management (and, relatedly, cashless welfare).

Rights possibly promoted

4.5The Department of Social Services (the department) noted that the objectives of income management under Part 3B are to:

reduce immediate hardship and deprivation by ensuring that the whole or part of certain welfare payments is directed to meeting the priority needs of the recipient of the welfare payment and their children, partner or other dependants (if any);

ensure that recipients of certain welfare payments are given support in budgeting to meet priority needs;

reduce the amount of certain welfare payments available to be spent on alcoholic beverages, gambling, tobacco products and pornographic material;

reduce the likelihood that recipients of welfare payments will be subject to harassment and abuse in relation to their welfare payments;

encourage socially responsible behaviour, including in relation to the care and education of children;

improve the level of protection afforded to welfare recipients and their families.[2]

These objects are contained in Part 3B of the Act.[3]

4.6The department stated that the objectives of the enhanced income management regime (under Part 3AA) are to:

support vulnerable individuals to manage their welfare payments;

ensure that a portion of the recipient's welfare payments is available to be spent on necessities, including food, housing, utilities, clothing and medical care, and

reduce the amount of an individual's welfare payment that is available to purchase goods and services that contribute to social harm, including alcohol, tobacco, pornography or gambling services.[4]

4.7These objects are not contained in Part 3AA of the Act. The statement of compatibility accompanying the Social Security (Administration) Amendment (Repeal of Cashless Debit Card and Other Measures) Bill 2022, which introduced Part 3AA,stated that enhanced income management seeks to ensure that income management ‘in prescribed community areas can continue as intended to address and curtail passive welfare, antisocial behaviour and entrenched disadvantage’.[5] The department has also stated that the objective of enhanced income management is ‘to ensure continuity for participants while the government makes decisions on the future of’ income management.[6]

4.8As detailed in Chapter 3, numerous witnesses and submitters strongly challenged the evidence that income management had achieved its stated objectives. Dr J. Rob Bray, a researcher at the Australian National University who has written extensively about income management, stated:

[I]n the Northern Territory one-third of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population aged 15 years and over have been subject to income management. One of the objectives of income management was supposedly to get changes at the community level. When you're treating one-third of the entire population—and most probably the most disadvantaged one-third of that population—you would expect that, if that policy worked, you would see some positive outcomes…Just look at that data; that result is not there.[7]

4.9Associate Professor Elise Klein OAM, of the Crawford School at the Australian National University (ANU), similarly argued that ‘the government has never been able to show how these measures are helpful to people subjected to them’.[8] Dr Francis Markham, Research Fellow at the ANU Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, further stated that there has been no decline in child protection matters in the Northern Territory since CIM was introduced:

[W]hen upwards of a third of remote-living Aboriginal people are on the card, and the most disadvantaged third, if it were an effective way of combatting child abuse and neglect you'd expect to see that flow through to those aggregate figures... I don’t think there’s been any improvement. I think there has been a worsening…[9]

4.10The committee has previously stated that, to the extent that income management ensures a portion of an individual's welfare payment is available to cover essential goods and services, the income management regime could have the potential to promote a number of human rights, including the right to social security, an adequate standard of living and the rights of the child.[10] If participation in income management were purely voluntary, it could promote a number of human rights and would not limit any human rights.

4.11The department stated that it can be challenging to identify the impact of income management separately from the effects of other measures (such as, decisions relating to school staffing, or alcohol bans).[11] It further advised that:

The government has committed to making income management voluntary for those individuals or communities who wish to keep a form of income management and to working with communities on these reforms. The Department of Social Services is in consultation with communities and stakeholders on the future of income management. This includes the Northern Territory and other income management sites, as well as communities which were part of the cashless debit card program.[12]

Rights limited

4.12The committee has also stated on numerous occasions that subjecting an individual to compulsory income management and restricting how they may spend a portion of their social security payment engages and limits several human rights, and in particular:

the right to social security;

the right to privacy; and

the right to equality and non-discrimination.

4.13Further, evidence raised in this inquiry indicated that compulsory income management may engage and limit other human rights, including the right to an adequate standard of living, the rights of the child, and the right to health.

4.14These rights may generally be limited where the limitation is reasonable, necessary and proportionate. This is further explained below.

The rights to social security and an adequate standard of living

4.15By restricting how a person may spend a portion of their social security payment (including a substantial portion), compulsory income management engages and limits the right to social security.

4.16The right to social security recognises the importance of adequate social benefits in reducing the effects of poverty and plays an important role in realising many other economic, social and cultural rights, in particular the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to health.[13]

4.17The right to social security encompasses the right to access and maintain benefits, whether in cash or ‘in kind’.[14] Restricted forms of cash transfers such as compulsory income management are, therefore, unlikely to be considered inherently incompatible with the right to social security.[15] However, several requirements apply. In this regard, Mr Jamie Burton KC (a barrister specialising in social security law) stated:

In human rights law states enjoy a discretion or margin of appreciation to devise poverty reduction policies which are most appropriate for their circumstances. That said, in order to be compatible with human rights, any social security scheme or measure must abide by certain norms of international human rights law.[16]

4.18International human rights law requires that social security benefits must be adequate in amount and duration.[17] States must also have regard to the principles of human dignity and non-discrimination so as to avoid any adverse effect on the levels of benefits and the form in which they are provided.[18] They must guarantee the equal enjoyment by all of minimum and adequate protection, and the right includes the right not to be subject to arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions of existing social security coverage.[19]

4.19The qualifying conditions for social welfare benefits must also be reasonable, proportionate and transparent.[20] Consequently, as Mr Jamie Burton KC observed, the eligibility rules for compulsory income management must be compatible with the core overarching requirements of legal measures governing social security, including protecting against arbitrariness.[21] Public authorities are responsible for ensuring the effective administration or supervision of a social security system.[22] Persons or groups who have experienced violations of their right to social security should have access to effective judicial or other remedies at both national and international levels.[23]

4.20Further, international law requires that the beneficiaries of social welfare schemes must be able to participate in the administration of the system. Consequently, the details of social security restrictions (including the goods on which restricted funds may be spent) must be developed with recipients pursuant to a participatory and inclusive process.[24] Such participatory mechanisms must ensure that participation is ‘authentic, takes into account the existing asymmetries of power within the community, and is tailored to ensure the broadest participation possible by vulnerable and disadvantaged groups’.[25] This relates closely to the consultation requirements that arise in relation to measures which impact Indigenous people, which is discussed in more detail below.

4.21If persons subject to compulsory income management experienced difficulties in accessing and meeting their basic needs (such as food, clothing and housing) the measure may also engage and limit the right to an adequate standard of living. This right requires Australia to take steps to ensure the availability, adequacy and accessibility of food, clothing, water and housing for all people in Australia, and also imposes on Australia the obligations listed above in relation to the right to social security.[26]

4.22Australia has two types of obligations in relation to economic, social and cultural rights. It is obliged to take reasonable measures within its available resources to progressively secure broader enjoyment of the right to an adequate standard of living and to social security. It also has immediate obligations to satisfy certain minimum aspects of the rights; not to unjustifiably take any backwards steps that might affect enjoyment of the rights; and to ensure the rights are made available in a non-discriminatory way.[27] In this regard, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has identified a 'minimum core' to the right to social security, requiring that States Parties ensure access to a social security scheme that provides a minimum essential level of benefits to all individuals and families that will enable them to acquire at least essential health care,basic shelter and housing, water and sanitation, foodstuffs, and the most basic forms of education, and ensure the right of access to social security systems or schemes on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged or marginalised individuals or groups.[28] Where there is a possibility that compulsory income management could cause individuals to be put into a situation where the minimum requirement is not being satisfied, that would raise concerns as to whether the minimum core obligation were satisfied.

