C. Parliamentary Library Papers

The following papers were provided courtesy of the Parliamentary Library, Department of Parliamentary Services.

Table 1. Overseas experience: declarations of war and military deployments in select countries

The table below summarises the requirements in select democratic countries for declaring war and deploying military forces overseas. It highlights whether constitutional and other legislative provisions require parliamentary approval for both declaring war and deploying military forces to conflict zones. In some instances, governments or heads of state have ignored the requirement for parliamentary approval, while others have sought parliamentary approval to establish a convention despite the absence of constitutional or legislative requirements.

The table includes applicable laws where available in English, as well as some examples of parliamentary involvement in deploying military forces overseas (contemporary declarations of war are rare). Instances where parliament has been consulted, despite laws to the contrary, are included in the notes column.

Declaring war and deploying military forces: select countries

Country	Declaring war	Deploying military forces	Law	Notes
Australia	No	No		The Australian Constitution does not say expressly who is responsible for declaring war or deploying military forces. In addition, there is no requirement in the Constitution or defence legislation for parliamentary involvement in most aspects of declaring war and deploying military forces.[1] While Australia contributes to various overseas military actions, the parliament has not been consulted prior to any decision by the government to deploy military forces overseas. There is no dedicated parliamentary committee to oversee military deployments.[2]
Belgium	No	No		Article 167 of the constitution explicitly entrusts the executive power with the conduct of military operations. If, on 2 occasions, the government has wished to address parliament to seek its approval, it is only because the government was operating under current affairs (election caretaker mode). The principle of current affairs is not included in the constitution or in any other legal provision, but a democratic tradition that a government in current affairs considers it necessary to have certain decisions covered by the legislature. This constitutional custom is connected with the continuity of the public service and the ministerial responsibility in the Belgian parliamentary system and is recognised through the case law of the Council of State and legal doctrine, and is considered to be of public order. No parliamentary approval is needed, except in case of current affairs.[3] The 2 occasions in which the Belgian Parliament authorised overseas military deployments was for the Libyan crisis in 2011 and against Islamic State in Iraq in 2014. In both cases, the government was in caretaker mode and there was cross-party agreement to seek parliamentary authorisation.[4] Both decisions were brought to parliament for a formal vote of approval: In the Libya case, the decision to participate with six F16 fighter jets, a marine minesweeper and approximately 200 military support personnel were voted upon on March 18, 2011, receiving a quasi-unanimous parliamentary support. On September 26, 2014, also the decision to deploy again six F16 fighter jets and an additional 120 military support troops to Iraq again received convincing parliamentary support, with only the extreme-left Partij van de Arbeid-Parti du Travail de Belgique (PVDA-PTB) voting against and the green Ecolo-Groen fraction abstaining.[5] The Belgium Parliament has a Special Committee for the Monitoring of Foreign Missions (SCMFM) which provides some operational oversight of military operations. The SCMFM has access to concluding decisions from the Council of Ministers, the Rules of Engagement and military intelligence reports.[6]
Canada	No	No		The Library of Parliament noted in 2006 that under the constitution, the prime minister and Cabinet exercise command of the armed forces in the name of the monarch, with parliament having ‘little direct role in such matters’.[7] The Library highlighted, however, that there had been attempts to change the practice: In its April 2000 report, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs considered the lack of parliamentary approval of overseas deployments of Canadian Forces to be “unacceptable” and stated that “Parliament should always be consulted … when Canadian troops are deployed abroad.” It also noted that the 1994 Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence Policy and the 1997 Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia had called for enhanced parliamentary oversight of defence matters and made recommendations to that effect, with little impact. In his May 1996 Report, the Auditor General of Canada had done the same. In addition, Members of Parliament have used private Members’ motions and opposition days in an attempt to require such a vote, at least in the House of Commons, before a decision is made. However, the government has consistently defeated these initiatives.[8] In February 2006 the Harper Government promised to make ‘Parliament responsible for exercising oversight over the conduct of Canadian foreign policy and the commitment of Canadian Forces to foreign operations’. There were occasions when the parliament was consulted on such matters.[9] For instance, in May 2006, Prime Minister Harper initiated parliamentary debate seeking approval to extend Canada’s military commitment in Afghanistan.[10] The House of Commons voted in favour of the mission extension on 17 May 2006.[11] As Philippe Lagassé noted: Harper’s Conservatives would hold several votes in the years that followed, notably for a further extension of the Kandahar mission in 2008 and to secure the Commons’ support for missions in Libya (2011) and Iraq (2014).[12] While a convention to consult parliament on significant military deployments has not emerged in Canada, there has since been one occasion when the practice was exercised. On 8 February 2016, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau acknowledged, during his announcement about Canada’s military deployment to Iraq and Syria, that ‘while we recognize the exclusive role of the executive in military matters, we will bring this mission to a Parliamentary debate…’.[13] A motion was moved in the House of Commons on Canada’s contribution to the effort to combat Daesh/Islamic State and was agreed to on 8March 2016.[14]
Denmark	Yes	Yes	Declaring war in Section 19(1) of Denmark’s Constitution: The King shall act on behalf of the Realm in international affairs. Provided that without the consent of the Parliament the King shall not undertake any act whereby the territory of the Realm will be increased or decrease, nor shall he enter into any obligation which for fulfillment requires the concurrence of the Parliament, or which otherwise is of major importance; nor shall the King, except with the consent of the Parliament, terminate any international treaty entered into with the consent of the Parliament. Deploying forces in Section 19(2) of Denmark’s Constitution: Except for purposes of defence against anarmed attack upon the Realm or Danish forces the King shall not use military force against any foreign state without the consent of the Parliament. Any measure which the King may take in pursuance of this provision shall immediately be submitted to the Parliament. If the Parliament is not in session it shall be convoked immediately.	The unicameral Danish Parliament mandates Danish military deployments and approves any changes to mission mandates. In addition, the Defence Committee of the Danish Parliament addresses a variety of issues including ‘whether Denmark should contribute to international military missions’.[15] Below are some examples of Danish military operations endorsed by the Danish Parliament. Since 2004 Denmark has contributed fighter aircraft in support of NATO’s Air Policing operations in the Baltic States. Denmark’s military contribution was authorised under motion B 210 in the Danish Parliament on 2 May 2004.[16] On 19 August 2016 the Danish Parliament unanimously approved motion B 197 authorising the Danish military to remove the last of Libya’s chemical weapons stockpile.[17] The expansion of Denmark’s military contribution to the Global Coalition against Daesh/Islamic State was approved by the Danish Parliament on 19 April 2016. The mandate allows Danish forces, including special forces, to operate in Iraq and Syria. In January 2017, the government consulted parliament about its intention to expand the mandate, by allowing special forces to ‘contribute in a more direct role’. This motion was supported by the majority of parliamentarians.[18] Approval for operations in the Sahel involved the adoption of motion B6 by the parliament on 24October 2019 in support of Denmark’s military contribution to MINUSMA and motion B7 for Operation Barkhane.[19]
Finland	Yes	Yes	Declaring war in Section 93 of Finland’s Constitution: The foreign policy of Finland is directed by the President of the Republic in co-operation with the Government. However, the Parliament accepts Finland's international obligations and their denouncement and decides on the bringing into force of Finland's international obligations in so far as provided in this Constitution. The President decides on matters of war and peace, with the consent of the Parliament. The Government is responsible for the national preparation of the decisions to be made in the European Union, and decides on the concomitant Finnish measures, unless the decision requires the approval of the Parliament. The Parliament participates in the national preparation of decisions to be made in the European Union, as provided in this Constitution. The communication of important foreign policy positions to foreign States and international organisations is the responsibility of the Minister with competence in foreign affairs. Mobilising forces in Section 129 of Finland’s Constitution: On the proposal of the Government, the President of the Republic decides on the mobilisation of the defence forces. If the Parliament is not in session at that moment, it shall be convened at once. Section 3 of Finland’s Act on Military Crisis Management deals with parliament’s participation in decision-making: (1) Before submitting a proposal referred to in section 2 concerning Finland’s participation, the Government must consult Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee. If the proposal concerns a crisis management operation that presents a particularly demanding military challenge or an operation that is not based on a UN Security Council mandate, the Government must, before submitting its proposal, consult Parliament by providing it with a report on the matter. If the proposal concerns the assignment of no more than ten persons to military crisis management duties, the Government must provide a report on the matter to Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee before submitting its proposal. (2) If plans are made for significant changes to the duties assigned to a Finnish crisis management force during the course of an operation, the Government must consult Parliament or Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee in accordance with subsection 1. (3) Before submitting a proposal concerning the establishment of a standby unit, the Government must consult Parliament by providing it with a report on the matter. Before submitting a proposal on the participation of Finland in crisis management by using a standby unit, the Government must consult Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.	In August 2021 the Parliament of Finland was recalled from summer break to debate the deployment of Finnish forces to Kabul airport, Afghanistan to assist with evacuation efforts. According to an English-language media report: Legislators expressed broad support for the deployment at a plenary session of parliament on Friday afternoon, although a vote was not held. Discussion then moved to parliament’s foreign affairs committee, before being passed to the government and then the president for final approval.[20] Finland’s military can take part in international peace and security operations as well as crisis management (including humanitarian assistance and civilian protection) under the Act on Military Crisis Management. The main conditions for Finnish deployment include: - the operation promotes peace and security - the president's decision, the Government's and Parliament's support - in principle a UN Security Council resolution on the execution of an operation in exceptional circumstances the possibility to participate in other operations as well, for e.g. as part of an EU battlegroup.[21] Additionally, the Act on Military Crisis Management limits the number of personnel serving in crisis management activities to 2,000. This could include crisis management forces, individual units and private persons.[22]
France	Yes	Yes	Declaring war and deploying forces in Article 35 of France’s Constitution: A declaration of war shall be authorized by Parliament. The Government shall inform Parliament of its decision to have the armed forces intervene abroad, at the latest three days after the beginning of said intervention. It shall detail the objectives of the said intervention. This information may give rise to a debate, which shall not be followed by a vote. Where the said intervention shall exceed four months, the Government shall submit the extension to Parliament for authorization. It may ask the National Assembly to make the final decision. If Parliament is not sitting at the end of the four-month period, it shall express its decision at the opening of the following session.	While Article 35 of the constitution is explicit about France’s bicameral parliament’s role in declaring war, the government of the day is required to inform the parliament when deploying military forces, but the parliament’s endorsement is not required. However, the parliament must authorise any extension to a deployment beyond the first 4 months. An occasional paper by the then Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) assessed: Article 35 of the constitution states that ‘a declaration of war shall be authorised by Parliament’, yet military actions short of war are not mentioned. In these cases the government has ‘the opportunity to decide whether a parliamentary authorisation is required’ (Rozenberg, 2002: 126). As military deployments nowadays are rarely if ever bound to declarations of war, the executive can usually decide freely whether it puts a deployment up to a parliamentary vote or not. Obviously this confines parliament to a very weak position, as it can be circumvented by the executive at will. A few examples from French deployment practice illustrate that the executive is indeed the decisive actor in determining troop deployments. ‘President Mitterrand asked for a vote in January 1991 at the beginning of the Gulf war whereas Prime Minister Jospin refused a vote during the Kosovo crisis in April 1999 given the divisions in its majority on the question’ (ibid.). Concerning the EUFOR DRC mission in 2003 and the EUFOR Althea mission in 2004, the French parliament was informed by the executive and debated the deployments in advance but did not enjoy veto power (Born et al., 2007: 23ff). As it is the executive that decides whether and how the French parliament is involved in a deployment decision, we classify France as a country in which ex ante parliamentary veto power is absent.[23] Another example is the authorisation by France’s parliament to extend the deployment of French forces in Mali.[24] This deployment has since concluded and forces have been redeployed within the region.[25]
New Zealand	No	No		In a 2014 New Zealand Parliamentary Library research paper, it states: There is no legal requirement in New Zealand for the government to obtain Parliament's consent to deployments of troops abroad. Over the last 25 years, however, it has generally been the practice for significant initial commitments of troops to overseas operations to be debated in Parliament.[26] The NZ Parliament has debated military deployments initiated by government ministers and sometimes the opposition. These typically take place prior to, and sometimes afterwards, the government’s announcement to deploy personnel overseas. The Library publication lists the following examples of NZ parliamentary involvement in military deployments: Persian Gulf Government announcement of a decision to commit units of the armed forces to provide air transport and medical services as part of the multinational commitment to uphold the UN resolutions passed following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, 3 December 1990. Parliament.Urgent debate, requested by the opposition, on the Prime Minister’s announcement that the government intended to commit military personnel to the Persian Gulf, 5 December 1990. Parliament recalled. Address in reply debate to the Governor-General’s speech on New Zealand’s contribution of two RNZAF Hercules aircraft and a New Zealand Army medical team to support the multinational force in the Gulf area, 22 January 1991. Bosnia-Herzegovina Parliament. Prime Minister’s statement, followed by a brief debate, on a further contribution of a reinforced infantry company group of around 250 personnel to the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia, 24 May 1994. Parliament.Adjournment debate, on a government motion, on the troop commitment to the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia, 24May 1994. Iraq Announcement by the Prime Minister that New Zealand would contribute up to 20 Special Air Services personnel and two RNZAF Orions to participate in the multinational coalition formed to pursue Iraq’s compliance with United Nations obligations to abandon its illegal weapons of mass destruction programmes, 2 February 1998. Parliament.Special debate on a government motion for the House to take note of the government’s decision to support the Coalition of Countries prepared to take action to enforce UN Security Council resolutions if all practicable diplomatic efforts failed to convince the Iraqi regime to comply with them, 18 February 1998. Motion carried, 71-49. Timor-Leste Parliament. Urgent debate, requested by the opposition, on the situation in East Timor, 7September 1999. Announcement by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence of a contribution of an initial force of around 420 personnel to the international peacekeeping force to be assembled in East Timor, and the deployment of an additional 300-400 personnel if necessary, 16 September 1999. Parliament recalled. Adjournment debate, on a government motion, on the commitment of up to 1,000 armed forces personnel to East Timor, 17 September 1999. International Coalition against Terrorism Announcement by the Prime Minister that New Zealand was responding to the United States and the UN Security Council’s calls for effective action to combat terrorism, and that New Zealand was prepared to make a military contribution, 21 September 2001. Parliament. Special debate on a government motion for the House to declare its support for the offer of Special Air Services troops and other assistance as part of the response of the United States and the international coalition to the terrorist attacks that were carried out on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania, 3October 2001. Motion amended to include, as well, total support for the approach taken by the United States and a declaration of support for UN Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373, and carried, 112-7. The Prime Minister said in her speech that the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade had conveyed New Zealand’s already public offer of special forces in person the previous week. Iraq and Afghanistan Parliament. Debate on Iraq, as decided by the Business Committee, 18 March 2003. At the conclusion of the debate an opposition motion for the House to recognise the threat that Iraq’s non-compliance with UN Security Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed to international peace was defeated, 35-84. Announcement by the Prime Minister of the provision of a Defence Force engineering group of up to 60 personnel to work on reconstruction tasks in southern Iraq and, as part of New Zealand’s continuing participation in Operation Enduring Freedom, of the intention to contribute to a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan, 9 June 2003. Parliament. Prime Minister’s statement on New Zealand’s assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by a brief debate, 10June 2003. Solomon Islands Parliament. Urgent debate, requested by the opposition, on a decision in principle to send police officers and military forces to the Solomon Islands as part of the South Pacific’s intervention in that country, 1 July 2003. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade said in his speech that Cabinet would shortly be making a decision on the deployment. Government announcement of the deployment of 35 police officers for two years, supported by 105 Defence Force personnel, to assist the Solomon Islands government, 15 July 2003.https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/research-papers/document/00PLLawRP2014051/troop-deployments-abroad - footnote_19
United Kingdom	No	No		The UK House of Commons Library describes the Royal Prerogative: The decision to deploy the Armed Forces in situations of armed conflict is currently a prerogative power. In the event of a declaration of war or the commitment of British forces to military action, constitutional convention requires that authorisation is given by the Prime Minister, on behalf of the Crown. Decisions on military action are taken within the Cabinet with advice from, among others, the National Security Council and the Chief of the Defence Staff. In constitutional terms Parliament has no legally established role and the Government is under no legal obligation with respect to its conduct, including keeping Parliament informed. In practice however, successive Governments have consulted and informed the House of Commons about the decision to use force and the progress of military campaigns, although there has been little consistency in how that has been achieved. Nor is the Government under any constitutional obligation to abide by the result of any Parliamentary vote on military action, although in reality it would be politically difficult to engage in military action without Parliamentary support.[27] On 18 March 2003 the Blair Government asked the parliament to vote on a motion to deploy UK forces to Iraq. The motion was agreed on division 412 to 149.[28] In July 2007 the Brown Government proposed limiting the executive’s powers and moving the Royal Prerogative powers to parliament on a number of matters, including the deployment of military forces abroad.[29] Subsequently, the Brown Government published a consultation paper in October 2007 that included options for parliamentary involvement in deploying armed forces abroad.[30] The outcome of this consultation was included in the 2008 White Paper on the Governance of Britain, which proposed a formal role for the parliament in deploying armed forces through the draft Constitutional Renewal Bill.[31] The 2008 white paper stated: On War Powers, the Government will propose a House of Commons resolution which sets out in detail the processes Parliament should follow in order to approve any commitment of Armed Forces into armed conflict. The resolution will define a clear role for Parliament in this most important of decisions, while ensuring our national security is not compromised.[32] In 2008 the Joint Committee (House of Commons and House of Lords) examined the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill in the context of the 2008 white paper.[33] The Public Administration Select Committee also inquired into the proposals. Both committees broadly supported a greater role for the parliament in war powers decisions, but the proposals were not adopted prior to the change of government in 2010.[34] In 2011, statements in parliament suggested the emergence of a convention to consult parliament when deploying armed forces abroad.[35] The existence of such a convention was tested during the Libya conflict in 2011. The deployment of UK military forces to Libya was announced on 18March 2018 and a retrospective motion debated in parliament on 21 March, which was affirmed 557 to 13.[36] The convention was not employed for the UK military deployment to Mali in 2013.[37] However, in August 2013 the parliament was recalled to debate, and vote on, a motion about the UK’s response to the Assad regime’s alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria. The motion was defeated by a vote of 272 to 285.[38] Parliament convened in September 2014 to debate a motion on the UK’s potential military air strikes against Daesh (ISIS) targets in Iraq: The motion explicitly ruled out deploying UK troops in ground combat operations and did not endorse UK air strikes in Syria, which the Government indicated would be subject to a separate vote in Parliament, should it become necessary.[39] The motion was affirmed by a vote of 524 to 43.[40] As the Daesh threat expanded to Tunisia and Paris in 2015 the parliament voted in the affirmative on a government motion in December 2015 to extend airstrikes against Daesh targets in Syria (while explicitly ruling out the use of land forces in Syria).[41] In 2018 the May Government did not consult parliament about military air strikes conducted against targets in Syria and was criticised for not applying the convention in this instance.[42] Prime Minister Theresa May clarified the government’s position: Let me begin by being absolutely clear about the Government’s policy in relation to the convention that has developed, because there is a fundamental difference between the policy and the perception of it that is conveyed in today’s motion. The Cabinet manual states: “In 2011, the Government acknowledged that a convention had developed in Parliament that before troops were committed the House of Commons should have an opportunity to debate the matter and said that it proposed to observe that convention except where there was an emergency and such action would not be appropriate.” More detail on the Government’s position was then set out in 2016 in a written ministerial statement from the then Defence Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Sir Michael Fallon), who wrote: “The exception to the convention is important to ensure that this and future Governments can use their judgment about how best to protect the security and interests of the UK. In observing the convention, we must ensure that the ability of our armed forces to act quickly and decisively, and to maintain the security of their operations, is not compromised…If we were to attempt to clarify more precisely circumstances in which we would consult Parliament before taking military action, we would constrain the operational flexibility of the armed forces and prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of those forces”—[Official Report, 18April 2016; Vol. 608, c. 10WS.][43] May went on to say that she was ‘very clear that the Government follow that convention, but the assumption that the convention means that no decision can be taken without Parliamentary approval is incorrect—it is the wrong interpretation of the convention’.[44]
United States	Yes	Yes	Declaring war in War Powers Resolution 1973 (WPR) (also known as the War Powers Act) permitted under Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution. Section 2 of the WPR states: (b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. (c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. Deploying forces in War Powers Resolution 1973 Section 3 of the WPR states: The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations. Section 4 of the WPR requires the president to report to Congress, in the absence of a declaration of war, within 48 hours on the deployment of military forces.	The Congressional Research Service (CRS) describes the basis of US war powers requirements: By the Framers’ apparent design, to keep the nation’s “purse” and the “sword” in separate hands and in other ways hinder the nation’s embroilment in unnecessary wars, the Constitution divides war powers between Congress and the President. Congress is empowered to declare war, provide for and regulate the Armed Forces, and issue letters of marque and reprisal, as well as to call forth the militia to suppress an insurrection, repel an invasion, or “execute the Laws of the Union.” The President, as the Commander in Chief, has the responsibility to direct the Armed Forces as they conduct hostilities, put down insurrections, or execute the law when constitutionally authorized to do so.[45] The CRS publication, Instances of use of United States armed forces abroad, 1798–2022, lists hundreds of occasions when US forces were deployed overseas, and 11 declarations of war. The CRS publication, War powers resolution: presidential compliance (last updated in 2012), details the presidential actions at the time military forces were deployed. For example, Yugoslavia/Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Haiti, Somalia and Libya. The latter, in particular, did not receive congressional authorisation. The publication notes: Debate continues on whether using the War Powers Resolution is effective as a means of assuring congressional participation in decisions that might get the United States involved in a significant military conflict. Proposals have been made to modify or repeal the resolution. None have been enacted to date.[46] In 2018 the Senate passed a resolution (S.J.Res. 54) directing the US president to withdraw military forces from the conflict in Yemen.[47] A similar resolution was introduced into the House in 2019 (H.J.Res. 37), which was vetoed by the Trump administration. The Biden administration has deployed a large number of military personnel to NATO countries in response to the Ukraine situation, but has not made the required notifications under Section 4 of the WPR.[48]