4.23Mr Jamie Burton KC observed that compulsory income management:

reduces the purchasing autonomy of recipients and therefore the relationship between the amount (which remains unchanged) and the adequacy of the benefit might potentially be undermined inadvertently ((if particular retailers…or geographic locations must be used, for example)). This requires vigilance: in particular, the CIM method “should be monitored regularly to ensure that beneficiaries are able to [obtain in practice] the goods and services they require to realize their Covenant rights”…It is also often the case that essential goods are disproportionately expensive for lower income families. Plainly, the Committee will wish to understand if CIM is contributing to the “poverty premium phenomenon”.[29]

4.24As to the right to an adequate standard of living (which encompasses the rights to food and adequate housing), the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stated that food must be economically accessible, meaning that personal or household financial costs associated with the acquisition of food for an adequate diet should be at a level such that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised.[30] Further, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has explained that the right to housing dimension of the right to an adequate standard of living refers not merely to a roof over one's head, but to the right to live somewhere in 'security, peace and dignity'.[31]

The right to equality and non-discrimination

4.25Compulsory income management measures have a disproportionate impact on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in practice. While Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are estimated to constitute just 3.8 per cent of the Australian population,[32] at 31 May 2024, 82.2 per cent of all participants in the compulsory income management system were Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander.[33] As such, compulsory income management engages and limits the right to equality and non-discrimination.

4.26The right to equality and non-discrimination establishes an immediate obligation on states, and provides that everyone is entitled to enjoy their rights without discrimination of any kind and that all people are equal before the law and entitled without discrimination to equal and non‑discriminatory protection of the law.[34]

4.27The right to equality encompasses both 'direct' discrimination (where measures have a discriminatory intent) and 'indirect' discrimination (where measures have a discriminatory effect on the enjoyment of rights).[35]Indirect discrimination occurs where 'a rule or measure that is neutral at face value or without intent to discriminate', exclusively or disproportionately affects people with a particular protected attribute (including race, gender and age).[36] The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has observed that discrimination undermines the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights for a significant proportion of the world's population.[37] It has stated that eliminating discrimination in practice requires paying sufficient attention to groups of individuals which suffer historical or persistent prejudice, and not merely comparing the formal treatment of individuals in similar situations.[38]

4.28International human rights law prohibits discrimination on several grounds, including race, colour, sex, and 'other status'. International human rights law recognises the particular risk of discrimination against Indigenous people.[39] The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has advised that the term 'other status' reflects the fact that the nature of discrimination varies according to context and evolves over time.[40] It has stated that these additional grounds 'are commonly recognized when they reflect the experience of social groups that are vulnerable and have suffered and continue to suffer marginalization'.[41] It has also set out examples of the types of other status which will be captured, including:

a person's economic and social situation (individuals and groups of individuals must not be arbitrarily treated on account of belonging to a certain economic or social group or strata within society); and

place of residence (the exercise of rights should not be conditional on, or determined by, a person’s current or former place of residence, such as whether an individual lives in an urban or a rural area).[42]

4.29Compulsory income management operates only in prescribed geographical areas, and largely in areas which the Australian Bureau of Statistics classifies as ‘very remote’.[43] As such, it treats people differently based on their place of residence. In this regard, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has observed that the exercise of rights should not be conditional on, or determined by, a person’s current or former place of residence, including whether they live in a rural area, and has expressed concern at the disparities in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights generally between rural and urban areas.[44] The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has also expressed particular concern to Australia regarding the mandatory income management scheme and its disproportionate impact on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, the availability of services in rural and remote areas, and a general lack of data about the extent of poverty across the country.[45]

When differential treatment will not be unlawful

4.30Differential treatment (including the differential effect of a measure that is neutral on its face) will not constitute unlawful discrimination if the differential treatment is based on reasonable and objective criteria such that it serves a legitimate objective (one which, where an economic, social and cultural right is in question, is solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society),[46] is rationally connected to that objective and is a proportionate means of achieving that objective (having regard also to the effects of the measure).[47] This test is set out below from paragraph [4.49].

Consultation

4.31International law establishes specific requirements regarding consultation where a measure will impact on Indigenous peoples. Australia has an obligation to consult with Indigenous peoples in relation to actions which may affect them.[48] Free, prior and informed consent is a human rights norm grounded in the fundamental rights to self-determination and to be free from racial discrimination guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.[49] The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has emphasised to Australia the importance of consultation regarding the planning and implementation of policies that impact Indigenous children in particular.[50]

4.32The requirement of consultation is further elaborated in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).[51] UNDRIP provides context as to how human rights standards under international law apply to the particular situation of Indigenous peoples. UNDRIP states that a state must consult and cooperate with Indigenous peoples in good faith in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.[52] Consultation should protect the right of Indigenous peoples to 'influence the outcome of decision-making processes affecting them', which is 'not a mere right to be involved in such processes or merely to have their views heard'.[53]

4.33Several submitters raised concerns that consultation had not been undertaken prior to the imposition of compulsory income management (which, as outlined in Chapter 2, has existed in various forms since 2007). For example, Dr Shelley Bielefeld—a senior law lecturer who has written extensively about income management—stated that, in her research speaking to people directly affected by compulsory income management, many interviewees expressed frustration about ‘the unending compulsory income management approaches being deployed by the federal government in a top-down manner’.[54] Similarly, Associate Professor Elise Klein stated:

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples sets out the right to free, prior and informed consent, which has never been given when it comes to compulsory income management in this country. I underline that consultation is not free, prior and informed consent. The peak bodies of the Northern Territory, where most people who are subject to compulsory income management live, have been unequivocal that they want compulsory income management abolished. Their consent for compulsory income management has never been seriously sought by any government since 2007 and has never been granted.[55]

4.34The department advised the committee that recent consultation undertaken in relation to the future of income management has been ‘the most comprehensive engagements with community undertaken on income management to date’:

As at 24 June 2024, we have consulted with 72 communities across the Northern Territory, the APY Lands in South Australia, the East Kimberley region in Western Australia and Shepparton in Victoria. Just under 4,000 community members have participated in these consultations. Since December 2022, we have also consulted with over 200 community organisations; Commonwealth, state and territory governments; peak bodies, including Economic Justice Australia; the Centre for Excellence in Child and Family Welfare; CatholicCare; and various land councils across the Northern Territory…Their success is a result of the department's partnering with First Nations organisation ETMP and of the time we are committing to ensuring communities and individuals have an opportunity to talk directly to government.[56]

4.35The department stated that the consultation described consisted of ‘spending time in community’, including the promotion of consultation activities in local languages, holding community events and break-out groups.[57] It stated that the message from the consultations was consistently that people want to be able to choose whether to be on income management:

From the nearly 4,000 consultations held to date, the department has identified that there is a clear message that people want choice on whether to stay on the program or leave. Although we have heard many would choose to leave, there are also many individuals who have said they would choose to stay on the program. We have also heard in submissions from many stakeholders who have raised issues similar to those, particularly where the programs have met their objectives. We see a clear preference to allow people to choose whether to participate in the program.

…

During consultations, it was also made clear that communities want us to continue to work with them on what comes next, and we are committed to doing that. The next stage is to ask communities and stakeholders their views on the process to support people to transition off the program and the process for people to stay on it, should they choose. It will seek their views on the assistance and information they want to help them make that choice, and we will also seek their advice on what they will need to support them once they have made that decision.[58]

The right to privacy

4.36Subjecting an individual to compulsory income management—including restricting how they may spend a portion of their social security payment, and providing for the use and disclosure of their personal information to administer that restriction—engages and limits the right to a privacy.[59]

4.37The right to privacy is multifaceted. It includes respect for informational privacy, including the right to respect for private and confidential information, particularly the storing, use and sharing of such information.[60] The right to privacy also prohibits unlawful and arbitrary interferences with an individual's privacy, family, correspondence or home.[61] The term 'arbitrary interference' is intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances.[62] This includes a requirement that the state does not arbitrarily interfere with a person's private and home life.[63] A private life is linked to notions of personal autonomy and human dignity. It includes the idea that individuals should have an area of autonomous development; a 'private sphere' free from government intervention and excessive unsolicited intervention by others.

The rights of the child

4.38Compulsory income management engages and may limit the rights of the child. Children may be directly subject to compulsory income management where they meet the criteria of 'disengaged youth' (which includes children aged between 15 and 17 years). Further, children in families where a parent or guardian is subject to income management are affected by the application of compulsory income management in practice.

4.39Children have special rights under human rights law taking into account their particular vulnerabilities. Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, children have the right to benefit from social security and to a standard of living adequate for a child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.[64]

4.40States parties are required to ensure that, in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child are a primary consideration.[65] This requires legislative, administrative and judicial bodies and institutions to systematically consider how children's rights and interests are or will be affected directly or indirectly by their decisions and actions.[66] The child's best interests includes the enjoyment of the rights set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and, in the case of individual decisions, 'must be assessed and determined in light of the specific circumstances of the particular child'.[67]

4.41The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has explained that the expression 'primary consideration' means that the child's best interests must be given primacy, and 'may not be considered on the same level as all other considerations'.[68] It is a concept involving:

A substantive right: The right of the child to have his or her best interests assessed and taken as a primary consideration when different interests are being considered in order to reach a decision on the issue at stake, and the guarantee that this right will be implemented whenever a decision is to be made concerning a child, a group of identified or unidentified children or children in general…

A rule of procedure: Whenever a decision is to be made that will affect a specific child, an identified group of children or children in general, the decision-making process must include an evaluation of the possible impact (positive or negative) of the decision on the child or children concerned. Assessing and determining the best interests of the child require procedural guarantees. Furthermore, the justification of a decision must show that the right has been explicitly taken into account. In this regard, States parties shall explain how the right has been respected in the decision, that is, what has been considered to be in the child’s best interests; what criteria it is based on; and how the child’s interests have been weighed against other considerations, be they broad issues of policy or individual cases.[69]

4.42The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has emphasised that the provision of benefits (in the form of cash or services) is crucial for realising the rights of the child.[70] The Convention on the Rights of the Child likewise provides that the underlying purpose of any such assistance is to ensure an adequate standard of living for families and children,[71] and article 27(3) of the Convention requires the state to assist parents or carers of children, through social assistance and support, to realise a child's right to an adequate standard of living.

4.43It appears that in most cases no individualised assessment is undertaken as to whether compulsory income management is in the best interests of an affected child. The overwhelming majority of people are subject to compulsory income management based on their place of residence and receipt of social welfare payments during a specified period, with no individualised assessment of their circumstances. Submissions regarding the best interests of a child would also not be a basis for seeking an exemption from income management. Consequently, this aspect of the compulsory income management scheme raises questions regarding whether Australia's obligation to ensure that, in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child are a primary consideration has been met. In this regard, Dr Anna Cody, the Sex Discrimination Commissioner, expressed concern regarding the compatibility of the scheme with the rights of the child.[72]

The right to health

4.44To the extent that the compulsory imposition of income management has a deleterious impact on people’s health,[73] it may also engage and limit the right to health.

4.45The right to health is the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.[74] It is a right to have access to adequate health care (including reproductive and sexual healthcare) as well as to live in conditions that promote a healthy life (such as access to safe drinking water, housing, food, and a healthy environment).[75]

4.46Professor Stephanie Schurer, a professor of economics at the University of Sydney, provided evidence relating to a peer reviewed research project she had undertaken, which she stated demonstrated a causal relationship between the imposition of compulsory income management and poor health outcomes.[76] She stated that the graduated roll-out of the policy in different communities created a ‘perfect natural experiment’ by which you could exclude the impact of seasonal variations and other variables.[77] She stated, in particular:

We found overall that children who were exposed to the introduction of income management while they were in utero were born with a lower birth weight, a statistically significant drop in birth weight by 100 grams. To put that into perspective, the drop of 100 grams is roughly equivalent to the drop in the case of a woman being exposed to domestic violence while pregnant, being in a community hit by a hurricane or being exposed to Ramadan. It's twice as large as the drop in birth weight related to losing a father in the family as a shock…One in five children were more likely to be born with low birth weight.

When we followed these children who were exposed to the policy in utero, by age 5 they had spent almost five times as many days in hospital as the children who were not exposed to the policy in utero. This adds up to five additional days spent in a hospital by the age of five, mainly due to infections that these children contracted.[78]

4.47Professor Schurer also stated that the research project also found that when compulsory income management was rolled out in a community, in the first five months of the policy introduction, school attendance dropped by five per cent (translating to approximately three to nine days lower school attendance).[79]

4.48Dr Shelley Bielefeld also stated that in research she had conducted with people who had been subject to compulsory income management, people had reported returning to antidepressant medication, experiencing irreparable health damage due to stress,[80] and worsening family violence.[81]

Permissible limitations on human rights

4.49International human rights law recognises that reasonable limits may be placed on most rights and freedoms—there are very few absolute rights which can never be legitimately limited.[82] All other rights may be limited provided the limitation meets certain standards. The imposition of a restriction on how a person receives and may access and use part of their social welfare payment, can be regarded as a limitation on the rights identified above.

4.50In general, limitations on human rights may be permissible where the limitation:

pursues a legitimate objective (one that is necessary and addresses an issue of public or social concern that is pressing and substantial enough to warrant limiting the right);

is rationally connected to (that is, capable of achieving) that objective; and

is a proportionate means of achieving that objective.

4.51With respect to proportionality, some of the matters it is necessary to consider are: whether a proposed limitation is sufficiently circumscribed; whether it is flexible enough to treat different cases differently, and is accompanied by sufficient safeguards; whether any less rights restrictive alternatives could achieve the same stated objective; and whether there is the possibility of oversight and the availability of review.

4.52The application of this general test is further qualified by specific requirements that apply to economic, social and cultural rights, such as the rights to social security and an adequate standard of living.

Legitimate objectives for limiting economic, social and cultural rights

4.53With respect to a legitimate objective, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights establishes a specific restriction on the reasons for which, and the manner in which, economic, social and cultural rights may be limited. Article 4 of this Convention establishes that States parties may limit economic, social and cultural rights only insofar as this may be compatible with the nature of those rights, and 'solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society'.[83] This has the effect that, applying the general limitation test, the only legitimate objective in the context of economic, social and cultural rights is a limitation for the 'promotion of general welfare'. In addition, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has advised that:

[T]he benefits of the limitation in promoting the general welfare must outweigh the impacts on the enjoyment of the right being limited. The more serious the impact on the [individual's] Covenant rights, the greater the scrutiny that must be given to the grounds invoked for such a limitation.[84]

4.54As to when a limitation will be compatible with the nature of economic, social and cultural rights, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights appears to indicate that minimum essential levels and corresponding minimum core obligations under each right represent the nature of the rights.[85] That is, even if a limitation were for the promotion of general welfare, if it was regarded as constituting a non-fulfilment of the minimum core obligations associated with economic, social and cultural rights, then it would go against the nature of those rights.[86] The term 'general welfare' is to be interpreted restrictively in this context, and should not be taken to impliedly include reference to public order, public morality and respect for the rights and freedoms of others.[87] Rather, 'general welfare' refers primarily to the economic and social well-being of the people and the community as a whole, meaning that a limitation on a right which disproportionately impacts a vulnerable group may not meet the definition of promoting 'general welfare'.[88] In this regard, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has indicated that references to broad concepts like 'economic development' cannot easily justify limitations of economic, social and cultural rights, particularly noting that policies directed towards economic development often limit these rights of certain individuals or groups without 'promoting general welfare'.[89]

Human rights assessment of compulsory income management

Legitimate objective

4.55As set out above, there are several stated objectives for Part 3B income management, and Part 3AA enhanced income management. They broadly relate to reducing immediate hardship and deprivation, encouraging socially responsible behaviour and supporting vulnerable individuals to manage their welfare payments. These are likely to constitute legitimate objectives under international human rights law insofar as they appear to be directed to the general welfare of society.

4.56However, it is noted that 'general welfare' is to be interpreted restrictively, and should not be taken to impliedly include reference to public order and respect for the rights and freedoms of others.[90] The term refers primarily to the economic and social well-being of the people and the community as a whole, meaning that a limitation on a right which disproportionately impacts a vulnerable group may not meet the definition of promoting 'general welfare'.[91]

4.57Further, even if a limitation is for the promotion of general welfare, if it was regarded as constituting a non-fulfilment of the minimum core obligations associated with economic, social and cultural rights, then it would go against the nature of those rights. Many parliamentary inquiries have previously noted extensive evidence as to the higher cost of basic goods and services in remote and rural parts of Australia, high rates of poverty among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (particularly in remote areas), and concerns regarding the adequacy of social welfare payments generally.[92] Many submitters stated that people subject to income management may be unable to participate in the cash-based second-hand market, and so are unable to decide to budget their money by buying used goods.[93] Mr Shane Foyster, Housing and Social Security Consultant Lawyer with the Northern Australia Aboriginal Justice Agency, provided a recent example of the effect of this isolation:

Just this week, one of our lawyers spoke to a client who travelled a 400-kilometre round trip to the nearest Centrelink in a regional centre in the NT so they could sort out their income management, collect their BasicsCard and buy food for their kids. This is someone who actually has employment. He is a responsible father. He has one of the few part-time jobs available in the remote community in which he lives. He said he couldn't access his income management money to buy food for his kids without driving a five-hour round trip to visit Centrelink in person. These are ongoing issues that happen every day in the Northern Territory.[94]

4.58This evidence is set out in greater detail in Chapter 3.