Table 2: Parliamentary involvement in declaring war and deploying military forces to overseas conflicts

Although the Australian Government is not legally required to consult parliament when declaring war or deploying military forces overseas, on most occasions the prime minister or defence minister has informed parliament of Cabinet’s decision through a ministerial statement and/or tabled paper(s). In most instances, a debate followed, and in some cases, a vote on the motion.

The following table lists the major conflicts in which Australia was involved and summarises parliamentary involvement during the first parliamentary sitting weeks after the decision to deploy military forces to conflicts overseas. Non-parliamentary events are also recorded to show the parallel activities of the Executive branch of government.

The table shows that the Executive’s decision to declare war and deploy military forces overseas has always been taken before parliament has debated the issue. Parliament is, in effect, asked to endorse a decision already taken. It also shows that, though the opposition of the day has usually supported the government’s action, there have been occasions when the opposition has opposed Australia’s involvement in a conflict (for example Malaya, Vietnam, and Iraq), or called for parliament to be consulted on the conduct of war (for example, the Second World War).

The motion most frequently moved in debate (on a ministerial statement or paper) is ‘that the paper be printed’. This technique was described in 1955 by the Speaker, Archie Cameron, as ‘only a formal method of securing debate’.

Motions have usually been passed without divisions being required, although there have been exceptions. In 2003, when the Senate debated the government’s motion on the Iraq war, opposition and minor parties succeeded in amending the motion to oppose the war.

The involvement of parliament may not be an essential step in the process of declaring war and deploying military forces overseas but ‘the calling of Parliament [is] an essential, and, indeed, natural step to take in waging war as a democracy’.