4.59Several witnesses and submitters also noted circumstances in which technological issues had prevented the use of an income management bank card to purchase basic foodstuffs,[95] and argued that bureaucratic administrative processes (including between agencies, and between state and federal bodies) have caused people to be put at risk of homelessness. Mr Shane Foyster of the Northern Australia Aboriginal Justice Agency raised the following contemporary example:

Just a few days ago our lawyers were informed by a major social housing provider in the Northern Territory that there were 70 families on their books at risk of eviction and homelessness. They identified to us in writing that the reason for this was in fact that those people were on income management. The housing provider had received properties to manage for the Northern Territory government and rent was meant to be transferred over to that housing provider. But, unfortunately, because income management has all of these extra administrative hurdles, with attendance on compulsory income management, their rent didn't transfer over and it never got paid. Other tenants who were not on compulsory income management didn't have this problem. The housing provider spoke to their counterparts in other states and territories, who had no solutions. Why? Because compulsory income management is predominantly a Northern Territory problem. The housing provider has even raised this issue with the Northern Territory Minister for Housing and has asked for our help to advocate with Services Australia, which we did by formally writing to them this Tuesday.[96]

4.60Consequently, it appears there is a risk, in practice, that there are circumstances in which the minimum core obligations in relation to social security (and the right to an adequate standard of living) may not be met in relation to a cohort of people subject to compulsory income management.

Rational connection

4.61Under international human rights law, it must also be demonstrated that any limitation on a right has a rational connection to the objective sought to be achieved. The key question is whether the relevant measure is likely to be effective in achieving the objective/s being sought.

4.62As noted above, and as discussed in Chapter 3, numerous witnesses and submitters strongly argued that income management had not been demonstrated to have achieved its stated objectives. Indeed, numerous evaluations and reviews undertaken since 2007 have called into question the extent to which compulsory income management (and, relatedly, the cashless debit card trial) have been demonstrated to be effective to achieve their stated aims (these are outlined in detail in Chapters 2 and 3). The committee has previously had regard to that evidence, and has repeatedly expressed concern as to whether these measures are rationally connected to (that is, effective to achieve) their stated objectives.[97] The department itself stated that it can be challenging to identify the impact of income management separately from the effects of other measures (such as, decisions relating to school staffing, or alcohol bans).[98]

4.63Consequently, concerns remain as to the extent to which compulsory income management has been demonstrated to be rationally connected to (that is, effective to achieve) its stated objective.

Proportionality

4.64A key aspect of whether a limitation on a right can be justified is whether the limitation is proportionate to the objective being sought. This necessitates consideration of several matters, including the extent of any interference with human rights: the greater the interference, the less likely the measure is to be considered proportionate. It is also necessary to consider: whether a proposed limitation is sufficiently circumscribed; whether it is accompanied by sufficient safeguards; whether any less rights restrictive alternatives could achieve the same stated objective; and whether there is the possibility of oversight and the availability of review.

4.65Associate Professor Elise Klein argued that compulsory income management interferes considerably with human rights:

[G]iven the ineffectiveness of compulsory income management in meeting its policy objectives—and the problems with those objectives in the first place—it is difficult to sustain a rational argument for the continuation of compulsory income management. Furthermore, compulsory income management can hardly be argued to be the least intrusive means of reaching its objectives, if it is so ineffective in doing so. There are many other options and alternatives that could be considered that have fewer adverse impacts on human rights. Proportionality also needs to consider the length of time that people are subjected to compulsory income management. We have a situation in the Northern Territory where the same cohort of First Nations people have been subject to this measure in different iterations since the intervention in 2007. This means that some people have lived their whole adult lives having their human rights restricted through compulsory income management.[99]

4.66The department advised that less than 5 people have been subject to compulsory income management continuously since 2008 (approximately 16 years).[100] It also advised that over 50 per cent of participants have been on income management for over 10 years.[101] The department also stated that, at 31 May 2024, the average length of time a participant has been subjected to any form of compulsory income management is approximately 3.2 years.[102]It indicated that this period of time reflects circumstances where a person has either left a geographical area subject to compulsory income management, or no longer received income support payments.[103] The department provided statistics indicating that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander participants are subject to compulsory income management for more than three times as long as non-Indigenous participants, on average. While the average time spent on compulsory income management overall is 1 188 days, non-indigenous participants have been subject to compulsory income management for an average of 512 days, whereas Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have been subject to an average of 1 682 days.[104]

4.67Consequently—in addition to the day-to-day interference each person subject to compulsory income management experiences—a significant proportion of participants have been subject to the regime for over 10 years, and there are people in this cohort who have been subject to these restrictions for up to 16 years. This constitutes a considerable interference with human rights.

Sufficiently circumscribed

4.68A further aspect of whether compulsory income management is a proportionate limit on rights is whether it is sufficiently circumscribed, and whether it applies as a blanket measure.

4.69Some of the measures which may result in people becoming subject to income management require an individualised assessment of an individuals’ circumstances for them to be placed on income management. This is the case with respect to the Child Protection, Supporting People at Risk, and Vulnerable Welfare Payment Recipient measures. However, in practice, people are rarely placed on income management pursuant to these measures, and the overwhelming majority of people are placed on compulsory income management with no assessment of their individual circumstances. At 31 May 2024, less than one per cent of compulsory income management participants, and three per cent of enhanced income management participants, were subject to compulsory income management pursuant to an individualised assessment of their personal circumstances.[105]

Figure 4.1: Income Management participants, at 31 May 2024, by measure

Source: Derived from statistics provided by the Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000041, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024).

4.7093.6 per cent of all compulsory income management participants are subject to income management because they meet the criteria of either ‘long term welfare payment recipient’ or ‘disengaged youth’, meaning they are either:

(a)a person aged 25 and over in the Northern Territory who has been receiving Job Seeker, Youth Allowance, Special Benefit, or Parenting Payment (partnered or single) for over 12 months; or

(b)a person aged between 15 and 24 years in the Northern Territory who has been receiving one of those social welfare payments for three of the previous six months.

4.71Mr Shane Foyster of the Northern Australia Aboriginal Justice Agency expressed concern at the blanket operation of these two measures with very broad criteria:

Consider, for example, someone who's on parenting payment—a mother with children. If she's receiving parenting payment for more than one year in a two-year period, her income, including all of her family tax benefit payments—all of her payments for her children—are income managed. Someone who's on parenting payment is very likely to be on parenting payment for a long period of time, because the purpose of that payment is for them to be able to care for their children.[106]

4.72This raises significant questions as to whether the qualifying conditions for these compulsory income management measures are sufficiently circumscribed, and whether income management is sufficiently individualised. It is not clear that a period of six months to one year during which time a person has continually received a particular social welfare payment necessarily reflects some kind of vulnerability in relation to that person. Further, it is not possible to exit compulsory income management while still receiving a relevant social welfare payment and living in an affected geographical area. For example, in the case of youth allowance, it would appear that if a person studied a degree for several years, during which time they received youth allowance continuously to support that study, they would be subject to income management unless they obtained a temporary exemption each year. In the case of parenting payment, it would appear that if a parent chose to take time out of the workforce to raise children (despite being otherwise employed) they would be subject to income management if they lived in the Northern Territory, unless they obtained a temporary exemption each year.