Conflict	Statement to parliament	Debate/vote	Other events and key dates
First World War 1914 to 1918	There was no ministerial statement to parliament. The Governor-General, Sir Ronald Ferguson, opened the sixth Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia on 8 October 1914. In his speech he said: You have been called together at the earliest moment after the return of the writs to deal with matters of great national importance, many of them arising out of the calamitous war in which the Empire has been compelled to engage. ... It has been necessary to anticipate Parliamentary approval of expenditure urgently required for war purposes. A Bill covering all such unauthorized expenditure will be submitted for your consideration at the earliest possible moment.[49]	The motion moved was ‘That the Address be agreed to by the House’.[50] A government senator speaking in the Address-in-Reply debate stated that ‘Our duty to the British Empire must never be questioned – must never be forsaken in any degree’.[51] During the debate, the Leader of the Opposition, Joseph Cook, said: I wish to say to the Government that we shall be behind them most cordially with our best support – and not critical support – in prosecuting this war right to the end, and in financing it to the full in every legitimate and reasonable way.[52] The question was resolved in the affirmative, without division, in the House of Representatives and the Senate.[53]	Prime Minister Joseph Cook’s Liberal Government was in power prior to the declaration of war by Britain.[54] Federal Parliament was prorogued on 27June and dissolved on 30 July 1914.[55] On 31 July 1914 the Opposition Leader, Andrew Fisher, declared at an election event: Should the worst happen, after everything has been done that honour will permit, Australians will stand beside the mother country to help and defend her to our last man and our last shilling.[56] Speaking on the same night at a separate event Prime Minister Joseph Cook said: If there is to be a war, you and I shall be in it. We must be in it. If the old country is at war, so are we.[57] An emergency Cabinet was held on 3 August 1914 to discuss the imminent war.[58] On 4 August 1914 Britain issued the first of 4 declarations of war; the first was against Germany;[59] the second against Austria-Hungary on 12 August 1914;[60] the third against Turkey on 5 November 1914;[61] and Bulgaria was the fourth on 15 October 1915.[62] A double dissolution election was held on 5September 1914.[63] Andrew Fisher’s ALP (Australian Labor Party) Government was elected.[64] The new parliament did not meet until 8October 1914.[65]
Second World War1939 to 1945	On 6 September 1939 Prime Minister Robert Menzies tabled a white paper and delivered a ministerial statement on the war in Europe. The white paper contained texts of documents exchanged between the British and German governments.[66] The motion ‘that the paper be printed’ was debated in both Houses.[67]	In his ministerial statement the prime minister said: However long this conflict may last, I do not seek a muzzled Opposition. Our institutions of parliament, and of liberal thought, free speech, and free criticism, must go on.’[68] During the debate, the Leader of the Opposition, John Curtin, expressed surprise that the prime minister had not: … seized this first opportunity of meeting the Parliament to outline, at least broadly, the intentions of the Government in respect of the defence of this Commonwealth, and of the general principles upon which it proposed to be influenced in framing its programme.[69] Curtin also read a statement endorsed by the Australian Labor Party caucus saying: ...The democratic rights of the people must be safeguarded to the maximum ... To ensure that this be done, it is essential that the Parliament of the Commonwealth should remain in session.[70] Debate on the ministerial statement was adjourned in the House of Representatives.[71] In the Senate, the motion was resolved in the affirmative. There was no division.[72]	Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister Robert Menzies.[73] The announcement by British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, that Britain was at war with Germany was received on short-wave wireless in Australia at 8 pm on 3 September 1939.[74] Once the news from Britain had been authenticated (via official telegram), the Executive Council approved the Commonwealth’s proclamation to declare war against Germany.[75] The Governor-General issued the proclamation in the Commonwealth Gazette.[76] At 9:15 pm on the same evening, Prime Minister Robert Menzies made a radio address to the nation. Menzies said: It is my melancholy duty to inform you officially, that in consequence of a persistence by Germany in her invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared war upon her and that, as a result, Australia is also at war.[77] The Second World War official histories notes that Menzies ‘made no suggestion that Australia could have taken any other course than to stand beside Great Britain’.[78] The Official histories record other events of that evening: At 10.14 [pm] a proclamation was issued in Canberra that Australia was at war, and at 10.25 [pm] Mr Shedden [Secretary, Department of Defence] signed a memorandum to the Secretary of the Military Board, as to other Federal departments stating that “the action specified in the Commonwealth War Book for the War Stage (including that for the Precautionary Stage not yet taken) should be initiated forthwith;” at 11.47 [pm] a message that war had begun was sent to all military districts.[79] The Official histories suggest that, although the Opposition accepted the existence of a state of war, ‘as a fact with which, in the circumstances, Parliament had been unable to deal’, it was developing the view that: … the nature and extent of Australian participation in the war should be determined or approved from time to time by the Commonwealth Parliament. The party’s request that Parliament should remain in session was in keeping with such a view.[80]
	On 7 September 1939, the Minister for Defence, Geoffrey Street, tabled a ministerial statement on defence preparations.[81] No motion was moved.	The statement was not debated. The Leader of the Opposition, John Curtin, replied: … regularly the Minister should make a statement to the House indicating the progressive steps that have been taken in relation to this most important and vital matter … it might be considered very serviceable if a motion could be moved on the occasion of the delivery of such a statement so that some opportunity could be provided … for members of the Parliament either to criticize it, … or to make suggestions that may be of use to the Government. In that way it could be made clear that the statement is made not merely as a recital of what has been done but as an intimation for the Parliament to consider and even to express its mindthereon ... in that way this Parliamentmaynotonly act, ... as the masters of the Government, but also we shall give every demonstration that in a democracy defence of the country is not a one-man job’.[82]
	On 19 September 1939, Prime Minister Robert Menzies delivered a ministerial statement on the international situation.[83] No motion was moved. On 20 September 1939, Menzies informed parliament about the government’s decision to offer the British Government an air expeditionary force of 6 squadrons.[84]	There was no debate on either statement and no reply from the Opposition.	All decisions about Australian expeditionary forces at the outset of the war were made by the Executive under Menzies.[85] On 28 October 1940, the Advisory War Council was established under national security regulations to advise government on the prosecution of the war. It was chaired by Menzies and comprised representatives from the government and opposition, including Curtin.[86] The agreement between the government and the ALP stated the council would allow a stronger ‘war effort and give substantial effect to the requirements for internal security and post-war preparation’. The council was ‘empowered to investigate, advise and assist the Government in its war efforts’. The ALP also agreed to place its members ‘at the disposal of the Government to assist Ministers occupied on war and defence efforts’, but would not take political advantage.[87]
	On 16 December 1941, Prime Minister John Curtin delivered a statement on the international situation and tabled documents relating to US-Japan conversations and Australia’s declaration on 8 December of the existence of a state of war with Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Japan. Curtin moved that the House approve the action of the government in issuing ‘proclamations declaring the existence of a state of war with Japan, Finland, Hungary and Rumania’.[88]	In his speech on 16 December 1941, Curtin noted that when a proclamation is issued calling up the military under the Defence Act, if parliament is not sitting, ‘it shall be summoned to meet within ten days’. He stated: …Parliament is now asked to endorse the advice which led to the issue of the proclamation by the Governor-General of Australia on behalf of His Majesty the King.[89] The Official histories noted: It would appear from Curtin’s words that the necessity to call Parliament together was presented by the Defence Act, but advantage was taken of the occasion to obtain formal parliamentary approval of the declaration of war. Although he [Curtin] created a precedent by seeking the passage of a resolution approving the Government’s action in respect to the declaration of war, he did not appear to have advanced anywhere the thesis that it was constitutionally necessary to do so.[90] Leader of the Opposition, Arthur Fadden responded: The Opposition not only associates itself with the grave and important resolution before the House, but also wholeheartedly allies itself with the Government in the steps it has taken.[91] The motion was passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate without division.[92]	ALP Government in power under Prime Minister John Curtin.[93] The War Cabinet met on 8 December 1941. That evening Prime Minister Curtin announced in a national broadcast that ‘we are at war with Japan,’ although the Official histories report that ‘the formal decision to declare war was not made until the 9th [December 1941]’.[94] On 9 December 1941, the government proclaimed, ‘the existence of a state of war with Japan as from 5 p.m. on 8th December’. The previous day the government had ‘declared the existence of a state of war with Finland, Hungary and Rumania respectively as from 5 p.m., 8th December’.[95]
	Parliament met on 20 February 1942. Prime Minister John Curtin moved: … a joint meeting of members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives be convened for 4pm this day, for the purpose of discussing in secret the present war and hearing confidential reports in relation thereto.[96]	Leader of the Opposition, Arthur Fadden responded that ‘The Opposition wholeheartedly supports the motion’.[97] The motion was passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives without division.[98]	On 6 January 1942, Australia declared war on Bulgaria.[99] On 2 March 1942, Australia declared war on Thailand.[100] The Official histories noted: There was no reference to Parliament of any question related to the war on Bulgaria, but the decision was made in consultation with and with the concurrence of the Advisory War Council. Subsequently Australia declared war with Thailand by a similar procedure...[101]
	On 25 February 1942, the Minister for External Affairs, Herbert V. Evatt, delivered a ministerial statement reviewing the war situation. He moved that the paper be printed.[102]	Leader of the Opposition, Arthur Fadden, said: I am sure that the House joins with me in expressing appreciation of the trouble to which the Minister for External Affairs ... has gone in the compilation of the information he has just conveyed, and of the opportunity that is thereby afforded to us to debate and review the international position in the light of what we have heard.[103] The motion was passed by the House of Representatives without division. In the Senate, the statement was read and discharged.[104]
Malayan Emergency 1950 to 1960	Prime Minister Robert Menzies delivered ministerial statements on the situation in Malaya on 30 May 1950 and 31 May 1950.[105]	In his ministerial statement on 30 May 1950, Prime Minister Menzies said the government was: … giving careful consideration to the question of ways and means of assisting the United Kingdom Government in its Malayan problem.[106] In his ministerial statement on 31 May 1950, the prime minister informed the House that the government had considered the request for assistance from the British Government and decided to provide: … a transport squadron of Dakota aircraft, for supply dropping and general transport services. The Royal Australian Air Force crews and ground staff accompanying the squadron will total approximately 168. The Government has also agreed to provide assistance in servicing certain Royal Air Force aircraft in Australia.[107]	Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister Robert Menzies.[108] The Official histories notes: The first direct approach for Australian assistance in combating the communist insurgency in Malaya was made in April 1950, when the British Government asked if Australia could provide reinforcements for British air squadrons operating in Malaya.’[109] Australian air units arrived in the Malayan theatre in June 1950.[110]
	The Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, delivered a ministerial statement on 20 April 1955 and moved that the paper be printed.[111] The statement included the following message from the acting chairperson of the Manila Treaty Council Representatives Meeting on 7 April 1955: …the Council Representatives of the South-East Asian Treaty Organization have taken note of the statement made by Your Excellency on the 1st instant and welcome the decision of the Australian Government to seek parliamentary approval for participation by Australian forces in a strategic reserve to be established in Malaya as an important part of the Treaty Area.[112] The strategic reserve to which Australia, Britain and New Zealand contributed to was known as the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR).[113]	In his ministerial statement, Prime Minister Robert Menzies stated: I have already announced publicly that the Government proposes to contribute a comparatively small force to a strategic reserve in Malaya. I will, a little later in this speech, indicate the acceptance of more extensive military responsibilities in the event of war.[114] The Leader of the Opposition, Herbert V. Evatt, responded: Australia’s true role in South-East Asia will not be helped butobstructed by the present proposal to send our armed forces to Malaya...[115] The Opposition moved an amendment that the following words be substituted after ‘that’: ‘this House rejects the Government’s proposals to despatch Australian armed forces to Malaya as set out in the paper read by the Prime Minister’.[116] The amendment was defeated.[117] In the House of Representatives, the main question ‘that the Paper be printed’ was negatived. There was no division.[118] In the Senate, the motion was resolved in the affirmative. There was no division.[119]	In 1955 the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR) was formed with Air Force, Army and Navy elements from Australia, Britain, and New Zealand. The key role of the FESR was to protect countries like Malaya and Singapore against communist forces.[120] The ALP conference held in March 1955 did not support sending military forces to Malaya. The motion stated: 7. The Australian Labor Party is satisfied that the use ofAustralian Armed forces in Malaya will gravely injure Australian relations with our Asian neighbours while in no way contributing to the prevention of aggression. The “guerrilla” operations in Malaya have lasted five years. They will eventually be ended by some form of agreement or amnesty. Action towards this end should begin now. 8. Labor policy is to oppose the use of Armed Forces in Malaya.[121] The prime minister announced the commitment of additional forces after a Cabinet meeting on 15 June 1955. These military forces would be available for use in anti-terrorist operations. The Official histories note: … the press generally welcomed this decision regarding it as logical, indeed inevitable, but criticising the fact that it was announced when Parliament was in recess.[122]
Korean War 1950 to 1953	Parliament was recalled on 6 July 1950. The motion moved by Prime Minister Robert Menzies stated: … this House, having before it the Charter of the United Nations and the recent resolutions of the Security Council in relation to Korea, approves of the action taken by the Government in placing at the disposal of the United Nations the forces indicated in the statement of the Prime Minister.[123]	On 6 July 1950, Prime Minister Robert Menzies delivered a statement on the situation in Korea and outlined the events leading to Australia’s involvement in the war.[124] The Leader of the Opposition, Ben Chifley, indicated the Opposition would support the motion.[125] In the Senate debate, William Ashley, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, said: Whilst it is not always opportune to call the Parliament together, and it is realized that certain matters must be dealt with urgently, I stress that any future Australian commitments should have the approval of Parliament.[126] The motion, debated in the Senate and the House of Representatives, was resolved in the affirmative. There was no division in either House.[127]	Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister Robert Menzies.[128] The war commenced on 25 June 1950.[129] In his statement to parliament on 6 July, the prime minister outlined the steps that led to Australia’s involvement in the conflict: United Nations’ Security Council resolutions were approved on 25 and 27June 1950. The latter recommended that: ‘Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area’.[130] On 29 June Australia advised relevant authorities that it had decided to support the Security Council resolution by: … placing an Australian naval force in far eastern waters … at the disposal of the United States authorities on behalf of the Security Council for the purpose of furnishing assistance to the Republic of Korea.[131] On 30 June, the government announced it ‘had decided to place at the service of the United Nations, through the American authorities, the Royal Australian Air Force fighter squadron stationed in Japan’.[132] The Australian Army’s Third Battalion (3RAR) deployed to Korea in early October 1950.[133]
Confrontation (Indonesia) 1963 to 1966	On 23 March 1965, the Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, delivered a ministerial statement on international affairs. He stated: … I shall confine my remarks to a few of the more urgent topics. This is not intended, however, to limit the range of debate.[134] Although the minister referred to the situation in Indonesia, he made no direct reference to the government’s decision to send military forces to Borneo.[135] The minister stated: …it remains a primary objective of Australian policy to seek with Indonesia a relationship based on understanding and respect. Hence, while leaving Indonesia in no doubt at all of Australia's determination to assist Malaysia to defend herself against armed attack and subversion, we continue to demonstrate our willingness to search for the basis of an enduring peaceful relationship with Indonesia. In this spirit, the Government is continuing a limited programme of aid to Indonesia, details of which are available to honourable members in statements tabled in the Library. This aid has been and will be kept under close review and the decision to proceed with it has been made after the most careful consideration of all the relevant factors.[136]	The Leader of the Opposition, Arthur Calwell, responded by briefly noting: Aggression in all forms must be resisted. We believe, however, that the Australian Government has failed totally to take any diplomatic initiative either to end this dispute, or to reduce its temperature. I am optimistic enough to believe that war can be avoided; but if it is, it will be not because of any initiative taken by this Government.[137] Debate on the motion ‘that the House take note of the Paper’ was adjourned on 1 April 1965.[138]	Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister Robert Menzies.[139] In January 1963 the Indonesian Government, under President Sukarno, declared a policy of Konfrontasi (meaning confrontation) in opposition to the formation of Malaysia.[140] Initially the Australian Government did not commit military assets and personnel to the Confrontation, despite requests for assistance by the British and Malaysian governments. Although, Australian military forces were: … used for the defence of the Malay peninsula against external attack. In the event, such attacks occurred twice, in September and October 1964, when Indonesia launched paratrooper and amphibious raids against Labis and Pontian on the south-western side of the peninsula. Members of the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) were used in clean-up operations against the invading troops. Although these attacks were easily repelled, they did pose a serious risk of escalating the fighting.[141] By January 1965, the Australian Government decided that 3 RAR and a squadron of SAS personnel should be made available for operations. The decision was announced by acting Prime Minister John McEwen on 3February 1965 (Prime Minister Menzies was in Britain attending Winston Churchill’s funeral).[142]