4.73Mr Foyster also argued that, because these blanket measures operate in the Northern Territory, it may be less likely that measures which would require an individualised assessment of a person’s circumstances (for example, if a person was at risk of their children being removed from their care), are utilised:

[T]here is this particular measure about child protection. There's a particular policy that allows income management to be applied in exactly that context—to help someone—and in every other state and territory that might be used in a way that is targeted. But, because there is a blanket operation of these two measures in the Northern Territory, it's probably not used because it's not needed, because everyone is already on compulsory income management if they're receiving, for example, parenting payment and they've received parenting payment for more than one year in a two-year period.[107]

4.74Dr Francis Markham, similarly, argued that the blanket application of compulsory income management to people based on the long-term welfare recipient measures is inappropriate because the root causes of unemployment are not being addressed:

In the Northern Territory, in particular, almost all the people on income management are there through the long-term unemployment or youth measure. These are measures where, essentially, you end up having your income managed because you're unemployed. The reason people are unemployed isn't that they're addicted. It's not that they're bad parents. It's that there are no jobs in the places they live. Until that problem is dealt with—until there's some form of economic development, jobs programs and the like, some form of decent way to subsist on social security, some way to supplement the private market in remote communities—there's still going to be a high degree of poverty, and there are still going to be the social problems that arise from poverty. People will still be triggering these measures if income management continues to exist, not because they're bad people, not because they have drug and alcohol problems but simply because they live where their ancestors have lived for tens of thousands of years, and there are no jobs.[108]

4.75Ms Taylah Bell (Committee member of the Accountable Income Management Network and Remote Women's Access Project Officer for Economic Justice Australia) also expressed concern regarding the capacity of the minister to extend compulsory income management to new regions and jurisdictions by way of their discretion (via legislative instrument).[109] Several submitters also expressed concern that, because Part 3B and Part 3AA of the Act are not subject to sunsetting, compulsory income management could operate indefinitely, suggesting that the scheme is not sufficiently circumscribed.[110] In this regard, Dr Shelley Bielefeld argued:

Compulsory income management programs have long violated the human rights of program participants and generated a range of detrimental outcomes for coerced cardholders. Restrictions on human rights should not be permanent, but in Australia, through compulsory income management, the federal government has turned restricting human rights for First Nations people and other people on social security into an art form. The result is an ugly system of prejudice that entrenches inequality. When governments set in place systems that ensure that some people are treated as though they are less human than others, less deserving of human dignity than others, it results in a host of problems for those people thus treated. Bearing the burden of discrimination comes at a cost: worse health outcomes, worse earning capacity and structurally generated poverty. I therefore strongly recommend that compulsory income management programs be stopped and that the federal government create a genuinely supportive social security system that does not stigmatise or punish people in need of support.[111]

Flexibility and safeguards

4.76The flexibility of compulsory income management (that is, its capacity to treat different cases differently), and the presence of safeguards, are also relevant considerations in assessing proportionality.

4.77Noting the broad blanket application of compulsory income management in practice, the capacity to seek an exemption from the scheme is a significant consideration. The department advised that exemptions from both Part 3B and Part 3AA income management are only available in relation to people under the disengaged youth or long-term welfare payment recipient measures, and only remain valid for up to 12 months.[112] This means that, currently, 93.6 per cent of all compulsory income management participants are eligible to apply for a temporary exemption.

4.78However, as a proportion of all people in this category, only a small number of exemptions are sought in practice. For example, while 26 319 people are currently eligible to apply for a temporary exemption, only 3 072 exemptions from income management, and 878 exemptions from enhanced income management were sought from 2023—2024 (to June 2024).[113] That equates to approximately 15 per cent of eligible participants seeking an exemption during that period.

Figure 4.2: income management exemptions by year (2010 – 14 June 2024)

Source: Derived from statistics provided by the department. See, Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000044, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024).

4.79The department advised that, overall, 71 per cent of all exemptions requested are granted, stating that this process is administered by Services Australia.[114] The department stated that the main reasons for exemptions being rejected are because a person has not supplied the required evidence, or the evidence has been regarded as being insufficient.[115] The data also indicates that the proportion of exemptions granted has increased with time, and that most people who do apply for a temporary exemption are successful. While it could be argued that the exemptions process therefore has safeguard value, it equally suggests that there was no basis for those exempted persons having been subject to compulsory income management.

4.80The data provided also indicates that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander participants have been less likely than non-Indigenous participants to apply for an exemption from income management in practice, and less likely to receive one, since 2010.

Figure 4.3: Indigenous participant exemptions (2010 – June 2024)

Source: Derived from statistics provided by the department. See, Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000044, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024)

Figure 4.4: Non-Indigenous participant exemptions (2010 – June 2024)

Source: Derived from statistics provided by the department. See, Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000044, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024).

4.81Mr Patrick Boneham, Branch Manager, Income Management, Policy and Data Branch at the department, stated that the disparity between Indigenous and non-Indigenous applications in terms of being exempted from compulsory income management had narrowed over time:

in relation to successful applications, from a proportion of total made to those which were successfully agreed to…For example, in 2010 it was 81 [non-Indigenous] to 34 [Indigenous]; in 2011, 79 to 43; in 2012, 85 to 53; in 2013, 81 to 35; in 2014, 81 to 36; in 2015, 86 to 46; in 2016, 86 to 53; in 2017, 86 to 53; in 2018, 84 to 53; in 2019, 88 to 61; in 2020, 94 to 70; in '21, 96 to 77; in '22, 96 to 75; in '23 I think it was 95 to 75; and in '24, 98 to 91.[116]

4.82The committee heard evidence that applying for an exemption is a challenging process. Mr Shane Foyster, Housing and Social Security Consultant Lawyer with the Northern Australia Aboriginal Justice Agency, described the challenge in securing an exemption from compulsory income management for a client in practice:

To apply for an exemption from compulsory income management, people need to demonstrate their financial capacity and competence to a very high degree—a degree that we wouldn't apply to other Australians. One of our recent clients was a responsible mother with two children living in a very remote region of the Northern Territory who fell under income management 13 years ago simply because of where she lived and because she was receiving parenting payment. She asked our lawyer how she could get off compulsory income management to have better control of our finances. She wanted her money to be all in one location rather than split and she wanted to be able to control what she could do to look after her children. She asked us for help because English is not her first language and there was no information she could find on how to get off income management. This is a mother who ensures her children have very good school attendance and that their immunisations are up to date and who is financially responsible. She had to prove each of have those things. There were very intrusive questions about her capacity to be a mother in order to apply for an exemption.

Our lawyer estimates that they spent over 20 hours helping this client to understand her rights, to gather all the documents—school records and medical records—and then submitting it to Centrelink. Yet five months later, there is still no decision. This is the system that operates right now and does not give people a permanent way out of this financial control. Even if she was successful in seeking an exemption, the exemption currently available under the legislation is only for 12 months and then it resets and she is back on compulsory income management all over again. She would have to get all those records again every 12 months.[117]

4.83He posited that the challenges associated with requesting an exemption mean that very few people do.[118] He also expressed concern that, in requesting an exemption, the decision-makers ‘are often in call centres thousands of kilometres away and have no idea about the cultural context or even the geographic context of where you're operating’.[119] In this regard, the department stated that Services Australia has dedicated priority income management phone lines with officers who are trained to assist Indigenous and remote participants with income management, as well as other specialist staff to support Indigenous customers through outreach services, including discussing exemptions from income management and supporting them with required evidence.[120] Mr Foyster further argued that the principles that underlie the application of the exemption framework seem to assume a lack of decision-making capacity on the part of welfare recipients:

An analogy is how we treat someone who has an acquired brain injury or dementia, in terms of financial guardianship. Our laws are very clear that we assume someone has capacity unless there's a medical report to say that they don't. We protect their right to make their own financial choices. But with compulsory income management, it's been reversed. It applies to a whole class of people and then they can apply for an exemption that lasts for up to 12 months.

The criteria that we had to go through with our client included her showing that she was not vulnerable to financial exploitation. We had to look at the policies that the Services Australia decision-makers would apply in answering that question. It's about five pages of factors and they're very intrusive questions. They're questions such as: How are you budgeting? Do you have anyone in your family who is trying to exploit you? How do you look after your children? How do you use your money on a daily basis? Why did you have to ask for this urgent payment on this date? This is all in the criteria that the decision-makers should be asking. We had to go through that with our client and we had to do that in the context of a very remote community where our client lives with family. It was quite difficult.