Vietnam War 1962 to 1973	No statement to parliament. Parliament adjourned on 17 May 1962 and did not meet again until 7August 1962.[143]		Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister Robert Menzies.[144] On 24 May 1962, the Minister for Defence, Athol Townley, issued a media release announcing: … at the invitation of the government of the Republic of Vietnam, Australia was sending a group of military instructors to that country.[145] This was subsequently confirmed in another media release on 26 July 1962.[146] These instructors became known as the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam and is considered the ‘beginning of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War’.[147] The Official histories noted that, although there was no opportunity for a parliamentary debate, it was ‘unlikely that the Opposition would have mounted a major challenge to the Government’s policy’.[148]
	On 23 March 1965, the Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, delivered a ministerial statement on international affairs that focused on the situation in Vietnam.[149] In a ministerial statement delivered on 29 April 1965, Prime Minister Robert Menzies advised the parliament that the government had decided to send combat forces to Vietnam.[150]	The motions on both 23 March 1965 and 29April 1965 moved ‘that the House take note of the paper’.[151] In his ministerial statement Menzies said: The Australian Government is now in receipt of a request from the Government of South Vietnam for further military assistance. We have decided – and this has been after close consultation with the Government of the United States – to provide an infantry battalion for service in South Vietnam … I should say … that we decided in principle some time ago … that we would be willing to do this if we received the necessary request from the Government of South Vietnam and the necessary collaboration with the United States.[152] Debate on the statement was postponed until parliament resumed on 4 May 1965. In response, the Leader of the Opposition, Arthur Calwell, said: … on behalf of all my colleagues of Her Majesty’s Opposition, I say that we oppose the Government’s decision to send 800 men to fight in Vietnam. We oppose it firmly and completely.[153] In the House of Representatives, the motion ‘that the paper be printed’ was resolved in the affirmative: ayes 60, noes 44.[154] In the Senate, the motion ‘that the Senate take note of the paper’ was resolved in the affirmative. There was no division.[155]	The first US proposal for the deployment of Australian combat forces to Vietnam was made on 4 December 1964.[156] On 13 April 1965 the Australian Government formerly offered to deploy an Army battalion, which was accepted by the US Government.[157] The Official histories noted that, as the timing of the government’s announcement on 29April depended on when it received a response from South Vietnam, the prime minister’s statement was delivered at the end of a parliamentary week. Both the Leader of the Opposition, Arthur Calwell, and Deputy Leader, Gough Whitlam, ‘had left Canberra ... for a political appointment in Sydney’.[158] Following Menzies’ 29 April 1965 statement to parliament, Rendle Holten (National Country Party) highlighted: It seems rather an anti-climax to be the first speaker in a resumed debate on education after such an historic statement by the Prime Minister of Australia (Sir Robert Menzies) on so serious a matter as the position in Vietnam. His statement has fully awakened us to the responsibility that we have in this Parliament in makingdecisions to send members ofourfighting forces overseas into deadly combat.[159]
Gulf War 1990 to 1991	On 21 August 1990 Prime Minister Bob Hawke delivered a ministerial statement to parliament. He said: … I want to take this first opportunity available to me to inform the House of the view the Government has taken of the situation which has arisen in the Middle East over the past three weeks and of the measures we have adopted to meet that situation.[160]	The prime minister’s motion, in part, condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; called upon Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait; affirmed the fundamental importance of the United Nations Charter to preserve peace and protect international borders; supported the government’s decision to send Royal Australian Navy ships to the Middle East to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq; and supported the government’s implementation of UN sanctions.[161] In response, Leader of the Opposition, John Hewson, said ‘The Opposition parties are pleased to support the motion that is before the House’.[162] In the House of Representatives, the motion was agreed to without a division. The Member for North Sydney, Ted Mack, asked that his dissent be recorded.[163] In the Senate, the motion was agreed to without a division. The Australian Democrats asked that their objection to paragraph 5, subsection 2 be recorded.[164]	ALP Government in power under Prime Minister Bob Hawke.[165] Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990.[166]
	On 4 December 1990 Prime Minister Bob Hawke delivered a ministerial statement on the Middle East. He informed the parliament: … the Government unreservedly supports the United Nations Security Council resolution 678. Our support for the resolution imposes on us an obligation to respond to the request in its third paragraph for all nations to provide appropriate support for actions taken under the resolution. I emphasise that the resolution not only authorises all necessary means; it explicitly requests that member states provide support.[167]	The motion moved was ‘that the House take note of the paper’.[168] During the debate, the Leader of the Opposition, John Hewson, said that ‘we are committed as an Opposition to building a united national position on this issue’. But he was critical of the government for failing ‘to consult with the Opposition prior to its original decision to deploy Australian defence forces to the Gulf’.[169] On 5 December 1990, in the House of Representatives, the question was resolved in the affirmative without division.[170] On 4 December 1990, in the Senate, the question was resolved in the affirmative without division.[171]	On 29 November 1990, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 678 (1990), which set 15 January 1991 as the deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.[172] On 17 January 1991, Operation Desert Storm commenced when US and coalition forces began an air bombardment of Iraq that continued without respite until the war ended 43 days later.[173] On 17 January 1991, Prime Minister Bob Hawke issued a statement announcing the participation of the Naval Task Force in armed action in the Gulf and the recall of parliament on 21 and 22 January 1991 to debate the decision.[174]
	Parliament was recalled on 21–22 January 1991 to debate the Gulf War. The Manager of Opposition Business, Wallace Fife, protested that, as there would not be a question time on either day, there was no opportunity to question the prime minister or ministers.[175] On 21 January 1991 Prime Minister Bob Hawke addressed the House and stated: The decision to commit Australian armed forces to combat is of course one that constitutionally is the prerogative of the Executive. It is fitting, however, that I place on parliamentary record the train of events behind this decision.[176]	The motion moved by Prime Minister Bob Hawke on 21 January 1991 stated, in part, that this House: … reaffirms its support for an on-going role for the United Nations in promoting world peace and the self-determination of nations …affirms its support forAustralia’s positive response to the request made by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 678 for support in implementing that Resolution; expresses its full confidence in, and support for, Australian forces serving with the UN-sanctioned multi-national forces in the Gulf; deplores Iraq’s widening of the conflict by its unprovoked attack upon Israel; and recognises … the need to intensify efforts to establish peace and stability in the Middle East, including a just resolution of the Palestinian issue and the continuing security of Israel, once the crisis in the Gulf is resolved.[177] The Leader of the Opposition, John Hewson, said ‘… the Opposition parties strongly support this motion before the House’.[178] On 22 January 1991, in the House of Representatives, the question was resolved in the affirmative without division. Member for North Sydney, Ted Mack, asked that his name be recorded as voting against the motion.[179] On 22 January 1991, in the Senate, the question was resolved in the affirmative: ayes 59, noes 9.[180]	On 27 February 1991 Iraqi forces had withdrawn from Kuwait and on 28 February 1991 Prime Minister Hawke announced military operations against Iraq had been suspended.[181]
Afghanistan 2001 to 2021	No ministerial statement to parliament.	On 17 September 2001 Prime Minister John Howard moved an 8-part motion in the House of Representatives. Of note, points 6 and 7 of the motion stated: (6) Believes that the terrorist actions in New York City and Washington, DC, constitute an attack upon the United States of America within the meaning of Articles IV and V of the ANZUS Treaty. (7) Fully endorses the commitment of the Australian Government to support within Australia's capabilities United States-led action against those responsible for these tragic attacks.[182] Leader of the Opposition, Kim Beazley, supported the motion and affirmed bipartisan support for the impending military response. Beazley noted: [j]oining the strong international coalition to fight terrorism wherever it threatens democratic and peaceful nations, as suggested by [US] Secretary Powell, is the right way to go’.[183] On the same day the motion was moved in the House of Representatives, the question was resolved in the affirmative.[184] In the Senate on 17 September 2001, the motion was also resolved in the affirmative.[185] However, the Australian Democrats and the Australian Greens sought to amend parts 6 and 7 of the motion.[186]	Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister John Howard.[187] On 14 September 2001 Prime Minister John Howard announced the government’s intent to invoke Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty in response to the terrorist attacks against the US on 11 September 2001.[188] At a press conference on 4 October 2001 Prime Minister John Howard announced Australia’s military commitment to the international coalition led by the US.[189] On 7 October 2001, the US and allied nations commenced military operations against al-Qa‘ida and Taliban targets in Afghanistan.[190] Federal Parliament was dissolved on 8October 2001. A federal election was held on 10 November 2001. The 40th Parliament met on 12 February 2002.[191] The 200-strong Australian Special Forces Task Force deployed to Afghanistan from October 2001 and following 3 rotations, withdrew in November 2002.[192] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led international coalition effort (known as the International Security Assistance Force – ISAF) was officially established on 20 December 2001 via United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386.[193] Australian combat forces withdrew from Afghanistan at the end of 2002 and did not re-deploy until August 2005.[194]
	On 18 August 2005 the Minister for Defence, Robert Hill, responded to a Question without Notice on Australia’s contribution to Afghanistan.[195] In his response, Hill recalled the prime minister’s 13July 2005 press conference about the deployment of a 150 strong Special Forces Task Group to Afghanistan, which would be increased to 190 personnel.[196] On 9 August 2006 Prime Minister John Howard informed the House via a ministerial statement that the Australian Government had decided to send: … an additional 150 troops of the ADF to reinforce the reconstruction task force and to provide enhanced force protection.[197]	The 9 August 2006 motion received bipartisan support.[198]	On 13 July 2005, Prime Minister John Howard announced at a press conference that Australia would deploy approximately 150 personnel for 12 months to undertake security tasks like those of the 2001–02 deployment to Afghanistan.[199] Consequently, Australia re-entered the Afghanistan conflict in August 2005.[200] Prior to the re-deployment, Australia had an exceedingly small non-combat presence in Afghanistan. From 2005–06, the authorised strength began to increase, eventually peaking at around 1,550 personnel from 2009 to 2012.[201] The parliament was prorogued in October 2007 and a federal election held on 24November.[202]
	On 19 October 2010, Prime Minister Julia Gillard presented a ministerial statement to parliament entitled No safe haven.[203] The statement allowed the first parliamentary debate on Australia’s contribution to the Afghanistan war and explained: … why Australia is involved in Afghanistan; what the international community is seeking to achieve and how; what Australia’s contribution is to this international effort—our mission; what progress is being made; and what the future is of our commitment in Afghanistan’.[204]	Minister for Defence Stephen Smith moved the following motion which was agreed to: That so much of the standing and sessional orders be suspended to allow Mr S. F. Smith (Minister for Defence), Mr Robert, Mr Rudd (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Ms J. Bishop (Deputy Leader of the Opposition), Mr O’Connor (Minister for Home Affairs), Mr Keenan, Mr Wilkie and Mr Bandt to speak on the motion for 20 minutes and for all other members to speak on the motion for 15 minutes.[205] As part of the debate, the Leader of the Opposition, Tony Abbott, stated: It is right that every member of parliament should now have the chance to reflect on Australia’s mission in Afghanistan. War should never be popular, but it can sometimes be right. Our job is not to persuade people to like the work our armed forces are doing, but they need to understand it and be able to support it. Winning hearts and minds in Australia is no less important than winning them in Afghanistan if this mission is to succeed. Our challenge this week is to be just as effective and professional in our tasks as our soldiers are in theirs.[206]	ALP Government in power under Prime Minister Rudd from December 2007.[207] On 24 June 2010, Kevin Rudd lost the support of his party and Julia Gillard became prime minister.[208] A federal election was held on 21 August 2010, which resulted in a hung parliament. Under the leadership of Julia Gillard, the ALP formed a minority government with support from 3 independents and one member of the Greens.[209] A parliamentary debate on Afghanistan was one of the agreements made between the ALP and the Greens to allow the ALP to form government.[210]
Iraq 2003 to 2009	On 4 February 2003 Prime Minister John Howard delivered a ministerial statement to explain the ‘government’s belief that the world community must deal decisively with Iraq’.[211] On 18 March 2003, Prime Minister John Howard moved a motion that included endorsement of: … the Government's decision to commit Australian Defence Force elements in the region to the international coalition of military forces prepared to enforce Iraq's compliance with its international obligations under successive resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, with a view to restoring international peace and security in the Middle East region.[212]	The motion moved on 4 February 2003 was ‘that the House take note of the paper’.[213] Attempts by the Opposition and independents to move motions on Iraq were not successful. Prime Minister John Howard’s motion of 18March 2003 prompted heated debate and divisions on the motion and proposed amendments by the Opposition.[214] During the debate, Leader of the Opposition Simon Crean said ‘… Labor opposes your commitment to war. We will argue against it, and we will call for the troops to be returned’.[215] In the House of Representatives on 20March 2003 the motion was agreed to in the affirmative: 80 ayes to 63 noes.[216] On the same date in the Senate, an amended motion, which, in part, opposed the decision of the Australian Cabinet to commit military forces to an attack on Iraq without UN resolution authorising force and called for Australian military forces to be withdrawn and returned home, was resolved in the affirmative: ayes 37, noes 32. The Opposition, Australian Democrats, Australian Greens, and an independent senator supported the amended motion.[217]	Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister John Howard.[218] On 10 January 2003, the prime minister foreshadowed at a press conference, ‘some forward deployment’ of elements of the ADF (Australian Defence Force) to the Middle East. On 22 January 2003, Defence Minister Robert Hill announced the government’s decision to forward deploy HMAS Kanimbla, lead elements of a Special Forces Task Group and an RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force) reconnaissance team to the Middle East.[219] The pre-deployment of Australia military elements to the Middle East commenced on 23 January 2003, known as Operation Bastille.[220] On 13 March 2003, Prime Minister John Howard addressed the National Press Club where he presented the case for disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction.[221] On 17 March 2003, the prime minister advised at a press conference that federal Cabinet would meet that evening to discuss Iraq and Australia’s military participation. Journalists asked about the role of parliament in the decision to join the ‘coalition of the willing’. In response, the prime minister said that ‘I have no desire at all to deny Parliament the full opportunity of debating this’.[222] On 17 March 2003 US President George W. Bush set a 48-hour deadline for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq with his sons or face war. Once the deadline had passed on 19 March 2003 the US-led Coalition of the Willing commenced offensive air strikes against key Iraqi leadership positions.[223] Prime Minister John Howard announced at a morning press conference that Australian military forces had ‘commenced combat and combat support operations’.[224]Australia’s combat mission in Iraq, known as Operation Falconer, involved around 2,000 ADF personnel from all 3 services.[225]
Iraq 2014Syria 2015 to 2020	On 1 September 2014 Prime Minister Tony Abbott delivered a ministerial statement to parliament on the situation in Iraq and Syria. The prime minister noted: So far, [Australia] have met requests for humanitarian relief and for logistical support. So far, there has been no request for military action itself. Should such a request come from theObamaadministration, and be supported by the government of Iraq, it would be considered against these criteria: Is there a clear and achievable overall objective? Is there a clear and proportionate role for Australian forces? Have all the risks been properly assessed? And is there an overall humanitarian objective in accordance with Australia’s national interests?.[226] On 16 September 2015, the Minister for Defence, Kevin Andrews, delivered a ministerial statement updating the parliament on Australia’s military operations in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and broader operations in the Middle East.[227]	The prime minister’s statement on 1September 2014 responded to the ALP’s request for a statement to parliament. The Opposition supported the government’s response to the situation in Iraq at that time.[228] A motion was moved to allow further statements in response to the prime minister’s statement.[229] Further statements were made in the Federation Chamber on 3, 4 and 22 September 2014. Most statements supported the government’s actions at that time, but some cautioned against Australia’s involvement in any escalation of military action.[230] On the same day as the prime minister’s 9September 2015 press conference announcing the expansion of Australia’s military operations into Syria, the Opposition Leader, Bill Shorten, proposed a discussion in parliament on Syria as a matter of public importance, which was supported.[231]	Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister Tony Abbott.[232] On 8 August 2014, following a request from the Iraqi Government, US-led international coalition military operations commenced against Daesh in Iraq.[233] On 14 August 2014, the Coalition Government announced the commencement of Australian military operations in Iraq. Initially the mission delivered humanitarian aid to civilians.[234] By mid-September 2014, the RAAF’s Air Task Group (ATG) had deployed to the Middle East ‘awaiting government approval to commence air strikes against Daesh in Iraq’. In October 2014, at the request of the Iraqi Government, the ATG had commenced regular air strikes against Daesh targets in Iraq. Australia’s contribution also involved a Special Operations Task Group. All elements of the mission were codenamed Operation Okra.[235] On 3 March 2015, Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced the ADF’s contribution to the international Building Partner Capacity mission in Iraq. This involved around 300 ADF personnel training and advising Iraqi forces, and was known as Task Group Taji.[236] On 9 September 2015, the Abbott Government announced Australian air operations in Iraq would extend to Syria.[237]