From that—again, this is in the department's own guidelines about what evidence is required—we had to get records of immunisation and school attendance and then assess whether that would meet the criteria. There's no actual specific benchmark. We just had to look at those statistics. We had to get evidence from her, from our client, about whether her core family priority needs were being met and whether she was being socially responsible…[I]f there were a decision, it would be for only a maximum of 12 months, and she would have to do the whole thing all over again. I don't think this person could possibly have done this herself.[121]

4.84This suggests that the availability of a temporary exemption from compulsory income management has limited safeguard value in practice.

4.85The department stated that persons subject to a Vulnerable Welfare Payment Recipient (Youth) measure may be ‘excluded’ from participating in income management. A temporary exclusion for 12 months may be granted if: the person has received less than 25 per cent of their maximum basic rate of payment for at least four out of the last six fortnights;[122] or income management would place their mental, physical or emotional wellbeing at risk; or they have been subject to Vulnerable Welfare Payment Recipient (Youth) measure for more than 12 months and a social worker has assessed that they have other adequate supports and capability to manage their finances.[123] At 31 May 2024, there were 1 050 people subject to compulsory income management under this measure.[124] The department advised that, at 14 June 2024, just 53 exclusions had been granted (representing approximately 5 per cent of eligible participants).[125] Consequently, the availability of this flexibility would appear to have limited safeguard value in practice.

4.86The department also advised that participants who are income managed under the Cape York Welfare Reform, Vulnerable Welfare Payment Recipient (social worker notice) or Child Protection measure are not eligible for an exemption but may ask the decision maker to review their circumstances.[126] As to the availability of review where a person has been placed on income management with no individualised assessment of their circumstances, the department advised that, where a formal review of a decision that Services Australia has made has been sought, an Authorised Review Officer will: speak to the participant about the decision, where possible; look at ‘the facts, the law, and the policy involved’; and change the decision if it is wrong.[127] However, because of the automatic nature of the process by which most people are subject to compulsory income management, it would appear that no department or agency has made a decision (within the meaning of the Administrative Appeals Act 1975), meaning that there is no decision to place a person on compulsory income management that would be subject to review.[128] As such, the availability of review of decisions would appear to have limited safeguard value.

4.87The availability of exemptions, exclusions and review has the capacity to assist with the proportionality of the measure. While most people who seek an exemption are successful, only a small proportion of people seek an exemption. Further, exemptions have had significantly less safeguard value for Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander participants in practice. Further, the Act provides for the discretion to exclude or exempt a person from compulsory income management—it does not require that a person must be excluded or exempted if certain circumstances are met. Where a measure limits a human right, discretionary or administrative safeguards alone may not be sufficient for the purpose of a permissible limitation under international human rights law.[129] This is because an administrative or discretionary safeguard is less stringent than the protection of statutory processes as there is no requirement to follow it. Noting that the onus is on the individual to seek an exemption, exclusion or review, and the evidence raising questions as to the accessibility of the process in practice, this raises serious questions as to the safeguard value of these aspects of compulsory income management.

Less rights restrictive alternatives

4.88A number of witnesses argued that less rights restrictive alternatives would (or had previously been) as effective to achieve the stated objectives of compulsory income management.

4.89Some witnesses argued that the Family Responsibilities Commission model in Queensland, which still provides for the compulsory application of income management, but pursuant to a series of individualised assessments, is an appropriate alternative.[130]

4.90Dr J Rob Bray noted previous policies which were designed to achieve the same outcomes as income management, but which were less rights restrictive:

A key example is the ALPA Foodcard. That card was developed by ALPA, the Arnhem Land Progress Aboriginal association, which operates a large number of the stores in the Northern Territory. They consulted with communities, and what they came up with was a card which people could choose how much money they wanted to put on and which could be used for healthy food purchases, and it said which members of the family could actually use the card, so you could send your children down to the store to get things. That card was basically operating quite well. Income management came along and decimated the use of the card, because everything was just dumped onto the BasicsCard, and people lacked that freedom. That is one example of a community led response which was quite effective, and it was basically destroyed.[131]

4.91Similarly, Dr Padraic Gibson, a Senior Researcher from the Jumbunna Institute for Indigenous Education and Research at the University of Technology Sydney, stated that Centrelink Centrepay had been favoured by some communities as a financial service.[132] He stated that Centrepay in Alice Springs had allowed people to voluntarily apportion their income to various services around the town, and stated that people could visit a local bank to make decisions about the Centrepay deductions they wanted to put in place. He argued that people liked this because it gave access to a financial service.

4.92In this regard, the department advised that income management would be made voluntary,[133] an amendment which would address the human rights concerns identified above.

Conclusion

4.93Compulsory income management raises many human rights concerns. There is a considerable risk that compulsory income management constitutes an impermissible limitation on the rights to social security, privacy, and equality and non-discrimination, noting that it is not clear that it is effective to achieve (that is, rationally connected to) its stated objectives, and it does not appear to constitute a proportionate limit on those rights. There appears to be a risk that compulsory participation may not, in relation to some cohorts of participants, constitute a permissible limit on the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to health, and the rights of the child.

4.94Were the income management regime to be made voluntary, and participants removed from any form of welfare restrictions, the human rights concerns outlined above would be addressed.

Committee view

4.95The committee notes that it has examined all legislation associated with compulsory income management since the committee commenced operation in 2012 and has consistently expressed concern that compulsory income management does not constitute a proportionate limit on several human rights.

4.96The committee notes that several responses to questions on notice taken by the Department of Social Services in July 2024 were provided well after the requested date, and that some remained outstanding when the committee considered the inquiry report in late August 2024. The committee notes that the provision of timely responses to requests for information is a core component of the committee’s capacity to undertake inquiries effectively, and that without timely responses, the committee is limited in its deliberations due to information not provided by the department.

4.97The committee considers that the evidence considered in this inquiry indicates clearly that there is a considerable risk that compulsory income management constitutes an impermissible limitation on the rights to social security, privacy, and equality and non-discrimination. The committee considers that there also appears to be a risk that compulsory participation may not, in relation to some cohorts of participants, constitute a permissible limit on the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to health, and the rights of the child.

4.98The committee notes that evidence provided about exemptions and reviews showed a distinct difference in First Nations people applying for exemptions from compulsory income management compared to the rest of the population. The committee also notes that the department was unable to answer why different groups had vastly different rates of applying for and being granted exemptions.

4.99The committee welcomes the department’s advice that it is consulting with affected communities with a view to making income management voluntary—an amendment which would address the human rights concerns identified in this report. The committee expects that the response to this report should include information regarding the specific time frames, and implementation of plans to transition impacted persons off compulsory income management. The committee considers that this transition should be completed in no greater than 12 months.

4.100The committee recommends that the government amend the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 to make income management voluntary, including transitional provisions to facilitate a transition to voluntary income management over a period of time.

4.101 The committee recommends that the government immediately amend the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 to establish more pathways out of compulsory income management, including to:

establish a process by which a person may apply to permanently exit compulsory income management;

provide that where a person has been subject to compulsory income management for a specified continuous period of time, an individualised assessment of their overall circumstances must occur to determine whether there is a basis for that person being subject to compulsory income management;

provide that any person subject to compulsory income management may apply for an exemption on the basis that income management is not necessary for them;

provide that where an exemption has been requested, an individualised assessment of the person’s overall circumstances must take place to determine whether there is a basis for that person being subject to compulsory income management; and

extend the maximum period of time for which an exemption may apply, and require an individualised assessment of a person’s overall circumstances where a period of exemption has ended to determine whether there is a basis for that person again being subject to compulsory income management.

4.102The committee recommends that, in addition to recommendation 2, the government give consideration to investment in a full suite of local support programs, opportunities, and community-driven alternatives and the creation of real jobs, with proper award wages and conditions, adequate training and skills, and rebuilding local community decision-making.

4.103The committee recommends that the government give consideration to the funding of social services and free and low-cost legal services to support the administration of exemptions, and the transition to voluntary income management.

4.104The committee recommends that, if income management is no longer compulsory, the government should amend the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 to repeal section 243AA (the legislative provision requiring this committee to review compulsory income management).