Conflict

Statement to parliament

Debate/vote

Other events and key dates

First World War

1914 to 1918

There was no ministerial statement to parliament.

The Governor-General, Sir Ronald Ferguson, opened the sixth Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia on 8 October 1914. In his speech he said:

You have been called together at the earliest moment after the return of the writs to deal with matters of great national importance, many of them arising out of the calamitous war in which the Empire has been compelled to engage.

...

It has been necessary to anticipate Parliamentary approval of expenditure urgently required for war purposes. A Bill covering all such unauthorized expenditure will be submitted for your consideration at the earliest possible moment.[49]

The motion moved was ‘That the Address be agreed to by the House’.[50]

A government senator speaking in the Address-in-Reply debate stated that ‘Our duty to the British Empire must never be questioned – must never be forsaken in any degree’.[51]

During the debate, the Leader of the Opposition, Joseph Cook, said:

I wish to say to the Government that we shall be behind them most cordially with our best support – and not critical support – in prosecuting this war right to the end, and in financing it to the full in every legitimate and reasonable way.[52]

The question was resolved in the affirmative, without division, in the House of Representatives and the Senate.[53]

Prime Minister Joseph Cook’s Liberal Government was in power prior to the declaration of war by Britain.[54]

Federal Parliament was prorogued on 27June and dissolved on 30 July 1914.[55]

On 31 July 1914 the Opposition Leader, Andrew Fisher, declared at an election event:

Should the worst happen, after everything has been done that honour will permit, Australians will stand beside the mother country to help and defend her to our last man and our last shilling.[56]

Speaking on the same night at a separate event Prime Minister Joseph Cook said:

If there is to be a war, you and I shall be in it. We must be in it. If the old country is at war, so are we.[57]

An emergency Cabinet was held on 3 August 1914 to discuss the imminent war.[58]

On 4 August 1914 Britain issued the first of 4 declarations of war; the first was against Germany;[59] the second against Austria-Hungary on 12 August 1914;[60] the third against Turkey on 5 November 1914;[61] and Bulgaria was the fourth on 15 October 1915.[62]

A double dissolution election was held on 5September 1914.[63] Andrew Fisher’s ALP (Australian Labor Party) Government was elected.[64]

The new parliament did not meet until 8October 1914.[65]

Second World War1939 to 1945

On 6 September 1939 Prime Minister Robert Menzies tabled a white paper and delivered a ministerial statement on the war in Europe. The white paper contained texts of documents exchanged between the British and German governments.[66] The motion ‘that the paper be printed’ was debated in both Houses.[67]

In his ministerial statement the prime minister said:

However long this conflict may last, I do not seek a muzzled Opposition. Our institutions of parliament, and of liberal thought, free speech, and free criticism, must go on.’[68]

During the debate, the Leader of the Opposition, John Curtin, expressed surprise that the prime minister had not:

… seized this first opportunity of meeting the Parliament to outline, at least broadly, the intentions of the Government in respect of the defence of this Commonwealth, and of the general principles upon which it proposed to be influenced in framing its programme.[69]

Curtin also read a statement endorsed by the Australian Labor Party caucus saying:

...The democratic rights of the people must be safeguarded to the maximum ... To ensure that this be done, it is essential that the Parliament of the Commonwealth should remain in session.[70]

Debate on the ministerial statement was adjourned in the House of Representatives.[71]

In the Senate, the motion was resolved in the affirmative. There was no division.[72]

Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister Robert Menzies.[73]

The announcement by British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, that Britain was at war with Germany was received on short-wave wireless in Australia at 8 pm on 3 September 1939.[74]

Once the news from Britain had been authenticated (via official telegram), the Executive Council approved the Commonwealth’s proclamation to declare war against Germany.[75] The Governor-General issued the proclamation in the Commonwealth Gazette.[76]

At 9:15 pm on the same evening, Prime Minister Robert Menzies made a radio address to the nation. Menzies said:

It is my melancholy duty to inform you officially, that in consequence of a persistence by Germany in her invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared war upon her and that, as a result, Australia is also at war.[77]

The Second World War official histories notes that Menzies ‘made no suggestion that Australia could have taken any other course than to stand beside Great Britain’.[78]

The Official histories record other events of that evening:

At 10.14 [pm] a proclamation was issued in Canberra that Australia was at war, and at 10.25 [pm] Mr Shedden [Secretary, Department of Defence] signed a memorandum to the Secretary of the Military Board, as to other Federal departments stating that “the action specified in the Commonwealth War Book for the War Stage (including that for the Precautionary Stage not yet taken) should be initiated forthwith;” at 11.47 [pm] a message that war had begun was sent to all military districts.[79]

The Official histories suggest that, although the Opposition accepted the existence of a state of war, ‘as a fact with which, in the circumstances, Parliament had been unable to deal’, it was developing the view that:

… the nature and extent of Australian participation in the war should be determined or approved from time to time by the Commonwealth Parliament. The party’s request that Parliament should remain in session was in keeping with such a view.[80]

On 7 September 1939, the Minister for Defence, Geoffrey Street, tabled a ministerial statement on defence preparations.[81] No motion was moved.

The statement was not debated. The Leader of the Opposition, John Curtin, replied:

… regularly the Minister should make a statement to the House indicating the progressive steps that have been taken in relation to this most important and vital matter … it might be considered very serviceable if a motion could be moved on the occasion of the delivery of such a statement so that some opportunity could be provided … for members of the Parliament either to criticize it, … or to make suggestions that may be of use to the Government. In that way it could be made clear that the statement is made not merely as a recital of what has been done but as an intimation for the Parliament to consider and even to express its mindthereon ... in that way this Parliamentmaynotonly act, ... as the masters of the Government, but also we shall give every demonstration that in a democracy defence of the country is not a one-man job’.[82]

On 19 September 1939, Prime Minister Robert Menzies delivered a ministerial statement on the international situation.[83] No motion was moved.

On 20 September 1939, Menzies informed parliament about the government’s decision to offer the British Government an air expeditionary force of 6 squadrons.[84]

There was no debate on either statement and no reply from the Opposition.

All decisions about Australian expeditionary forces at the outset of the war were made by the Executive under Menzies.[85]

On 28 October 1940, the Advisory War Council was established under national security regulations to advise government on the prosecution of the war. It was chaired by Menzies and comprised representatives from the government and opposition, including Curtin.[86] The agreement between the government and the ALP stated the council would allow a stronger ‘war effort and give substantial effect to the requirements for internal security and post-war preparation’. The council was ‘empowered to investigate, advise and assist the Government in its war efforts’. The ALP also agreed to place its members ‘at the disposal of the Government to assist Ministers occupied on war and defence efforts’, but would not take political advantage.[87]

On 16 December 1941, Prime Minister John Curtin delivered a statement on the international situation and tabled documents relating to US-Japan conversations and Australia’s declaration on 8 December of the existence of a state of war with Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Japan. Curtin moved that the House approve the action of the government in issuing ‘proclamations declaring the existence of a state of war with Japan, Finland, Hungary and Rumania’.[88]

In his speech on 16 December 1941, Curtin noted that when a proclamation is issued calling up the military under the Defence Act, if parliament is not sitting, ‘it shall be summoned to meet within ten days’. He stated:

…Parliament is now asked to endorse the advice which led to the issue of the proclamation by the Governor-General of Australia on behalf of His Majesty the King.[89]

The Official histories noted:

It would appear from Curtin’s words that the necessity to call Parliament together was presented by the Defence Act, but advantage was taken of the occasion to obtain formal parliamentary approval of the declaration of war. Although he [Curtin] created a precedent by seeking the passage of a resolution approving the Government’s action in respect to the declaration of war, he did not appear to have advanced anywhere the thesis that it was constitutionally necessary to do so.[90]

Leader of the Opposition, Arthur Fadden responded:

The Opposition not only associates itself with the grave and important resolution before the House, but also wholeheartedly allies itself with the Government in the steps it has taken.[91]

The motion was passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate without division.[92]

ALP Government in power under Prime Minister John Curtin.[93]

The War Cabinet met on 8 December 1941. That evening Prime Minister Curtin announced in a national broadcast that ‘we are at war with Japan,’ although the Official histories report that ‘the formal decision to declare war was not made until the 9th [December 1941]’.[94]

On 9 December 1941, the government proclaimed, ‘the existence of a state of war with Japan as from 5 p.m. on 8th December’. The previous day the government had ‘declared the existence of a state of war with Finland, Hungary and Rumania respectively as from 5 p.m., 8th December’.[95]

Parliament met on 20 February 1942. Prime Minister John Curtin moved:

… a joint meeting of members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives be convened for 4pm this day, for the purpose of discussing in secret the present war and hearing confidential reports in relation thereto.[96]

Leader of the Opposition, Arthur Fadden responded that ‘The Opposition wholeheartedly supports the motion’.[97]

The motion was passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives without division.[98]

On 6 January 1942, Australia declared war on Bulgaria.[99]

On 2 March 1942, Australia declared war on Thailand.[100]

The Official histories noted:

There was no reference to Parliament of any question related to the war on Bulgaria, but the decision was made in consultation with and with the concurrence of the Advisory War Council.

Subsequently Australia declared war with Thailand by a similar procedure...[101]

On 25 February 1942, the Minister for External Affairs, Herbert V. Evatt, delivered a ministerial statement reviewing the war situation. He moved that the paper be printed.[102]

Leader of the Opposition, Arthur Fadden, said:

I am sure that the House joins with me in expressing appreciation of the trouble to which the Minister for External Affairs ... has gone in the compilation of the information he has just conveyed, and of the opportunity that is thereby afforded to us to debate and review the international position in the light of what we have heard.[103]

The motion was passed by the House of Representatives without division. In the Senate, the statement was read and discharged.[104]

Malayan Emergency 1950 to 1960

Prime Minister Robert Menzies delivered ministerial statements on the situation in Malaya on 30 May 1950 and 31 May 1950.[105]

In his ministerial statement on 30 May 1950, Prime Minister Menzies said the government was:

… giving careful consideration to the question of ways and means of assisting the United Kingdom Government in its Malayan problem.[106]

In his ministerial statement on 31 May 1950, the prime minister informed the House that the government had considered the request for assistance from the British Government and decided to provide:

… a transport squadron of Dakota aircraft, for supply dropping and general transport services. The Royal Australian Air Force crews and ground staff accompanying the squadron will total approximately 168. The Government has also agreed to provide assistance in servicing certain Royal Air Force aircraft in Australia.[107]

Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister Robert Menzies.[108]

The Official histories notes:

The first direct approach for Australian assistance in combating the communist insurgency in Malaya was made in April 1950, when the British Government asked if Australia could provide reinforcements for British air squadrons operating in Malaya.’[109]

Australian air units arrived in the Malayan theatre in June 1950.[110]

The Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, delivered a ministerial statement on 20 April 1955 and moved that the paper be printed.[111] The statement included the following message from the acting chairperson of the Manila Treaty Council Representatives Meeting on 7 April 1955:

…the Council Representatives of the South-East Asian Treaty Organization have taken note of the statement made by Your Excellency on the 1st instant and welcome the decision of the Australian Government to seek parliamentary approval for participation by Australian forces in a strategic reserve to be established in Malaya as an important part of the Treaty Area.[112]

The strategic reserve to which Australia, Britain and New Zealand contributed to was known as the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR).[113]

In his ministerial statement, Prime Minister Robert Menzies stated:

I have already announced publicly that the Government proposes to contribute a comparatively small force to a strategic reserve in Malaya. I will, a little later in this speech, indicate the acceptance of more extensive military responsibilities in the event of war.[114]

The Leader of the Opposition, Herbert V. Evatt, responded:

Australia’s true role in South-East Asia will not be helped butobstructed by the present proposal to send our armed forces to Malaya...[115]

The Opposition moved an amendment that the following words be substituted after ‘that’: ‘this House rejects the Government’s proposals to despatch Australian armed forces to Malaya as set out in the paper read by the Prime Minister’.[116] The amendment was defeated.[117]

In the House of Representatives, the main question ‘that the Paper be printed’ was negatived. There was no division.[118]

In the Senate, the motion was resolved in the affirmative. There was no division.[119]

In 1955 the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR) was formed with Air Force, Army and Navy elements from Australia, Britain, and New Zealand. The key role of the FESR was to protect countries like Malaya and Singapore against communist forces.[120]

The ALP conference held in March 1955 did not support sending military forces to Malaya. The motion stated:

7. The Australian Labor Party is satisfied that the use ofAustralian Armed forces in Malaya will gravely injure Australian relations with our Asian neighbours while in no way contributing to the prevention of aggression. The “guerrilla” operations in Malaya have lasted five years. They will eventually be ended by some form of agreement or amnesty. Action towards this end should begin now.

8. Labor policy is to oppose the use of Armed Forces in Malaya.[121]

The prime minister announced the commitment of additional forces after a Cabinet meeting on 15 June 1955. These military forces would be available for use in anti-terrorist operations. The Official histories note:

… the press generally welcomed this decision regarding it as logical, indeed inevitable, but criticising the fact that it was announced when Parliament was in recess.[122]

Korean War 1950 to 1953

Parliament was recalled on 6 July 1950. The motion moved by Prime Minister Robert Menzies stated:

… this House, having before it the Charter of the United Nations and the recent resolutions of the Security Council in relation to Korea, approves of the action taken by the Government in placing at the disposal of the United Nations the forces indicated in the statement of the Prime Minister.[123]

On 6 July 1950, Prime Minister Robert Menzies delivered a statement on the situation in Korea and outlined the events leading to Australia’s involvement in the war.[124]

The Leader of the Opposition, Ben Chifley, indicated the Opposition would support the motion.[125]

In the Senate debate, William Ashley, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, said:

Whilst it is not always opportune to call the Parliament together, and it is realized that certain matters must be dealt with urgently, I stress that any future Australian commitments should have the approval of Parliament.[126]

The motion, debated in the Senate and the House of Representatives, was resolved in the affirmative. There was no division in either House.[127]

Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister Robert Menzies.[128]

The war commenced on 25 June 1950.[129]

In his statement to parliament on 6 July, the prime minister outlined the steps that led to Australia’s involvement in the conflict:

United Nations’ Security Council resolutions were approved on 25 and 27June 1950. The latter recommended that:

‘Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area’.[130]

On 29 June Australia advised relevant authorities that it had decided to support the Security Council resolution by:

… placing an Australian naval force in far eastern waters … at the disposal of the United States authorities on behalf of the Security Council for the purpose of furnishing assistance to the Republic of Korea.[131]

On 30 June, the government announced it ‘had decided to place at the service of the United Nations, through the American authorities, the Royal Australian Air Force fighter squadron stationed in Japan’.[132]

The Australian Army’s Third Battalion (3RAR) deployed to Korea in early October 1950.[133]

Confrontation (Indonesia) 1963 to 1966

On 23 March 1965, the Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, delivered a ministerial statement on international affairs. He stated:

… I shall confine my remarks to a few of the more urgent topics. This is not intended, however, to limit the range of debate.[134]

Although the minister referred to the situation in Indonesia, he made no direct reference to the government’s decision to send military forces to Borneo.[135] The minister stated:

…it remains a primary objective of Australian policy to seek with Indonesia a relationship based on understanding and respect. Hence, while leaving Indonesia in no doubt at all of Australia's determination to assist Malaysia to defend herself against armed attack and subversion, we continue to demonstrate our willingness to search for the basis of an enduring peaceful relationship with Indonesia. In this spirit, the Government is continuing a limited programme of aid to Indonesia, details of which are available to honourable members in statements tabled in the Library. This aid has been and will be kept under close review and the decision to proceed with it has been made after the most careful consideration of all the relevant factors.[136]

The Leader of the Opposition, Arthur Calwell, responded by briefly noting:

Aggression in all forms must be resisted. We believe, however, that the Australian Government has failed totally to take any diplomatic initiative either to end this dispute, or to reduce its temperature. I am optimistic enough to believe that war can be avoided; but if it is, it will be not because of any initiative taken by this Government.[137]

Debate on the motion ‘that the House take note of the Paper’ was adjourned on 1 April 1965.[138]

Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister Robert Menzies.[139]

In January 1963 the Indonesian Government, under President Sukarno, declared a policy of Konfrontasi (meaning confrontation) in opposition to the formation of Malaysia.[140]

Initially the Australian Government did not commit military assets and personnel to the Confrontation, despite requests for assistance by the British and Malaysian governments. Although, Australian military forces were:

… used for the defence of the Malay peninsula against external attack. In the event, such attacks occurred twice, in September and October 1964, when Indonesia launched paratrooper and amphibious raids against Labis and Pontian on the south-western side of the peninsula. Members of the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) were used in clean-up operations against the invading troops. Although these attacks were easily repelled, they did pose a serious risk of escalating the fighting.[141]

By January 1965, the Australian Government decided that 3 RAR and a squadron of SAS personnel should be made available for operations. The decision was announced by acting Prime Minister John McEwen on 3February 1965 (Prime Minister Menzies was in Britain attending Winston Churchill’s funeral).[142]

Vietnam War 1962 to 1973

No statement to parliament.

Parliament adjourned on 17 May 1962 and did not meet again until 7August 1962.[143]

Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister Robert Menzies.[144]

On 24 May 1962, the Minister for Defence, Athol Townley, issued a media release announcing:

… at the invitation of the government of the Republic of Vietnam, Australia was sending a group of military instructors to that country.[145]

This was subsequently confirmed in another media release on 26 July 1962.[146] These instructors became known as the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam and is considered the ‘beginning of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War’.[147]

The Official histories noted that, although there was no opportunity for a parliamentary debate, it was ‘unlikely that the Opposition would have mounted a major challenge to the Government’s policy’.[148]

On 23 March 1965, the Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, delivered a ministerial statement on international affairs that focused on the situation in Vietnam.[149]

In a ministerial statement delivered on 29 April 1965, Prime Minister Robert Menzies advised the parliament that the government had decided to send combat forces to Vietnam.[150]

The motions on both 23 March 1965 and 29April 1965 moved ‘that the House take note of the paper’.[151]

In his ministerial statement Menzies said:

The Australian Government is now in receipt of a request from the Government of South Vietnam for further military assistance. We have decided – and this has been after close consultation with the Government of the United States – to provide an infantry battalion for service in South Vietnam … I should say … that we decided in principle some time ago … that we would be willing to do this if we received the necessary request from the Government of South Vietnam and the necessary collaboration with the United States.[152]

Debate on the statement was postponed until parliament resumed on 4 May 1965. In response, the Leader of the Opposition, Arthur Calwell, said:

… on behalf of all my colleagues of Her Majesty’s Opposition, I say that we oppose the Government’s decision to send 800 men to fight in Vietnam. We oppose it firmly and completely.[153]

In the House of Representatives, the motion ‘that the paper be printed’ was resolved in the affirmative: ayes 60, noes 44.[154]

In the Senate, the motion ‘that the Senate take note of the paper’ was resolved in the affirmative. There was no division.[155]

The first US proposal for the deployment of Australian combat forces to Vietnam was made on 4 December 1964.[156] On 13 April 1965 the Australian Government formerly offered to deploy an Army battalion, which was accepted by the US Government.[157]

The Official histories noted that, as the timing of the government’s announcement on 29April depended on when it received a response from South Vietnam, the prime minister’s statement was delivered at the end of a parliamentary week. Both the Leader of the Opposition, Arthur Calwell, and Deputy Leader, Gough Whitlam, ‘had left Canberra ... for a political appointment in Sydney’.[158]

Following Menzies’ 29 April 1965 statement to parliament, Rendle Holten (National Country Party) highlighted:

It seems rather an anti-climax to be the first speaker in a resumed debate on education after such an historic statement by the Prime Minister of Australia (Sir Robert Menzies) on so serious a matter as the position in Vietnam. His statement has fully awakened us to the responsibility that we have in this Parliament in makingdecisions to send members ofourfighting forces overseas into deadly combat.[159]

Gulf War 1990 to 1991

On 21 August 1990 Prime Minister Bob Hawke delivered a ministerial statement to parliament. He said:

… I want to take this first opportunity available to me to inform the House of the view the Government has taken of the situation which has arisen in the Middle East over the past three weeks and of the measures we have adopted to meet that situation.[160]

The prime minister’s motion, in part, condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; called upon Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait; affirmed the fundamental importance of the United Nations Charter to preserve peace and protect international borders; supported the government’s decision to send Royal Australian Navy ships to the Middle East to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq; and supported the government’s implementation of UN sanctions.[161]

In response, Leader of the Opposition, John Hewson, said ‘The Opposition parties are pleased to support the motion that is before the House’.[162]

In the House of Representatives, the motion was agreed to without a division. The Member for North Sydney, Ted Mack, asked that his dissent be recorded.[163]

In the Senate, the motion was agreed to without a division. The Australian Democrats asked that their objection to paragraph 5, subsection 2 be recorded.[164]

ALP Government in power under Prime Minister Bob Hawke.[165]

Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990.[166]

On 4 December 1990 Prime Minister Bob Hawke delivered a ministerial statement on the Middle East. He informed the parliament:

… the Government unreservedly supports the United Nations Security Council resolution 678. Our support for the resolution imposes on us an obligation to respond to the request in its third paragraph for all nations to provide appropriate support for actions taken under the resolution. I emphasise that the resolution not only authorises all necessary means; it explicitly requests that member states provide support.[167]

The motion moved was ‘that the House take note of the paper’.[168]

During the debate, the Leader of the Opposition, John Hewson, said that ‘we are committed as an Opposition to building a united national position on this issue’. But he was critical of the government for failing ‘to consult with the Opposition prior to its original decision to deploy Australian defence forces to the Gulf’.[169]

On 5 December 1990, in the House of Representatives, the question was resolved in the affirmative without division.[170]

On 4 December 1990, in the Senate, the question was resolved in the affirmative without division.[171]

On 29 November 1990, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 678 (1990), which set 15 January 1991 as the deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.[172]

On 17 January 1991, Operation Desert Storm commenced when US and coalition forces began an air bombardment of Iraq that continued without respite until the war ended 43 days later.[173]

On 17 January 1991, Prime Minister Bob Hawke issued a statement announcing the participation of the Naval Task Force in armed action in the Gulf and the recall of parliament on 21 and 22 January 1991 to debate the decision.[174]

Parliament was recalled on 21–22 January 1991 to debate the Gulf War. The Manager of Opposition Business, Wallace Fife, protested that, as there would not be a question time on either day, there was no opportunity to question the prime minister or ministers.[175]

On 21 January 1991 Prime Minister Bob Hawke addressed the House and stated:

The decision to commit Australian armed forces to combat is of course one that constitutionally is the prerogative of the Executive. It is fitting, however, that I place on parliamentary record the train of events behind this decision.[176]

The motion moved by Prime Minister Bob Hawke on 21 January 1991 stated, in part, that this House:

… reaffirms its support for an on-going role for the United Nations in promoting world peace and the self-determination of nations …affirms its support forAustralia’s positive response to the request made by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 678 for support in implementing that Resolution; expresses its full confidence in, and support for, Australian forces serving with the UN-sanctioned multi-national forces in the Gulf; deplores Iraq’s widening of the conflict by its unprovoked attack upon Israel; and recognises … the need to intensify efforts to establish peace and stability in the Middle East, including a just resolution of the Palestinian issue and the continuing security of Israel, once the crisis in the Gulf is resolved.[177]

The Leader of the Opposition, John Hewson, said ‘… the Opposition parties strongly support this motion before the House’.[178]

On 22 January 1991, in the House of Representatives, the question was resolved in the affirmative without division. Member for North Sydney, Ted Mack, asked that his name be recorded as voting against the motion.[179]

On 22 January 1991, in the Senate, the question was resolved in the affirmative: ayes 59, noes 9.[180]

On 27 February 1991 Iraqi forces had withdrawn from Kuwait and on 28 February 1991 Prime Minister Hawke announced military operations against Iraq had been suspended.[181]

Afghanistan 2001 to 2021

No ministerial statement to parliament.

On 17 September 2001 Prime Minister John Howard moved an 8-part motion in the House of Representatives. Of note, points 6 and 7 of the motion stated:

(6) Believes that the terrorist actions in New York City and Washington, DC, constitute an attack upon the United States of America within the meaning of Articles IV and V of the ANZUS Treaty.

(7) Fully endorses the commitment of the Australian Government to support within Australia's capabilities United States-led action against those responsible for these tragic attacks.[182]

Leader of the Opposition, Kim Beazley, supported the motion and affirmed bipartisan support for the impending military response. Beazley noted:

[j]oining the strong international coalition to fight terrorism wherever it threatens democratic and peaceful nations, as suggested by [US] Secretary Powell, is the right way to go’.[183]

On the same day the motion was moved in the House of Representatives, the question was resolved in the affirmative.[184]

In the Senate on 17 September 2001, the motion was also resolved in the affirmative.[185] However, the Australian Democrats and the Australian Greens sought to amend parts 6 and 7 of the motion.[186]

Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister John Howard.[187]

On 14 September 2001 Prime Minister John Howard announced the government’s intent to invoke Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty in response to the terrorist attacks against the US on 11 September 2001.[188]

At a press conference on 4 October 2001 Prime Minister John Howard announced Australia’s military commitment to the international coalition led by the US.[189]

On 7 October 2001, the US and allied nations commenced military operations against al-Qa‘ida and Taliban targets in Afghanistan.[190]

Federal Parliament was dissolved on 8October 2001. A federal election was held on 10 November 2001. The 40th Parliament met on 12 February 2002.[191]

The 200-strong Australian Special Forces Task Force deployed to Afghanistan from October 2001 and following 3 rotations, withdrew in November 2002.[192]

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led international coalition effort (known as the International Security Assistance Force – ISAF) was officially established on 20 December 2001 via United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386.[193]

Australian combat forces withdrew from Afghanistan at the end of 2002 and did not re-deploy until August 2005.[194]

On 18 August 2005 the Minister for Defence, Robert Hill, responded to a Question without Notice on Australia’s contribution to Afghanistan.[195] In his response, Hill recalled the prime minister’s 13July 2005 press conference about the deployment of a 150 strong Special Forces Task Group to Afghanistan, which would be increased to 190 personnel.[196]

On 9 August 2006 Prime Minister John Howard informed the House via a ministerial statement that the Australian Government had decided to send:

… an additional 150 troops of the ADF to reinforce the reconstruction task force and to provide enhanced force protection.[197]

The 9 August 2006 motion received bipartisan support.[198]

On 13 July 2005, Prime Minister John Howard announced at a press conference that Australia would deploy approximately 150 personnel for 12 months to undertake security tasks like those of the 2001–02 deployment to Afghanistan.[199]

Consequently, Australia re-entered the Afghanistan conflict in August 2005.[200]

Prior to the re-deployment, Australia had an exceedingly small non-combat presence in Afghanistan. From 2005–06, the authorised strength began to increase, eventually peaking at around 1,550 personnel from 2009 to 2012.[201]

The parliament was prorogued in October 2007 and a federal election held on 24November.[202]

On 19 October 2010, Prime Minister Julia Gillard presented a ministerial statement to parliament entitled No safe haven.[203] The statement allowed the first parliamentary debate on Australia’s contribution to the Afghanistan war and explained:

… why Australia is involved in Afghanistan; what the international community is seeking to achieve and how; what Australia’s contribution is to this international effort—our mission; what progress is being made; and what the future is of our commitment in Afghanistan’.[204]

Minister for Defence Stephen Smith moved the following motion which was agreed to:

That so much of the standing and sessional orders be suspended to allow Mr S. F. Smith (Minister for Defence), Mr Robert, Mr Rudd (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Ms J. Bishop (Deputy Leader of the Opposition), Mr O’Connor (Minister for Home Affairs), Mr Keenan, Mr Wilkie and Mr Bandt to speak on the motion for 20 minutes and for all other members to speak on the motion for 15 minutes.[205]

As part of the debate, the Leader of the Opposition, Tony Abbott, stated:

It is right that every member of parliament should now have the chance to reflect on Australia’s mission in Afghanistan. War should never be popular, but it can sometimes be right. Our job is not to persuade people to like the work our armed forces are doing, but they need to understand it and be able to support it. Winning hearts and minds in Australia is no less important than winning them in Afghanistan if this mission is to succeed. Our challenge this week is to be just as effective and professional in our tasks as our soldiers are in theirs.[206]

ALP Government in power under Prime Minister Rudd from December 2007.[207]

On 24 June 2010, Kevin Rudd lost the support of his party and Julia Gillard became prime minister.[208]

A federal election was held on 21 August 2010, which resulted in a hung parliament. Under the leadership of Julia Gillard, the ALP formed a minority government with support from 3 independents and one member of the Greens.[209]

A parliamentary debate on Afghanistan was one of the agreements made between the ALP and the Greens to allow the ALP to form government.[210]

Iraq 2003 to 2009

On 4 February 2003 Prime Minister John Howard delivered a ministerial statement to explain the ‘government’s belief that the world community must deal decisively with Iraq’.[211]

On 18 March 2003, Prime Minister John Howard moved a motion that included endorsement of:

… the Government's decision to commit Australian Defence Force elements in the region to the international coalition of military forces prepared to enforce Iraq's compliance with its international obligations under successive resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, with a view to restoring international peace and security in the Middle East region.[212]

The motion moved on 4 February 2003 was ‘that the House take note of the paper’.[213] Attempts by the Opposition and independents to move motions on Iraq were not successful.

Prime Minister John Howard’s motion of 18March 2003 prompted heated debate and divisions on the motion and proposed amendments by the Opposition.[214] During the debate, Leader of the Opposition Simon Crean said ‘… Labor opposes your commitment to war. We will argue against it, and we will call for the troops to be returned’.[215]

In the House of Representatives on 20March 2003 the motion was agreed to in the affirmative: 80 ayes to 63 noes.[216]

On the same date in the Senate, an amended motion, which, in part, opposed the decision of the Australian Cabinet to commit military forces to an attack on Iraq without UN resolution authorising force and called for Australian military forces to be withdrawn and returned home, was resolved in the affirmative: ayes 37, noes 32. The Opposition, Australian Democrats, Australian Greens, and an independent senator supported the amended motion.[217]

Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister John Howard.[218]

On 10 January 2003, the prime minister foreshadowed at a press conference, ‘some forward deployment’ of elements of the ADF (Australian Defence Force) to the Middle East.