4.105The committee recommends that data relating to applications and grants of exemptions or refusals from compulsory income management be monitored and publicly reported including detail on First Nations status, disability, age and other factors.

4.106The committee recommends that the government ensure participants are advised, in ways that are accessible and culturally appropriate, of the option to apply to be exempt from compulsory income management and the process to achieve this.

Mr Josh Burns MP

Chair

Member for Macnamara

Australian Labor Party

Footnotes

[1]See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Social Security (Administration) Amendment (Repeal of Cashless Debit Card and Other Measures) Bill 2022, Report 3 of 2022(7September 2022) pp.15–26 and Report 5 of 2022(20 October 2022) pp. 39–55; 2016 Review of Strong Futures measures(16 March 2016) pp. 37–62; Eleventh Report of 2013: Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012 and related legislation(June 2013) pp.45–62. The committee has made similar comments regarding measures relating to the Cashless Debit Card program. See, e.g. Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Thirty-first report of the 44th Parliament (24 November 2015) pp. 21–36; Report 7 of 2016 (11 October 2016) pp. 58–61; Report 9 of 2017 (5 September 2017) pp. 34–40; Report 11 of 2017 (17 October 2017) pp. 126–137; Report 8 of 2018 (21 August 2018) pp. 37–52;Report 2 of 2019(2April 2019) pp.146–152; Report 1 of 2020(5 February 2020) pp. 132–142; Report 14 of 2020(26November 2020) pp. 38–54; Report 1 of 2021(3 February 2021) pp. 83–102; Report 14 of 2021(24 November 2021) pp.14–18.

[2]Department of Social Services, Submission 14, p. 3.

[3]Social Security (Administration) Act 1999, Part 3B, section 123TB (objects).

[4]Department of Social Services, Submission 14, p. 4.

[5]Social Security (Administration) Amendment (Repeal of Cashless Debit Card and Other Measures) Bill 2022, supplementary explanatory memorandum relating to amendment sheet TK324, p. 25.

[6]Australian National Audit Office, Performance Audit of “Transitional Arrangements for the Cashless Debit Card”Auditor-General Report No. 48 of 2023-24 (June 2024) p. 48.

[7]Dr J. Rob Bray, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, pp. 32–33.

[8]Associate Professor Elise Klein OAM, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 37. See, for example, Stephen Roche et al, ‘How effective is conditional welfare support for enhancing child wellbeing? An examination of compulsory income management (welfare payment quarantining) in Australia’, Children and Youth Services Review, vol. 131, 2021.

[9]Dr Francis Markham, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2042, p. 43.

[10]See, for example, See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Social Security (Administration) Amendment (Repeal of Cashless Debit Card and Other Measures) Bill 2022, Report 3 of 2022(7September 2022) pp.15–26 and Report 5 of 2022(20 October 2022) pp. 39–55.

[11]Mr Patrick Boneham, Branch Manager, Income Management Policy and Data, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 50.

[12]Mrs Letitia Hope, Deputy Secretary, Families and Communities, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 44.

[13]International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, article 9. See also, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (2008).

[14]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (2008) [2].

[15]Mr Jamie Burton KC, Submission 31, p. 4.

[16]Mr Jamie Burton KC, Submission 31, pp. 3–4.

[17]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (2008) [22].

[18]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (2008) [22].

[19]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (2008) [4] and [9].

[20]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (2008) [24].

[21]Mr Jamie Burton KC, Submission 31, p. 5.

[22]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (2008) [11].

[23]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (2008) [77]. Australia has not accepted the complaints mechanism jurisdiction of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by becoming party to the Optional Protocol to International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (10 December 2008) which establishes the complaints mechanism. As such, people cannot make individual complaints in relation to alleged breaches of the CESCR against Australia.

[24]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (2008) [26].

[25]Special rapporteur on extreme poverty, Ms Magdalena Sepulveda, The Human Rights Approach to Social Protection (2012) [28].

[26]International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, article 11.

[27]See, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (2008) [40].

[28]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (2008) [59].

[29]Mr Jamie Burton KC, Submission 31, p. 5.

[30]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12: the right to adequate food (1999) [13].

[31]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 4: the right to adequate housing (1991)[7].

[32]Australian Bureau of Statistics, Estimates of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians (at 30 June 2021).

[33]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000041, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024.

[34]International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, articles 2 and 26. Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also prohibits discrimination specifically in relation to the human rights contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See also UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20: non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (2009) [7].

[35]UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination (1989).

[36]Althammer v Austria, UN Human Rights Committee Communication no. 998/01 (2003) [10.2]. The prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Under 'other status' the following have been held to qualify as prohibited grounds: age, nationality, marital status, disability, place of residence within a country and sexual orientation. The prohibited grounds of discrimination are often described as 'personal attributes'.

[37]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20: non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (2009) [1].

[38]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20: non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (2009) [8].

[39]See, recent consideration of the particular risk of discrimination faced by Indigenous women: Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, Report on Indigenous women and girls, A/HRC/30/41 (2015).

[40]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20: non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (2009) [27].

[41]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20: non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (2009) [27].

[42]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20: non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (2009).

[43]The Australia Bureau of Statistics utilises a standard to divide Australia into five classes of remoteness, characterised by a measure of relative geographical access to services.

[44]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20: non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (2009) [34].

[45]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Australia (11 July 2017) E/C.12/AUS/CO/5 [31], [34] and [40].

[46]International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, article 4.

[47]UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-Discrimination (1989) [13] and UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20: non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (2009) [13]. See also Althammer v Austria, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 998/01 (2003) [10.2].

[48]TheUN Human Rights Council has recently provided guidance on the right to be consulted, as part of its Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, stating that 'states' obligations to consult with indigenous peoples should consist of a qualitative process of dialogue and negotiation, with consent as the objective' and that consultation does not entail 'a single moment or action but a process of dialogue and negotiation over the course of a project, from planning to implementation and follow-up'. See UN Human Rights Council, Free, prior and informed consent: a human rights-based approach - Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/HRC/39/62 (2018) [15]–[16].

[49]UN Human Rights Council, Free, prior and informed consent: a human rights-based approach - Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/HRC/39/62 (2018) [1].

[50]UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Australia (1 November 2019) CRC/C/AUS/CO/5-6* [46]; and Concluding observations on Australia (28 August 2012), CRC/C/AUS/CO/4 [30]

[51]While the Declaration is not included in the definition of 'human rights' under the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act2011, it provides clarification as to how human rights standards under international law, including under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, apply to the particular situation of indigenous peoples. See UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, preamble.

[52]UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, article 19.

[53]UN Human Rights Council, Free, prior and informed consent: a human rights-based approach - Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/HRC/39/62 (2018) [15]–[16].

[54]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 36.

[55]Associate Professor Elise Klein, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 37.

[56]Mrs Letitia Hope, Deputy Secretary, Families and Communities, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 44.

[57]Mrs Letitia Hope, Deputy Secretary, Families and Communities, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 47.

[58]Mrs Letitia Hope, Deputy Secretary, Families and Communities, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 45.

[59]International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 17.

[60]Every person should be able to ascertain which public authorities or private individuals or bodies control or may control their files and, if such files contain incorrect personal data or have been processed contrary to legal provisions, every person should be able to request rectification or elimination of these records. UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (1988) [10]. See also, General Comment No. 34 (Freedom of opinion and expression) (2011) [18].

[61]International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, articles 17 and 23. UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (1988) [3]–[4].

[62]UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (1988) [4].

[63]The UN Human Rights Committee further explains that this right is required to be guaranteed against all such interferences and attacks whether they emanate from state authorities or from natural or legal persons: General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (1988).

[64]Convention on the Rights of the Child, articles 26 and 27.

[65]Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 3(1).

[66]UN Committee on the Rights of Children, General Comment 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interest taken as primary consideration (2013).

[67]UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General comment 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (2013) p. 3.

[68]UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General comment 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (2013); see also IAM v Denmark, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child Communication No.3/2016 (2018) [11.8].

[69]UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General comment 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (2013) [6].

[70]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (2008) [18].

[71]See also Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 27(3).

[72]Dr Anna Cody, Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 9. See also, Associate Professor Elise Klein, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 37.

[73]For example, a research project demonstrating a causal relationship between the imposition of compulsory income management and lower birth weights and higher hospital attendances among children. See, Professor Stephanie Schurer, Submission 4.