On 22 January 2003, Defence Minister Robert Hill announced the government’s decision to forward deploy HMAS Kanimbla, lead elements of a Special Forces Task Group and an RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force) reconnaissance team to the Middle East.[219]

The pre-deployment of Australia military elements to the Middle East commenced on 23 January 2003, known as Operation Bastille.[220]

On 13 March 2003, Prime Minister John Howard addressed the National Press Club where he presented the case for disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction.[221]

On 17 March 2003, the prime minister advised at a press conference that federal Cabinet would meet that evening to discuss Iraq and Australia’s military participation. Journalists asked about the role of parliament in the decision to join the ‘coalition of the willing’. In response, the prime minister said that ‘I have no desire at all to deny Parliament the full opportunity of debating this’.[222]

On 17 March 2003 US President George W. Bush set a 48-hour deadline for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq with his sons or face war. Once the deadline had passed on 19 March 2003 the US-led Coalition of the Willing commenced offensive air strikes against key Iraqi leadership positions.[223]

Prime Minister John Howard announced at a morning press conference that Australian military forces had ‘commenced combat and combat support operations’.[224]Australia’s combat mission in Iraq, known as Operation Falconer, involved around 2,000 ADF personnel from all 3 services.[225]

Iraq 2014Syria 2015 to 2020

On 1 September 2014 Prime Minister Tony Abbott delivered a ministerial statement to parliament on the situation in Iraq and Syria. The prime minister noted:

So far, [Australia] have met requests for humanitarian relief and for logistical support. So far, there has been no request for military action itself. Should such a request come from theObamaadministration, and be supported by the government of Iraq, it would be considered against these criteria: Is there a clear and achievable overall objective? Is there a clear and proportionate role for Australian forces? Have all the risks been properly assessed? And is there an overall humanitarian objective in accordance with Australia’s national interests?.[226]

On 16 September 2015, the Minister for Defence, Kevin Andrews, delivered a ministerial statement updating the parliament on Australia’s military operations in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and broader operations in the Middle East.[227]

The prime minister’s statement on 1September 2014 responded to the ALP’s request for a statement to parliament. The Opposition supported the government’s response to the situation in Iraq at that time.[228] A motion was moved to allow further statements in response to the prime minister’s statement.[229] Further statements were made in the Federation Chamber on 3, 4 and 22 September 2014. Most statements supported the government’s actions at that time, but some cautioned against Australia’s involvement in any escalation of military action.[230]

On the same day as the prime minister’s 9September 2015 press conference announcing the expansion of Australia’s military operations into Syria, the Opposition Leader, Bill Shorten, proposed a discussion in parliament on Syria as a matter of public importance, which was supported.[231]

Coalition Government in power under Prime Minister Tony Abbott.[232]

On 8 August 2014, following a request from the Iraqi Government, US-led international coalition military operations commenced against Daesh in Iraq.[233]

On 14 August 2014, the Coalition Government announced the commencement of Australian military operations in Iraq. Initially the mission delivered humanitarian aid to civilians.[234]

By mid-September 2014, the RAAF’s Air Task Group (ATG) had deployed to the Middle East ‘awaiting government approval to commence air strikes against Daesh in Iraq’. In October 2014, at the request of the Iraqi Government, the ATG had commenced regular air strikes against Daesh targets in Iraq. Australia’s contribution also involved a Special Operations Task Group. All elements of the mission were codenamed Operation Okra.[235]

On 3 March 2015, Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced the ADF’s contribution to the international Building Partner Capacity mission in Iraq. This involved around 300 ADF personnel training and advising Iraqi forces, and was known as Task Group Taji.[236]

On 9 September 2015, the Abbott Government announced Australian air operations in Iraq would extend to Syria.[237]

Footnotes

[1]Deirdre McKeown and Roy Jordan, Parliamentary Involvement in Declaring War and Deploying Forces Overseas, Research paper series, 2009–10, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 22 March 2010), 3.

[2]Karen Elphick, United States Senate Shows President a Red Light on War Powers as Labor Promises a War Powers Inquiry in Australia, Parliamentary Library, FlagPost, 21 December 2018.

[3]Embassy of Belgium, personal communication, 19 December 2017.

[4]Yf Reykers and Daan Fonck, ‘Who is Controlling Whom? An Analysis of the Belgian Federal Parliament’s Executive Oversight Capacities Towards the Military Interventions in Libya (2011) and Iraq (2014–2015)’, Studia Diplomatica vol. LXVIII (9 June 2016): 98.

[5]Daan Fonck, Tim Haesebrouck and Yf Reykers, ‘Parliamentary Involvement, Party Ideology and Majority-Opposition Bargaining: Belgian Participation in Multinational Military Operations’, Contemporary Security Policy 40, no. 1 (26 July 2018).

[6]Daan Fonck and Yf Reykers, ‘Who is Controlling Whom? An Analysis of the Belgian Federal Parliament’s Executive Oversight Capacities Towards the Military Interventions in Libya (2011) and Iraq (2014–2015)’, Studia Diplomatica, (3 June 2016): 95–96.

[7]Michael Dewing and Corinne McDonald, International Deployment of Canadian Forces: Parliament’s Role, Library of Parliament, 18 May 2006.

[8]Dewing and McDonald, International Deployment of Canadian Forces.

[9]Conservative Party of Canada, Stand up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform, 2006, 45; S Harper (Canadian Prime Minister), ‘The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, PC, MP’, media release, 6 February 2006 [link no longer available].

[10]House of Commons Canada, ‘Canadian Forces in Afghanistan: Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence’, June 2007, 89.

[11]Talia Chung, Afghanistan: Chronology of Canadian Parliamentary Events, Library of Parliament, InfoSeries, 20 November 2007.

[12]Philippe Lagassé, ‘Improving Parliamentary Scrutiny of Defence’, Canadian Military Journal 22, no. 3 (Summer 2022).

[13]Justin Trudeau (Canadian Prime Minister), ‘Prime Minister Justin Trudeau: New Approach to Address the Ongoing Crises in Iraq and Syria and the Impact on the Surrounding Region’, transcript, 8 February 2016.

[14]Canadian House of Commons, 42nd Parliament, First Session, Vote no. 19, 8 March 2016.

[15]Folketinget, ‘Defence Committee’, Danish Parliament website, n.d.

[16]Danish Ministry of Defence (DMoD), ‘Air Policing in the Baltic States’, DMoD website, n.d.

[17]DMoD, ‘Unanimous Parliament puts Denmark in Head of Libya Operation’, DMoD website, 19 August 2016.

[18]Ministry of Defence, ‘Danish Special Forces Assigned with New Tasks in the Coalition’s Fight Against Da’esh’, media release, 20 January 2017.

[19]DMoD, ‘Danish Military Contributions to the Sahel Region’, DMoD website, 24 October 2019; DMoD, ‘The Danish Effort in the Sahel Region (MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane)’, DMoD website, n.d.

[20]Editorial, ‘Parliament and President Approve Finnish Troop Deployment in Kabul’, Yle News, 20 August 2021.

[21]The Finnish Defence Forces (FDF), ‘Finland’s Participation in Crisis Management’, FDF website, n.d.

[22]The Act on Military Crisis Management, Section 5(3); FDF, ‘Finland’s Participation’, FDF website, n.d.

[23]Wolfgang Wagner, Dirk Peters and Cosima Glahn, ‘Parliamentary War Powers Around the World, 1989–2004. A New Dataset’, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Occasional Paper, no. 22 (2010): 52–53.

[24]Editorial, ‘French Parliament Votes to Prolong Mali Mission’, France24, 22 April 2013.

[25]Lauriane Noelle Vofo Kana, ‘France and European Allies to Withdraw Troops from Mali but Remain in Region’, Africa News, 17 February 2022 (updated 1 July 2022).

[26]New Zealand Parliamentary Library, Troop Deployments Abroad: Parliamentary Consent, Research Paper, 24 November 2014.

[27]Claire Mills, Parliamentary Approval for Military Action, House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, 8 May 2018, 4.

[28]Mills, Parliamentary Approval, 14.

[29]Gordon Brown (UK Prime Minister), The Governance of Britain, Green Paper, July 2007, 15–19.

[30]UK Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain: War Powers and Treaties: Limiting Executive Powers, 25 October 2007.

[31]UK Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain: Constitutional Renewal, White Paper, Part 1, March 2008.

[32]UK Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain: Constitutional Renewal, 8.Note: pages 47–56 discuss war powers consultations and debates, and include a draft war powers resolution to parliament.

[33]Mills, Parliamentary Approval, 21.

[34]Mills, 22

[35]Mills, 24.

[36]Mills, 25–26.

[37]Mills, 27–28.

[38]Mills, 29.

[39]Mills, 32.

[40]Mills, 32.

[41]Mills, 34.

[42]Mills, 38–39.

[43]UK House of Commons, ‘Military Action Overseas: Parliamentary Approval’, Debates, 17 April 2018.

[44]UK House of Commons, ‘Military Action Overseas’.

[45]Jennifer K. Elsea, Defense Primer: Legal Authorities for the Use of Military Forces, Congressional Research Service, 26 January 2022.

[46]War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance, Congressional Research Service, 25 September 2012, i.

[47]Elphick, United States Senate shows President a Red Light.

[48]Matthew C. Weed, Ukraine: New U.S. Deployments to Europe Might Raise War Powers Resolution Questions, Congressional Research Service, 15 March 2022, 1–2.

[49]Ronald Ferguson, Governor-General’s Speech, Senate, Debates, 8 October 1914, 1.

[50]Edward Jolley, Governor-General’s Speech: Address-in-Reply, House of Representatives, Debates, 8 October 1914, 34.

[51]David Watson, Governor-General’s Speech: Address-in-Reply, Senate, Debates, 8 October 1914, 22.

[52]Joseph Cook, Governor-General’s Speech: Address-in-Reply, House of Representatives, Debates, 14 October 1914, 174.

[53]House of Representatives, Debates, 15 October 1914, 236, and Senate, Debates, 15 October 1914, 216.

[54]Parliamentary Library, The 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia 2020, 46th Parliament (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 2020), 580.

[55]Rob Lundie and Joy McCann, Commonwealth Parliament from 1901 to World War I, Research paper series, 2014–15, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 4 May 2015), 16.

[56]Jonathan Curtis, To the Last Man – Australia’s Entry to War in 1914, Research paper series, 2014–2015, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 31 July 2014), 2.

[57]Charles Edwin Woodrow Bean, First World War Official Histories: Volume I: The Story of Anzac from the Outbreak of War to the End of the First Phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1941), 16.

[58]Lundie and McCann, Commonwealth Parliament from 1901 to World War I, 16.

[59]Foreign Office, ‘A State of War’, Supplement to the London Gazette no. 28861, authorised on 4 August 1914, published on 5 August 1914.

[60]Foreign Office, ‘Notice’, Supplement to the London Gazette no. 28868, authorised on 12 August 1914, published on 13 August 1914.

[61]Foreign Office, ‘Notice’, Second Supplement to the London Gazette no. 28963, authorised and published on 5 November 1914.

[62]Foreign Office, ‘Notification’, Supplement to the London Gazette no.29329, authorised on 15 October 1915, published on 16 October 1915.

[63]Parliamentary Library, The 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook, 283.

[64]Parliamentary Library, 580.

[65]Parliamentary Library, 460.

[66]Robert Menzies, White Paper, House of Representatives, Debates, 6 September 1939, 80–96.

[67]House of Representatives, Debates, 6 September 1939, 36; Senate, Debates, 6 September 1939, 3.

[68]Robert Menzies, War in Europe, House of Representatives, Debates, 6 September 1939, 36.

[69]John Curtin, War in Europe, House of Representatives, Debates, 6 September 1939, 36.

[70]Gavin Long, ‘A Second A.I.F.’, Australia in the War of 1939–1945, series 1, vol. 1, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1953), 37.

[71]House of Representatives, Debates, 6 September 1939, 79.

[72]Senate, Debates, 7 September 1939, 118.

[73]Parliamentary Library, The 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook, 580.

[74]Paul Hasluck, ‘Australia Enters the War, September 1939–April 1940’, Australia in the War of 1939–1945, series 4, vol 1, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952), 152.

[75]Hasluck, ‘Australia Enters the War’.

[76]Commonwealth Gazette, 63, 3 September 1939.

[77]Robert Menzies, ‘Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies: Wartime Broadcast’, 3 September 1939.

[78]Long, ‘A Second A.I.F.’, 33.

[79]Long, 33–34.

[80]Hasluck, ‘Australia Enters the War’, 159–160.

[81]Geoffrey Street, Ministerial Statements: Defence Preparations, House of Representatives, Debates, 7September 1939, 122.

[82]John Curtin, Ministerial Statements: Defence Preparations, 125–126.

[83]Robert Menzies, Ministerial Statements: International Situation: War in Europe, House of Representatives, Debates, 19 September 1939, 681–683.

[84]Robert Menzies, Question: Air Expeditionary Force, House of Representatives, Debates, 20 September 1939, 840.

[85]Hasluck, ‘Australia Enters the War’, 165–166.

[86]Troy Bramston and Ted Ling, Robert Menzies: Guide to Archives of Australia’s Prime Ministers, (Canberra: National Archives of Australia,2021).

[87]Paul Hasluck, ‘Clearing a Way to Total War, October 1940–January 1941’, Australia in the War of 1939–1945, series 4, vol. 1, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952), 270.

[88]John Curtin, International Affairs: War with Japan, Finland, Hungary and Rumania, House of Representatives, Debates, 16 December 1941, 1068–1081.

[89]Curtin, International Affairs: War with Japan, Finland, Hungary and Rumania, 1069.

[90]Hasluck, ‘War in the Far East’, 10.

[91]Arthur Fadden, International Affairs, House of Representatives, Debates, 16 December 1941, 1082.

[92]House of Representatives, Debates, 16 December 1941, 1133; Senate, Debates, 17December 1941, 1163.

[93]Parliamentary Library, The 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook, 580.

[94]Hasluck, ‘War in the Far East’, 5.

[95]Hasluck, 5–6.

[96]John Curtin, War Situation: Secret Meeting of Senators and Members, House of Representatives, Debates, 20 February 1942, 6.

[97]Arthur Fadden, War Situation: Secret Meeting of Senators and Members, House of Representatives, Debates, 20 February 1942, 7.

[98]House of Representatives, Debates, 20 February 1942, 8; Senate, Debates, 20 February 1942, 4.

[99]Hasluck, ‘War in the Far East’, 9.

[100]Hasluck, 9.

[101]Hasluck, 9

[102]Herbert Evatt, International Affairs: Review of War Situation, House of Representatives, Debates, 25 February 1942, 48–58.

[103]Arthur Fadden, International Affairs: Review of War Situation, House of Representatives, Debates, 25 February 1942, 59.

[104]House of Representatives, Debates, 26 March 1942, 486; Senate, Debates, 29 April 1942, 569.

[105]Robert Menzies, Malaya, House of Representatives, Debates, 30 May 1950, 3349–3351; Robert Menzies, Malaya, House of Representatives, Debates, 31 May 1950, 3464.

[106]Menzies, Malaya, 30 May 1950, 3351.

[107]Menzies, Malaya, 31 May 1950, 3464.

[108]Parliamentary Library, 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook, 580.

[109]Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966, (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1996), 22.

[110]Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 25.

[111]Robert Menzies, Ministerial Statement: Foreign Affairs and Defence, House of Representatives, Debates, 20 April 1955, 44–54.

[112]Menzies, Ministerial Statement: Foreign Affairs and Defence, 50.

[113]Menzies, Ministerial Statement: Foreign Affairs and Defence, 51; David Watt, The 70th Anniversary of the Malayan Emergency: a Quick Guide, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 28 May 2020), 3.

[114]Menzies, 49.

[115]Herbert V. Evatt, Ministerial Statement: Foreign Affairs and Defence, House of Representatives, Debates, 27 April 1955, 200.

[116]Leslie Haylen, Foreign Affairs And Defence, House of Representatives, Debates, 4 May 1955, 403.

[117]House of Representatives, Debates, 5 May 1955, 521–522.

[118]House of Representatives, Debates, 5 May 1955, 523.

[119]Senate, Debates, 24 May 1955, 398.

[120]Karl James, ‘Conflicts Since 1945: Australia’s Other Asian Wars’,Wartime 41, (January 2008): 12–15; Australian War Memorial website, ‘Malayan Emergency’.

[121]Australian Labor Party, Official Report of Proceedings of the 21st Commonwealth Conference, Hobart, 15–18 March 1955, 46.

[122]Peter Edwards and Gregory Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: the Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965, (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1992), 175–176.

[123]Robert Menzies, Korea, House of Representatives, Debates, 6 July 1950, 4836–4839.

[124]Menzies, Korea, 4835–4839.

[125]Ben Chifley, Korea, House of Representatives, Debates, 6 July 1950, 4839.

[126]William Ashley, Korea, Senate, Debates, 6 July 1950, 4834.

[127]Senate, Debates, 6 July 1950,4834; House of Representatives, Debates, 6 July 1950, 4860.

[128]Parliamentary Library, 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook, 580.

[129]David Watt, Anzac Day 2020: The 70th Anniversary of the Korean War: a Quick Guide, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 15 April 2020).

[130]Menzies, Korea.

[131]Menzies, Korea, 4837.

[132]Menzies, Korea, 4837.

[133]Watt, Anzac Day 2020: The 70th Anniversary of the Korean War, 3.

[134]Paul Hasluck, Ministerial Statement: International Affairs, House of Representatives, Debates, 23 March 1965, 230–238.

[135]Hasluck, Ministerial statement: International affairs, 235–236.

[136]Hasluck, Ministerial Statement: International Affairs, 236.

[137]Arthur Calwell, Ministerial Statement: International Affairs, 242.

[138]House of Representatives, Debates, 1 April 1965, 602.

[139]Parliamentary Library, 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook, 580.

[140]Australian War Memorial website, ‘Indonesian Confrontation, 1963–66’.

[141]Australian War Memorial, ‘Indonesian Confrontation, 1963–66’.

[142]John McEwen, ‘Further Australian Military Assistance for the Defence of Malaysia – Statement by the Acting Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. J. McEwen’, 3 February 1965; Edwards and Pemberton, Crises and Commitments,343.

[143]House of Representatives, Debates, 17 May 1962, 2519; House of Representatives, Debates, 7 August 1962.

[144]Parliamentary Library, 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook, 580.

[145]Athol Townley (Minister for Defence), ‘Australian Military Instructors for South Vietnam’, media release, 24 May 1962.

[146]Athol Townley (Minister for Defence), ‘Australian Army Training Team for Vietnam’, media release, 26 July 1962.

[147]Australian War Memorial website, ‘Australian Army Training Team Vietnam’, and ‘Vietnam War 1962–75’.

[148]Edwards and Pemberton, Crises and Commitments,249.

[149]Paul Hasluck, Ministerial Statement: International Affairs, House of Representatives, Debates, 23 March 1965, 230–238.

[150]Robert Menzies, Ministerial Statement: Vietnam, House of Representatives, Debates, 29 April 1965, 1060–1062.

[151]House of Representatives, Debates, 23 March 1965, 238; House of Representatives, Debates, 29 April 1965, 1062.

[152]Robert Menzies, Ministerial Statement: Vietnam, 1060.

[153]Arthur Calwell, Ministerial Statement: Vietnam, House of Representatives, Debates, 4 May 1965, 1102.

[154]. House of Representatives, Debates, 6 May 1965, 1288.

[155]Senate, Debates, 24–25 May 1965, 1211.

[156]Ian McNeill, To Long Tan: the Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1950–1966, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), 53.

[157]Frank Frost, Australia’s War in Vietnam, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 19.

[158]Peter Edwards, A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy During the Vietnam War 1965–1975, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1997), 27.

[159]Rendle Holten, Ministerial Statement: Tertiary Education in Australia, House of Representatives, Debates, 29 April 1965, 1062.

[160]Robert Hawke, Ministerial Statement: Middle East, House of Representatives, Debates, 21 August 1990, 1118.

[161]Hawke, Ministerial Statement: Middle East, 1118.

[162]John Hewson, Ministerial Statement: Middle East, House of Representatives, Debates, 21 August 1990, 1123.

[163]Edward (Ted) Mack, Ministerial Statement: Middle East, House of Representatives, Debates, 21 August 1990, 1194.

[164]Senate, Debates, 21 August 1990, 1857. The section of the motion to which the Democrats objected read: ‘supports the Government’s decision to send ships of the RAN [Royal Australian Navy] to the Middle East to assist by means of identification, contact, interrogation and warning-in enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq under Article 51 of the UN Charter’.

[165]Parliamentary Library, 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook, 580.

[166]Nicole Brangwin, Anzac Day 2020: 30th Anniversary of the Gulf War: a Quick Guide, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 14 April 2020).

[167]Robert Hawke, Ministerial Statement: Middle East, House of Representatives, Debates, 4 December 1990, 4322.

[168]House of Representatives, Debates, 4 December 1990, 4325.

[169]John Hewson, Ministerial Statement: Middle East, House of Representatives, Debates, 4 December 1990, 4325.

[170]House of Representatives, Debates, 5 December 1990, 4435.

[171]Senate, Debates, 4 December 1990, 4938.

[172]United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 678 (1990)’, 29 November 1990.

[173]US Central Command website, ‘US Central Commission History’.

[174]Robert Hawke (Prime Minister), ‘Statement by the Prime Minister: The Gulf’, media release, 17 January 1991.

[175]Wallace Fife, Motion: Day and Hour of Next Sitting, House of Representatives, Debates, 21 January 1990, 1.

[176]Robert Hawke, Motion: Middle East, House of Representatives, Debates, 21 January 1991, 2.

[177]Hawke, Motion: Middle East, 2–3.

[178]John Hewson, Motion: Middle East, House of Representatives, Debates, 21 January 1991, 9.

[179]Edward Mack, Motion: Middle East, House of Representatives, Debates, 22 January 1991, 268. Ten ALP parliamentarians did not support the Gulf War. See Ian Bickerton and Michael Pearson, 43 Days: the Gulf War, (East Melbourne: ABC Books, 1991), 84; Editorial, ‘War Vote Earns Censure for ALP Parliamentarians’, Canberra Times, 12 February 1991, 6.

[180]Senate, Debates, 22 January 1991, 267. The Australian Democrats and the Greens WA senator did not support the motion. Three ALP senators spoke against the motion and abstained from the vote. Editorial, ‘War Vote Earns Censure for ALP Parliamentarians’, 6.

[181]Brangwin, Anzac Day 2020: 30th Anniversary of the Gulf War, 3.

[182]John Howard, ‘United States of America: Terrorist Attacks’, House of Representatives, Debates, 17 September 2001, 30739.

[183]Kim Beazley, ‘United States of America: Terrorist Attacks’, 30745.

[184]House of Representatives, Debates, 17 September 2001, 30800.

[185]Senate, ‘United States of America: Terrorist Attacks’, Debates, 17 September 2001, 27209.

[186]Bob Brown, ‘United States of America: Terrorist Attacks’, Senate, Debates, 17 September 2001, 27169; Natasha Stott Despoja, ‘United States of America: Terrorist Attacks’, Senate, Debates, 17 September 2001, 27164.

[187]Parliamentary Library, 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook , 580.

[188]John Howard (Prime Minister), ‘Application of ANZUS Treaty to Terrorist Attacks on the United States’, media release, 14 September 2001.

[189]John Howard (Prime Minister), ‘Press Conference: Parliament House: Australia’s Involvement in a US led Response, Defence, Leadership, APEC’, transcript, 4 October 2001.

[190]Nicole Brangwin, Australia’s Military Involvement in Afghanistan Since 2001: a Chronology, Background Note, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 16 July 2010), 1.

[191]Parliamentary Library, 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook, 462.

[192]Brangwin, Australia’s Military Involvement in Afghanistan, 2.

[193]Brangwin, 1.

[194]Brangwin, 2.

[195]Robert Hill, ‘Question without Notice: Afghanistan’, Senate, Debates, 18 August 2005, 72.

[196]Hill, ‘Question without Notice: Afghanistan’, 72.

[197]John Howard, ‘Ministerial Statements: Afghanistan’, House of Representatives, Debates, 9 August 2006, 83.

[198]Kim Beazley (Leader of the Opposition), ‘Ministerial Statements: Afghanistan’, Hansard, House of Representatives, 9 August 2006.

[199]John Howard (Prime Minister) and Robert Hill (Minister for Defence), ‘Press Conference: Troop Deployment to Afghanistan, Telstra, Rau Family’, transcript, 13 July 2005.

[200]Brangwin, Australia’s Military Involvement in Afghanistan, 2; 23.

[201]Nicole Brangwin, Background to the Afghanistan Withdrawal: a Quick Guide, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 26 August 2021), 10–11.

[202]Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) website, ‘2007 Federal Election Timetable’; Australian Parliament, ‘Procedural Information Bulletin’, no. 217, Senate, 15 October 2007.

[203]Julia Gillard, ‘Ministerial Statements: Afghanistan’, House of Representatives, Debates, 19 October 2010, 692.

[204]Gillard, ‘Ministerial Statements: Afghanistan’, 692.

[205]Stephen Smith, ‘Ministerial Statements: Afghanistan’, House of Representatives, Debates, 19 October 2010, 706.

[206]Tony Abbott, ‘Ministerial Statements: Afghanistan’, House of Representatives, Debates, 19 October 2010, 700.

[207]Parliamentary Library, 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook, 580.

[208]Parliamentary Library, 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook, 580.

[209]Parliamentary Library,43rd Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia 2011, 43rd Parliament, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 2011), 271

[210]Julia Gillard (Prime Minister) and Bob Brown (Australian Greens), Australian Greens, Labor Commit to Agreement for Stable Government, 2 September 2010; David Crowe, ‘Gillard in Historic Alliance with Greens’, Australian Financial Review, 2 September 2010, 1; 8.

[211]John Howard, ‘Ministerial Statements: Iraq’, House of Representatives, Debates, 4 February 2003, 10642.

[212]John Howard, ‘Motion: Iraq’, House of Representatives, Debates, 18 March 2003, 12505.

[213]House of Representatives, Debates, 4 February 2003, 10651.

[214]House of Representatives, Debates, 20 March 2003, 1619.

[215]Simon Crean, ‘Motion: Iraq’, House of Representatives, Debates, 18 March 2003, 12517.

[216]Australia, House of Representatives, ‘Iraq – Commitment to Coalition in the Gulf’, Votes and proceedings, HVP 83, 20 March 2003.

[217]Senate, Debates, 20 March 2003, 9819–9820, 9886–9888.

[218]Parliamentary Library, 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook, 580.

[219]RobertHill (Minister for Defence), ‘Forward Deployment of ADF Elements’, media release, 22January 2003.

[220]Department of Defence, The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2003), 11.

[221]John Howard (Prime Minister), ‘Address to the National Press Club, Canberra’, 13 March 2003.

[222]John Howard (Prime Minister), ‘Press Conference, Parliament House: Iraq’, transcript, 17 March 2010.

[223]Steve Bowman, Iraq: US Military Operations: Update, report for Congress, (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 31 March 2003), i.

[224]John Howard (Prime Minister), ‘Press Conference, Parliament House: Commencement of the Disarmament of Iraq’, transcript, 20 March 2010.

[225]Department of Defence, The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, 16.

[226]Tony Abbott, ‘Ministerial Statements: Iraq and Syria’, House of Representatives, Debates, 1 September 2014, 9147.

[227]Kevin Andrews, ‘Ministerial Statements: Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Operations in the Middle East,’ House of Representatives, Debates, 16 September 2015.

[228]Bill Shorten, ‘Ministerial Statements: Iraq and Syria’, House of Representatives, Debates, 1 September 2014, 9148.

[229]Christopher Pyne, ‘Ministerial Statements: Iraq and Syria: Reference to Federation Chamber’, House of Representatives, Debates, 1 September 2014, 9150.

[230]House of Representatives, ‘Federation Chamber: Statements: Iraq’, Debates, 3 September 2014, 9672–9712; House of Representatives, ‘Federation Chamber: Statements: Iraq’, 4 September 2014, 9848–9880; House of Representatives, ‘Federation Chamber: Ministerial Statements: Iraq’, 22 September 2014, 10125–10134.

[231]House of Representatives, ‘Matters of Public Importance: Syria’, Debates, 9 September 2015, 9640–9653.

[232]Parliamentary Library, 46th Parliament: Parliamentary Handbook, 581.

[233]Renee Westra, ‘Syria: Australian Military Operations’, research paper series, 2017–18, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 20 September 2017), 3.

[234]Tony Abbott (Prime Minister), ‘Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq’, media release, 14 August 2014.

[235]Australian Government, Defence Annual Report 2014–15, (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2015), 4.

[236]Tony Abbott (Prime Minister) and Kevin Andrews (Defence Minister), ‘Building Partner Capacity in Iraq’, media release, 3 March 2015

[237]Tony Abbott (Prime Minister), Julie Bishop (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Kevin Andrews (Minister for Defence) and Mark Binskin (Chief of the Defence Force), ‘The Syrian and Iraqi Humanitarian Crisis; Australia to Extend Air Operations Against Daesh into Syria’, media release, 9 September 2015; Tony Abbott (Prime Minister), Julie Bishop (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Kevin Andrews (Minister for Defence) and Mark Binskin (Chief of the Defence Force), ‘Joint Press Conference: Canberra, Syrian and Iraqi Humanitarian Crisis; Australia to Extend Air Operations Against Daesh into Syria’, transcript, 9 September 2015.