[74]International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, article 12(1).

[75]UN Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee, General Comment No. 14: the right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (2000) [4]. See also, General Comment No. 12: the right to food (article 11) (1999); General Comment No. 15: the right to water (articles 11 and 12) (2002); and General Comment No. 22: the right to sexual and reproductive health (2016).

[76]Professor Stephanie Schurer, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 30. See further, Submission 4.

[77]Professor Stephanie Schurer, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 31.

[78]Professor Stephanie Schurer, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 30.

[79]Professor Stephanie Schurer, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 30. Associate Professor Elise Klein echoed these concerns. See, Associate Professor Elise Klein, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 37.

[80]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 38.

[81]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, pp. 39–40.

[82]Some human rights obligations are absolute under international law, that is, a State cannot lawfully limit the enjoyment of an absolute right in any circumstances. For example, the right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment may never be permissibly limited.

[83]International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, article 4.

[84]Pardo v Spain, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Communication No. 52/2018, E/C.12/67/D/52/2018 [9.4].

[85]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: the nature of states parties' obligations (14 December 1990) E/1991/23(Supp) [10].

[86]For further discussion see, Amrei Muller, 'Limitations to and derogations from economic, social and cultural rights', Human Rights Law Review,vol. 9, no. 4, 2009, pp. 580–581.

[87]Amrei Muller, 'Limitations to and derogations from economic, social and cultural rights', Human Rights Law Review,vol. 9, no. 4, 2009, p. 573. See also, Phillip Alston and Gerard Quinn, 'The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 9 no. 2, 1987, pp. 201–202.

[88]Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, June 1986 [52]. See also, Amrei Muller, 'Limitations to and derogations from economic, social and cultural rights', Human Rights Law Review,vol. 9, no. 4, 2009, p. 573; Erica-Irene A Daes, The Individual's Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Study of the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2 (1983) pp. 123–124.

[89]See, for example, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations: Egypt (23 May 2000) E/C.12/1/Add.44 [10]; and Concluding observations: Kyrgyzstan (1 September 2000) E/C.12/1/Add.49 [29]. In addition, comparative jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights would appear to indicate that where a limitation relates to a right which is vital for a person's immediate survival (such as the right to an adequate standard of living), the more a state will be required to demonstrate that there is a pressing social need justifying that interference. See, for example, Dudgeon v United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights (1981) [52].

[90]Amrei Muller, 'Limitations to and derogations from economic, social and cultural rights', Human Rights Law Review,vol. 9, no. 4, 2009, p. 573. See also, Phillip Alston and Gerard Quinn, 'The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 9 no. 2, 1987, pp. 201–202.

[91]Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, June 1986 [52]. See also, Amrei Muller, 'Limitations to and derogations from economic, social and cultural rights', Human Rights Law Review,vol. 9, no. 4, 2009, p. 573; Erica-Irene A Daes, The Individual's Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Study of the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2 (1983) pp. 123–124.

[92]See, for example, Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs (References), The extent and nature of poverty in Australia: Final Report (February 2024).

[93]See, Anglicare Australia, Submission 3, p. 8; Associate Professor Elise Klein and Dr Francis Markham, Submission 8, p. 2; Centre for Policy Futures, Submission 10, p. 5; Northern Australia Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 19, p. 3; Associate Professor Liesel Spencer, Submission 25, p.7.

[94]Mr Shane Foyster, Housing and Social Security Consultant Lawyer with the Northern Australia Aboriginal Justice Agency, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 14.

[95]See, for example, Mr Jared Sharp, Principal Legal Officer, North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 13; Dr Anna Cody, Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Australian Human Rights Commission, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 12.

[96]Mr Shane Foyster, Housing and Social Security Consultant Lawyer with the Northern Australia Aboriginal Justice Agency, CommitteeHansard, 5 July 2024, p. 14.

[97]See, for example, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights,Social Security (Administration) Amendment (Income Management to Cashless Debit Card Transition) Bill 2019, Report 6 of 2019(5 December 2019) pp 46–47; Social Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card Trial Expansion) Bill 2018, Report 8 of 2018(21 August 2018) pp. 37–53; and Report 11 of 2017 (17 October 2017) pp. 126–137.

[98]Mr Patrick Boneham, Branch Manager, Income Management Policy and Data, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 50.

[99]Associate Professor Elise Klein, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 37.

[100]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000042, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024).

[101]Mr Patrick Burford, Group Manager, Communities Group, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 29 July 2024, p. 16.

[102]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000042, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024).

[103]Mr Patrick Boneham, Branch Manager, Income Management Policy and Data, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 49.

[104]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000147, 29 July 2024 (received 22 August 2024).

[105]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000047, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024).

[106]Mr Shane Foyster, Housing and Social Security Consultant Lawyer with the Northern Australia Aboriginal Justice Agency, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, pp. 15–16.

[107]Mr Shane Foyster, Housing and Social Security Consultant Lawyer with the Northern Australia Aboriginal Justice Agency, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 16.

[108]Dr Francis Markham, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 42.

[109]Ms Taylah Bell, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 22.

[110]See, for example, The Jumbunna Institute for Indigenous Education and Research, Submission 26, p.5; and Economic Justice Australia, Submission 9, p. 3.

[111]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, pp. 36–37.

[112]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000046, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024). See also, Department of Social Services, Submission 14, p. 7. The Department’s Guide to Social Policy Law advises that an exemption may be reassessed prior to the end of the 12-month exemption period in cases where an individual's circumstances have significantly changed. See, Department of Social Services, Guide to Social Policy Law, Social Security Guide (Version 1.318, released 1 July 2024), at 11.1.14.10 (overview of exemptions from income management)

[113]The department advised that of the 878 exemptions from enhanced income management that were sought from 2023 – June 2024, 416 (47 per cent) were granted. See, Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000044, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024).

[114]Mr Patrick Boneham, Branch Manager, Income Management Policy and Data, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 49.

[115]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000140, 29 July 2024 (received 22 August 2024).

[116]Mr Patrick Boneham, Branch Manager, Income Management, Policy and Data Branch, Committee Hansard, 29 July 2024, p. 11.The department also provided statistics for exemptions relating to enhanced income management. They advised that 401 of the 878 exemptions (46 per cent) from enhanced income management from 2023 - June 2024 were from people who identified as Indigenous. While 54 per cent of requests for an exemption from enhanced income management from non-Indigenous applicants were successful, only 39 per cent of applications from Indigenous applicants were successful. See, Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000044, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024).

[117]Mr Shane Foyster, Housing and Social Security Consultant Lawyer with the Northern Australia Aboriginal Justice Agency, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 14.

[118]Mr Shane Foyster, Housing and Social Security Consultant Lawyer with the Northern Australia Aboriginal Justice Agency, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 18. See also, Ms Judy Harison, Co-Convenor, National Regional, Rural, Remote and Very Remote Community Legal Network, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 23.

[119]Mr Shane Foyster, Housing and Social Security Consultant Lawyer with the Northern Australia Aboriginal Justice Agency, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 16.

[120]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000140, 29 July 2024 (received 22 August 2024).

[121]Mr Shane Foyster, Housing and Social Security Consultant Lawyer with the Northern Australia Aboriginal Justice Agency, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, pp. 17–18.

[122]The department advised that an individual may request an exemption on this basis and that Services Australia may automatically identify that a person may be subject to an exemption on this basis, following a review of a weekly system generated report for enhanced income management. See, Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000118, 29 July 2024 (received 13 August 2024).

[123]Department of Social Services, Submission 14, p. 8.

[124]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000041, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024).

[125]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000045, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024).

[126]Department of Social Services, Submission 14, p. 8.

[127]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000148, 29 July 2024 (received 22 August 2024).

[128]See further, Administrative Review Council, ‘What decisions should be subject to merit review?’ (1999).

[129]See, for example, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27, Freedom of movement (Art.12) (1999).

[130]See, for example, Family Responsibilities Commission, Submission 20.

[131]Dr J. Rob Bray, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 33.

[132]Dr Padraic Gibson, Senior Researcher, Jumbunna Institute for Education and Research, University of Technology Sydney, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 35.

[133]Mrs Letitia Hope, Deputy Secretary, Families and Communities, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 44.